# 1NC

### New Affs Bad

#### Interpretation—the aff must disclose the plan text, framework, and advantage areas 30 minutes before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—they didn’t

#### Vote neg for prep and clash—two internal links—a) neg prep—4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions apply and cut and research their applications to the affirmative b) aff quality—plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose—this will answer the 1ar’s claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there’s still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can’t check against the broader literature.

#### Voters:

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.

#### Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance,

#### b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) baiting – incentivizes good debaters to be abusive, bait theory, then collapse to the 1AR RVI, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

#### Evaluate T before 1AR theory – a) norms – we only have a couple months to set T norms but can set 1AR theory norms anytime,

#### b) magnitude – T affects a larger portion of the debate since the aff advocacy determines every speech after it

### T Generic – Appropriation

#### Interpretation: The aff may not defend a subset of appropriation of outer space by private entities being unjust.

#### **Violation – they only defend \_\_\_\_**

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Limits – they can pick any form of appropriation from internet satellites to asteroid mining to moon basing to Mars colonization and there’s no universal disad since they’re all different and require different uses space – explodes neg prep and leads to random appropriation of the week affs which makes cutting stable neg links impossible.

#### 2] TVA – read the aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff.

### T Appropriation – Space Tourism

#### Interp: Appropriation is defined as exclusive and permanent.

Taylor 19 (Kurt Taylor, [Writer for the Emory international law review] 2019, “Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States SPACE Act of 2015 Is Illegal“, Emory Law, accessed: 1-23-2022, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr) ajs

The broad text in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty provides an ordinary and unambiguous meaning free from absurdity.90 The language of Article II is short: “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”91 At first glance, the language clearly intends to bar ownership over all aspects of outer space, with the only wrinkle of confusion being the meaning of “national appropriation.” Stephen Gorove, a space law expert, has suggested it is better to first define appropriation before determining how “national” modifies the term.92 Broadly, appropriation is “the taking of property for one’s own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence.”93 In this regard, appropriation is of a “national” character when it is by an entity under the sovereignty of the state from which they come or represent.94 Even though Article II uses the “national” language, its ordinary meaning is most closely linked to all sovereignties and the individuals and entities that attain property rights under the authority of a sovereign.

#### 2] Violation – no

#### Limits – they expand the topic to anything that can take up a specially temporal spot – any form of rocket, launches, and individual weapons, asats, shuttles, all become topical and topic DAs like innovation, mining good, deterrence, lashout args assumes permanence – we lose any link magnitude since the plan only effects a small amount of time.

### CP

#### New cp

#### CP text: The appropriation of outer space for the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence by private entities is unjust except for military purposes.

#### US should prepare nukes in conjunction with private companies, ie starlink partnerships, to combat aliens.

#### Space militarism are k2 to deter extraterrestrial civilizations that will pre-emptively wipe us out us if we appear unable to defend ourselves —extinction

**Korhonen 2013** (Janne M. Korhonen, post-doctoral Researcher at Aalto University, DF Research Wing, Betonimiehenkuja Finland. PhD in Organization Science and Masters in Science (Tech and mechanical engineering) from Aalto University. “MAD with aliens? Interstellar deterrence and its implications” in *Acta Astronautica* [Volume 86](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00945765/86/supp/C), May–June 2013, Pages 201-210)DR 18

On the other hand, **many rationales for hostility have** also **been suggested**. The non-exhaustive list includes an eagerness to consume our resources, an ideological requirement, a desire to be the sole galactic power, indifference to our existence, **or a combination of the above** [10]. Science fiction authors in particular have argued that **ETIs could see other species as threats to their own well-being, and that paranoid or xenophobic ETIs might simply want to preventively destroy other species before they can pose a**n intentional or unintentional **threat** to them [4]. Perhaps the most chilling part of **this** rationale is that it **does not require any particular malice from the part of the ETIs: a simple ‘‘rational’’ if possibly paranoid analysis might** suffice to seal our execution warrant**. After all, if interstellar travel proves to be feasible, there is always the non-zero probability of humanity harming ETIs.**

