## 1AC

### SPIKES ON THE BOTTOM

### AC – The Lorax

**There is no transcendental force behind being – humans, animals, rocks are forms of matter which exist as modes of a larger essence that is nature – the vessel of cause and effect.**

**Hanson 12** – Daniel Hansson “Unpacking Spinoza: Sustainability Education Outside the Cartesian Box” March 2012 chrome-extension://cbnaodkpfinfiipjblikofhlhlcickei/src/pdfviewer/web/viewer.html?file=http://www.jsedimensions.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Hansson2012Updated.pdf

Spinoza’s epistemic approach is simple yet profound. In a famous letter from 1665 to Henry Oldenburg, the first Secretary of the Royal Society (Letter 32, in Curley, 1994, Spinoza explains the relationship between parts and wholes by using an organic analogy, intuitively more fitting than a machine analogy when we describe a complex, natural system.6 **Spinoza asks the reader to conceive a**n imaginary “little **worm living in the blood” of a larger organism**. **This worm is so tiny that it is able to distinguish by sight the individual “particles of** the **blood**” and how these particles bounce into each other, “communicate part of their motion, and so on” (ibid). Spinoza explains that because of this experience, **the worm would have a worldview very different from our own:** Indeed, **it would live in this blood as we do in this part of the universe**, **and would consider** each part of **the blood as a whole, not as a part**. **Nor could it know how** all **the parts of the blood are restrained by the** universal **nature of** the **blood**, and compelled to adapt themselves to one another, as the universal nature of the blood requires, so that they harmonize with each other in a certain way (ibid). In other words, **the worm is unable to see the bloodstream in itself as a ‘whole**’ (a unified system), **and** even less **to recognize the whole body containing the blood as being a ‘whole’ in itself**. **The perspective of the observer** (the worm) **has thereby determined what is viewed as parts and wholes**. In contrast to the worm, **we** ourselves **would consider the blood to “have the nature of a part and not of a whole**” (ibid). According to Spinoza, “**all bodies in Nature” have to be understood in the same way** – from a contextual and relational perspective: “everybody... must be considered as a part of the whole universe, must agree with the whole to which it belongs, and must cohere with the remaining bodies” (ibid). Therefore, **proper knowledge of any individual thing must be based on contextual understanding**, including the recognition of how we organize the world around us as ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ **– entities that are constructed by our limited mind,** **seeking to structure our experience** in comprehensible patterns, labeled to organize our perceptions in the form of sense-making units.7In his letter, Spinoza explains that **a complete understanding** of what we today would call a complex system **would require knowledge of all interrelations that** unify the parts of that system internally and at the same time with the rest of the universe. Since each individual “thing” in itself is conditioned by countless causes external to itself, **we can never know** – and even less, in the Cartesian sense quantify – all of them.8 Instead, **we need to understand the relative** (but not arbitrary!) **nature of ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’**. In Spinoza’s view, **this** relativity **depends** **on** **scale** **and observational vantage point**. We perceive something as a ‘part’ of a larger ‘whole’ when we experience the ‘whole’ as an integrated unit within which the component ‘parts’ coexist in a state of perceived mutual harmony. **The ‘whole’ is** therefore **a** more or less **imaginary unit** constructed by our cognitive process.9 And when we perceive that something is not sharing a mutual harmony with its surrounding environment, then we recognize this thing as a separate individual, distinct from the contextual background. Therefore it is a ‘whole’ in itself and not a ‘part’ of its surrounding context (which is perceived as a separate ‘whole’ or collection of ‘wholes’ in relation to the given thing).

#### An assemblage can engage in the world only with the features it possesses, characterized by conatus – an inherent drive towards self-preservation. Identity emerges as a site of experimentation – difference becomes the grounds for our shared singularity.

**Sharp 11** – Hasana Sharp, (2011) Assistant professor of philosophy at McGill University. “Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization,” The University of Chicago Press, pp. 132-139

Whereas Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit concerns spiritual (geistige), human beings, Spinoza’s Ethics begins with a treatment of existence as a whole. Based upon a characterization of substance (nature or God), its attributes, and their modifications, Spinoza makes specific claims about human life. Human phenomena, problems, and experiences must be ex- amined within a general portrait of nature. Desire is no different. Like Hegelian desire, Spinozan **desire exists within a relational field and is** fully **actualized** only **with** favorable **relations**. Yet Spinoza maintains a different understanding of the relationships that contour desire and power, which results in a broader view of the forces and connections essential to agency. Assimilating Spinoza to a neo-Hegelian political program mutes the fun- damental insight of the politics of renaturalization: human striving is undermined insofar as we apprehend ourselves as different in kind from the rest of nature. **The striving to persevere** in being **is the “essence**” or “nature” **of each** and every **singular thing**. “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being [in suo esse persevere conatur]” (E III p). A singular thing might be an idea, an artifact, or an organism. Each being aims not to exist simpliciter but to persevere in its determinate way. **To strive to be, even as a table, is to exert some kind of effort to be this table. A table does not yearn to approximate tableness but rather perseveres by virtue of a unique arrangement among its parts that effectively preserves its integrity amidst the many other ambient bodies**. **Conatus**, Spinoza’s notion of essence (III p), **names the singularity of beings**, a force of existence **unique to each thing, which accounts for the infinite diversity of finite things in nature**. Such striving should not be understood, as Matheron contends, as an abstract concept of bodily motion. **Conatus is not** simply **a mechanical**, inertial **movement that stops only when contradicted by an opposing force** (Ep ). **Conatus names a power of self-organization**, self- maintenance, and **striving to preserve one’s distinctness amidst infinitely many other singular beings.** It is the principle of conatus that endows Spi- noza’s metaphysics with a vitalistic element and makes it irreducible to simple mechanism. One’s conatus constitutes an intrinsic determination, which is not communicated from the outside by external, finite beings. Conative striving in living organisms is a desire for life, yet Spinoza as- serts that it is not reducible to a biological function (TP .). Each strives to be in a singular rather than a generic way. Thus, we strive not simply to be alive but to be alive as a distinctive power of mind and body. Nevertheless, within Spinoza’s relational ontology, t**he singularity of each essence does not entail that the conatus is the exclusive cause of a being’s perseverance**. **To remain this table or this body, one must maintain a constant flow of exchanges with** myriad ambient **beings** (E III ppostIV). **One must perpetually mutate in order to remain what one is**. Moreover, Spinoza notes that “**the power** [potentia] **of each thing**, or the striving [co- natus] by which it (either alone or with others) does anything, or strives to do anything . . . **is** nothing but **the** . . . actual **essence of the thing**” (E III pd; emphasis added). Beings act and strive “either alone or with others.” **Our most fundamental power to be cannot** ultimately **be separated from the concurrent forces of other beings**. It is for this reason that the concept of “transindividuality,” described in chapter , is particularly apt for Spinoza. We are complex singular beings whose agency is not ultimately isolable. **The striving of a given being** is irreducible to that of any other and yet **would not exist without infinitely many others**. Rather than designating a solitary agency, conatus indicates a basic power of individuation that re- mains ineluctably situated within a relational field. A thing, for Spinoza, always perseveres in being and maintains its integrity amidst and by virtue of many other beings. As mentioned above, conatus implies that a thing cannot be self- opposed in essence: “**No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause.**”

#### Conflicting affective drives within conatus cause a chaotic state of nature that produces endless egoist violence. We must re-naturalize agency as a site of constant experimentation – a unique but miniscule part of nature.

