# 1NC

## 1

### T

#### Interpretation – affirmatives must demonstrate how they engage efforts to advocate the plan beyond hypothetical imagination in the 1AC – only this model signals spiritual life and prevents ascetic tourism.

**Reid-Brinkley 20** – Shanara Reid-Brinkley 2020, “The Future is Black: Afropessimism, Fugitivity, and Radical Hope in Education”, Edited by Carl Grant, Ashley Woodson, Michael Dumas, https://books.google.com/books?id=SMHyDwAAQBAJ&pg=PR5&source=gbs\_selected\_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false//WY

What lies in the wake" of competitive policy debate? How are Black debaters doing wake work? In the following section I take two examples from the National Debate Tournament Final Round to demonstrate wake work in competitive debate. Next, I ana-lyze the central argument in the final round characterizing the current clash of civilizations in debate and the ramifications of building community in debate. The final round of the 2017 National Debate Tournament was not just a com- petition, it was a referendum on the notion of a universal community and the structural exclusions and fairness issues that characterize the traditions and norms of competitive practice. Georgetown is affirmative in the debate and of fer a federal policy toward Alaska as an example of a specific proposal to combat catastrophic climate change. Based on the norms of competition, Georgetown presents a coherent affirmative argument providing an effective stasis point for fair deliberation of the climate change resolution. After the affirmative's speech Rutgers is allowed to cross-examine the speaker. Devane Murphy asks, “When is the first life saved as a result of the afffirmative]?” (2017). While Georgetown admits that a debate round cannot save lives directly, they argue that discuss- ing climate change policy is a valuable academic conversation. Rutgers then asks a series of questions about Georgetown's relationship as individuals to the people and places targeted by the federal policy they suggest: “Do you know any people in the arctic? Do you know any communities in the arctic? Can you name a family in the arctic?” (Murphy, 2017). While Georgetown answers no to these questions, they argue that a focus on debaters as individuals rather than the policy option they have presented is a distraction from the stasis point they have set for the debate. Using Afropessimism as a heuristic for engaging the resolution, debaters like Rutgers, reject any affirmation of the United States Federal Government. For these students, the federal government is always an unethical actor. In as much as the resolutional statement requires the affirmative to posit federal government action as an ethical response to public need, the vast majority of Black debaters refuse to take such a position. To combat this refusal to follow com- petitive norms, the Framework argument developed to confront the disruption of the normative form and content of policy debate competition. Framework debaters (mostly White and non-Black POCs) argue that if a team violates the norms of common practice they reject the normative stasis points for delibera-tion destroying the educational benefits of policy debate. Framework has operated as a strategic tool of capture and exclusion of Black thought in competitive debate. However, as "the holds multiply" so too does Black innovation. Rutgers' strategy in the final round took the form of the traditional Framework argument, but using Black thought to revise the content and turn it against the norms of traditional debate. Black Framework, Rutgers' strategy, argued that the affirmative must embody their politics and demonstrate how they directly engage in efforts to reduce climate change. Rutgers' argues that Georgetown is disconnected from their politics which is why they can advocate a policy that may affect the people of the Arctic while having little knowledge of those people or their lives. This kind of orientation toward policy action is dangerous, encouraging what Rutgers refers to as “ascetic tourism" by which debaters role-playing policy advocates “tour [the] trauma of various populations without ever acting to alleviate the harm” (Murphy, 2017). When Georgetown seeks further clarification of Black Framework, Rutgers' responds: "We provided an interpretation of what we think debate should look like, the same way in which when you're negative and you read my affirmative and you say we should not be able to do what we do. Very simple” (Murphy, 2017). Georgetown often runs the traditional Framework argument against Black Debate teams who fall outside their interpretation of a fair stasis point for debate about the resolution. Rutgers' turns the tables on Georgetown argu- ing that the traditional form of policy debate produces poor policy advocates and that Black Debate practice which centers embodied political practice is a superior method of training political advocates. Black Framework is an exam- ple of political theorizing from the hold. It operates from the perspective that anti-blackness is the stage upon which all political deliberation is played and then strategically identifies a tactic and an exigency for disruption.Rutgers capitalizes on the growing middle majority of judges who agree that Black Debate practice is an effective training tool for political advocacy. The use of Black Framework flips the script; it is a jarring (re)performance of the acts of exclusion that Black debaters have faced for decades. It took the form of Framework, paired with Black content, to argue that the neo-liberal norms of civil society would no longer get a free pass as the base frame for political negotiation. Rutgers turned a mirror on debate and offered a reflection of itself haunted by the specter of Black death. Arguing Black Framework was an act of bringing out the dead.

#### Vote Neg:

#### 1 – Access – our interp privileged debaters forced to mobilize as accomplices to minority debaters outside of the round.

#### 2 – Presumption – Absent an affective connection towards space exploration that moves past imaginary fiated action, voting aff cannot actualize their advantages and entrench cruel optimism.

#### 3 – Pornotroping – The 1AC utilizes suffering as a currency to trade in exchange for ballots which commodifies experience – our interp forces them to go further to realize the lived consequences of in-round practices.

