# 1NC

## 1

#### Interp – the aff must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Violation – they’re extra topical – cx binding international agreement + using regulator delimiting and liability inserted lines from their sa that they read

Conceding to a regime that tempers free exploitation of the commons allows everyone to benefit from the positive externalities

To ascertain the interests of nation-states, we must look to the factors motivating current space utilization. Routine access to space undeniably aids our technological advancement. The ISS’s antigravity environment provides unique conditions to study medicine.125 Satellites provide real-time tracking of environmental conditions and transmit crucial information for disaster recovery planning.126 Space telescopes track objects with the potential to cause the extinction of life of Earth.127 Free from the veil of our hazy atmosphere, satellites can produce better imagery and ascertain the composition of potential resource deposits on celestial bodies.128 And simply receiving satellite imagery of our planet forces us to confront the realities of our fragile existence. These benefits signify the tangible realization of the OST’s object and purpose, which flow to all members of the global community.129 If we do not begin active decontamination and mitigation of space debris, the utility of geospace will cease to exist. Imagining our existence without these advances is a potent method to stress the criticality of unabated pollution in geospace.

This informs the structure of the ensuing two-part framework: geospace delimitation and global liability

global liability will consider the responsibility of nation-states and private entities in isolation.176 This will coerce cooperation among all agencies, nations, and private entities because the equitable share of responsibility will drive collective resolution.

#### Vote neg for limits – extra-topicality allows them to tack on infinite planks to artificially improve aff solvency and spike out of DAs, like fiating enforcement or random possible modifications to extraterrestrial property rights. The counter-interp sets a precedent that the scope of aff fiat doesn’t have to be bounded by the resolution, which outweighs on magnitude.

They can read normal means ev but can’t make it the plan – links to our offense bc they can call any procedure normal means and we’re forced to negate it. It’s also about classification which goes beyond saying it is unjust since it’s a form of regulation which shoud be neg ground

#### Voters:

#### Competing interpretations—it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse and because the 2N doesn’t get new disads to whole rez so it’s permanently skewed.

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

#### T comes before 1AR theory – a) norms – we only have a couple months to set T norms but can set 1AR theory norms anytime, b) magnitude – T affects a larger portion of the debate since the aff advocacy determines every speech after it

## Solvency

#### 1] Zero framing args in the aff means you err neg on 2nr weighing and give us new responses– anything else means aff is infinitely unpredictable bc they can shift their standard based on the 1nc

#### 2] No terminals to any scenario means you err neg and don’t give them new 1ar impact cards – no warrant for how the environment, starvation, econ collapse, undermining humanity’s interests, ethics, causes extinction so I shouldn’t have to read impact defense preemptively

#### 3] Extinction comes first – moral theories converge

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

## Corporate Colonalism

### **Space Col**

#### Impact turning every part of the 1AC—first, space col is good.

#### Only the private sector can do it – governments lack incentive and the OST prohibits it

Eure 16 (, J., 2016. Space… the final frontier. [online] Campbell Law Observer. Available at: <http://campbelllawobserver.com/space-the-final-frontier/> [Accessed 28 December 2021] Jonathan Eure is a 2017 graduate of Campbell Law School, winner of the 2017 J. Bryan Boyd Award for Excellence in Legal Journalism, and served as a senior staff writer for the Campbell Law Observer. He lived in Morganton, in the foothills of North Carolina, before moving to Raleigh for law school. He earned BA’s in Political Science and History from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, graduating in 2014. The summer after his first year of law school, Jonathan worked as a legislative research intern with Representative Rob Bryan in the North Carolina General Assembly. Jonathan now interns with the Honorable Paul Newby at the North Carolina Supreme Court. Jonathan is the Secretary for the Campbell Public Interest Law Student Association (CPILSA).)-rahulpenu

As a policy matter, though the **O**uter **S**pace **T**reaty uses lofty ideals to **bind** **nations** into mutual respect and perhaps even unity of purpose, focusing solely on those ideals discounts a key ingredient of the original space race. Promulgation of national ideology was the original motivator of the space race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Without national ideology, prestige, or power as a motivating factor, there is really **no** **incentive** **for** the **governments** of major spacefaring nations **to** **spend** massive amounts of money over long periods of time **on** such risky endeavors as space **colonization**. For this reason, the **colonization** of Proxima b would more likely **fall** **to** private **corporations** with much to gain from the resources other worlds might offer. Private exploration of space becomes more of a reality each day, with private corporations such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic testing new platforms for space travel. A **movement** has **grown** **up** **alongside** these private spacefaring **companies** **claiming** planets such as Proxima b might become a **new** **frontier**, where private citizens can stake their own personal claims. This movement has even **proposed** **legislation** in Congress. The “Space Settlement Prize Act,” which would **ultimately** **guarantee** that **any** **settlement** built privately on other planets, moons, asteroids, etc., would be **owned** **by** the private citizens or **corporations** **who** **claim** **them**. This act would likely function similarly to the Homestead Acts, which allowed settlers who worked unclaimed land, to buy that land at very little cost. Furthermore, these groups claim that they are **not** **subject** **to** the **O**uter **S**pace **T**reaty, as the treaty’s provisions only govern nations. “The language of the Outer Space Treaty does not forbid private claims on and settlement of celestial bodies, only national appropriations. Furthermore, nations themselves are answerable in case of any environmental damages.” It is an interesting theory, and these 21st century frontiersmen and women might be correct. The Outer Space Treaty does not only govern nations themselves, but national oversight of non-governmental organizations as well. As all private attempts at space colonization on Proxima b and any other celestial body would be through corporate entities. These corporate entities would certainly fall under the national mandate to authorize and continually supervise the operation of such groups. But just because governments must have some form of oversight in place to manage private space exploration corporations, does not mean there is a mandate to control the legal operation of such corporations. The language of the Outer Space Treaty does not forbid private claims on and settlement of celestial bodies, only national appropriations. Furthermore, nations themselves are answerable in case of any environmental damages. Nations can certainly pass laws regulating the actions of private corporations consistent with the Outer Space Treaty’s mandate, and in fact the U.S. is already considering and attempting to create policies governing private space craft and travel. The problem is that none of this law has become official yet.

#### No delink – nobody will do it without profit motives

#### Investing in space exploration solves econ

Dubner, American journalist & Freakonomics Author, 8 (Steven, Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics Quorum, Freakonomics Blog, http://freakonomics.com/2008/01/11/is-space-exploration-worth-the-cost-a-freakonomics-quorum/)