**Sharp 3** – Hasana Sharp, (2011) Sharp is an assistant professor of philosophy at McGill University. “Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization,” The University of Chicago Press, pp. 7-15

¶ There are practical and theoretical reasons, however, that argue for the critical alternative of renaturalization. As mentioned, Spinoza contends that regarding ourselves as special beings inflames odium. **Understand-ng humanity as vulnerable to the same determinations as beasts, rocks, and vegetables facilitates social harmony and political emancipation. Only when we consider ourselves to be constituted by our constellations of relationships and community of affects can we hope to transform the forces that shape our actions and characters.** When we regard ourselves as beings within nature, we affirm the passionate basis of activity and respond more effectively and knowledgeably to harms, sorrows, and threats, as well as to pleasures, joys, and promises. **Avowing humanity as part of nature entails** understanding individu- als as beings with complex histories, exposed to many diverse bodies and minds, and ever **open to forming new compositions with ambient forces**. Nature, on Spinoza’s model, is not opposed to history. A Spinozist can agree with the notion that man is a historical being, while insisting that history is not the product of overcoming nature. History is not a progres- sive spiritualization of nature, where humans, through working together, come to master, bring under control, and “interiorize” biological need, instinct, and other “external” elements of our existence. **Nature**, for Spinoza, **names the necessity of ongoing mutation and the inescapability of dependence among finite beings**. Rather than serving to prescribe the en- telecheic unfolding of a thing’s essence, Spinoza’s **nature affirms the vari- ability intrinsic to relational existence. To be a relational being is to undergo a history of constitutive affections and transformations in response to encounters with other beings, human and nonhuman.** The mutable aspect of Spinoza’s notion of nature underscores that renaturalization is not necessarily incompatible with denaturalization. Spinoza’s analysis of scripture as a natural rather than a supernatural ar- tifact suggests significant overlap with a denaturalist approach, insofar as it involves revealing the sociopolitical genealogies of what appears to be given. Among other things, Spinoza recommends studying the original language in which it was written, the precise meanings of the idioms at the time they were recorded, who the particular audience was, and the political circumstances the stories aim to address (do they pertain, for ex- ample, to just or oppressive conditions?) (*TTP* .). Renaturalizing scrip- ture does not produce a naturalistic ideology whereby its decrees appear eternal, necessary, and immune to challenge. On the contrary, Spinoza’s approach calls much of its authority into radical question. Given that most of ancient Hebrew is lost, interpretation of scripture is necessarily partial and ought to be responsive to new knowledge about ancient peoples and languages. Being natural means being situated within a particular time, place, and causal nexus. The encounter between reader and text, a complex meeting of composite individuals, engenders still further effects to be explored and understood, if always incompletely. Spinoza’s naturalism, likewise, shares with Marxism and feminism an emphasis upon the relational character of existence, while offering some practical guidance for negotiating life within a causal community. Marx- ism and feminism focus on the institutional and ideological character of social relations, but Spinoza presents a broader perspective that includes our relations with all of nature. The virtues of an extrasocial perspective, as I see it, are as follows: **renaturalization combats voluntarism more ef- fectively than a denaturalizing approach, which, as a variant of social con- structivism, implies that social artifacts are products of human actions and institutions. The core thesis of renaturalization is the radical redefinition of human agency as part of nature. Spinoza refuses to distinguish between natural and social forces, or mental and physical determination. Renaturalization differs from many approaches to social construction in that it does not aim to revolutionize consciousness alone or to relabel ob- jects that once appeared natural as social (i.e., effects of human agency). Rather, it is a practical theory that seeks the nonhuman forces operating within everything we think is ours, or our own doing.** ¶That is, **renaturalization maintains that there is an irreducible power of external causes, within and without each of our bodies**. The constitutive aspect of nonhuman powers points to the second major advantage of a renaturalist approach: anti-anthropocentrism. Denaturalization and so- cial constructivism meet criticism from an ecological perspective for pro- moting an anthropocentric worldview in which everything appears to be a human artifact. Nevertheless, many environmental thinkers confirm, with this very criticism, an opposition between humanity and nature. Although Spinoza has been an inspiration for ecological thought, “nature” must not be understood to imply whatever is nonhuman. It should already be clear that Spinoza challenges all of our usual distinctions between mind and body, “man” and nature, culture and wilderness, artifice and adaptation. As long as we keep in mind that cyborgs, landfills, and leviathans are just as natural as tides, forests, and flocks of birds, I hope to contribute to the ecopolitical ambition to rethink nature. In an epoch that threatens envi- ronmental catastrophe and mass extinction, we must marshal theoretical resources for thinking and speaking about nonhuman nature, in political as much as in ethical theory. Not only do we have obligations to nonhu- man nature, we have reasons to amplify the power of nonhuman nature. Our collective power, our politics, depends upon becoming a part of na- ture differently. For the politics of renaturalization, our agency, persever- ance, and pleasure depend upon affirming and nourishing the nonhuman in and outside of ourselves. The relations that matter to our intellectual and our corporeal well-being are far from exclusively human. Rather than merely defending Spinoza’s concept of nature against the denaturalist accusation that invocations of “nature” are oppressive— something that can perhaps too easily be done—this book explores the emancipatory promise of the politics of renaturalization. In the end, ad- mittedly, any concept of nature is a blunt tool that is only as valuable as its effects, its ability to generate other concepts and tools that fortify our ability to think and act (*TIE* §§–). In an age that continues to view human existence as an “empire within an empire” (*E* III pref), however, critical political thought urgently needs a sense of freedom compatible with our character as corporeal, affective, and sensuous beings, invariably embedded in relations with other beings, human and nonhuman. From a contemporary perspective, however, much of what I have said may not sound especially political. Contemporary political theory is over- whelmingly concerned with questions of justice and legitimation rather than with ontological accounts of what kinds of beings we are. Normative political theory, for good reasons, is also wary of deriving political prin- ciples from nature or metaphysics. Contemporary debates occur largely within the categories of normative political and moral thought, which per- tain to conventional human practices and the criteria for just procedures within institutions that engender and regulate what Hegel calls “ethical life.” As a result of this powerful philosophical tradition, we lack a sophis- ticated political language to address either our own naturalness or our relationship to nonhuman nature. The discourse of animal rights, for ex- ample, succeeds, to the limited extent that it does, by arguing for the ex- tension of the definition of humanity to include a tiny elite of nonhuman animals in the sphere of moral concern and juridical standing. There are, simply put, no words flowing in mainstream currents to express a poli- tics of intimacy, power, and connection with nonhuman forces, even with those nonhuman companions to which we have profound attachments and bonds. It has been argued that Spinoza’s philosophy is free of normative ele- ments. Although it is true that there is no room in Spinoza’s politics for a conception of rights separable from their exercise, presenting his thought as a radically antinormative program or a thoroughgoing critique of juridi- cal power is not my project. Moreover, despite his notorious critique of the separation of right and power, Spinoza’s practical philosophy involves an affirmation of the necessity of both (provisional) morality and juridical politics, but the precise approach to political institutions of legitimation in his political treatises is highly complex and somewhat elusive. While I often refer to the political treatises for support, my study emphasizes the political implications of the naturalist ontology in the *Ethics.