# 1NC

### 1

#### CP: Ukraine should:

#### Increase private and civilian entity cooperation with the Russian Federation over a joint lunar base.

#### Ban all other appropriation of outer space by private entities in Ukraine.

#### The CP solves Ukraine-Russian relations that cement interdependence preventing conflict AND saves Russia’s Economy.

Beldavs 14 Vid Beldavs 8-25-2014 "An outer space solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict" <https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2582/1> (Writer at the Space Review)//Elmer

Russia has chosen to invest heavily in military modernization but has let its R&D capacity deteriorate. Russia barely invests 1% of its GDP in R&D, far less than nations like Israel (4.2%), South Korea (3.7%), Sweden (3.3%), and Finland (3.1%.) The EU has a goal of 3% of GDP invested in R&D by 2020, the US invests about 2.7%, and China presently is at about 2% but has targeted 3% in the long term. If innovation is the primary driver of economic development, Russia’s choice of emphasizing the military is likely to have disastrous consequences, further exacerbating its brain drain. Bright people, particularly scientists, will continue to leave to do great science elsewhere. Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin often speaks of building a Russian Moon base. The capital flight that has occurred over the years could have funded multiple lunar bases and possibly a base on Mars. In 2014 the plans have become more elaborate, but less realizable after the Ukraine fiasco. Now Rogozin speaks of a permanent base, with a Russian presence on the Moon forever. Consider the money spent on the military after its modernization drive started in 2008. If a quarter of the hundreds of billions in military spending had gone into advanced space development, it could have been Russia-based asteroid mining companies that find and exploit the asteroids with trillions of dollars of recoverable resources. Instead it will be Deep Space Industries, SpaceX, Planetary Resources, and other American companies that will reap the rewards. Now that weapons have been purchased and the troops have been trained to use them, the impulse is to put the military to use. Russia is losing hundreds of billions due to a senseless war that did not have to take place. The Ukraine crisis started as a result of a gross misreading of Ukrainian public opinion by Russian leadership. About 75% of the public was for joining the EU in the fall of 2013, eagerly anticipating President Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement. In the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, 318 votes out of 449 has been cast for joining the EU, reflecting strong support from all regions of the country. The people of Ukraine—Russian, Polish, Tatar, Ukrainian, and other nationalities—had the hope that their country could finally get on the road to prosperity where they could live like their European neighbors. President Yanukovych had been elected in 2010 on the basis of his advocacy for Ukraine joining the EU. When Russian President Putin compelled the alternative solution, for Ukraine to join the new Eurasian Union led by Russia, the public was outraged. The Maidan revolution was a predictable consequence that had nothing to do with Victoria Nuland, NATO, or other Western influence. Russian interests would have been much better served if Yanukovych had simply been allowed to sign the EU Agreement. He would have increased his political standing in Ukraine while remaining a friend of Russia. Yanukovych is history, Petro Poroshenko is now president, and there have been thousands of casualties in a senseless war that harms Russia, Ukraine, and the EU. Economic growth in the EU is threatening to collapse, while the Russian and Ukrainian economies are imploding. The Russian and Ukrainian economies are deeply intertwined, particularly in the space and high technology sectors. The war in eastern Ukraine is affecting both economies and resulting in significant delays in Russian space efforts as Russia seeks to substitute its own production for imports from Ukraine. It is time to consider a solution to the problems of the region. A large-scale project that results in an investment of billions in the Russian, Ukrainian, and EU space and technology sectors could provide a highly visible re-unifier that generates jobs in eastern Ukraine and bolsters science and industrial development in Russia and drives innovation in the EU to lift it back to a growth path. Why not reframe the Russia-Ukraine-EU relationship towards a mutually positive future? Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin has already given the answer: build the Moon base as a joint Russia-Ukraine-EU project. Better yet, why not expand the opportunity and invite the US, China, Japan, and others to join? There is an existing structure that could make it work. It is the International Space Station (ISS): the largest international cooperation effort in technology development in human history. In fact, the ISS has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Such a project could begin the drive for industrial development of the Moon and beyond, and create a permanent Russian presence on the Moon forever, in partnership with Ukraine, the EU and the rest of the world. Stop the stupid war. Build the Moon base.