#### 4 – TVA – Introduce a petition to halt space exploration.

#### Drop the debater – we indict their model of debate. Evaluate the T-shell through competing interpretations – you cannot be reasonably oppressive, and reasonability bright-lines are arbitrary which requires judge intervention. No RVIs – you should not win for proving you’re accessible – their model deters debaters from indicting oppressive practices and it forces debaters to defend repugnant norms.

## 3

### K

#### Abled subjectivity is tied up in a two-tiered affective response that explains disabled life – primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status, which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15 The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 //ACCS JM

Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman’s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one’s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers’s formulation: one “cannot bear to look...but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego’s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person’s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud’s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity’s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else’s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture’s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people’s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity’s incursions, reinforces the ego’s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud’s primary- secondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud’s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual’s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person’s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability’s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one’s own self undone?

#### The desire to fill the insatiable lack creates experiences of impairment that structures the disability drive – cementing an order of signification that relies upon ableist value systems.

Mollow 2 [The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 // WHSRS and Lex VM]

Tropes of disability are also present in what Edelman reads as Jean Baudrillard‟s “panicky offensive against reproduction without heterogenital copulation,” in which sex is described as devolving into a “useless function” and humans are distinguished (unsuccessfully, Edelman argues) from “the order of the virus” (qtd. in Edelman 64, 62).111 Edelman‟s apt reading of these remarks by Baudrillard in relation to what was once called “the gay plague,” as well as his own plays on the word “bent,” suggest that it can be difficult, in homophobic and ableist culture, to distinguish between queerness and disability (62, 90).112 Anti-queer religious leaders, Edelman notes, characterize queer sexualities as “unhealthy” and “ugly,” and “ministries of hope” offer cures to those who have “grown sick-to-death of being queer” (91, 47). 113 Against the “pathology” or “social disease” as which queerness is diagnosed, queer-baiting of children, Edelman argues, functions as a form of “antigay immunization,” while the narrative of A Christmas Carol serves as an annual “booster shot” (143, 19, 49). These repetitive references to disability suggest that not only queerness but also disability might be a fitting name for what Edelman, alluding to the death drive, calls “the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order” (25). Indeed, disability metaphors are often the closest approximations that Edelman can find for the “unnameable” death drive (25). The terms that Edelman uses to describe the death drive include “wound,” “fracture,” “stupid enjoyment,” “mindless violence,” “lifeless machinery,” “senseless compulsion,” “disfiguration,” and a “shutdown of life‟s vital machinery” (No Future 22; “Kid” 28; No Future 38, 23, 27, 38, 37, 44). Although these signifiers do not directly refer to specific impairments, they do, taken together, evoke the physical and mental injury and dysfunction as which disability is commonly understood. And then there is Edelman‟s term “sinthomosexuality,” a neologism formed by “grafting, at an awkward join,” the word “sexuality” onto Lacan‟s term “sinthome.” With its “awkward” “grafting,” the word “sinthomosexuality” embodies disability at the level of the letter.114 Etymologically, too, Edelman‟s term harkens back to disability: “sinthome” is an archaic way of spelling the French word for “symptom” (qtd. in Edelman 33). The root meaning of “sinthomosexuality,” then, is something like “symptom-sexuality.” However, Lacan‟s “sinthome” means more than simply “symptom”: it refers, Edelman explains, to “the particular way each subject manages to knot together the orders of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real” (35). The sinthome is the only means by which the subject can access the Symbolic order of meaning production; but paradoxically, because each subject‟s sinthome is arbitrary and meaningless (as individual as a fingerprint), the sinthome also threatens the Symbolic order to which it provides access (36). Both this access and this threat are figured as disability. In order to be constituted as a subject and to take one‟s place within the Symbolic order, one must be metaphorically blind: the cost of subjectivity is “blindness to this determination by the sinthome,” “blindness to the arbitrary fixation of enjoyment responsible for [the subject‟s] consistency,” “blindness” to the functioning of the sinthome (Edelman 36, 38). The alternative to subjectivity as disability would be, according to remarks that Edelman attributes to Lacan, “radical psychotic autism” (qtd. in Edelman 37).115 That is, whatever might alleviate our constitutive “blindness” by exposing “the sinthome as meaningless knot” must effect a “disfiguration” (Edelman 38), the consequences of which would be “pure autism” (Žižek 81, qtd. in Edelman 38). On the one side, blindness; on the other, disfiguration, psychosis, autism: when it comes to recognizing the senselessness of one‟s sinthome, it seems we‟re disabled if we do, disabled if we don‟t. This is why I have proposed that the “death drive”—a force that has less to do with literal death than with a strange persistence of life in death, or of death in life (perhaps like the “life not worth living” of which disability is often supposed to consist)—would more accurately be termed the “disability drive.” Writing of the contingency of disability as an identity category, Michael Bérubé observes: Any of us who identify as “nondisabled” must know that