# SO21 Deleuze AC

## 1AC

### Shell

#### Interpretation: All debaters must have contact info on the NSDA 21-22 wiki.

#### Violation: You don’t even have a wiki – screenshots below:

#### Drop them on 1AC theory – skews put me at an unrecoverable disadvantage from the outset. Use competing interps on 1AC theory – the negative has 7 minutes to answer the shell. No RVIs – you’d read a counter-interp for 7 minutes of the NC and the debate would end right there.

### AC – You’re Going De-Leuze

#### We are dynamic – overtime, affective encounters with our surroundings through time shape subjectivity, yet representational thought ascribes to them a limited essence – our model resists the imposition of sameness onto a chaotic world.

Deleuze – Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repitition. Translated by Paul Patton. 1968

Temporally speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito. It is as though **Descartes's Cogito** **operated** **with** two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. **The** **determination (I think) implies an undetermined** **existence** (**I am,** because 'in order to think one must exist') - **and** **determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject**: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. **The** entire **Kantian** **critique [is]** amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. **The determination ('I think')** obviously **implies** something undetermined **('I am'), but** **nothing so far tells us how it is that** **this undetermined is determinable** **by the 'I think'**: 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'8 **Kant** therefore **adds** a third logical value: **the determinable**, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the deter­ mination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but **in the form of a transcendental** **difference** between the Determination as such and what it determines; **no[t] longer in the form of an external difference which separates**, **but in the form of an** **internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation** between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ...9 The consequences of this are extreme: **my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a** **phenomenon**, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, **the spontaneity of which I am** **conscious in the 'I think' cannot** **be understood as the** **attribute of a substantial** and spontaneous **being**, **but only as the affection** **of a passive self** **which experiences its own thought** - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. **The activity of thought applies** to a receptive being, **to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it**, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. **To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the** **self** - **that is, the passive position** (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, **namely** **time**. Nor is 'add' entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the **I were fractured** from one end to the other: fractured **by** the pure and empty form of **time**. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. **Time signifies a** fault or a **fracture in the I and a passivity in the self**, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. **Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant** and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the 'I' for the point of view of 'God' = than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an identity that it owes precisely tt. If the greatest tmttattve of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis. On the contrary, we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive (contemplation ontraction). · The possibility of receiving sensations or impressions follows from this. It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation: here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. The Kantian initiative can be taken up, and the form of time can support both the death of God and the fractured I, but in the course of a quite different understanding of the passive self. In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant - rather, it is Holderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self.10 Holderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though these were complementary figures of the same death instinct. Is it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus?

#### Our instability necessitates power structures of rhizomatic becoming that embrace difference. Dominant economic models repress creative desires and over-code social life – fields that are not intelligible within straited space are excluded as deviant.

**Rowe 13** – Rowe, J. E. (2013). Understanding economic development as a Deleuzian “plateau.” Local Economy, 28(1), 99–113. doi:10.1177/0269094212465580, Agastya