**Prior research has analyzed the general logic and some specific scenarios of interstellar conflict and the risks of contacting possible ETIs** (e.g. [7–12]), usually concluding that the practical problems of attacks, invasions and resource grabs would make the possibility of realistic gains dubious at best. **However**, to my knowledge, **no prior work has analyzed the specific case of** preventive first strike **aimed at eliminating competitors**. Although acknowledging the limitations of generalizing from human experience, I believe that **the lessons learned from the Cold War—**where two fundamentally antagonistic civilizations were able to destroy one another **and even had a rationale for** launching a disarming first strike**—**can be fruitfully extended to the specifics of interstellar conflict**.** In short, this paper tries to roughly estimate the risks of what is perhaps the most disquieting scenario: that an ETI would, upon detecting advanced civilization on Earth, launches an unprovoked preventive attack aimed at destroying or severely damaging the humanity.

While this analysis does not cover irrational attacks (e.g. ones motivated by ideology, such as xenophobia), carelessness or accidents, the findings do suggest that the possibility of retaliation would seem to make preventive attacks a flawed strategy, and that **interstellar civilizations would be disinclined to knowingly initiate hostilities against each other in general – even under the worst case assumption that communicating peaceful intentions and working towards win–win solutions across interstellar distances proves to be impossible**. In fact, even irrationally aggressive civilizations can probably be deterred**.** The paper should help to shape the discussion of risks of ETI contact and the findings should help ameliorate one of the objections expressed against METI efforts, namely, that METI would broadcast our location to a possibly hostile ETI (for an overview of the discussion, see e.g. [12,13]). However, the study also advises caution in the design of interstellar exploratory missions.

#### Only that’s sufficient to repel an alien invasion

**Patel 16** (Neel V. Patel science and tech writer at Inverse. MA in journalism in New York University’s master’s program Science, Health, and Environmental Reporting Program in NYU. BS in Biological science from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. **Internally citing aeronautics engineer**[**Bong Wie**](http://www.aere.iastate.edu/department-overview/bong-wie/) of Iowa State University, one of the only 30 people to receive proposals for funding under the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts for the HAIV proposal discussed here. He is the Vance Coffman Endowed Chair Professor of Aerospace Engineering here at Iowa State University, and is the founding director of the Asteroid Deflection Research Center. He is the author of AIAA textbook  Space Vehicle Dynamics and Control (2nd edition, 2008). He has published 150 technical papers and 60 peer-reviewed   journal articles,  and  holds three U.S. patents on control-moment-gyro (CMG) steering logic. Ph.D. and M.S. in Aeronautics and Astronautics from Stanford. In 2006, the AIAA presented Dr. Wie with the Mechanics and Control of Flight Award for his innovative research on advanced control of complex spacecraft. How Earth Can Beat Invading Aliens", Inverse, [https://www.inverse.com/article/17242-how-earth-can-beat-invading-aliens June 21](https://www.inverse.com/article/17242-how-earth-can-beat-invading-aliens%20June%2021), 2016)DR 18

**Defending Earth from alien invaders will require a lot more than some outposts** and a Hemsworth brother. Still, even that’s better than what we’ve got. As it stands, we possess neither of the two things we’d need to repel an extraterrestrial attack: a system to find and assess alien threats and a means to destroy incoming ships. We’re way closer on the former than the latter.

Believe it or not, **planetary defense is a real part of space research and exploration** — albeit in terms of protecting the planet against natural threats, like asteroids, comets, surprise solar flares, etc. For NASA, other space agencies around the world, and private companies, [planetary defense](https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense/) is basically limited to a discussion of asteroid impact avoidance and deflection, and **the development of technologies that allow us to track near-Earth objects that might pose a threat should their travel path ever line up with ours**. **To that end, NASA has been bolstering its efforts to improve instruments designed to track such rocks** zipping through the solar system — most notably through the recent opening of the [Planetary Defense Coordination Office](https://www.inverse.com/article/10131-nasa-formalizes-asteroid-defense-plan), to better study and characterize different near-Earth asteroids and comets and predict their orbits around the sun in relation to Earth.