our self-designation is inevitably temporary, and that a car crash, a virus, a degenerative genetic disease, or a precedent-setting legal decision could change our status in ways over which we have no control whatsoever. If it is obvious why most nondisabled people resist this line of thinking, it should be equally obvious why that resistance must somehow be overcome. (viii) Could part of this resistance be attributable to a fear that, in the car crash or other identity- shattering event, it might be the driver‟s own hand that makes that disabling turn, that is, that the driver might be driven by an impulse, unwanted and unconscious, toward something beyond the principles of pleasure and health? Applying the name “the disability drive” to this “beyond” affords insight into the reasons that images of disability so powerfully excite and repel, becoming, as Tobin Siebers writes, “sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look” (178). Later in this chapter, I will define the affect that Siebers references here as “primary pity.” For now, though, I simply want to point out that Siebers‟s important observation can be extended by noting that it is not only nondisabled people who react to images of disability with a mixture of aversion and attraction. Disabled people may also respond in this way, especially when contemplating impairments other than those that currently disable us.116 Building on Douglas Baynton‟s famous assertion that “disability is everywhere,...once you begin looking for it,” I suggest that the same may be true in regard to the disability drive: this ego-undoing psychic force shapes the subjectivities of disabled and nondisabled subjects alike (52). Manifestations of the disability drive may be present in Edelman‟s discussion of Tiny Tim. Take, for example, Edelman‟s contention that “the pleasurable fantasy of survival” in Dickens‟s story requires the survival of the fantasy that Tiny Tim “does not excite an ardent fear (or is it a fearful ardor?) to see him . . . at last cash in his chips” (45). It‟s a familiar cultural fantasy: cure ‟em (as Dickens might hope) or kill ‟em (as Edelman suggests readers must secretly wish).117 But in this unacknowledged wish, there may be more at stake than either killing or curing. In the chapter that follows his reading of A Christmas Carol, Edelman adduces Lacan‟s discussion of the legend of Saint Martin, who was said to have cut his own cloak in two in order to give half of it to a beggar. “Perhaps,” Lacan suggests, “over and above that need to be clothed, [the beggar] was begging for something else, namely that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him” (qtd. in Edelman 83). Drawing upon this passage in his analysis of North by 72 Northwest, Edelman proposes that as Leonard attempts to push Roger Thornhill to his death from atop Mount Rushmore, he “enacts . . . the one [killing] as displacement of the other [fucking]” (85). Killing as displacement of fucking: might a similar displacement be at work in Edelman‟s attribution, to Dickens‟s readers, of a “fearful ardor” to see Tiny Tim “at last cash in his chips” (45)? As evidence for this suggestion, take the mode by which Edelman introduces his discussion of A Christmas Carol: “Take Tiny Tim, please!,” “with a nod to the spirit of the late Henny Youngman” renders Tiny Tim wifelike—clearly undesirable in this context, but not wholly uneroticized (41). And then there is the word “take,” which, particularly when followed by the word “please,” has a meaning other than the ones Edelman seems deliberately to invoke: “take” means “fuck,” and so Edelman‟s directive to “take Tiny Tim, please!,” which echoes his earlier injunction to “fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net,” seems to authorize an additional imperative: fuck Tiny Tim. “Fuck” here means, of course, “remove” or “the hell with,” but it also means fuck.118 Arguably, these two ways in which No Future says “fuck Tiny Tim” coincide with what disability studies most ardently desires. “Fuck Tiny Tim, please!” disability scholars beg: rid us, please, of this most reviled textual creation. And also: if it is our cultural mandate to embody this pitiable, platitude-issuing, infantilized, and irritating figure—well, then fuck us, every one. Fuck us because figuratively, we are already “so fucked” by our culture‟s insistence, through this figure, that the disabled are not fuckable. This insistence must be understood as a form of reactive reinforcement: propelling every cultural representation of disability as undesirable, there may be a “fearful ardor,” an unacknowledged drive. Such representations include Edelman‟s abjection of Tiny Tim. And, I will argue, they also pertain to a similar abjection of Tiny Tim in the field of disability studies. As we shall soon see, the drive that infuses affective reactions to disability with ardor is often expressed through the emotion of pity. In taking account of the various forms that pity can take, we will be led to pose a question to disability studies and to queer antisocial theory together: are we sure that we want to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text? A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema. Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? At first glance, the answer to the latter question might seem to be “everyone.” Certainly, multitudes of moviegoers appear to enjoy our culture‟s annual recitations of Tiny Tim‟s pity inducing tale. If it can be fun to perform pity, perhaps this is because pity gives a boost to the ego of the pitying person. “You are broken, and I am whole,” the pitier says to the one who is pitied. “I look down on you because you suffer.” Naturally, disabled people resist performing this service for the nondisabled. “Spare us your pity,” we say, because pity is felt to be demeaning. 73 Yet an incoherence structures this familiar account of pity: if pity fortifies the ego of the subject who feels it, then why do people so often resist feeling pity? Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won‟t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim. It‟s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity. Edelman argues that compassion (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) is fundamentally narcissistic (73). When we call ourselves compassionate, we think we‟re feeling for the other; but, Edelman contends, we‟re really only feeling for ourselves (83). That is, compassion involves projecting one‟s own ego onto the object of one‟s compassion. In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self.

