## 1AC

### Framing

#### Ethics begins with a distinction between the Real and the Symbolic – this forms a plane of signification where meaning is contextually produced and expressed through language.

**Van Haute** – Philippe Against Adaptation: Lacan’s “Subversion” of the Subject Translated by Paul Crowe and Miranda Vankerk 2002, Agastya

**The signifier** actively **institutes meaning**. **Language** does not simply reflect reality; it **is not the expression of a previously given order**. The **reality** in which we carry on our existence **must**, on the contrary, **be understood** in a pregnant sense **as the effect of the order of signifiers**. In this context, Lacan points out that **signifiers are** essentially **determined** diacritically or **differentially**. In other words, **they signify** primarily **on the basis of their difference from other signifiers and not**, for example, **by referring to a non-linguistic reality.** Let us return to our example of the difference between “man” and “woman.” It is clear that the signifier “man” only has meaning as opposed to the signifier “woman”—for what could “man” mean without “woman”? The signifiers “man” and “woman” receive further meaning from a complex network of references in which signifiers such as “human,” “animal,” and “plant,” for example, hold a central place. The meaning of a signifier is in the first place dependent upon the linguistic context of which it is a part. Moreover, **the fact that a signifier only receives meaning from a complex network of signitive** references immediately **implies**, for Lacan, **that the meaning of a signifier changes according to the context in which it is taken up.** When an analysand says in an analytical session, Je vais à la mer (“I am going to the sea”), the analyst might hear, Je vais à la mère (“I am going to the mother”), basing her interpretation on other associations that the analysand has formulated in the course of this or other sessions. A second example can perhaps make the point somewhat clearer. Some years ago, for professional reasons, I opened a bank account in Holland, and the bank clerk asked if I had any “titles.” I replied that I did, but immediately added that I wanted to keep them in Belgium, where I was living at the time. The man looked at me strangely, and asked me if the “titles” were not valid in Holland. After a bit of talking back and forth, it turned out that he had meant academic titles, while I, because of my Belgian background, had understood “titles” in the sense of the French titres (“financial securities”).9 Just as the associative context determined the meaning of the signifier mer/mère (“sea”/“mother”) in the first example, so here the meaning of the signifier “title” changes depending on whether it is to be understood in an academic context or an economic one. **The production of meaning is** thus in principle **a process that cannot be closed off. There is no ultimate context that could**, as it were, **embrace all contexts and so bring the production of meaning to completion**.

#### The failure of linguistic signifiers to describe the Real creates a lack – the subject undertakes repetitive drives to access the Real which traps ethics in permanent antagonism.

**Solomon 10** – “Affect and Identification In American Foreign Policy” Ty Solomon University Of Florida 2010, Agastya

It is here that we can locate the importance of the Lacanian notion of desire. **Desire refers to the gap opened** in the subject **when hailed by a master signifier** (Lacan 2006, 690-1; Žižek 1989, 111). **When faced with** this **mandate**, **the subject** **must have an ―answer if s/he is to go on as a subject within the system of social relations offered by the master signifier** or discourse in question. It is this gap, or lack, introduced by the signifier that stimulates desire to fill it. When our hypothetical American is successfully hailed as a supporter of ―freedom,‖ his/her desire is sparked to engage in the duties and practices that s/he understands are called for with such identification. **The hailing introduces a lack that the subject feels** **must be filled with the appropriate beliefs and practices**. **Yet, there is no objective** ―**answer** that society can offer the subject in its quest to realize its submission to a master signifier. There is no single 81 ideology or set of beliefs in American culture, for instance, that can offer our American subject a fixed ―answer‖ to what practices identifying as a believer in ―freedom‖ entails. The subject‘s cultural context offers nothing that can satisfy the desire to fully and completely identify with a master signifier, since there is no natural or primordial identity of ―one who supports freedom‖ that is fixed or incontestable. Since subjects must adopt some signifiers as their own if they are to make sense of themselves and communicate with others within discourse – again, as conceived by Lacan as the social condition of language – desire always and inevitably persists as long as the subject exists as a subject in discourse. Desire itself, though, has no object. ―In its essence,‖ writes Bruce Fink (1995, 90), ―**desire is a constant search for something else, and there is no specifiable object that is capable of** satisfying it, in other words, **extinguishing it‖**.10 This leads to a paradoxical situation: desire for a signifier that the subject can assume as its own sparks the search for identity, yet none is able to fully represent the subject. **Desire, then, remains unsatisfied;** a fully stable identity always remains out of reach, and the search for identity stability continues. Indeed, desire does not seek satisfaction, ―rather, it pursues its own continuation and furtherance – it merely seeks to go on desiring‖ (Fink 1997, 51). It is this quest for a sense of fullness that leads to perpetual processes of identification, rather than the construction of fixed and conclusive identity. 11 Subjects need ―to identify with something because there is an originary and insurmountable lack of identity‖ (Laclau 1994, 2-3)12. Consequently, the construction of an (ultimately unstable) identity is only possible through continual processes of identification with culturally available social constructions, such as political ideologies, narratives, and values (Stavrakakis 1999, 36). In other words, subjects must identify with societal discourses if they are to have a place in that society. However, due to the instability and contestability of any discourse (such as conflict over the ―true‖ meaning of an ideology, belief system, or social role), a **fixed and uncontestable identity is impossible, since there is no extra-linguistic foundation upon which any ―identity‖ may be grounded.**

**Thus, the standard is to traverse the fantasy – we embrace the inevitability of lack to engage in true enjoyment despite incomplete identity. Prefer the standard:**

#### 1 – Pedagogy – Our method breaks free from educational projects that create psychic numbness and smooth governmentality.

Taubman 17 – Peter Taubman (Department of Secondary Education @ Brooklyn College, CUNY), 2017, “DEATH BY NUMBERS: A RESPONSE TO BACKER, SARIGIANIDES, AND STILLWAGGON,” Educational Theory, 67(1), 97–106, doi:10.1111/edth.12230, Agastya

