# SO21 Deleuze AC

### SPIKES ON THE BOTTOM

### AC

#### We are dynamic – overtime, affective encounters with our surroundings through time shape subjectivity, yet representational thought ascribes to them a limited essence – our model resists the imposition of sameness onto a chaotic world. Every negation is just a reconfiguration of a set of relationships of differences. It doesn’t in truth deny those relations, it just affirms them in a different way.

Deleuze – Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repitition. Translated by Paul Patton. 1968

Temporally speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito. It is as though **Descartes's Cogito** **operated** **with** two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. **The** **determination (I think) implies an undetermined** **existence** (**I am,** because 'in order to think one must exist') - **and** **determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject**: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. **The** entire **Kantian** **critique [is]** amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. **The determination ('I think')** obviously **implies** something undetermined **('I am'), but** **nothing so far tells us how it is that** **this undetermined is determinable** **by the 'I think'**: 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'8 **Kant** therefore **adds** a third logical value: **the determinable**, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the deter­ mination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but **in the form of a transcendental** **difference** between the Determination as such and what it determines; **no[t] longer in the form of an external difference which separates**, **but in the form of an** **internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation** between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ...9 The consequences of this are extreme: **my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a** **phenomenon**, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, **the spontaneity of which I am** **conscious in the 'I think' cannot** **be understood as the** **attribute of a substantial** and spontaneous **being**, **but only as the affection** **of a passive self** **which experiences its own thought** - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. **The activity of thought applies** to a receptive being, **to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it**, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. **To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the** **self** - **that is, the passive position** (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, **namely** **time**. Nor is 'add' entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the **I were fractured** from one end to the other: fractured **by** the pure and empty form of **time**. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. **Time signifies a** fault or a **fracture in the I and a passivity in the self**, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. **Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant** and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the 'I' for the point of view of 'God' = than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an identity that it owes precisely tt. If the greatest tmttattve of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis. On the contrary, we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive (contemplation ontraction). · The possibility of receiving sensations or impressions follows from this. It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation: here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. The Kantian initiative can be taken up, and the form of time can support both the death of God and the fractured I, but in the course of a quite different understanding of the passive self. In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant - rather, it is Holderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self.10 Holderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though these were complementary figures of the same death instinct. Is it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus?

#### Our instability necessitates power structures of rhizomatic becoming that embrace difference. Dominant economic models repress creative desires and over-code social life – fields that are not intelligible within straited space are excluded as deviant.

**Rowe 13** – Rowe, J. E. (2013). Understanding economic development as a Deleuzian “plateau.” Local Economy, 28(1), 99–113. doi:10.1177/0269094212465580, Agastya