#### The drive to separate the body from disability forces us to fabricate our identity.

Campbell 08 (Dr Fiona Kumari Campbellis a Senior Lecturer in the School of Health and Wellbeing at the University of South Queensland <http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/handle/10072/21024/50540_1.pdf> “Exploring Internalized Ableism using Critical Race Theory” Disability and Society, Vol. 23 (2), p. 151-162) //ACCS JM

Internalized oppression is not the cause of our mistreatment; it is the result of our mistreatment. It would not exist without the real external oppression that forms the social climate in which we exist. Once oppression has been internalized, little force is needed to keep us submissive. We harbour inside ourselves the pain and the memories, the fears and the confusions, the negative self-images and the low expectations, turning them into weapons with which to re-injure ourselves, every day of our lives. (Mason, as cited Marks, 1999, p.25). Internalised ableism means that to assimilate into the norm the referentially disabled individual is required to embrace, indeed to assume an ‘identity’ other than one’s own – and this subject is repeatedly reminded by epistemological formations and individuals with hegemonic subjectifications of their provisional and (real) identity. I am not implying that subjects have a true or real essence. Indeed the subjects' formation is in a constant state of fluidity, multiplicity and (re)formation. However, disabled people often feel compelled to fabricate ‘who’ they are – to adopt postures and comportments that are additional to self. The formation of internalised ableism cannot be simply deduced by assessing the responses of individuals to Althusser’s famous interpolative hailing “Hey you, there” (Althusser & Balibar, 1979). Whilst a subject may respond to “Hey you there, crip!” – it is naïve to assume that an affirmative response to this hailing repressively inaugurates negative disabled subjectification. In fact the adoption of more positive or oppositional ontologies of disability by the subject in question may be unexpectedly enabling. As Susan Park (2000: 91) argues “what is at stake here is not so much the accuracy behind the hailing privilege, but the power of the hailing itself to instantly determine (or elide) that thing it is naming”. Nonetheless, censure and the cancellation of the legitimacy of oppositional subjectivities remains common place as Cherney reminds us with respect to Deaf culture: “If abnormal [sic] bodies must be fixed to fit within dominant cultural views of appropriateness then the Deaf celebration of their differences must be read as an illegitimate model of advocacy”. (Cherney, 1999, p. 33). Foucault’s (1976; 1980) theorisation of power as productive may provide some offerings from which to build a conversation about internalised ableism. I am not so much interested in the ‘external’ effects of that power, but for the moment wish to concentrate on what Judith Butler aptly refers to as the ‘psychic life’ of power. She describes this dimension: … an account of subjection, it seems, must be traced in the turns of psychic life. More specifically, it must be traced in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with processes of social regulation (Butler, 1997b, p.19). In other words, the processes of subject formation cannot be separated from the subject him/herself who is brought into being though those very subjectifying processes. The consequences of taking into oneself negative subjectivities not only regulate and continually form identity (the disabled citizen) but can transcend and surpass the strictures of ableist authorizations. Judith Butler describes this process of the “carrying of a mnemic trace”: One need only consider the way in which the history of having been called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, craft the gesture, bend the spine …how these slurs accumulate over time, dissimulating their history, taking on the semblance of the natural, configuring and restricting the doxa that counts as “reality”. (Butler, 1997b, p. 159) The work of Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) links racism experienced by African Americans to the effects of hurtful words and negative cultural symbols on mental health, especially when marginalized groups embrace negative societal beliefs about themselves. They cite an international study by Fischer et al (1996) which inter alia links poor academic performance with poor social status. Although using different disciplinary language Wolfensberger (1972) in his seven core themes of SRV, identified role circularity as a significant obstacle to be overcome by disabled people wanting socially valued roles. Philosopher Linda Purdy contends it is important to resist conflating disability with the disabled person. She writes My disability is not me, no matter how much it may affect my choices. With this point firmly in mind, it should be possible mentally to separate my existences from the existence of my disability. (Purdy, 1996, p. 68). The problem with Purdy’s conclusion is that it is psychically untenable, not only because it is posited around a type of Cartesian dualism that simply separates being-ness from embodiment, but also because this kind of reasoning disregards the dynamics of subjectivity formation to which Butler (1997a; 1997b) has referred. Whilst the ‘outputs’ of subjectivity are variable the experience of impairment within an ableist context can and does effect formation of self – in other words ‘disability is me’, but that ‘me’ does not need to be enfleshed with negative ontologies of subjectivity. Purdy’s bodily detachment appears locked into a loop that is filled with internalised ableism, a state with negative views of impairment, from which the only escape is disembodiment; the penalty of denial is a flight from her body. This finds agreement in the reasoning of Jean Baudrillard (1983) who posits that it is the simulation, the appearance (representation) that matters. The subject simulates what it is to be ‘disabled’ and by inference ‘abled’ and whilst morphing ableist imperatives, in effect performs a new hyper reality of be-ing disabled. By unwittingly performing ableism disabled people become complicit in their own demise – reinforcing impairment as an outlaw ontology.