By connecting the viciously punitive aspects of melancholia to what increasingly appears as our ferocious drive toward death, I hope to widen the discussion of melancholia in education to include current social and political conditions in education that sustain melancholia and intensify the death drive. These conditions destroy our sense of self-worth, deaden our psyches, and put each of us at risk. These conditions, not unlike those that Backer, Sarigianides, and Stillwaggon describe, stifle dialogue, ignore the losses education demands, and intensify racial melancholia. My aim here is to build on their work. My response essay assumes that all of us, teachers and students alike, suffer inexpressible losses that we cannot publicly grieve, that melancholy is not foreign to any of us. However, it seems that the depression or melancholia I and many of my colleagues, both teachers and teacher educators, are experiencing today is related to something more insidious than the inability to express a real or imagined loss. It seems related to an increasing drive to turn ourselves and others into numbers, even into machines — that is, into inert matter. Or, to put it differently, I can’t help wonder if we are driving ourselves and our students to death. The Death Drive Freud’s speculations about a death drive began with his consternation over the pleasure principle, which he tended to define in terms of the release of built-up tension or excitation and the avoidance of unpleasure. If, as he seemed to argue in most of his early work, we pursue pleasure — even our dreams, for example, fulfill a disguised wish — how then, he asked, can we account for our own sabotaging of such pleasure? Why do we return to traumatic events in our dreams? Why do we repeat painful behaviors or experiences? Why do we resist perspectives that might interrupt these dangerous or damaging repetitive patterns? And what, he struggled to understand, could account for the atrocities humans inflict on one another? These questions prompted Freud’s speculations in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.”There he wrote that based upon his observations of behavior in the transference and upon the life histories of men and women, he was forced to conclude that “there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat painful experiences which overrides the pleasure principle.”8 This compulsion to repeat, he wrote, “gives the appearance of some daemonic force at work.”9 Freud labeled this “daemonic force” the “death drive.” Freud speculated that this “daemonic force” emerges in, is revealed by, and offers an explanation for our compulsion to repeat painful experiences. It is also, as Freud suggested in his later writings, responsible for the destructive forces that threaten our “civilization.” I want to focus on three claims Freud makes in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” and that he elaborates in later work. These are (1) the claim that the death drive compels us to return to an inanimate or inert state; (2) the claim that the death drive is “historically determined”; and (3) the claim that Eros opposes the death drive and is “the preserver of life.”10 I want to explore the first two claims together, in that I will consider how particular corporate-driven education reforms provoke and shape the death drive, a drive that calls on and intensifies the aggression that is so much a part of melancholia. First and Second Claims: The Death Drive Compels Us to Return to an Inanimate State, and It Is Historically Determined Freud’s initial claim was that the death drive compels us to return to an inanimate or inert state.11 What if we were to read the death drive not in the literal sense but rather in the figurative sense, as a drive to put an end to memory, and history, and therefore to feelings? What if the death drive kills that which, in fact, makes us human? What if we have within us as individuals or groups a drive that, provoked and shaped by particular constellations of social and historical forces or by particular conditions, impels us to create psychic dead zones, to render ourselves and others less than human? As Michael Eigen said, “When one is dead, one fears being alive.”12 The Death of History If repetition results from not remembering or is a form of remembering without working through, if it is a way, as Adam Phillips suggests, of “making memory impossible,” of “determinedly wishing not to know” or creating “states of mind in which there is nothing left to remember,”13 then can we not read the death drive in terms of a force that destroys history and memory? Might not the compulsion to repeat, in which Freud initially located the death drive, be seen in the repetition compulsion of education, returning again and again to the same purported panaceas as a way to avoid the trauma of its inherent impossibility? “To be locked in the past,” James Baldwin wrote, “means that one has no past, since one can never assess it, or use it, and if one cannot use the past, one has no present.”14 One is, as Baldwin warns, stuck in a perpetual youth, a corrupt innocence. Can we not see such corrupt innocence in education reform’s insistence on its newness, its certainty, and its “nowness”? Anyone who opposes ed reform is cast as living in a dead past. Can we not see this blind innocence in the failure to work through histories and dreams of and dependence on, for example, white supremacy or misogyny? Certainly in the United States, the inability to face the trauma of race and the resistance to looking at the role of white supremacy in the formation of identities, fortunes, and education policies create not only racial melancholia but psychic dead zones and reveal the workings of a death drive. Sarigianides suggests as much in her reading of American Born Chinese. 15 As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes, the “tenacious dream of white, straight, male exceptionalism that thrives on generalization, limiting questions, and privileging immediate answers” numbs memory and erases history.16 This drive to forget, to not remember, is evident, too, in the contention by education reformers in the United States that the history of education is irrelevant to becoming a teacher and in the denigration of foundation courses in teacher education. If history is offered, it is as what Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno referred to as a fixed order of time, not something living but transformed into the “material to be used for the ideology of progress.”17 When education reformers offer medicine, engineering, and architecture as analogies for teaching, or when they base their views of teaching in the learning sciences, they effectively remove teaching from the world of history. The Death of Feelings But if memory and history disappear, what happens to feelings? Let us follow Brian Massumi and take feelings to be both personal and biographical. They are, he writes, body-based sensations, checked against remembered experiences that emerge in language.18 What will happen to feelings if memory and history vanish and the language in which feelings take form diminishes? If the language of education reform increasingly constricts the symbolic — I imagine many of us have had the experience of feeling suffocated or flattened by that language at meetings — and if it makes relationships suspect — I imagine, too, we have all felt interpersonal exchanges rushed, diminished, or mistrusted under the glare of audit — might we not also venture that such language diminishes the world of feelings? Certainly we know that education reform culls its language from the worlds of finance and business, which reduce all behavior to the bottom line; from the learning sciences, which render knowledge and wisdom as information and insist on predictability and replicability; from the military, with its focus on command and control; and from the world of sports, which knows only winners and losers. The language of these worlds evacuates our subjectivity, except insofar as it demands that we endlessly monitor, control, and improve ourselves and others. This demand for constant improvement, a kind of superego of education reform, lacerates us with the harsh and narrow language of failure, substituting imperious judgment for conversation and, as Adam Phillips suggests in Unforbidden Pleasures, submitting our lives to one, often cruel, “correct” interpretation.19 The self-denigration with which Freud distinguished melancholia from mourning appears in the impoverished language of the superego that harbors the drive to turn us into objects. The language of the superego, Phillips further suggests, is filled with petty and cruel demands and vicious charges that we are never enough.20 There is no dialogue, no poetry, no interpretive flexibility. There is only the one right answer, and we are reduced to an object whipped and rendered inert, left with only depression or, turned outward, rage, and a lingering affect provoked by the constrictions of deadened identities and numbed and numbered selves. The superego — that stuck record that endlessly reiterates its scathing criticism in its impoverished vocabulary — first turns us into an object by telling us who we are before it unleashes its scorn on us. As Phillips writes, “[T]he superego treats the ego like an object not a person.”21 Can we not see the work of the death drive in the way teachers and students are articulated as bundles of skills, lists of rules and procedures, and scripts written, designed, and packaged somewhere else? It’s no wonder that education reformers talk so much of “building” a better teacher. Through various vocabularies and practices of quantification, we are rendered and render ourselves as machines: efficient, predictable, and easily programmed, machines that elicit and process numerical data. The impoverishment of language results not only from the barrage of terms culled from the worlds of business, the learning sciences, the military, and sports, but also from ed reform’s fascination with and promotion of technology. Sherry Turkle, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has perhaps written most persuasively about the role of technology in the transformation of our feeling life. She is particularly worried about the decline in empathy among young people and the blurring of boundaries between machines and humans, as robots come to be programmed to give the appearance of feeling.22 If feelings disappear or emerge only in terms of spatial descriptions — I feel high, low, flat, as Fredric Jameson so many years ago claimed was happening in our postmodern state23 — what happens to thought? Deprived of feeling, does not thought itself dry up? Bound by rules of statistical evidence, empirical verifiability, experimental design, and linear sequential logic, rendered always in terms of cognitive operations or in terms of Bloom’s taxonomy, thinking hardens. The rigor demanded by education reformers becomes rigor mortis.

#### 2 – Performativity – Debate is a libidinal activity that asks us to evaluate possible worlds and advocacies through language which cannot encompass the Real – means every argument concedes to the authority of the lack.

#### 3 – Circularity – Answers to the standard concede to the lack since we recognize achieving an absolute correct interpretation is impossible – the aff is a never-ending project.

#### 4 – Cruel Optimism – Embracing our constitutive lack severs proximate affective investments that breed passivity – our orientation is necessary to bridge the gap between discursive regimes and the material world.

Berlant 11 – Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, *Cruel Optimism*, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 33-6, Agastya

When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea - whatever. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic**.** That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form. In optimism, the subject leans toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter with their object.' 'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. What's cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject's sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object. One more thing: the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is, I think, usually something an analyst observes about someone's or some group's attachment to x, since usually that attachment exists without being an event, or even better, seems to lighten the load for someone/some group.^ But if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone/some group, even in disavowed fashion, the fear is that the loss of the object/scene of promising itself will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising or animating potency of an object/ scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. To understand cruel optimism, therefore, one must embark on an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But **the condition of projected possibility**, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) **creates a** fake present moment of intersubjectivity **in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is made possible by the fantasy** of you, laden with the x qualities I can project onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under the condition, and illusion, that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe is thus an indirect, unstable, physically impossible but phenomenologically vitalising movement of rhetorical animation that permits subjects to suspend themselves in the optimism of a potential occupation of the same psychic space of others, the objects of desire who make you possible (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that the conditions of the lush submerging of one consciousness into another require a double negation: of the speaker's boundaries, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; and of the spoken of, who is more or less a powerful mute placeholder providing an opportunity for the speaker's imagination of her/his/their flourishing. Of course psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible. It is a wish, a desire, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, **a transaction that affirms you** without, again, necessarily feeling good or accurate (it might idealise, **it might affirm your monstrosity**, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, **Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment**, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression. Political depression **persists in affective judgments of the world's intractability** - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - **modes of what might be called detachment that are really not detached at all but** constitute ongoing relations of sociality**.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in the problem of** the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities that can no longer be said to be doing their work, andwhich indeed make obstacles to the desires that animate them; my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." Cruel optimism is, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as an analytic lever it is an incitement to inhabit and to track the affective attachment to what we call 'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless, and at the same time, find their conditions of possibility within it. My assumption is that the conditions of ordinary life in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, are conditions of the attrition or the wearing out of the subject, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ Cruel optimism is in this sense a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence, one that grows from a perception about the reasons people are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but choose to ride the wave of the system of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, and to misrecognise that promise as an achievement. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out by the promises that they have attached to in this world.