Understanding economic development as a Deleuzian ‘plateau’ Crafting an economic development strategy from a Deleuzian poststructuralist perspective can be likened to a series of plateaus. In geology or physical geography a plateau refers to relatively flat elevated regions with often nearly horizontal underlying layers of rock strata. When discussing ‘plateaus’, Colebrook (2002: 58) stated that: of layers: genetic, chemical, geological and cultural events all produce different strata or plateaus of life ... The idea of **a ... [framework for understanding economic development] suggests that there is a distribution, a drawing of lines, a plane of differences, a number of planes or plateaus which constitute ...[practice], and that this number of plateaus cannot be located within the unity of a subject**. In this article, ‘plateaus’ are metaphorically conceptualized as levels of understanding of basic economic development concepts such as competitive advantage (Rowe, 2009). The elevation of the various ‘plateaus’ becomes increasingly higher and more complex as new goals and key concepts are folded into the mix.1 The various levels of understanding are conceptualized as rhizomatic structures of paths and connective links (Morss, 2000: 195).2 The paths or links could be disturbed, interrupted or lost, but there is always an alternative path to follow that continues the flow by connecting ideas and thoughts. The implications from the upwards sophistication of concepts will be examined through a Deleuzian lens.3 This researcher also interprets such concepts as tools for thinking outside the square. This research seeks to illustrate the potential value for alternative ways of thinking about and conceptualizing key local economic development fundamentals through the use of the Deleuzian metaphor ‘plateau’ in a New Zealand context. **Deleuzian concepts offers a ‘new way of thinking about economic development by providing insights into the complexity and chaos of capitalism while affording alternative ways of thinking about economic development policies** or strategies’ (Rowe, 2012: 76). Such a framework is potentially useful because Deleuzian concepts ‘clearly refer to spatial relationships’ (Gough, 2005: 2) between real world economic activities and can be seen as ways of visualising them. The second section of this article will further develop the theoretical framework. New Zealand’s geographic location will be delineated and the effects of globalization on the nation’s economy will be investigated from a practitioner’s perspective. The following sections will begin by conceptualizing the nation’s competitive advantage and regional fundamentals as ‘plateaus’ of knowledge. Other key economic development tools, such as clustering, SME support systems and small business incubators, will also be folded into the mix of fundamental concepts. Theoretical framework The landscape can be visualized as a series of ‘plateaus’ or plateaux as originally conceptualized by Bateson (1973) in the early 1970s (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21–22, 158; Massumi, 1992: 7). The concept has been subsequently refined by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) in their seminal publication A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari developed the concept as a way of describing the **distinction between arborescent and rhizomatic thinking**. The philosophers called a ‘plateau’ ‘any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 22). Jacobs (2007: 268) described the metaphor ‘rhizome’ as follows: The multifarious activities that constitute [economic development] can be seen ... as links between those ensembles of activity or patchworks ... through what **Deleuze and Guattari term the ‘rhizome’, a metaphor that they use to ‘maps’ the connections between agents, material objects and the local**. A ‘plateau’ can also be formulated as a descriptor in order to enhance the understanding of the New Zealand context. The context needs to be understood as an essential component of a conceptual framework for visualizing how different stakeholders (Central Government policy makers, local politicians, the forces of globalization, etc.) at different scales converge across the ebbs and flows of daily practice. According to Brian Massumi (1992: 7): intensity that is not automatically dissipated in a climax leading to a state of rest. The heightening of energies is sustained long enough to leave a kind of **afterimage of its dynamism that can be reactivated or injected into other activities**, creating a fabric of intensive states between which may number of connecting routes could exist. This is important because an economic development practitioner needs to be able to ‘identify, analyse and intervene in the **complex mixture of forces at work in a globalised economy’** (Hillier, 2005: 279). In order to intervene, practitioners have to deal with the virtual and actual because they both constitute reality. Actuality is unfolded from potentiality and the ‘diverse actualisations of the virtual... [can be] understood as solutions’ (Boundas, 2005: 297) or events. ‘Virtual implies future potential or becoming’ 4 (Hillier, 2008: 45) and in this first domain, the virtual, essences are replaced with multiplicities. Deleuze (1988: 55) further elaborated by stating that: We have ... confused Being with beingpresent. Nevertheless, the present is not; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not; but it acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act or be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: it is identical with being in itself. Deleuze developed his conceptualization of virtual by drawing upon the Bergsonian dure´e and e´lan vital. Both Deleuze and Bergson agree that dure´e is an ‘immanently differentiated dynamic process of the real whose nature is always to actuali[s]e itself in novel differentiations’ (Boundas, 2005: 298). ‘From any actual or unfolded term it should be possible (and, for Deleuze, desirable) to intuit the richer potentiality from which it has emerged’ (Colebrook, 2005: 10). This is applicable to this research because ‘difference is something possible for an already actualised entity’ (Colebrook, 2005: 9). This can be related to the striated hierarchical bureaucratic structure that a practitioner has to deal with when seeking funding for a new initiative. For example, key concepts such as smooth and striated space clearly illustrate the connection between Deleuzian philosophy and the practice of local economic development. According to Patton (2000: 111–112) smooth space indicates ‘the **heterogeneous space of qualitative multiplicity**, while striated space is the homogeneous space of quantitative multiplicity’. Smooth space can also be considered **‘rhizomatic space**... in which local regions are juxtaposed without reference to an overarching’ (Patton, 2000: 112) economic development strategy. In the above quotations, Patton was referring to the inherent tension between smooth and striated space. An economic development strategy is usually designed as a striated structure with specific actions plans to address each goal. Paradoxically, a key objective of most economic development strategies is to create the smooth space of an entrepreneurial culture. It should be noted that Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 474) understood that these opposing spaces are intertwined by stating that: ‘smooth space is constantly being **translated, transversed into striated space**; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to smooth space’. Following this same line of thought, a practitioner can strive towards immanence by implementing new initiatives which challenges the striating forces which seek to deand reterritorialize space and by regulating its chaotic multiplicities through striation (Osborne and Rose, 1999: 738).5 As a result, immanence is difficult to achieve because policies and strategic documents create points on which to tie striations. Similarly, ‘Deleuzoguattarian knots of arborescence where matted elements of smooth space are woven into the... [fabric] of striated space’ (Hillier 2007: 139). These ‘becomings of entangled complex assemblages’ (Bonta, 2005: 110) invent new lines of flight 6 and **innovative solutions** to approach local problems as ‘**they escape from old constraints’ and ‘convert desire into economic opportunities’** (Hillier, 2007: 139). Crafting an economic development strategy is a becoming because it promotes new trajectories, ideas and innovative solutions (Massumi, 1992: 101). Consequently, one could strive toward immanence by channelling smooth space into the mix of striations to create a becoming: a becoming-developed. The practice of economic development can also be regarded as a performance of folding (there is no predetermined style of folding, un-or-refolding). Practitioners may choose (if they wish) to participate in a Deleuzian voyage of discovery by ‘play[ing] along the folds and... become swept up by the variable consistency of a certain context’ (Doel, 2000: 131) **which opens up potentialities of becoming** (Semetsky, 2011). The issue is not one of relation, but of ‘fold-in’ or of ‘fold according to fold’. Folds are in this sense everywhere without the fold being a universal (Deleuze, 1993: 135). It’s a ‘differentiation’, a ‘differential’ (Deleuze, 1995: 156) and the ‘unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold’ (Deleuze, 1992: 6). The term ‘fold’ has also been borrowed from geology. It can be defined as a bend, flexure, or wrinkle in rock produced when the rock was in a plastic state (Leet et al., 1978: 468). It is in this sense that a fold, as the minimal element, is a transformer because one is always amongst countless others who perpetually pull it out of shape (Doel, 2001: 564). This means that understanding can be enhanced by visualizing key concepts such as competitive advantage and the forces of globalization being folded into the complex mix that constitutes the practice of economic development. Visualizing concepts such as competitive advantage and the forces of globalization as ‘plateaus’ can be enabling and emergent via differential relations of folding. As Deleuze (1992: 93) concludes: ‘I am forever unfolding between two folds and if to perceive means to unfold, than I am forever perceiving within the folds’. Practitioners with new insights are better prepared to navigate through the muddled transdisciplinary field of local economic development.

