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#### The Space Race is simulacra – the mythos of a distinction between institutional space flight and the market fuels the image-machine.

**Dickens and Ormrod 16** – Peter Dickens, Senior Research Associate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge, member of the Red-Green Study Group in London, James S Ormrod, Principal Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton, 2016, “Introduction: The Production of Outer Space” in The Palgrave Handbook of Society, Culture and Outer Space, pp 5-6, footnote 4 included in curly braces, Agastya

An argument can be made that ‘the space race’ – as a material technological project, as a discourse about the conquest of space, and as an imagined competition – clung on to the older conceptions of space that were being abandoned in so many other areas of social life (while, it should be noted, embracing some of the developments Kern identifies). The space race was historicized and spatialized by its protagonists, by academics, and by the public, in largely consensual terms on both sides of the iron curtain (‘consensual’ in the sense that all agreed on how the race was to be understood). Indeed, for Baudrillard (1994), this was one of the keys to understanding the space race. Its aim was not to put a man on the Moon. The Moon landings functioned as models of rational, calculated control, in relation to which all earthly activity was to become oriented. As in nuclear proliferation,4 ‘[t]heir truth is to be models of simulation, the model vectors of a system of planetary control (where even the superpowers of this scenario are not free – the whole world is satellized)’ (1994, p. 35). Viewed in this way, the space race was a conspiracy, albeit one that nobody had charge of.

{4. Baudrillard believed the space race played the same role as the Cold War arms race that preceded it. In his understanding, nuclear deterrence was not aimed at containing a real threat from the other side, just as the aim of the space race was not to put a man on the Moon. Rather, the former represented a pretext ‘for installing a universal security system whose deterrent effect is not at all aimed at an atomic clash … but, rather, at the much greater probability of any real event, of anything that would be an event in the general system and upset its balance’ (p.33). Baudrillard sees the Cold War and space race as taking place in the cause of rationalization of the world and the exclusion of pre-modern forms: ‘[B]ehind this simulacrum of fighting to the death and of ruthless global stakes, the two adversaries are fundamentally in solidarity against something else, unnamed, never spoken, but whose objective outcome in war, with the equal complicity of the two adversaries, is total liquidation. Tribal, communitarian, precapitalist structures, every form of exchange, of language, of symbolic organization, that is what must be abolished, that is the object of murder in war – and war itself, in its immense, spectacular death apparatus, is nothing but the medium of this process of the terrorist rationalization of the social – The murder on which sociality will be founded, whatever its allegiance, Communist or capitalist’ (p.37)}

Because of this conspiracy, there now exists a standard account of the space race, and of the history of the American space programme. Histories of the Soviet programme are still being produced (see, for example, Siddiqi, 2010), but these do not necessarily challenge this standard account. A very condensed account runs as follow. Wernher von Braun, the Nazi rocket scientist, had been taken back to the United States in 1945 as part of Operation Paperclip, to later use what he had learnt working on the V-2 in the services of the American space programme. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 by the Soviet Union had shocked the United States. Eisenhower had then created NASA in 1958, and Kennedy had announced the decision to send a human to the Moon in 1962 in the wake of the embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The United States had beaten the Soviet Union to the Moon by 1969.5

Kennedy (1962) had attempted to assert that the reasons for conquering space were noble and involved ‘new knowledge to be gained and new rights to be won … for the progress of all people’. However, he also made it clear that it was crucial for America to secure these victories. It was meant to be understood that the space race was intimately connected with the Cold War, although academics disagreed about exactly how (see Dickens & Ormrod, 2007b). The space race was nonetheless about the extension of the space of the nation state, whether this was physical space or the space of national prestige. It was also well understood that the space race, civilian and military, had to do with the proper or improper ‘meshing’ of the spaces of government, business and politics (see Chapter 3 by Wills, this volume). The existence of a military-industrial complex of some kind is widely accepted, even if historians and social scientists have been left arguing about which interests were the most significant (see, for example, Baran & Sweezy, 1966).

#### This war of images plays on the terms of simulation – the aff reinforces technological forms and refashions a new space race headed by the government.

**Dickens and Ormrod 16** – Peter Dickens, Senior Research Associate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge, member of the Red-Green Study Group in London, James S Ormrod, Principal Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton, 2016, “Conclusion: The Future of Outer Space” in The Palgrave Handbook of Society, Culture and Outer Space, pp 446-449, Agastya

An argument can be made that the conquest of outer space has represented the ultimate victory of abstract space (see also Shaw, 2008, p. 115). Any meaningful distinction between terrestrial space and the rest of the cosmos has been eroded. This is not to say that the whole of outer space has been humanized, which of course it has not, but that space has come to be reconceptualized and re-experienced as a space for accumulation like any other. It is a space thoroughly colonized by terrestrial knowledge and practice (whether considered primarily capitalist, male, white or anything else).

For Benjamin and a host of others (from Klerkx, 2005, to Parker, 2009), the disinvestment in outer space exploration and development came as a result of the bureaucratization of NASA, and its engulfment within the military-industrial complex. With the development of the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle (which according to some accounts were each the rationale for the development of the other), space exploration became routine and unexciting. Nothing fundamentally new appeared to be happening in space. Whether or not this is seen as true depends a great deal on perspective. Even if NASA budgets were being cut, this volume has hopefully made clear that a great deal was still happening in space. New space technologies continued to be developed, and these technologies were being integrated into terrestrial life in innumerable ways. But we believe it is also true (and this has been the emphasis of our work elsewhere, see Dickens and Ormrod, 2007) that these developments represent the continuation of terrestrial power relations and social dynamics. Space development is, to put it one way, business as usual. And crucially, any novelty to these developments was undermined by the representation of outer space in similar terms to the representation of terrestrial space. As evidenced in this book, political scientists, geographers and legal scholars had begun to talk about outer space as a knowable, if not actually known, space. The origins of this representation of space can be traced to Copernicus (MacDonald, 2009) and/or Kepler (Zubrin, 1996). But with the routinization of outer spatial practices (from increasing launch rates to the proliferation of satellite-receiving terminals, to the everyday use of satellite services to underpin military operations, communications, entertainment, navigation and so on), these representations were made manifest in the creation of a new social space.