#### 5 – Verifiability – robust neuro-studies prove our theory.

Pizzato 10 – Mark Pizzato, Research Affective Neuroscience and Lacanian psychoanalysis as professor @ UNC-Charlette Film Studies, published 4 studies of Lacan and neuroscience. 4“Inner Theatres of Good and Evil: The Mind's Staging of Gods, Angels and Devils,” 2010

I argue **that these three Lacanian orders relate to the basic areas of neural anatomy: the left and right neocortex, plus the subcortical areas (from limbic system to brainstem).21 Humans share with all pre-existing animals, at least as far back as reptiles, a core brainstem that regulates internal functions and processes instinctual responses to outside stimuli, such as the body's instant, unconscious reaction to danger**. We share with mammals a limbic system (including the temporal lobes at the sides of the head) that evolved around the brainstem to process more complex emotions and learned behaviors.22 Like other primates, we also have an expanded neocortex as the outermost layer of our brain (with occipital lobes in the back of the head, parietal lobes at the top rear, and frontal lobes).23 However, humans evolved distinct functional areas on each side of the neocortex. The left neocortex has audioverbal, linear, causal, executive, prosocial, routine functions, in contrast to the right hemisphere's visuospatial, holistic, intuitive, devil's advocate, anxiety- biased, novelty-detecting processes.25 Distinctive language systems (syntax and semantics) are in the left hemisphere, in Broca's and Wernicke's areas,2' in nearly all right-handed people and most left-handed.2. The right brain has further ties to the emotional limbic system and instinctual brainstem, but the left tends to operate separately (especially in men28), expressing or inhibiting limbic emotions and right-cortical intuitions, through its rational language and executive controls. Specifically regarding theatrical mimesis, the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL) is used for recognizing "pantomimes executed by others" because it stores the "complex digrams" or schemas used in the "higher level intentional planning" of actions, while the right IPL is used for interpreting spatial orientation (Jacob and Jeannerod 253). Thus, certain **left-cortical functions correlate with Lacan's Symbolic order of language, rules, and social codes, the right with the Imaginary, and the limbic system and brain- stem areas with the Real.** Yetthese three orders arc "inmixed" dimensions (Ragland-Sullivan 190), as are the corresponding areas of our brains. The Symbolic order resides primarily, but not solely within and between left brains, like the Imaginary in and between right hemispheres, and the Real in limbic systems and brainstems.2- I say "primarily" because there are also aspects of Symbolic language, involving imagery and emotions, in certain right-brain functions: making and interpreting metaphors, contextual meanings, puns, prosody, and non- verbal gestures (Ornstcin 103-08; Cozolino, Neuroscience of Psychotherapy 109). Thus, the right brain is used more for language, along with the left, by "expert" readers (Wolf 162). While the right brains Imaginary order is crucial for "sell-image" (Ornstein 132, 175-76), the spatial sense of ego also depends upon the left brain's "orientation area," as I will consider in the first chapter The general correspondence of Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic orders to the brainstem/limbic system, right hemisphere, and left hemisphere is confirmed by research on developmental growth spurts in the neocortex during childhood. As in Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, with the infant's Imaginary ego initially developing through preverbal communication with the (m)Other, **neuroscience shows that right-brain to right-brain "attunement" between the mother and child, during its first two years of life, profoundly shapes its emotional and perceptual pathways, especially its sense of self in relation to others** (Cozolino, Neuroscience of Human 38, 66-75, 84-85; Neuroscience of Psychotherapy 191-92). The "prosocial self then shifts, through language development, into the left brain, with its growth in subsequent years (118; Wolf 185-88). This relates to the Lacanian Symbolic order of words and laws shaping the child more directly after the initial mirror stage, at 6-18 months. According to neuroscience, the self as a "distributed neural network that encompasses shared self-other representations" continues to be "right- hemisphere based" (Deccty and Sommerville 527). Recognition of one's own face can be lost when the right hemisphere is anesthetized (529)—demon- strating that the Imaginary perception of ego (or the Freudian "imago"), and its possible fading or Lacanian "aphanisis," is based in the right cortex.31 Regarding our potential for therapeutic and theatrical catharsis, there appears to be a crucial filter between Symbolic/Imaginary and Real orders (or superego /ego and id) in the prefrontal area of the neocortex, at the edge of the limbic system.3 Neurologists locate a "stimulus barrier" between the Freudian superego and id in the "ventromesial [or ventromedial regions of the prefrontal lobe [where it] merges into the limbic system" and protects the ego "from the incessant demands of instinctual life" (Kaplan-Solms and Solms 275-76).34 Here, cathartic changes may occur in how remnant natural instincts are expressed (or transformed through greater awareness), from mostly unconscious, limbic, Real emotions, through right-brain, Imaginary perceptions and fundamental fantasies, to the Symbolic order of language, rules, and self identity in relation to the social Other. Neurologists have also found four layers of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) with distinctive, nested, hierarchical functions (Koechlin et al.; Murphy and Brown 133-35). The premotor cortex, at the rear of the PFC, exerts sensory control, selecting specific motor (bodily action) responses to stimuli. The caudal lateral PFC, the next layer moving forward, adds contextual control regarding the current situation when stimuli are received. The rostral lateral PFC, a further anterior layer, then exerts episodic control over the other two, by tracking present and past information regarding general behavior, thus allowing for changing contingencies. (Murphy and Brown give the examples of answering the phone when it rings, not answering it at a friend s house, or answering it there because the friend IS in the shower and asks you to, as illustrating these three levels of stimulus response.) A fourth area is posited in the frontopolar cortex, used for cognitive branching and controlling the shifts between different episodes of behavior, while exerting control over the other three layers. Likewise, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) determines "reward value" choices, including the selection of "stimuli on the basis of familiarity and [selection of] responses on the basis of a feeling of Vightness" (Elliott et al. 308). The lateral regions of the OFC arc involved with "the suppression of previously rewarded responses." Brain imaging studies find that these areas are "fundamental" in behavioral choices, especially in "unpredictable situations." One might argue that the Lacanian Symbolic and Imaginary orders of cultural rules and personal perceptions connect with the Real of stimuli and actions through these areas of the PFC (just behind and above the ventrome- dial). The brain responds to familiar or unpredictable stimuli with inner theatrical representations and outer performances, through shifting, time-bound, contextual, sensory controls. Such controls are shaped in each human brain through learned cultural experiences of the social Other, which create further top-down constraints utilized by the PFC's layered functions, in relation to bottom-up stimuli. And yet, theatrical performances are ways that the Other, as well as the individual, may change. A culture can explore extended possibilities of Symbolic and Imaginary shifts in situation, context, and sensation, using a collective dreamlike space. This may also involve divine and demonic characterizations of top-down or bottom-up forces, experienced in nature, in the body and brain, or in social networks. Lacan's three orders relate not only to the brain's anatomy, but also to cognitive psychologist Merlin Donald's theory about the evolutionary stages of cultural development in our hominid ancestors. About two million years ago, early hominids evolved beyond the "episodic" experience of other animals (and prior australopithecines)— with the "mimetic" stage of human evolution.3 Donald cites the evidence of increasing brain size in our hominid ancestors,-' the first stone tools, big game hunting, a more group-oriented way of life, and thus "a cultural strategy for remembering and problem solving" (Mind 261).' Instead of being "immersed in a stream of raw episodic experience, from which they ... [could not] gain any distance," early hominids developed a new cognitive capacity, "mimetic skill, which was an extension of conscious control into the domain of action. It enabled playacting, body language, precise imitation, and gesture" (120, 261). This also included prosody, which is processed today in the brain's right hemisphere: "deliberately raising and lowering the voice, and producing imitations of emotional sounds. About a half million years ago, archaic Homo sapiens gradually evolved a "mythic" stage of culture and brain development, culminating with the emergence of our own subspecies, Homo sapiens sapiens, about 125,000 years ago (Donald, Mind 261). The mythic stage is evidenced by a much higher rate of innovation than in prior hominids: sophisticated tools, "beautifully crafted objects, improved shelters and hearths, and elaborate graves" (261-62). This stage included oral traditions of language and narrative thought — beyond the gesture, mime, and imitation of prior mimetic hominids, or the basic awareness and event sensitivity of episodic primates (260)." **It thus involved a fundamental change in the human brain (and vocal tract): an "invasion" of the left parietal lobe by language**, replacing spatial perception and movement, which then became a more distinctive function of the right parietal lobe (LcDoux, Synaptic 303, 318).40 Donald's mythic stage shows the evolution of the Symbolic order of mind and society, as well as our current left hemisphere functions. The mimetic stage correlates to right brain processing and the Lacanian Imaginary. Today's human brains also bear the remnant animal emotions and drives of primal episodic awareness in the limbic system and brainstem, as a lost yet disruptive Real or chora\*1 Indeed, each child moves through similar developmental stages, recapitulating hominid phylogeny: from primal episodic awareness to the mimetic "interlinking of the infant's attentional system with those of other people" and then to narrative speech (Donald, Mind 255). Or, in Lacanian terms, a child moves from the Real of natural being to the Imaginary order of mirrored illusions of ego in the (m)Others desires and then, through verbal language, to the Symbolic order of superego incorporation, with the Others discourse and social rules, via the Name and No of the Father. This basic outline of Lacanian orders, brain anatomy, and hominid evolution shows that "theatre" (and dance) in the most primal sense — as Imaginary, mimetic performance —began about two million years ago. At that time, our ancestors developed a new skill that eventually became specialized in the visuospatial, prosodic, Imaginary functions of the right hemisphere, with ties to the emotional/instinctual Real of the limbic system and brain- stem. Later hominids developed oral language and myth-making, as further Symbolic orders, through distinct areas of the left brain about a half million years ago. As with the modern child's development from primary to higher- order consciousness, through the Real and Imaginary dimensions of the mirror stage and the later Symbolic acquisition of language and rules, these layers of the brain and of hominid culture continue to interact today — with each human being transformed by a particular family and society. As Donald points out, primal mimesis in early hominids relates not only to the current playacting of children (Mind 266), but also to the "many institutionalized versions of pretend play in theater and him, and [to the] imaginative role playing [that] is integral to adult social life" (263). A crucial aspect of this evolutionary skill is emotional regulation, which involves the germ of self-consciousness, through a "mimetic controller" in the brain, "a whole-body mapping capacity ... under unified command" (269). Thus, early hominids developed larger frontal lobes, setting the stage for the later evolution of a distinctive left hemisphere (271).'15 Like children today (starting with the Imaginary dimension of the Lacanian mirror stage), our hominid ancestors developed a "kinematic imagination" with the physical "image of self" becoming an anchor to experience and awareness (273). This involved rhythmic body movements, expressing temporal relations, through the intersubjective medium of performance, as a "public theatre of convention" (272-74). However, the full emergence of theatre as narrative performance began with oral storytelling during the hominid "mythic" stage, starting about a half million years ago. Then, about forty thousand years ago, humans evolved a further, "theoretic" stage, through the "externalization of memory ... [using] symbolic devices to store and retrieve cultural knowledge" (Donald, Mind2G2). During this current stage of hominid evolution, the tradition of recorded theatre and drama developed, along with other artistic technologies,44 a "Symptom" of being human that has vastly expanded in recent centuries.45 Thus, theatre in the theoretic sense may have started with Paleolithic cave art (as considered in the first chapter). Eventually, the theoretic technologies of theatre, externalizing and interconnecting the performance elements of the human brain, developed in various ways through different cultures — culminating in the current globalism 01 virtual media screens, often dominated by Western paradigms. Our theoretic stage with its evolving technologies continues to reshape the skills of prior stages and "liberate consciousness from the limitations of the brains biological memory systems" (305). However, such an external memory field can also be a "Trojan Horse," Donald warns, "a device that invades the innermost personal spaces of the mind. It can play our cognitive instrument, directing our minds toward predetermined end states along a set course" (316). Such a Trojan Horse potential, with good and evil effects, becomes even more significant through divine characters and godlike ideals, at various points in Western history, from stage to screen performances, as explored throughout this book. Donald's stages of cognitive psychology match with Stephen Mithens archeological theories and research.4fl According to Mithen, the early hominid social intelligence of Homo erectus> 1.6 million years ago, involved the communication of "contentment, anger or desire" through a "wide range of sounds (Prehistory 144) —as with the mimetic prosody theorized by Donald. Human verbal language with "a vast lexicon and a set of grammatical rules" began 500,000 to 200,000 years ago, with Neanderthals and archaic Homo sapiens, as evidenced by brain and throat structure, indicated in fossils of their bones (140-42, 208). This corresponds to Donald's mythic stage of hominid evolution. Mithen also cites archeological evidence that a dramatic shift occurred 40,000 years ago. Early humans in the Upper Paleolithic period changed from having separate types of intelligence—natural history intelligence (such as interpreting animal hoofprints), social intelligence (with intentional communication), and technical intelligence (producing artifacts from mental templates) — to a new cognitive fluidity between them, creating artifacts with "symbolic meanings ... i.e. art" (163-65).47 This shows the begin- ning of Donald's theoretic stage and relates to the possible shamanic visions and performances evidenced by Paleolithic cave art.48 The evolutionary stages, neurological layers, and psychoanalytic orders of self and Other awareness, developing through shared cultural performances, reflect what might be called an "inner theatre" of the brain.49 By this, I do not mean a "Cartesian theatre" with the mind inside the brain as a single ghostly spectator watching the machinery of inner scenes, or as a play-wright-homunculus inhabiting a central control area (the pineal gland, according to Descartes. 400 years ago). This theory has been fully critiqued by cognitive philosophers, from Gilbert Rylc to Daniel Dennett, as well as by current neurological evidence. However, cognitive scientist Bernard Baars uses theatrical terms in other ways to explain the global workspace of human consciousness. **Less than 10 percent of brain activity is conscious, like a "spot- light" on the visible actors and scenery (Theater 46-47).5 The rest involves unconscious agents, like a legislative "audience," competing and collaborating to focus attention on particular perceptions and ideas onstage**. There are Deep Goal and Conceptual Contexts, like "backstage" workers, as well as immediate expectations and intentions, forming an unconscious sense of self as "director" of the brains inner theatre (144-45).