Pretend that instead of being responsible for your household budget, which means paying for rent or a mortgage, transportation, some schooling costs, groceries, healthcare, vacation, etc., you are instead responsible for a considerably larger budget that provides a variety of services for about 300 million people including the maintenance of an army, protecting the borders, etc. In other words, pretend you are responsible for the U.S. Federal budget. And now ask yourself how much of that money you want to spend on manned space travel, and why. We gathered up a group of space authorities — G. Scott Hubbard, Joan Vernikos, Kathleen M. Connell, Keith Cowing, and David M. Livingston, and John M. Logsdon — and asked them the following: Is manned space exploration worth the cost? Why or why not? Their responses are below. As I suggested above, take your time. For the impatient among you, here are a few highlights: Logsdon on a not-so-obvious incentive for manned space travel: “Space exploration can also serve as a stimulus for children to enter the fields of science and engineering.” Vernikos on the R.O.I. of space travel: “Economic, scientific and technological returns of space exploration have far exceeded the investment. … Royalties on NASA patents and licenses currently go directly to the U.S. Treasury, not back to NASA.” Cowing on space expenditures relative to other costs: “Right now, all of America’s human space flight programs cost around $7 billion a year. That’s pennies per person per day. In 2006, according to the USDA, Americans spent more than $154 billion on alcohol. We spend around $10 billion a month in Iraq. And so on.” I hope you enjoy their answers, and learn from them, as much as I did. G. Scott Hubbard, professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at Stanford University and former director of the NASA Ames Research Center: The debate about the relative merits of exploring space with humans and robots is as old as the space program itself. Werner Von Braun, a moving force behind the Apollo Program that sent humans to the moon and the architect of the mighty Saturn V rocket, believed passionately in the value of human exploration — especially when it meant beating the hated Soviet Empire. James Van Allen, discoverer of the magnetic fields that bear his name, was equally ardent and vocal about the value of robotic exploration. There are five arguments that are advanced in any discussion about the utility of space exploration and the roles of humans and robots. Those arguments, in roughly ascending order of advocate support, are the following: 1. Space exploration will eventually allow us to establish a human civilization on another world (e.g., Mars) as a hedge against the type of catastrophe that wiped out the dinosaurs. 2. We explore space and create important new technologies to advance our economy. It is true that, for every dollar we spend on the space program, the U.S. economy receives about $8 of economic benefit. Space exploration can also serve as a stimulus for children to enter the fields of science and engineering. 3. Space exploration in an international context offers a peaceful cooperative venue that is a valuable alternative to nation state hostilities. One can look at the International Space Station and marvel that the former Soviet Union and the U.S. are now active partners. International cooperation is also a way to reduce costs. 4. National prestige requires that the U.S. continue to be a leader in space, and that includes human exploration. History tells us that great civilizations dare not abandon exploration. 5. Exploration of space will provide humanity with an answer to the most fundamental questions: Are we alone? Are there other forms of life beside those on Earth? It is these last two arguments that are the most compelling to me. It is challenging to make the case that humans are necessary to the type of scientific exploration that may bring evidence of life on another world. There are strong arguments on both sides. Personally, I think humans will be better at unstructured environment exploration than any existing robot for a very long time. There are those who say that exploration with humans is simply too expensive for the return we receive. However, I cannot imagine any U.S. President announcing that we are abandoning space exploration with humans and leaving it to the Chinese, Russians, Indians, Japanese or any other group. I can imagine the U.S. engaging in much more expansive international cooperation. Humans will be exploring space. The challenge is to be sure that they accomplish meaningful exploration. Joan Vernikos, a member of the Space Studies Board of the National Academy and former director of NASA’s Life Sciences Division: Why explore? Asked why he kept trying to climb Everest, English mountaineer George Mallory reputedly replied, “Because it was there.” Exploration is intrinsic to our nature. It is the contest between man and nature mixed with the primal desire to conquer. It fuels curiosity, inspiration and creativity. The human spirit seeks to discover the unknown, and in the process explore the physical and psychological potential of human endurance. There have always been the few risk-takers who ventured for the rest of us to follow. Because of earlier pioneers, air travel is now commonplace, and space travel for all is just around the corner. Economic and societal benefits are not immediately evident, but they always follow, as does our understanding of human potential to overcome challenges. Fifty years after Sputnik, space remains the next frontier. Without risking human lives, robotic technology such as unmanned missions, probes, observatories, and landers enables space exploration. It lays the groundwork, and does the scouting. But as I heard former astronaut Thomas Jones often say, “only a human can experience what being in space feels like, and only a human can communicate this to others.” It is humans who repair the Hubble telescope. It is humans who service the International Space Station (ISS). Mercury astronauts were the first to photograph Earth from space with hand-held cameras. Earth scientists in orbit on the ISS may view aspects of global change that only a trained eye can see. In addition, studying astronauts in the microgravity of space has been the only means of understanding how gravity affects human development and health here on Earth. It is highly probable that, in this century, humans will settle on other planets. Our ability to explore and sustain human presence there will not only expand Earth’s access to mineral resources but, should the need arise, provide alternative habitats for humanity’s survival. At what cost? Is there a price to inspiration and creativity? Economic, scientific and technological returns of space exploration have far exceeded the investment. Globally, 43 countries now have their own observing or communication satellites in Earth orbit. Observing Earth has provided G.P.S., meteorological forecasts, predictions and management of hurricanes and other natural disasters, and global monitoring of the environment, as well as surveillance and intelligence. Satellite communications have changed life and business practices with computer operations, cell phones, global banking, and TV. Studying humans living in the microgravity of space has expanded our understanding of osteoporosis and balance disorders, and has led to new treatments. Wealth-generating medical devices and instrumentation such as digital mammography and outpatient breast biopsy procedures and the application of telemedicine to emergency care are but a few of the social and economic benefits of manned exploration that we take for granted. Space exploration is not a drain on the economy; it generates infinitely more than wealth than it spends. Royalties on NASA patents and licenses currently go directly to the U.S. Treasury, not back to NASA. I firmly believe that the Life Sciences Research Program would be self-supporting if permitted to receive the return on its investment. NASA has done so much with so little that it has generally been assumed to have had a huge budget. In fact, the 2007 NASA budget of $16.3 billion is a minute fraction of the $13 trillion total G.D.P. “What’s the hurry?” is a legitimate question. As the late Senator William Proxmire said many years ago, “Mars isn’t going anywhere.” Why should we commit hard-pressed budgets for space exploration when there will always be competing interests? However, as Mercury, Gemini and Apollo did 50 years ago, our future scientific and technological leadership depends on exciting creativity in the younger generations. Nothing does this better than manned space exploration. There is now a national urgency to direct the creative interests of our youth towards careers in science and engineering. We need to keep the flame of manned space exploration alive as China, Russia, India, and other countries forge ahead with substantial investments that challenge U.S. leadership in space. Kathleen M. Connell, a principal of The Connell Whittaker Group, a founding team member of NASA’s Astrobiology Program, and former policy director of the Aerospace States Association: The value of public sector human space exploration is generally perceived as worth the cost when exploration outcomes address one or more national imperatives of the era. For example, in the twentieth century, the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik required a bold technological retort by the U.S. Apollo put boots on the moon, winning the first space race. The resulting foreign policy boost and psychic prestige for the U.S. more that justified the cost for the Cold War generation. Unquestionably, manned exploration of that era also created unintended economic consequences and benefits, such as the spinoff of miniaturization that led to computers and cell phones. Apollo also created new NASA centers in the South, acting as an unanticipated economic development anchor for those regions, both then and now. In the twenty-first century, what would happen if U.S. manned space programs were managed based upon the contemporary demands of the planet and the American taxpayer? NASA could be rewarded to explore, but with terrestrial returns as a priority. Space exploration crews could conduct global warming research on the International Space Station National Laboratory, while other crews from the public or private sector could rapidly assemble solar energy satellites for clean energy provision to Earth. Lunar settlements could be established to develop new energy sources from rare compounds that are in abundance on the moon. Getting to Mars, to develop a terrestrial lifeboat and to better understand the fate of planets, suddenly takes on new meaning and relevance. I have to come the conclusion, after over 20 years in the space industry, that addressing global challenges with space solutions that benefit humanity and American constituents is the key to justifying the cost of manned space exploration. I believe we are about to find out, all over again, if civil manned space capability and policy can adapt and rise to meet new imperatives. Keith Cowing, founder and editor of NASAWatch.com and former NASA space biologist. Right now, all of America’s human space flight programs cost around $7 billion a year. That’s pennies per person per day. In 2006, according to the USDA, Americans spent more than $154 billion on alcohol. We spend around $10 billion a month in Iraq. And so on. Are these things more important than human spaceflight because we spend more money on them? Is space exploration less important? Money alone is not a way to gauge the worthiness of the cost of exploring space. NASA is fond of promoting all of the spinoffs that are generated from its exploits, such as microelectronics. But are we exploring space to explore space, or are we doing all of this to make better consumer electronics? I once heard the late Carl Sagan respond to this question by saying, “you don’t need to go to Mars to cure cancer.” If you learn how to do that as a side benefit, well, that’s great, but there are probably more cost effective ways to get all of these spinoffs without leaving Earth. To be certain, tax dollars spent on space projects result in jobs — a large proportion of which are high paying, high tech positions. But many other government programs do that as well — some more efficiently. Still, for those who would moan that this money could be “better spent back on Earth,” I would simply say that all of this money is spent on Earth — it creates jobs and provides business to companies, just as any other government program does. You have to spend all of NASA’s money “on Earth.” There is no way to spend it in space — at least, not yet. Where am I going with this? Asking if space exploration — with humans or robots or both — is worth the effort is like questioning the value of Columbus’s voyages to the New World in the late 1490s. The promise at the time was obvious to some, but not to others. Is manned space exploration worth the cost? If we Americans do not think so, then why is it that nations such as China and India — nations with far greater social welfare issues to address with their limited budgets — are speeding up their space exploration programs? What is it about human space exploration that they see? Could it be what we once saw, and have now forgotten? As such, my response is another question: for the U.S. in the twenty-first century, is not sending humans into space worth the cost? David M. Livingston, host of The Space Show, a talk radio show focusing on increasing space commerce and developing space tourism: I hear this question a lot. So a few years ago, I decided to see what really happened to a public dollar spent on a good space program, compared to spending it on an entitlement program or a revenue generating infrastructure program. I used the school breakfast program for the test entitlement program. I chose Hoover Dam for the revenue generating infrastructure program. The space program I chose was the manned program to the moon consisting of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Let me briefly summarize what I discovered. All programs, if properly managed, can produce benefits in excess to the original invested dollar. There is no guarantee that a program will be properly managed, and this includes a space program. “Properly managed” implies many things, but I don’t think space is any more or less likely to be well managed than anything else the government does. A mismanaged space program wastes money, talent, and time, just like any other faulty program. As for what happened to the dollar invested in the respective programs, the school breakfast program was successful, in that it increased the number of kids who received breakfast. However, when funding for this program or this type of program stops, as soon as the last of the funds goes through the pipeline, the program is over. It has no life past government funding. I was unable to find an inspirational or motivational quality for the program leading to downstream business, economic, or science advancements. One could make the case that kids who benefited from the program went on through school to accomplish great things, and I don’t doubt that — I simply could not document it in my research. The Hoover Dam was very interesting. This project paid off its bond cost early, was a major contributor to the U.S. victory in World War II, and has been a huge economic factor for development in the Western part of the country. However, the Hoover Dam requires overhead and maintenance investment on a continual basis. It needs repairs, updates, modernization, and security, and it employs a labor force. Were we to stop investing in the Hoover Dam, over time it would lose its effectiveness and cease to be the value to our nation that it is now. Its value to us depends on our willingness to maintain, protect, and update it as necessary. The Hoover Dam and Lake Mead have given birth to thousands of private businesses, economic growth for the region, and much more. However, as with the entitlement program above, I could not find an inspirational or motivational aspect to the Hoover Dam. What I discovered about our manned lunar program was different. When I did this study, it was 34 years after the last dime had been spent on Apollo, the last of the manned moon programs. Thirty-four years later, when I asked guests on The Space Show, students, and people in space-related fields what inspired or motivated them to start a space business or pursue their science education, over 80 percent said they were inspired and motivated because of our having gone to the moon. Businesses were started and are now meeting payrolls, paying taxes, and sustaining economic growth because the founder was inspired by the early days of the manned space program, often decades after the program ended! This type of inspiration and motivation seems unique to the manned space program and, of late, to some of our robotic space missions. I found the same to be true when I asked the same question to Space Show guests from outside the U.S. John M. Logsdon, director of the Space Policy Institute and acting director of the Center for International Science and Technology Policy at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs: The high costs of sending humans into orbit and beyond are measured in dollars, rubles, or yuan. The benefits of human spaceflight are not so easily calculated, since they include both tangible and intangible payoffs. So answering the question, “Do the benefits outweigh the costs?” is not straightforward. If the payoffs are limited to scientific discovery, the position taken by many critics of human spaceflight is “no.” With both current and, especially, future robotic capabilities, the added value of human presence to missions aimed primarily at new understanding of the moon, Mars, near-Earth asteroids, and other celestial destinations most likely does not justify the added costs and risks involved. However, Steve Squyres, the principal investigator for the Mars Exploration Rovers, has frequently said that he wished that spirit and opportunity were working in partnership with humans on the surface of Mars; that combination, he argues, would greatly increase the scientific payoffs of the mission. To me, the primary justifications for sending people into space require that they travel beyond low Earth orbit. For the next few decades, the major payoffs from humans traveling to the moon and Mars are intangible, and linked to both national pride and national power. Space exploration remains an effort that can be led by only a few countries, and I believe that it should be part of what the United States does in its desire to be seen by both its citizens and the global public as a leader, one to be admired for its continued willingness to invest in pushing the frontiers of human activity. In the longer run, I believe that human exploration is needed to answer two questions. One is: “Are there activities in other places in the solar system of such economic value that they justify high costs in performing them?” The other is: “Can humans living away from Earth obtain at least a major portion of what they need to survive from local resources?” If the answer to both questions is “yes,” then I believe that eventually some number of people in the future will establish permanent settlements away from Earth, in the extreme case to ensure that the human species will survive a planetary catastrophe, but also because people migrate for both economic opportunities and new experiences. That is a big jump from today’s argument regarding the costs and benefits of human spaceflight, but I believe such a long range perspective is the best way to justify a new start in human space exploration.