#### Russian Economic Decline causes Nuclear War.

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Scenario 1: Disintegration If the Russian economy continues to deteriorate and the regime continue to distance themselves from the West, the centre may not be capable to maintain legitimacy and keep the periphery together. Already, some regions and counties are highly indebted. In other parts, ethnic Russians are a minority. Regions in eastern Russia, rich in raw materials, may look to China for funding. It is, however, probable that Beijing will not want to undermine the stability in Russia. Closer to the region in focus in this report, Kaliningrad is an area that could distance itself from the Kremlin. Economic problems and security concerns form a background that could lead to a political uprising. A “Kaliningrad-Maidan” development is at the heart of this scenario. Triggers could also come from outside Kaliningrad, in or in the immediate surrounding of the Russian Federation, or from other factors such as severe pollution. The other countries in the region would in all probability remain cool in this situation, considering the county’s military importance for the Russian government. However, a mutiny like the ones in Kroonstad in June 1917, March 1921 or on the frigate Storozjevoj in November 1975 cannot be excluded. Economic and political tensions in Europe could weaken the EU and worsen the development at the same time. A Greek withdrawal from the EU, triggered by its exit from the Eurozone, could set such a movement in motion. A Podemos-led government in Spain could undermine confidence for the single market, at a time when Europe also faces the consequences of a highly unstable North Africa, with a large flow of migrants. Attempts by Russia to influence certain members in the EU, such as Hungary and Cyprus, could sow further discord in the EU. At the most severe levels of disintegration, France could adopt policies effectively blocking EU and NATO response in a time of increased tensions. Britain may opt out of the union altogether, or be forced out if their demands for special status is rejected by the other member states. In all varieties of disintegration, uncertainty concerning the control over the nuclear arsenals will increase. The US will become involved both diplomatically and financially in order to bring clarity and establish control over the arsenals. Should Russia, in that situation, ask for military support for this, it is highly probable that the US would acquiesce: such operations in other parts of the world were the object of joint US-Russian exercises just a few years ago. Scenario 2: Ultra-nationalism If Russian domestic and international policy continues to become more radicalised, it might take ever more drastic forms. As the economy deteriorates, wages fall and shortages become common, a focus on nostalgic nationalism, using belligerent rhetoric and demonstrations of military power, could be used to deflect growing discontentment. A logical target would be to “protect” zones which are perceived as Russian, e.g. where there are Russian ethnic minorities or even just Russian-speaking areas. Such rhetoric was and is used in the Ukraine. The coming years will tell what the Russian ambitions are in the Ukraine. Offensives to secure and expand their supply lines, and weakening those of the Ukraine, are probable, and more ambitious plans, such as the opening of new directions in Kharkiv or Odessa, are possible. As a distraction, conflicts in Moldavia can be fuelled. If the West, primarily the US, UK and Poland, support Ukraine with military means, the risk increases for further escalation of the conflict. Remaining passive, on the other hand, runs the risk that Russia perceives that it could act against other targets. A second country that could be the target of Russian nationalism is Belarus. Judging by president Putin’s justification of the annexation of Crimea, Belarus would similarly be a legitimate candidate for “re-inclusion” in Russia. There are indications that the regime in Belarus are worried about such a development and acting to thwart it. In late 2014, Lukashenko appointed a new government, and has increased the emphasis on “Belorussian”. The fragmented (and thoroughly infiltrated) opposition has declared that it will not field candidates in elections this autumn, since they deem the threat of president Putin to be greater than of Lukashenko himself. Belarus has also passed laws permitting prosecution of non-regular armed troops, as a consequence of the Russian method employed in the annexation of Crimea. In the economic sphere, Russia has complained that Belarus is profiting from sanctions against Russia. Any attempts from Russia to enter Belarus’ with military means would probably not be met by any effective resistance from the Belorussian security apparatus. The opportunities for Russia are in some ways more favourable here than in Ukraine, due to the close cooperation between the countries’ armies and intelligence services. Passive resistance cannot be ruled out but would not mean much in a short-term. However, tensions with other former Soviet Union republics, with the EU and with NATO would surely increase. Polish and Lithuanian forces would probably mobilize to counteract spillover effects. EU policy would be substantially revised. Belorussian citizens would attempt to flee, primarily to neighbouring Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The Russian government would also threaten the Baltic states, in order to undermine their economies and try to influence policy in these countries. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be in a precarious situation. While they need to strengthen their civil and military defence, they must retain credibility with their allies and not be perceived as to exaggerate the Russian threat. The higher the tensions, the more sensitive the world is to psychological influence. Russia would, in this scenario, also fan nationalism in other parts of Europe through political and financial support. West Balkan is particularly vulnerable, as the EU and the US have invested considerable political capital in the region with only mixed success. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia have stagnated in their political and economic development with high levels of unemployment, political polarisation and even the establishing of Islamic fundamentalist cells: a fertile ground for nationalist movements. Finally, Russian ultra-nationalism would also be directed inwards, with an escalated persecution of the domestic political opposition, independent media, and nationalisation of foreign assets. This will be combined with attacks on minority groups, especially on Jews. This scenario could happen separately or as a precursor to the final, and most dangerous, scenario. Scenario 3: Test of strength In this scenario, Russia would attempt to break NATO through challenging of one or more of the Baltic states. The objective would be to demonstrate to alliance members that NATO’s response is too late and too weak. A precondition for success is a distraction through a crisis by an intermediator, which would tie down especially American attention and resources. The distraction could come in many forms, e.g. by partnering with North Korea, fanning war in the Middle East, or even hidden support for terrorists. If the current polarisation in US domestic politics continues, any reaction will be obstructed and delayed. An especially vulnerable window of opportunity is in the period between the presidential elections in November 2016 and the installation of the new president in January 2017, which could create a legitimacy problem for the American political system when it comes to the possibilities of directly confronting Russia quickly. An attack on any Baltic state would directly affect Swedish territory and air space. In the worst-case scenario, it will happen immediately before open conflict with NATO. The Baltic states each offer different opportunities for Russia, but they all have in common that they lack any strategic depth, which means that an open invasion would be accomplished in a few days, unless support from other alliance members is forthcoming. Estonia, which is the most powerful of the three, both economically and military, poses as a potential threat to the trade over St Petersburg. To control the maritime traffic through the Gulf of Finland is an important motive for Russia to influence Estonian politics. The population of Estonia, with 25 percent ethnic Russians, could be used to legimize action and as grounds for destabilisation, especially around the border town Narva where more than 90% of the population is ethnic Russian. Latvia is the most vulnerable of the three states. The economy is weaker; the Russian minority is about the same as in Estonia; and Russian organised crime has a strong hold. Especially the eastern parts of the country are vulnerable to Russian influence. Lithuania only have about six percent ethnic Russians and a stronger military tradition. On the other hand, Lithuania offers access to Kaliningrad. Lithuania’s attempts to decrease their dependence on energy from Russia has annoyed the Russian regime, as is evident in the harassments by the Russian navy of the cabling operation which will connect the Lithuanian grid to Sweden. There are also some tensions surrounding the Polish minorities in the country which Russia could exploit. How fast Sweden will become involved depends on the extent of open, armed actions against one or all of the Baltic States. If a confrontation occurs with non-regular or paramilitary means, maintaining dominance over Swedish territory and territorial waters will be in focus. The same will be the case for Finland, but Finnish action could be influenced by Russian fabrication of tensions in Karelia, that Helsinki could be blamed for. NATO would try to respond in a controlled manner, i.e. prioritizing transports by air and sea. This would mean greatly increased traffic in and over the Baltic Sea. Tensions will rise drastically, with increased risks of miscalculations on both sides. Sweden and Finland are expected to act together with the rest of the EU and the US. If no direct military threat emerges against Sweden, then Sweden cannot count on any enforcements from the rest of the world apart from mutual information exchange. The instance that the citizens in the Baltic states perceive a risk of a Russian incursion, the probability is high that a flow of refugees will commence. From Lithuania, the biggest flow will be to Poland while Latvian will flee to Sweden, mainly Gotland. Refugees from Estonia can be expected to flee towards Finland or Sweden depending on where in the country they live and where they have relations or connections. In the worst-case scenario, Swedish and Finnish territory will become an arena for hostilities. As Russian readiness exercises have shown, airborne and marine infantry could rapidly and with surprise occupy parts of Gotland and Åland. A possible option is also to mine the Danish Straits in connection with this. By supplies of surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, Russian forces can temporarily extend their air and coastal defence in the Baltic Sea, protecting an incursion by land into the Baltic states. NATO would be faced with a fait accompli. The invasion does not need to happen in all three states nor include the entire territory of a country. The only thing that is needed is a demonstration of NATO’s inability to defend alliance members. This would establish a new security order. Depending on the level of conflict that Russia would be willing to risk, air and navy bases in Sweden and Finland could be struck with missiles from the ground, air and sea. It is, however, likely that the governments would be issued an ultimatum to remain neutral, with only a few hours to comply. Public announcement of the ultimatum would put immense pressure on the political system and weaken resistance. Such diplomatic tactics could be reinforced by forced cyber attacks on the electricity and telecommunication networks. During the coldest months of the year, the vulnerability would be the highest. At the same time, Sweden would be expected to support their Western partners’ need for transports into the theatre of action. If Russia would close the Danish Straits, any military support to the Baltic states would need to move over Swedish territory; such as air support Norwegian air bases or aircraft carriers in the Norwegian Sea. There would also be demands to clear of mines in Oresund, and possibly for allowing equipment and troop transports to harbours on the east coast for further transport across the Baltic Sea. The Swedish to such demands would have consequences for generations to come. If Gotland would not be occupied by Russian forces, NATO would demand to set up bases on the island. The smallest indication of acquiescing to such demands would have the Russians racing to the island. Furthermore, Russia would coordinate activities in the far north, with submarines of all kinds and possibly even direct action in northern Finland and even in northern Sweden, in order to expand Russian air defence. Faced with the risk of direct confrontations between Russian and American forces, Russia could mount land-based as well as amphibian operations in the north of Norway and on Svalbard, to improve the defence of Murmansk. Following a similar strategy, occupying parts of Bornholm would make it more difficult for NATO to support their members. This is probably not necessary, but it is a possible option. In most people’s minds, there is a sharp line between the Baltic states’ eastern borders and Russia, the crossing of which is unconceivable. By first gaining the control over Gotland and Åland, the Russian General Army Staff could circumvent a mental Maginot line, in the same way as Germany attacked France through Benelux in May 1940. Russian success in this scenario hinges on speed and the ability to contain the conflict. The first message to Washington will entail the understanding that this is not a direct conflict between the US. For Russia, the uncertainty is therefore how US interests are perceived from an American perspective. For the US, it is not just the credibility of NATO that is at stake but also the unity of the EU. This has global connotations since allies (and enemies) in the Middle East and Asia will also form assumptions regarding the willingness and ability of the US to act in order to protect their allies. The risk is obviously that Russia miscalculates and underestimates the difference between, for instance, the departing presidential administration perceptions of US security interests on the one hand with the wider US security establishment’s perception of these on the other. During the whole process, the threat of nuclear strikes would hover over all decision makers, which increases the degree of uncertainty. Nuclear tests in the period before a test of strength cannot be ruled out, especially since Russian emphasis on nuclear deterrence could lose credibility over time. Direct threats of using the nuclear weapons is, however, completely excluded in this scenario.

### 2

#### CP: Ukraine ought to:

#### End exports of space technology to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

#### Ban private space companies from accepting Chinese investment

#### Move all nuclear reactors offline, dismantle nuclear reactors, and entomb them in concrete deep underground

#### Plank 1 solves advantage 1 – they said NoKo ballistic missile capabilities are dependent on the Ukrainian space industry but we end supply

#### Planks 2 and 3 solve advantage 2 – Ukraine not taking Chinese investment means no US alienation which preserves Biden’s support AND lack of nuclear reactors takes out the terminal impact

#### 1AR theory is skewed towards the aff – a) the 2NR must cover substance and over-cover theory, since they get the collapse and persuasive spin advantage of the 3min 2AR, b) their responses to my counter interp will be new, which means 1AR theory necessitates intervention. Implications – a) reject 1AR theory since it can’t be a legitimate check for abuse, b) drop the arg to minimize the chance the round is decided unfairly, c) use reasonability with a bar of defense or the aff always wins since the 2AR can line by line the whole 2NR without winning real abuse

### 3

#### Decline in Noko nukes program prompts Chinese peninsular aggression—It needs to be seen as a threat—that escalates

Zhang & Wang, 18—Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at the College of William & Mary AND Research Assistant at the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA) for Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Issues (Hongyu and Kevin, “Why the United States Needs North Korea to Stay Nuclear,” <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-united-states-needs-north-korea-stay-nuclear-26382>, dml.

There are two reasons for this. First, possessing nuclear weapons is the best way to pacify North Korea and constrain its aggression. Second, a secure and independent North Korea (without the presence of Chinese or U.S. forces) would also provide a buffer against great power tensions. The long-term primary objective of U.S. strategy in East Asia should be to contain a rising China. To achieve this, the United States must minimize Chinese influence on its neighboring states—whether they are U.S. allies or not. A limited North Korean nuclear arsenal is the most effective way to make this happen.

The United States should, therefore, continue reaching out diplomatically to North Korea and even end some sanctions to seek long-term stability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, a nuclear North Korea and a balanced peninsula are the best possible outcome for the region and the world.

The View From Pyongyang: A Need for Balance

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s backing of North Korea and U.S. backing of South Korea were roughly equal, resulting in a stable power balance on the Korean Peninsula. However, since the Soviet collapse, the balance of power has rapidly shifted against North Korea. The United States continues to lead the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Combined Forces Command and regularly renews its security commitments in the region. In contrast, Russia abolished its alliance treaty with North Korea in 1994. China also refused to replace the Soviet Union as North Korea’s patron when the matter was discussed between Deng Xiaoping and Kim Il-sung in 1991.

Without this balance, the peninsula has been in prolonged instability and frequently came close to military confrontation. As a sovereign state ruled by a totalitarian regime, North Korea has shown its willingness to guarantee its security at any cost. Intensifying military and economic pressure against the North has only made it more defiant and unpredictable. Therefore, any solution to the present crisis must take into account the security of this sovereign nation. Clearly, massive militarization and isolation are not a long-term solution for North Korea.

Security guarantees from China are not a solution, either. Until recently, China's North Korea policy has been passive and minimal in commitment. Per the terms of its “friendship treaty” with North Korea, China is obliged to “render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal” in the event North Korea comes under “armed attack by any state.” However, China is not bound by this obligation primarily due to the treaty. Its primary motivation for intervention in North Korea is due to its security concerns—not those of the regime in Pyongyang. Beijing will lose more defensive capabilities if North Korea falls into the hands of an adversary, whoever it may be.

