# AC

### Adv - Populism

#### News outlets with advocacies perpetuate the populist mindset

Fletcher ’19 [Richard Fletcher, 2019, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism | University of Oxford, “The Rise of Populism and the Consequences for News and Media Use”, <https://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2019/the-rise-of-populism-and-the-consequences-for-news-and-media-use/> ] SLHS-CL

Populist Attitudes and News Outlet Selection Our data also show that those with populist attitudes gravitate towards different news outlets, and thus have different news diets. If we take our cross-platform data (online use combined with offline use) from the UK as an example, we can see that some outlets are more widely used by those with populist attitudes than those without, and vice versa. People who hold populist views are significantly more likely to use ITV, the Mirror, the Express, and the Sun, but those without populist attitudes are more likely to rely on the FT, Channel 4, the Telegraph, the Times, the Guardian, and the BBC. Audiences for other brands – including the Mail and Sky – are roughly evenly split. This pattern reflects a preference for commercial TV and tabloid newspapers among those with populist attitudes. Those without, on the other hand, seem to prefer broadsheet newspaper brands and public service media. Some digital-born sites like HuffPost and BuzzFeed tend to have news audiences that are fairly evenly split. Other outlets however – particularly those we have previously referred to as alternative or partisan outlets – are often favoured by those with populist views, in addition to having audiences with a heavy left–right skew. It is also noticeable how populist preferences cut across left–right divides, highlighting new dimensions along which news audiences can be segmented. For example, those with populist attitudes exhibit a clear preference for both the right-leaning Sun and the left-leaning Mirror. Similarly, those without populist attitudes have a preference for both the Guardian and the Telegraph – two newspapers with very different editorial lines.

#### Opinionated news polarizes audiences, feeding off of mistrust

Fletcher ’19 [Richard Fletcher, 2019, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism | University of Oxford, “The Rise of Populism and the Consequences for News and Media Use”, <https://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2019/the-rise-of-populism-and-the-consequences-for-news-and-media-use/> ] SLHS-CL

The maps we have shown so far also contain partisan and alternative news websites – such as the Canary in the UK and Breitbart in the US. These outlets usually have very left- or right-leaning audiences, but as is clear from the maps, they often have very populist audiences as well. Breitbart has the most populist audience in our US dataset, and the Canary’s audience is also more likely to hold populist views. Sweden contains some extreme examples of this phenomenon. Outlets like Fria Tider are used by around 10% of the online population, and have audiences that are heavily skewed towards those that both self-identify on the right and hold populist views. These outlets are sometimes understood as anti-immigration, but are also critical of political elites and the criminal justice system (Nygaard 2019). Their tone and style of coverage is a clear departure from the norms that govern the established television and newspaper outlets in Sweden. In France and Italy, perhaps the most notable feature of the maps is that the most popular outlets also have a higher than average number of people with populist attitudes in their audience. These are typically commercial television channels, again highlighting the link between populist attitudes and seeing TV as the main source of news. We have not fully explored the links between populist attitudes and trust this year. But our data do show less of a trust gap between those with populist attitudes and those without populist attitudes in countries where the most popular news outlets have populist audiences. However, in countries where populist outlets are less prominent – often because public service media are dominant – populists are considerably less likely to think that they can trust most news most of the time. In short, people who do not find any news media that reflect their attitudes often trust all news media less.

#### The current news model perpetuates sensationalized news and the pattern is reverse causal

Harrison ’21 [Thomas F Harrison, Feb 5 2021, Courthouse News Service, “The Real Reason So Few People Trust the News Media”, <https://www.courthousenews.com/the-real-reason-so-few-people-trust-the-news-media/> ] SLHS-CL

And yet, while overall trust in journalism has risen from 32% to 40% since 2015, it’s still dramatically below its high-water mark of 72% in the post-Watergate era. Trust has been declining steadily for decades, and the real reasons have to do with economic and technological changes in the industry itself, not with a single controversial politician or fleeting partisan dispute. In journalism’s heyday, successful local newspapers — many cities had more than one — pumped healthy advertising revenue into in-depth coverage while the three major TV networks as well as radio stations were required by the FCC’s “Fairness Doctrine” to present a balance of differing viewpoints on controversial issues. Growing up with these media, the public had a fairly good sense of the differences between reporting, analysis and opinion. The first change to this model was talk radio, said Joy Mayer, a former journalism professor and director of Trusting News, a nonprofit dedicated to helping journalists improve their credibility. In 1987 the FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine and the following year Rush Limbaugh began his nationally syndicated radio show, combining news and opinion and blurring the lines between reporting and entertainment. His show was popular because, like Trump 30 years later, he struck a nerve with a large segment of the population whose attitudes were underrepresented. But his success encouraged others to imitate not only his views but also his formula, often showing a complete disregard for the objectivity model that was standard in the mainstream press. Then in January 1991 CNN scored a coup by being the only network able to broadcast from Iraq during the early hours of the Gulf War, attracting over a billion viewers worldwide and eclipsing the three major U.S. broadcast networks. Cable news became a viable new information source, one that often broadcast live (without editors to carefully analyze copy) and that had to fill many hours a day rather than a single half-hour broadcast. Five years later a competing cable network, Fox News, launched. Its top prime-time host was Bill O’Reilly, who boasted huge ratings but who brought to television Limbaugh’s model of blurring news, opinion and entertainment, making it harder for the public to distinguish which was which. And then the internet happened.

#### The line between news and opinion are destroyed, presenting mistrust

Harrison ’21 [Thomas F Harrison, Feb 5 2021, Courthouse News Service, “The Real Reason So Few People Trust the News Media”, <https://www.courthousenews.com/the-real-reason-so-few-people-trust-the-news-media/> ] SLHS-CL

Lehrman added, “Reporters missed the 2016 election result because they weren’t listening to middle America.” On the other hand, “people overestimate bias,” Mayer said. “Things that are balanced or in the middle can look biased if you expect them to be.” And complaints about “media bias” are often the result of the confusing nature of what’s presented, said Kirtley. “Who are ‘the media’? If you ask people, they often mention things that are really entertainment. They’ll confuse Fox news with Fox opinion.” Moran said that there is no longer a consensus as to what is news. “If I ask my 85-year-old grandmother what the news is, I’ll get one answer, and if I ask a student, I’ll get a completely different answer,” she said. In other words, the reason that many people believe that journalists are biased is that they have been led to misidentify high-profile entertainers, political commentators and analysts with an axe to grind as “journalists.”