#### Economic decline causes extinction.

Qian **Liu 18**. China-based economist. “From economic crisis to World War III.” Project Syndicate. 11-8-2018. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-crisis-military-conflict-or-structural-reform-by-qian-liu-2018-11

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the **current** **social, political, and technological** **landscape**, a **prolonged** **economic crisis**, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a **major global military conflict**. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including **q**uantitative **e**asing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, **prolonged** **periods of** **economic** **distress** have been characterised also by public **antipathy toward** **minority groups or** **foreign countries** – attitudes that can help to **fuel unrest**, **terrorism**, or even **war**. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 **Smoot-Hawley** Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, **World War II** had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas **Piketty**, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing **populists** to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will **only** **make matters worse**. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, **multilateralism is** **increasingly** **being eschewed**, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, **proxy wars** are **raging in Syria and Yemen**. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the **next** **economic** **crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation**. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

#### Space colonization solves extinction and is a filter for all other risks

**Torres 16** – PhD Candidate @ Rice (Phil, “Top Three Strategies for Avoiding an Existential Risk,” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, https://ieet.org/index.php/IEET2/print/11654)

(3) Space colonization. I would argue that this offers perhaps the **most practicable strategy** for avoiding an existential catastrophe, all things considered. It requires neither the invention of a superintelligence nor the sort of radical cognitive enhancements discussed above. The idea is simple: the wider we spread out in the world, the less chance there is that a single event will have worldwide consequences. A collapse of the global ecosystem on Earth wouldn’t affect colonies on Mars, nor would a grey goo disaster on (say) Gliese 667 Cc affect those living on spaceship Earth. Similarly, a disaster that wipes out the Milky Way in 1,000 years might be survivable if our progeny also resides in the Andromeda Galaxy. As it happens, NASA recently announced that there will be Earth-independent colonies on Mars by the 2030s, and Elon Musk has said that he’s hoping to launch the first flight to Mars “in around 2025.” As Musk described his motivation in 2014, “there is a strong humanitarian argument for making life multi-planetary . . . in order to safeguard the existence of humanity in the event that something catastrophic were to happen.” This sentiment was echoed by the former NASA administrator, Michael Griffin, who claimed that “human expansion into the solar system is, in the end, fundamentally about the survival of the species.” Similarly, Hawking has opined that he doesn’t “think the human race will survive the next thousand years, unless we spread into space.” So, there’s growing momentum to distribute the human population throughout this strange universe in which we find ourselves, and numerous intellectuals have explicitly recognized the existential significance of space colonization. Given the minimal risks involved, the relatively minimal cost of colonization programs (for example, it requires neither “(1)” nor “(2)” to be realized), and the potential gains of establishing self-sustaining colonies throughout the galaxy, this strategy ought to be among the top priorities for existential risk activists. **To survive, we must colonize**.

#### Outweighs scope of all living humans by like 10^30 – so tiny risk of this o/w

Bostrom 3 – Department of Philosophy, Yale University, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, 2002 (Nick, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development,” Preprint, Utilitas Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 308-314, http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html)

As I write these words, suns are illuminating and heating empty rooms, unused energy is being flushed down black holes, and our great common endowment of negentropy is being irreversibly degraded into entropy on a cosmic scale. These are resources that an advanced civilization could have used to create value-structures, such as sentient beings living worthwhile lives. The rate of this loss boggles the mind. One recent paper speculates, using loose theoretical considerations based on the rate of increase of entropy, that the loss of potential human lives in our own galactic supercluster is at least ~10^46 per century of delayed colonization.[1] This estimate assumes that all the lost entropy could have been used for productive purposes, although no currently known technological mechanisms are even remotely capable of doing that. Since the estimate is meant to be a lower bound, this radically unconservative assumption is undesirable. We can, however, get a lower bound more straightforwardly by simply counting the number or stars in our galactic supercluster and multiplying this number with the amount of computing power that the resources of each star could be used to generate using technologies for whose feasibility a strong case has already been made. We can then divide this total with the estimated amount of computing power needed to simulate one human life. As a rough approximation, let us say the Virgo Supercluster contains 10^13 stars. One estimate of the computing power extractable from a star and with an associated planet-sized computational structure, using advanced molecular nanotechnology[2], is 10^42 operations per second.[3] A typical estimate of the human brain’s processing power is roughly 10^17 operations per second or less.[4] Not much more seems to be needed to simulate the relevant parts of the environment in sufficient detail to enable the simulated minds to have experiences indistinguishable from typical current human experiences.[5] Given these estimates, it follows that the potential for approximately 10^38 human lives is lost every century that colonization of our local supercluster is delayed; or equivalently, about 10^31 potential human lives per second. While this estimate is conservative in that it assumes only computational mechanisms whose implementation has been at least outlined in the literature, it is useful to have an even more conservative estimate that does not assume a non-biological instantiation of the potential persons. Suppose that about 10^10 biological humans could be sustained around an average star. Then the Virgo Supercluster could contain 10^23 biological humans. This corresponds to a loss of potential equal to about 10^14 potential human lives per second of delayed colonization. What matters for present purposes is not the exact numbers but the fact that they are huge. Even with the most conservative estimate, assuming a biological implementation of all persons, the potential for one hundred trillion potential human beings is lost for every second of postponement of colonization of our supercluster.[6]

#### Space col solves universe extinction through quantum immortality

Turchin 19 (Alexey Turchin an author of several books and articles on the topics of existential risks and life extension, and was published in "Futures", "Acta Astronatutica", "Informatica", "AI & Society" journals. He graduated in Moscow State University where he studied Physics and Art History (1997). He translated into Russian around 20 main articles about existential risks by Bostrom, Yudkowsky, Circovich, Kent, Hanson. From 2010 he works in the "Science for Life Extension Foundation" on various topics about life extension and risks prevention. He is a contributing author on IEET. He is the founder of the Digital Immortality Now startup. He is a member of the advisory boards of IEET, Open Longevity, AI agents, Arch Mission. In 2018 he won one of the prizes in AI Global Challenge race with his article on global solutions on AI safety, ”How to Survive the End of the Universe.” Version 2, Uploaded: 2019-11-28, Available at https://philpapers.org/rec/TURHTS-2, HKR-cjh)