#### 6 – Topic Ed – Fantasy is central towards discussions of space appropriation.

Ormrod 9 – James S. Ormrod -- School of Applied Science @ University of Birmingham UK, “Phantasy and Social Movements: An Ontology of Pro-Space Activism”, http://cyber.sci-hub.tw/MTAuMTA4MC8xNDc0MjgzMDkwMjc3MDI3NA==/10.1080%4014742830902770274.pdf, April 2009, Agastya

Since the 1970s (though with some precursors) a number of citizen ‘pro-space’ organizations have been established to promote human activity in outer space. Some groups/activists are devoted to exploration (human or robotic), some focus on human sensuous consumption and tourism, whilst others set their sights on mining resources and space settlement. While most are for the exploration and development of space in general, some have specific targets like the Moon or Mars. There is variation in their political activity, but many groups regularly lobby governments about space issues. Outside of this, most groups also promote space activity by sponsoring research, holding scientific discussions, supporting private sector projects, educating the public and producing news magazines for their membership. They also organize trips, parties and other social events. National-level organizations such as the Mars Society, National Space Society or ProSpace convene only once or twice a year. Gatherings are much more frequent amongst local chapters of these organizations and local groups affiliated to them such as the Huntsville Alabama L-5 Society.

The movement has never been particularly large in social movement terms. Membership is largely formalized through joining one or more pro-space organizations (costing roughly $30-40). Yet surveys of membership in recent years have been limited. The last record as of 1985 suggested there were 150,000–200,000 citizen pro-space activists (Bell cited in Michaud, 1986). Movement numbers probably peaked in the late 1980s/early 1990s at about 200,000–250,000. Since the 1970s, the vast majority of organizations have been based in the US, though independent organizations and international chapters of US groups do exist in other developed countries (including Australia, Canada, the UK, France and Japan).

Despite members of pro-space organizations referring to themselves as part of a prospace movement, Michaud (1986) points to the existence of some debate as to whether or not it is a true social movement (see also Bainbridge, 1976). In 1980, writer Trudy Bell believed that the emerging movement could go on to be as powerful as other social movements. Even two years later she was less optimistic (Bell cited in Michaud, 1986), and in 1985 concluded ‘that the space community was too fragmented and had too diverse an agenda to be called a movement’ (1985, p. 305). Michaud argues that some older groups do not qualify as being part of a social movement because of their economic interests and nor do enthusiast groups (within which category one could include astronomy and rocket clubs and science fiction fans), but believes some of the newer groups ‘seeking significant change ... may indeed reflect a social movement’ (Michaud, 1986, p. 304). It is on these latter groups, in particular the National Space Society, ProSpace and the Mars Society, that my own research has focussed.