Yet, China does not intend to do anything more than is necessary to meet this policy goal. China’s reluctant relationship with North Korea may help it deter a large-scale invasion by ROK-U.S. forces, but does little to assuage other security threats. The ROK-U.S. combined forces have a rich set of military options with which to threaten the North. These include limited operations for punitive or coercive purposes that target North Korea’s vital industrial or nuclear facilities. American and South Korea even have the capacity for decapitation strikes. Furthermore, China’s options in assisting North Korea to cope with these threats are limited since it must always balance the strategic importance of North Korea with the economic importance of South Korea and its need to avoid overt confrontation with the United States.

North Korea itself has a clear understanding of China’s unenthusiastic role in its security. In a commentary published by Korean Central News Agency during the peak of last year’s crisis, North Korea made it clear that it holds its nuclear weapons dearer than its friendship with China . In short, the quiet alliance between China and North Korea does not ensure security to the North Korean regime other than preventing a massive military attack.

Therefore, not only do nuclear weapons offer a level of security that Chinese assurances do not, but they also are the most cost-effective way for a resource-poor North Korea to achieve sustainable security. A nuclear North Korea is not a threat, but an ideal stabilizer. The balance of power on the Korean peninsula and that between the United States and China are interrelated. China's rise has the potential to shift the regional balance, making confrontation more likely in the future. If a limited nuclear capability guarantees North Korea's existence and independence, it can provide a buffer space to keep Chinese forces in China and U.S. troops stationed in South Korea separate. If U.S. and Chinese forces were to face each other on the Korean peninsula directly, there would be a higher chance for clash and escalation, especially given already tense standoff the United States and China face in the East and South China Seas. Restoring the power balance between the North and South will not only stabilize the peninsula but also help manage the power relationship between the United States and China.

Some common concerns about a nuclear North Korea include the damage to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)’s authority and the domino effect of proliferation. Other worries also are a politically unstable North Korea losing control of nuclear weapons or a more emboldened and aggressive North Korea. However, the problem on the Korean peninsula relates to long-standing and complicated geopolitical issues, that the NPT was not necessarily designed to address. There is also no evidence to suggest that a rapid wave of proliferation would sweep the region as long as the United States maintains the status quo and strengthens its commitments in the region.

There have been four instances of nuclear states facing instability: the French General’s Revolt, the Cultural Revolution in China, the unseating of Bhutto in Pakistan, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The record shows that no matter which domestic group gains control of the state, all parties show great restraint with regards to the use of nuclear weapons. The stakes are simply too high. As Waltz once put it, “obtaining nuclear weapons is a sobering event.” States become more aware of the negative attention they receive from the international community after acquiring the bomb and actually act more cautiously, and North Korea will likely do the same going forward.

Another concern is that an emboldened North Korea will use these weapons to force reunification under its terms. At the very least it is assumed that they will be more likely to engage in cross-border attacks such as the shelling of islands and the sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan in 2010. But, these arguments do not account for the evidence suggesting that nuclear weapons are not useful tools of conquest or coercion. The overwhelming U.S. responses with both conventional and nuclear forces are enough to deter North Korea from engaging in any act of nuclear blackmail.

Even though Pyongyang's nuclear capability can hit targets in South Korea and Japan, these two countries should not worry too much about this nuclear threat. As explained above, this nuclear force is meant to close a power gap, not to give North Korea an offensive advantage. Research shows that atomic weapons are perfect instruments of deterrence, but poor instruments of coercion. Furthermore, North Korea declared a no-first-use policy in May 2016 and recently renewed this pledge in its Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. More importantly, the threat posed by North Korea can be alleviated if it is brought into a larger block, if even just a tacit one, to balance a rising China.

A Broader Benefit: Balancing China

China’s security commitment towards North Korea has historically been minimal since the Korean War. However, recent tensions between Beijing and Washington and interactions between Beijing and Pyongyang suggest that China is no longer able to afford this minimal policy. In the future, it may be China that would seek to project power into a non-nuclear North Korea. Offensive realism would predict that a China more confident in its conventional capabilities may seek to directly balance the U.S.-ROK alliance by subjugating North Korea and basing Chinese forces on the peninsula. Eventually, it would try to expel U.S. forces from the peninsula, implementing its version of the Monroe Doctrine . Were it not for its nuclear deterrent, North Korea would be the most logical space for China to project power into due to its weak conventional military but strategically valuable location. A Chinese military presence in North Korea would not only undermine U.S. interests but regional and global stability as well.

#### Invasion’s on the brink and escalates

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North Korea is both a blessing and a curse for China. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an independent state that is openly hostile to the United States and other regional powers. Pyongyang’s military is a **deterrent** to attack without posing a direct threat to China. As a result, nearly a thousand miles of China’s borders are occupied by a regime that finances its own defense and will **never fall willingly within the U.S. sphere of influence.**

The situation is far from perfect. While North Korea has traditionally been a Chinese client state, ties between the two countries have deteriorated in recent years. Pyongyang’s fiery anti-American rhetoric and nuclear weapons program have provoked the United States, making North Korea a major point of contention between Washington and Beijing. The country’s flagrant violation of international norms have tested Beijing’s patience.

There are persistent rumors that Beijing has long prepared to intervene in North Korea, whether in the aftermath of a government collapse or should the country’s leadership make credible threats against China. No one outside of Beijing knows what those preparations might be, but we can outline some scenarios. **One thing seems reasonably certain**, however: if China goes into North Korea, the presiding regime, whether of Kim Jong-un or someone else, **will not survive.**

One possible scenario is a military incursion into North Korea in response to **regime collapse**. An **imploding economy, military coup**, or **Syria-like rebellion** could all cause the regime to fold, and it will likely fold quickly. When it does, the **national food distribution** system will likely fail, **causing refugees** to flee the country. Given that the border with South Korea is notoriously fortified and the Russian border is relatively far and remote, the least difficult border to cross is into **China**.

Beijing, **obsessed with internal stability**, would almost certainly not tolerate millions of refugees crossing into northern China. From a Chinese perspective, it would be far better for those refugees to stay in North Korea. In the event of regime collapse, we could see the three People’s Liberation Army (PLA) armies in the country’s Northern Theater Command move south. One option is to create a buffer zone in North Korea, but that would not solve the problem of political and economic instability. If the PLA does move South, it would likely go all the way to Pyongyang in order to establish a **puppet government** and reestablish some level of stability.

The most likely scenario is that China launches an all-out invasion to topple the existing regime. Of the sixteen armored, mechanized, infantry and artillery corps that make up the Korea People’s Army (KPA), only two are deployed along the Sino-Korean border. Three more corps are stationed in and around Pyongyang. Nearly 70 percent of the KPA is south of the Pyongyang/Wonsan line, sited to support a cross-border attack against South Korea.

China’s Northern Theater Command ground forces consist of the 78th, 79th and 80th Armies. These armies are what would be considered corps in the U.S. Army, collectively controlling eighteen combined arms brigades supported by three special operations, three aviation, three artillery and three engineering brigades. This gives the PLA a powerful force equivalent, at least on paper, to roughly five or six U.S. combat divisions. Supported by the two air attack divisions of the Chinese Air Force assigned to the Northern Command, the three PLA armies could quickly cross the border and march south into the KPA’s strategic rear.

To what extent would the KPA resist an invasion? It depends. If the regime in Pyongyang is still in place, it China could face considerable resistance. A lack of fuel reserves, dictated by China, would likely strand many of the remaining fourteen army corps in place, rendering them unable to resist a Chinese invasion. If the government collapses the KPA could become part of the **hungry, leaderless masses**—masses with weapons. Ideally, Beijing would cultivate ties with the KPA leadership before a move South and persuade it to not resist and maintain order.

It’s difficult to foretell how well the PLA would do in wartime. The last time the Chinese Army engaged in such large scale combat was the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. Using inferior, outdated tactics, China’s ground forces suffered heavy casualties against their battle-hardened Vietnamese opponents, and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping vowed never to repeat such a costly war. It is unlikely that Beijing would order the attack if it did not have full confidence in the PLA to carry it out without embarrassing failure.

The PLA of today however is a completely different beast. While the PLA lacks the institutional skill of the battle-tested U.S. Army, it is certainly better than the Korean People’s Army. The army has **modernized** both its equipment and military doctrine—Xi Jinping’s repeated calls to be “**combat ready**”, often interpreted as **outwardly aggressive**, are more likely to be exhortations toward **general readiness** and **against corruption** in the ranks. A recent and pervasive emphasis on high speed, mechanized warfare will pay the PLA dividends in a drive on Pyongyang.

**The most dangerous aspect of a Chinese invasion** of North Korea is if it is launched **concurrent with a U.S. and South Korean assault** northward from the demilitarized zone. While the U.S. and South Korea would operate with the same objectives in mind, they would likely be **very different from China’s**. The possibility of fighting breaking out between those armies marching north and those marching south **would be very real.**

#### China war goes nuclear – escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

### 4

#### Artemis accords boost US-Ukrainian co-op

Yarova 20 (Maya Yarova, [editor and journalst @ ain.ua], 11-16-2020, “Ukraine becomes the ninth country joining the NASA space program“, AIN.UA, accessed: 1-21-2022, https://ain.ua/en/2020/11/16/ukraine-signs-the-nasa-artemis-accords/) ajs

Ukraine has [become](https://www.nkau.gov.ua/ua/news/main-themes/1597-ukraina-stala-deviatoiu-krainoiu-iaka-pidpysala-domovlenosti-v-ramkakh-prohramy-artemida) the ninth participant of the Artemis program aimed at the exploration and development of the Moon, Mars, comets, and asteroids. This is reported by the press office of the State Space Agency of Ukraine.