1. Introduction Based on some optimistic models, we could start a wave of colonization of the universe using von Neumann probes moving at near-light speed a few hundred years from now (Stuart Armstrong & Sandberg, 2013), leveraging technology such as nanotech replicators connected to laser-powered sails. Communication and coordination between different parts of such a wave would be difficult. But to prevent some scenarios of the end of the universe, a form of large-scale coordination may be needed. This may take, for example, the form of an aggregation of large masses of matter to build massive astroengineering structures, as described by (Hooper, 2018), who suggested that an advanced civilization will send stars to its central region and increase mass of available matter after expansion of the universe will make these stars inaccessible. (Hooper expected that it may help to increase the available mass by 1000 x, but Loeb wrote that it may be cheaper to migrate to a dense cluster of galaxies (Loeb, 2018)). Bostrom suggested idea of astronomical waste (Bostrom, 2003), a huge opportunity cost which could come into play if we delay our exploration of the universe—as many new stars become permanently inaccessible every day because of the expansion of the universe. He also states that human endowment could be to reach all our opportunities and become everything which we could be. This assumes that we should use remaining time and matter of the universe in the most effective way to get as much human-values-related utility as possible. However, there is another alternative: use all the time and matter available to use to find the ways to survive the end of the universe, as the possible prize could be very large: in other words, this enterprise is a form of Pascal’s wager. Moreover, before the decision about how to fight the end of the universe is made (or at least before we know how much time we actually have left), we need a perfect knowledge of high-energy physics—as we need to know for sure how and when the universe will end and what can be done to prevent it. Gaining such knowledge may require creation of large-scale particle accelerators or long-term observations of changes in dark energy. Sabina Hossenfelder has said that new physics become apparent only by studying energies many orders of magnitude higher than those achievable on Cern’s Large Hadron Collider (LHC), and for example, to study quantum gravity, an accelerator the size of the Milky Way Galaxy is needed (Hossenfelder, 2019). Several authors have explored the possibility of reaching immortality and surviving “the end of the universe.” Tipler suggested that we will use the energy of the collapsing universe to perform an infinite number of computations in Omega point (Tipler, 1997), but this idea was criticized by (Ellis & Coule, 1994). Many predictions made by Tipler now seem to be obsolete: for example, the mass of the Higgs boson turned to be different than that required by Tipler’s Omega theory, as well as Hubble’s constant. Notably, Tipler wrote his book The physics of Immortality before the discovery of dark energy. Egan suggested—in fictional form—migration into an eternal mathematical universe as the ultimate form of escape in his novel Permutation City (Egan, 2010). Dvorsky explored several ideas about surviving the end of the universe (Dvorsky, 2015). Cirncovich and Bostrom suggested the possibility that a mind could travel between old and new universes via singularities (Ćirković & Bostrom, 2000). There have also been suggestions about how to extend our existence as long as possible in the case of a Big Freeze. For example, Sandberg et al. suggested an “aestivation hypothesis” (Sandberg, Armstrong, & Cirkovic, 2017), in which civilizations might wait until very cold times to perform computations more effectively. However, such “civilizational life extension” is not a form of true immortality. Along similar lines, Freeman Dyson explored how to survive for a very long time in a slowly freezing universe (Dyson, 1979). Preventing the end of the universe could be also regarded as a cause prioritization area for effective altruism, because if we prevent (or survive) some short-term forms of the end of the universe, like false vacuum decay or a Big Rip soon, we could increase amount of good we can create by many orders of magnitude. We could also act effectively in this direction by preventing collider accidents (Kent, 2004) or other potentially dangerous experiments, and by including the goal of surviving the end of the universe in the goal system of future superintelligent AI (Bostrom, 2014). By exploring survival strategies for the universe, we may help establish existential optimism for people who are living now, support life extension research, and gain more information from fundamental studies of physics. Another purpose of the discussion about surviving the end of the universe is to show that actual immortality is possible: that we have the opportunity to live not just billions and trillions of years, but for an unlimited duration. My hope is that recognizing the possibility to survive the end of the universe will encourage us to invest more in life extension and prevention of global catastrophic risks. Our life could be eternal and thus have meaning forever. The end of the observable universe is not an absolute end: it's just one more problem the future human race will be able to address. And even at the limited level of knowledge about the universe that we have today, we are still able to offer several dozen more ideas on how to prevent its end. In the distant future, we can find more ideas, choose the best, validate them, and prepare for their implementation.

#### That solves vacuum decay

Turchin 19 (Alexey Turchin an author of several books and articles on the topics of existential risks and life extension, and was published in "Futures", "Acta Astronatutica", "Informatica", "AI & Society" journals. He graduated in Moscow State University where he studied Physics and Art History (1997). He translated into Russian around 20 main articles about existential risks by Bostrom, Yudkowsky, Circovich, Kent, Hanson. From 2010 he works in the "Science for Life Extension Foundation" on various topics about life extension and risks prevention. He is a contributing author on IEET. He is the founder of the Digital Immortality Now startup. He is a member of the advisory boards of IEET, Open Longevity, AI agents, Arch Mission. In 2018 he won one of the prizes in AI Global Challenge race with his article on global solutions on AI safety, ”How to Survive the End of the Universe.” Version 2, Uploaded: 2019-11-28, Available at https://philpapers.org/rec/TURHTS-2, HKR-cjh)

4.6. Prevent accidental universe destruction There is a very small probability that we could destroy universe even now by starting false vacuum decay. Small black holes could be nucleation points of new vacuum, and such small black holes could theoretically appear during experiments in a hadron collider. The recently discovered Higgs boson’s mass range renders the vacuum decay hypothesis more probable; also, true vacuum will not be like ordinary vacuum, but will itself gravitationally collapse (Elias-Miro et al., 2012; Mack, 2015). Objections often refer to the fact that much more intensive collisions are happening in the universe all the time; however, there are small differences between collider experiments and natural collisions: the products of LHC collisions have a small relative speed to the Earth as opposite beams collide (Kent, 2004). As a result, it is possible small black holes could have the opportunity to catch surrounding atoms before evaporating via Hawking radiation and could start to grow. Such a growing black hole would eventually consume the Earth (as in David Brin’s novel Earth), but not immediately, as the accretion rate initially could be very slow on the early stages. It may take years before any observable effects became obvious (as the accretion rate could become stable on some lower level and the whole black hole will be just the size of a few atoms, surrounded by a pocket of hot gas and sitting somewhere in the center of the Earth). However, such a small black hole could exist long enough to make the random event of the false vacuum decay more probable (or maybe two such small black holes would need to collide) (Burda et al., 2015; Villatoro, 2015). 5. Survival strategies in relation to other ideas 5.1. Order of implementation Preventing the end of the universe should concentrate on different risks at different times. 1. False vacuum. We need to minimise the risk of false vacuum decay, while simultaneously getting more information about the nature of the universe and reducing our cosmological uncertainty. We should conduct experiments about the nature of the universe carefully, as they themselves may trigger false vacuum decay or have other unintended consequences. Also, if everything possible actually exists, false vacuum decay may be exactly compensated for by quantum immortality, and thus will be an unobservable and inconsequential event. However, if the speed of the false vacuum bubble is a little bit below the speed of light, we could observe the incoming bubble. For example, if the bubble originates 1 billion light-years from us and has the speed of 99.9 per cent of the speed of light, we would observe, and may be even be destroyed by the radiation of its domain walls. Bostrom and Tegmark estimated that such type of catastrophes has a probability below one percent in a billion years based on some observation selection effects: if they occurred more often, we should find ourselves earlier in the timeline of our universe (Tegmark & Bostrom, 2005). 2. Big Rip. This risk could arise relatively soon, but not very soon: even in the case of very implausible values of dark energy, it is still 20 billion years from now. 3. Heat death is the most remote risk, and we have plenty of time to prepare for it.

#### Impact cards have no implication – just cap which we’ll do next but it doesn’t undermine humanity, proven by the cards above, their impact cards are just bauot Elon Musk and Mars which is clearly cherrypicked

### Cap

#### Don’t let them delink – cx – said effects people on Earth OR they solve none of their imapcts

#### Tech innovation undergirded by profit motives are driving the Second Machine Age, which dematerializes capitalism and makes growth a sustainable necessity

This ev is v v v long but it’s amazing – answers basically every aff arg

McAfee, 19—cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, former professor at Harvard Business School and fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Andrew, “Looking Ahead: The World Cleanses Itself This Way,” *More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next*, Chapter 14, pg 278-292, Kindle, dml)

The decreases in resource use, pollution, and other exploitations of the earth cataloged in the preceding chapters are great news. But are they going to last? It could be that we're just living in a pleasant interlude between the Industrial Era and another rapacious period during which we massively increase our footprint on our planet and eventually cause a giant Malthusian crash.

It could be, but I don't think so. Instead, I think we're going to take better care of our planet from now on. I'm confident that the Second Machine Age will mark the time in our history when we started to progressively and permanently tread more lightly on the earth, taking less from it and generally caring for it better, even as we humans continue to become more numerous and prosperous. The work of Paul Romer, who shared the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics, is one of the sources of this confidence.

Growth Mindset

Romer's largest contribution to economics was to show that it's best not to think of new technologies as something that companies buy and bring in from the outside, but instead as something they create themselves (the title of his most famous paper, published in 1990, is "Endogenous Technological Change"). These technologies are like designs or recipes; as Romer put it, they’re "the instructions that we follow for combining raw materials." This is close to the definitions of technology presented in chapter 7.

Why do companies invent and improve technologies? Simply, to generate profits. They come up with instructions, recipes, and blueprints that will let them grow revenues or shrink costs. As we saw repeatedly in chapter 7, capitalism provides ample incentive for this kind of tech progress.