Understanding economic development as a Deleuzian ‘plateau’ Crafting an economic development strategy from a Deleuzian poststructuralist perspective can be likened to a series of plateaus. In geology or physical geography a plateau refers to relatively flat elevated regions with often nearly horizontal underlying layers of rock strata. When discussing ‘plateaus’, Colebrook (2002: 58) stated that: of layers: genetic, chemical, geological and cultural events all produce different strata or plateaus of life ... The idea of **a ... [framework for understanding economic development] suggests that there is a distribution, a drawing of lines, a plane of differences, a number of planes or plateaus which constitute ...[practice], and that this number of plateaus cannot be located within the unity of a subject**. In this article, ‘plateaus’ are metaphorically conceptualized as levels of understanding of basic economic development concepts such as competitive advantage (Rowe, 2009). The elevation of the various ‘plateaus’ becomes increasingly higher and more complex as new goals and key concepts are folded into the mix.1 The various levels of understanding are conceptualized as rhizomatic structures of paths and connective links (Morss, 2000: 195).2 The paths or links could be disturbed, interrupted or lost, but there is always an alternative path to follow that continues the flow by connecting ideas and thoughts. The implications from the upwards sophistication of concepts will be examined through a Deleuzian lens.3 This researcher also interprets such concepts as tools for thinking outside the square. This research seeks to illustrate the potential value for alternative ways of thinking about and conceptualizing key local economic development fundamentals through the use of the Deleuzian metaphor ‘plateau’ in a New Zealand context. **Deleuzian concepts offers a ‘new way of thinking about economic development by providing insights into the complexity and chaos of capitalism while affording alternative ways of thinking about economic development policies** or strategies’ (Rowe, 2012: 76). Such a framework is potentially useful because Deleuzian concepts ‘clearly refer to spatial relationships’ (Gough, 2005: 2) between real world economic activities and can be seen as ways of visualising them. The second section of this article will further develop the theoretical framework. New Zealand’s geographic location will be delineated and the effects of globalization on the nation’s economy will be investigated from a practitioner’s perspective. The following sections will begin by conceptualizing the nation’s competitive advantage and regional fundamentals as ‘plateaus’ of knowledge. Other key economic development tools, such as clustering, SME support systems and small business incubators, will also be folded into the mix of fundamental concepts. Theoretical framework The landscape can be visualized as a series of ‘plateaus’ or plateaux as originally conceptualized by Bateson (1973) in the early 1970s (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21–22, 158; Massumi, 1992: 7). The concept has been subsequently refined by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) in their seminal publication A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari developed the concept as a way of describing the **distinction between arborescent and rhizomatic thinking**. The philosophers called a ‘plateau’ ‘any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 22). Jacobs (2007: 268) described the metaphor ‘rhizome’ as follows: The multifarious activities that constitute [economic development] can be seen ... as links between those ensembles of activity or patchworks ... through what **Deleuze and Guattari term the ‘rhizome’, a metaphor that they use to ‘maps’ the connections between agents, material objects and the local**. A ‘plateau’ can also be formulated as a descriptor in order to enhance the understanding of the New Zealand context. The context needs to be understood as an essential component of a conceptual framework for visualizing how different stakeholders (Central Government policy makers, local politicians, the forces of globalization, etc.) at different scales converge across the ebbs and flows of daily practice. According to Brian Massumi (1992: 7): intensity that is not automatically dissipated in a climax leading to a state of rest. The heightening of energies is sustained long enough to leave a kind of **afterimage of its dynamism that can be reactivated or injected into other activities**, creating a fabric of intensive states between which may number of connecting routes could exist. This is important because an economic development practitioner needs to be able to ‘identify, analyse and intervene in the **complex mixture of forces at work in a globalised economy’** (Hillier, 2005: 279). In order to intervene, practitioners have to deal with the virtual and actual because they both constitute reality. Actuality is unfolded from potentiality and the ‘diverse actualisations of the virtual... [can be] understood as solutions’ (Boundas, 2005: 297) or events. ‘Virtual implies future potential or becoming’ 4 (Hillier, 2008: 45) and in this first domain, the virtual, essences are replaced with