The central problem with the final victory of abstract space was that it obliterated the very ‘absolute spaces’ on which it was founded, and from which it derived its emotional appeal. It is in a way surprising that the development of modern spaceflight was from its inception anchored in a religious or spiritual cosmology. This was true of both Russian and American contexts (see also Geppert, 2007, p. 599). The Russian programme has long roots in the tradition of Russian cosmism (Kohonen, 2009; Siddiqi, 2010). And, as Pop notes, Richard Nixon said to the Apollo 11 astronauts; ‘Because of what you have done, the heavens have become a part of man’s world.’ Pop goes on:

‘Are we today turning mythology into fact?’ – asked Joseph Campbell on the occasion of the Apollo programme. The astronauts walked on the real astronomical moon, as it was; but they walked on the mythical moon of each culture, as thought to be, as imagined. Their trip was physical and metaphysical. They walked through different cosmogonies; through different models of the universe.

(Pop, 2012, personal communication, see also ‘High Flight: A Spiritual History of the Space Age’, in preparation)

This continued relationship was not coincidental. As a number of contributions here show, the appeal of outer space lay in the promise of conquering the wondrous or Godly and hence the elevation of the status of humanity (or, rather more specifically, white men). This is not necessarily that dissimilar to the process Sims describes in his chapter, whereby myths ‘record time’. Ormrod illustrates this in his chapter through analysis of Tsiolkovsky’s science fiction in which the best human beings are able to fly like angels in space. As Kilgore notes in his chapter, Carl Sagan owed his continued appeal to his simultaneous reproduction of wonder as well as knowledge. The British celebrity cosmologist Brian Cox (see Mellor, this volume, for more on him) has arguably taken this even further, such that his popular shows and writing dedicate more time to what is unknown than to knowledge itself. These lacunae became spaces for wild imaginative projects – projects more captivating than any empirical knowledge. It is no wonder that the continued disenchantment and re-enchantment of the universe have become a major theme in recent work. Based largely on studies of astronauts’ experiences, Kilbryde (2015) argues that space exploration can potentially be a means of overcoming the dualism through which outer space is constructed as an object, and thus of experiencing unity. This is provided that the sense of awe and wonder it engenders is not sought as a ‘possession’ of the individual or as something to be subsequently rationalized.

It is the invocation of obstacles that produces space as something potentially unconquerable, and hence worth conquering. And yet the obliteration of the irrational or wondrous sweeps the ground from underneath such a project. To the extent that outer space has become an abstract space, it has been foreclosed as a frontier. It is a frontier, but a frontier without a future. In removing the possibility of an elsewhere, it serves only to secure terrestrial hegemony. In their own ways, both Baudrillard and Virilio present such a view of outer space. For Baudrillard, it was in any case a frontier that served as a model for terrestrial life, which set the permissible limits for struggle and confrontation within it. He concludes,

Through the orbital inscription of a spatial object, it is the planet earth that becomes a satellite, it is the terrestrial principle of reality that becomes eccentric, hyperreal, and insignificant. Through the orbital installation of a system of control like peaceful coexistence, all the terrestrial microsystems are satellized and lose their autonomy. (p. 35)

Everyone on Earth is neutralized and homogenized. The proliferation of space technology since he was writing, and the blurring of civilian and military technologies, has only broadened the potential of such an understanding. Parks and Schwoch (2012, p. 4), in the context of the ‘satellization’ of global security, refer to the satellites as ‘the ultimate rationalization and instrumentalization of the quest for global security and domination’.

For Virilio, there was such a homology between the technologies of war, the image of space as a battlefield and the political discourses about space that the future seemed equally foreclosed. He makes the claim that any space is constituted ‘from the outside’ (cited in Bormann, 2009, p. 80). That is to say, it is perceived on the basis of that which precedes it. Bormann is therefore able to argue that ‘nothing about outer space is “out there”, what we get to know about outer space is always socially, spatially and locally embedded’ (p. 80). Bormann, following Virilio, seems to believe that this is especially true of the vacuum of outer space:

[O]ther than the view there is no physical or physiological contact. No hearing, no feeling in the sense of touching materials, with the exception of an actual Moon landing. Thus the conquest of space, of outer space – isn’t it more the conquest of the image of space?

(Virilio & Ujica, 2003, cited in Bormann, 2009, p. 84)

Bormann reaches the pessimistic conclusion that ‘the perpetuation of outer space as a sphere of permanent war and its claims to weaponization will soon make no alternative possible’ (p. 84). This is the product, in the large part, of her assumption that ‘[w]hat we get to know about the space of outer space is dominated by information provided through the possibilities (and limits) of military technology’ (p. 81).

#### The aff trades the suffering of others for a ballot, sustaining a system in its death throes.

**Baudrillard 94** – Jean Baudrillard, dead French philosopher, former professor emeritus at the University de Paris X, The Illusion of The End, pg. 66-70, Agastya

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' ['autre monde]. **We must** today **denounce the** moral and **sentimental exploitation of** that poverty - **charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence**. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that **material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of people**s, **which serves as psychological nourishment for** the rich countries and media nourishment for **our daily lives**. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. **Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground**. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of **our** own **efforts to alleviate it** (which, in fact, merely **function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market**); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel **essential to the moral** and sentimental **equilibrium of the West**. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. **But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point**, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, **when we run out of disasters from elsewhere** or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, **the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself, in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it** even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The **'disaster show' goes on without any let-up** and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race.