So far, all this seems like a pretty standard argument for how the first two horsemen work together. Romer's brilliance was to highlight the importance of two key attributes of the technological ideas companies come up with as they pursue profits. The first is that they're nonrival, meaning that they can be used by more than one person or company at a time, and that they don't get used up. This is obviously not the case for most resources made out of atoms—I can't also use the pound of steel that you've just incorporated into the engine of a car—but it is the case for ideas and instructions. The Pythagorean theorem, a design for a steam engine, and a recipe for delicious chocolate chip cookies aren't ever going to get "used up" no matter how much they're used.

The second important aspect of corporate technologies is that they're partially excludable. This means that companies can kind of prevent others from using them. They do this by keeping the technologies secret (such as the exact recipe for Coca-Cola), filing for patents and other intellectual-property protection, and so on. However, none of these measures is perfect (hence the words partially and kind of). Trade secrets leak. Patents expire, and even before they expire, they must describe the invention they're claiming and so let others study it.

Partial excludability is a beautiful thing. It provides strong incentives for companies to create useful, profit-enhancing new technologies that they alone can benefit from for a time, yet it also ensures that the new techs will eventually "spill over"—that with time they’ll diffuse and get adopted by more and more companies, even if that's not what their originators want.

Romer equated tech progress to the production by companies of nonrivalrous, partially excludable ideas and showed that these ideas cause an economy to grow. What's more, he also demonstrated that this idea-fueled growth doesn't have to slow down with time. It's not constrained by the size of the labor force, the amount of natural resources, or other such factors. Instead, economic growth is limited only by the idea-generating capacity of the people within a market. Romer called this capacity "human capital" and said at the end of his 1990 paper, "The most interesting positive implication of the model is that an economy with a larger total stock of human capital will experience faster growth."

This notion, which has come to be called "increasing returns to scale," is as powerful as it is counterintuitive. Most formal models of economic growth, as well as the informal mental ones most of us walk around with, feature decreasing returns—growth slows down as the overall economy gets bigger. This makes intuitive sense; it just feels like it would be easier to experience 5 percent growth in a $1 billion economy than a $1 trillion one. But Romer showed that as long as that economy continued to add to its human capital—the overall ability of its people to come up with new technologies and put them to use—it could actually grow faster even as it grew bigger. This is because the stock of useful, nonrivalrous, nonexcludable ideas would keep growing. As Romer convincingly showed, economies run and grow on ideas.

The Machinery of Prosperity

Romer's ideas should leave us optimistic about the planetary benefits of digital tools—hardware, software, and networks—for three main reasons. First, countless examples show us how good these tools are at fulfilling the central role of technology, which is to provide "instructions that we follow for combining raw materials." Since raw materials cost money, profit-maximizing companies are particularly keen to find ways to use fewer of them. So they use digital tools to come up with beer cans that use less aluminum, car engines that use less steel and less gas, mapping software that removes the need for paper atlases, and so on and so on. None of this is done solely for the good of the earth—it's done for the pursuit of profit that's at the heart of capitalism—yet it benefits the planet by, as we've seen, causing us to take less from it.

Digital tools are technologies for creating technologies, the most prolific and versatile ones we've ever come up with. They're machines for coming up with ideas. Lots of them. The same piece of computer-aided design software can be used to create a thinner aluminum can or a lighter and more fuel-efficient engine. A drone can be used to scan farmland to see if more irrigation is needed, or to substitute for a helicopter when filming a movie. A smartphone can be used to read the news, listen to music, and pay for things, all without consuming a single extra molecule.

In the Second Machine Age, the global stock of digital tools is increasing much more quickly than ever before. It's being used in countless ways by profit-hungry companies to combine raw materials in ways that use fewer of them. In advanced economies such as America's, the cumulative impact of this combination of capitalism and tech progress is clear: absolute dematerialization of the economy and society, and thus a smaller footprint on our planet.

The second way Romer's ideas about technology and growth are showing up at present is via decreased excludability. Pervasive digital tools are making it much easier for good designs and recipes to spread around the world. While this is often not what a company wants—it wants to exclude others from its great cost-saving idea— excludability is not as easy as it used to be.

This isn't because of weaker patent protection, but instead because of stronger digital tools. Once one company shows what's possible, others use hardware, software, and networks to catch up to the leader. Even if they can't copy exactly because of intellectual-property restrictions, they can use digital tools to explore other means to the same end. So, many farmers learn to get higher yields while using less water and fertilizer, even though they combine these raw materials in different ways. Steve Jobs would certainly have preferred for Apple to be the only provider of smartphones after it developed the iPhone, but he couldn't maintain the monopoly no matter how many patents and lawsuits he filed. Other companies found ways to combine processors, memory, sensors, a touch screen, and software into phones that satisfied billions of customers around the world.

The operating system that powers most non-Apple smartphones is Android, which is both free to use and freely modifiable. Google's parent company, Alphabet, developed and released Android without even trying to make it excludable; the explicit goal was to make it as widely imitable as possible. This is an example of the broad trend across digital industries of giving away valuable technologies for free.

The Linux operating system, of which Android is a descendant, is probably the best-known example of free and open-source software, but there are many others. The online software repository GitHub maintains that it's "the largest open source community in the world" and hosts millions of projects. The Arduino community does something similar for electronic hardware, and the Instructables website contains detailed instructions for making equipment ranging from air-particle counters to machine tools, all with no intellectual-property protection. Contributors to efforts such as these have a range of motivations (Alphabet's goals with Android were far from purely altruistic—among other things, the parent of Google wanted to achieve a quantum leap in mobile phone users around the world, who would avail themselves of Google Search and services such as YouTube), but they're all part of the trend of technology without excludability, which is great news for growth.

As we saw in chapter 10, smartphone use and access to the Internet are increasing quickly across the planet. This means that people no longer need to be near a decent library or school to gain knowledge and improve their abilities. Globally, people are taking advantage of the skill-building opportunities of new technologies. This is the third reason that the spread of digital tools should make us optimistic about future growth: these tools are helping human capital grow quickly.

The free Duolingo app, for example, is now the world's most popular way to learn a second language. Of the nearly 15 billion Wikipedia page views during July of 2018, half were in languages other than English. Google's chief economist, Hal Varian, points out that hundreds of millions of how-to videos are viewed every day on YouTube, saying, "We never had a technology before that could educate such a broad group of people anytime on an as-needed basis for free."

Romer's work leaves me hopeful because it shows that it's our ability to build human capital, rather than chop down forests, dig mines, or burn fossil fuels that drives growth and prosperity. His model of how economies grow also reinforces how well capitalism and tech progress work together, which is a central point of this book. The surest way to boost profits is to cut costs, and modern technologies, especially digital ones, offer unlimited ways to combine and recombine materials—to swap, slim, optimize, and evaporate—in cost-reducing ways. There's no reason to expect that the two horsemen of capitalism and tech progress will stop riding together anytime soon. Quite the contrary. Romer's insights reveal that they're likely to gallop faster and farther as economies grow.

Our Brighter, Lighter Future

The world still has billions of desperately poor people, but they won't remain that way. All available evidence strongly suggests that most will become much wealthier in the years and decades ahead. As they earn more and consume more, what will be the impact on the planet?

The history and economics of the Industrial Era lead to pessimism on this important question. Resource use increased in lockstep with economic growth throughout the two centuries between James Watt's demonstration of his steam engine and the first Earth Day. Malthus and Jevons seemed to be right, and it was just a question of when, not if, we'd run up against the hard planetary limits to growth.

But in America and other rich countries something strange, unexpected, and wonderful happened: we started getting more from less. We decoupled population and economic growth from resource consumption, pollution, and other environmental harms. Malthus's and Jevons's ideas gave way to Romer's, and the world will never be the same.

This means that instead of worrying about the world's poor becoming richer, we should instead be helping them upgrade economically as much and as quickly as possible. Not only is it the morally correct thing to do, it's also the smart move for our planet. As today’s poor countries get richer, their institutions will improve and most will eventually go through what Ricardo Hausmann calls "the capitalist makeover of production." This makeover doesn't enslave people, nor does it befoul the earth.

As today’s poor get richer, they'll consume more, but they'll also consume much differently from earlier generations. They won't read physical newspapers and magazines. They'll get a great deal of their power from renewables and (one hopes) nuclear because these energy sources will be the cheapest. They’ll live in cities, as we saw in chapter 12; in fact, they already are. They'll be less likely to own cars because a variety of transportation options will be only a few taps away. Most important, they'll come up with ideas that keep the growth going, and that benefit both humanity and the planet we live on.

Predicting exactly how technological progress will unfold is much like predicting the weather: feasible in the short term, but impossible over a longer time. Great uncertainty and complexity prevent precise forecasts about, for example, the computing devices we’ll be using thirty years from now or the dominant types of artificial intelligence in 2050 and beyond.

But even though we can't predict the weather long term, we can accurately forecast the climate. We know how much warmer and sunnier it will be on average in August than in January, for example, and we know that global average temperatures will rise as we keep adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. Similarly, we can predict the "climate" of future technological progress by starting from the knowledge that it will be heavily applied in the areas where it can affect capitalism the most. As we've seen over and over, tech progress supplies opportunities to trim costs (and improve performance) via dematerialization, and capitalism provides the motive to do so.