#### Trust in institutions is the primary factor preventing populism

Davies ’18 [William Davies (sociologist and political economist. His latest book is This is Not Normal: The Collapse of Liberal Britain), Nov 29 2018, The Guardian “Why we stopped trusting elites”, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/nov/29/why-we-stopped-trusting-elites-the-new-populism> ] SLHS-CL

For hundreds of years, modern societies have depended on something that is so ubiquitous, so ordinary, that we scarcely ever stop to notice it: trust. The fact that millions of people are able to believe the same things about reality is a remarkable achievement, but one that is more fragile than is often recognised. At times when public institutions – including the media, government departments and professions – command widespread trust, we rarely question how they achieve this. And yet at the heart of successful liberal democracies lies a remarkable collective leap of faith: that when public officials, reporters, experts and politicians share a piece of information, they are presumed to be doing so in an honest fashionThe notion that public figures and professionals are basically trustworthy has been integral to the health of representative democracies. After all, the very core of liberal democracy is the idea that a small group of people – politicians – can represent millions of others. If this system is to work, there must be a basic modicum of trust that the small group will act on behalf of the much larger one, at least some of the time. As the past decade has made clear, nothing turns voters against liberalism more rapidly than the appearance of corruption: the suspicion, valid or otherwise, that politicians are exploiting their power for their own private interestThis isn’t just about politics. In fact, much of what we believe to be true about the world is actually taken on trust, via newspapers, experts, officials and broadcasters. While each of us sometimes witnesses events with our own eyes, there are plenty of apparently reasonable truths that we all accept without seeing. In order to believe that the economy has grown by 1%, or to find out about latest medical advances, we take various things on trust; we don’t automatically doubt the moral character of the researchers or reporters involved.

#### Widespread disillusionment is a crisis for democracy – declining faith in the liberal order is the underlying driver of populism and threatens multilateral governance – creating a more trustworthy democracy is key.

Lloyd 8/14 [Lindsay Lloyd is the Bradford M. Freeman Director of the Human Freedom Initiative at the George W. Bush Institute. Before joining IRI, Lindsay worked for several members and the leadership of the U.S. House of Representatives. He graduated from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. **“**Making Democracy Deliver for All Is the Antidote to the Dangers of Populism.” August 14 2020. <https://www.insidesources.com/making-democracy-deliver-for-all-is-the-antidote-to-the-dangers-of-populism/>**]**

Whether it’s President George W. Bush’s trio of “-isms” — nationalism, isolationism and protectionism — or Condoleezza Rice’s “four horsemen of the apocalypse” adding populism to the mix, we are seeing unprecedented challenges to democracies around the world. They affect old and established democracies like the United States and newer and more fragile systems like Hungary. In the U.S. case, our systems and institutions have been tested in recent years. In trade policy, the United States has shifted away from longstanding inclinations toward free trade and multilateralism to a policy that prefers bilateralism and a more restrictive outlook on international commerce. While “isolationism” may be too strong a term, the White House has pursued some policies that have reduced American engagement in multilateral structures, such as the World Health Organization and the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade bloc. On the other hand, the United States did negotiate a lightly refreshed version of NAFTA, our trade agreement with Canada and Mexico. Nationalism is a recurrent theme throughout American history. American patriotism and a widespread belief in American exceptionalism are strikingly foreign to many other advanced democracies. While the “America First” terminology currently in vogue may harken back to an uglier version in the first half of the 20th century, in many ways it reflects longstanding historical currents in the United States. What is different about this moment is how populism has jolted American politics. It has also had a marked effect on many of our European allies’ democracies as well. There’s nothing inherently bad about populism, at least in theory. If populism refers to addressing the concerns of the ordinary people, versus those of the elites, then populism ought to be a priority for all elected officials and their parties. Many Americans have a genuine and growing sense that Washington has become largely disconnected from the problems they face. Automation, globalization and international trade are broadly supported among political leaders, but they have also led to job losses and dislocation. Immigration is seen by many as out of control and wrongly blamed for many ills in society. Tax laws are viewed as helping the 1 percent, while most struggle to get by. We face myriad social problems ranging from race to an opioid epidemic to substandard schools to a failing health care system. Few of us perceive any sign of progress. A genuine populism would logically be working to address these challenges and societal ills. But most Americans would question whether these issues are really a focus in Washington these days. In some of Europe’s most durable democracies, populists have gained a foothold, but not yet garnered enough strength to govern. The Alternative for Germany, France’s National Rally (formerly National Front), the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, and others share a similar populist, right-of-center orientation. These movements have seen considerable electoral success. Yet the more traditional parties have typically sought and succeeded in excluding them from government. Austria’s Freedom Party is a rare exception that has shared power in coalition governments. In the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, populist parties and movements have found more electoral success. Hungary’s FIDESZ and Poland’ Law and Justice are perhaps the best examples in the region, both having generated significant concern for their departures from democratic norms. In the Hungarian case, FIDESZ’s roots stem from student opposition to communism in its waning days. Led then as now by charismatic leader Viktor Orban, FIDESZ transitioned from liberalism in the 1990s to Christian Democracy in the 2000s, as Hungary joined the European Union. Of concern is the party’s continued trajectory away from mainstream conservatism to today’s more populist position. In its current iteration, FIDESZ has been broadly criticized for its policies and practices, and is widely viewed as moving Hungary away from democracy toward a hybrid or authoritarian government. In particular, it has quashed the independence and power of many of democratic institutions, including the press, local government, universities and independent judiciary. Orban’s defenders argue that critical judgments are distorted and exaggerated, but in Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the World survey, Hungary dropped from being rated “free” to “partly free” in 2019. Populists are able to fill a vacuum when other parties and leaders fail to address legitimate concerns of the electorate. Part of Orban’s success is due to the failure of other political parties to address broad concerns and problems in Hungarian society. The danger in all of this is that voters will turn to available alternatives if traditional parties and leaders can’t make democracy deliver. That means making economies work for the broad middle. That means making school systems succeed. That means protecting the rights of minorities. That means listening to the cries for equal justice. I could continue with that list, but, in short, the answer to the dangers of populism is ensuring all people can realize the promises of democracy.

#### The rise of U.S. populism dooms effective liberal internationalism -- that makes the entire system more prone to erupt and escalates every major hotspot.

Lavin 17 [Frank Lavin is the Chairman of Export Now. He served in the White House, National Security Council, State Department, and Commerce Department during the Reagan, Bush (41) and Bush (43) Administrations. Things Fall Apart: Populism and Foreign Policy. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. October 20, 2017. <https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2017/10/20/things-fall-apart-populism-and-foreign-policy>]