#### We refuse to be for or against New Space. Vote negative to understand the space race as pure spectacle – anything else plays into the military industrial complex.

Shapiro 14– Alan, senior lecturer at the Offenbach Art and Design University in Germany, “Jean Baudrillard and Albert Camus on the Simulacrum of Taking a Stance on War”, IJBS Volume 11, Number 2 (May 2014), Special Issue: Baudrillard and War, Agastya

Unlike other thinkers such as Noam Chomsky or Chris Hedges (whose positions are highly valuable in their own right), Jean Baudrillard is not ‘against war’. Baudrillard’s position is rather that of being ‘neither for nor against’ contemporary hyper-real mediatized wars, and seeing the imperative of choosing whether one is ‘for’ or ‘against’ war as being something of a forced and imposed simulacrum. To say that one is ‘against’ a specific war, or even all wars, would be to implicitly acknowledge the ‘reality’ of war(s), which have, to the contrary, drifted increasingly into the fakeness of virtuality, simulation, and an indeterminate hyperspace. Baudrillard, in his orientation of being ‘neither for nor against’ war, finds a strong predecessor in another great writer and thinker who wrote in French: Albert Camus. In his political theory and activist engagements, Camus was an independent hybrid anarchist-liberal (the very notion of hybrid, with which one can retrospectively illuminate Camus’ politics, has only emerged as a well-known concept in recent times, in the wake of, for example, Donna Haraway’s cyborg theory). Camus was a serious thinker who – like Plato, Nietzsche, Baudrillard, Deleuze and Philip K. Dick – had deep insights into the genealogy of image-making simulacra in and of Western culture. As a major figure of twentieth century French intellectual history, Albert Camus appears now in retrospect to have been way ahead of his time in his positions on ethics, aesthetics, virtuality, and political philosophy. The intention of this essay is not to claim that Baudrillard and Camus had ‘the same position’ on war or on simulacra. It is, rather, to make an initial attempt to outline important affinities between the two thinkers, hinting at a sort of ‘alliance’ between these two intellectual figures which has not been previously articulated in the academic literature in Baudrillard or Camus studies. The essay indicates certain key starting points for substantiating the affinity/alliance, but it should also be read in the spirit of suggesting fruitful directions for future research. The stance of opposition to a war undertaken by America’s ’military-industrial complex’ (MIC), as President Dwight D. Eisenhower termed it in his Farewell Address to the nation on January 17, 1961 after spending 8 years as President, seems to be based on the assumption of the discursive viability of projecting oneself into the imaginative space of being a sort of ‘shadow government of truth-speakers’, empowered by democracy into the democratic position of being able to make ‘better’ decisions for the body politic of democracy than those who hold institutional power in political economy and government. Most political discourse in the U.S., including the anti-war stance, seems to take for granted the idea that we should clarify ‘our politics’ by imaginatively putting ourselves ‘in the shoes’ of national strategists choosing among the policy options available. Jean Baudrillard expands our sense of what is history because he does not operate with a strict separation between what are ‘the facts’ and what are the engaging stories that we as a culture have written and enacted about important ‘historical’ events. Much of what we know about the Holocaust, the Second World War, and the Vietnam War comes from Hollywood films about the Holocaust, the Second World War, and the Vietnam War that we have seen. In his essay on Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 blockbuster Vietnam War movie Apocalypse Now, Baudrillard writes that Coppola’s masterpiece is the continuation of the Vietnam War by other means. “Nothing else in the world smells like that,” says Lt. Colonel Bill Kilgore – played by Robert Duvall – in the 2 hour and 33 minute film. “I love the smell of napalm in the morning… It smells like victory.” The high-budget extravaganza was produced exactly the same way that America fought in Vietnam, says Jean Baudrillard of the film made by director Francis Ford Coppola (Baudrillard 1981: 89-91). “War becomes film,” Baudrillard writes of Coppola’s spectacularly successful cinematic creation. “Film becomes war, the two united by their shared overflowing of technology” (Ibid.: 89). There is implosion or mutual contamination between ‘film becoming Virtual Reality’ and War. Think also of Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1998): total immersion in the Virtual Reality of combat – an aesthetics of VR different from ‘critical distance’ – as a new kind of ‘testimonial position’ with respect to war and atrocities. In Vietnam-slash-Apocalypse Now, War is a Drug Trip and a God Trip, a psychedelic and pornographic carnival (Baudrillard 2010), a savage cannibalism practiced by the Christians, a film before the shooting and a shoot before the filming, a vast machine of excessive special effects, a ‘show of power’, a territorial lab for testing new weapons on human guinea pigs, and the sacrificial jouissance of throwing away billions of dollars – all these aspects alluded to or mentioned by Baudrillard. Coppola’s film, according to Baudrillard, is the carrying on of an undeclared, unfinished and unending War. An interminable Heart of Darkness. Jean Baudrillard is not ‘against war’, not even against specific wars like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He says this explicitly in “Le masque de la guerre,” published in the Parisian daily newspaper Libération, just prior to President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ni pour ni contre. Neither for nor against. “This war is a non-event,” writes Baudrillard, “and it is absurd to take a stance on a non-event (Baudrillard 2003).” The non-events of the Iraq War and the War on Terror opposed themselves to the event of September 11th, 2001. Baudrillard’s two most explicit texts about war are The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1991), written just before, during, and just after the Persian Gulf War of 1991 that was initiated by President George H.W. Bush, and The Spirit of Terrorism (2002), written just after 9/11. At the very beginning of the essay “The Gulf War Will Not Take Place,” the first of the three essays that comprise The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Baudrillard explains that non-war – which is what the military-industrial complex or the (non-)war machine has become very adept at carrying out in the age of virtuality – “is characterised by that degenerate form of war which includes hostage manipulation and negotiation (Baudrillard 1995: 24). The Eisenhower-coined term of the military-industrial complex is used by Baudrillard in his essay "No Reprieve For Sarajevo," published in Libération, January 8, 1994. He sees the MIC as still operative yet in need of conceptual upgrading. “Hostages and blackmail,” Baudrillard continues in “The Gulf War Will Not Take Place,” “are the purest products of deterrence. The hostage has taken the place of the warrior. He has become the principal actor, the simulacral protagonist, or rather, in his pure inaction, the protagoniser (le protagonisant) of non-war” (Baurillard 1995: 24). And we, the television viewers of the non-war, are all in the situation of hostages, “all of us as information hostages on the world media stage” (Ibid.). Hostages of the screen, of the intoxication of the media, dragged and drugged into a logic of deterrence, "we are no longer in a logic of the passage from virtual to actual but in a hyperrealist logic of the deterrence of the real by the virtual” (Ibid.: 27). The post-structure [the successor to a sociological structure with less stability and with less of a center] of the (non-)war machine in the age of media virtuality has properties of binary/digital, simulation/modeling, viral metastasis, and complex intricate paradoxical topology. Let us consider all four of these properties as aspects of a Baudrillardian theory of war (or a theory of war in honour of Jean Baudrillard). First of all, the post-structure of the (non-)war machine in the age of media virtuality has the property of binary/digital. It presents itself to us through the dualistic structure of a forced binary choice, where the system obliges each of us to take a position ‘for’ or ‘against’ war, or ‘for’ or ‘against’ particular wars, as waged, for example, by the Pentagon, the EU ‘humanitarian’ forces, or the surveillance state’s War on Terror. It is this very binary logic of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ that is the news media discourse, the rhetoric of politicians, and the hybrid virtual-and-real-killing of the screen and the bomb. Today, of course, the Internet has superceded television as the prevailing universal media (although there is much convergence and combination of the two). And the Internet is much more interactive and participatory. There is much more response. There is much less of a ‘spectacle’ than there was when Guy Debord and the Situationists conceptualized their media theory in the 1960s. Yet everywhere that the ‘news media’ and the (non)-war machine still prevail, everywhere that they are still massively influential, everywhere that they still exercise their power, we are not quite liberated from the ‘speech without response’ described by the early Baudrillard. When Muammar Gaddafi, the former dictator of Libya, was brutally killed by rebel forces on October 20, 2011, during the Libyan Civil War, the event, having been filmed by a cell phone, was presented to worldwide viewers by almost all of the ‘news media’ as some kind of triumph for ‘justice’, even though it was clearly a loss for democratic principles and the possible coming to light of priceless information about the decades of atrocities committed by Gaddafi’s regime during a public trial which would never take place.