#### And, it is imperative to preserve affective truth – theories cannot rely on an external framework of power structures for validation – other ethics are referential.

**Joyce 1** – Joyce, R. (2001). The Myth of Morality (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511487101

This distinction between what is accepted from within an institution, and “stepping out” of that institution and appraising it from an exterior perspective, is close to Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. 15 Certain“linguistic frameworks” (as Carnap calls them) bringwith themnewterms andways of talking: accepting the language of “things” licenses making assertions like “The shirt is in the cupboard”;accepting mathematics allows one to say “There is a prime number greater than one hundred”; accepting the language of propositions permits saying “Chicago is large is a true proposition,” etc. Internal to the framework in question, confirming or disconfirming the truth of these propositions is a trivial matter. But traditionallyphilosophers have interested themselves inthe external question –the issue of the adequacy of the framework itself**:** “Do objects exist?”, “Does the world exist?”, “Are there numbers?”, “Are the propositions?”, etc. Carnap’s argument is that theexternalquestion**,** as it has been typically construed,does not make sense. From a perspective that accepts mathematics, the answer to the question “Do numbers exist?” is justtrivially“Yes.”From a perspective which has not accepted mathematics, Carnap thinks, the only sensible way of construing the question is not as a theoretical question, but as a practical one: “Shall I accept the framework of mathematics?”, and this pragmatic question is to be answered by consideration of the efficiency, the fruitfulness, the usefulness,etc., of the adoption. But the (traditional)philosopher’s questions – “But is mathematics true?”, “Are there really numbers?” – are pseudo-questions**.** By turning traditional philosophical questions into practical questions of the form “Shall I adopt...?”, Carnap is offering a noncognitive analysis of metaphysics. Since I am claiming that we can critically inspect morality from an external perspective – that we can ask whether there are any non-institutional reasons accompanying moral injunctions – and that such questioning would not amount to a “Shall we adopt...?” query, Carnap’s position represents a threat. What arguments does Carnap offer to his conclusion? He starts with the example of the “thing language,” which involves reference to objects that exist in time and space.Tostep out of the thing language andask “But does the world exist?” is a mistake, Carnap thinks, because the very notion of “existence” is a term which belongs to the thing language, and can be understood only within that framework, “hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself.” 16 Moving on to the external question “Do numbers exist?” Carnap cannot use the same argument – he cannot say that “existence” is internal to the number language and thus cannot be applied to the system as a whole. Instead he says that philosophers who ask the question do not mean material existence, but have no clear understanding of what other kind of existence might be involved, thus such questions have no cognitive content. It appears that this is the form of argument which he is willing to generalize to all further cases: persons who disputewhether propositions exist, whether properties exist**,** etc., do not know what they are arguing over, thus theyare not arguing over the truth of a proposition, but over the practical value of their respective positions**.** Carnap adds that this is so because there is nothing that both parties would possibly count as evidence that would sway the debate one way or the other.