* My consid- ered conviction is that the normative and juridical lens in contemporary political theory needs to be supplemented and challenged by what I call an “impersonal” perspective. Although I do not mean to claim that it repre- sents the totality of Spinoza’s political philosophy, throughout the book I develop an impersonal perspective on ethics and politics. His philosophy provides resources for unsettling the presumptions of “personal politics” and thereby altering current debates in feminist and critical theory. Hegel claims that the “commandment of right” is to “be a person and respect others as persons.” “Person” for Hegel is a technical term that re- fers to the “capacity for rights” through which human individuals and so- cieties represent themselves as free and equal. Rather than representing a simple recognition of a given, essential human freedom, personhood for Hegel is a historical achievement, possible only in “postconventional” so- cieties. Persons are equal precisely because modern institutions and ways of life liberate them from natural determination, allowing them to grasp the universal aspects of their selfhood. Recognition of oneself and others as persons involves knowledge of those so recognized as finite and infinite at once, as natural beings who can nevertheless sustain the radical infin- ity of self-consciousness. When we achieve consciousness of ourselves as moral agents through juridical representation, we grasp ourselves as per- sons rather than as things. Personhood is a normative rather than a purely descriptive category. It designates how we ought to see ourselves and others in order to recog- nize one another as free beings. With the notion of personhood we rep- resent ourselves as freed of natural determination and thereby morally responsible for our actions. Not only, then, are we persons rather than things, we are rational and not merely human. Whereas *human* names a biological organism, person, strictly speaking, designates only rational be- ings. Children and the cognitively impaired who cannot will their actions in accordance with universal rules are not persons, but extraterrestrials (and possibly higher animals) and corporate entities (“artificial persons”) may be. A virtue of Hegelianism is to insist that personal politics ap- proximates universality only when the multifarious social institutions and dimensions of collective life allow for inclusive and expansive rep- resentation of the diverse constituents of the social body. A collection of particularities needs to become universal. The normative function of “personhood” has force for Hegel only insofar as it also reflects powers that are actualized by some meaningful (in his time, male and propertied) portion of a community. The affirmation of personhood in oneself and others is far from the totality of ethical life for Hegel, but contemporary political philosophy nevertheless has come to preoccupy itself above all with this “moment” of politics. Personal politics, like denaturalization, is important and indispensable. Throughout this book, I often contrast Spinoza to Hegel because they are very close in some respects and mutually illuminating opponents in oth- ers. Moreover, I take neo-Hegelianism to be the best expression of norma- tive political thought today, especially from a feminist perspective. As I remark in chapter , the emphasis in neo-Hegelian politics of recognition upon the arduous and delicate intersubjective processes of establishing re- lationships of respect, equality, and sympathy among people with distinct languages, cultures, histories, and perspectives is invaluable. Likewise, the neo-Hegelian politics of recognition appreciates the psychic damage caused by oppressive sociosymbolic regimes, which cannot be captured by a theory that focuses on the just distribution of goods or the rights owed to individuals. Because, as I discuss in chapter , Hegel’s political ontology is thoroughly relational, like Spinoza’s, Hegelianism regards freedom as a complex process that cannot be understood independently of historical conditions or relations with others. Yet **personal politics is essentially antinatural. To be a person is to be free from nature, to have transubstantiated one’s animality into human- ity.** Even if personhood does not embody the totality of ethical life, neo- Hegelian political theory emphasizes the representation of humanity and personhood. Thus, Butler’s post-Hegelian politics of recognition, as she notes, returns again and again to “the question of the human.” **Personal politics cannot avoid restricting the domain of the political to an interrogation of the normative criteria that guarantee and foreclose personhood, the representation of distinctively human freedom**. Without arguing for a displacement of normative political theory—something that is as unre- alistic as it is foolhardy—I claim that an impersonal perspective opens up a new continent of political theory and practice. Indeed, to transform a phrase, I contend that the *impersonal* is political. Impersonal politics does not necessarily oppose but is different from a politics of rights and representation. Impersonal politics will not be tele- vised. Impersonal forces include those affects that circulate in the social body, enabling and constraining the powers of bodies and minds, often without anyone’s awareness or knowledge. **Impersonal politics happens, whether we are aware of it or not, but we can cultivate a practical wisdom of renaturalization by which we seek out new sources of agency, connec- tion, and energy. Rather than a politics of rights and representation, im- personal politics is a project of composition and synergy.** Let me offer an example. **A group of five hundred thousand people as- semble on the National Mall to protest a bill being considered by Congress.** They gather, sing, chant, present their signs, and socialize. **They receive disappointing media coverage and the opposed bill passes easily**. **From the perspective of strictly personal politics, the rally failed**. The demands of the protestors were not represented to a larger public, nor did they come to be reflected in the law; the contours of the legal person and mass under- standings of freedom were not altered. **From an impersonal political per- spective, however, the primary sites of concern are different. Rather than a concern with whether representations were contested or confirmed, an impersonal lens is trained upon the affects that concretely determine in- dividual and collective power. Insofar as individuals were exhilarated and forged connections pregnant with unknown futures, this event contrib- uted to the agency of those involved, engendered the basis of new forms of shared power, and thereby “succeeded.”** Such connections may not have taken the form of email addresses exchanged or future meet-ups estab- lished but may be nothing other than a coagulation of joyful affect that enabled ambient bodies and minds to think and act more effectively or, in Foucault’s words, to engage in an “art of not being governed quite so much” in their everyday lives. On the other hand, the event may have amplified sad passions, en- trenched divisions between social groups with different demands and self- conceptions, and foreclosed certain alliances that had seemed replete with possibility beforehand. Nevertheless, the affective therapy that emerges from a politics of renaturalization offers the following counsel: ¶It should be noted that in ordering our thoughts and images, we must always attend to those things that are good in each thing so that we are always determined to acting from an affect of joy. For example, if some- one sees that he pursues esteem too much, he should think of its correct use, the end for which it ought to be pursued, and the means by which ¶ it might be acquired, not of its misuse and emptiness, and men’s incon- stancy, or other things of this kind. (*E* V ps) ¶ **The practical wisdom of renaturalization depends upon an affective orientation toward joy, which indicates an augmentation in one’s power or agency.** Impersonal politics takes its point of departure from the desire to enhance one’s pleasure and power through encounters with other bod- ies and minds. **It is an affective politics that privileges enabling relation- ships, wherever they may be found, rather than particular identities or institutions. Such an orientation cannot simply be willed but must occur by virtue of myriad impersonal factors in one’s environment over which one cannot exercise sovereign control. The impersonal perspective en- courages one to be attuned to those sources of strength and vitality that generally fly below the radar of theoretical or even conscious scrutiny.** I have already noted that one of the virtues of the neo-Hegelian tradition of political theory is that it does not dismiss unconscious and affective elements of agency and ethical life as irrelevant. Yet Spinoza advocates a shift from understanding affective and psychic life in terms of represen- tation to thinking in terms of natural forces combining or combusting. Spinoza encourages an attentiveness to affect as an indication of whether and how ambient forces enhance one’s power of existing. Spinoza hopes that **each affect, whether painful or pleasurable, if considered in terms of both its natural multiplicity (*E* V p) and its “correct use,” can animate and support a “love of freedom”** (V ps). This book endeavors not only to describe but to be such an exercise in the love of freedom.