Trump does indeed have guiding principles, but they are process principles and not the substantive principles that we are used to seeing in a president. What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign. Indeed, Trump abjured several of the policies that have guided Republican campaigns of the modern era: entitlement reform, trade agreements, and international leadership. A long-time supporter of both Bill and Hillary Clinton, President Trump’s political success was drawn not from conservatism nor an intellectual architecture—though he has some conservative impulses—but from political populism. His worldview in many ways is an extension of that belief. What is Populism? This populism has four characteristics. First, it is grievance-based. It focuses on problems rather than solutions. This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition, since constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives. Indeed, as a candidate, Trump avoided articulating a positive vision regarding even central pillars of his campaign such as health care. Notably, Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration. Equally noteworthy, they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis. The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent from his discussions: What is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations? Second, the populist must establish emotional connectivity with the audience. Trump tends to evaluate people largely based on how they connect with him. The rally format suits him well; he loves the audience and the audience loves him. There are no questions and answers, nor any discussion, nor does there have to be new information, but there is plenty of emotional connectivity. Importantly, this emotional connectivity has little to do with economic class, a point that can befuddle Trump’s domestic political opponents, who underestimate his working-class appeal on the basis that he personally has little in common with them or that his policies supposedly would not help them. To a populist, the first point is broadly irrelevant and the second point is highly debatable. Might many a construction worker welcome a construction boom, and many a restaurant worker welcome an expansion of the business, if it meant job security and a larger paycheck, even if it would create disproportionate returns to the construction company and restaurant owner? For many working men and women, a growth in inequality is not inherently troubling. Thomas Piketty might be right, but it might not matter to most Americans if returns to capital outpace returns to labor. In addition, when establishment elites mock Trump, from his grammar to his boorishness, a portion of non-elites see this as condescension. Third, populism is exculpatory: Every problem the United States faces was caused by others and the target audience is blameless. So if a company wanted to relocate some activity to Mexico, it must have been to exploit wage differences. No discussion as to whether wage increases at the U.S. facility have outpaced productivity increases. No discussion as to whether union rules impede flexibility and productivity. No discussion of the fact that Mexico might be a better production platform because it has more free trade agreements. Management is to blame, with Mexico in connivance. This is frequently expressed in themes of anti-establishment or alienation, which can have a corrosive effect when anchored in grievances. Fourth, policy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs. Cost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself. As such, populists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall on the U.S. border with Mexico since it will be, by self-declaration, cost free. To be fair, others in public life exhibit some of these elements. President Obama’s healthcare plan was historically grandiose in scope, cost and complexity, yet it was ballyhooed to save money. Similarly, Obama’s eight-year effort to reduce U.S. commitments to NATO was to have no costs in terms of force projection, alliance cohesion, or deterrence. And, Obama was the only President in the modern era to have run against trade as a candidate, an approach Trump followed. What Went Wrong? How could the bipartisan consensus on U.S. international leadership fade so quickly, particularly at a moment when the combination of market economics and alliances of democracies had resulted in perhaps the most prosperous and most liberal moment in human history? There are four contributors to the rise of populism: societal transformation, grievance economics, international leadership, and elite limitations. First, societal transformation – meaning both globalization and automation— has two profound socio-political effects. It produces an extraordinary degree of prosperity; and it carries with it a distribution effect. The bell curve of income distribution does not shift as much as it elongates. Few people are worse off, but many people are not better off. There is not necessarily the creation of a large number of winners and losers, but there is certainly the perception people getting left behind. Trump understands the message: The globalization club is having a party, and you are not invited. Silicon Valley is drinking champagne and your role is to pick the grapes. These trends also feed into the narrative of alienation because it decreases people’s control over their lives even as their overall prosperity increases. Globalization and automation have created economic anxiety in electorates around the world, and not just among steelworkers and coal miners. Realtors, bank tellers, school teachers, and cab drivers are all seeing competitive pressure and the prospect of job elimination. To many Americans, comparative advantage and creative destruction create a more prosperous society, but accompanying it is job insecurity. David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter might be right, but so what? Second, over several decades we have seen a shift from growth economics to grievance economics. This represents a break with the recovery policies that guided the leading economies through the 1950s and 1960s (and that economic rationalists such as Macron tilt toward today). In the current view, the primary purpose of economic policy is not to foment prosperity, but to redress grievances. Indeed, regardless of absolute improvements in well-being, reducing economic inequality is deemed to be a basis for policy. The premise of growth economics is that a system is fundamentally fair, so the main challenge is how fast we can go. The premise of grievance economics is that the system is fundamentally unfair, so going faster merely exacerbates the unfairness. This cult of inequality incentivizes interest-group politics and rent-seeking, leading to slower growth. If you focus on growth policies, you get growth. If you focus on grievance policies, you get grievances. A third cause is the shift in the U.S. international posture. We have seen a growing fatigue in the United States over the cost of international leadership. The U.S. entered the post-Cold War era with the institutions and the cohesion of the Cold War era largely intact, even though the end of the Soviet Union removed what political scientists term a “negative integrator.” Now we are deep into the post-post-Cold War era, with faded cohesion and institutions. For the first time since Harding and Coolidge we have two presidents in a row who have no international military or policy pedigree. Beyond the direct costs of international leadership in defense budgets and personnel, Americans seem more sensitive to the indirect costs of public opinion and anti-Americanism. Relationships can be expensive. Friendships can be complicated. If there is no immediate threat, and if no one likes us anyhow, then what is the point of foreign policy? To sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late. Do you deter or do you react? Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error and the cost of action without a consensus. “Left of Boom,” the British call it. Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach. President Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late, such as responding after-the-fact to the Chinese build-out in the South China Sea, not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections, and perhaps in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS, Obama was more than a minute late. President Bush’s instinct was to be a minute early, foolishly so to his critics. Presidents have spent some 75 years since Pearl Harbor trying to be a minute early, with all the costs and mistakes that entailed, yet now we have two presidents in a row who believe we are better off being a minute late. Finally, the appeal of populism has been driven by their perception of the limitations of the U.S. leadership class: insular, rigid, and sometimes simply mediocre. Additionally, over-engineered solutions and the appearance of being self-serving, if not corrupt, help the appeal of populism. Sometimes it comes from the declining marginal effectiveness of government programs as society becomes more affluent and complicated. Indeed, the Obama administration seemed to regularly play into the hands of populists, sometimes passively so, as with the refusal to challenge even the more exotic of the sanctuary city movement. Sometimes, it was by design as with the painstaking construction not to label Islamic terrorism as such. If responsible leaders appear to be playing favorites or not accurately describing a phenomenon, they abandon the issue to their opponents — a phenomenon Trump witnessed through his hesitation in characterizing the Charlottesville protests. If populists rely too heavily on emotional connectivity, which establishment politicians have any emotional connectivity? Does there exist an aspirant for President, other than Donald Trump, who can have a friendly discussion with a Walmart cashier? How many of the possible 2020 presidential candidates have worked in the “real” economy, working for an institution that needed to turn a profit? Sam Rayburn’s wish to Lyndon Johnson, after LBJ had related how bright was his brain trust, was that he wished one of them had run for county sheriff. Can we today wish that one of the 2020 presidential candidates will have run a diner, which would have required them to hire teenagers, train high school dropouts, deal with single parents, lay-off workers from failed projects and negotiate wages, all while paying taxes and dealing with various government agencies? Maybe this is why a restaurant worker might respect an owner, or even a New York real estate developer, but not a career politician. If the elites cannot maintain that connectivity, they give an opening to populists. Attaining political maturity contemporaneous with the Bush 43 invasion of Iraq, Obama was wary of American over-reach and committed to a foreign policy pullback. He embedded that withdrawal in a denial of American exceptionalism, a pillar of U.S foreign policy since Pearl Harbor. If you stop believing in yourself, it is difficult to ask others to believe in you. The rejection of America’s special role in the world helped set the stage for “Make America Great Again.” Was Barack Obama the ultimate Donald Trump enabler? There other contributing factors beyond the above four. The rise of identity politics probably played into Trump’s hands, as did the digital communications revolution. News clutter rewards pugnacity and sensationalism and allows for cocoons and even tribalism. It is also worth noting that Trump is a man of unusual presentation strengths, and he can effectively project personality. Simply put, Trump was an exemplary grievance candidate in a grievance year. Trump articulated a vision; Hillary Clinton did not. We are in a communications era. For Secretary Clinton, communications is a means to an end. For Trump it is an end. She believes in her in-box; He, in his out-box. Hillary campaigned as the functionary; Donald as the visionary. Is internationalism doomed? America is now in the middle of a twelve and possibly sixteen year reign of two presidents who challenge the Cold War view that America is better off with a leading international presence, with being a minute early. It is too expensive, argued President Obama, and it leads us into unwinnable conflicts, draining our reputation and our purse. It is too expensive, echoes President Trump, and foreigners abuse and cheat us. Obama argues for minimalism because the United States is a problem for the world, and Trump argues for minimalism because the world is a problem for the United States. Even as President, Trump is easy to underestimate. Appealingly so. Many critics derive amusement, even a sense of superiority, from his foibles. His factual errors and even spelling mistakes provide an opportunity for mockery, but the lazy epiphany of error-spotting is a poor substitute for a substantive rebuttal. And a significant portion of the criticism is either ad hominem or an over-reach, either of which helps Trump. Those who are serious about policy should look at the direction in which he is taking the country, rather than fixate on these errors. To be even-handed, if President Trump’s distinctive success in the public space was his astonishing 2016 victory, in 2008 the distinctive success of Senator Obama was his astonishing election. Obama wisely chose not to run on his government record but marshaled his formidable stage skills and personal charisma to direct criticism toward Hillary Clinton and John McCain. So if Trump’s foreign policy approach stems from his success as “Ranter-in-Chief,” does Obama’s approach stem from his success as “Charmer-in-Chief?” Radically different styles, but with policy similarities. The deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue for the near term. On any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures, to reduce international good-will and connectivity, to save money all around. Relationships can be expensive and even harmful – this is the seduction of the minimalist school. But there is a countervailing argument. The main argument against this minimalist approach will be events themselves. The minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer. At some point, history presents the bill. Only then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early. If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself. Worse than the expense and bother of having friends would be the expense and bother of not having friends.