## 2

### K

#### Transcendental truth is an illusion – the world is an extension of the self’s conceptual frames but the Other’s infinity interrupts our imposition of meaning. Totalization, or the attempt to reduce the Other to a one-dimensional object is the root cause of violence because it denies our obligation to preserve the Other’s mystery. Thus, the role of the ballot is to resist totalization – they can’t weigh the case if we win their starting point is flawed.

**Hooft 6** – Stan Van Hooft “Understanding Virtue Ethics” 2006 pg. 99-101, Agastya

Let us try to understand that suggestion more fully by taking a few steps back from interpersonal relations and considering our knowledge of the world. The way in which philosophers have traditionally understood knowledge and perception is to suggest that we assimilate things into our cognitive schemes. It is as if we impose categories and classifications on things in order to integrate them into our familiar world. We cognitively take possession of what we perceive and know. I do not mean by this that we literally or legally own them, of course. I mean that we assimilate what was previously unknown and therefore beyond our ken into a lived environment in which everything has its place and its relation to me. Once again, we can use your pen as an example. Whether or not you legally own the pen, the key point is that it is a familiar item in your world. If you are sitting in your study, then your desk, the books in front of you, the poster of a pop star on your wall and even the buildings that you see through your window are all a familiar environment to you. This environment contains things that you use and also things that are not your legal possessions but that are familiar parts of “your” world. You gaze upon it as your own domain. This was, of course, Sartre’s point in relation to the park. The very processes of cognition, of making sense of the world, involve your imposing your concepts and categories upon it and thereby appropriating it as your world. But now imagine yourself having dinner with a person you are very close to. Once again you are in a familiar environment. As far as you are concerned you are assimilating this world of the restaurant to yourself. But what of your companion sitting opposite you at this candle-lit table? Do you also assimilate them into your world? As you gaze at their face and into their eyes, do you appropriate them into the lived world of familiar objects that constitutes your known and comfortable environment? Levinas would say no. He would insist that the face of the Other person, and particularly their eyes (traditionally thought of as the “windows to the soul”) are[is] not assimilable in this way. They are a mystery. They are infinite in the sense of being ungraspable in the cognitive categories with which we appropriate our lived world. They are beyond our ken. Levinas is alluding to more than the important point that people are hard to get to know. Everyone seems to be keeping their own natures hidden within themselves. Indeed, the closer we are to someone the harder they seem to be to know. Th e spouse you might have lived with for many years continues to be a mystery to you. All of this is relevant, but Levinas is appealing to the very moment at which you look into that person’s face. What you see there has such depth and mystery as to forever escape your cognitive grasp. You cannot assimilate it. You must let it be what it is. The face is present in its refusal to be contained. It is neither seen nor touched – for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content. But this is not experienced as a problem to be overcome or as a threat to your own authenticity or selfhood. It is experienced by you as an opening on to something wonderful. It is experienced by you almost as a mystical rapport with something of infinite depth. (One can only speak in metaphors here since the hypothesis is that the other is unattainable through the categories of understanding.) And this changes the quality of your own being. Rather than now being the Nietzschean self-affi rmer or the existential self-project, you become an openness to the mystery of the Other. This is not, of course, a stance taken consciously or as the result of a decision. It is simply your mode of being as transformed by the presence of the Other person. Your primordial comportment towards the world is now no longer that of a self-project bent on making and affirming your own identity and on appropriating the environment as your own lived world; it is that of reverence and wonder in the presence of the mystery of the Other. And this comportment or stance always already has an ethical quality. I can illustrate this last point by using a much more mundane example than the intimate candle-lit dinner. Imagine yourself buying a railway ticket from an automatic vending machine. Here you are engaging in an interaction with a machine. As such the action falls clearly within that familiar world that you have appropriated to yourself through the way you understand and live in that world. You are the centre of this world and you do not need to respond to the machine as anything other than a thing that is there for you. But now imagine yourself buying the train ticket from a station attendant seated in a ticket booth. From a pragmatic or functional point of view the exchange is not different from the previous one. You are obtaining a ticket in exchange for money. However, there is a qualitative difference. This difference is marked by the etiquette of saying “please” and “thank you” and, perhaps, of exchanging some remarks about the weather. Th ese words add nothing to the functionality of the exchange but they are important in that they mark your acknowledgement of the other as a person rather than a machine. The very presence in that booth of a person elicits in you a courteous and pleasant response. Although hardly a dramatic moment in your life, this response is an expression of a primordial ethical comportment that marks your mode of being as ethical. Without any deliberate thought, you acknowledge and respect the mystery of that other person in those simple gestures.