#### Thus, the standard is to promote a politics of renaturalization. Prefer additionally:

#### 1 – Pedagogy – status-quo academia imposes a fragmented Cartesian model of analysis which demands difference as currency and coopts political praxis – renaturalization is necessary to affirm difference.

**Hansson 2** – “Unpacking Spinoza: Sustainability Education Outside the Cartesian Box” March 2012 chrome-extension://cbnaodkpfinfiipjblikofhlhlcickei/src/pdfviewer/web/viewer.html?file=http://www.jsedimensions.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Hansson2012Updated.pdf

In education and many other human endeavors, a systems approach can provide a basic language for communicating effectively and meaningfully about a most fundamental subject: organized complexity in any of its myriad forms (Checkland, 1993, pp. 8, 98;Checkland, 1999, p. 48). We can call such a basic language a ‘meta-discipline’. As pointed out by Peter Checkland, “systems thinking” (in the widest sense) can function as a meta-discipline: What distinguishes systems is that it is a subject which can talk about the other subjects. It is not a discipline to be put in the same set as the others, it is a meta-discipline whose subject matter can be applied within virtually any other discipline (Checkland, 1993, p. 5).Because of its multi-dimensional nature and inherent complexity, sustainability requires such an organizing, conceptual language beyond the confines of any single discipline. Without an appropriate meta-level of communication, ‘sustainability’ is often degraded to a catch-all buzzword devoid of epistemic precision, pedagogic power, and practical utility. At this point, it must be noted that the comprehensive systems theories and methodologies of the twentieth century have failed in the role as universally applicable and widely accepted meta-disciplines. One of them is General Systems Theory (Checkland and Scholes, 1999, p. A3; Jackson, 2000, p. 100). In part, this failure can be explained by the fact that a conceptual meta-language needs to have an intuitive directness and relative simplicity that makes it useful as a facilitator of understanding across artificial boundaries. To make sense to teachers and students alike, theory and method must be ontologically grounded and epistemically justified. In short, our methodology and the theory behind it must both be rooted in a philosophy explaining “what is” and how we can gain true knowledge about things in the world. Considered as a meta-level facilitator of understanding, Spinoza’s systems philosophy provides an onto-epistemic foundation for the individual systems-based disciplinary approaches that are essential to sustainability education. When this systems philosophy is taught as a meta-discipline explaining the systemic organization of nested ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ in the world; then concepts from other systems-based disciplines and interdisciplines (including specific methodologies) are allowed to coexist functionally within a unified epistemic framework. This framework is based on a view of the world as an integrated, complex ‘whole’ that is knowable not by means of reductionism but through awareness of functional interrelations. A universal framework of this kind is one of the fundamentals of a transdisciplinary approach unconfined by any single disciplinary conceptual framework (or any synthesis of such frameworks produced by interdisciplinary integration).Grounding Transdisciplinarity in Spinoza In higher education, profoundly discipline-transcending integration is rare indeed. Instead, most course- and program offerings with “interdisciplinary” aspirations remain multi-disciplinary (in the sense of adding parts from multiple disciplines without conscious, “organic” integration among them). According to this definition, ‘interdisciplinarity’ is greater than the sum of the parts (disciplines; disciplinary concepts). ‘Multi-disciplinarity’, on the other hand, is equal to the sum of parts. ‘Transdisciplinarity’, finally, is also, just like ‘interdisciplinarity’, greater than the sum of conceptual parts, but representing a degree of integration that is profound, inclusive, and systematic.17 This unification mirrors the seamless integrity of complex systems. It also conveys a kind of understanding that, in Spinoza’s words, “follows the order and connection of things” which in reality are organized in nested structures of relative ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ (Ethics, Part II, Proposition 7).According to Basarab Nicolescu (2002, p. 44),transdisciplinarity concerns that which is at once between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond all disciplines. Its goal is the understanding of the present world, of which one of the imperatives is the unity of knowledge. With this definition, the degree of cross-disciplinary integration increases from multi- to interdisciplinarity, culminating in transdisciplinarity where “disciplinary” aspects of understanding are considered as more or less limiting constructs vested with lesser or greater epistemic utility in relation to the undivided body of reality (the total structure of all ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’). As Erich Jantsch (1980) observed, this integrative endeavor is of greatest needbecause “an intricately interconnected reality is a whole which cannot be described by the sum of its disciplinary aspects, just as no real system may be described by the sum of its parts”. The displaced application of the Baconian-Cartesian method to educational administration has resulted in fragmentation separating the practitioners of individual academic disciplines into camps. Spinoza’s alternative to reductionism, however, could facilitate transdisciplinary integration and sustainable problem solving across cultural divides. Being among the first to use the term coined by Jean Piaget in the 1970s (Bourguignon, 1997), Erich Jantsch called ‘transdisciplinarity’ “a key notion for a systems approach to education” (1970, p. 414; italics in original). In the same publication, Jantsch also foreshadowed today’s emerging ideal of sustainability in education: It is important to understand the quest for knowledge as a form of interaction between living systems and their environment, no less essential than, say, breathing or feeding, and in the same sense subjective and objective at the same time In this paper, I use the term ‘transdisciplinarity’ in the same vein: as a rather open label-concept for a practical approach to knowledge considered as a unified body, transcends the artificially imposed boundaries of the academic disciplinary structure; an integrative approach that requires a well-developed and articulated meta-level of communication which in itself is not limited by disciplinary confines. The purpose of this meta-disciplinary level of communication is to facilitate a meaningful dialogue about the simultaneously subjective and objective nature of systematically organized ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’; subjective in the sense of being perspective-dependent (as discussed above), and objective in the sense of conveying understanding of reality with maximum accuracy. Sustainability is a discipline-transcending concept. The recognition of this fact has recently contributed to the growing interest in transdisciplinary approaches(Thompson Klein, 2004).In my courses and workshops, individual disciplines contribute conceptual tools, such as models and terminology, organized within a wider, transdisciplinary scope. I have found that Spinoza’s philosophy provides epistemic integration and justification for such an approach, as well as a pedagogic “blueprint” for problem solving beyond disciplinary and cultural confines. In the context of sustainability education, Spinoza’s “worm’s-eye approach” to ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ can function as a meaningful and practically useful epistemic meta-context for individual elements of disciplinary knowledge, understood as parts of a larger, in reality undivided whole. Thereby, this philosophy can provide the missing key to understanding our present sustainability crisis.

#### 2 – Collapses – theories cannot rely on an external affective framework for validation.

**Joyce 1** – Joyce, R. (2001). The Myth of Morality (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511487101

This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain“linguistic frameworks” (as Carnap calls them) bring with them new terms and ways of talking: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”; accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”; accepting the language of propositions permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. Internal to the framework in question, confirming or disconfirming the truth of these propositions is a trivial matter. But traditionallyphilosophers have interested themselves inthe external question –the issue of the adequacy of the framework itself**:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “Are there numbers?”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that theexternalquestion**,** as it has been typically construed,does not make sense. From a perspective that accepts mathematics, the answer to the question “Do numbers exist?” is justtrivially“Yes.”From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics, Carnap thinks, the only sensible way of construing the question is not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?”, and this pragmatic question is to be answered by consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the usefulness,etc., of the adoption. But the (traditional)philosopher’s questions – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – are pseudo-questions**.** By turning traditional philosophical questions into practical questions of the form “Shall I adopt...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space.Tostep out of the thing language andask “But does the world exist?” is a mistake, Carnap thinks, because the very notion of “existence” is a term which belongs to the thing language, and can be understood only within that framework, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that philosophers who ask the question do not mean material existence, but have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved, thus such questions have no cognitive content. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: persons who disputewhether propositions exist, whether properties exist**,** etc., do not know what they are arguing over, thus theyare not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but over the practical value of their respective positions**.** Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing that both parties would possibly count as evidence that would sway the debate one way or the other.

#### 3 – Cruel optimism – perseverance creates a gap between discursive regimes and actuality which create spaces of domination – only structures of affect escape our cruelly optimistic relation to stable structures.

**Schafer 13** – Schaefer ’13. Schaefer, D. "The Promise of Affect: The Politics of the Event in Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness and Berlant's Cruel Optimism." Theory & Event 16.2 2013. Project MUSE