“Ukraine has all the scientific and technical capabilities and experience allowing the country to become one of the weighty partners of NASA during the implementation of the Artemis program,” the report says.

Previously, on October 15, the agreement was signed by the following [eight countries](https://korrespondent.net/tech/space/4284405-vosem-stran-podpysaly-sohlashenye-o-dobyche-resursov-na-lune): the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Canada, Australia, Japan, United Arab Emirates, and Luxembourg.

“This is important for Ukraine because we will be able to implement our own projects in partnership with the world’s leading space agencies… Also, I am convinced that the agreements will give a new impetus to unite countries in establishing multilateral consultations in the context of the development of international space law,” said Volodymyr Usov, the Head of the State Space Agency of Ukraine.

The signing of the agreement contributes to the growing cooperation between Ukraine and the US in other areas of space activities as well, the release says. In particular, to the resumption of the dialog between the two countries within the scope of the Ukrainian-American working group for the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, established back in 2016.

#### Empirics – squo trust building

Matyushenko 21 (Yevgeny Matyushenko, [], 12-4-2021, “Ukraine must regain leadership in aerospace industry – Zelensky“, No Publication, accessed: 1-21-2022, https://www.unian.info/economics/space-exploration-ukraine-must-regain-leadership-in-aerospace-industry-zelensky-11385475.html) ajs

Volodymyr Horbulin, First Vice President of the National Academy of Sciences, noted the high level of cooperation in the aerospace industry with the United States.

"We have reached an unprecedented level of cooperation with Americans. They never trusted anyone to make the first stage of a rocket carrier. This is recognition of our technological and technical capabilities," he said.

#### The aff reverses that – it contradicts the Artemis Accords by banning mining and lunar property

Nelson 20 “The Artemis Accords and the Future of International Space Law” Jack Wright Nelson [Jack Wright Nelson is a Research Associate at the Faculty of Law of the National University of Singapore and a Member of the International Institute of Space Law. The author is grateful to the Faculty's Centre for Banking & Finance Law for supporting his ongoing research.], December 10, 2020 <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/31/artemis-accords-and-future-international-space-law> SM

The Artemis Accords

The Accords' ten operative paragraphs can be grouped into three categories. The first category reinforces certain core tenets of international space law. In particular, the Accords emphasize that all space activities must be for "peaceful purposes" and performed "in accordance with relevant international law."[8] The Accords also reaffirm and expand upon astronaut assistance obligations from the Rescue Agreement and registration requirements from the Registration Convention.[9]

The second category of operative paragraphs concerns specific operational issues. To this end, the Accords promote transparency, interoperability, and the sharing of scientific data.[10] On the pressing issue of space debris, the Accords' signatories have committed to engage in mitigation planning.[11]

The first and second categories are unlikely to be controversial: the first restates well-accepted law, while the second codifies nascent best practice. But the third category of operative paragraphs aims to progress international space law by promoting particular interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty concerning lunar heritage protection, space resource extraction, and the "deconfliction"[12] of space activities. Further, there are potential conflicts between the Accords and the most recent treaty to emerge from COPUOS—the Moon Agreement.[13]

The Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement

Regarding lunar heritage protection, the Accords state that signatories:

intend to preserve outer space heritage . . . compris[ing] historically significant human or robotic landing sites, artifacts, spacecraft and other evidence of activity on celestial bodies.[14]

Signatories to the Accords also:

affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.[15]

Reducing the legal uncertainty surrounding space resource extraction was a key impetus for the development of the Accords. They build upon an Executive Order issued in April 2020 by President Trump to internationally promote space resource extraction.[16] But it is a controversial issue. Ultimately, the Accords represent a compromise. They do not expressly state that space resource extraction is legal. Rather, they simply state a negative: that such activity would not in and of itself amount to national appropriation (which Article II of the Outer Space Treaty—as extracted below—expressly prohibits).

Regarding space activities deconfliction, the Accords provide detailed guidance on the establishment and operation of "safety zones" around lunar installations.[17] Safety zones are buffer areas in which lunar activities would be subject to specific notification and coordination procedures in order to reduce the risk of collisions or interference. However, carving out or otherwise demarcating portions of the lunar surface—whether required for lunar heritage protection, space resource extraction, or safety zones—may face legal hurdles.

First, dividing up the lunar surface could breach the fundamental principle of non-appropriation of celestial bodies. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty provides that:

[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

Second, a divided lunar surface could prevent states from exercising their exploration, use, and free access rights. Article I, paragraph 2 of the Outer Space Treaty provides that:

[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

#### US-Ukraine Relations solves Baltics War.

Pifer 17 Steven Pifer 4-12-2017 "Why should the United States be interested in Ukraine?" <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/12/why-should-the-united-states-be-interested-in-ukraine/> (Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative)//Elmer

BOLSTERING EUROPEAN SECURITY Above and beyond Ukraine, Russia’s aggression constitutes a fundamental challenge to the post-Cold War European security order and raises questions about what the Kremlin might try next. That is of interest to the United States, given that the trans-Atlantic relationship links us to our longest and closest friends and partners, and we are committed to their defense in NATO. Support for Ukraine, along with political and economic sanctions, are ways in which the West can make clear to Moscow that there will be consequences for its egregious misbehavior. The risk otherwise is that the Kremlin might undertake other actions that would further threaten European security and stability. Would Moscow use military force against the Baltic states, which are members of NATO? Most likely not. But five years ago, the answer would have been a resounding “no.” Supporting Ukraine and imposing costs on Russia for its aggression help ensure that Moscow does not miscalculate in a way that would lead to deeper crisis. Secretary Tillerson’s question, if odd coming from him, is one that many American might ask. However, there are very good reasons why the United States should take an interest in Ukraine.

#### Baltic conflict goes nuclear

Kofman ’16 [Michael; May 12; Analyst at CNA Corporation and fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, M.A. in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; War On The Rocks, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia,” <https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/>; RP]

What’s the Right Force Posture for Nuclear Oblivion?

The other problem with the fixation on conventional deterrence in the Baltic fight is that just as in the old standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this battle is fraught with opportunities for nuclear escalation. Most Russian experts I know in the military analysis community, including those in Russia, don’t see much of a chance for conventional battle with NATO to stay conventional. RAND didn’t wargame that out, since theirs was an AirLand Battle exercise, but it makes the debate over how many brigades to stick into the Baltics somewhat moot. On any map, Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad is a central problem in keeping this a conventional fight, because this is a piece of Russian territory that NATO must either bypass or neutralize to reinforce the Baltics. That’s not just a Russian fort, projecting long arcs of anti-access and area denial weaponry between Poland and Lithuania — it’s also liable to be a nuclear landmine.

There is a possibility that if Russian forces are sufficiently degraded or defeated in Kaliningrad that Moscow may resort to or threaten nuclear first use. Even if we fill all those hex squares with blue forces, it doesn’t get around the issue that NATO’s prize for its victory is not necessarily the successful rescue of the Baltics, but an inbound tactical nuclear warhead. RAND’s report alludes to the minor problem of escalation (all of us dying in nuclear oblivion), but such thoughts get in the way of gaming out how many heavy armor brigades one needs in on the eastern flank. Nuclear escalation is not assured, but given the impact of such an outcome, perhaps the best strategy is to make decisions that afford the most opportunities for managing escalation dynamics. That means a force posture oriented toward strategic flexibility, not entrenchment.

### 5

#### Ukraine-China relations motivated by space cooperation – the Aff makes that impossible – that spills-over into other aspects of the relationship.

Ma and Soroka 20 Ma, B., and L. Soroka. "The Cooperation between China and Ukraine in Space Exploration: Genesis and Development. Advanced Space Law, 5, 58-70." (2020). (Ph.D. in Law, Professor, Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology)//Elmer