**Tracking technologies**, **like the**[**Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer**](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/WISE/main/index.html)**space telescope, would let us know if an alien battalion were en route to Earth long before it reached the planet** — provided the aliens were in a pretty big ship and traveling slow enough to give us time to parse the patterns. The issue with WISE, from a strategic defense perspective, is just how easy it would be for aliens to destroy. **It is a scientific instrument and, as such, not designed to be combat ready.**

Unfortunately, **we still have no actual way of engaging with an object that’s on a crash course for a pale blue dot. Under the asteroid-focused planetary defense model, NASA is actually supporting a few off-the-wall projects with a bit of R&D funding, such as**[**the gravity tractor**](https://www.inverse.com/article/13842-here-s-how-to-build-a-gravity-tractor-save-mankind-from-an-asteroid-apocalypse)**.** **But this isn’t technology we could use to actually defend ourselves against creatures with superior ships.** The only technology we have that can really do that is nuclear bombs.

Whether **our lives are threatened by** an asteroid or **extraterrestrials**, bombs are likely the best answer we’ve got. **If it comes down to saving humanity, you better believe** we’ll be launching nukes straight up.

Of course, this is easier said than done. The problem, as the aforementioned movies each discussed, is that you can’t simply launch a nuke or 12 straight into an asteroid. They’ll barely make a dent into the rock, and will hardly affect the trajectory of the damn thing. When it comes to alien invasion**, we might have better luck, since a spaceship would need to**[**slow down upon approaching the planet to ensure its safety**](https://www.inverse.com/article/15982-interstellar-space-travel-won-t-be-successful-without-a-better-braking-system). **At deceased speeds and with a structure that would presumably facilitate interstellar travel (i.e. made to be lightweight with a relatively hollow interior), an alien ship would be a lot more vulnerable to damage by nuclear weapons.**

**Unfortunately, if an alien civilization is capable of waging wars light-years away from its home,** it’s probably already found a way to mitigate **or even** totally offset damage by a conventional bombs. **We’d have to find a way to crack our way in and blow the ship up from the inside.**

**Meet the Hypervelocity Asteroid Intercept Vehicle, or HAIV**: **a seemingly conventional spacecraft carrying a nuclear explosive device capable of blowing an object up from the inside out**. **HAIV is basically two main components — a “kinetic impactor” that bores a hole into the object and creates a hollow path behind it, and an encasement for the nuke.**

**The genius behind HAIV, aeronautics engineer**[**Bong Wie**](http://www.aere.iastate.edu/department-overview/bong-wie/) of Iowa State University, **conceived of HAIV as a potential way to defend Earth** against asteroid threats. Wie, who is also director the university’s Asteroid Deflection Research Center, says his projectile, which would be between 1000 to 2000 kilograms in mass and move at about 5 kilometers per second, contains enough kinetic energy to create a hole or crater about 10 meters deep and 20 meters wide in an oncoming asteroid. **The nuclear device would go into that crater behind the spacecraft and,** boom goes the dynamite.

If we have at least a 5-year warning time, Wie says, mankind will be able to prep a HAIV mission. **A nuclear explosion will then occur in space far outside the lunar distance. “Less than 0.1% of resulting fragments would enter Earth’s atmosphere.”**

The reason we would need to design and build HAIV from scratch after we know an asteroid is on its way is because you need to cater the whole thing to destroy the asteroid as optimally as possible. For an asteroid with a diameter of 300 meters, the best kind of nuclear device would probably weigh about 1000 kilograms. A larger meteor will need something bigger; smaller rocks could be crushed with smaller bombs.

**Wie and his colleagues were previously awarded two phases of funding through the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts (NIAC) program**. “This concept is now further being investigated by a team of researchers from NASA and the national defense laboratories for a possible flight demonstration in the near future,” he says. “**However, all previous studies of HAIV were based on conceptual and computational research. No experimental validation or testing of the HAIV concept has been performed yet.”**

Wie has never explained whether the HAIV might be a useful system to protect us from aliens, but he has said that the use of nuclear devices is the most cost-effective option for mitigating impact threat.

### Consult NATO CP

#### CP: States should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over a proposal to declare appropriation of outer space for the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence by private entities is unjust. States will support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation.

\*\*modify for aff plan\*\*

#### NATO says yes – appropriation is bad, and NATO is uniquely defensive and cooperative with I-Law.

Peace In Space 21 Peace In Space. March 25, 2021. “NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: no weapons In space” [NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg: no weapons In space – Peace In Space](https://peaceinspace.com/2019/12/nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-no-weapons-in-space/) Accessed 12-9 // gord0

In a November 20 speech to [NATO ministers in Brussels](https://peaceinspace.com/2019/12/10/nato-foreign-ministers-officially-recognise-space-as-an-operational-domain/), NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that while the organization’s security presence in space is vital, “NATO has no intention to put weapons in space — we are a defensive alliance.”