#### Thus, the standard is to embrace economic creative difference.

#### There are infinite affective states – the aff is moral in one which is sufficient.

**Vaidman 2** [Vaidman, Lev, 3-24-2002, "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/]

**The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave.** (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) **The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance**. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a **quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions** of the Universe prior to the experiment: **only the probabilities are governed by the initial state**. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions**. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI.** We need not assume that Nature plays dice: science has stronger explanatory power. The MWI is a deterministic theory for a physical Universe and it explains why a world appears to be indeterministic for human observers.

#### Static rules fail since each agent formulates their own interpretation in moments of crisis – we must orient agency towards chaos to break free from indeterminate principles.

**Smith** – Nathan Jun and Daniel W. Smith. “Deleuze and Ethics.”

As I suggested earlier, traditional ethical **philosophy** suffers from **approach[es]**ing **ethics the wrong way** round. The maneuver seems to be as follows: **The ethicist begins with well-determined situations** that have already occurred **and** then **proceeds to search for** **a rule** that would allow him or her **to evaluate** **whether the action is right or wrong**. In ethical philosophy and theorization everything seems to proceed as if the action were already accomplished and then the action gets evaluated. However, this reversal becomes unconscious in the mind of the theorist, such that the rule allowing for the evaluation of the action is treated as preceding the event to be evaluated. Part of **the problem** here **lies in** the ethical theorist implicitly asking the wrong sort of question. And by **asking the wrong sort of question,** the ethical theorist situates himself in **the wrong ethical “phenomenology**.” **Rather than** rushing to **answer** the question of what ethics is, or **how we distinguish right from wrong, we** should rst **ask the strange question of when ethical problematics arise.** In this connection, Deleuze was right to denounce the question “what is x?” As Deleuze writes: Rationalism wanted to tie the fate of [problems] to abstract and dead essence; and to the extent that the problem form of [problems were] recog- nized, it even wanted that form tied to the question of essences – in other words, to the “What is X?”. How many misunderstandings are contained in this will! . . . Once it is a question of determining the problem or the Idea as such, once it is a question of setting the dialectic in motion, the ques- tion “What is X?” gives way to other questions, otherwise powerful and ef cacious, otherwise imperative: “How much, how and in what cases?” (Deleuze 1994: 188) The question of the “when” of ethical problematics would at least possess the virtue of suspending a number of our assumptions pertaining to what ethics is about, and setting us on the track of a more accurate ethical phenomenology. **The problem with** the **traditional ethic[s]al** philosophies I discussed earlier **is that they know everything in advance**. Here **it is simply a question of applying a rule or a scheme to a particular case.** Yet when we look at **actual ethical situations** such as the one depicted at the beginning of this chapter, we notice that they **are** above all **characterized by uncertainty.** Somehow, within the framework of traditional ethical theories it is this moment of uncertainty, of crisis, that utterly disappears and is erased. To be sure, traditional ethical theory attenuates the question of what is to be done, but almost always within the framework of clearly delineated possibilities and alternatives. What is missing is precisely this moment of the uncertain that gives the ethical, whether at the level of an individual life or in relations amongst elements or actors in a collective, its particular avor. If **the moment of the ethical is characterized by** anything – and note I’ve shifted from a substantialist language to a temporal language – it is characterized by precisely **that moment where an organized and stable situation has become** **unsettled** and it is no longer clear as to how that stability is to be maintained or whether a new organization entirely should emerge. If this approach to ethics is so egre- gious it is because it restricts the ethical to the moment of reduction and normalization, to subsumption under a category or rule, failing to rec- ognize the inventiveness and creativity that ethics embodies. Indeed, the invention and creation that lies at the heart of the ethical, constituting its very being. Phenomenologically, **the moment of the ethical is** precisely **the moment of crisis**. And it is this that recourse to arch/, foundations, or principles so thoroughly obscures, for it is exactly where principles fail that we encounter the problem of the ethical. **The question of the ethical is not the question of how crisis can be ameliorated by recourse to pre- existing principles** for the simple reason that **the ethical is encountered at just that moment where “principles” governing a composition no longer hold. Rather, the question of the ethical is that of how situations must be re-composed in response to this moment of crisis.