multiplicities. Deleuze (1988: 55) further elaborated by stating that: We have ... confused Being with beingpresent. Nevertheless, the present is not; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not; but it acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to act or be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: it is identical with being in itself. Deleuze developed his conceptualization of virtual by drawing upon the Bergsonian dure´e and e´lan vital. Both Deleuze and Bergson agree that dure´e is an ‘immanently differentiated dynamic process of the real whose nature is always to actuali[s]e itself in novel differentiations’ (Boundas, 2005: 298). ‘From any actual or unfolded term it should be possible (and, for Deleuze, desirable) to intuit the richer potentiality from which it has emerged’ (Colebrook, 2005: 10). This is applicable to this research because ‘difference is something possible for an already actualised entity’ (Colebrook, 2005: 9). This can be related to the striated hierarchical bureaucratic structure that a practitioner has to deal with when seeking funding for a new initiative. For example, key concepts such as smooth and striated space clearly illustrate the connection between Deleuzian philosophy and the practice of local economic development. According to Patton (2000: 111–112) smooth space indicates ‘the **heterogeneous space of qualitative multiplicity**, while striated space is the homogeneous space of quantitative multiplicity’. Smooth space can also be considered **‘rhizomatic space**... in which local regions are juxtaposed without reference to an overarching’ (Patton, 2000: 112) economic development strategy. In the above quotations, Patton was referring to the inherent tension between smooth and striated space. An economic development strategy is usually designed as a striated structure with specific actions plans to address each goal. Paradoxically, a key objective of most economic development strategies is to create the smooth space of an entrepreneurial culture. It should be noted that Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 474) understood that these opposing spaces are intertwined by stating that: ‘smooth space is constantly being **translated, transversed into striated space**; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to smooth space’. Following this same line of thought, a practitioner can strive towards immanence by implementing new initiatives which challenges the striating forces which seek to deand reterritorialize space and by regulating its chaotic multiplicities through striation (Osborne and Rose, 1999: 738).5 As a result, immanence is difficult to achieve because policies and strategic documents create points on which to tie striations. Similarly, ‘Deleuzoguattarian knots of arborescence where matted elements of smooth space are woven into the... [fabric] of striated space’ (Hillier 2007: 139). These ‘becomings of entangled complex assemblages’ (Bonta, 2005: 110) invent new lines of flight 6 and **innovative solutions** to approach local problems as ‘**they escape from old constraints’ and ‘convert desire into economic opportunities’** (Hillier, 2007: 139). Crafting an economic development strategy is a becoming because it promotes new trajectories, ideas and innovative solutions (Massumi, 1992: 101). Consequently, one could strive toward immanence by channelling smooth space into the mix of striations to create a becoming: a becoming-developed. The practice of economic development can also be regarded as a performance of folding (there is no predetermined style of folding, un-or-refolding). Practitioners may choose (if they wish) to participate in a Deleuzian voyage of discovery by ‘play[ing] along the folds and... become swept up by the variable consistency of a certain context’ (Doel, 2000: 131) **which opens up potentialities of becoming** (Semetsky, 2011). The issue is not one of relation, but of ‘fold-in’ or of ‘fold according to fold’. Folds are in this sense everywhere without the fold being a universal (Deleuze, 1993: 135). It’s a ‘differentiation’, a ‘differential’ (Deleuze, 1995: 156) and the ‘unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold’ (Deleuze, 1992: 6). The term ‘fold’ has also been borrowed from geology. It can be defined as a bend, flexure, or wrinkle in rock produced when the rock was in a plastic state (Leet et al., 1978: 468). It is in this sense that a fold, as the minimal element, is a transformer because one is always amongst countless others who perpetually pull it out of shape (Doel, 2001: 564). This means that understanding can be enhanced by visualizing key concepts such as competitive advantage and the forces of globalization being folded into the complex mix that constitutes the practice of economic development. Visualizing concepts such as competitive advantage and the forces of globalization as ‘plateaus’ can be enabling and emergent via differential relations of folding. As Deleuze (1992: 93) concludes: ‘I am forever unfolding between two folds and if to perceive means to unfold, than I am forever perceiving within the folds’. Practitioners with new insights are better prepared to navigate through the muddled transdisciplinary field of local economic development.