At a recent talk at the University of Pennsylvania, Lauren Berlant was asked a question about the relationship between her work—she had just finished a lecture on the theme of flat affect in Gregg Araki's 2004 film Mysterious Skin—and the political. "Because I work on affect," she responded, "I think everything is realism" ([Berlant: 2012](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b3)). Like the dense introductory segments of each of her chapters—thick but fast-moving genealogical waterslides—I think that unpacking statements like this from Berlant is best repaid by taking them in a low gear. When Berlant maps her method as affect theory, she is suggesting that the works she examines in her capacity as a scholar of literature cannot be divorced from the political-material contexts out of which they emerge, but at the same time must be recognized as incarnations of aparticular embodied iteration within this field. **Texts are produced by bodies that are both enmeshed in their political worlds and trying to negotiate those worlds in their own distinct way. Everything we do is realism:** Berlant's textual objects of study are mediations, attempts to work something out, exhibitions of tensed, embodied, affective realities.[1](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f1) This is the promise of affect theory, the possibility sliding together analytical tools used to pick apart both highly individuated and highly social contact zones—bodies and histories—as incarnated realities. Affect theory wants to maintain the insights of high theory, the doctrinaire approach that says "historicize everything," while at the same time thinking of how bodies inject their own materiality into spaces. This means using language that enters the orbit of the biological. In the introduction to their 1995 edited volume Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader (later reprinted in Sedgwick's Touching Feeling)—one of the earliest manifestoes of contemporary affect theory— Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank acerbically catalog what theory "knows today," first and foremost that 1: The distance of [an] account from a biological basis is assumed to correlate near precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference (individual, historical, and cross-cultural), to contingency, to performative force, and to the possibility of change ([Sedgwick: 2003, 93](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b11)). And 2: Human language is assumed to offer the most productive, if not the only possible, model for understanding representation ([Sedgwick: 2003, 93](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b11)). **Affect theory in this vision is designed to explore[s] the "crucial knowledges" of bodies outside a purely theoretical determination, outside the traditional domains of humanist scholarship—reason, cognition, and language** ([Sedgwick: 2003, 114](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b11)). Affect, for Lauren Berlant, is thus understandable as "sensual **matter that is elsewhere to sovereign consciousness** but that has historical significance in domains of subjectivity" ([Berlant: 2011, 53](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Affect theory is about how systems of forces circulating within bodies—forces not necessarily subsumable or describable by language—interface with histories. It is about how discourses form ligatures with pulsing flesh-and-blood creatures. Two recent texts, Sara Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness ([2010](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)) and Berlant's Cruel Optimism ([2011](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)), can be seen as developing this strand, and in particular, of indicating new ways of feeling out politics through the membrane of affect theory. Both of these authors suggest that the repertoire of the analytics of power ([Foucault: 1990](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b6)) must be supplemented with resources from the affective turn. Recent critiques of affect theory[2](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f2) have focused on a branch of affect theory heavily informed by Gilles Deleuze's reading of Spinoza. In this strand, affect is rendered as a set of ontological properties, as an ensemble of mutable attributes.[3](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f3) Contemporary Deleuzians such as Brian Massumi[4](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f4) and William Connolly[5](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f5) have been targeted by these critics for their attempts at absorbing scientific research into the Spinozistic discourse of affect. But Spinoza and Deleuze are second-tier characters in Ahmed and Berlant's work—which is perhaps why Ahmed situates herself in a lineage—stretching back to Sedgwick—that she calls "feminist cultural studies of affect"[6](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#f6) ([Ahmed: 2010, 13](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Where the Deleuzian strands focuses on affect as the raw material of becoming, as the play of substances, Ahmed and Berlant locate affect theory [is] as a phenomenological, rather than ontological enterprise. It is in the phenomenology of the political that Ahmed and Berlant ground their projects. For Ahmed, this comes in the form of a new attention to happiness as an object of analysis. This does not mean a circumscribed exploration of happiness as a thing, but rather programmatically asking the question "what does happiness do?" ([Ahmed: 2010, 2](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Happiness is not autonomous, Ahmed argues, but a relationship of evaluation that creates the horizon of the self. For Ahmed, the "near sphere" of the self is constituted by a perimeter studded with "happy objects." This cluster of objects is what gives the field of mobile operations of the self its shape. In this "drama of contingency," we "come to have our likes, which might even establish what we are like" ([Ahmed: 2010, 24](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). But for Ahmed, happiness as an affective field settling in proximity to bodies is not necessarily transparent in its shape or its function to the self. Happiness often takes the form, she suggests, of a promise, of a deferred possibility. Taking the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl as a springboard for a discussion of time-consciousness, she suggests that happiness as a promise—from the Latin verb promittere, "to let go or send forth"—is an anticipation rather than a felt presence ([Ahmed: 2010, 38](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Rather than simply an affect that circulates between bodies and objects, happiness is also a promise that is passed around. This analysis of the promise of happiness underpins the genealogy Ahmed organizes in the opening chapter of the book: an exploration of the contemporary "happiness turn" in scholarship and the "happiness industry" emerging in parallel in popular media marketplaces. This discourse, she suggests, moves happiness further away from its etymological origin point—in the Middle English hap or fortune, cognate with "perhaps" and "happenstance"— suggesting chance to a sense of happiness as a scheme, a program that, if followed, leads to ultimate good ([Ahmed: 2010, 6](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). This sense of the promise of happiness is the elimination of contingency by guaranteeing the futurity of happiness: "The promise of happiness takes this form: if you have this or have that, or if you do this or do that, then happiness is what follows" ([Ahmed: 2010, 29](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Happiness as a guarantee—a promise that circulates through power-knowledge regimes—but one that defers happiness rather than making happiness present, is one of the mechanisms by which happiness is translated into the skin of a political organism, an "affective community"—such as a family or a society. Through the promise of happiness, bodies are brought together by a shared expectation of future comfort. But because this is a promise rather than immediate happiness, an interstice is formed between this promise and individual experiencing bodies— an interstice that can either be full and complete or disconnected. The family, for instance, does not share a happiness, but a happiness deferred, a promise or image of happiness to-come ([Ahmed: 2010, 46](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). It is in this interstice, either blockaded or fluid, that Ahmed articulates the need for a politics of killing joy, of breaking down the promise of happiness as a regime that demands fidelity without recourse. For Ahmed, the discourse of happiness is performative: it produces a politics of promise (or nostalgia) that suffocates alternative promises and alternative explorations. Here Ahmed produces biographies of a range of "affect aliens," bodies that are called on to be silent and accept the happiness that has been promised, while their actual desires and hopes are out of joint with the world around them: feminist killjoys, unhappy queers, melancholic migrants. The promise of happiness, Ahmed suggests, must be interrupted to make room for emancipatory politics. "I am not saying that we have an obligation to be unhappy," she writes, "I am simply suggesting that we need to think about unhappiness as more than a feeling that should be overcome" ([Ahmed: 2010, 217](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). In the closing passage of the book she writes that since "the desire for happiness can cover signs of its negation, a revolutionary politics has to work hard to stay proximate to unhappiness" ([Ahmed: 2010, 223](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b1)). Political change, Ahmed contends, is paralyzed by the imperative to be happy, to stay within the narrow guidelines of happiness's promise. Where Ahmed's background is in a western philosophical lineage that leads up to contemporary questions of affect, the immediate theoretical precursor of Lauren Berlant's Cruel Optimism is Kathleen Stewart's Ordinary Affects ([2007](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b12)), which develops the notion of the "ordinary" as a felt reality. "Ordinary affects," Stewart writes, "are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences" ([Stewart: 2007, 1f](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b12)). Berlant is interested in particular in how the ordinary comes to take the form of a sort of affective impasse, a set of felt relationships that cannot be moved through. Cruel Optimism is a focused study of a particular category of impasse, what she calls "cruel optimism." Cruel optimism, she explains at the book's outset, refers to a relation that emerges "when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be **a fantasy of the good life, or a political project**" ([Berlant: 2011, 1](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Berlant explores a range of situations where these attachments emerge, as a response to trauma or out of the ongoing pressures of the ordinary, in particular through the parameters of what she calls "genres of precarity," a range of aesthetic practices and styles—"mass media, literature, television, film, and video"—that ... emerge during the 1990s to register a shift in how the older state-liberal-capitalist fantasies shape adjustments to the structural pressures of crisis and loss that are wearing out the power of the good life's traditional fantasy bribe without wearing out the need for a good life ([Berlant: 2011, 7](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Realism: texts always reflect an affective situation, a force field of desires, a labile contact zone between bodies and intersecting historical frames. Framing literary criticism (broadly construed) as a practice of tracing the connective tissue between bodies and situations is what lets Berlant speak to the political uses of affect. She suggests that affect theory is a "another phase in the history of ideology theory," that it "brings us back to the encounter of what is sensed with what is known and what has impact in a new but also recognizable way" ([Berlant: 2011, 53](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). **Affect—especially ordinary affect—is the missing link between discursive regimes and bodies, the arterial linkages through which power is disseminated. "The present" is not an assemblage of texts and knowledges, bloodless discursive inscriptions on the body, but a felt sense out of which political circumstances emerge.** "We understand nothing about impasses of the political," she writes, "without having an account of the production of the present" ([Berlant: 2011, 4](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Cruel optimism as a byproduct of political situations colliding with bodies plays out in ongoing, semistable routines, in ordinariness. This focus on the ordinary frames Berlant's conception of the political as a slow-motion reaction rather than a series of staccato punctuations. This comes out, for instance, in her exhortation to move away from trauma theory as a way of "describing what happens to persons and populations as an effect of catastrophic impacts" ([Berlant: 2011, 9](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Rather, Berlant suggests that trauma is only one facet of the ordinary, a precursory event that yields new historical trajectories lived out in slow-motion. "Trauma," she writes, ... forces its subjects not into mere stuckness but into crisis mode, where they develop some broad, enduring intuitions about the way we live in a now that's emerging without unfolding, and imagining a historicism from within a discontinuous present and ways of being that were never sovereign ([Berlant: 2011, 93](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Rather than the instantiating event, Berlant is interested in the fallout of politics, the long-running reverberations. It is in these interwoven aftermaths following in the wake of bodies that Berlant locates the tropic of cruel optimism. Optimism, she is careful to point out, can "feel" any number of different ways, can come clothed in any number of affective orientations. "Because optimism is ambitious," she writes, "at any moment it might not feel like anything, including nothing: dread, anxiety, hunger, curiosity, the whole gamut from the sly neutrality of browsing the aisles to excitement at the prospect of 'the change that's gonna come'" ([Berlant: 2011, 2](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). Rather than a singularly identifiable feeling, optimism takes the phenomenological form of a "knotty tethering to objects, scenes, and modes of life that generate so much overwhelming yet sustaining negation" ([Berlant: 2011, 52](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). **Optimism binds bodies to "fantasies of the good life,"** to horizons of possibility that may or may not be defeated by the conditions of their own emergence. Cruel optimism is the outcome of this circumstance of tethering confused by itself, of Möbius-strip cycles of ambition and frustration. The ordinary, precisely because of its complexity, can contain the intransigent contradictions of cruel optimism ([Berlant: 2011, 53](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). It is the space of the rubble, the hovering dust, the shockwaves that follow the event rather than the piercing clarity of the punctum itself. Berlant is interested in the ways that habits form out of situations of impossibility—for instance, in her reading of Gregg Bordowitz's documentary filmHabit (2001), about the body rituals that structure the daily lives of a gay man living with AIDS and his partner in New York City in the 1990s. Bordowitz's work maps a crisis that reflects Berlant's delineation of the field of the political: with the new availability of anti-retroviral drugs in the 1990s, AIDS ceased to be "a death sentence," and thus "turned fated life back into an ellipsis, a time marked by pill- and test-taking, and other things, the usual" ([Berlant: 2011, 58](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). For Berlant, the event is a rarity, and is only secondarily the zone of the political, which is itself constituted by ongoing patterns of response and desire—slow-motion echoes producing new forms as they cross-cut and interfere with one another ([Berlant: 2011, 6](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)). In this sense, Berlant explains, her work meshes with Sedgwick's queer reading of affect as the histories that make us desire in unexpected, perverse ways. "The queer tendency of this method," Berlant writes, "is to put one's attachments back into play and into pleasure, into knowledge, into worlds. It is to admit that they matter" ([Berlant: 2011, 123](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/509908#b2)).