#### American credibility is on the line---only consistent and clear commitments avoid nuclear great power war through expanding spheres of influence.

Grygiel and Mitchell 10 [Jakub Grygiel is associate professor of international relations at the Catholic University of America, Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and has a PhD from Princeton. A. Wess Mitchell is the President of the Center for European Policy Analysis. Mitchell holds a doctorate in political science from the Otto Suhr Institut für Politikwissenschaft at Freie Universität in Berlin, a master’s degree from the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. “Predators on the Frontier”. The American Interest. 2/12. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/12/predators-on-the-frontier/>]

Revisionist powers are on the move. ‎From eastern Ukraine and the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea, large rivals of the United States are modernizing their military forces, grabbing strategic real estate, and threatening vulnerable U.S. allies. Their goal is not just to assert hegemony over their neighborhoods but to rearrange the global security order as we have known it since the end of the Second World War. We first wrote about these emerging dynamics in 2010, and then in TAI in 2011. We argued three things. First, that revisionist powers were using a strategy of “probing”: a combination of assertive diplomacy and small but bold military actions to test the outer reaches of American power and in particular the resilience of frontier allies. Second, we argued that the small, exposed allies who were the targets of these probes were likely to respond by developing back-up options to U.S. security guarantees, whether through military self-help or accommodation. And third, we argued that that China and Russia were learning from one another’s probes in their respective regions, and that allies themselves were drawing conclusions about U.S. deterrence in their own neighborhood from how America handled similarly situated allies elsewhere. Five years later, as we argue in a new book released this month, these dynamics have intensified dramatically. Revisionist powers are indeed probing the United States, but their methods have become bolder, more violent—and successful. Allies have grown more alert to this pressure, amid the steady whittling away of neighboring buffer zones, and have begun to pursue an array of self-help schemes ranging from arms build-ups to flirtations with the nearby revisionist power. It has become harder for the United States to isolate security crises to one region: Russia’s land-grabs in Eastern Europe provide both a model and distraction effect for China to accelerate its maritime claims in the South China Sea; Poland’s quest for U.S. strategic reassurance unnerves and spurs allies in the Persian Gulf and Western Pacific. By degrees, the world is entering the path to war. Not since the 1980s have the conditions been riper for a major international military crisis. Not since the 1930s has the world witnessed the emergence of multiple large, predatory states determined to revise the global order to their advantage—if necessary by force. At a minimum, the United States in coming years could face the pressure of managing several deteriorating regional security spirals; at a maximum, it could be confronted with a Great Power war against one, and possibly two or even three, nuclear-armed peer competitors. In either case, the U.S. military could face these scenarios without either the presumption of technological overmatch or favorable force ratios that it has enjoyed against its rivals for the past several decades. How should the United States respond to these dynamics? As our rivals grow more aggressive and our military edge narrows, we must look to other methods for waging and winning geopolitical competitions in the 21st century. The most readily available but underutilized tool at our disposal is alliances. America’s frontline allies offer a mechanism by which it can contain rivals—indeed, this was the original purpose for cultivating security linkages with small states in the world’s rimland regions to begin with. In coming years, the value of strategically placed allies near Eurasia’s large land powers will grow as our relative technological or numerical military strength shrinks. The time has come for the United States to develop a grand strategy for containing peer competitors centered on the creative use of frontline allies. It must do so now, before geopolitical competition intensifies. Predatory Peers Probing has been the strategy of choice for America’s modern rivals to challenge the existing order. Over the past few years, Russia, China, and, to a degree, Iran have sensed that the United States is retreating in their respective regions—whether out of choice, fatigue, weakness, or all three combined. But they are unsure of how much remaining strength the United States has, or of the solidity of its commitments to allies. Rather than risking direct war, they have employed low-intensity crises to test U.S. power in these regions. Like past revisionists, they have focused their probes on seemingly secondary interests of the leading power, either by humbling its weakest allies or seizing gray zones over which the United States is unlikely to fight. These probes test the United States on the outer rim of its influence, where the revisionist’s own interests are strongest while the U.S. is at its furthest commitments and therefore most vulnerable to defeat. Russia has launched a steady sequence of threatening military moves against vulnerable NATO allies and conducted limited offensives against former Soviet satellite states. China has sought out low-intensity diplomatic confrontations with small U.S. security clients, erected military no-go zones, and asserted claims over strategic waterways. When we wrote about this behavior in The American Interest in 2011, it was composed mainly of aggressive diplomacy or threatening but small military moves. But the probes of U.S. rivals are becoming bolder. Sensing a window of opportunity, in 2014 Russia upped the ante by invading Ukraine—the largest country in Eastern Europe—in a war that has so far cost 7,000 lives and brought 52,000 square kilometers of territory into the Russian sphere of influence. After years of using unmarked fishing trawlers to harass U.S. or allied naval vessels, China has begun to militarize its probes in the South China Sea, constructing seven artificial islands and claiming (and threatening to fight over) 1.8 million square kilometers of ocean. Iran has recently humiliated the United States by holding American naval vessels and broadcasting photos of surrendering U.S. sailors. In all cases, revisionist powers increased the stakes because they perceived their initial probes to have succeeded. Having achieved modest gains, they increased the intensity of their probes. The strategic significance of these latest probes for the United States is twofold. First, they have substantially increased the military pressure on frontline allies. The presence of a buffer zone of some sort, whether land or sea, between allies like Poland or Japan and neighboring revisionist powers, helped to reduce the odds of sustained contact and confrontation between allied and rival militaries. By successfully encroaching on or invading these middle spaces, revisionists have advanced the zone of contest closer to the territory of U.S. allies, increasing the potential for a deliberate or accidental military clash. Second, the latest probes have significantly raised the overall pressure on the United States. As long as Russia’s military adventures were restricted to its own southern periphery, America could afford to shift resources to the Pacific without worrying much about the consequences in Europe—an important consideration given the Pentagon’s jettisoning of the goal to be able to fight a two-front war. With both Ukraine and the South China Sea at play (and with a chaotic Middle East, where another rival, Iran, advances its reach and influence), the United States no longer has the luxury of prioritizing one region over another; with two re-militarized frontiers at opposite ends of the globe, it must continually weigh trade-offs in scarce military resources between geographic theaters. This disadvantage is not lost on America’s rivals, or its most exposed friends. Frontier Frenzy The intensification of probing has reverberated through the ranks of America’s frontline allies. In both Europe and Asia, the edges of the Western order are inhabited by historically vulnerable small or mid-sized states that