#### The alternative is to disable the figure of the “human” – we weaponizes disability’s structural position against the human.

Mollow 12 Mollow, Anna. "Is Sex Disability? Queer Theory and the Disability Drive." Sex and Disability, by R. McRuer and A. Mollow, Durham, Duke UP, 2012, pp. 306-10. http://www.sfu.ca/~baw2/GSWS826/Mollow.pdf //ACCS JM

But here a problem emerges: as we have seen, the writing by Bersani and Edelman that I have examined forwards powerful arguments against the project of becoming human. Urging queers to embrace the “inhumanity of the sinthomosexual,” Edelman observes that the liberal goal of expanding the category of “human” to encompass those presently excluded from it will not “stop the cultural production of figures” made to embody the inhumanity of the death drive (No Future 107). What would it mean for disability theory to embrace disabled people’s figuration as inhuman? As we contemplate this possibility, a moment from How I Became a Human Being may give us pause. After a presentation by the physicist Stephen Hawking at the U.C. Berkeley campus, O’Brien posed the following question: “Doctor Hawking, what can you say to all the disabled people who are stuck in nursing homes or living with their parents or in some other untenable situation and who feel that their life is over, that they have no future?” (Human Being 230). A response that might be derived from Edelman’s book—that there is, and can be, no future, since the future, by definition, can only ever be a fantasy (“always / A day / Away,” in Annie’s paean to “Tomorrow”)—hardly seems more adequate than Hawking’s reply: “All I can say is that one must do the best one can in the situation in which one finds oneself ” (No Future 30; Human Being 231). In light of O’Brien’s question, Edelman’s embrace of the death drive, or Bersani’s celebration of what he calls “the breakdown of the human itself in sexual intensities,” can easily appear as irresponsible theoretical indulgences (“Rectum” 29). Indeed, the word “irresponsible” is one that Bersani himself uses when he reflects, at a distance of thirteen years, on “Is the Rectum a Grave?”: “Much of this now seems to me a rather facile, even irresponsible celebration of ‘self- defeat.’ Masochism is not a viable alternative to mastery, either practically or theoretically” (“Sociality” 110). This remark highlights important shifts and ambivalences in Bersani’s thinking over the course of his career, which may serve as an entry into the question of the status of the human in disability theory. Bersani and Edelman are often cited, as if in the same breath, as proponents of an “antisocial” or “antirelational” “thesis” in queer theory, in opposition to which some critics of their work, such as Muñoz, have defined their own projects as “utopian.”17 But Bersani’s work, rather than conforming to either side of a utopian/antirelational binary, often reveals an interest in thinking in both of these ways at once. For example, writing of passages in his book, Homos (published in 1995) that are frequently cited as the origin of the “antirelational thesis,” Bersani describes the “performance of antirelationality” that he celebrates in Jean Genet’s Funeral Rites as a “utopic form of revolt” (“Sociality” 103; emphasis added). This joining of the utopian and the antirelational corresponds to what Bersani describes, in an essay published in 2004, as a central concern throughout his career: “a dialogue (both conciliatory and antagonistic) between” Foucault and Freud (“Fr- oucault” 133). In this essay and other recent writings, Bersani moves away from the “Freudian” and toward the “Foucauldian.” Worrying that the psychoanalytic (or antirelational) side of this paradigm may be politically irresponsible (insofar as its insistence on the intractability of the death drive seems “resistant to any social transformations whatsoever”), Bersani has become increasingly interested in the creation of what, invoking a phrase of Foucault’s, he calls “new relational modes” (“Fr- oucault” 134). Interestingly, this “admittedly utopic” project often employs a rhetoric of futurism, both reproductive and rehabilitative (Bersani, “Fr- oucault” 134). For example, in a reading of Plato’s Symposium, Bersani approvingly observes that “the goal of a love relation with Socrates” is “the bringing to term of the other’s pregnancy of soul” (“Sociality” 110; 117).18 Not only a pregnancy but perhaps also a rehabilitation of the soul is at stake at moments in which a utopian impulse is evident in Bersani’s work—as when, for example, he speaks of effecting “a curative collapse of social difference,” or of enabling a future enjoyment of “as yet unarticulated pleasures” that have thus far been “suppressed and crippled” (Homos 177; “Fr- oucault” 137; emphasis added). If, as these examples suggest, Edelman is correct in asserting that we cannot think of the future without reference to the Child—and if I am right in suggesting that the overlapping ideology of rehabilitative futurism is equally pervasive and insidious—then how should disability theory answer O’Brien’s question? The disability rights movement, of course, has already provided compelling responses: protestations against the injustice of institutionalization, critiques of the nursing home lobby, and advocacy for attendant programs. Theoretically, it could be said that the goal of de- institutionalization is merely a liberal one, as it aims only to include disabled people within the social fabric. Yet in this instance (and many similar ones), an imperfect politics clearly seems better than no politics at all. But what is the role of disability theory in relation to this politics? Is it, as Paul Longmore described disability studies in 2003, to serve as the “academic counterpart to disability rights advocacy” (Burned 2)? Or should disability theory conceive of itself as sometimes in tension with this movement (as queer theory often is