It is true that the movement utilises formal political channels to a greater extent than many new social movements, but it does also have a life outside of politics as demonstrated by the list of activities above. Elsewhere (Ormrod, 2006, p. 31–9)1 , I have examined the case for the pro-space movement being a new social movement as defined by theorists like Alberto Melucci (1985). I concluded that in so much as the movement does not imply a ‘breaking of the system limits’ (indeed it has always had what Diamond, 1995, refers to as ‘system supportive’ elements and found allies within both Congress and NASA) nor engages in alternative lifestyle practices, it does not approach the ideal type of new social movement. Yet its commitment to political action means it is definitely not just a collection of clubs and organizations, its generalised goals which transcend any particular objective distinguish it from a campaign, and its life away from formal politics and the representation of interests mark it off from lobbies or associations.

This paper emerges from an ethnography of contemporary pro-space activism conducted at various pro-space events in the US and UK in 2003 and 2004. Data comes from formal and informal interviews, conference papers by activists, panel discussions and lobbying appointments with congressional staffers, whilst older studies have relied on the publications of early movement leaders, large-scale attitude surveys or interviews with a few selected activist-informants.

The Centrality of Fantasy

The centrality of fantasy or daydreaming to those pursuing the human exploration, development and settlement of space is well established. McCurdy (1997) argues that motivation has been based on constructed romantic images of space travel. It is reported that the early rocket pioneers like Robert Goddard were driven by imaginative daydreams. Carl Sagan describes a young Goddard sitting in a cherry tree and envisioning exotic new vehicles (cited in Kilgore, 2003, p. 42). My own interviews showed that pro-space activists continue childhood daydreaming about space in later life, as Melvin, a 35 year-old parttime student from the UK testified; Me: Do you find yourself still daydreaming about space a lot? M: [resounding] Yes. Probably too much, but its one of those things that’s so rigid in my psyche I don’t suppose I’ll ever be able to get it out really. Nor would I want to, I don’t think. Yeah, a lot of people say I spend too much time up there. There were also more subtle clues that vivid space fantasies lay behind individuals’ activism. Middle-aged Bruce McMurray gave the most speculative talks about space settlement at one of the pro-space conferences I attended. What was noticeable about his talks was the authority with which he pronounced not that we could build houses for our space colony in a particular way, but that we will build our houses in a particular way. This was not unique to Bruce but suggested that what he was doing was not forwarding possible solutions to potential engineering problems, but instead describing a very elaborate fantasy he had constructed.

Pro-space activists report two main catalysts for their fantasising. The first is reading science fiction. The second is having witnessed previous space missions. Despite crucial differences from science fiction fans (discussed later), science fiction is an essential part of many activists’ paths to joining the movement. One veteran estimated that seventy per cent of members got into the movement through reading (or, less commonly, watching) science fiction. For many of them, the interest in science fiction began at an early age, even as young as four (‘Rupert and the Spaceship’). From this point, activists often developed an insatiable appetite for the genre. Arthur C. Clarke and Robert Heinlein (along with Isaac Asimov and Ray Bradbury) have a particularly close relationship with the pro-space movement. But crucially, pro-space activists did not simply read science fiction passively, they elaborated their own fantasies based on it. The creative aspects of science fiction fandom have been emphasised by Jenkins (1992).

When discussing how they ‘got into’ space, nearly all pro-space activists will mention something about their memories of watching space missions, usually huddled around the family TV, or perhaps witnessing a launch in person. Again, childhood memories are the most pertinent. Amongst those I interviewed, first memories ranged from Sputnik I, the first satellite to be put into space in 1957, to the first launch of the American Space Shuttle in 1981. There is a large cohort that grew up during the Apollo era, clearly the most stimulating American space program, but there are many activists inspired by other programs. Journalist Marina Benjamin (2003) explains how NASA’s ‘dream-peddling’ had filled her and others like her with inspiration when they were young, and gave them high hopes for what mankind could achieve in the future. Looking back, she asks reflexively whether these were delusions; ‘Was I naı¨ve to believe we’d simply hop from the moon to other planets and thence to the stars?’ (Benjamin, 2003, p. 3). It is clear that for Benjamin, as for so many pro-space activists, seeing space missions unfold before them had encouraged daydreams and fantasies every bit as much as reading science fiction.

Activists’ fantasies about the future have largely been ignored in social movement research. This is despite the fact that any utopian movement must, by definition, imagine some form of alternative future society which exists only in the mind and not in reality, as Robin Kelley (2002) has pointed out in his celebration of the imagination in radical social movements. There are many theoretical positions from which fantasy can be approached, however (Ormrod, 2007), and my psychoanalytic framework is quite different to Kelley’s. Where Kelley sees the imagining of future worlds as a positive creative force operating on a conscious level, I argue that conscious imaginings are best understood as manifestations of underlying unconscious phantasies about the self. 2

Space Fantasy and Unconscious Phantasy

One initial piece of evidence for the unconscious origins of space activists’ motivation is that often they cannot explain why they want to get into space. Jim, a software engineer from Illinois, is articulately inarticulate on the matter 3 ; Me: For what reasons would you want to go? J: For the fun of it or for the ... It’s hard to say it’s just been a dream of mine to be in space, you know. So, why do you want to be in space; it’s exciting, you know, it’s not something that everybody does but still its not trying to beat the Joneses or anything. It’s just one of those desires you grow up with from when you’re a kid, it’s just a strong desire so you kind of loose track of the original reason [... .]. So let me think about that, I might be able to answer you better in the future, but it’s not one of those things... It’s sort of like asking somebody ‘why do you scratch your head up here instead of over here?’ It’s like ‘I just got into the habit of doing it’.

Jim could no longer remember why it was he wanted to go into space (assuming he ever knew). Lots of other pro-space activists got agitated when pushed on the origins of their self confessed ‘drive’. One resorted to saying ‘the mystics amongst us might say God put it there’.

My argument is that the conscious fantasies of pro-space activists play out intrapsychic conflicts and desires relating to the break from the state of primary narcissism experienced in the first few years of life.4 After reading science fiction or watching space missions, these unconscious phantasies are translated into fantasies about the exploration, development and settlement of space.

Two pleasurable aspects of the stage of primary narcissism are relevant here. Arguably the precedent one is the unity of the infant with the mother (‘the monad’, Grunberger, 1989) and indeed the rest of its universe. This is a state in which the infant does not even recognise the separate existence of other selves. Some have suggested this begins with the pre-natal relationship between child and mother in the womb. As the child grows older, it learns to appreciate the independent existence of others (Mahler et al., 1975). The other aspect is the experience of omnipotence - of power and control over the world - afforded to the infant treated as ‘His Majesty the baby’ (Freud, 1995, p. 556). This is a world in which all demands are satisfied. In normal development these experiences are, of course, shattered by the realities of family life and social existence. Pro-space activists’ fantasies can be understood, however, as translations of phantasies about regaining the self of primary narcissism.

#### 7 – Indeterminacy – there is nothing inherent in a rule that mandates following a specific interpretation. They are always subject to interpretation by the observer, which means an absolute moral rule would get interpreted differently by different agents. The AC solves – we recognize that signified rules cannot encompass their true essence because of the gap between the Symbolic and the Real.

### Contention

#### Space appropriation furthers a fantasy of human omnipotence but fails to satisfy repetitive cravings for whole subjectivity – this expands militarism and commodification.

Dickens and Ormrod 7 – Peter Dickens -- Affiliated Lecturer in the Faculty of Social and Political Science at the University of Cambridge; James S. Ormrod -- Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton, Cosmic Society: Towards a sociology of the universe, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pgs. 73-77, Agastya

As a number of authors have argued, we are now witnessing widespread adult narcissism as a predominant personality type in the West (Lasch 1979, 1984; Sennett 1974, 1977; Westen 1985; Craib 1994; Dean 2000; Dickens 2004). Freud (1995) was the first to outline this kind of personality disorder. Infants understandably make constant and wholly unreasonable demands on the world in general and their parents in particular, expecting their universe to orient around them. This is the stage of primary narcissism in which the child is treated, in Freud’s phrase, as ‘His Majesty the baby’ (Freud 1995: 556). Serious problems result, however, if these attitudes persist into later life as the self becomes the chosen love object (secondary narcissism). According to Freud, in normal development, people later recognize that they must rely on significant others. ‘Anaclitic’ attachments are formed, self-love being displaced onto other people. The family and social life in general also come to impinge on the child’s desires, and these limitations are internalized. The child becomes aware of the existence of other people with their own needs and demands.