over the past seven decades have relied on the United States for their existence. The similarities in the geopolitical position and strategic options of states like Estonia and Taiwan, or Poland and South Korea, are striking. For all of these states, survival depends above all on the sustainability of U.S. extended deterrence, in both its nuclear and conventional forms. This in turn rests on two foundations: the assumption among rivals and allies alike that the United States is physically able to fulfill its security obligations to even the smallest ally, and the assumption that it is politically willing to do so. Doubts about both have been growing for many years. Reductions in American defense spending are weakening the U.S. military capability to protect allies. Due to cuts introduced by the 2009 Budget Control Act, the U.S. Navy is smaller than at any point since before the First World War, the U.S. Army is smaller than at any point since before the Second World War and the U.S. Air Force has the lowest number of operational warplanes in its history. Nuclear force levels are static or declining, and the U.S. technological edge over rivals in important weapons types has diminished. The Pentagon in 2009 announced that for the first time since the Second World War it would jettison the goal of being able to conduct a two-front global war. At the same time that U.S. capabilities are decreasing, those of our rivals are increasing. Both Russia and China have undertaken large, multiyear military expansion and modernization programs and the technological gap between them and the United States is narrowing, particularly in key areas such as short-range missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, and fifth-generation fighter aircraft. Recent American statecraft has compounded the problem by weakening the belief in U.S. political will to defend allies. The early Obama Administration’s public questioning of the value of traditional alliances as “alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long-gone Cold War” shook allied confidence at the same time that its high-profile engagement with large rivals indicated a preference for big-power bargaining over the heads of small states. The U.S.-Russia “reset” seemed to many allies both transactional and freewheeling, and left a lasting impression of the suddenness with which U.S. priorities could shift from one Administration to the next. This undermined the predictability of patronage that is the sine qua non of effective deterrence for any Great Power. As the revisionists’ probes have become more assertive and U.S. credibility less firm, America’s frontier allies have started to reconsider their national security options. Five years ago, many frontline states expressed security concerns, began to seek greater military capabilities, or looked to offset risk by engaging diplomatically with revisionists. But for the most part, such behavior was muted and well within the bounds of existing alliance commitments. However, as probing has picked up pace, allied coping behavior has become more frantic. In Europe, Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania have initiated military spending increases. In Asia, littoral U.S. allies are engaged in a worrisome regional arms race. In both regions, the largest allies are considering offensive capabilities to create conventional deterrence. Their willingness to build up their indigenous military capabilities is overall a positive development, but it carries risks, too, spurring dynamics that were absent over the past decades. The danger is that, absent a consistent and credible U.S. overwatch, rearming allies engage in a chaotic acquisition strategy, poorly anchored in the larger alliance. Fearing abandonment, such states may end up detaching themselves from the alliance simply by pursuing independent security policies. There is also danger on the other side of the spectrum of possible responses by frontline allies. Contrary to the hopeful assumptions of offshore balancers, not all frontline allies are resisting. Some are choosing strategies of accommodation. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia in Europe and Thailand and Malaysia in Asia are all examples of nominal U.S. allies that are trying to avoid antagonizing the stronger predator. Worsening regional security dynamics create domestic political pressures to avoid confrontation with the nearby revisionist power. Full-fledged bandwagoning in the form of the establishment of new alliances is not yet visible, but hedging is. Seeds of Disorder The combination of intensifying probes and fragmenting alliances threatens to unravel important components of the stability of major regions and the wider international order. Allowed to continue on their current path, security dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific could lead to negative or even catastrophic outcomes for U.S. national security. One increasingly likely near-term scenario is a simmering, simultaneous security competition in major regions. In such a scenario, rivals continue probing allies and grabbing middle-zone territory while steering clear of war with the United States or its proxies; allies continue making half-measure preparations without becoming fully capable of managing their own security; and the United States continues feeding greater and greater resources into frontline regions without achieving reassurance, doggedly tested and put in doubt by the revisionists. Through a continued series of probes, the revisionist powers maintain the initiative while the United States and its allies play catch up. The result might be a gradual hardening of the U.S. security perimeter that never culminates in a Great Power war but generates many of the negative features of sustained security competition—arms races, proxy wars, and cyber and hybrid conflicts—that erode the bases of global economic growth. A second, graver possibility is war. Historically, a lengthy series of successful probes has often culminated in a military confrontation. One dangerous characteristic of today’s international landscape is that not one but two revisionists have now completed protracted sequences of probes that, from their perspective, have been successful. If the purpose of probing is to assess the top power’s strength, today’s probes could eventually convince either Russia, China, or both that the time is ripe for a more definitive contest. It is uncertain what the outcome would be. Force ratios in today’s two hotspots, the Baltic Sea and South China Sea, do not favor the United States. Both Russia and China possess significant anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities, with a ten-to-one Russian troop advantage in the Baltic and massive Chinese preponderance of coastal short-range missiles in the South China Sea. Moreover, both powers possess nuclear weapons and, in Russia’s case, a doctrine favoring their escalatory use for strategic effect. And even if the United States can maintain overwhelming military superiority in a dyadic contest, war is always the realm of chance and a source of destruction that threatens the stability of the existing international order. Having failed a series of probes, the United States could face the prospect of either a short, sharp war that culminates in nuclear attack or an economically costly protracted two-front conflict. Either outcome would definitely alter the U.S.-led international system as we know it. A third, long-term possibility is a gradual eviction of the United States from the rimland regions. This could occur either through a military defeat, as described above, or through the gradual hollowing out of U.S. regional alliances due to the erosion of deterrence and alliance defection—and therefore this scenario is not mutually exclusive of the previous two. For the United States, this would be geopolitically disastrous, involving a loss of position in the places where America must be present to prevent the risk of hemispheric isolation. Gaining a foothold in the Eurasian rimlands has been a major, if not the most important, goal of U.S. grand strategy for a century. It is through this presence that the United States is able to shape global politics and avoid the emergence of mortal threats to itself. Without such a presence, America’s largest rivals would be able to steadily aggrandize, building up enlarged spheres of influence, territory, and resources that would render them capable of sustained competition for global primacy. Unlike in the 20th century, current A2AD and nuclear technology would make a military reentry into these regions difficult if not impossible.