** And in this respect, **the** fetishistic **obsession of traditional ethical theory with whether** or not **lying is moral or whether or not it is just to kill another** person com- pletely **trivializes the proper theme of ethics and confuses ethics with questions of customs organizing a flourishing collective**. Did anyone ever really doubt whether we should, by and large, keep our contracts, be honest, or not murder our fellows? It is astonishing that such trite issues could justify the destruction of so many trees. Let us return to the example of the HPV vaccine and try to imagine the situation not as we see it in retrospect or from a dis-involved per- spective oating up above, but rather from the perspective of the event as it unfolds. The rst thing we notice is that this situation is composed of all sorts of heterogeneous actors: young girls, parents, insurance cor- porations, pharmaceutical companies, schools, fundamentalist religious groups, governors, gods, religious texts, legislators, but also scientists, doctors, laboratories, viruses, cancers, genital warts, sexual activities, outcomes of research indicating that a statistically signi cant number of women will contract the HPV virus at some point of their lives, and vaccines. It will be objected that viruses, vaccines, diseases, and laboratories are not actors, but mere objects, functioning as nothing more than means. Objects, it will be said, display behavior but not action, and therefore fall outside the purview of ethics which is concerned with goal-directed intentional action alone. However, following Bruno Latour, it has become increasingly dif cult to discern how nonhuman objects are not themselves genuine actors. Thus, for example, nonhuman objects act in the laboratory all the time, betraying and surprising the intentions of the scientist with their responses, and completely modifying the coordinates of the situation.6 To argue that nonhuman actors should be excluded from ethical thought or treated as mere means to an end is to fall prey to a fallacy similar to that which Marx denounced under the title of “commodity fetishism.” Just as commodity fetishism prevents us from seeing the complex networks of labor involving workers, technologies, materials, etc., ethical fetishism prevents us from seeing the complex net- works of nonhuman actors that play such a signi cant role in perturbing collectives, bringing about the moment of the ethical. Moreover, given the manner in which humans always employ other objects and are employed by other objects in their actions, the idea of humans acting alone without the intermediary of other objects at work in their action is itself a ction (Latour 2005: 43–86). For Latour, an actor is just any entity that modi es “a state of affairs by making a dif- ference” (Latour 2005: 71). In and of itself this would not be enough to call the distinction between action (of humans) and behavior (of objects) into question, were there not an issue of who and what is acting in the case of humans. In this connection Latour gives the marvelous example of television and the remote control to illustrate his point. Would I have become a couch potato, switching endlessly from channel to channel, he asks, **if I did not have a remote?** (Latour 2005: 77). The point here **is not that the remote determines me to become a couch potato, but rather the far more disturbing consequence that we cannot remotely draw the distinction between actors** (humans) and mere behaviors (objects).7 “**Our” action is a network composed of** human and nonhuman **actors, rather than** two **ontologically heterogeneous domains composed of humans and action on one side, and objects functioning as mere means and possessing only behaviors on the other**. For this reason, I include nonhuman entities among the list of actors in collectives or situations. Ethical theory has suffered tremendously as a result of treating ethics exclusively as the domain of the human divorced from all relations to the nonhuman.8 Returning to the discussion of the HPV vaccine, prior to the research linking the HPV virus to cervical cancer, genital warts, and other cancers, and prior to the invention of the HPV vaccine, we had a more or less smoothly running collective. Parents sent their kids to school. These kids grew up and had sex. Some of them got cervical cancer or genital warts, others didn’t. No one had ever heard of HPV. Doctors treated these diseases. Sometimes insurance companies covered the treatments, sometimes they didn’t. Some lived, some died. If the question of the ethical came to befall this collective composed of parents, children, doctors, diseases, and so on, then this was the result of the surprising appearance of new objects or actors within the collective: the appearance of the HPV virus, its correlation to various cancers and sexually transmitted diseases, and the HPV vaccine. One might object that the HPV virus and its link to these diseases had been there all along. This would be true. The point however is that it hadn’t been registered or counted by the collective as a member of the collective. It is with the appearance of these new actors that the prior collective becomes beset with uncertainty, and enters a state of crisis. With the appearance of these new actors within the collective, relations among the existing members of the collective are transformed and the question emerges as to how these new actors are to be integrated. Here, then, the relation between women and their bodies is transformed, the question arises of whether or not the children should take the vaccine, relations between insurance companies and their clients are modi ed, government is faced with questions of whether or not it should mandate vaccination, funda- mentalist religious groups encounter the issue of whether these vaccines con ict with established religious norms, anti-vaccination groups face the question of whether or not there will be dire unintended side-effects to these vaccines, and so on. It is here that the work of ethics begins. And here the question of **the work of ethics concerns not the application of** **a** pre-existing **rule to an existing situation, but** rather **how a collective is to be assembled or com- posed in light of the appearance of these strange new actors**, these stran- gers, **or how a new collective is to be formed**. In this regard, **rather than thinking ethics on the model of judgment, it would be more accurate to think the ethical as a sort of construction or building. The question of ethics** then **becomes: “given this event, how is our collective** to be **built**?” Alternatively, it is the question of whether the new actor knocking at the door of the collective should be inducted into the collective at all. In this respect, it does not seem that wide of the mark to draw a connection between the Greek h•qoß from whence we derive the term “ethics,” and oi•koß which is the root of terms such as “ecology” or “economy.” h•qoß originally signi ed “accustomed place” (i.e., habitat), whereas oi•koß refers to home or dwelling. Whether or not an etymological connec- tion actually exists between these two terms, what is at stake here are questions of collective composition involving humans and nonhumans, such that the ethics is essentially a question of ethical ecology or the composition of collectives in response to events that buffet collectives.