As a result, the Second Enlightenment will continue as we move deeper into the twenty-first century. I'm confident that it will accelerate as digital technologies continue to improve and multiply and global competition continues to increase. We’ll see some of the most striking examples of slim, swap, evaporate, and optimize in exactly the places where the opportunities are biggest. Here are a few broad predictions, spanning humanity's biggest industries.

Manufacturing. Complex parts will be made not by the techniques developed during the Industrial Era, but instead by three- dimensional printing. This is already the case for some rocket engines and other extremely expensive items. As 3-D printing improves and becomes cheaper, it will spread to automobile engine blocks, manifolds and other complicated arrangements of pipes, airplane struts and wings, and countless other parts. Because 3-D printing generates virtually no waste and doesn't require massive molds, it accelerates dematerialization.

We'll also be building things out of very different materials from what we're using today. We're rapidly improving our ability to use machine learning and massive amounts of computing power to screen the huge number of molecules available in the world. Well use this ability to determine which substances would be best for making flexible solar panels, more efficient batteries, and other important equipment. Our search for the right materials to use has so far been slow and laborious. That's about to change.

So is our ability to understand nature's proteins, and to generate new ones. All living things are made out of the large biomolecules known as proteins, as are wondrous materials such as spiders' silk. The cells in our bodies are assembly lines for proteins, but we currently understand little about how these assembly lines work—how they fold a two-dimensional string of amino acids into a complicated 3-D protein. But thanks to digital tools, we're learning quickly. In 2018, as part of a contest, the AlphaFold software developed by Google DeepMind correctly guessed the structure of twenty-five out of forty-three proteins it was shown; the second-place finisher guessed correctly three times. DeepMind cofounder Demis Hassabis says, "We [haven't] solved the protein-folding problem, this is just a first step... but we have a good system and we have a ton of ideas we haven't implemented yet." As these good ideas accumulate, they might well let us make spider-strength materials.

Energy. One of humanity's most urgent tasks in the twenty-first century is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Two ways to do this are to become more efficient in using energy and, when generating it, to shift away from carbon-emitting fossil fuels. Digital tools will help greatly with both.

Several groups have recently shown that they can combine machine learning and other techniques to increase the energy efficiency of data centers by as much as 30 percent. This large improvement matters for two reasons. First, data centers are heavy users of energy, accounting for about 1 percent of global electricity demand. So efficiencies in these facilities help. Second, and more important, these gains indicate how much the energy use of all our other complicated infrastructures— everything from electricity grids to chemical plants to steel mills—can be trimmed. All are a great deal less energy efficient than they could be. We have both ample opportunity and ample incentive now to improve them.

Both wind and solar power are becoming much cheaper, so much so that in many parts of the world they're now the most cost-effective options, even without government subsidies, for new electrical generators. These energy sources use virtually no resources once they're up and running and generate no greenhouse gases; they're among the world champions of dematerialization.

In the decades to come they might well be joined by nuclear fusion, the astonishingly powerful process that takes place inside the sun and other stars. Harnessing fusion has been tantalizingly out of reach for more than half a century—the old joke is that it's twenty years away and always will be. A big part of the problem is that it's hard to control the fusion reaction inside any human- made vessel, but massive improvements in sensors and computing power are boosting hope that fusion power might truly be only a generation away.

Transportation. Our current transportation systems are chronically inefficient. Most vehicles aren't used much of the time, and even when they’re in use, they're not nearly full. Now that we have technologies that let us know where every driver, passenger, piece of cargo, and vehicle is at all times, we can greatly increase the utilization and efficiency of every element of transportation.

Renting instead of owning transportation is a likely consequence of this shift. Instead of owning cars, which typically sit idle more than 90 percent of the time, more people will choose to access transportation as needed. We're already seeing this with car-hailing companies such as Uber and Lyft. These services are quickly spreading around the world, and expanding to cover more modes of transportation, from motorbikes to bicycles to electric scooters. They're also moving into commercial applications such as long- and short-haul trucking. As this shift continues, we’ll need fewer tons of steel, aluminum, plastic, gasoline, and other resources to move the world's people and goods around.

We might also experience less congestion and gridlock as we try to get around. Bikes and scooters take up little space compared to cars, so streets can accommodate many more of them. Technology also gives us the ability to implement many forms of "congestion pricing," which has been shown to reduce gridlock by making car access to busy streets expensive enough that people use other options. The most intriguing future transportation platform of all might be the sky. The same technologies that power today's small drones can be scaled up to build "air taxis" with as many as eight propellers and no pilot. Such contraptions sound like science fiction today, but they might be carrying us around by midcentury.

Agriculture. As we saw in chapter 5, leading farms have demonstrated an ability to increase their tonnage of output year after year while decreasing their use of inputs such as land, water, and fertilizer. This trend toward optimization will continue thanks to a set of innovations under the label precision agriculture. The precision comes from many sources, including better sensors of plant and animal health, soil quality and moisture, and so on; the ability to deliver fertilizer, pesticides, and water just where they're needed; and machinery that adapts itself to each plant or animal. All these varieties of precision will combine to allow traditional farms to generate more from less.

So will changes to the genomes of plants and animals. DNA modifications will increase disease and drought tolerance, expand where crops can be grown, and allow us to get more of what we want from each crop or herd. As we saw in chapter 9, they'll also allow us to take better care of vulnerable populations such as infants in poor countries by creating golden rice and other nutrition enhancers. We'll also be able to make much more precise and targeted genetic modifications thanks to a new crop of gene-editing tools that are large improvements over their more scattershot predecessors. Opposition to genetically modified organisms is fierce in some quarters, but isn't based on reason or science. This opposition will, one hopes, fade.

Throughout human history, just about all farming has been done in fields. For some crops, this is now changing. Agriculture has moved indoors, where parameters such as light, humidity, fertilizer, and even the composition of the atmosphere can be precisely monitored and controlled. In everything from urban buildings to shipping containers, crops are now being grown with progressively less labor and fewer material inputs. These completely contained farms will spread and help reduce the planetary footprint of our agriculture.

These examples aren't intended to be comprehensive, and I don't have precise estimates of how likely each innovation is, or when it's most likely to occur. I offer them only to indicate how broad and exciting are the possibilities offered by the two horsemen of capitalism and technological progress, and how they’ll continue to dematerialize our consumption and let us increase our prosperity while treading more lightly on our planet.

## Space Debris

#### Uncertainty from debris collisions creates restraint not instability.

MacDonald 16, B., et al. "Crisis stability in space: China and other challenges." Foreign Policy Institute. Washington, DC (2016). (senior director of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Project with the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention)//Elmer

In any crisis that threatens to escalate into major power conflict, political and military leaders will face uncertainty about the effectiveness of their plans and decisions. This uncertainty will be compounded when potential conflict extends to the space and cyber domains, where weapon effectiveness is largely untested and uncertain, infrastructure interdependencies are unclear, and damaging an adversary could also harm oneself or one’s allies. Unless the stakes become very high, no country will likely want to gamble its well-being in a “single cosmic throw of the dice,” in Harold Brown’s memorable phrase. 96 The novelty of space and cyber warfare, coupled with risk aversion and worst-case assessments, could lead space adversaries into a situation of what can be called “hysteresis,” where each adversary is restrained by its own uncertainty of success. This is conceptually shown in Figures 1 and 2 for offensive counter-space capabilities, though it applies more generally. 97 These graphs portray the hypothetical differences between perceived and actual performance capabilities of offensive counter-space weapons, on a scale from zero to one hundred percent effectiveness. Where uncertainty and risk aversion are absent for two adversaries, no difference would exist between the likely performance of their offensive counter-space assets and their confidence in the performance of those weapons: a simple, straight-line correlation would exist, as in Figure 1. The more interesting, and more realistic, case is notionally presented in Figure 2, which assumes for simplicity that the offensive capabilities of each adversary are comparable. In stark contrast to the case of Figure 1, uncertainty and risk aversion are present and become important factors. Given the high stakes involved in a possible large-scale attack against adversary space assets, a cautious adversary is more likely to be conservative in estimating the effectiveness of its offensive capabilities, while more generously assessing the capabilities of its adversary. Thus, if both side’s weapons were 50% effective and each side had a similar level of risk aversion, each may conservatively assess its own capabilities to be 30% effective and its adversary’s weapons to be 70% effective. Likewise, if each side’s weapons were 25% effective in reality, each would estimate its own capabilities to be less than 25% effective and its adversary’s to be more than 25% effective, and so on. In Figure 2, this difference appears, in oversimplified fashion, as a gap that represents the realistic worry that a country’s own weapons will under-perform while its adversary’s weapons will over-perform in terms of effectiveness. If both countries face comparable uncertainty and exhibit comparable risk aversion, each may be deterred from initiating an attack by its unwillingness to accept the necessary risks. This gap could represent an “island of stability,” as shown in Figure 2. In essence, given the enormous stakes involved in a major strike against the adversary’s space assets, a potential attacker will likely demonstrate some risk aversion, possessing less confidence in an attack’s effectiveness. It is uncertain how robust this hysteresis may prove to be, but the phenomenon may provide at least some stabilizing influence in a crisis. In the nuclear domain, the immediate, direct consequences of military use, including blast, fire, and direct radiation effects, were appreciated at the outset. Nonetheless, significant uncertainty and under-appreciation persisted with regard to the collateral, indirect, and climatological effects of using such weapons on a large scale. In contrast, the immediate, direct effects of major space conflict are not well understood, and potential indirect and interdependent effects are even less understood. Indirect effects of large-scale space and cyber warfare would be virtually impossible to confidently calculate, as the infrastructures such warfare would affect are constantly changing in design and technology. Added to this is a likely anxiety that if an attack were less successful than planned, a highly aggrieved and powerful adversary could retaliate in unanticipated ways, possibly with highly destructive consequences. As a result, two adversaries facing potential conflict may lack confidence both in the potential effectiveness of their own attacks and in the ineffectiveness of any subsequent retaliation. Such mutual uncertainty would ultimately be stabilizing, though probably not particularly robust. This is reflected in Figure 2, where each side shows more caution than the technical effectiveness of its systems may suggest. Each curve notionally represents one state’s confidence in its offensive counter-space effectiveness relative to their actual effectiveness. Until true space asset resilience becomes a trusted feature of space architectures, deterrence by risk aversion, and cross-domain deterrence, may be the only means for deterrence to function in space.