#### Strengthening alliances are the only way to solve global war – now is key

Zack **Beauchamp 18**, senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy and international relations, “How Trump is killing America’s alliances”, Vox, <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-g7>

How the weakening of American alliances could lead to a massive war There has never, in human history, been an era as peaceful as our own. This is a hard truth to appreciate, given the horrible violence ongoing in places like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, yet the evidence is quite clear. Take a look at this chart from the University of Oxford’s Max Roser. It tracks the number of years in a given time period in which “great powers” — meaning the militarily and economically powerful countries at that time — were at war with each other over the course of the past 500 years. The decline is unmistakable: [[TABLE OMITTED]] This data should give you some appreciation for how unique, and potentially precarious, our historical moment is. For more than 200 years, from 1500 to about 1750, major European powers like Britain and France and Spain were warring constantly. The frequency of conflict declined in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the wars that did break out — the Napoleonic conflicts, both world wars — were particularly devastating. The past 70 years without great power war, a period scholars term “the Long Peace,” is one of history’s most wonderful anomalies. The question then becomes: Why did it happen? And could Trump mucking around with a pillar of the global order, American alliances, put it in jeopardy? The answer to the second question, ominously, appears to be yes. There is significant evidence that strong American alliances — most notably the NATO alliance and US agreements to defend Japan and South Korea — have been instrumental in putting an end to great power war. “As this alliance system spreads and expands, it correlates with this dramatic decline, this unprecedented drop, in warfare,” says Michael Beckley, a professor of international relations at Tufts University. “It’s a really, really strong correlation.” A 2010 study by Rice’s Leeds and the University of Kentucky’s Jesse C. Johnson surveyed a large data set on alliances between 1816 and 2000. They found that countries in defensive alliances were 20 percent less likely to be involved in a conflict, on average, than countries that weren’t. This holds true even after you control for other factors that would affect the likelihood of war, like whether a country is a democracy or whether it has an ongoing dispute with a powerful neighbor. In a follow-up paper, Leeds and Johnson looked at the same data set to see whether certain kinds of alliances were more effective at protecting its members than others. Their conclusion is that alliances deter war best when their members are militarily powerful and when enemies take seriously the allies’ promise to fight together in the event of an attack. The core US alliances — NATO, Japan, and South Korea — fit these descriptors neatly. A third study finds evidence that alliances allow allies to restrain each other from going to war. Let’s say Canada wants to get involved in a conflict somewhere. Typically, it would discuss its plans with the United States first — and if America thinks it’s a bad idea, Canada might well listen to them. There’s strong statistical evidence that countries don’t even try to start some conflicts out of fear that an ally would disapprove. These three findings all suggest that NATO and America’s East Asian alliances very likely are playing a major role in preserving the Long Peace — which is why Trump’s habit of messing around with alliances is so dangerous. According to many Russia experts, Vladimir Putin’s deepest geostrategic goal is “breaking” NATO. The member states where anyone would expect him to test NATO’s commitment would be the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — small former Soviet republics that recently became NATO members. We can’t predict if and when a rival like Putin would conclude that America’s alliances seemed weak enough to try testing them. Hopefully, it never happens. But the more Trump attacks the foundations of America’s allies, the more likely things are to change. The absolute risk of a Russian invasion of a NATO state or a North Korean attack on the South is relatively low, but the consequences are so potentially catastrophic — nuclear war! — that it’s worth taking anything that increases the odds of such a conflict seriously. The crack-up of the West? The world order is a little like a game of Jenga. In the game, there are lots of small blocks that interlock to form a stable tower. Each player has to remove a block without toppling the tower. But each time you take out a block, the whole thing gets a bit less stable. Take out enough blocks and it will collapse. The international order works in kind of the same way. There are lots of different interlocking parts — the spread of democracy, American alliances, nuclear deterrence, and the like — that work together to keep the global peace. But take out one block and the other ones might not be strong enough to keep things together on their own. At the end of the Cold War, British and French leaders worried that the passing of the old order might prove destabilizing. In a January 1990 meeting, French President François Mitterrand told British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he feared a united Germany could seize control of even more territory than Hitler. Some experts feared that in the absence of the external Soviet threat, Western European powers might go back to waging war with each other. Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I. But if American alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up. America’s partners aren’t stupid. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. The worst-case scenarios for a collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries or any combination of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And indeed, in the short run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next president after Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again. But the truth is that there’s just no way to know. When a fundamental force for world peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will hold up. Nothing like this — the leader of the world’s hegemon rounding on its most important allies — has ever happened before. What Donald Trump’s presidency has done, in effect, is start up another geopolitical Jenga game. Slowly but surely, he’s removing the blocks that undergird global security. It’s possible the global order survives Trump — but it’s just too early for us to say for sure. Given the stakes, it’s a game we’d rather not play.

#### The alternative is Chinese rise---weak American responses embolden aggression.

Choi 18—Ji Young Choi, associate professor in the Department of Politics and Government and affiliated professor in the International Studies Program and East Asian Studies Program at Ohio Wesleyan University (“Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Rise of China: Long Cycles, Power Transitions, and China's Ascent,” *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 42, Issue 1, January-March 2018, pages 61-84, Available through ProQuest)