Critical outcomes of bilateral China-Ukraine relations in space China and Ukraine do not provide complete open official information on aircraft and missile science, which complicates the analysis, including the analysis of trends and opportunities for further cooperation between China and Ukraine. However, available open sources enable to summarize some of the outcomes. In the space segment of bilateral cooperation, the developments should be highlighted as follows (Badrak, et al., 2009: 63): a) the exchange of information on the technical parameters of the Chinese Environment-1B project and the Ukrainian Sich-2 project to establish mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of space data exchange; b) delivery to China of a laboratory facility (including the transfer of production technology) for manufacturing non-plasma engines for spacecraft; c) closeness and interchangeability of the Ukrainian UNOSAT project and the Chinese seismic electromagnetic satellite project give the possibility of establishing mutually beneficial cooperation on these projects. According to the Agreement between Ukraine and China, Kharkiv Military University has started training Chinese air defense specialists (Training Aviation Command began operating in the military town “Rogan-1” near Kharkiv). It is possible that in the future Ukraine will begin to train cadets-pilots from the PRC, as well as provide medical support for the training of astronauts, which is especially important for the implementation of the Chinese Space Program “Project 921” (921 Project, 2020). To date, Ukraine’s position in the space sector is the strongest in the launch services market. While China is interested in developing its satellite navigation system, Ukraine is interested in acquiring microelectronics technology and investing. Therefore, constant and promising cooperation between the PRC and Ukraine can be established and stabilized in these sectors. However, nowadays, Ukraine should be more actively involved in projects within the framework of cooperation with China on legal, clearly stipulated contractual bases with the maximum contract validity to enhance its capabilities in this sector and gain competitive advantages in international markets. Promising forms of scientific and technical cooperation, such as the creation of technoparks, incubators, engineering and technology transfer, etc., are being implemented between China and Ukraine. Moreover, in the People’s Republic of China, the first industrial zones were established back in 1980. Currently, there are 54 technoparks in the country that provide about 10% of GDP and accumulate 30% of FDI. In Ukraine, 12 industrial parks are registered, and only a few of them are under construction. The rest is not functioning (Natalushka, 2017). The creation of technoparks will provide potential foreign investors with new opportunities for preferential taxation, as it has been done in Singapore. With such technoparks, the owner will be able to draw up all the necessary permits for Chinese investor companies, eliminating the need to run around the offices of officials. Along with the positive points in bilateral relations between China and Ukraine, factors that hinder the development of interstate partnerships remain and need to be addressed. First, these are a narrow foreign policy orientation of the Government of Ukraine to the countries of Europe and the USA, the inaction of the Ukrainian side in holding official meetings, visits to China with the participation of the first persons of the State, the absence of political continuity (every time after a change of power, a new plan, a new strategy of development occur) and the presence of corrupt schemes in legal regulation (Natalushka, 2017). Second, insufficient explanatory work on the meaning and ultimate purpose of socio-political transformation in Ukraine (for example, the Chinese will understand de-sovietization as a rejection of the negative heritage of the USSR and will not understand decommunization, because communism remains the official ideology of the PRC) (Goncharuk et al., 2016: 38). Third, the difficulty of a Ukrainian visa for the PRC citizens remains a huge obstacle to establishing effective relations with China, and there are problems with guaranteeing the safety of Chinese living in Ukraine, their businesses, and property. At the present stage, China and Ukraine have every opportunity to realize a considerable potential of bilateral cooperation in science, technology, and education, to be in close relation with the international scientific and technological community, and to participate in creating an innovative global society (Joint, 2018). Cooperation China’s role in the world becomes more significant. Expanding political, economic, cultural, and other relations with this country is one of the critical areas of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Before the declaration of independence in 1991, Ukraine, as part of the USSR, had been building its relations with the People’s Republic of China within the framework of the all-Union foreign policy doctrine. Only after the collapse of the USSR and the proclamation of its independence an independent policy became possible. Ukraine and the PRC are known to have much in common. This concerns geopolitics, which broadly defines the role and place of Ukraine and the PRC not only in the Eurasian region but also in the broader, global geopolitical context. The countries have mutual economic interests and close positions on the key problems of contemporary world political development. Both states face similar internal socio-economic issues. In both countries, a transition to a market economy occurs, a desire for a policy of openness exists. Both countries are in the Eurasian region, are neighbors of Russia, and are in the interests of the United States of America. The foreign policy of both countries is based on a realistic consideration of their national interests. Ukraine is an essential factor in European and world politics. It is respectful of the PRC’s growing role in contemporary international relations. Ukraine and the PRC have been productively and consistently working and coordinating their policies at the UN and other international organizations. According to Meng Hin, despite a great interest of politicians and the public regarding the issue of China-Ukraine cooperation in the 1990s of the twentieth century, it remains studied incompetently. However, for the first time in the history of the two countries, their relations have begun to develop on a broad legal basis (Meng, 2005). This requires an in-depth study of the various strands of relations between Ukraine and the PRC. The study of this issue will enable us to understand the main trends in the development of relations between the States and to offer recommendations on the implementation of comprehensive cooperation. Therefore, considering the benefits of scientific and technical cooperation, and existing areas of cooperation, the authors propose the following strategic approaches to expanding science and technology-based relationships, which form an overall strategy for long-term cooperation in space that could, in the long run, bring China and Ukraine to a new level of development, increase their competitiveness in the world markets: joint research and development; exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation, samples of products and materials, as well as the exchange of know-how and licenses on a compensatory basis; organization of scientific-technical seminars, symposia and scientific conferences, etc. Besides, the successful commercialization of space exploration products requires to develop and adopt regulatory acts promptly to create the necessary legal platform to realize the prospects for both China and Ukraine. In conclusion, some truths are eternal. Ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius said: “Those who do not care about their future will be in trouble soon.” If Ukraine had perceived the recommendation of its first president, “science can wait” as a ridiculous joke. Our current “famine of science” might not have occurred, or, as our Western colleagues say, “innocide” instead of innovation (Driga, 2017: 61).

#### That cements the BRI – Ukraine is a critical partner in Europe for China Trade.

Zeneli and Haluhan 19 Valbona Zeneli and Nataliia Haluhan 10-4-2019 "Why China is Setting its Sights on Ukraine" <https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/why-china-is-setting-its-sights-on-ukraine/> (Dr. Valbona Zeneli is the Chair of the Strategic Initiatives Department at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Ms. Nataliia Haluhan is the Chief Consultant, National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine). She is a former Marshall Center scholar.)//Elmer

As China continues to assert itself as an emerging world power, Europe remains a very important target. While Chinese investment has significantly increased, by 50 times in the last decade, the current figures underestimate the true scope of Beijing’s ambitions in the old continent. To achieve its goals, every European country is important for China: economically, geographically, or politically. Ukraine is no exclusion from the rule. Beijing’s multifaceted interests in Ukraine mainly relate to its strategic geographic location. It is highly attractive as a logistic transit hub within the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative that links China with European Union (EU) markets. Other attractive factors are its rich natural resources, opportunities for new infrastructure projects and its agricultural industry. These factors are all in line with the Chinese expansionist agenda in Europe. A member of OBOR since 2017, the business community and political leaders in Ukraine have shown increased interest in deepening cooperation with China. To serve this purpose, the “Belt and Road” Trade and Investment Promotion Center was established in Kyiv, seeing BRI as a tool to improve infrastructure,

attract foreign investment from China, invest in energy projects and modernize agricultural technology. To date, there has been a lot of conversation, but projects are not clearly defined, nor transparent. Being attracted by the promises of the BRI as an opportunity for their country to unlock the potential of it being an “entrepot” to Europe, Ukrainian politicians had earlier expressed their willingness to deeper institutionalize relations with Beijing in offering to join the “16+1” mechanism, a platform created by Beijing to increase trade and economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe.

#### Solves Central Asian and South Asia War.

Muhammad et Al 19, Imraz, Arif Khan, and Saif ul Islam. "China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Peace, Prosperity and Conflict Resolution in the Region." (Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Buner)//Elmer