#### Collision risk is very small

Fange 17 Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.

#### Active debris removal coming now – solves debris

Chow 18 [Brian G. - PhD in physics from Case Western Reserve University, “Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach,” p. 115, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Volume 12, Number 2, JSTOR]

There are three reasons the United States **should not attempt to ban debris removal** and servicing spacecraft to deal with space stalking threat. First, ADR spacecraft are necessary in the emerging era **to prevent the space debris population from increasing and hindering the peaceful uses of space.** Also, as space technologies continue to become more capable and less expensive, it is highly advantageous to have some satellite services performed in space. Second, as noted earlier, China will likely deploy both ADR and OOS spacecraft in the early 2020s and Russia is likely to follow suit in the 2020s. Even if the United States wanted to delay ADR and OOS deployment for the benefit of preventing space stalker threat, it could not dissuade China and Russia from such a deployment. Third, and most importantly, there is a way to both deter and defend against space stalkers and still be able to benefit from the presence of ADR and OOS spacecraft.

#### Solar flares will end satellites inevitably – no defense

Wild 15 (Jim Wild, Professor of Space Physics at Lancaster University, “With So Much Vested In Satellites, Solar Storms Could Bring Life To A Standstill,” July 30, 2015, https://theconversation.com/with-so-much-vested-in-satellites-solar-storms-could-bring-life-to-a-standstill-45204)

These can disrupt satellite operations by depositing electrical charge within the on-board electronics, triggering phantom commands or overloading and damaging sensitive components. The effects of space weather on the Earth’s upper atmosphere disrupts radio signals transmitted by navigation satellites, potentially introducing positioning errors or, in more severe cases, rendering them unusable.

These are not theoretical hazards: in recent decades, solar storms have caused outages for a number of satellites services – and a handful of satellites have been lost altogether. These were costly events – satellite operator losses have run into hundreds of millions of dollars. The wider social and economic impact was relatively limited, but even so it’s unclear how our growing amount of space infrastructure would fare against the more extreme space weather that we might face.

When Space Weather Becomes A Hurricane

The largest solar storm on record was the Carrington event in September 1859, named after the British astronomer who observed it. Of course there were no Victorian satellites to suffer the consequences, but the telegraph systems of the time were crippled as electrical currents induced in the copper wires interfered with signals, electrocuted operators and set telegraph paper alight. The geomagnetic storm it triggered was so intense that the northern lights, usually a polar phenomenon, were observed as far south as the Bahamas.

Statistical analysis of this and other severe solar storms suggests that we can expect an event of this magnitude once every few hundred years – it’s a question of “when” rather than “if”. A 2007 study estimated a Carrington event today would cause US$30 billion in losses for satellite operators and threaten vital infrastructure in space and here on the ground. It’s a risk taken sufficiently seriously that it appears on the UK National Risk Register and has led the government to draw up its preparedness programme.

#### Their impact ev says nothing – economic impact and starvation are just the terminal of nuclear war which we’ll answer next. No terminal to shipping/services/etc going down bc it just says reliant which proves we can just switch to pre sat techology esp since kessler doesn’t happen all at once

#### No Escalation over Satellites:

#### 1] Planning Priorities

Bowen 18 Bleddyn Bowen 2-20-2018 “The Art of Space Deterrence” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/> (Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester)//Elmer

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### 2] If we don’t have sufficient data we move the satellite to ‘lost’ category

Hoots ’15 [Felix; Fall 2015; Distinguished Engineer in the System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, Ph.D. in Mathematics from Auburn University, M.S. in Mathematics from Tennessee Tech University; Crosslink, “Keeping Track: Space Surveillance for Operational Support,” <https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Crosslink%20Fall%202015%20V16N1%20.pdf>; RP]

The JSpOC tasks these sensors to track specific satellites and to record data such as time, azimuth, elevation, and range. This data is used to create orbital element sets or state vectors that represent the observed position of the satellite. The observed position can then be compared with the predicted position. The dynamic models used for predicting satellite motion are not perfect; factors such as atmospheric density variation caused by unmodeled solar activity can cause the predicted position to gradually stray from the true position. The observations are used to correct the predicted trajectory so the network can continue to track the satellite. This process of using observations to correct and refine an orbit in an ongoing feedback loop is called catalog maintenance, and it continues as long as the satellite remains in orbit. Ideally, the process is automatic, with manual intervention only required when satellites maneuver or get near to reentry due to atmospheric drag.

Sometimes, however, more effort is required. For example, a sensor may encounter a satellite trajectory that does not correspond well to anything in the catalog. Such observations are known as partially correlated observations if they are somewhat close to a known orbit or uncorrelated observations (or uncorrelated tracks) if they are far from any known orbit. Also, if a satellite is not tracked for five days, it is placed on an attention list for manual intervention. In that case, an analyst will attempt to match the wayward satellite to one of these partially correlated or uncorrelated tracks. If that effort succeeds, then the element sets are updated, and the object is returned to automatic catalog maintenance. On the other hand, if the satellite cannot be matched to a partially correlated or uncorrelated track, the satellite information continues to age. If it reaches 30 days without a match, the satellite is placed on the lost list.

One of the most visible uses of the catalog is to warn about collision risks for active payloads. This function predicts potential close approaches three to five days in advance to allow time to plan avoidance maneuvers, if necessary. Unplanned maneuvers may disturb normal operations and deplete resources for future maneuvers, so one would like to have high confidence in the collision-risk predictions. The reliability of the predictions depends directly on the accuracy of the orbit calculation, which in turn depends on the quality and quantity of the tracking data, which is limited by the capability of the Space Surveillance Network. Simply put, there are not enough tracking resources in the network to achieve high-quality orbits for every object in the catalog. Furthermore, many smaller objects can only be tracked by the most sensitive radars, and this tracking is infrequent. Most objects in the catalog are considered debris, which can neither maneuver nor broadcast telemetry. On the other hand, some satellite operators depend exclusively on the satellite catalog to know where their satellites are, and users of the satellite orbital data depend on the catalog to know when the satellites will be within view.

This situation creates a challenging problem in balancing Space Surveillance Network resources to support the collision-warning task (tracking as many potential hazards as possible) while also providing highly accurate support to operational satellites (tracking the spacecraft as precisely as possible). The practical solution is to perform collision risk assessment using a large screening radius to ensure no close approaches are missed despite lower-quality predictions. Once an object is identified as having a potentially close approach, then the tasking level is raised, with the expectation that more tracking data will be obtained to refine the collision risk calculations. When the danger has passed, the object reverts to a normal tracking level.

Collisions and spontaneous breakups do happen. The first satellite breakup occurred on June 29, 1961, when residual fuel in an Ablestar rocket body exploded, creating 296 trackable pieces of debris. Since that time, there have been more than 200 satellite breakups, the most notable being the missile intercept of the Fengyun-1C satellite, which created more than 3300 trackable fragments. In most cases, these breakups are first detected by the phased-array radars in the Space Surveillance Network. When multiple objects are observed where only one was expected, the downstream sensors are alerted, but no tasking is issued because specific debris orbits are not yet established. Tracks are taken and tagged as uncorrelated. Analysts at JSpOC then attempt to link uncorrelated tracks from different sensors to form a candidate orbit. Subsequent tracking improves the orbit to the point that the object can be named and numbered and moved into the catalog for automatic maintenance.

#### But debris is good—

#### Loss of satellites shuts down drones

Daniel Ventre 11, Engineer for CNRS and Researcher for CESDIP, Cyberwar and Information Warfare, p. 198-199

The introduction of cyberspace operations is part of a specific context; a major evolution in the operation environment and the nature of the conflicts, which make irregular wars the rule, and make regular actors the exception to the rule. But the battle against unconventional, non-state governed, irregular actors raises specific problems: there are multiple actors, unpredictable at that, who do not abide by the same rules. New orders in conflicts are imposing the implementation of an ever more important need for information, and information collection and processing. Networks now have an incredible importance. The document refers to the growing threats against American heritage: the USA is a target and the increasing amount of attacks against their networks is indeed the proof of this. There are many obstacles which need to be removed before they can achieve real superiority and freedom to act, especially as vulnerable points may originate within the very operations of the armed forces. An example of this is the vulnerability of using products (software and hardware), commercial products (off-the-shelf), and sometimes even foreign products123. This brings to mind the fact that the US Air Force uses commercial, even foreign, applications for its cyberspace operations.