This brings us to why this widescale shift in subjectivity is happening, a matter which Freud did not foresee. Societies like Britain and the US encourage impossible desires and make reality testing difficult (Craib 1994). Idealism, which was once focussed on altruism (and emancipatory politics), is now the pursuit of selfexpression and the satisfaction of personal needs and wants. Disappointment is normal to psychological development. The process of the id (the unconscious part of the mind from which basic drives emerge) meeting with the harsh reality of social relations is, at least to a certain extent, therefore a positive thing. But it is increasingly uncommon in late modern capitalism for some groups of people. And pro-space activists are amongst those least likely to recognize the importance of disappointment. Craib and others offer a much needed extension of Freud’s analysis of the overly repressed child to cover a contemporary society in which there is simply not enough repression. Indeed, Craib believes the demand for expression of the id is the ideology of late modernity.

Consumption fulfils a symbolic role in narcissistic culture for the ‘insatiable personalities’ it generates (Dean 2000). Consuming goods can provide the illusory sense of omnipotence and self that the narcissist craves. They fantasize about their access to the world and its goods, failing to recognize the reality that they are still dependent individuals. If they make sufficient demands (particularly with the aid of money) they appear omnipotent and capable of acquiring and achieving almost anything. The reality principle has not struck home. And this is damaging in many ways, not least to other individuals whose rights are overridden and unrecognized. Furthermore, self-absorption of this kind is damaging to external as well as internal nature. Narcissism and cosmic society

How does this discussion of contemporary subjectivity in a globalized society relate to our main theme, that of an emergent cosmic society? What forms of subjectivity are now developing in relation to a society that is socializing, privatizing and humanizing the cosmos? Again, we find a shift, one both encouraging a new vision of an owned cosmos and underpinning its acquisition. Contemporary cosmic subjectivity remains in some respects the heir to the early individualism created in the Italian Renaissance and developed between the Enlightenment and the twentieth century. But the development towards adult narcissism has now been even further enhanced. Potentially owning and occupying parts of the universe beyond Earth are the cause and consequences of a rising cosmic consciousness, one simultaneously envisaging a cosmos out there waiting to be occupied while demanding entry into that same cosmos. Today’s individualistic cosmic narcissism is therefore very different from the individualism of ‘universal man’ in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Here we suggest, based on empirical work, that pro-space activists campaigning to further explore and develop the universe demonstrate an extreme form of this kind of subjectivity, and one in which the individual’s relationship to the universe is central (Ormrod 2007). There are strong indications that these pro-space activists (many from the quasi-technical new middle class) are amongst those most affected by late modern narcissism. These activists are pursuing fantasies about exploring and developing space which manifest themes from the infant’s experience of self during the stage of primary narcissism. This includes those relating to omnipotence and to unity; with the mother in particular and the universe in general. The adult narcissist seeks to regain the experience of primary narcissism, and fantasies about conquering and consuming space represent pursuit of this idealized relationship with the universe.

These fantasies are further encouraged by new developments in space tourism and plans for the private development and settlement of space. They also achieve a certain legitimacy largely through the ideology of the libertarian right. Those who have grown up in the ‘post-Sputnik’ era and were exposed at an early date to science fiction are particularly likely to engage in fantasies or daydreams about travelling in space, owning it, occupying it, consuming it and bringing it under personal control. Advocates talk about fantasies of bouncing up and down on the Moon or playing golf on it, of mining asteroids or setting up their own colonies. Of course not all of those people growing up in late modern societies come to fantasize about space at such an early age like this, and most are less single-minded in their attempts to control and consume the universe, but we argue that this is nonetheless the way in which some dominant sectors of Western society relate to the universe. It is not only pro-space activists, but many wealthy business people and celebrities who are lining up to take advantage of new commercial opportunities to explore space as tourists and of other ways of symbolically consuming the universe. The promise of power over the whole universe is therefore the latest stage in the escalation of the narcissistic personality. A new kind of ‘universal man’ is in the making. Space travel and possible occupation of other planets further inflate people’s sense of omnipotence.

Fromm (1976) examines how in Western societies people experience the world (or indeed the universe) through the ‘having’ mode, whereby individuals cannot simply appreciate the things around them, but must own and consume them. Mean and Wilsdon (2004) make a causal connection between the disenchanted universe viewed only as object and this kind of consumerism. ‘The underlying anxiety and disorientation that pervade modern societies in the face of a meaningless cosmos create both a collective psychic numbness and a desperate spiritual hunger, leading to an addictive, insatiable craving for ever more material goods’ (ibid.: 32–3). For the narcissistic pro-space activist, this sentiment means that they feel a desperate need not just to look at the Moon but to have immediate sensuous contact with it, and thereby bring it closer to their control: Some people will look up at the full Moon and they’ll think about the beauty of it and the romance and history and whatever. I’ll think of some of those too but the primary thing on my mind is gee I wonder what it looks like up there in that particular area, gee I’d love to see that myself. I don’t want to look at it up there, I want to walk on it. (25-year-old engineering graduate interviewed at ProSpace March Storm 2004)

This sentiment is even more apparent when considering the companies which now allow consumers to symbolically purchase a star (e.g. International Star Registry).

Here, too, there is a dialectic movement back towards how the universe is experienced. Humans’ sense of power in the universe means our experience of the cosmos as well as our selves is fundamentally changing: It really presents a different perspective on your life when you can think that you can actually throw yourself into another activity and transform it, and when we have a day when we look out in the sky and we see lights on the Moon, something like that or you think that I know a friend who’s on the other side of the Sun right now. You know, it just changes the nature of looking at the sky too. (46-year-old space scientist interviewed at ProSpace March Storm 2004)

A widespread cosmic narcissism of this kind might appear to have an almost spiritual nature, but the cosmic spirituality we are witnessing here is not about becoming immortal in the purity of the heavens. Rather, it is spirituality taking the form of self-worship; further aggrandizing the atomized, self-seeking, twenty-firstcentury individual (see Heelas 1996). Indeed, the pro-space activists we interviewed are usually opposed to those who would keep outer space uncontaminated, a couple suggesting we need to confront the pre-Copernican idea of a corrupt Earth and ideal ‘Heaven’.

The universe as object

For these cosmic narcissists, the universe is very much experienced as an object; something to be conquered, controlled and consumed as a reflection of the powers of the self. This vision is no different from the Baconian assumptions about the relationship between man and nature on Earth. This kind of thinking has its roots in Anaxagoras’ theory of a material and infinite universe, and was extended by theorists from Copernicus, through Kepler and Galileo, to Newton. The idea that the universe orients around the self was quashed by Copernicus as he showed that the Earth was not at the centre of the universe and therefore neither were we (see Freud 1973a: 326). However, science has offered us the promise that we can still understand and control it. Earlier, we heard how Robert Zubrin, founder of the Mars Society, trumpets Kepler’s role in developing the omniscient fantasy of science, and on that basis begins to lay out his plan to colonize Mars.

However, narcissistic relationships with external nature are intrinsically unsatisfying. Objectifying nature and the cosmos does not actually empower the self, but rather enslaves it. Pro-spacers’ lack of reality principle shows its head in a number of quite disturbing ways. Many activists had wanted to be astronauts but had been turned down. The first barrier of not meeting the requirements of a governmental programme has not dampened their enthusiasm. Within the US space programme only the elite got to fulfil these dreams. Now, private industry is beginning to offer more people this opportunity. One young activist said she would pay any price to go into space, a sentiment echoed by two of her friends. She was so unable to accept the limit to her personal power posed by space that she was prepared to spend all her income for life on the chance to go up into space for one day. Other people, like Randall Severy, have created high-risk companies like Cyberteams with the sole aim of getting to space, extending a personal desire to their professional lives and risking a lot in doing so. The family of Barbara Marx Hubbard, an early advocate, was clearly quite disturbed by her lack of reality principle (Marx Hubbard 1989). Her sister pleaded with her to spend less time on pro-space activism because she was neglecting other areas of her life. Her brother and father meanwhile conspired to stop her inheritance because of the money she was squandering on the pro-space cause.