I have explored in light of historical and theoretical perspectives whether China is a candidate to become a global hegemonic power. The next question I will address is whether the ascent of China will lead to a hegemonic war or not. As mentioned previously, historical and theoretical lessons reveal that a rising great power tends to challenge a system leader when the former's economic and other major capabilities come too close to those of the latter and the former is dissatisfied with the latter's leadership and the international rules it created. This means that the rise of China could produce intense hegemonic competition and even a global hegemonic war. The preventive motivation by an old declining power can cause a major war with a newly emerging power when it is combined with other variables (Levy 1987). While a preventive war by a system leader is historically rare, a newly emerging yet even relatively weak rising power at times challenges a much more powerful system leader, as in the case of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Schweller 1999). A historical lesson is that "incomplete catch-ups are inherently conflict-prone" (Thompson 2006, 19). This implies that even though it falls short of surpassing the system leader, the rise of a new great power can produce significant instability in the interstate system when it develops into a revisionist power. Moreover, the United States and China are deeply involved in major security issues in East Asia (including the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Taiwan issue, and the South China Sea disputes), and we cannot rule out the possibility that one of these regional conflicts will develop into a much bigger global war in which the two superpowers are entangled. According to Allison (2017), who studied sixteen historical cases in which a rising power confronted an existing power, a war between the United States and China is not unavoidable, but escaping it will require enormous efforts by both sides. Some Chinese scholars (Jia 2009; Wang and Zhu 2015), who emphasize the transformation of China's domestic politics and the pragmatism of Beijing's diplomacy, have a more or less optimistic view of the future of US-China relations. Yet my reading of the situation is that since 2009 there has been an increasing gap between this optimistic view and what has really happened. It is premature to conclude that China is a revisionist state, but in what follows I will suggest some important signs that show China has revisionist aims at least in the Asia Pacific and could develop into a revisionist power in the future.¶ Beijing has concentrated on economic modernization since the start of pro-market reforms in the late 1970s and made efforts to keep a low profile in international security issues for several decades. It followed Deng Xiaoping's doctrine: "hide one's capabilities, bide one's time, and seek the right opportunity." Since 2003, China's motto has been "Peaceful Rise" or "Peaceful Development," and Chinese leadership has emphasized that the rise of China would not threaten any other countries. Recently, however, Beijing has adopted increasingly assertive or even aggressive foreign policies in international security affairs. In particular, China has been adamant about territorial issues in the East and South China Seas and is increasingly considered as a severe threat by other nations in the Asia Pacific region. Since 2009, for example, Beijing has increased naval activities on a large scale in the area of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. In 2010, Beijing announced that just like Tibet and Taiwan, the South China Sea is considered a core national interest. We can identify drastic rhetorical changes as well. In 2010, China's foreign minister publicly stated, "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). In October 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping also used the words "struggle and achieve results," emphasizing the importance of China's territorial integrity (Waldron 2014, 166-167). Furthermore, China has constructed man-made islands in the South China Sea to seek "de facto control over the resource-rich waters and islets" claimed as well by its neighboring countries (Los Angeles Times 2015). As of now, China's strategy is to delay a direct military conflict with the United States as long as possible and use its economic and political prowess to pressure smaller neighbors to give up their territorial claims (Doran 2012). These new developments and rhetorical signals reflect significant changes in China's foreign policies and signify that China's peaceful rise seems to be over.¶ A rising great power's consistent and determined policies to increase military buildups can be read as one of the significant signs of the rising power's dissatisfaction with the existing order and its willingness to do battle if it is really necessary. In the words of Rapkin and Thompson (2003, 318), "arms buildups and arms races . . . reflect substantial dissatisfaction on the part of the challenger and an attempt to accelerate the pace of military catchup and the development of a relative power advantage." Werner and Kugler (1996) also posit that if an emerging challenger's military expenditures are increasing faster than those of a system leader, parity can be very dangerous to the international political order. China's GDP is currently around 60 percent of that of the United States, so parity has not been reached yet. China's military budget, however, has grown enormously for the past two decades (double-digit growth nearly every year), which is creating concerns among neighboring nations and a system leader, the United States. In addition to its air force, China's strengthening navy or sea power has been one of the main goals in its military modernization program. Beijing has invested large financial resources in constructing new naval vessels, submarines, and aircraft carriers (Economist 2012). Furthermore, in its new defense white paper in 2015, Beijing made clear a vision to expand the global role for its military, particularly its naval force, to protect its overseas economic and strategic interests (Tiezzi 2015).¶ Sea power has special importance for an emerging great power. As Mahan (1987 [1890]) explained cogently in one of his classic books on naval strategy, Great Britain was able to emerge as a new hegemonic power because of the superiority of its naval capacity and technology and its effective control of main international sealanes. Naval power has a special significance for China, a newly emerging power, as well as for both economic and strategic reasons. First, its economy's rapid growth requires external expansion to ensure raw materials and the foreign markets to sell its products. Therefore, naval power becomes crucial in protecting its overseas business interests and activities. Second, securing major sea-lanes becomes increasingly important as they will be crucial lifelines for the supply of energy, raw materials, and other essential goods should China become involved in a hegemonic war or any other major military conflict (Friedberg 2011). In light of this, it is understandable why China is so stubborn over territorial issues in the South China and East China Seas. In fact, history tells us that many rising powers invested in sea power to expand their global influence, and indeed all the global hegemons including Great Britain and the United States were predominant naval powers.¶ Another important aspect is that Beijing is beginning to voice its dissatisfaction with the existing international economic order and take actions that could potentially change this order. The Chinese economy has overall benefited from the post-World War II international liberal order, but the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have been dominated by the United States and its allies and China does not have much power or voice in these institutions. Both institutions are based in Washington, DC, and the United States has enjoyed the largest voting shares with its veto power. Along with other emerging economies, China has called for significant reforms, especially in the governing system of the IMF, but reform plans to give more power to China and other emerging economies have been delayed by the opposition of the US Congress (Choi 2013). In response to this, Beijing recently took the initiative to create new international financial institutions including the AIIB. At this moment, it is premature to say that these new institutions would be able to replace the Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, this new development can be read as a starting point for significant changes in global economic and financial governance that has been dominated by the United States since the end of World War II (Subacchi 2015).¶ China's historical legacies reinforce the view that China has a willingness to become a global hegemon. From the Ming dynasty in the late fourteenth century to the start of the first Opium War in 1839, China enjoyed its undisputed hegemonic position in East Asia. "Sino-centrism" that is related to this historical reality has long governed the mentality of Chinese people. According to this hierarchical world view, China, as the most advanced civilization, is at the center of East Asia and the world, and all China's neighbors are vassal states (Kang 2010). This mentality was openly revealed by the Chinese foreign minister's recent public statement that I quoted previously: "China is a big country . . . and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact" (Economist 2012). This view is related to Chinese people's ancient superiority complex that developed from the long history and rich cultural heritage of Chinese civilization (Jacques 2012). In a sense, China has always been a superpower regardless of its economic standing at least in most Chinese people's mind-set. The strong national or civilizational pride of Chinese people, however, was severely damaged by "the Century of Humiliation," a period between the first Opium War (1839) and the end of the Chinese Civil War (1949). During this period, China was encroached on by the West and invaded by Japan, experienced prolonged civil conflicts, and finally became a semicolony of Great Britain while its northern territory was occupied by Japan. China's economic modernization is viewed as a national project to lay an economic foundation to overcome this bitter experience of subjugation and shame and recover its traditional position and old glory (Choi 2015). Viewed from this perspective, economic modernization or the accumulation of wealth is not an ultimate objective of China. Rather, its final goal is to return to its traditional status by expanding its global political and military as well as economic influence. What it ultimately desires is recognition (Anerkennung), respect (Respekt), and status (Stellung). These are important concepts for constructivists who see ideational motives as the main driving forces behind interstate conflicts (Lebow 2008). This reveals that constructivist elements can be combined with long cycle and power transition theories in explaining the rise and fall of great powers, although further systematic studies on it are needed.¶ Considering all this, China has always been a territorial power rather than a trading state. China does not seem to be satisfied only with the global expansion of international trade and the conquest of foreign markets. It also wants to broaden its (particularly maritime) territories and spheres of influence to recover its traditional political status as the Middle Kingdom. As emphasized previously, the type or nature and goals or ideologies of a rising power matter. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (territorial powers) experienced rapid economic expansion and sought to expand their territories and influence in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, during this period Japan's goal was to create the Japanese empire in East Asia under the motto of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. On the other hand, democratized Germany and Japan (trading powers) that enjoyed a second economic expansion did not pursue the expansion of their territories and spheres of influence in the post-World War II era. Twentiethcentury history suggests that political regimes predicated upon nondemocratic or nonliberal values and cultures (for instance, Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan before the mid-twentieth century, and communism in the Soviet Union during the Cold War) can pose significant challenges to democratic and liberal regimes. The empirical studies of Lemke and Reed (1996) show that the democratic peace thesis can be used as a subset of power transition theory. According to their studies, states organized similarly to the dominant powers politically and economically (liberal democracy) are generally satisfied with the existing international rules and order and they tend to be status quo states. Another historical lesson is that economic interdependence alone cannot prevent a war for hegemony. Germany was one of the main trade partners of Great Britain before World War I (Friedberg 2011), and Japan was the number three importer of American products before its attack on Pearl Harbor (Keylor 2011). A relatively peaceful relationship or transition is possible when economic interdependence is supported by a solid democratic alliance between a rising great power and an existing or declining one.¶ Some scholars such as Ikenberry (2008) emphasize nuclear deterrence and the high costs of a nuclear war. Power transition theorists agree that the high costs of a nuclear war can constrain a war among great powers but do not view them as "a perfect deterrent" to war (Kugler and Zagare 1990; Tammen et al. 2000). The idea of nuclear deterrence is based upon the assumption of the rationality of actors (states): as long as the costs of a (nuclear) war are higher than its benefits, an actor (state) will not initiate the war. However, even some rationalists admit that certain actors (such as exceedingly ambitious risk-taking states) do not behave rationally and engage in unexpected military actions or pursue military overexpansion beyond its capacity (Glaser 2010). The state's behaviors are driven by its values, perceptions, and political ambitions as well as its rational calculations of costs and benefits. Especially, national pride, historical memories, and territorial disputes can make states behave emotionally. The possibility of a war between a democratic nation and a nondemocratic regime increases because they do not share the same values and beliefs and, therefore, the level of mistrust between them tends to be very high. China and the United States have enhanced their cooperation to address various global issues like global warming, international terrorism, energy issues, and global economic stability. But these issues are not strong enough to bring them together to overcome their mistrust that stems from their different values, beliefs, and perceptions (Friedberg 2011). What is more important is whether they can set mutually agreeable international rules on traditional security issues including territorial disputes.