In the twenty first century, the geostrategic importance of South Asia is rising because of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is the important component of the **o**ne **b**elt **o**ne **r**oad initiative (BRI). CPEC, started point is Gawadar a deep water port connects to the China‘s province of Xinjiang. Being part of the BRI, once CPEC is completely started functioning, it **will improve** the **political, social and economic situation** of the regional states and will raise the geo-strategic importance. CPEC is the priority of both states China and Pakistan, for Pakistan, CPEC pass through Pakistan‘s geography, is outlet for the landlocked countries and provides access to the supply and demands market to regional countries, while it is very short route for China, CPEC replace 13000 km only into 2500 km to reach to Middle East.1 So both the states have an instinct desire to continue it irrespective of change in the government. Not only this, CPEC will **boost** up the **regional** states‘ **economy**, **ensure peace** and prosperity in the region. Political, social and economic degradation in South Asia, created a hurdle in the cooperation among the regional countries. Security issues, terrorism, over population, economic disparities, lacking of education and modern inventions, lacking of health facilities, poor economic setup, water issues etc. devastated the life style and hindered the progress, development and peace in the region. CPEC is a turning point in the history of Asians‘ countries, it is not only a game changer and a target for Pakistan and China but a project for the whole region. Goal of this project is to promote commerce and trade culture, integrate the regional states for the development of economy, agriculture and industries. Furthermore, it is a source of peace, prosperity and conflicts resolutions in the region through economic development, economic dependence and regional integration. CPEC is a sign of peace and affluence for the whole region as for Pakistan. Being economic zone it will bring political, social and especially economic growth in the region. However, this research work deals with analyse the CPEC role in bringing peace and prosperity on the one hand and led to conflict resolution in South Asia on the other hand. What is CPEC? The CPEC is the part of one belt, one road has featuring of common advantages and prosperity, containing on complimentary interest, cooperation and collaboration and mutual benefits. A widespread transport corridor, industrial and trade cooperative rout between China and Pakistan, having the potential of people to people contact and communication, sources of cultural diffusion and exchange. Additionally, CPEC has the ability of political, social and economic growth, bringing peace, prosperity and security in region2 The CPEC covers the areas starting from a muslim majority province Xinjiang Uygur in China and almost all provinces Pakistan. Main areas through which CPEC passes are Kashgar, Atushi, Tumshuq, Shule, Shufu, Akto, Tashkurgan Tajik, Gilgit, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Islamabad, Lahore, Multan, Quetta, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Karachi and Gwadar. Furthermore, the CPEC will comprise one belt, three passageways, and two axes and five functional zones. Peace, Prosperity and Conflict Resolutions Narrowly peace is defined as the passivity and acceptance of injustice and cruelty without showing reaction.3 It may also be turn as the complete absence of war which simply fall in the negative peace category, but actually **peace** is more than that, it is **based on the political,** social **and economic development** of society and elimination of the injustice, and violations of the human rights.4 More elaborately, peace focused on the modern concept of democracy, liberalism and postmodern society, which is really related to the deconstruction of the parochial society, snatch powers from single body and share with rest of the society, where there is popular democracy is observed. Where there is no exploitation of the individual and restriction on the abusive use of the authorities.5 Nonviolence, the philosophy of Gandhi and Bacha Khan, is the part of positive peace, where there is no violation of the law, demand for rights under the shadow of law, no threats are used during protest and strikes. So, by this way there is risk for the conflicts, violations and war. Demand for right by using violence fall under the umbrella of negative peace. Jonathan Schell fruitfully summarised the dilemma of non-violence as cooperation, collective action consist on the mutual consent against abusive and parochial power and compel those actions which are taken against them.6 However, it is a very emotive term which has many heads and tails has not absolute end, in short the think tankers are in seeking to find easy way to bring cooperation, consensus, mediations, resolutions and more effective ways to resolve the issues and disputes, and transform the causes of war into peace. Perpetual peace is possible in resolving the conflicts, but due to anarchy in the international community, there is conflict. Disagreements, irrational demands, denial and counter claim leads to conflicts. So, prevention of the conflicts, mediation, management and resolution fascinated the international community, because the cost of war and conflicts is higher. For the conflict resolution, various methods are used as the tactics of good offices, arbitration, enquiry, negotiation, problem setting workshop, second track diplomacy, reconciliation and judicial settlement.7 However, conflict resolution depends upon clear assurance from all parties. CPEC Role in Bringing Peace and Prosperity & Peace through Economic Growth & Regional Integration: Political, social and economic interdependence society, reduce the chances of conflicts and war. Liberal thinkers probe out that **free trade and** economic **interdependence** flourish peace and **eliminate** the risk of **militancy**. The theory of Economic Opportunity Cost Hypothesis investigated that economic interdependence increase the level of integration among nations, consequently there is the eruption of peace and alleviated the condition of war8 . Economically weak states, where is economically disintegrated states are mostly enhanced in conflicts with each other. So, it is the benefits of trade globalization which decreases conflicts among nations. The theory of Neo-Functionalism which discussed norms and values of the Europe integration, has focused that cooperation and harmonization in one sector open the routes of another for the cooperation.9 Where, further expansion of the chain of integration, cooperation and as a result peace enhances in society. Like European states, Afghanistan, Iran, India, **Pakistan**, China **and** other **central Asian states** **have** the **capacity of regional integration** through CPEC. The CPEC has the potential of cooperation, integration, economic growth, and forged unity among regional states. According to the norms of NeoFunctionalism, CPEC provides an opportunity of free trade, economic dependence, transportation and regional integration through functional cooperation. **South Asia** is the **most exacerbated region** in the world, because of militancy, conflicts, overpopulation, less development, lacking of education and specially the arm race among nations. Terrorism in the region (Afghanistan and Pakistan) created security dilemma and furthermore the conflicts of Pakistan and India over Kashmir worsen the situation, which disturb the economic chain in the region for a long time. **CPEC** **bestowed the best opportunity to resolve the conflicts** and created peace through geo-economics and geo-politics. This corridor has the capacity to create economic interdependence in the region and regional integration because of functional cooperation based on common interest and needs.10 CPEC network connected the regional and extra-regional countries through, economic trade, liberalization of economy, free policies and open membership, to get advancement in commerce and trade on global level.11 Being part of the of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), CPEC has the capacity to **interconnect** China, **Pakistan**, Iran, **India**, Afghanistan, **Central Asia**, West Asia, not only this other states of the Central Asia are also may connected with this corridor through India. After Passing through Asia, CPEC enter into Europe through ―One Belt, One Road‖ strategy.12 By this way CPEC created cooperation among adjacent and de-adjacent countries, and lead to peace and prosperity through economic dependence, as the China‘s Assistant Foreign Minister opined that peace, prosperity and economic development of CPEC not only limited to China and Pakistan but to the whole region.13 Similar view has been presented by the Ex-PM Nawaz Sharif during his visit to Turkmenistan, CPEC would be beneficial for everyone in the region in the socio-economic perspective, as he said that ―CPEC will offer opportunities for hundreds of millions of people.‖ But it is necessary to promote peace in the region because without peace, development remains just words on the tongue, as he further mentioned that peace and prosperity are connected with each other. Furthermore, flourishing the popular concept of happiness and prosperity Nawaz Sharif added, that my government will ensure Regional integration and connectivity. It will help us to work together towards pursuing our common objective of strengthening peace and bringing development in our region. In fact CPEC is an opportunity where Pakistan and other countries of the region have to work for the betterment of our people.‖14 So, through integration of the regional states, CPEC has a great role in the flourishing of the peace, prosperity and development in the region. The issue of terrorism, militancy, Kashmir disputes, crimes as piracy, human trafficking and problems around the Indian Oceans, are created severe affection over the region regarding international trade and commerce, crumpling of economy and security threats. These issues also devastating the security and economic situation of Pakistan, therefore, responding to these devastating issues is one of the foremost priorities of Pakistan and China. ChinaPakistan adopted joint struggle for the fortification of their maritime security to bring peace and stability in the region and secure the CPEC from insecurity.15

#### South Asia War goes Nuclear and causes Extinction.

Menon 19 Prakash Menon, The nuclear cloud hanging over the human race, Nov 15, 2019, [PhD from Madras University for his thesis “Limited War and Nuclear Deterrence in the Indo-Pak context”] [https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-nuclear-cloud-hanging-over-the-human-race/cid/1719608#](https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-nuclear-cloud-hanging-over-the-human-race/cid/1719608) SM

The nuclear cloud hanging over the human race Even a limited India-Pakistan nuclear conflict could pose an existential challenge to life on Earth The smoke injected into the stratosphere due to a nuclear attack would block the sunlight and result in a ‘Nuclear Winter' - freezing temperatures that pose an existential threat. One study estimates that in an India-Pakistan exchange, the immediate casualties could number 125 million lives The smoke injected into the stratosphere due to a nuclear attack would block the sunlight and result in a ‘Nuclear Winter' - freezing temperatures that pose an existential threat. One study estimates that in an India-Pakistan exchange, the immediate casualties could number 125 million lives iStock Prakash Menon | | Published 15.11.19, 08:04 PM With the recent administrative changes in Jammu and Kashmir, Indo-Pak hyphenation has come back to haunt India’s aspirations to break out of that narrow mould and be perceived as an independent player on the global stage. The clubbing of India with Pakistan is an echo of India’s political and strategic confinement to the sub-continent. Pakistan has always attempted to paint the Indo-Pak situation as a nuclear flashpoint essentially to invite international intervention in what India insists is a bilateral issue. A recent report in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Toon et al entitled 'How an India-Pakistan Nuclear War Could Start and have Global Consequences' provides grist to the mill of the nuclear flashpoint theory. But it also raises an issue that has yet not found its place in the public imagination nor has sufficient cognisance been taken by the political and military leadership of nuclear weapon powers – the climatic consequences of nuclear explosions. It is well known that nuclear powers have and continue to base their targeting requirements of nuclear weapons on calculations that are restricted mostly to the major but immediate effects of nuclear explosions – blast, heat and radiation. According to General Lee Butler, the former United States, Strategic Forces Commander, during the cold war, the Standard Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) had targeted Moscow with 400 nuclear weapons and Kiev with 40. Several scientific studies of the impact of nuclear explosions since the 1980s up to the present which utilises advanced computer models, confirm the effect of smoke injected into the stratosphere that would block sunlight from reaching the earth’s surface and is described as ‘Nuclear Winter’. In essence global temperatures would plunge below freezing point thus posing threats to life support systems especially food production. In short, it threatened human existence itself. Later studies that focused on regional nuclear wars especially in the Indo-Pak context, have indicated that the impact of a nuclear exchange would have an immediate significant and catastrophic impact in terms of death and destruction. The latest Toon study, estimates that in a situation where around 350 warheads are used by India and Pakistan, the immediate casualties would vary between 50 to 125 million lives depending on the yields of the weapons used which could vary between 15-100 Kilotons. (a Kiloton being the explosive equivalent power of 1000 tons of TNT). Such scales and speeds of destruction for both parties would indeed be of an existential nature. Therefore, both India and Pakistan despite the rhetoric during times of tension have so far displayed caution and refrained from getting into situations where nuclear weapons are alerted. The speedy de-escalation after Balakot is indicative of a cautionary approach. Of course, this is no guarantee that the next round would not witness a different outcome. For as long as nuclear weapons exist in the arsenals of both countries, the possibility of use remains, however low the probability. It is now well known (but widely ignored by the strategic cognoscenti) that even a regional Indo-Pak nuclear war with hundreds of low yield nuclear explosions can also pose an existential threat

at the global level. The latest study states “In the India-Pakistan scenario, we calculated a total of 16.1 TG (1 TG is equivalent of one million tons of smoke) of black carbon injected into the upper atmosphere (11 from India and 5.1 from Pakistan) for weapons with yields of 15 kilotons; 27.3 TG (19.8 from India and 7.5 from Pakistan) for 50 kiloton weapons; and 36.6 TG (27.5 from India and 9.1 from Pakistan) for 100 kiloton weapons. The smoke would be heated by sunlight and lofted high into the stratosphere, where it could remain for years, since it does not rain in the stratosphere”. The Climate Model indicates that global average temperatures and precipitation would be significantly lowered and comparisons are drawn to the ice age that prevailed thousands of years ago. Agriculture around the world would be impacted and billions of people could face starvation. In earlier studies, even 5 TG of smoke produced (which is one third of what is expected in a lower scale Indo-Pak conflict), food production would change in China and the US for specific crops causing widespread shortages at the global level. Moreover, the ozone layer would be degraded as the rising smoke absorbs the sunlight and heats up the stratosphere that would permit ultra-violet rays of greater magnitude to reach the earth causing negative effects. The political and strategic implications of the long-term impact on climate change challenges the foundations of the edifice on which nuclear weapon strategy has been constructed. It is obvious that any deliberate initiation of nuclear war has a high probability of posing an existential threat to humanity. Even with the achievement of the complete destruction of an adversary’s arsenal through a first strike, the initiator cannot itself escape the existential threat posed by long term climate change. This indicates that the First Use doctrine in the name of strengthening deterrence stands fully exposed for its incredibility and the utter stupidity of the use of nuclear weapons.