#### Prefer obligatorily – ought entails that obligations are understood through the frame of affective relations.

**Cappelle** – “Should vs Ought to” 2010 Bert Cappelle is a lecturer of English linguistics at the University of Lille [https://www.academia.edu/1433058/Should\_vs\_ought\_to //](https://www.academia.edu/1433058/Should_vs_ought_to%20//)

Our corpus contained few instances in which the speaker expresses an ‘objective’ opinion (as in (1a) above)—and besides, whether an opinion counts as truly objective is always hard to verify—or in which the speaker just plainly states which requirements ‘objectively’ have to be fulfilled for some other situation (as in (1b) above). At any rate, we did not find corroboration that ought to occurs more frequently than should in such cases. However, if oughttowerereally more objective than should, then it should be avoided in contexts containing hedges like I thinkor If you ask me**,** but sentences like th[is] following do occur, seem[s] perfectly natural and have been shown in this study to be indeed more frequent than similar sentences with should (cf. the seventh result stated in section 4)**.** (20) a. If you ask me, though, it ought to be twice that size**.** (www.deadline.com/hollywood/mr-rogers-gone-but-notforgotten/) b. “I think this woman ought to be replaced immediately by myself,” he said. (Cobuild corpus, The Times newspaper) c. …what’s been er been going through my head recently is, is er the, looking at the pattern of the meetings and the way the meetings are arranged and, and how, erm, at the last meeting we had a speaker er and that I think, we all found that quite interesting and the one, one from Central America that things and I feel we ought to have that much more frequently than we do have er, a, either a speaker or a focus of some sort of meetings erm, so I think that’s something I’d like to raise and get the A G M at the next meeting I think [a] similar thing we ought to consider there… (BNC, spoken discourse) Moreover, our study also reveals that ought to (vs. should) is chosen twice as likely with first and second person subjects, which refer to the author and his addressee, as with third person subjects (cf. our eighth result). This suggests thatought to ismore (inter)subjectivethan should**.**