### Advocacy

#### Thus the plan: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

### Framework – Util

#### The standard is maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain

#### 1] Existential threats outweigh – extinction eliminates the possibility for future generations

#### 2] Reject calc indicts, policy makers make informed decisions without needing to know an infinite amounts of data

#### 3] Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable and as such are the basis for values.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281]

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

### Underview

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all broken positions on the NDCA LD wiki under their name and school at least 1 hour before the round starts.

#### Violation: None for TFA State

#### Standards:

#### Academic integrity – without disclosure it’s impossible to check your citations to make sure a. they were done properly b. that the evidence is not misrepresented or miscut. If a teacher finds out a student plagiarized a paper, the student gets failed, similarly, you should lose for not having academic integrity so it’s an independent voter. Don’t let them make potential abuse claims a. I shouldn’t have to waste prep checking cites b. no way to prove abuse unless it is disclosed.

#### Accessibility – The wiki enables all schools to see the trends in case positions and have access to lots of evidence. Else, large schools with many flows and scouts would have a massive advantage over smaller schools who are exposed to less case positions due to having less people since they have more rounds and people. This screws over smaller programs and socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. Accessibility controls the strongest internal link to fairness – If only the wealthy big schools have access to argumentative trends then they will win all the rounds.

#### Research – disclosure incentivizes better research.

Nails 13Jacob “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure)” NSD Update October 10th 2013 http://nsdupdate.com/2013/10/10/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/

I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First**, disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature.** The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory, the increased quality of information could trade off with quantity. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of disclosure is that it motivates research. **Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it.** Likewise, debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and adovcacies employed by other debaters. The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, **if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago.** Lastly, and to my mind most significantly**, disclosure weeds out anti-educational arguments.** I have in mind the sort of theory spikes and underdeveloped analytics whose strategic value comes only from the fact that the time to think of and enunciate responses to them takes longer than the time spent making the arguments themselves**. If these arguments were made on a level playing field where each side had equal time to craft answers, they would seldom win rounds, which is a testimony to the real world applicability (or lack thereof) of such strategies. A model in which arguments have to withstand close scrutiny to win rounds creates incentive to find the best arguments on the topic rather than the shadiest.** Having transitioned from LD to policy where disclosure is more universal, I can say that debates are more substantive, developed, and responsive when both sides know what they’re getting into prior to the round.

K2 education.

#### Clash - With positions disclosed, I can prep out responses, leading to debates with more engagement since both debaters know the other’s positions. And both debaters will have evidence on both sides of each issue. Else, debaters will make strategies to avoid cash. Clash has the strongest internal link to fairness – only unique form of education to debate – all other forms can be received out of round.

#### DTD – cant DTA, norm setting

#### CI – Brightline is CI, judge intervention and race to the bottom

#### No RVI – chilling effect

#### 1] 1AR theory – the aff gets it because otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive. It’s drop the debater since the 1AR doesn’t have enough time to prove abuse and still adequately cover substance. No RVIs since the neg can dump on the shell for 6 minutes and make the 2AR impossible. 1ar theory before neg theory – the neg can win their shell and beat back the aff shell in the long 2nr but its impossible for the 2ar to beat back their shell and extend mine since its too short and I need to sit on one arg – means you cant determine the truth of their shell.

#### 2] Nothing in the 1AC triggers presumption or permissibility – but they should affirm:

#### A] 1ar time skew means 1ar has to answer 7 minutes of offense and hedge against a 6 minute 2nr collapse, if the neg can’t prove the aff false you should presume its true

#### B] You presume statements true unless proven false – If I tell you my name is chris you believe me unless you have evidence to the contrary

#### C] Presuming statements are false is impossible – we can’t operate in the world if we can’t trust anything we hear

#### 3] PICs affirm, I’m affirming the general truth of the resolution, thus subsets of the plan don’t negate

### Definitions

#### Next, “objective” means “not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts” according to Oxford Languages (https://www.google.com/search?q=objective+definition&sxsrf=APq-WBuHl0XyiRsN7xugy1WY0nQPX1aldg%3A1645738280458&ei=KPkXYpO\_G6OyqtsPsPW2kAk&oq=objective+defin&gs\_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAEYADINCAAQsQMQkQIQRhD5ATIFCAAQkQIyBQgAEJECMgUIABCRAjIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgUIABCABDoHCAAQRxCwAzoSCAAQgAQQhwIQsQMQFBBGEPkBOggIABCABBCxAzoLCAAQgAQQsQMQgwFKBAhBGABKBAhGGABQiAFY9wVgvQ1oAXABeACAAZoBiAG-BJIBAzEuNJgBAKABAcgBCMABAQ&sclient=gws-wiz)