#### Thus, the roll of the ballot is to embrace economic creative difference. Our orientation is key to pedagogy – we need to tip the scales towards a minoritarian repositioning to mobilize moments of relationality and challenge dominant epistemologies.

Carlin and Wallin – Carlin, Matthew. Wallin, Jason. “Deleuze & Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbury. 2014. Pg. 119-121

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘**the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’** (p. 6). Where **education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its** modes of production have taken as their teleological **goal** the **production of a ‘majoritarian people’**, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where **education aspires to invest desire in the** production of a ‘**majoritarian’** or ‘molar’ **public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed**, not only through the paucity of enunciatory **forms and images available for thinking education** in the first place, but further, **through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection**, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, **the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the** singular, the ‘**majoritarian’** **and standardizing** **impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production** **the reification of common sense**, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). **Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’,** common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, **where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited** and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: **common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression**. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, **while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking** – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

#### The politics of stable subjectivity coopts all attempts at resistance – it stabilizes complex features into unchanging models which dooms all radical praxis to failure.

**Rolli** – Rolli, Marc. “Immanence and Transcendence” Bulletin de la Sociite Amincaine de Philosophie de Langue Franfais Volume 14, Number 2, Fall 2004

We now arrive at the last point. I have emphasized how immanence can be considered as a profane source of experience that makes sense only in the context of temporal subjectification processes. It does not therefore suffice to posit a pure sensuality or a pure thinking of immanence. **Our self and worldly relations are always determined by relations of power**. But **only** **on** the basis of a scheme of **immanent thinking is it possible** **to** really begin to **see these determining factors**.28 **Otherwise** an **empricial state of affairs-an empirical normality-is hypostatized as a transcendental norm**, **in such a way that its** **genetic background** and conditions **can be** considered mere byproducts **and ignored**. Thus, **as long as** it is considered a foregone conclusion that **a normal human [is]** being has **white** skin, is of the **male** gender, **middle aged**, belongs to a (particular) religion, and so on, then **there is no need** **to ask about the disciplining**, sociological, political, and economical processes in recent or **past** **history[s] that have given rise to that person**. From the perspective of immanence, **what can be located within power relations**-in the sense of the conditions of actualization of immanent structures-thus **seems** naturally **legitimate**. Deleuze's philosophy o f immanence is therefore both political as weil as "absolute." Immanent perceptions, sensations, and concepts are just as much immediately determined by social conditions as are the micrological regions of the political as immanent processes of being. Against established power structures that benefit the rich to the detriment of the many, a kind of thinking emerges that relies on immanence and is thereby qualified to inquire into the implicit strategies that motivate all representative forms of life production and empowerment. **Such [immanent] a thinking does not solely** **aim at unveiling the orders of life** that are otherwise presumed to be natural, **but is** **directed towards a model of free associations** and free action. Deleuze's temporal ontology of **imn1anence** thus **reveal[ing]**s itself as excluding dejure **concentrations of power** **and** thereby **making them** **comprehensible** as facts with **regard to** **their causal conditions**. **It is** therefore **impossible** **to** tacitly **insert transcendence into** **the corresponding level of immanence**, **where its power can be played** **out**. It is impossible because the **structural characteristic of** **immanence is a constant transport of difference**, **so** that the **syntheses** **of** differential **singularities always refer to a particular actuality** of immanent structures-and according to Deleuze, it is only on this level that densities and consolidations of power relations are situated. By contrast, the postulates of **transcendence**, by relying on natural orders and homologies, **conceal the power**- drenched determination **of** forms of **thinking and action**. Although in his early lectures on Kant, Heidegger drew on the dimension of time to expand critical philosophy-and in this regard he was a source of inspiration for Deleuze-his orientation towards the origin of imagination as a medium between understanding and contemplation testifies to a certain natural accordance which in fact renders superfluous any profound analysis of conditioning power relations. Central to Heidegger's discourse is an act of transcendence which assigns the level oE temporal immanence to a self-identical Dasein which overcomes itself. The same problem can be identified in the context of the critique of onto-theology. Here the difficulty has to do with the presumed philosophical "unity" ofbeing and thinking which, according to Heidegger, pre-exists any active or spontaneous activity of thinking and is but the task of thinking to heed.29 In this regard Deleuze can be seen to playoff Nietzsche against Heidegger. For while Nietzsche, with the "will to power," presents a concept of immanence that leaves modern nihilism behind because it radically questions the value of value, Heidegger, in his criticism of Nietzsche, relies on the "proper" (eigentliche) value of a dedicated "experience of being" (5 which backs away from the escalating nihilism of the times. Insofar as Heidegger, faced with the decay of modernity, holds on to a thinking of transcendence, his diagnosis of the present thus remains stuck in resentment. For instead of taking fate (Geschick) into our own hands, we are to let fate follow its course and obey the order that comes from the highest ruler: Being itself.

#### Now affirm – The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to eliminate intellectual property protections for medicines. I’ll clarify specification in CX to avoid frivolous debates.

#### Medical intellectual property protections proliferate the Empire’s parasitic control of subjects by restricting affective communication, making revolution impossible.