#### 4 – Rule-Following fails – there is nothing inherent in a rule that mandates following a specific interpretation. They are always subject to interpretation by the observer, which means an objective moral rule would get interpreted differently by different agents. The only solution is to embrace the chaos of nature – our shared relationality creates mutual agreement on rules since every sensation is constituted by the same substance.

#### 5 – Referential – negating assumes the AFF is valid of contestation which concedes the validity of our affective investment.

#### 6 – Negative arguments begin with a descriptive premise about our natural investment – however, if the aff does not have truth value, their counter-premise would not have truth value.

#### 7 – There are infinite natural states – the aff is moral in one which is sufficient.

**Vaidman 2** – Vaidman, Lev, 3-24-2002, "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/

**The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave.** (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) **The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance**. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a **quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions** of the Universe prior to the experiment: **only the probabilities are governed by the initial state**. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions**. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI.** We need not assume that Nature plays dice: science has stronger explanatory power. The MWI is a deterministic theory for a physical Universe and it explains why a world appears to be indeterministic for human observers.

#### 8 – Our framework is not consequentialist but relational – the basis for ethics are the fluid relations that manifest in singular essence.

**Sharp 2** – Hasana Sharp, 2011 Sharp is an assistant professor of philosophy at McGill University. “Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization,” The University of Chicago Press, pp. 100-102

“Peter must, as is necessary, conform to the idea of Peter, and not to the idea of man” (KV I). While there is no biological or spiritual basis for human distinctiveness, Spinoza prefers human association by virtue of our **relative “**similarity**”** (E III p) and our greater power to enjoy one another (IV appIX). The more similar a being is to me, he claims, the more “useful” it is. Thus, Matheron has suggested that rather than a universalist ethics, Spinoza’s is an “ethics of similitude.” In a pluralist world, **those who reject a universalist ethics might not find an ethics of similitude ap- pealing**. But let us examine the character of this similitude and the ethical practice it involves. Even if there is not one single property that unites us and excludes all other beings, **the relative similarity of our bodies makes for the greatest possible agreement** (convenientia) among us. Nevertheless, **each of us has a singular essence** (or nature), a unique ratio of motion and rest **and a distinctive striving to persevere in being** (conatus) (E III p). Desire is “the very essence of [a] man” (III ps), and “**the desire of each individual differs from the desire of another as much as the nature, or essence**, of the one differs from the other” (III pd). Spinoza notes the essential differences between a human and a horse but also between a drunk and a philosopher (he says nothing of the drunk philosopher, however). **When distinct desires come into contact with one another, they will accord more or less with one another.** Each of us desires to produce effects that enhance **and preserve** our natures**, such that those with similar natures tend to amplify each other’s power.** “Things which are said to agree in nature are understood to agree in power” (IV pd). Adequate shelter and heat in Montreal during the winter, for example, preserve my being, along with that of my child, cats, electronics, and books. What maintains our being overlaps to various extents. What we do in the shared space of my apartment fortify our minds and bodies **in complementary ways. Human needs tend to be more complicated than protection from the elements**, of course, and (albeit technically correct) it is only so helpful to think of my iPod as striving for shelter. **Conatus**, in the most general sense, **refers to a particular composition of energy persisting in a relatively stable state.** My child and cats clearly exhibit a desire to exist in determinate ways (E III ps). They aim not only to avoid death but to enjoy their characteristic pleasures and cultivate their distinctive powers. All of the small animals in my home enjoin me to develop skills of communication, nurturing, and play. My son skillfully solicits me to develop new powers (rather relentlessly!), just as my interest in stimulating laughter and affection in him (which enables me to further love myself) encourages him to grow and thrive. We are, I dare say, mutually useful to one another. My cats and I likewise mutually support each other’s vitality. Studies suggest that people who have regular contact with companion animals live longer. As much as we abuse and instrumentalize animals, there are many indications that they enjoy our company, such as the meow by which cats address humans (but rarely one another), communicating their desires for food, play, and affection. Although the suggestion that my child and I are involved in a relation of reciprocal utility is perhaps not an edifying notion, we should take note of Spinoza’s peculiar definition of utility. **Whatever so disposes the human body that it can be aff ected in a great many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in a great many ways, is useful** [utile] to man; the more it renders the body capable of being affected in a great many ways, or of affecting other bodies, the more useful [utile] it is; on the other hand, **what renders the body less capable of these things is harmful** [noxium]. (E IV p) Spinozan utility is not, therefore, the “utilitarian” notion it is often taken to be. **The notion of utility does not imply that other people are the most effective instruments for satisfying our preferences.** Useful **phenomena,** encounters**, experiences, and beings** are those that “dispose” the body so as to make it **more receptive and**, thereby, more active. Utility names a kind of corporeal involvement that renders affected beings increasingly open to the world and thereby increasingly able to affect others. According to Spinoza, the most useful relationship in my house is between my adult partner and me, since we can nourish and stimulate one another’s minds and bodies in the greatest diversity of ways. **The notion of utile echoes Spinoza’s principle establishing the relative superiority of human minds.** “The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the more capable, the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways” (E II p). **Utility** points to the affective conditions of perception. It **names the** sensuous **receptivity and connectivity required** in order **to think and act under the guidance of reason.** The same word designates “interest” or “advantage,” because it describes the source of our activity as finite beings, ineluctably bound to one another.