NATO members will continue to use space for observation and surveillance purposes, but will remain fully in line with international law, he said. “This approach can allow NATO planners to make requests for allies to provide capabilities and services, such as hours of satellite communications.”

“We are proud of NATO’s historic decision to recognise space as an operational domain, alongside air, land, sea and cyber. Space is part of our daily lives. It is also essential to the Alliance’s deterrence and defence, from navigation to intelligence to missile detection.” — [NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_49999.htm)

Observation and surveillance purposes

Stoltenberg further explained that NATO’s coordinated approach involves three strategic issues: relations with Russia, the rise of China, and arms control. “Making space an operational domain will help us ensure that all aspects are taken into account to ensure the success of our missions.”

NATO members will continue to use space for observation and surveillance purposes, but will remain “fully in line with international law,” he added. This approach “can allow NATO planners to make requests for allies to provide capabilities and services, such as hours of satellite communications.”

Stoltenberg noted that NATO keeps at the leading edge of technology with a “one billion dollar investment in eyes in the sky, AWACS surveillance aircraft. This modernization will ensure the fleet’s service to 2035 and provide the best possible intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.”

#### Consultation over space strengthens NATO legitimacy and operations – communication, positioning, missile warning and counter space ops

Louisa Remuss 10 Nina-Louisa Remuss holds a M. Litt, in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews and a B.A. in European Studies from the University of Maastricht. October, 2010. “NATO and Space: Why is Space Relevant for NATO?” [NATO and Space: Why is Space Relevant for NATO? (ethz.ch)](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/124749/ESPI_Perspectives_40.pdf) Page 2-3 Accessed 12-9 // gord0

The increasing reliance on space applications and the emerging global challenges and threats, place new demands on space capabilities.5 Given today’s multi-polar world, security providers face a very different security and threat environment than during the Cold War. At the same time, during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed not to attack each other’s space assets, which provided for a certain degree of transparency given that both were the sole actors in space. Characterizing conflicts as fundamentally unpredictable, NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine stresses the added value of using technology. Accordingly, NATO’s operations are already dependent on space applications as NATO comes to rely on it for global situational awareness, decision superiority and precision engagement. In spite of NATO’s dependence on space operations, the Alliance is still missing a holistic approach to the subject. Space applications can be understood as force multipliers or enablers. The following section will rely on the EU’s experiences and will give four examples of areas where this is the case: in external security missions, in damage and impact assessment during post-crisis management, in the fight against piracy and in providing internal security, i.e. against nontraditional threats such as terrorism, natural disasters etc. In External Security Missions European Union external security missions, such as the EU Military Crisis Management Operations EUFOR Chad / RCA (from French: Central African Republic) rely on satellites for secure communications between the Operations Headquarters (OHQ) and units deployed on the field, as well as on satellite imagery for mapping in support of their mission, especially considering the local absence of terrestrial communications infrastructure and the large dimensions of the theatre of operations. NATO is relying on space applications to support its ISAF operations in Afghanistan. These range from communications, position, navigation and timing, environmental sensing, missile warning, personnel recover and infrared remote sensing, to counter space operations. Space capabilities are however not fully integrated and utilised as a result of, first the lack of NATO strategy to space applications, second the resulting limited exposure of space capabilities prior to the deployment and third the limited number of personnel among the ISAF staff with space expertise.