## Case

### Solvency

#### Two major issues with this aff that means they can’t solve any of the advantages:

#### 1] – it is not about appropriation

#### Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty defines outer space and appropriation

OST 66 “2222 (XXI). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1499th plenary meeting, Dec 19, 1966, <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html> TG

ARTICLE II. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

#### Appropriation has to be permanent and exclusive control

Trapp 13, Timothy Justin. "Taking up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms with Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty." U. Ill. L. Rev. (2013): 1681. (JD Candidate at UIUC Law School)//Re-cut by Elmer

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217

[\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]

The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were try3ing to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Outer space starts above the Karman line

World Atlas n.d. “What is the Karman Line?” World Atlas, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-karman-line.html> TG

Karman line is the boundary between the Earth's atmosphere and outer space.

Its 100km (62 miles) above sea level

Anything past the Karman line is not subject to control by countries like their airspace

The Karman line is an imaginary line that scientists use to define the border between outer space and the Earth’s [atmosphere](https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-layers-of-the-atmosphere.html). The Karman line is at an altitude of approximately 62 miles. It is considered to be the starting point of outer space in various space treaties and also for aerospace record keeping.

#### Their internal link evidence is NOT about appropriation—private companies in Ukraine don’t launch spacecraft they just make money selling parts to other countries or building spacecraft to contract out to the state—also doesn’t say that private companies can successfully compete—insert rehighlighting

* We’re green, removed their h/l

1AC Antonink 8/7 [(Daryna, studied journalism and communications at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. Antoniuk worked as a news editor, social media manager, and freelance journalist before she joined the Kyiv Post staff in February 2020.) “Ukraine’s space industry goes after private money” KyivPost, 8/7/2021. https://www.kyivpost.com/business/ukraines-space-industry-goes-after-private-money.html] BC

Lucrative industry

If space was once a political tool for world’s superpowers, today it is also a business opportunity for a new generation of entrepreneurs all over the world, including Ukraine.

Last year international private space companies attracted a record $9.1 billion to launch Earth monitoring or communications satellites into orbit or to build spacecraft that deliver people and cargo to space.

Investments in space are long-term and risky, Taftay said, but they pay off in the future.

“The space industry brings in seven times more money than it receives. For every dollar invested in the space industry, the country’s economy receives $6–7 in taxes and investment,” according to him.

As of today, Ukraine has 10 private space companies, Taftay said. Most of them — like Firefly Aerospace, Skyrora and Dragonfly — have become international stars and are now based in the U.S. or U.K., working with NASA and SpaceX.

But many Ukrainian space businesses export their products abroad because there is no money or work for them in Ukraine. “You can create your own space company here, but it is unclear what to do with it next. Who will be the customer?” Usov said.

In the U.S., nearly 80% of orders for space businesses come from the State Department or the Department of Defense, according to Usov. NASA astronauts even flew to the International Space Station on the Crew Dragon spacecraft manufactured by SpaceX.

For many decades Ukraine has only worked with state-owned enterprises like Pivdenmash and Pivdenne on its space projects. “This business model discouraged the development of new private companies,” Usov said.

To change this, the government passed a law in 2019 that allows private companies to build spacecraft in Ukraine and compete for contracts with state-owned enterprises or work together with them. In 2019, for example, Ukrainian-American aerospace company Firefly Aerospace ordered $15 million worth of missile parts from Ukrainian Pivdenmash.

But these agreements are rare. Ukraine’s main customer — the government — hasn’t yet signed any big contracts with private space companies. “There are no orders because we haven’t had financing or even a space program since 2018,” Taftay said.

$1 billion space program

Without a governmental space program, the Ukrainian space industry is frozen: “It hasn’t had any priorities, nor the conditions to develop,” said Oleg Uruskyi, the minister of strategic industries.

As a result, state-owned space enterprises have become less productive over the years. In 2018, state-owned space enterprises brought Ukraine $42 million in taxes, in 2019 — $34 million, in 2020 — $32 million. Last year was the most unfortunate for the Ukrainian space industry, according to Taftay.

Out of the country’s 15 state-owned space enterprises, five were loss-makers last year, four went bankrupt and one fired all of its employees. Together, they lost $30 million in 2020 compared to $16 million in 2019 and $2.7 million in 2018.

The space program submitted by Taftay will cost Ukraine over $1 billion — only half of this money will be covered by state funds, the other half — by export contracts.

Last year Ukrainian state-owned space companies produced $103 million worth of space-tech products and exported almost half of them — $64 million. Export usually takes up nearly 60–70% of the industry’s financing, according to Taftay.

Many European countries and the U.S. order Ukrainian-made rocket engines, navigation technology and rocket stages because they are cheap and reliable.

In the last 30 years, Ukrainian state-owned enterprises manufactured the components for 169 carrier rockets, including Cyclone, Zenith, Antares, Vega. These rockets launched 449 international spacecraft into orbit.

As of today, Ukraine only has two big international projects to rely on — the assembly of the first stage cores for NASA’s rocket Antares and the production of cruise propulsion engines for the European Space Agency’s rocket project Vega.

But they will not last forever, Usov said. Ukraine will need to secure more contracts with international partners but without a space program, it is impossible to do, according to Usov.

“Ukraine is still enjoying the perks it has gained in Soviet times — but it isn’t evolving. Other countries, in turn, invest in innovations and are catching up with Ukraine,” he said.

Future changes

To regain its power on the global market, Ukraine has to boost competition inside the country — between state-owned behemoths and private companies, according to Usov.

Today, the country’s space enterprises like Pivdenmash and Pivdenne in Dnipro, Kommunar and Hartron in Kharkiv or Kyivpribor in Kyiv cannot control their own assets or attract investment. They are also burdened by outdated infrastructure and a bloated workforce.

The giant Pivdenmash spaceship factory, which in the 20th century manufactured the most powerful rockets in the world, suffered $25 million losses in 2020. As the number of orders for its products has been decreasing, the factory descended into crisis: it didn’t have water for weeks, its sewage system didn’t work and employees weren’t paid properly.

To save state enterprises from the crisis, Ukraine plans to turn them into joint-stock companies, Taftay said. “It will make them more flexible and attractive for investors.”

Within the new space program, state enterprises will compete with private companies for the right to build six satellites — two each year starting in 2023, Taftay said. But first, Ukraine plans to send up the Sich 2–30 satellite in December using the U.S. launch vehicle Falcon 9 that belongs to SpaceX.

#### Their own evidence also concedes Ukraine does not have a single satellite in space and does not have plans to launch a satellite that is profitable in any way OR that is created by the private sector.

1AC Antonink 8/7 [(Daryna, studied journalism and communications at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv. Antoniuk worked as a news editor, social media manager, and freelance journalist before she joined the Kyiv Post staff in February 2020.) “Ukraine’s space industry goes after private money” KyivPost, 8/7/2021. https://www.kyivpost.com/business/ukraines-space-industry-goes-after-private-money.html] BC

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Ukraine will pay Elon Musk’s company $1 million to launch the satellite — eight times lower than planned. Ukraine will send the assembled satellite to the spaceport in the U.S. by plane, at the beginning of November, according to Taftay.

With this satellite, Ukraine could collect data to forecast crops and detect problems in the fields, analyze the usage of minerals and water, monitor the movement of troops.

Sich 2–30 was designed by the state design bureau Pivdenne in 2015 after Ukraine lost touch with another satellite, Sich 2. According to Taftay, the previous satellite broke down because it was made of low-quality components imported from Russia. The new satellite, however, will be all-Ukrainian, he said.

Compared to modern satellites, Sich 2–30 is outdated, Usov said. It was designed to go into space with the Ukrainian rocket Dnipro, not Falcon 9, meaning that Ukraine had to adjust it. It is also larger and less technologically advanced than the new generation of satellites.

“But given that Ukraine does not have its own satellite, it is a big step forward,” Usov said

#### No warrant for why ending Ukranian appropriation means they can’t build and sell parts cuz they aren’t the ones in space, AND no warrant for why continued appropriation is key to China’s continued investment

### Adv 1

#### 1] No US or NoKo strike – neither side can advantageously escalate

Friedman 3/5/19 [George Friedman, founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures, U.S. geopolitical forecaster, and strategist on international affairs. After Hanoi: North Korea, the US and Japan. March 3, 2019. <https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/03/05/after_hanoi_north_korea_the_us_and_japan_112981.html>]

The Hanoi talks ended in deadlock. Both sides – represented by U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un – showed their anger by refusing to shake hands. The media labeled the talks a failure. But I’ve been involved in a number of negotiations in my life, and I see this as a normal part of the process. At some point, all parties will take positions designed to test the other side’s hunger for a deal, and prudent negotiators know that showing hunger can be devastating. So, ending the negotiation, particularly with a show of anger, is routine. At the same time, mutual rejection can be genuine, and now each side is trying to figure out how serious the other is. Establishing that you are prepared to walk away from the table is important – but sometimes the deal falls apart as a result.

Where Things Stand

War with North Korea is not a good option for the U.S. There’s the danger of artillery fire close to Seoul, the uncertainty of the location of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, and the U.S. aversion to the idea of getting bogged down in another war this century. North Korea, on the other hand, knows that one thing that would trigger a U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strike would be to develop weapons that can reach the U.S., and it wants to avoid such a strike at all costs. So, this failed negotiation leaves a reality in which war is not likely, giving both sides room for obstinacy.