#### Now affirm – The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to eliminate intellectual property protections for medicines. Resolved is defined as[[1]](#footnote-1) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined. Affirm means to express agreement[[2]](#footnote-2) and you already know I do. I’ll clarify specification in CX to avoid frivolous debates.

#### Medical intellectual property protections proliferate the Empire’s parasitic control of subjects by restricting affective communication, making revolution impossible.

**Lemmens –** Lemmens, P. (n.d.). The conditions of the Common. A Stieglerian critique ON Hardt AND Negri's thesis on Cognitive capitalism as a prefiguration of communism. The\_Conditions\_of\_the\_Common\_A\_Stieglerian\_Critique\_on\_Hardt\_and\_Negri\_s\_Thesis\_on\_Cognitive\_Capitalism\_as\_a\_Prefiguration\_of\_Communism

Immaterial labour is becoming increasingly free and autonomous and capital ever more dependent and parasitic, forced to block the movements of knowledge, communication and cooperation (e.g. through intellectual property rights) in order to survive **(Hardt & Negri, 2009: 142). Whereas the multitude ‘is the real productive force of our social world’, therefore, ‘Empire is a mere apparatus of capture that lives off the vitality of the multitude** – as Marx would say, a vampire regime of accumulated dead labor that survives only by sucking off the blood of the living’; it is nothing but ‘an empty machine, a spectacular machine, a parasitical machine’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 62). **Capital thereby loses its historically progressive force and can continue to exist only through direct expropriation of externally produced value** – that is, through expropriation of the common (Negri, 2008d: 64–7). Immaterial production is structurally ‘incompatible’ with the logic of capital and therefore cognitive capitalism will ultimately destroy itself through its inherent contradictions. Capitalism’s traditional **mechanisms of exploitation and control, both the intensive and extensive, increasingly contradict and fetter the productivity of biopolitical labour and frustrate the creation of value.** Biopolitical labour in all its forms – cognitive, intellectual, affective, etc. – cannot be contained by the forms of discipline and command that were developed during the era of Fordism. Therefore, the **integration of labour within the ruling structures of capital becomes increasingly difficult** (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 264, 291). Capital’s **strategies of privatisation and control destroy the common that is at the base of biopolitical production**, so biopolitical productivity is hampered every time the common is destroyed. A good example is the impediment of innovation Perspectives on Commoning 1st proof.indd 178 04/05/2017 16:16 The conditions of the common 179 in agriculture and biotechnology and the **blocking of creativity in cultural production due to excessive intellectual property regimes** in the form of patents and copyrights (see Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002; Lessig, 2004; Aigrain, 2005; Jefferson, 2006; Boyle, 2008; Hope, 2008; Kloppenburg, 2010). The **disciplinary strategies of precarisation of work and flexibilisation of the labour market are also counterproductive, depriving cognitive and affective workers of precisely the time and freedom on which the creativity** and productivity of cognitive and affective labour depends (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 145–7). All attempts of capital to intervene in the production process and to appropriate the common frustrate that which it tries to capture: the productivity of the common. And the more the capitalist economy becomes a knowledge economy, the more it embarks on the path of value creation through knowledge production, the more that knowledge escapes its control and the more it produces and nourishes that which ultimately undermines its own existence: the common. Of course, as Hardt and Negri admit, ever since Marx uncovered the logic of capital, the critique of political economy has pointed to the contradiction within capitalism of the social nature of production and the private nature of accumulation. However, in the context of today’s cognitive capitalism, this contradiction is becoming ever more extreme and consequently ever more destructive for the capitalist endeavour, reaching a point of rupture: ‘This is how capital creates its own gravediggers: pursuing its own interests and trying to preserve its own survival, it must foster the increasing power and autonomy of the productive multitude’, Hardt and Negri (2009: 311) contend. ‘And when that accumulation of power crosses a certain threshold, the Perspectives on Commoning 1st proof.indd 179 04/05/2017 16:16 180 PERSPECTIVES ON COMMONING multitude will emerge with the ability to rule common wealth.’ Indeed, capital today is ‘facing increasingly autonomous, antagonistic, and unmanageable forms of social labor-power’ which embody an inherent potential for autonomy and have the capacity to ‘destroy capital and create something entirely new’ (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 136, 288, 311).