**Lemmens –** Lemmens, P. (n.d.). The conditions of the Common. A Stieglerian critique ON Hardt AND Negri's thesis on Cognitive capitalism as a prefiguration of communism. The\_Conditions\_of\_the\_Common\_A\_Stieglerian\_Critique\_on\_Hardt\_and\_Negri\_s\_Thesis\_on\_Cognitive\_Capitalism\_as\_a\_Prefiguration\_of\_Communism

Immaterial labour is becoming increasingly free and autonomous and capital ever more dependent and parasitic, forced to block the movements of knowledge, communication and cooperation (e.g. through intellectual property rights) in order to survive **(Hardt & Negri, 2009: 142). Whereas the multitude ‘is the real productive force of our social world’, therefore, ‘Empire is a mere apparatus of capture that lives off the vitality of the multitude** – as Marx would say, a vampire regime of accumulated dead labor that survives only by sucking off the blood of the living’; it is nothing but ‘an empty machine, a spectacular machine, a parasitical machine’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 62). **Capital thereby loses its historically progressive force and can continue to exist only through direct expropriation of externally produced value** – that is, through expropriation of the common (Negri, 2008d: 64–7). Immaterial production is structurally ‘incompatible’ with the logic of capital and therefore cognitive capitalism will ultimately destroy itself through its inherent contradictions. Capitalism’s traditional **mechanisms of exploitation and control, both the intensive and extensive, increasingly contradict and fetter the productivity of biopolitical labour and frustrate the creation of value.** Biopolitical labour in all its forms – cognitive, intellectual, affective, etc. – cannot be contained by the forms of discipline and command that were developed during the era of Fordism. Therefore, the **integration of labour within the ruling structures of capital becomes increasingly difficult** (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 264, 291). Capital’s **strategies of privatisation and control destroy the common that is at the base of biopolitical production**, so biopolitical productivity is hampered every time the common is destroyed. A good example is the impediment of innovation Perspectives on Commoning 1st proof.indd 178 04/05/2017 16:16 The conditions of the common 179 in agriculture and biotechnology and the **blocking of creativity in cultural production due to excessive intellectual property regimes** in the form of patents and copyrights (see Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002; Lessig, 2004; Aigrain, 2005; Jefferson, 2006; Boyle, 2008; Hope, 2008; Kloppenburg, 2010). The **disciplinary strategies of precarisation of work and flexibilisation of the labour market are also counterproductive, depriving cognitive and affective workers of precisely the time and freedom on which the creativity** and productivity of cognitive and affective labour depends (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 145–7). All attempts of capital to intervene in the production process and to appropriate the common frustrate that which it tries to capture: the productivity of the common. And the more the capitalist economy becomes a knowledge economy, the more it embarks on the path of value creation through knowledge production, the more that knowledge escapes its control and the more it produces and nourishes that which ultimately undermines its own existence: the common. Of course, as Hardt and Negri admit, ever since Marx uncovered the logic of capital, the critique of political economy has pointed to the contradiction within capitalism of the social nature of production and the private nature of accumulation. However, in the context of today’s cognitive capitalism, this contradiction is becoming ever more extreme and consequently ever more destructive for the capitalist endeavour, reaching a point of rupture: ‘This is how capital creates its own gravediggers: pursuing its own interests and trying to preserve its own survival, it must foster the increasing power and autonomy of the productive multitude’, Hardt and Negri (2009: 311) contend. ‘And when that accumulation of power crosses a certain threshold, the Perspectives on Commoning 1st proof.indd 179 04/05/2017 16:16 180 PERSPECTIVES ON COMMONING multitude will emerge with the ability to rule common wealth.’ Indeed, capital today is ‘facing increasingly autonomous, antagonistic, and unmanageable forms of social labor-power’ which embody an inherent potential for autonomy and have the capacity to ‘destroy capital and create something entirely new’ (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 136, 288, 311).

#### Restrictions of fluidity idealize life to warrant a cleansing of difference which is the root cause of material violence and collapses to fascism.