The universe: from object to subject

If this is the universe as experienced by pro-space activists, then a contrary development, which we began to outline in Chapter 1, is the return to a fearful and estranged relationship with the universe, again experienced as a frightening subject controlling Earthly affairs from on high. It is a twenty-first-century version of the Platonic and mediaeval universes in which humans are made into repressed objects and thereby brought to heel. This is a relationship experienced by those not in control of the universe: those on the margins of Western society. Commodification, militarization and surveillance by the socially powerful are again making the universe into an entity dominating human society, as are contemporary cosmological theories divorced from most people’s understanding. Once more, socially and politically powerful people (some even claiming to be on a mission from God) are attempting to make the cosmos into a means by which they can control society on Earth. The combination of these two trends is a ‘Wizard of Oz’ effect, in which power is maintained by those with technological domination over the universe. But this is hidden by a mask of mysticism, which keeps the public in a position of fear and subservience. These developments are explored further over the next two chapters.

But alternative forms of consciousness can be developed. A dominant form of identity appropriate to a ‘cosmic society’ may not be universal and certainly cannot be guaranteed. But, for example, those social movements opposed to the developments we have been discussing are working towards the use of space for peaceful purposes and an alternative form of consciousness. Historical materialism looks to real material conditions as underlying human subjectivity. But we simultaneously recognize the possibility of new resistances and forms of subjectivity. Here, too, lie real and actual instabilities.

#### This causes a never-ending war against life and culminates in extinction.

Themi 8 – Tim, Prof @ Deakin U, “How Lacan’s Ethics Might Improve Our Understanding of Nietzsche’s Critique of Platonism: The Neurosis & Nihilism of a ‘Life’ Against Life,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2008, Agastya

But with our advancements in technological power outmatching by far any correlative advance in the awareness gained as a whole of our prehistoric Thing within: the great 21st century ecological disaster that too many academics and activists now increasingly predict, seems more than just a little possible. But to this increasingly macabre scenario, we must also add the renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons which occurs, no less, amidst a world where vital resources for energy and democracy are wearing thin[50]. For just such reasons, wilful ignorance of the Thing now bares results which Lacan’s Ethics reveals as far too terrifyingly possible to rationally accept; given that we have the Thing armed to the teeth now from that primitive id-like part of the brain, with no Sovereign Good, and all the way into a nuclear age.

CONCLUSION: THE NEUROSIS &amp; NIHILISM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.

This is why Lacan proposes that **his enquiry into ethics must be one to go “more deeply into the notion of the real”(LE:11). Further into what he would rather call the real, given that previous notions of ‘nature’ have been too far ‘different’––from being far too Platonic––than his own; and because it’s the very exclusions in these previous notions which upon return, as return of excess, are yielding our** most tragic problems.

Today when faced with problems of the magnitude of global warming––a special but by no means solo case of adverse environment change at present due to our physical treatment of the planet––we often think the answer is to be more moral, more good, and we are thankful when exponents of the Good in some way bring attention to the problem. However, the idea of the Good as introduced by Plato, and nigh all of its descendants whether secular, rationalist, religious or not, continue to predicate themselves on a radically false picture of the human-condition: if not still of the entire cosmos––which only then lines itself up aside of an age- old repression, a repression of das Ding, that Freudian Thing in our inner real which, when it returns after being disavowed and denied in the name of the Good too long, is even more devastating.

Presently we are accelerating along the path of what Lacan discloses as our civilisation’s “race towards destruction”, a “massive destruction”, “a resurgence of savagery”, snaking the paths traced out before us by the centuries long dominion of Western morality [51]; and the nihilism detected by Nietzsche before the turn of the 20th has never threatened to reach such the grand finale. But what I would have us take from this enquiry here is that this is not because we aren’t in accordance enough with a moral ideal of the Sovereign good, but rather, it’s because we aren’t in accordance enough with a proper understanding of the real. It’s because we still at some level think that being more moral, in accordance with the Good’s inherited repressive structures towards our drives, desire, and truthfulness about the real, is actually the answer to––rather than the source of––our most tragic problems.

The goal here is by no means then to encourage all to let their Things run wild––which would probably be nothing short of an instant conflagration––but this is why and precisely why we must desist from deluding ourselves under the tightening grip of a Sovereign Good, for this is precisely the move which cuts the Thing loose after pressing down for far too long, a slippery hand’s palming on the coils of a spring, forever readying the subsequent explosion. For when that which is really real––as opposed to what Christian-Platonism falsely called the ‘real’––is forced from mind, it can’t really disappear because it is real, and it tends to end up only in our gun-sights as an imaginary overlaying of an external other, when the signifier ‘enmity’ appears. The earth itself can even seem like the enemy after while, one which like Plato in his Phaedo, we might think then to escape from “as if from a prison”, and especially from “the bonds of the body”, in the hope that we may live one day without the earthly altogether[52]. Following such negations to their logical conclusion, life itself becomes enemy too, for as being made up of the earthly and organic, life could never be free of what it is in essence. And what is the death-drive Freud tells from the start, if not to return us sundry to that dust-bowl of the inorganic; as per that “second death”[53] fantasm Lacan salvages from the Monstre de Sade, which wills to go beyond the destruction of mere beings, by destroying too the principle from which fresh sets could emerge. Such negative devaluations of our earthly, organic life though are really of our own construction: as de Sade, like any pervert, is only the mirror which shows expressed what Platonic- neurotics are but hide inside––a cess-pit of loathing contempt for life, built up from the unconscious and disowned, distorted and damned up, built up, instinctual-ideational elements of their own subjective psyches, phobically ferocious of that Thingly real lying not so dormant, and readying within…

But is it now still possible as Nietzsche teaches to say ‘Yes’ to the real of nature both without and within––to return to it!––even though it is more frightful and we are less guaranteed protection of it than the Platonic history of metaphysicians taught? For with the further disclosures of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis––Lacan’s following up and extension of the meta-ethical implications of Freud: perhaps even Nietzsche, our great intellectual übermensch, may too have bitten off more snake- head than he could chew? From certain moments in Nietzsche’s texts we can perhaps interpret that he may have had this Thing in his sights, but saw nothing much to come of it, so instead, elected to turn away, though not without some perhaps hinted at self- amusement.[54]

But with psychoanalysis, rightly or wrongly, such truths are out. It doesn’t seem all positive at first, and perhaps it never entirely will. But we must not let this deeper disclosure desist us now from the core Nietzschean project of locating and overcoming the nihilism which begs us to take cover in idealising fictions, as if life as life is not worth living. Not because nihilism and the annihilation of the species is wrong in the sense of being immoral, but rather because it is bad art, mediocre art, and the ‘knowledge’ claims it trumpets on should only make us flare. If we are at our full intellectual and creative will to power, we can only consider such cultural-civil regressions as we saw on display with that whole propaganda comedy that surrounded the war for more oil in Iraq as infantile; the hapless results of sibling rivalries gone too far astray. But **we must also resist being caught up in the imaginary of those who would only re-preach to us now of a return to the Good, who would only redeploy such versions of nihilism’s precursory defensive fictions, the pernicious ones, which would only then re-falsify our data,** and leave us disappointed when the truth then re-emerges. Doing more harm than good does Platonism in the end by **leaving us untrained for the real**, with the habit instead to take some truth as ‘error’, and error as ‘truth’––as ‘real’––to the point even of epistemic dysfunction. Take the grotesque intellectual poverty of that whole Christian middle-ages for example, whence put into relation with the heights of Aristotle and his fellow Greeks, as Augustine and Aquinas amplified some of the worst bits of Platonism, and threw the rest into abyss.

The overcoming of the moralising good of Christian-Platonism though does by no means imply then a subsequent affirmation of all that brutal Roman like greed, slavery, decadence, circus-bread corruption and mindless colonial expansion that we’ve heard all about, and are hardly so free of with our corporate today––just ask a Latin-American for instance![55] For it is possible within the perspectives opened up by Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, as Silvia Ons puts it, to view a social-historical or individual neurosis of any kind: including the expressed acted-out, perverse-sadistic form that escapes when the Good is temporarily loosed of its repressive grip––and say to the would be Platonist: ‘No, not that, that’s not a cure, that’s a mirage; that’s sheer fantasy, resentment, spite; that’s not a cure it will only make things worse; worse in a different way, but worse nonetheless!’ By greater mindfulness then, with guided affirmation towards even that fearsome Freudian Thing that The Ethics of **Psychoanalysis has us find now in our inner natures: we can eventually again say ‘Yes’-to-life** in such the way that it overcomes the nihilism of not caring too much whether we as individuals or species live or die, whether we as culture or civilisation advance or decline. But we can only do this with fullest efficacy by freeing ourselves of all that wasted neurosis sickness that feels it must deny our Thing like aspect of the real: because from all those Christian-Platonic prejudices of the Good, it has been taught that such ‘things’ are too far beneath it. We must continue instead to train ourselves to stare the real directly in the face, without flinching, and that’s all we can do at least to start. For unless we can continue to utilise, sublimate, enjoy and get a positive, well-guided **jouissance** out of all aspects of life––including that Freudian Ding in our real––then the chances are we’re going to be at least in part, happy enough in no longer living it: offering not even a puff of genuine political praxis! We either face up to the death-drive snaking long beneath the dank, hidden history of the un-real, anti-real Good of Platonism––or let the disowned, un-understood drive resurge of its own volition **until it accidentally finishes us**!s Ethics, May 1960.