### 1AC – Paradigm

#### 1] Yes 1AR theory – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer – the 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time – eval after the 1AR – only way to check back for 7 minute NC dump. No new 2NR weighing or theory – they can up-layer the short 3 minute 2AR with infinite no-risk paradigm issues for 6 minutes.

#### 2] Presumption and Permissibility Affirm – [A] We assume statements true until proven false. You’d believe me if I told you that my name was Agastya unless you already had a reason to believe otherwise. The neg may not read meta-theory – I only have time to check abuse 1 time but you can do it in the NC and 2N, up-layering my attempt means we never get to the best norm. This means reject any reason why an aff spike is bad since they claim aff theory is unfair. And, drop them for contesting spikes – skews 1ar time allocation cause I invested time in reading them. [B] Affirming is harder – the short 1AR is always at a disadvantage to the 7 minute NC dump – means that if the round’s equal I did the better debating.

#### 3] No 2NR “I meet” arguments – A] Skews theory ground because they’re each a NIB for me to winning theory which kills my ability to check abuse. B] Skews time, they can make three minutes of blippy I meets that I can’t cover because the 2AR is too short. No neg arguments – skews me to answer those. Answering this triggers a contradiction since it relies on an analytic argument and those affirm since I spoke first and they were your fault for creating. Also no new 2n arguments, weighing, and paradigm issues. a) overloads the 2AR with a massive clarification burden b) it becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2NR – c) neg has access to bidirectional shells which makes neg shells impossible to meet and impact turns your reading of the shells since I’ll always lose on an interpretation.

#### 4] The neg may not read nibs or OCIs a) you can up-layer for 7 minutes that I have to answer before I even have access to offense b) inf neg abuse since you would just read 7 mins of auto-negate arguments c) The neg may not read overview answers to aff arguments – they can up-layer all aff arguments for 7 minutes and the 1ar has to shift through it all. I have a computer virus that prevents changing font size and everything’s in an overview. d) OCIs are just shorter theory args they can blow up. No neg analytics - I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win. No Ks on spikes – moot all the time I spent reading it. This means they must only line by line aff arguments, since otherwise they function as nibs before I access warrants.

#### 5] Can’t contest both the fwk and ROB a) forces me to win my fwk is relevant, then win the fwk, then win offense which is a 3-1 skew b) All neg interps are counter interps since the aff takes an implicit stance on every issue which means you need an RVI to become offensive. C) You should accept all aff interps and assume I meet neg theory since the aff speaks in the dark and I have to take a stance on something, you can at least react and adapt.

#### reject all answers to this theory argument – you solve all objections by picking a specific ROB and being the only one that links offense.

#### 6] Reject neg fairness concerns since a) 13-7 time skew and 6-minute collapse gives the negative the strategic advantage and means the AFF must split 1AR time. b) The NC has the ability to uplayer and restart the round and have time to generate offense that matters. c) The AFF will defend NEG preferences on specificity insofar as it doesn't require me to abandon my maxim. Subsequently, you must propose all interps about my advocacy to guarantee better substantive debates. This also means that you should reevaluate the AC under the interpretation. If there is a problem with the paradigmatic issues set, it would justify dropping them rather than the AFF in its entirety since they are logically a prerequisite to the round. d) You have access to more positions due to generic backfiles and bidirectional shells which means neg theory is impossible to avoid. Also, fairness definitionally questions ability to engage in same practice, any abuse is solved for when you affirm next round which is terminal defense to neg shells – only affirming solves because you can construct the aff the way you like while neg is always reactive which means you can’t do anything every round d) neg reactivity means you can just perfectly react to any of my advantages and then generate offense – if anything it’ll be for 3 mins max which evens out the 1ar and 2n and and no neg analytics.

1. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm [↑](#footnote-ref-2)