#### Util totalizes the Other on the basis of mechanical calculations which destroys ethics, politics, and the value to life. Vote negative to recognize the Other as a complex subject that demands a continual quest of understanding.

**Joseph 17** – <https://dspace.wlu.edu/bitstream/handle/11021/33878/RG38_TaylorZ_Poverty_2017_A.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> ” The Essential Poverty of the Face: A Case for Levinasian Responsibility and Justice in Poverty Studies” Zachary Taylor Joseph 2017 Washington and Lee University, Agastya

On the one hand**,** Levinas and utilitarians ostensibly share a similar view of responsibility. Utilitarianism is a kind of consequentialism; whether an action is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act, as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or what happens before the act.112 While, for simplicity’s sake, I focus here on act utilitarianism, my comments about how Levinasian responsibility is instructive to utilitarianism apply to other forms of utilitarianism as well. Act utilitarians claim that I am morally required to promote the most preferences or satisfactions of the most people. Act utilitarianism, it should be noted, cannot easily distinguish the different categories of moral permissibility, impermissibility, obligation, and supererogation. In effect, act utilitarianism implies that I do wrong each time I fail to perform an action that maximizes the most preferences or satisfactions for the most people. Since it makes the optimal action obligatory and the suboptimal action wrong, act utilitarianism expands the realm of that which is morally impermissible, collapses the distinction between the permissible and the obligatory, and eliminates the possibility of the supererogatory. **My responsibilities according to act utilitarianism, then, are more or less endless.** Moreover, as John Stuart Mill, one of utilitarianism’s foremost exponents, writes in Utilitarianism, “the happiness that forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”114 My responsibilities, then, are endless with respect to the happiness, preferences, or satisfactions of others. Insofar as the ideal utilitarian agent is a “disinterested and benevolent spectator” with responsibilities determined by the needs of others, utilitarianism’s account of responsibility notably parallels Levinasian responsibility. Bernard Williams, in “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” elucidates how the demands of others impact the responsibility of the utilitarian agent. He writes: On the utilitarian view, the undesirable projects of other people as much determine […] one’s decisions as the desirable ones do: if those people were not there, or had different projects, the causal nexus would be different, and it is the actual state of the causal nexus which determines the decision. The determination to an indefinite degree of my decisions by other people’s projects is just another aspect of my unlimited responsibility to act for the best in a causal framework formed to a considerable extent by their projects.115 It is notable here how Williams characterizes utilitarianism’s account of responsibility as “unlimited.” It is also notable how, similar to Levinas’s phenomenological description of responsibility, the projects of other people seem to impose themselves on the utilitarian agent Williams describes. Williams also claims that on the utilitarian view, the projects of others will more often than not override the preferences or satisfaction I derive from my own projects, so that even if the projects of others conflict with some project of mine, “the satisfaction to [me] of fulfilling [my] project, and any satisfactions to others of [my] doing, have already been through the calculating device and have been found inadequate.”116 On this point, too, the utilitarian account of responsibility intrinsically tied to the projects of others closely resembles Levinasian responsibility, insofar as what I want to pursue is secondary to that which I know will benefit other people. Whatever the similarities between utilitarian responsibility and Levinasian responsibility, the utilitarian account severely undervalues the importance of both subjectivity and individuation. In his critique of utilitarianism, Williams points out that the ideal utilitarian agent is not at all someone with a unique identity and robust personality. To the contrary, he is at the whims of the mechanistic calculations that utilitarianism prescribes. Whatever actions he performs “will depend entirely on the facts, on what persons with what projects and what potential satisfactions there are within calculable reach of the casual levers near which he finds himself.”117 Williams rightly characterizes the demands of utilitarianism as “an attack on [a person’s integrity].” **Utilitarian responsibility effectively strips a person of projects and attitudes which in some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about**. […] It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come in from the utility network which the projects of others have in part determined, that he should just step aside from his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his own convictions.118 Levinasian responsibility, on the other hand, while no less demanding than utilitarian responsibility, avoids reducing the subjected “I” to a mechanistic tool through which utilitarian calculations impersonally run. For Levinas, responsibility is synonymous with subjectivity; rather than lose myself in the projects of other people, I discover who I am in responsibility to the Other. Recall the words of Paul Celan, quoted earlier:119 “I am you, when I am I,” or, as I also rendered his statement, only when I am for another, am I really the “I” I should be. According to Levinas’s phenomenological description, responsibility by no means alienates me from my actions or the source of my actions. Quite the opposite, it in fact constitutes my unique identity and robust personality as a human subject.120 In this sense, Levinas’s account of responsibility is instructive to the utilitarian account while still retaining the moral exigency of utilitarianism that those who are concerned with poverty alleviation might find attractive in utilitarian responsibility.