Information space extends to space124, particularly via communication and observation satellites125. Satellites are the keystone to the cyberspace and communication systems, but also the security system: monitoring (Echelon network is the symbol), observation, communication. These are at the heart of the C4ISR systems, without which a concept such as network-centric warfare could not exist. There would be no drones without satellites. It is even a question of extending the Internet to extra-atmospheric space. Projects in this vein (Interplanetary Networks) were being formed in the 1990s, but ran into several technical difficulties (delays in important transmissions due to high distances and costs) [GEL 06]. NASA dedicates a few pages on its website to this project126. The development of communication systems based on the infrastructures in extra-atmospheric space will also raise questions for legal, geopolitical and geostrategic domains: questions of seizing this space, questions of regulation of human activity in this space, of sovereignty, new territoriality and independence.

#### Drone prolif is inevitable and causes global nuclear war

Dr. Michael C. Horowitz 19, Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania, NDT Champion from Emory University, PhD in Government from Harvard University, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability”, 5/2/2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3348356

Thus, the reason to deploy autonomous systems would have to be their reliability and effectiveness rather than signaling. And giving up human control to algorithms in a crisis that could end with global nuclear war would require an extremely high level of perceived reliability and effectiveness. Few things are more important to militaries in crisis situations than informational awareness and control over decisions, and there might be fear that autonomous systems are prone to accidents.

This counterfactual illustrates that the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems by national militaries, if it occurs, is unlikely to have simple, easy, and linear consequences. Instead, human factors, including the psychological desire for control and organizational politics, will strongly shape how militaries think about developing and using LAWS. This will not just influence the potential for arms races in peacetime, but deterrence and wartime stability due to the organizational processes militaries implement for the deployment and use of autonomous systems on the battlefield.

This paper draws on research in strategic studies and examples from military history to assess how LAWS could influence the development and deployment of military systems, including arms races, crisis stability, and wartime stability, especially the risk of escalation. It also discusses the potential for arms control. It focuses on these questions through the lens of key characteristics of LAWS, especially the potential for increased operational speed and, simultaneously, less human control over battlefield choices. One of the primary attractions of autonomous systems, even compared to remotely piloted systems, is the potential to operate at machine speed. Another potential benefit is the possibility of machine-like accuracy in following programming, but that comes with a potential downside: the loss of control and the accompanying risk of accidents, adversarial spoofing, and miscalculation. Even if LAWS malfunction at the same rate as humans in a given scenario, the ability of operators to control the impact of those malfunctions may be lower, which could make LAWS less predictable on the battlefield. The paper then examines how these issues interact with the large uncertainty parameter associated with AI-based military capabilities at present, both in terms of the range of the possible and the opacity of their programming.

The results highlight several critical issues surrounding the development and deployment of LAWS.1 First, the desire to fight at machine speed with autonomous systems, while making a military more effective in a conflict, could increase crisis instability. As countries fear losing conflicts faster, it will generate escalation pressure, including an increased incentive for first strikes. Second, in addition to the actual risk of accidents and miscalculation from LAWS, the fear of accidents and losing control of autonomous systems could limit the willingness of militaries to deploy them, particularly since many militaries are conservative when it comes to emerging technologies and have high standards for system reliability. Third, the dual-use, or even general purpose, character of the basic science underlying many autonomous systems will make the technology hard to control, giving many countries and actors access to basic algorithms, though whether this is described as diffusion, proliferation, or an arms race will depend on political dynamics as much as anything.

Finally, multiple uncertainty parameters concerning lethal autonomous weapon systems could exacerbate security dilemmas. Uncertainty over the range of the possible concerning the programming of lethal autonomous weapon systems will increase fear of those systems in the near term, making restraint less likely for competitive reasons. Moreover, the inherent differences between remotely piloted systems and LAWS at the platform level come from software, not hardware. There is arguably an inherent opacity to lethal autonomous weapon systems. If an arms race over lethal autonomous weapon systems occurs, it will likely be because of worse-case assumptions about capability development by potential adversaries.

What is Autonomy or Artificial Intelligence?

Artificial intelligence is the use of computing power, in the form of algorithms, to conduct tasks that previously required human intelligence.2 Artificial intelligence in this context is best thought of as an umbrella technology or enabler, like the combustion engine or electricity. Military applications of artificial intelligence are potentially broad – from image recognition for surveillance to more efficient logistics to battle management.3 These include both non-kinetic applications, including in the cyber realm, as well as kinetic applications.4 One potential application of artificial intelligence is through armed autonomous systems that could be deployed on the battlefield, or what are most popularly called lethal autonomous weapon systems or lethal autonomous weapon systems. This differs from remotely-piloted systems where a human, though at a distance, still operates a given vehicle or system.

What is a lethal autonomous weapon system? While simple to describe on first glance, and easy to understand in the extreme – an armed humanoid robot with extremely broad programming making decisions about engaging in warfare – drawing the line between a lethal autonomous weapon system and other weapon systems is complex. In Directive 3000.09, published in 2012, the US Department of Defense defines an autonomous weapon as “A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”5 What it means to select and engage a target is not entirely clear, however. For example, homing munitions, which have existed since World War II, select and engage targets, according to a common sense understanding of the terms.6

Exactly what functions are autonomous also matters. A system could have automatic piloting, for example, that flies or drives a platform to a target, but still have complete human control over the use of the weapon. That would be a system with a high level of automation, though not a lethal autonomous weapon system according to most perspectives. Heather Roff measures the level of autonomy in a weapon system based on three subcomponents: self-mobility, self-direction, and self-determination. This helps distinguish systems where there might be autonomy concerning the best way a missile should get to a target, but the target itself is designated by a person fromsystems where an algorithm might be making higher-level engagement decisions.7 There are already some applications of limited machine autonomy in military systems, with the most prominent example being the automatic mode present on many Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), such as the Phalanx, used to defend ships and incoming missiles from attack.8

This article will not resolve the definitional debate surrounding lethal autonomous weapon systems, which is still ongoing in meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts focused on lethal autonomous weapon systems in the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Provisionally, this article adopts the Scharre and Horowitz definition that a lethal autonomous weapon system is “[A] weapon system that, once activated, is intended to select and engage targets where a human has not decided those specific targets are to be engaged.”9 However, moving beyond the close cases (e.g. particular types of missile guidance systems) and considering those weapon systems that clearly use machine intelligence to search for, select, and/or engage targets can help clarify what is at stake in this debate in the first place.10 After all, if most militaries most of the time would not have any need for lethal autonomous weapon systems, or those systems have significant disadvantages relative to remotely-piloted military robotics or soldiers on the battlefield, the stakes are lower. In contrast, if the integration of machine intelligence with military systems could give countries or violent non-state actors a significant advantage in how they employ force, it becomes even more crucial to engage the topic.

It is important to note that this article does not address concerns about existential risk related to artificial general intelligence – the fear that a superintelligence could decide to destroy the human race, either because it decides humans are malign or because humans program it to achieve a goal it can only accomplish by destroying humans.11 The existential risk issue associated with artificial intelligence is not necessarily closely coupled to military applications of artificial intelligence. If a super-intelligent machine learning system has the ability to take over human society in the interest of a goal – any goal – whether autonomous systems at much smaller orders of magnitude already exist in military systems will likely be unimportant. The super-intelligent system would simply create what it needed.

Why Invest in Autonomous Systems?

Militaries are already increasing their investments in remotely-piloted robotic systems. From UAVs such as the MQ-9 Reaper (United States) to uninhabited surface vehicles (USVs) such as the Guardium (Israel) to uninhabited ground vehicles (UGV) such as Platform-M (Russia), militaries around the world are investing in remotely piloted platforms, some of which can carry weapons. In these systems, human control over the use of force is not fundamentally different from the use of force with inhabited systems. In some cases, such as the MQ-9 Reaper, the sensor system a drone pilot uses to launch a weapon might even be the same sensor system a pilot in the cockpit of an inhabited fighter uses. Using remotely piloted systems gives militaries the ability to reduce the risk to their own soldiers while still projecting power in similar ways to how they used force previously.12 The first places militaries are likely to use kinetic lethal autonomous weapon systems include relatively “clear” environments such as air-to-air combat or naval combat, especially in geographic arenas where civilians are extremely unlikely to be present.13

#### Drolif means every hotspot goes nuclear.

Zenko and Kreps, PhDs, 14 \*Micah - Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, PhD in political science from Brandeis University; \*Sarah - Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor in the department of government and an adjunct professor at Cornell Law School, BA from Harvard University, MSc from Oxford University, and PhD from Georgetown University; “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," Council on Foreign Relations, June 2014, http://aspheramedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Limiting\_Armed\_Drone\_Proliferation\_CSR69.pdf

The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.27 With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft— unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.28 Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.29 This scenario points to the spiraling escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”30 The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.31 A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would have tremendous consequences for regional and international stability. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).32 It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have publicly articulated any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to shape drone doctrines, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.