#### NATO is a force multiplier – solves a slew of existential threats

Burns 18 Nicholas Burns 7-11-2018 “What America Gets Out of NATO” <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what-america-gets-out-of-nato.html> (former under-secretary of state and ambassador to NATO and teaches diplomacy and international relations at Harvard)//Elmer

None of this, of course, is likely to disturb Mr. Trump, who remains steadfast in his belief that whatever benefits the United States gained from the trans-Atlantic alliance in the past, the country no longer profits. But he’s wrong — there are compelling reasons that NATO in particular will be a distinct advantage for America’s security far into the future. First, NATO’s formidable conventional and nuclear forces are the most effective way to **protect North America and Europe** — the **heart of the democratic world** — from attack. Threats to our collective security have not vanished in the 21st century. Mr. Putin remains a determined adversary preying on Eastern Europe and American elections. **NATO is a force multiplier**: The United States has allies who will stand by us, while Russia has none. And while it’s true that most of America’s NATO allies need to increase their defense spending under the treaty, they’re not freeloaders: The United States has **relied on NATO allies to strike back against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in the Middle East**. European troops have replaced American soldiers in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and contribute the large majority in Kosovo. Our NATO allies are also getting better about contributing their fair share. They have increased their defense spending by a total of more than $87 billion since Mr. Putin annexed Crimea in 2014. Fourteen more allies will reach NATO’s military spending target — 2 percent of gross domestic product — by 2024. Mr. Trump would be smart to claim credit for this at this week’s summit. A second reason for maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance is America’s economic future. The European Union is our country’s largest trade partner, and its largest investor. The United States and the European Union are the world’s two largest economies, and can steer global trade to their advantage if they stick together. More than four million Americans work for European companies in the United States. Forty-five of the 50 states export more to Europe than to China. Mr. Trump is right that the two sides are also economic competitors, and trade disputes are inevitable. His predecessors kept this tension in balance lest there be damaging consequences for American businesses, workers and farmers — a good reminder for Mr. Trump, whose ill-conceived trade war with Canada and Europe risks harming the American economy. Third, future American leaders will find Europe is our most capable and willing partner in tackling the biggest threats to global security: **climate change; drug and cybercrime cartels; terrorism; pandemics and mass migration from Africa and the Middle East**. And America’s **NATO allies will continue to be indispensable in safeguarding democracy** and freedom, under assault by Russia and China.

#### Ought means should

Merriam Webster n.d. – Merriam Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary, “ought”, <http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/ought>  
ought /ˈɑːt/ verb  
Learner's definition of OUGHT [modal verb] 1 ◊ Ought is almost always followed by to and the infinitive form of a verb. The phrase ought to has the same meaning as should and is used in the same ways, but it is less common and somewhat more formal. The negative forms ought not and oughtn't are often used without a following to. — used to indicate what is expected They ought to be here by now. You ought to be able to read this book. There ought to be a gas station on the way. 2 — used to say or suggest what should be done You ought to get some rest. That leak ought to be fixed. You ought to do your homework.

#### Should means must and is immediate

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16) [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future *[in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

### Xi Lashout DA

#### Plan: The appropriation of outer space for the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence by private entities is unjust except for China.

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### \*\*US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Ch

inese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

## Case

#### Plans must have structural and attitudinal inherency – their model of sole existential inherency is bad for debate – it’s faulty, assumptive, and misunderstands the inherency requirement.

#### No structural inherency – nothing prevents private space appropriation being unjust – neg on presumption

#### No attitudinal inherency – your authors want the plan

#### This impact is so silly probably inecitbale if its true they exist def coming and if they have incentives we’re already dead

#### No aliens – err towards humans

Greene 19, Tristan. “NASA research shows alien life is far less likely than previously thought.” Next Web. June 12, 2019. <https://thenextweb.com/science/2019/06/12/nasa-research-shows-alien-life-is-far-less-likely-than-previously-thought/>