#### Now affirm – The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines. Resolved is defined as[[1]](#footnote-1) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined. Affirm means to express agreement[[2]](#footnote-2) and you already know I do.

#### Intellectual property regimes biologically regulate affective relationalities and force the subject into binary, mechanical, categories.

Wolodzko 18 – Agnieszka Anna, Bodies within affect. : on practicing contaminating matters through bioart, 2018, <https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/66889>

The particular discrepancy between the practice of affect and its control, between discovering the relations of transformation and managing these relations in order to achieve particular formations, is present in the practices of biotechnology. Take, for instance, the patenting of the human genome, which touches the very intimate and existential realm of what it means to have and be a body. Donna Dickenson reports that, according to common law, once a part of your body is separated from you, it is legally treated as waste and as not belonging to anybody [lat. res nullius].22 Dickenson believes that this disposable attitude to body parts that have been detached from the body is due to the traditional distinction between a person and raw matter. Unlike a body part, persons cannot be owned as this would undermine the notion of human dignity.23 However, as Dickenson states, recent biotechnological practices undermine the boundaries between what can be considered as a person and what is just a raw body part, which results making the body a much more fluid and hybrid phenomenon. The scale and implications of the hybridity and relationality of the body as a result of biotechnological practices can be seen, for instance, within the phenomenon of human genome patenting and genetic testing, the most lucrative applications of biotechnological innovations.24 Till 2013, it was common practice to patent the human genome once it had been isolated from the body. Even though genes are not an invention as such, their isolation from a body was considered an innovative practice and thus subject to patenting laws.25 This resulted in an enormous biomarket, where, in the 1980s-1990s, till 2005, over twenty per cent of the human genome was patented in the US.26 A patent is “a legal right granted to inventors by national governments to exclude others from making, using or selling their invention in a given country,”27 and so, in this context, its function presupposes that parts of our own body are legally owned by companies and institutions.28 Most importantly, gene patents are usually applied to all methods of their detection. This means that every test and tool involved in the management of a particular sequence are covered by patent laws. The patent thus reaches a very broad research area, and this may have consequences for future innovation and medical care. Since the main role of patents in the biotechnology that has induced genetic testing was to allow for private investment in research and development, biotechnology has transformed from a common good into a commodification and exploitation of the body. Arguably, things have changed once the US Supreme Court banned the patenting of “natural” genes in the case of the Myriad Genetics Inc., the company that discovered the sequence and location of BRCA1 and BRCA1 – a gene mutation that increases the risk of ovarian and breast cancer: “A naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”29 However, things become more ambiguous when we look not only at the differences, but also at the similarities between DNA and its copy, cDNA (complementary DNA). cDNA is “a type of a man-made DNA composition, which is made in a lab with an enzyme that creates DNA from RNA template.”30 Not naturally occurring, and structurally and functionally different from DNA, cDNA thus complies with the patent law. Nevertheless, some critics argue that, despite its structural and functional difference, which allows for the further research, the copy (cDNA) still holds exactly the same information as the original (DNA).31 Moreover, because cDNA is not distinct from the methods it is extracted with, there is no specification of how much intervention is actually needed in order for the gene to be legally patented, since mere simple separation from the body is no longer a boundary.32 Despite the lack of boundaries and clear definitions of what a body’s natural state is and what its manipulated state is, Myriad, (like other companies involved in human gene patenting), practices what is now called personalized medicine. Bodies are practiced as autonomous and fixed identities, independent from collective relations.33 As Dickenson argues, personalized medicine deliberately positions itself against we medicine, emphasising individual responsibility and care, rather than a collective and relational understanding of the way our bodies are. We witnessed the power of individual choice when the American actress Angelina Jolie announced that she had undergone a double mastectomy due to the presence of the BRCA gene in her body. This was in 2013, just before the Supreme Court decision in the Myriad case and the actress’s experience provoked a public debate about the necessity of testing for the cancer gene. However, the media conveniently failed to mention the patent that applied to the BRCA gene, and just how expensive the test to detect it was (in 2013, the test cost between US$3,000 and US$4,000).34 Moreover, the decision to undergo the mastectomy – which for the average woman does not end with a full breast reconstruction as it did in Jolie’s case – was portrayed as being a woman’s – a mother’s – individual choice. The discussion of the elective surgery largely ignored any discussion of the financial, political or social situation of women, or of the industry involved in performing these tests. Importantly, in order for the testing to be accurate and certain, a large database of the variation of this mutation is needed. You need “we medicine in order to perform a successful me medicine.”35 In other words, to be accurate, any medicine depends on a range of relational practices and multiple bodies from various social, political and biological states. Any distinction, therefore, between “me” and “we” medicine is an artificial one. Medical practice has exposed how “me” medicine has already been “we” medicine. The tangible danger, however, is that these relational practices become veiled by the abstract categories of individuality and autonomy. In other words, while we are already living within affect, and are already practicing affect’s contaminations and its multiple relations and implications for various spheres of living bodies, we have never really changed our logic with regard to affect. In the case of Myriad, while, in principle, researchers, share their genome database in order to provide an exchange of information for the common good and to promote innovation and accurate medical care, fear of competition led the company to stop contributing to the data already in 2004. It has also stopped publicising new information about variations. As a major performer of tests for the BRCA gene, Myriad has thus significantly restricted research on breast cancer. The company’s self-interest, clothed in a policy of personalized medicine has stopped the flow of data and, therefore, causing less accurate medical care.36 What is worse, after the US Supreme Court decision of 15 April 2013, Myriad filed a number of lawsuits against laboratories that had started to offer the BRCA test more cheaply.37 What we learn from the BRCA case, is that by failing to change the logic of thinking about the bodies and as a result of its perpetuation of the belief in the autonomy of bodies, despite their obvious dependence on bodies’ relationality, the gene patenting industry has created even stronger hierarchies among bodies. The industry’s policies have enacted a strong belief in determinism, ascribed to DNA within the practices of biotechnological, economic and political application. The idea of the autonomous body is stronger than the actual matters of practice and relations that construct the body. Such practice of the body has preserved the nature/culture divide in a bizarrely paradoxical way. The US Supreme Court’s decision perpetuates a belief in the exclusion of nature from any economic-political spheres. As long as something does not occur in “nature”, it can be patented. However, as shown in the case of Myriad, the copy (cDNA) of DNA that is to be patented holds exactly the same information as the original (DNA). The border between what occurs naturally and culturally, what is original and what is a copy, is thus blurred. Without the “original” DNA there would be no cDNA in the first place. Moreover, what is considered as artificial and therefore ready for manipulation and commodification, materially influences and transforms what we consider to be “natural”. The promise of cure and treatment that has justified the privatization and monopolization of research, ultimately influences our own bodies and lives. Patented genes sequences do not regard a particular body, but “the body”. Patents have a universal function, which, in turn, incorporates all our bodies under its law. Once you have a breast cancer, part of you, what you think of as the “natural” you, belongs, in practice, to the corporation. The artificial divide between the “state of nature” and man-made practice does not respond to our bodies, which are an entanglement of living matter and practices. Furthermore, the Myriad case is also a striking example because it shows the consequences of our lack of understanding that biotechnology has a real material impact on our social and political life. Here, the idea of personhood and human dignity cannot do justice to the scale of novelty and unpredictability of the biotechnological world. Biobanks, which are the modern equivalent of surveillance and property, have resulted in: commodified cell lines, such as those in the Henrietta Lacks legal case,38 promises of regenerative medicine via new methods that transform a cell from an adult body into any other type of a cell, and CRISPR genome editing, which makes the idea of designer babies not just futuristic speculation, but a scientific possibly.39 Indeed, these new biotechnological inventions have undermined any doubt about the influence that biotechnology already has in shaping our lives. These phenomena are not just the concern of bioethical committees and economic policies, they directly touch the multiple political, social and cultural realms of our existence. Ingeborg Reichle called the unprecedented power inherent to the use of biotechnology “bottom-up eugenics”, which is not based directly on a socio-cultural idea and narration, but rather the market and profit.40 As Robert Zwijnenberg argues, biotechnology inevitably correlates with such problems as, for instance, human enhancement, posing not only ethical and legal problems, but forcing more philosophically and culturally varied questions and attitudes, i.e. “who and what do we want to be as humans, and who and what do we want to become?”41 Biotechnological innovations that allow us to manipulate our bodies construct economicsocial realities that do not respond to disciplinary divisions. Economic and political demands are strongly entangled with scientific findings, technologies and their agencies, which, in turn, inevitably influence social and cultural, individual and the population’s practices, as well as our lives and bodies. However, as the Myriad case shows, once these multiple entanglements are applied according to the traditional beliefs in autonomy, individuation and personalization, which do not respond to the relational nature of phenomena, we enter into the realm of utopian beliefs in purity and clear-cut boundaries between species and disciplines. For instance, transhumanists’ desire for designer babies and perfect humans,42 fuelled by an unquestioning use of technology, is just one among many examples of using relationality not as an ontological way of being, but as a means for strengthening the fixed ideas about our bodies. We already live and practice affect, that is why, if we do not think and act according to its dynamic nature, we create even sharper dualisms, polarizations and hierarchies. It is therefore time to map these material and relational ways of understanding. It is time to map bodies within affect, in order to meet the challenges of the biotechnological future. The question is, how to do that? How can we relationally practice the relational nature of our bodies? In other words, how do we make matters of affect matter?