Evans 10– Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424

**Imposing liberalism has** often **come at a price**. That price has tended to be a **continuous recourse to war.** While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. **Liberalism** today, they argue, **is underwritten by the** unreserved **righteousness of its mission**. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘Liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/**elimination of** all forms of **political difference** in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, **The more peace is commanded, the more war is declared** in order **To achieve it**: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . **liberals are** nonetheless **committed** also **to making war.**’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). **Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war.** However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), **These wars no longer benefit from the possibility of** scoring outright **victory**, retreating, **or** achieving a lasting negotiated **peace** by means of political compromise**.** Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . **The project** of removing war from the life of the species **becomes** a lethaland, in principle, continuous and **unending** process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars**,** which is **fought on and between the modalities of life itself.** . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how **Liberalism gains its mastery by posing** fundamental **questions of life and death –** that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by **a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative** (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be **for the unification of the species.** This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. **With enmity** instead **depending upon the** complex, adaptive, dynamic **account of life** itself**, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those** newly **appointed enemies of humanity** – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival**.** Vital in other words to all human existence, **Doing what is necessary** out of global species necessity **requires a new moral assay of life that**, pitting the universal against the particular, **willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference**, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters**.** Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). **Racism** thus **appears here** to be a **thoroughly modern** phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002)**.** This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of **The threat** that **is now** from **the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within –** that **societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous** and nobody can be exempt, **for political modernity to function** one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘Killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255)**.** While killing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, **when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of The most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’**, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171)**.** The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

**Reject focus on utility and death – it creates a survival-at-all-costs mindset in the form of racism, xenophobia, and sexism that makes debate unsafe.**

**Winnubst** – Shannon Winnubst, professor of Women’s and gender studies at Ohio State University, Queering Freedom, pg. 183

For Bataille, the **servility to utility** is **displayed** particularly in **the temporality** of such a world—**the temporality of anticipation**. Returning again to the role of the tool, he writes, In efficacious activity man becomes **the equivalent of a tool**, which produces; he is like the thing **the tool is**, being itself a product. The implication of these facts is quite clear: the tool’s meaning is given by the future, in what the tool will produce, in the future utilization of the product: like the tool, he who serves—who works—has the value of that which will be later, not of that which is. (1988–91, 2:218) The **reduction of our lives to the order of utility** forces us to **project ourselves endlessly** into the **future**. Bataille writes of this as our anguished state, caused by this anticipation “that must be called **anticipation of oneself**. For he must apprehend himself in the future, through the anticipated results of his action” (1988–91, 2:218). This is why **advanced capitalism** and **phallicized whiteness** must **ground themselves in a denial of death**: death **precludes** the **arrival of this future**. It **cuts us off from ourselves**, **severing us** from the **future self** that is always our real and true self. Resisting the existential turn, however, Bataille refuses to read this denial of death as an ontological condition of humanity. For Bataille, this is a **historical** and **economic denial**, one in which only a culture **grounded in the anticipation** of the **future** must **participate**. He frames it primarily as **a problem of the intellect**. In the reduction of the world to the order of utility, we have **reduced our lives** and **experiences** to **the order of instrumental reason**. This order necessarily operates in a sequential temporality, facing forward toward the time when the results will be achieved, the questions solved, the theorems proved—and also when political domination will be ended and ethical an- guish quieted. As Bataille credits Hegel for seeing, “knowledge is never given to us except by unfolding in time” (1988–91, 2:202). It never appears to us except, finally, “as the result of a calculated effort, an operation useful to some end” (1988–91, 2:202)—and its utility, as we have seen, only drives it forward toward some future utility, endlessly. There are always **new and future objects** of thought to conquer and domesticate. Within this order of reason, death presents the cessation of the very practice of knowledge itself. **Severing us** from the **future objects of thought** and **from our future selves**, “death **prevents man** from attaining himself” (1988–91, 2:218). As Bataille explains, “the fear of death appears linked from the start to the projection of oneself into a future time, which [is] an effect of the positing of oneself as a thing” (1988–91, 2:218). The **fear of death derives from the subordination** to the **order** of **utility** and its dominant form of the intellect, **instrumental reason.** While death is unarguably a part of the human condition, for Bataille the **fear of death** is a **historically habituated response**, one **that grounds cultures of advanced capitalism** and **phallicized whiteness**. In those frames of late modernity, death introduces **an ontological scarcity** into **the very human condition**: it **represents finitude**, the **ultimate limit**. We must **distance ourselves from such threats**, and we do so most often by **projecting** them **onto sexualized, racialized**, and **classed bodies**. But for Bataille, **servility** to the **order of knowledge** is as **unnecessary** as **servility to the order of utility**. To **die humanly**, he argues, is to accept “**the subordination of the thing**” (1988– 91, 2:219), which places us in the schema that separates our present self from the future, desired, anticipated self: “to die humanly is to have of the future being, of the one who matters most in our eyes, the senseless idea that he is not” (1988–91, 2:219). But if we are not trapped in the endless anticipation of our future self as the index of meaning in our lives, we may not be anguished by this cessation: “If we live sovereignly, the **representation of death is impossible**, for the **present is not subject** to the **demands of the future**” (1988–91, 2:219). **To live sovereignly** is **not to escape death**, which is ontologically **impossible**. But it is to **refuse the fear**, and **subsequent attempts at disavowal**, of death as the **ontological condition** that **defines humanity**. Rather than trying to transgress this ultimate limit and prohibition, the sovereign [person] man “**cannot die fleeing**. He [it] **cannot let the threat** of **death** deliver him over to **the horror of a desperate yet impossible flight**” (1988–91, 2:219). Living in a temporal mode in which “anticipation would **dissolve into NOTHING**” (1988–91, 2: 208), the sovereign man **[person] “lives and dies like an animal”** (1988–91, 2:219). He lives and dies without the anxiety invoked by the forever unknown and forever encroaching anticipation of the future. As Bataille encourages us elsewhere, “Think of **the voracity** of **animals**, as **against the composure of a cook**” (1988–91, 2:83).