in relation to the mainstream lGbt movement)? Insofar as it has acted as a “counterpart” to the disability rights movement, disability studies has made crucial contributions to what might be called a humanizing enterprise. It has offered, for example, myriad analyses of the reasons for our society’s willingness—its desperation, even—to dehumanize and exclude disabled people, even to the point of locking them up. But when sex enters the picture, things get complicated. Consider, for example, the following remark, made by a doctor to a group of patients at one of O’Brien’s rehabilitation hospitals: “You may think you’ll never have sex again, but remember . . . some people do become people again” (Human Being 80). The doctor’s comment points to a paradox that inheres in any conversation about sex and disability: disabled people, it is implied here, are less than fully human because they are presumed not to “have sex”—but sex, psychoanalysis shows us, is radically dehumanizing, effecting a “shattering” of “the structured self” rather than its entrenchment in personhood or identity. This paradox is at the root of the double bind I discussed in the introduction to this chapter, in which disability simultaneously figures sexual excess and sexual lack: disabled people are regarded as sexually deficient and therefore not fully human, but at the same time, disabled people register as less than human because disability is the ubiquitous figure for a dehumanizing, identity- disintegrating force that resembles sex. If, as the second half of this paradoxical construction suggests, assertions of humanity are in necessary conflict with expressions of sexuality, then perhaps disability theory should, rather than seeking to humanize the disabled (insisting that disabled people be treated “as human beings”), instead ask how disability might threaten to undo, or disable, the category of the human. It might do so in part by attending to the insights Bersani’s and Edelman’s readings of psychoanalytic theory yield, according to which sex, far from enabling us to “become people,” ruptures the self and dehumanizes us all. But what, then, would become of disability politics? Critics of No Future— despite Edelman’s insistence that its argument pertains to “figurality,” not to “being or becoming” the death drive—tend to read the book as advocating, on a literal level, the abandonment of hope and political goals (No Future 17; 25).19 As noted earlier, however, it is “politics as we know it” that Edelman refuses, and even this refusal does not mean that queers should stop insisting on “our equal right to the social order’s prerogatives” (No Future 3; 29; emphasis added). Edelman further clarifies this point in his essay “Ever After”: “Without for a moment denying the importance that distinguishes many [political] projects, I want to insist on the need for an ongoing counterproject as well: a project that’s willing to forgo the privilege of social recognition” (473; emphasis added). Such a counterproject—one that can be read as possibly opposing the humanizing impulse behind O’Brien’s narration of How I Became a Human Being—may take shape in some of O’Brien’s own poetry. While the title of his autobiography speaks of becoming human, his unpublished poem “Femininity” disrupts this trajectory. O’Brien writes of lying: Naked on the gurney in the hospital corridor, surrounded by nurses, tall, young, proud of their beauty, admiring my skinny cripple body. “You’re so thin, you should’ve been a girl.” “I wish my eyelashes were as long as yours.” “Such pretty eyes.” I thought or think I thought or wish I’d said, “But your bodies work. Get scissors, cut my cock and balls off. Make me a girl, without anaesthesia, make me a girl, make me a girl.”20 Much of the unnerving intensity of these lines derives from what, invoking Bersani, we might refer to as their embrace of “the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman” (or a girl, or queer, or disabled); from their rejection, that is, of the ideology of rehabilitative futurism, and from their refusal to engage in a “redemptive reinvention” of sex or disability. O’Brien’s speaker does not plead with the nurses who admire his “skinny cripple body” to “cure me” or “make me walk again.” Nor does he attempt to redefine his body (which does not “work”) as merely a manifestation of human variation. Suffering and lack, rather than being dissociated from disability, are amplified and eroticized: “cut my cock and balls off . . . without anaesthesia,” the speaker implores, the repetition of his plea (“make me a girl, / make me a girl”) evoking the repetitiveness of a drive. “Femininity” can indeed be read as an instantiation of the disability drive: disability in this poem, like “the rectum” in Bersani’s essay, “is the grave in which the masculine [and nondisabled] ideal of proud subjectivity is buried.” It will of course be tempting to evade this “nightmare of ontological obscenity” (“Rectum” 29), this fantasy of unbecoming human.21 But the dehumanizing double binds that so persistently structure cultural representations of sex and disability suggest that such evasions may be futile. Intrinsically obscene, yet inherently asexual: rather than attempting to assume a different position within this impossible paradigm, disability theory should perhaps underscore its pervasiveness as evidence of a disability drive; as a sign, that is, that our culture’s desexualization of disabled people functions to defend against a deeply rooted but seldom acknowledged awareness that all sex is incurably, and perhaps desirably, disabled.

#### Communicative spheres always zone out disability – breaking down notions of progress is necessary in the face of social death. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best disrupts progress within civil society. That means be epistemically suspect and surrender to disability since it’s key to proliferate our scholarship.