#### 3] No North Korean threat—Kim’s rational and their ev’s biased

Jonathan C. **Jobe, Ph.d. 19**, of Crescent Valley, is a retired educator and a veteran of the U.S. Air Force., “COLUMN: North Korea not a threat unless threatened”, <https://www.duncanbanner.com/oklahoma/opinion/column-north-korea-not-a-threat-unless-threatened/article_a63c250b-c8a1-5e8b-8875-177fa577ff56.html>. Rez

In point of fact, the threat from North Korea is more a fabrication by those who think we should always be at war with someone (anyone) and constantly threatening other countries as the basis for our foreign policy.

North Korea may be somewhat of a threat to Japan and South Korea and China and Russia, but **is not a threat of any kind to the** **U**nited **S**tates.

The **North Koreans are very backward militarily and politically**, and are different from the South Koreans only because China and the U.S. drew a line more or less along the 38th parallel and called it a day in 1954 after three years of bloody war, rather than continue to fight and slaughter hundreds of thousands more Chinese troops at a time.

And unlike all of the “experts” on Korea who have never lived there or even met a Korean in person, I lived in South Korea for three years, traveled in North Korea as part of a South Korean diplomatic contingent, and also married into the Korean aristocracy. Of course, that doesn’t make me an expert on Korea, either, but it does give me some factual basis and background for my opinions on the country.

The first thing you need to understand about North and South Korea is that it is, and always has been, a single country, with a single people, speaking a single language – and had a single history prior to the Korean War. And every South Korean had relatives living in North Korea for two reasons.

First, the Korean peninsula has been more or less unified since about 1900, when the Japanese invaded the country and occupied it until they were ejected by the U.S. in 1945. Before that, there existed three separate kingdoms on the peninsula that were closely affiliated. Then, for the brief period from 1945 to 1950, it was a free country with aspirations to become Westernized and democratic. China was unable to allow that, and tried to annex it by force in 1950.

The other reason every South Korean has relatives in the North is because when the Korean War was ending, everyone in the North who was able fled southward to avoid living under the thumb of Mao and the Communist Chinese. Families were divided and have until recently not even been able to speak to each other, much less meet and spend time with their relatives. So there is no incentive for the North to attack t

he South or anyone else unless goaded into war by others. Of course, the North would love to annex the South, just as China annexed Hong Kong and for the same economic reasons: Democracy breeds wealth and plenty for a society, while Communism must rely on taking and redistributing what others have earned.

In sum, North Korea only poses a threat when threatened, and for that reason will never agree to relinquish its nuclear weapons. Kim saw what happened to Gaddafi in Libya when that leader gave up his nuclear program, and has no intention of being murdered by his own subjects the same way that Gaddafi was.

### Adv 2

#### 1] Biden thumps – he backs down to Russia and hasn’t even sent Ukraine military aid

Lake 12/17 Eli Lake (Eli Lake is a columnist covering national security and foreign policy. He was the senior national security correspondent for the Daily Beast and covered national security and intelligence for the Washington Times, the New York Sun and UPI.), 12-17-2021, "Who’s Appeasing Putin Now?," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-12-17/who-s-appeasing-putin-now-biden-policy-on-ukraine-shows-weakness> mvp

Eleven months into Biden’s presidency, that harder line has yet to emerge. In the current crisis in Ukraine, for example, Biden and his administration have told Putin that there will be devastating sanctions if he orders the troops amassed on Ukraine’s border to invade. At the same time, Biden has invited Putin to a NATO summit to air his grievances about the alliance he seeks to break apart. The Biden administration has also sent mixed messages on whether Ukraine should give separatists in the Donbas region special political status before Russia withdraws its forces and dismantles the illegal armed groups it created during its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

Another aspect of Biden’s policy is that coercive measures against Russia are proposed as a consequence only if it invades. This makes Putin’s destabilizing troop buildup on Ukraine’s border essentially cost-free. Biden still hasn’t used his congressionally mandated authority to send up to $200 million in military aid to Ukraine, an authority that exists for just this type of an emergency. Last week a group of Democratic House lawmakers urged the White House to tap this fund.

The Biden administration has also declined to enforce significant sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would bypass Ukraine and provide natural gas directly to Germany, depriving the struggling Ukrainian country of a critical source of revenue and a hedge against Russian belligerence. The U.S. has hinted that such sanctions would be enforced if there were an invasion, but for now Russia has a path to securing one of Putin’s strategic priorities.

The lack of action has caught the attention of Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. “It is important to have sanctions applied before, rather than after, the conflict would happen,” he told reporters this week. “If they were applied after the conflict would happen, this would basically make them meaningless.”

Biden’s approach to Russia is part of a pattern. Consider the lack of response to Russia’s hack earlier this year of the Colonial oil pipeline, which led to gasoline shortages across the U.S. Biden warned Putin that the U.S. would respond if Russian hackers targeted critical infrastructure again, but did not respond to the pipeline hack itself.

Biden also appeased Russia during the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Initially, the U.S. wanted counterterrorism agreements with Afghanistan’s neighbors, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. But Russia instructed those governments to decline to meet with the U.S., leading the Biden administration to pursue a counterterrorism partnership with Russia instead. This is a tacit acknowledgement of Putin’s claim to hold dominion over the republics that were once part of the Soviet Union.

Alina Polyokova, the president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis, told me that while she has been pleased with some of the recent rhetoric from the administration, many of her interlocutors in Eastern Europe are shocked that Biden has not pursued a more hawkish policy against Russia. “A lot of this is revealing that much of the criticism of Russia from the Democratic side was because of Trump and doesn’t reflect policy,” she said.

This presents a political crisis for Democrats, in addition to the strategic crisis in Ukraine. For four years, Democrats portrayed themselves as a party of Russia hawks, in contrast to a president they saw as Putin’s lackey. But since Biden came into office, his administration has stopped enforcing major sanctions on Russia’s pipeline to Germany, held off on punishing Russian hacks of critical infrastructure and now seeks to deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine with threats alone.

Some might call that appeasement. Others might say Biden’s presidency so far has been a gift to Vladimir Putin.

#### 2] No Russian action in Ukraine now – they view geopolitical costs and perceived reactions as too high – the Plan reverses that by signaling a lessened stance.

Chausovsky 21 Eugene Chausovsky 12-27-2021 "How Russia Decides When to Invade" <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/27/how-russia-decides-when-to-invade/> (Eugene Chausovsky is a nonresident fellow at the Newlines Institute. Chausovsky previously served as senior Eurasia analyst at the geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor for more than 10 years. His work focuses on political, economic, and security issues pertaining to Russia, Eurasia, and the Middle East.)//Elmer

The world is looking fearfully at the Russian-Ukrainian border and for good reason. Russia has amassed some 120,000 troops on the border, and fighting along the line of contact between Moscow-backed separatists and Ukraine’s security forces has intensified in recent days. Signs at the top are no better. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a draft proposal on Dec. 17 detailing security guarantees between Russia and the United States that explicitly draws a red line on NATO’s expansion eastward to Ukraine and other former Soviet states, and Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an ominous warning on Dec. 21 of a “military-technical” response to what he deemed as “aggressive” measures by the West. U.S. and other Western officials have already deemed many of Russia’s proposals “unacceptable,” though the urgency of the situation has spurred plans for security talks between the United States and Russia in January. While many have tried to read the tea leaves and psychoanalyze Russian President Vladimir Putin as to whether or not he will actually make the decision to invade Ukraine, there is a broader structural framework for understanding and anticipating Russian military interventions in the post-Soviet space that can perhaps be a more useful guide. Despite all the hard words from Moscow, Russia’s record shows that an invasion is unlikely. What specific objectives would Putin have in launching an invasion? The answer to this question must be rooted in Russia’s geopolitical imperatives, which frame all manners of Moscow’s decision-making. Russia’s primary imperatives are domestic political consolidation on the homefront, protecting itself from external threats (whether that be from neighbors or global powers), and expanding its influence both regionally—especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union—and beyond to the extent possible. The expansion of NATO to the former Soviet bloc thus violates a key imperative for Russia, which leaves Moscow feeling fundamentally insecure both from neighboring countries that join the bloc and the external powers—primarily the United States—that support them. While Russia was too weak to stop NATO expansion into Central Europe and the Baltic states in the 1990s and early 2000s, Moscow was willing to go to war in Georgia in 2008 and subsequently in Ukraine in 2014 to stop this from happening. But even this decision was not taken lightly or indiscriminately by the Kremlin, which brings us back to the framework on Russian military interventions. In its decision-making process on whether to intervene militarily in the former Soviet sphere, Russia’s calculus uses a strategic framework that rests primarily on five variables: 1) a trigger; 2) local support; 3) anticipated military reaction; 4) technical feasibility; and 5) relatively low anticipated political and economic costs, especially when it comes to nonmilitary responses to invasion such as sanctions or diplomatic restrictions

. If any one of these conditions is insufficient or nonexistent, then Russia is unlikely to intervene militarily, even within the former Soviet space. If all these factors are present, there is a much higher likelihood for a Russian military intervention. And if Russia gambles wrong, it pays a very high cost.

#### 3] Doesn’t come close to exticiton – their evidence doesn’t say so it just says mass refugee exodus and ukraine uninhabitable – not the globe

Agency “Level 7” accidents in a matter of days. Such a contingency would induce a massive refugee exodus and could render much of Ukraine uninhabitable for decades.