## 3

#### Interp: debaters must record their speeches

#### Violation: They didn't record, that was cx

#### A~ Cheating – debaters can fake internet drop offs and then steal prep which decks reciprocity. O/Ws since it destroys competitive incentives and educational value.

#### Reject the team – (1) No argument to drop and (2) Strongest internal link to better norms through deterrence.

#### No RVIs – (1) Going all in on theory kills substance education which outweighs on timeframe (2) Discourages checking real abuse which outweighs on norm-setting (3) Encourages theory baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly (4) Its illogical for you to win for proving you were fair – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for other arguments (5) Kills norm setting since debaters can never admit they’re wrong – outweighs since norm setting is the constitutive purpose of theory (6) They are the logic of criminalization that over-punish people-of-color for trying to create productive discourse.

#### Evaluate the debate after the 2NR – Key to check back against 2AR collapse on 1 arg for 3 minutes.

#### Competing interpretations – (1) Reasonability is arbitrary – impossible to know what is reasonable until you establish a brightline (2) Bites judge intervention – they have to gut check what they think is good (3) Collapses – you use offense/defense to evaluate offense under the brightline (4) Norms – you can sidestep norms by selectively choosing a different brightline you meet every round.

**1NC theory first – (1) If I was abusive, it was because the 1AC was (2) You have persuasive advantages in the 2AR on top of infinite prep time.**

## 4

#### Interpretation – Debaters may not bracket cards, or insert any of their own words into a piece of evidence written by another author in brackets, unless doing so is necessary to avoid using offensive language.

#### Violation- screenshots from the aff

Text

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

#### Vote neg on Misappropriation of evidence – brackets represent their words as if they were written by the authors. Judges don’t have access to your speech doc and don’t know what you bracketed, so they perceive your words as your authors’.

#### Even if it’s subtle modification, this changes perception of the arguments since it is taken as the author’s words instead of the debaters. That kills fairness – it allows them to represent their own words as the authors, increasing the validity of their own arguments inaccurately.

## 5

### T

#### Interpretation – affirmatives must defend the resolution as a general principle. This requires that you defend that the plan is a good idea in the abstract and don’t defend implementation.

#### Violation – they defend implementation.

#### 1 – Jurisdiction – it’s NSDA rules.

**NSDA 21** – 2021-22 Lincoln-Douglas Ballot, https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/Sample-Lincoln-Douglas-Debate-Ballot-Blank.pdf // JB

Each **debater** has the burden to **prove** their **side** of the resolution **more valid** as a **general principle**. It is **unrealistic** to expect a debater to prove **complete validity or invalidity** of the resolution. The **better debater** is the one who, on the whole, proves their side of the resolution **more valid** as a general principle.

#### Outweighs – It’s on the LD ballot which means whenever a judge submits the ballot it’s what they contractually abide by – operating outside of the rules would forfeit the judge’s ability to submit a decision.

#### 2 – Precision:

#### Resolved in LD is a statement of values.

**UPitt ND** – University Of Pittsburgh Communications Services Webteam, copyright 2015-21, "Basic Definitions," Department of Communication , <https://www.comm.pitt.edu/basic-definitions> CHO

Affirmative/Pro. The side that “affirms” the resolution (is “pro” the issue). For example, the affirmative side in a debate using the resolution of policy, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens, would advocate for federal government implementation of a poverty reduction program. Argument. A statement, or claim, followed by a justification, or warrant. Justifications are responses to challenges, often linked by the word “because.” Example: The sun helps people, because the sun activates photosynthesis in plants, which produce oxygen so people can breathe. Constructive Speech. The first speeches in a debate, where the debaters “construct” their cases by presenting initial positions and arguments. Cross-examination. Question and answer sessions between debaters. Debate. A deliberative exercise characterized by formal procedures of argumentation, involving a set resolution to be debated, distinct times for debaters to speak, and a regulated order of speeches given. Evidence. Supporting materials for arguments. Standards for evidence are field-specific. Evidence can range from personal testimony, statistical evidence, research findings, to other published sources. Quotations drawn from journals, books, newspapers, and other audio-visuals sources are rather common. Negative/Con. The side that “negates” the resolution (is “con” the issue). For example, the negative side in a debate using the resolution of fact, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production, would argue that global warming does not threaten agricultural production. Preparation Time. Debates often necessitate time between speeches for students to gather their thoughts and consider their opponent's arguments. This preparation is generally a set period of time and can be used at any time by either side at the conclusion of a speech. Rebuttal Speech. The last speeches in a debate, where debaters summarize arguments and draw conclusions about the debate. Resolution. A specific statement or question up for debate. Resolutions usually appear as statements of policy, fact or value. Statement of policy. Involves an actor (local, national, or global) with power to decide a course of action. For example, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens. Statement of fact. Involves a dispute about empirical phenomenon. For example, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production. Statement of value. Involves conflicting moral dilemmas. For example, Resolved: The death penalty is a justified method of punishment. Topic. A general issue to debate. Topics could be “The Civil War,” “genetic engineering,” or “Great Books.”