Selck 16 Selck, Michael L. "Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't." (Jan 2016) //ACCS JM

Despite the fact that a large basis of American culture is founded on ability, dis/ability rarely enters the dominant public communication sphere. The unpleasant and visceral questions that accompany communication about dis/ability have been strategically re-zoned and relocated like so many dis/abled patients, veterans, and transients. Yet, when conversation about dis/ability does seem to permeate the ideological walls of ability the messages are inspirationally distorted and optimistic. My time researching dis/ability in academia found that the conversation there mimicked the exploitive inspirational humaninterest trope found in cinema and journalism. To break the optimistic silence I set out with a performance art piece titled Under The Mantle to advance a theme of crip-pessimism, which intended to raise the stakes of contemporary dis/ability research. The beginning of this essay takes the time to detail the vast theoretical backgrounds of critical disability theory and philosophical pessimism. In the following section I reviewed intercultural communication literature for dis/ability because much of the theory literature I drew from existed outside the communication studies discipline. The evidenced lack of intercultural dis/ability artifacts up against a dis/ability centric performance art project necessitated an interdisciplinary multi-method framework. In that framework I demonstrate how autoethnography is significant to dis/ability studies because it illuminates even the most mundane able-bodied norms. In the final sections I offer a textual description of the performance and hone in on three explicit arguments that augment traditional thinking about dis/ability and communication. The trouble I encountered with dis/ability research in communication studies has to do with the way American culture understands offensive communication. Political correctness as a disciplining communication concept dictates what terms are socially acceptable at a given time. Political correctness underscores how many communication studies programs operate within the rubric of conflict (Wilderson, 2010). The thinking that suggests simply avoiding offensive terms will diminish oppression is within the rubric of conflict because it understands the oppression as materially reconcilable. What crippessimism does, and what UTM performed, is skepticism that speaking inspirationally and avoiding speaking offensively about dis/ability would end disablism. Instead I argued that what dis/ability represents is an antagonism, it is an oppression so much more foundational to the core of American values that linguistic reforms would not even scratch the surface. The significance of antagonism is that it raises the stakes of dis/ability research. The end goal of research should not be to service the meta-theoretical assumptions of the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962), because consequently the researcher never stops to ask if the assumptions of the paradigm are ethical, valid, or effective. Crippessimism is a call for some demolition and redistribution of communicative identity paradigms. If the radical promise of our theories is nothing more than a call for social stability then they are complicit in the neoliberal eugenic project. We need to theorize so that there is nothing already ‘given’ or taken for granted. Often in those moments, like the moments of so many textbooks, the underlying optimism goes completely unquestioned. Crip-pessimism as a theme is characterized by negotiating debates surrounding the efficacy of identity politics. Arguments that fit within the theme ask why the disabled should abandon their bodies in the political sphere. Social death has already occurred, the dis/abled are being rendered culturally unintelligible and physically fungible. So what we need when we are having discussions about how to progress is a theory that breaks down the notion of progress. The recognition and need for a theory like this comes about when we ask central dis/ability questions like: ‘when did eugenics end?’ and ‘where is disability in U.S. society before and after the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act?’ and ‘globally has the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities reconciled the antagonism of disablism?’. These are the questions that I want to end on and encourage communication and dis/ability scholars alike to take up. As scholars and mass media engines continue to project dis/ability within the rubric of conflict our collective reliance on capitalism and neoliberalism grow deeper. It is my hope at the end of this project that my voice both in performing and in writing encourages more scholarship detailing the omnipresence of disablism in American culture. Under The Mantle is a reminder to me that all representations of dis/ability have consequences and in many cases all we need to witness those consequences is a slight perspectival shift.

## 4

### CP

#### CP – Do the aff outside of debate. The 1AC operates from the position of the intellectual – acting as the interpreter of the truth to debate community – they are just another part of the productive process.

**Berardi 9** – Berardi, Franco " Bifo " Berardi (born 2 November 1948 in Bologna, Italy) is an Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism, Precarious Rhapsody, 2009, [www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/PrecariousRhapsodyWeb.pdf](http://www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/PrecariousRhapsodyWeb.pdf)