Scientists just threw a monkey wrench in the search for intelligent extraterrestrial life by redefining what a “habitable planet” is. A team of researchers led by NASA astrobiologist Edward Schwieterman recently published a study indicating that the habitable zone (HZ) for life includes far fewer planetary systems than scientists thought. Rented shoes are gross But bowling is fun! Join us for Bowlr, Amsterdam’s best networking event YEAH! According to the paper: Here we show that the HZ for complex aerobic life is likely limited relative to that for microbial life. We use a 1D radiative-convective climate and photochemical models to circumscribe a Habitable Zone for Complex Life (HZCL) based on known toxicity limits for a range of organisms as a proof of concept. Basically the scientists used the only model for life we have – Earth life – and came up with a solution for determining whether anything intelligent could evolve in the expected conditions of systems in the HZ. They concluded that a large number of planets thought capable of supporting life have toxic atmospheres unlikely to support any lifeforms beyond the most rudimentary organisms. According to study co-author Timothy Lyons, distinguished professor of biogeochemistry at the University of California, Riverside, previous ideas on what makes a planet habitable haven’t taken such a specific view. He told NASA: This is the first time the physiological limits of life on Earth have been considered to predict the distribution of complex life elsewhere in the universe. So what does it actually mean? Well, that depends on your belief system. Scientifically speaking, the search for alien life is based on faith. There’s no more evidence for alien life than there is for the various gods and goddesses of Earth‘s religions. Though there are mountains of evidence to support the idea that humans believe in aliens for the exact same reasons they believe in religion. That’s not to say that intelligent alien life is impossible. It’s just highly improbable. We know that the evolution of complex beings took billions of years on Earth, and we know our planet is so fragile that it almost surely wouldn’t have survived long enough to support that life were it not for Jupiter and Saturn out front blocking asteroids for us. And there’s countless other instances of conditions in our planet’s history so improbably perfect that life itself, even on a single planet, only seems possible because we’re experiencing it. Supposedly, anyway. This research shows that when you strip away our yearning, burning desire to find something to help us make sense of our own existence: you’re left with a universe that probably can’t support complex life anywhere but on Earth. As Schwieterman told USA Today: Showing how rare and special our planet is only enhances the case for protecting it. As far as we know, Earth is the only planet in the universe that can sustain human life. Sure, intelligent aliens could be deliberately concealing themselves to watch us from afar; they could be invisible to our senses and existing beside us in spiritual form, or simply beyond the reach of our current technology. The absence of evidence isn’t the evidence of absence. But climate crisis, war, disease, hunger, and poverty are demonstrably real. With no evidence for ET, maybe it’s time we made helping humans our new religion instead of seeking out neighbors we ought to be embarrassed to invite over.

#### No alien war

Sedacca 16 [Matthew Sedacca, science writer for Cosmos, citing Janne Korhonen, interstellar military expert. What Military Theory Tells Us About Future Space Warfare. December 2016. cosmos.nautil.us/short/82/what-military-theory-tells-us-about-future-space-warfare]

Janne Korhonen, an author and economics graduate student at Aalto University in Finland, is one of the world’s handful of interstellar military theorists (yes, these people exist). In 2013 he argued that aliens, even if in possession of vastly superior technologically, are very unlikely to attack us. To begin with, why would they bother? War is typically fought over resources. Almost one century ago, historian John Edwin Bakeless found that 14 of the 20 wars from 1878 to 1918 had economic motivations strongly connected to asserting control of natural resources. The number is even larger when you include wars of colonial conquest, which can be counted as no-contest resource-grabs.

But if aliens are looking for resources, an assault on Earth doesn’t make a whole lot of sense, since the gas giant planets and the asteroid belt offer huge repositories of materials for the taking. Sure, Earth does have the most varied minerals in the solar system because of the action of life and water, but just to get to our solar system would require huge amounts of fuel, making the whole venture rather pointless from a cost-benefit view. Only an alien species that requires our specific minerals (or needs to eat sentient carbon-based organisms) would trouble itself with such a voyage.

Nonetheless, if extraterrestrials did want to pick a fight with us, they would be running a huge risk. Korhonen argued that, unless they were 100-percent sure they could destroy us, they could never be assured of final victory. It is often said that advanced aliens would regard us as mere ants—and anyone who has ants in their house or yard knows they are almost impossible to eradicate. Even a few survivors could quickly multiply to repopulate the planet, while learning from the attacker’s technology and preparing a retaliation. Meanwhile, neighboring civilizations might see the act of aggression and join the battle, if only to protect their own interests. In light of this strategic calculus, aliens would be foolish to invade.

#### It's too late—Aliens are already here

Weisberger 19 (Mindy Weisberger is a Senior Writer for LiveScience, and studied film and English at Columbia University. They have written, directed, and produced over 250 videos for the American Museum of Natural History over the past 15 years, “Are Aliens Ignoring Us? Maybe We're Already Their Captives in a 'Galactic Zoo'”, LiveScience, 3/25/19, <https://www.livescience.com/65063-meti-galactic-zoo-aliens.html>) //EG

Why hasn't Earth received any messages from extraterrestrials yet? Perhaps because we're already unwitting inhabitants in a so-called galactic zoo.