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE dialectal present tense first-person and third-person singular of BE dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### That requires logical coherence and implies no implementation.

Your Dictionary ND – "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### Be is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent.

Grammar Monster ND – "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)



#### Outweighs: (A) They can arbitrarily jettison words which decks ground and preparation because there is no stasis point (B) Jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the authority to vote aff if it wasn’t legitimate.

#### 3 – Fairness – it prevents abusive PICs out of certain parts of the plan that steal aff ground by isolating a hyper-specific DA to the plan – solves topic education to read it as a DA and promotes critical thinking because you need to win the DA actually outweighs the plan.

#### 4 – Phil education – it encourages philosophical analysis and prevents messy enforcement and process debates where you just focus on the post-fiat implications. We’ll impact-turn policy debate: (A) It’s nonunique through forums of CX and PF (B) Philosophical policy is better because you can find the best possible idea, not the most common (C) Phil education is unique to LD and controls the internal link since the only way to determine the validity of voters is through philosophical justification.

#### 5 – Topic Ed – Consequential ethics that rely on implemented action fail under conditions of space expansion.

**Diakovska 1** – consequentialism and commercial space exploration. (n.d.). Retrieved December 6, 2021, from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338707972_Consequentialism_and_Commercial_Space_Exploration>, Agastya

Consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts states the following. “Whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.” Or otherwise, “What is best or right is whatever makes the world best in the future, because we cannot change the past, so worrying about the past is no more useful than crying over spilled milk” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2019). Consider two examples. Elon Musk in his article “Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species” expressed his vision of the future of humanity. According to Musk, human civilization should “become a spacebearing civilization and a multi-planetary species” (Musk, 2017). Russian astronaut and explorer Sergey Krichevsky views terrestrial civilization as cosmic humanity. He argues that the evolution of human civilization will lead to the creation of cosmic humanity (Krichevsky, 2017). Oleg Bazaluk states that the appearance of humanity is a natural phenomenon, which is conditioned by the philosophy of the Cosmos (Bazaluk & Kharchenko, 2018). Thus, human expansion of space is regarded not only as an obvious phenomenon, but also as a natural process of human evolution. Colonization of space objects is expected to become a common practice in the short term. We are currently observing the formation of a sequence of actions that, at the first stage, will lead to the colonization of Mars. The first colony on Mars is expected to be built by 2030 (Musk, 2017). Consider to what extent the cosmic expansion and colonization of space objects are consistent with the moral rightness of acts. Consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts has been established and operates on a planetary scale. “Best or right is whatever makes the world best in the future” implies, above all, human activities on Earth as a space object. The thesis “makes the world best” is an exclusively human vision of the world, limited by its current level of development. In addition, we do not have a unified and well-established basis for planetary worldview in the scale of terrestrial civilization. It is pluralistic. Earth-scale consequentialism is effective because Earth as a cosmic object is the medium of birth and Consequentialism and Commercial Space Exploration by Halyna Diakovska and Olga Aliieva Philosophy and Cosmology. Volume 24, 2020 11 development of human civilization. Human has the right to regard the environment of their birth and existence as “Homo Nooeconomicus” as a Human Image for the Noospheric Epoch” (Smirnov & Odintsova, 2019). However, how ethical is the expansion of consequentialism theory to spaces that are not the birthplace and formation of human civilization? Does consequentialism apply to space objects that do not have a history of human presence? Musk, Krichevsky, Bazaluk, and many other researchers regard space expansion as a natural process for the evolution of human civilization. However, is this not equivalent to acknowledging that aggression is an ontological characteristic of humans? After all, expansion is primarily aggression. On the scale of Earth, expansion is associated primarily with the terms “war”, “violence”, “coercion”, “restriction of rights and freedoms”, etc. What will change when we consider the ethics of “space expansion”? We have every right to compare commercial space exploration with the discovery and development of America by Christopher Columbus and the Europeans. The consequences of colonization of America for its indigenous peoples are well known. The exploration of Mars that Elon Musk is so eager for is tantamount to “conquering America” by terrestrial civilization. Currently, the fact of the presence of complex biological organisms on Mars is not reliably established. However, scientists are inclined to believe that Mars has the simplest biological organisms. In 2018, Princeton University Press published the book Life on Mars: What to Know before We Go by David A. Weintraub. David A. Weintraub is Professor of Astronomy at Vanderbilt University. His research essentially precedes the maxim “The end justifies the means.” An ethical problem arises: how far is humanity willing to go to satisfy their desire to colonize Mars? If biological life is indeed to be found on Mars, then colonization of Mars will, at best, lead to its transformation and, at worst, to death. There are a sufficient number of examples like this in world history. It is possible to extend the consideration of the problem of “Mars exploration”. For example, we can assume the existence of civilizations that are beyond earthly civilization in terms of development. Such a conclusion follows, for example, from the new paradigm of the Universe proposed by Bernardo Kastrup (Kastrup, 2018). Suppose these highly developed civilizations would be the observers of the “colonization” of Mars by modern man. What conclusions can they come to when observing the devastating effects of Mars colonization by man? How will the ethics of a human colonizer correspond to the ethics of the behavior of highly developed space civilizations? Space expansion formulates a problem that has not previously been faced by humans. Suppose, in 2030, the first colony will be really built on Mars. Will consequentialism remain relevant to it? The first colonizers will face at least the following problems: 1. Moral rightness and wrongness of actions is determined by the history of human development on Earth. To what extent can the history of human development on Earth and the consequences of consequentialism, formed on its basis, be projected on the ethics of Mars colonizers? 