The role of **intellectuals** is central in the political philosophy of the twentieth century, and particularly in communist revolutionary thought. In What is to be Done?, Lenin asks himself how it is possible to organize collective action, and how the activity of intellectuals can become effective. For Lenin intellectuals are not a social class; they have no specific social interests to uphold. They **are** generally **an expression of parasitic profit and** can make ‘purely intellectual’ choices, **turn**ing **themselves into intermediaries and organizers of a revolutionary consciousness descending from philosophical thought. In this sense intellectuals are very similar to the pure becoming of the ‘spirit,’ to the Hegelian unfolding of self-consciousness. On the other hand, the workers,** still bearers of social interests, **can only pass from a purely economic phase** (the Hegelian ‘in itself’ of the social being) **to a politically conscious phase** (the ‘for itself’ of selfconsciousness) **through the political form of the party, which incarnates and transmits a philosophical legacy**. Marx speaks of the proletariat as heir to German classical philosophy: thanks to workers’ struggles a historical realization of the dialectical horizon becomes possible – the arrival of the end-point of German philosophical development from Kantian Enlightenment to romantic idealism. In Gramsci the reflection on intellectuals connotes social analysis, and approaches a materialist formulation of the ‘organic’ relationship between intellectuals and the working class. Nonetheless, the collective dimension of intellectual activity remains within the party, defined as the collective intellectual. The intellectual of the Gramscian tradition (the one that has yet to be put to work by the digital network) therefore cannot access the collective and political dimension except through the party. But in the second part of the twentieth century, **following mass education and the techno-scientific transformation of production which came about through the direct integration of different knowledges, the role of intellectuals was redefined**. No longer are intellectuals a class independent of production, or free individualities that take upon themselves the task of a purely ethical and freely cognitive choice; instead **the intellectual becomes a mass social subject that tends to become an integral part of the general productive process**. Paolo Virno uses the term ‘mass intellectuality’ to denote the formation of social subjectivity tied to the mass standardization of intellectual capacity in advanced industrial society.

#### No perms: (A) View the CP as artificially distinct to flesh out the intricacies of our methods (B) It’s a methods debate – you should hold them to the method they defended in the 1AC – they justify severance which is a voting issue for skewing 7 minutes of NC offense (C) Allows them to read infinite new advocacies in the 1AR which destroys neg ground.

## 5

### CP

#### We endorse the entirety of the aff except for their usage of the word *dependent*. Their discourse is steeped in white supremacy, sexism, and ableism.

NANCY FRASER AND LINDA GORDON, American critical theorist, feminist, and the Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School in New York City. AND professor of history and a University Professor of the Humanities at New York University , "Dependency" Demystified: Inscriptions of Power in a Keyword of the Welfare State, published 1994, ///AHS PB

"Dependency" is the single most crucial term in the current U.S. debate about welfare reform. "Welfare dependent" in the United States means someone who relies on one of the stigmatized programs of public assistance, as distinguished from honorable programs such as old age insurance, which are not called "welfare." The paradigmatic "dependent" is the poor solo mother who collects benefits from the stingy and politically unpopular program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). "Welfare reform" today means reducing "dependency" by getting claimants off the rolls. Few concepts in U.S. social policy discussions do as much ideological work as "dependency." The term leaks a profusion of stigmatizing connotations—raci[st]al, sex[ist]ual, misogynist, and more. It alludes implicitly to a normative state of "independence," which will itself not withstand critical scrutiny. Naming the problems of poor solo mothers and their children "dependency," moreover, tends to make them appear to be individual rather than social problems, as much moral or psychological as economic. The word carries strong emotive and visual associations and a powerful pejorative charge. The most common image is a "welfare mother," typically figured as a young unmarried black woman of uncontrolled sexuality and fertility. This stereotype haunts even the most neutral-sounding talk about dependency in discussions of welfare reform. Why does the word "dependency" carry so much ideological weight? Part of the reason, we suggest, is historical. The term carries the debris of several centuries of poor relief policies that relieved hunger while stigmatizing recipients, often actually impeding their escape from the dole into wage labor. Branding welfare recipients as "dependents" continues a long tradition of opposing dependence to independence. Both terms were redefined in the last few centuries in ways that help[s]ed adapt old traditions of gender, race, and class domination to new social and economic conditions. But the fundamental opposition remains: "independence" is strong, virtuous, white, and male, while "dependence" is disreputable, colored, and/or femalen. In the last half-century, as "dependency" became associated particularly with AFDC, it has intensified disrespect for women's unpaid labor.

### CP

#### We endorse the entirety of the aff except for their usage of the word *weak* – the word is inherently ableist

Smith 9

[S.E., 11-2-9, Forward, “Ableist Word Profile: Weak”, [**http://disabledfeminists.com/2009/11/02/ableist-word-profile-weak/**](http://disabledfeminists.com/2009/11/02/ableist-word-profile-weak/), Accessed 7-6-14, CX]

It’s worth discussing why “weak” is ableist before plunging into its history. The reasons this word are ableist get at the crux of the ableist identity of many words: Because it centers around the idea that Disability Is Bad. Disability is so bad, in fact, that it can be used as a shorthand to refer to something viewed as bad, unpleasant, or unworthy. Disability status, or symptoms of a disability, are so awful that they can be used as an insult.

“Weak” entered English in the 1300s, courtesy of Old Norse. The word was initially used in the sense of something soft or pliant. By the 1300s, it was being used to refer to moral failings as well as physical ones, and along the way it spawned the idea that to be strong is to be good, and to be weak is to be bad. “Weakness” is still used in a diagnostic context today, in discussions of situations in which patients lack physical strength.

Numerous disabilities are associated with physical weakness. For people with these disabilities, hearing “weak” used as an insult is not very pleasant, as you might imagine. Thus, it’s a word we would like to avoid using when it is not appropriate, if possible, since we don’t want to go around suggesting that physical weakness is something so deplorable that it’s appropriate to use the term “weak” to describe things which are unpleasant, boring, bad, dull, etc.