#### Our demand for affective revolution is an investigation into networks of domination – placing being over nature is the root cause of material violence and culminates in fascism.

Evans 10– Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424

**Imposing liberalism has** often **come at a price**. That price has tended to be a **continuous recourse to war.** While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. **Liberalism** today, they argue, **is underwritten by the** unreserved **righteousness of its mission**. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘Liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/**elimination of** all forms of **political difference** in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, **The more peace is commanded, the more war is declared** in order **To achieve it**: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . **liberals are** nonetheless **committed** also **to making war.**’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). **Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war.** However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), **These wars no longer benefit from the possibility of** scoring outright **victory**, retreating, **or** achieving a lasting negotiated **peace** by means of political compromise**.** Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . **The project** of removing war from the life of the species **becomes** a lethaland, in principle, continuous and **unending** process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars**,** which is **fought on and between the modalities of life itself.** . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how **Liberalism gains its mastery by posing** fundamental **questions of life and death –** that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by **a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative** (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be **for the unification of the species.** This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. **With enmity** instead **depending upon the** complex, adaptive, dynamic **account of life** itself**, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those** newly **appointed enemies of humanity** – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival**.** Vital in other words to all human existence, **Doing what is necessary** out of global species necessity **requires a new moral assay of life that**, pitting the universal against the particular, **willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference**, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters**.** Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). **Racism** thus **appears here** to be a **thoroughly modern** phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002)**.** This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of **The threat** that **is now** from **the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within –** that **societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous** and nobody can be exempt, **for political modernity to function** one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘Killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255)**.** While killing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, **when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of The most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’**, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171)**.** The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

### Underview

#### Give both debaters 30 speaks – key to overcome the hard 4-2 screw at this tournament. Imma take a change with you Andrew – plsss gimme an easy essay q 😉

**Treat each theoretical argument as drop the debater – they have the ability to meet them but chose not to and its key to norm-set.**

**1 – Yes 1AR theory – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, no RVIs and the highest layer of the round – 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs or 2NR theory and paradigm issues – evaluate after the 1AR since the 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.**

**2 – No 2NR “I meet” arguments**

**A] Skews theory ground because they’re each a NIB for me to winning theory which kills my ability to check abuse.**

**B] Skews time, they can make three minutes of blippy I meets that I can’t cover because the 2AR is too short.**

**3 – No new 2N arguments, weighing, and paradigm issues A] Overloads the 2AR with a massive clarification burden B] It becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2NR C] Neg has access to bidirectional shells which makes neg shells impossible to meet and impact turns your reading of the shells since I’ll always lose on an interpretation.**

**4 – Check all neg interps and K/DA links in CX – A] avoids infinite regress due to links and interps B] Otherwise reevaluate under the Neg’s K C] Norms – you’d do the same with TFW**

**5 – The neg may not read nibs or OCIs (offensive counter-interps) A] You can up-layer for 7 minutes that I have to answer before I even have access to offense B] Inf neg abuse since you would just read 7 mins of auto-negate arguments C] OCIs are just shorter theory args they can blow up. This means they must only line by line aff arguments, since otherwise they function as nibs before I access warrants.**

**6 – No neg analytics – I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win.**

**7 – No neg arguments – skews me to answer those and they can extend one for 7 minutes whereas I have to answer all their arguments. Answering this triggers a contradiction since its inherently a neg argument.**

**8 – The neg may not read meta-theory – I only have time to check abuse 1 time but you can do it in the NC and 2N, up-layering my attempt means we never get to the best norm. This means reject any reason why an aff spike is bad since they claim aff theory is unfair.**

**9 – Reject out of round violations since A] You can pull up someone saying the f word and reading the k which polarizes argumentation and means someone always loses B] Not jurisdictional since the judge can only vote for the better debate, the violation doesn't happen in round.**

**10 – The neg may not read overview answers to aff arguments – they can up-layer all aff arguments for 7 minutes and the 1ar has to shift through it all. I have a computer virus that prevents changing font size and everything’s in an overview. No 1NC prep time – they have infinite prep to craft a strategic 1NC.**

**11 – Aff theory first – it’s a much larger strategic loss because 1min is ¼ of the 1AR vs 1/7 of the 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time.**

**12 – Neg shells may not be bidirectional because they should be aff specific. If they are, drop them for exacerbating time skew which is lexically prior. They must spec their favorite thing about Agastya – anything else makes Agastya sad – key to mental health.**

**13 – Refer to me in theory violation and in CX as agastyamuni Sridharan – anything else justifies misnaming and destroys predictability since I don’t know what they refer to. Independently vote for me because my name is Agastya – key to promoting education about lesser known names in debate.**

**14 – Allow new 2AR responses to NC arguments but not new 2N responses A] Reciprocity – the NC has 7 minutes of rebuttal time while I only have 4 minutes, the 2ar makes it 7-7 B] Time skew – the 2n can overload the aff with args and makes the 2a impossible – allows for the neg to auto-win every round.**

**15 – Theory or K indicts on spikes is drop the arg A] My theory paradigms are simply presented models for debate B] Its key to reciprocity since one line shouldn’t warrant the death penalty.**

**16 – All neg interps are counter interps since the aff takes an implicit stance on every issue which means you need an RVI to become offensive. You should accept all aff interps and assume I meet neg theory since the aff speaks in the dark and I have to take a stance on something, you can at least react and adapt.**

**17 – I don’t have to take a stance on anything in cross – A] Judges don’t flow it B] Let’s the 2NR go all in on something I wasn’t prepared for.**

1. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm [↑](#footnote-ref-2)