#### Utilitarianism fails – multiple warrants.

**Cleveland** [Cleveland, Paul A. “The Failure of Utilitarian Ethics in Political Economy.” Independent Institute. <https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602>. Published 1 September 2002]

The Problem of Making Interpersonal Comparisons Among the many difficulties encountered in Bentham?s approach, the first is that **it is impossible to make interpersonal comparisons**. It is a well-known fact that different **people have different tastes**. In addition, there are differences in personalities and talents that different people possess **and these differences give rise to differences in** their **goals** and ambitions. All these variations in turn give rise to a fundamental fact of human existence. Namely, that **it is impossible** for us **to** know or **measure the extent of either pleasure or pain for any specific person** in any particular situation. Such measures are beyond the capacity of our ability to know. **While human beings can** most certainly **empathize** with someone who is experiencing extreme hardship or enjoying great success, such **efforts are only accomplished by projecting one’s own inward feelings to someone else’s** circumstance. One person simply cannot accurately know the depth of another person’s pain nor the height of his joy. While Bentham at least recognized this problem, it did not discourage him from his ultimate pursuit. Instead, he continued to promote his new ethical philosophy and argued that it was the only way that we could go. Therefore, he pressed for a way to measure happiness. While he was never able to arrive at such a measure, he remained confident that one would soon be developed and even used the term utils as the units in which it would be measured. Economists have long since given up on the search for a cardinal measure of utility. Strangely enough however, welfare economists continue to act as if we can actually accomplish the impossible task by attempting to measure deadweight losses within the context of modern price theory. It is the rise in the prominence of welfare analysis that has given **utilitarianism** a standing in modern policy debates. However, such efforts **cannot escape the reality that** such **measures cannot be made**. With no adequate way to measure utility in order to make the necessary interpersonal comparisons, all such policy arguments are reduced to contests where each side claims that the rewards to be received by them would greatly outweigh whatever pain might be incurred by those who are forced to bear the costs. B. An Inadequate Conception of Human Nature Another problem with **utilitarianism** is that it **has a very narrow conception of what it means to be a human being**. Within Bentham’s view, human beings are essentially understood to be passive creatures who respond to the environment in a purely mechanical fashion. As such, **there are no “bad” motives, only “bad” calculations**. In these terms, **no person is responsible for his or her own behavior.** In effect, the idea being promoted is that human action is essentially the same as that of a machine in operation. **This** notion **reduces a human thought to** nothing more **than a series of bio-chemical reactions**. Yet, if this is true, **then there is no meaning to human thought or human action and all human reason is reduced to the point of being meaningless**.[[6]](https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602" \l "_ftn6" \o ") Beyond this problem, it also seems a little absurd to argue that since all human beings seek pleasure and avoid pain, that we can conclude that such a fact ought then be used as the foundation upon which an ethical theory ought to be constructed. As Opitz points out, **Words like pleasure** happiness, or satisfaction **are** what might be called “**container words**.” **They are words needing a content,** like the word “assistant.” When someone tells you he is an assistant, you are told nothing about his actual job. All you know is that he is not an executive. To make it specific, the job of being an assistant needs some entity to hook up with. Similarly, happiness or pleasure. **There is no such entity as pleasure or happiness**; these are mental states which may be associated with many different things.