This was one of the scenarios a group of international researchers explored on March 18 at a meeting organized by the nonprofit organization [Messaging Extraterrestrial Intelligence](http://meti.org/) (METI). The gathering, which took place at the City of Science and Industry museum in Paris (Cité), brought together about 60 scientists who research the possibility of communication with hypothetical intelligent extraterrestrials.

There, they debated "The Great Silence" — why aliens haven't contacted us — exploring one possibility known as the "zoo hypothesis." First proposed in the 1970s, it describes Earth as a planet that is already under observation by "galactic zookeepers" who are deliberately concealing themselves from human detection, Forbes [reported](https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiecartereurope/2019/03/18/are-we-in-a-galactic-zoo-protected-by-aliens-scientists-meet-to-investigate-the-great-silence/#260714a81ce7). [[9 Strange, Scientific Excuses for Why Humans Haven't Found Aliens Yet](https://www.livescience.com/63208-alien-life-excuses.html)]

"When we try to better understand the universe, the question of whether we are alone is unavoidable," meeting attendee Florence Raulin-Cerceau, an associate professor at the National Museum of Natural History in Paris, told [Paris-Match](https://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Sciences/Et-si-les-extraterrestres-ne-voulaient-pas-repondre-a-nos-messages-1614552).

That Earth would be the lone planet to evolve and host intelligent life among potentially [billions of planets](https://www.livescience.com/17866-160-billion-alien-planets-milky-galaxy.html) in our galaxy alone seems very unlikely. But if there are intelligent extraterrestrials out there, where are they, and why haven't we found them yet? This conundrum, posed in 1950 by Italian physicist Enrico Fermi, is known as [Fermi's Paradox](https://www.livescience.com/62715-first-in-last-out-fermi-paradox-answer.html), and it still stymies experts today.

Fermi didn't live to see evidence of the first exoplanets, which were discovered decades after his death. Since 2014, NASA's Kepler space telescope has confirmed the existence of [hundreds of distant worlds](https://www.livescience.com/17321-exoplanets-earth-habitable-infographic.html), and its findings have hinted at potentially 2,300 more. And yet, despite these exciting exoplanet discoveries, contact with extraterrestrials seems no closer now than it did in Fermi's day.

Under alien observation?

One explanation that scientists explored at the METI meeting, is that aliens are aware of Earth and are observing us as we would observe animals kept in a zoo, METI President Douglas Vakoch said in a workshop. If this is the case, humans should increase their efforts to create messages capable of reaching our "keepers," to demonstrate our intelligence, Vakoch explained.

For example, if a captive zebra were to suddenly tap out a pattern of prime numbers, humans would be required to re-evaluate their understanding of zebra cognition, "and we would be compelled to respond," according to [EarthSky](https://earthsky.org/space/meti-workshop-in-paris-fermis-paradox-great-silence).

But what if we're not part of a vast alien zoo — what if, instead, humanity has been evaluated by alien civilizations, and subsequently "quarantined" from our galactic neighbors?

It's possible that extraterrestrials are actively isolating us from contact for our own good, because interacting with aliens would be "culturally disruptive" for Earth, meeting co-chair Jean-Pierre Rospars, honorary research director at the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), said in a workshop.

#### We won’t find aliens, and machines—not aliens—would come if we did

Rowan 10 (Karen Rowan is a Health Editor for LiveScience with a Master’s degree in science and medical journalism from Boston University and in cellular biology from Northeastern Illinois University and has previously written for the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, “Could Extraterrestrials Really Invade Earth, and How?”, LiveScience, 4/28/10, <https://www.livescience.com/32557-could-extraterrestrials-really-invade-earth-and-how.html>) //EG

"In movies, aliens only come here for two reasons," Seth Shostak, senior astronomer at the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) told Life's Little Mysteries. "They either come here to find some resource they don't have on their own planet, or they want to use us for some unauthorized breeding experiment." These scenarios play on our most primal human fears of losing the resources we need to survive or not being able to reproduce, Shostak said.

In reality, it isn't logical to think that aliens would want to do either of those things, Shostak said. Space travel is expensive and requires an enormous investment, he said.