2. What can the colonizers of Mars mean by the phrase “makes the world best in the future”? Primarily, the first colonizers of Mars will be aware of the degree of risk of their presence on a new planet and the inability to return to Earth. Will this not cause the extension of consequentialism? Secondly, few of the colonizers of Mars will consider their future on Mars. For most of them, the experience of colonization will be a bright but short-lived event of their lives. Again, will this initial setting not change the foundations of consequentialism? Finally, thirdly, man will colonize a planet that lacks complex biological organisms. The present planetary thinking does Section One. Inert Matter 12 Philosophy and Cosmology. Volume 24, 2020 not imply the ethics of the attitude towards the simplest ones. Something, which man cannot visually perceive, is mostly beyond their thinking. This means that, in essence, the colonization of Mars does not imply the ethics of attitude toward the indigenous Martian life. A priori, man will act on Mars as an aggressor. 3. How can you understand the phrase “makes the world best” when you live in a colony surrounded by life-threatening space? What does “the world” mean? Is it the colony or the surface of Mars? How ethical is the assumption that an alien from another planet — a colonizer — can make Mars better? At its best, they can make their stay on Mars better. However, this “better” for Martian evolution will be comparable to the “better” for the indigenous people of America after its colonization by Europeans. Consider the second example. Commercial Space Exploration is not only the development of the space tourism and space travel market. This is, first and foremost, the use of mineral resources that are part of the structure of space objects. When we consider the use of mineral resources on a planetary scale, we are guided by consequentialism. The moral rightness and wrongness of actions is determined by the stereotypes existing on the Earth’s scale about what “makes the world the best in the future” (O’Connor, 2016). Current ethics laws strike a balance between utilitarian views on the use of planet resources and awareness of the effects of environmental disasters on human life. Moreover, this equilibrium is not stable. It is constantly regulated under the influence of continuous rethinking of the connections between the tangible, living and rational matter, which results in the human understanding of the philosophy of the Cosmos (Bazaluk & Kharchenko, 2018). The basis of this understanding is formed by the experience of human activities on a planetary scale. Commercial space exploration updates the problem of transferring the ethics of extraction and use of mineral resources in Earth conditions to other space objects. The question is how effective is consequentialism in organizing the extraction of mineral resources on Mars? If consequentialism on Earth establishes specific boundaries that limit human intervention in the ecosystem of the planet, are there such boundaries on Mars? Is there a need to create such boundaries on a planet that lacks reasonable matter? Extraction of minerals on space objects of various forms actualizes another problem. The fact of the absence or presence of biological life at this site is significant, but not determining. Man is far from understanding the cosmic processes. Suppose cosmic expansion opens up the possibility for man to extract mineral resources on the planet, which is guaranteed to have no biological evolution. It is basically impossible there. However, the extraction of mineral resources is always an interference with the geological evolution of a space object. Human intervention in its geological evolution raises a problem of danger for the space object. Moreover, it is followed by another problem. If human intervention in the geological evolution of a space object leads to its collapse, how much will the destruction of the cosmic object affect the cosmic processes? Man does not know the answer to the question: how much can geological evolution change the evolution of the Universe? The examples we considered, allow us to formulate the ultimate question of our study. How applicable are the maxim “The end justifies the means” and consequentialism itself in commercial space exploration? Overall, the present study will at least result in the revision of consequentialism in commercial space exploration. The history of culture, that laid the foundations for it, limits its influence solely to the scale of Earth. This means that under conditions of space expansion, consequentialism loses its cogency and cannot be used as an effective theory. Space expansion Consequentialism and Commercial Space Exploration by Halyna Diakovska and Olga Aliieva Philosophy and Cosmology. Volume 24, 2020 13 and colonization of space objects present completely new history of terrestrial civilization that may lay entirely new groundwork for the moral rightness of acts.

## 6

#### Interp: If the affirmative defends anything other than the text of the resolution then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy in the 1AC. Violation – they didn’t

#### 1 -Limits – there are infinite things you could defend outside the exact text of the resolution which pushes you to the limits of contestable arguments, even if your interp of the topic is better, the only way to verify if it’s substantively fair is proof of counter-arguments. 2. Shiftiness-Having a counter-solvency advocate helps us conceptualize what their advocacy is and how it’s implemented. Intentionally ambiguous affirmatives we don’t know much about can’t spike out of DA’s and CP’s if they have an advocate that delineates these things.

## 7

#### Interpretation: Debaters who make presumption arguments must specify in the text of the AC ~in the form of a list~ the set of conditions under which presumption can become relevant in the evaluation of the round. We’ve inserted examples in the doc. ~i.e. if there is some kind of defense to the AC framework or NC framework which "triggers," someone fails to extend offense, skepticism, utilitarianism, I won’t trigger presumption – it’s a preempt, drop the advocacy T + winning the framework debate etc.~

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### 1~ Engagement– the ability for me to contest the implications of presumption or form a strategy to engage the aff depends on my knowing what kind of arguments are enough to justify the judge voting on presumption.

#### 2~ Topic Education and Strat Skew– Specifying in the 1AC allows me to form a 1NC strat that doesn’t have the potential to trigger presumption or permissibility so we can have a clean substance debate. It also incentivizes them spamming presumption and permissibility triggers in the 1AR since I can’t contest which way it flows which gives them access to infinite nibs and bidirectional ground.