[[7]](https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602" \l "_ftn7" \o ") Since this is true, **pleasure cannot be the goal of human action in and of itself**. **It is simply the by-product** of human action which is actually aimed at the attainment of some specific goal or end. To be sure, people rarely seek to refine their tastes by considering such qualitative issues until they are well fed, clothed, and housed, but that fact does not mean that such issues are unimportant. Even that great proponent of utilitarianism, J. S. Mill, came to understand this point. As a result, he too began to recognize that happiness was not something that could be had directly and tried to introduce qualitative factors into his utilitarianism. Regrettably, Mill did not press the implication of this insight to its final conclusion. If he had, he would have abandoned his utilitarianism in favor of some other ethical philosophy. The reason why this is so is that **an effort to include qualitative factors into one’s ethical thinking** necessarily **requires an appeal to some ideal**. That is, Mill must have in mind some concept or idea of what human beings ought to be, rather than what they in fact are, if he is going to include qualitative factors in his analysis. When this is done, one is forced back into the mode of the traditional ethical philosophies that existed prior to the utilitarian project. If one has an ideal of what men should be, then that ideal establishes a standard of moral behavior apart from the pursuit of pleasure itself. As Copleston comments on the matter: Hence **there must be a standard of excellence**; and this is not fully worked out. The relevant point in the present context, however, is not Mill’s failure to elaborate a theory of human nature. Rather is it the fact that he grafts on to Benthamism a moral theory which has little or nothing to do with balancing of pleasures and pains according to the hedonistic calculus of Bentham, and that he does not see the necessity of subjecting his original starting-point to a thorough criticism and revision.[[8]](https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602" \l "_ftn8" \o ") C. The Fallacy of Composition A final problem with **utilitarianism** that ought to be mentioned is that it **is subject to** being criticized because of **a** potential **fallacy of composition**. **The common good is not** necessarily **the sum of the interests of individuals**. In their book, A History of Economic Theory and Method, Ekelund and Hebert provide a well-conceived example to demonstrate this problem. They write: **It is** presumably **in the** general **interest of American society to have every automobile** in the United States **equipped with** all **possible safety devices**. **However**, a majority of **individual car buyers may not be willing to pay the cost** of such equipment in the form of higher auto prices. **In this case, the collective interest does not coincide with the sum of the individual interests.** The result is a legislative and economic dilemma. [[9]](https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602" \l "_ftn9" \o ") Indeed, individuals prone to political action, and held under the sway of utilitarian ethics, will likely be willing to decide in favor of the supposed collective interest over and against that of the individual. But then, **what happens to individual human rights**? Are they not sacrificed and set aside as unimportant? In fact, this is precisely what has happened. In democratic countries the destruction of human liberty that has taken place in the past hundred years has occurred primarily for this reason. In addition, **such thinking largely** **served as** the **justification for the mass murders of millions** **of innocent people in communist countries** where the leaders sought to establish the “workers’ paradise.” To put the matter simply, utilitarianism offers no cohesive way to discern between the various factions competing against one another in political debates and thus fails to provide an adequate guide for ethical human action. The failure of utilitarianism at this point is extremely important for a whole host of policy issues. Among them, the issue of the government’s provision of public goods is worth our consideration.

### AFC

#### Interpretation: The negative must concede the affirmative framework if the standard is promoting economic creative difference.

#### Prefer – 1] Time skew – Winning the negative framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense and forces a 1AR restart against a 7 min 1NC – outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility – I can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse. 2] Topic Ed – Every debate would just be a framework debate which crowds out our ability to have core debates about the topic – that outweighs – we only have 2 months to debate the topic 3] Prep skew – We can’t predict every single negative framework before round but they know the aff coming into round which makes pre-tournament prep impossible. Especially true since there are millions of K’s and NC’s that could negate – that outweighs – A] Sequencing – It’s a perquisite engaging in-round since you need prep to debate B] Engagement – It ruins the quality and depth of discussions that make debate rounds educational.

### 1AC – Paradigm

#### 1] Yes 1AR theory – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer – the 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.