"Anything that we have here, they could find where they live," Shostak said. If there was a resource found on Earth that did not exist on [the aliens' home planet](http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/extrasolar_planets.html), there would certainly be easier ways to get or make the resource than coming here.

And if an alien civilization was advanced enough to engage in [interstellar travel](http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/080313-tw-centauri-travel.html), they would also probably have very advanced robotic machines, Shostak said. If they wanted to research our planet, they would be more likely to send those machines here than to come here themselves.

"It's not like, the hatch will open and we'll see a strange, alien paw coming out," he said. "It's more likely to be a robotic arm."

Contact with aliens is extremely unlikely, agrees David Morrison, Director of Space at NASA-Ames Research Center. Any communication that may occur would likely be in the form of radio waves sent from one civilization to another, he said.

"We're listening for radio signals," Morrison said, "And we can assume that any civilization that we receive a signal from is more advanced than we are."

We have only had the technology to listen and [send radio waves](http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/080701-st-earth-sounds.html) for the last century, so if an alien radio signal reaches us from a distant planet hundreds or thousands of light-years away, that civilization would have to be more advanced than ours, Morrison said.

Morrison doubts that an advanced alien civilization would come here to harm us.

"Someone once suggested that if a civilization can last for hundreds of thousands of years, it almost surely has solved the problems we have. I would hope so," Morrison said.

Even if aliens existed, knew about us, and could travel here, they wouldn't be likely to send an army or the equipment needed to launch an attack on the Earth, said science fiction writer Jack McDevitt.

"Imagine putting together an invasion force, only to stick them in containers to travel here for years," McDevitt said.

Although contact between humans and aliens has been a key part of many of McDevitt's books, he doesn't think that it's likely to actually happen. It would take a great amount of time for aliens to reach Earth, and any civilization capable of this feat would not want to delegate its fighting force to the task, he said.

We have bigger problems to worry about, McDevitt said.

#### Zoo hypothesis says that aliens have isolated ourselves from them

Shostak 19

Shostak, Seth. "'Zoo Hypothesis' May Explain Why We Haven't Seen Any Space Aliens". NBC News, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/zoo-hypothesis-may-explain-why-we-haven-t-seen-any-ncna988946. SHS TG

It may occur to you that Ball’s idea sounds something like Star Trek’s famous “prime directive,” which forbade spacefaring members of the Federation from doing anything that might interfere with other cultures or civilizations, even if that interference was well intentioned. The MIT astronomer was proposing that we’ve failed to make contact with aliens not because we’re unworthy, but because we are worthy — the way endangered eels are. Ball went further, proposing that we may live in a metaphorical zoo — a kind of cosmic Eden. The aliens of the galaxy have somehow arranged things so that our planet is shielded from them by one-way bars: They can observe us, but we can’t observe them. One nice thing about this conjecture is that it offers a solution to a long-standing puzzle known as Fermi’s Paradox. Broached nearly 70 years ago by physicist Enrico Fermi, it rests on the fact that the universe is very old. Consequently, if intelligent life is commonplace, then some of it is surely advanced enough to have colonized the entire galaxy. We should see evidence of aliens everywhere. The fact that we don’t might be explained by Ball’s hypothesis — we’re being deliberately isolated. The zoo hypothesis has been in the news recently because it also provides justification for an activity known as METI, short for Messaging Extraterrestrial Intelligence. Simply stated, METI practitioners transmit radio signals into space with the hope of provoking a response from any aliens who might pick them up. In 2017, a Norwegian antenna was used to beam a message to a star system 12 light-years away. Earlier this month, this whole enterprise was discussed by researchers at a meeting in Paris. Douglas Vakoch, the president of METI International, a San Francisco-based organization that organized the Norwegian transmission, invoked the zoo hypothesis as a possible justification for broadcasting. After all, if the hypothesis is correct, then it’s understandable why our efforts to find signals from space have been unsuccessful. We’ve been mindlessly pacing our Earthly cage while the extraterrestrials maintain their distance and keep watch. But as Vakoch argues, this one-way scenario might be changed. If a zoo animal suddenly starts barking through the bars, saying “I’m here and I think you’re out there,” those on the other side might respond. Simply put, METI’s deliberate transmissions might lead to a discovery of cosmic company because the broadcasts would tell the aliens that we no longer require their helicopter parenting. We’re adult enough for them to get in touch.