### Add-On – AFC

#### Interpretation – The negative must concede the affirmative framework if the standard is to traverse the fantasy.

#### 6 ways out if you concede AFC – T or theory, CPs, DA/Impact-Turns, Ks impacted to the aff, and Link-Turns.

#### 1 – Time skew – Winning the negative framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense and forces a 1AR restart against a 7 min 1NC – outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility – I can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse.

#### 2 – Topic Ed – Every debate would just be a framework debate which crowds out our ability to have core debates about the topic – that outweighs – we only have 2 months to debate the topic.

#### 3 – Prep skew – We can’t predict every single negative framework before round but they know the aff coming into round which makes pre-tournament prep impossible – outweighs on scope since there are millions of K’s and NC’s that could negate.

#### Fairness is a voter – debate requires equity for objective evaluation. Drop the negative on 1AC theory – skews put me at an unrecoverable disadvantage from the outset. Use competing interps on 1AC theory – the negative has 7 minutes to answer the shell, and you can’t reasonably concede my framework. No RVIs – you’d read a counter-interp for 7 minutes of the NC and the debate would end right there.

### U/V

#### 1 – Yes 1AR theory – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps – the 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.

#### 2 – Permissibility affirms on this topic: (A) The aff is the status quo since existing I-Law treaties and the OST all ban private space appropriation. That affirms since negating requires a coherent obligation to take action – absent one you default to an action being unjust. Probability flips aff – there are infinite ways an action could be unjust, and only one way for the action to be just. (B) [Unjust](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust) is defined as not morally right, therefore the negative must prove that the resolution is expressly right or good since neutrality means it’s not necessarily right and the aff would win (C) Reciprocity – it’s reciprocal since the neg gets exclusive access to T which gives them a 2-1 advantage on the theoretical layer – granting me permissibility solves since I get a 2-1 substantive advantage

#### 3 – Presumption Affirms: (A) Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason B) Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water (C) Its Intuitive – If I told you my name was Agastya you’d believe me.

#### 4 – The negative must concede that either Permissibility or presumption affirms. Violations are preemptive and inherent to the interp. (A) Key to 1AR strat, the 1AR is much too short to win multiple layers such as theory, framework and contention as well as disprove arguments like skepticism so I need creative outs and triggers to substantively compensate. (B) Anything else incentivizes the NC to load up with multiple forms of triggers but splitting up the two forces more nuanced engagement as they can be leveraged against one another.

#### 5 – Reject NIBs – make the 1ar structurally impossible since I cant turn them so I have to get through 7 minutes of no risk args in 4 minutes

#### 6 – Ethical universalism requires the stigmatization of the Other through the projection of the lack.

Zevnik 16 – Andreja Zevnik, University of Manchester, “KANT AVEC SADE: Ethics entrapped in perversions of law and politics,” from “Jacques Lacan: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics,” Edited by Samo Tomšič and Andreja Zevnik, 2016, Routledge, sjbe

From this introductory discussion one can extrapolate that the discourse of morality and ethics relies on illusions: that is the illusion of objective good actually existing and the illusion of it being a factor leading to a better more ethical life. If a subject acts as a moral subject towards its ‘neighbour’, that is a person who is at the receiving end of ‘ethical actions’, a life of a community can be considered as better and more ethical. As Alenka Zupancˇicˇ points out in her piece ‘The Subject of the Law’, the psychoanalytic intervention into the realm of ethics addresses this illusion of good as a factor of a better life.1 Psychoanalysis, so Zupancˇicˇ argues (1998) speaks of two disillusionments: the first is Freud’s and the second Lacan’s. However, the Lacanian one is of greater importance, as it reveals the truth about the Freud’s critique, as well as of Kant’s theory of ethics.2 Thus in terms of psychoanalysis we can speak of first a Freudian and then a Lacanian blow. The Freudian blow is directed at Kant and targets the idea that moral imperative is freed of pathological origins. Zupancˇicˇ (1998: 41) summarizes Freud’s objection in the following way: What philosophy calls the moral law and, more precisely, what Kant calls the categorical imperative is in fact nothing other but the superego. […] This judgement provokes an ‘effect of disenchantment’ that calls into doubt any endeavour to base ethics on foundations other than ‘pathological’. […] ethics is thus nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous and honourable inclinations of the subject. The second Lacanian blow is aimed first at Freud and secondly at Kant. Lacan in his critique does not challenge Freud’s ideological or superegoical interpretations of ethics but focuses on what Freud (and Kant) considered as the cornerstone of ethical attitude.3 ‘Thy shall love your neighbour as thyself’ is commonly considered an ethical axiom par excellence. Yet Lacan is of a different opinion and sets out to critique it. First, Lacan in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis sees the above statement as a representation of traditional ethics, which is in ‘service of good’ and the sharing of good, but points out that the act of ‘sharing’ is different from ethics. The sharing of good comes ‘naturally’ or rather ‘it is in the nature of the good to be altruistic’, as he states (Lacan 1992: 186). And further, the good that is shared or acknowledged as an asset of a good life in a community is of a particular kind. It is, as Lacan (1992: 187) continues: ‘the good of others provided that it remains in the image of my own’. Thus the above statement paints a very closed picture of an ethical community. Love that is one to share with the neighbours is a type of love one considers as good, which in turn creates an ‘ethical act’ in an image of one’s good. Such a community is altruistic rather than ethical, and the good guiding it is not universal but that which the subject considers it as such. In turn it means that the other is a recipient of one’s good only for as long as it ascribes to the same value of good. Lacan thus highlighted that traditional ethics operates with highly individualized accounts of good. This realization bears great political significance. If good is always made in the image of the subject recognizing it then the good that is shared is likewise a reflection of the subject’s desires. Or to put it differently, the neighbour receives what the subject recognizes as in need. This point is very straightforward and easily translated in modern political discourse: think of human rights discourse in relation to postcolonial, ‘third-world’, or feminist struggles. The observations of the Western subjects (or international organizations) concerning the struggles for emancipation or human rights breaches taking place in so-called ‘underdeveloped’ countries follow that logic. We ‘judge’ others’ situation according to our expectations and knowledge. What it means to live a humane life and whether others live life worthy of a human being, whether others’ rights are violated, are all questions judged on our image of humanity, good life, or rights. This game between the desire and the image in which we judge what surrounds us is at the heart of the liberal conception of rights, duties, and morality. However, this play of desire reveals something else. Lacan said that one’s desire is always the desire of the Other (Lacan 1998). Thus the moment of tension occurs when the two desires are met in contradiction. That is when the Other does not correspond with the image we have of it. Who then is the Other we can tolerate? Zupancˇicˇ (1998) gives a modern example of the aforementioned moral imperative. Instead of asking to love your neighbour as yourself, the modern imperative, she states, calls for the recognition of the Other. No longer is there the need to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’, the modern age mantra is that the Other has the right to be different. ‘Admittedly’, as Zupancˇicˇ (1998: 43) writes: [T]his commandment does not require that we love this other, it is enough that we tolerate him/her. [… But] what happens if this other is really the Other, if his/her difference is not only ‘cultural’, ‘folkloric’ but a fundamental difference. Are we still to respect him/her, to love him/her? The answer to this question is rather obvious. The Other whom we should love and respect is the Other we are comfortable with, one, who is not too different and we can respect. The Other earns our respect, as Alain Badiou (2001: 24) writes, only when and if he is respecting the differences. ‘Just as there can be no freedom for the enemies of freedom, so there can be no respect for those whose difference consists precisely in not respecting differences’ (ibid.). This encounter with radical difference – or intolerance – is precisely the point at which ethics should be thought. That is, unlike the liberal discourse of ethics, which would have stopped when met with the impasse of intolerance, the psychoanalytic ethics advocated by Lacan begins precisely at the moment of intolerance or radical difference. Lacan would see this encounter as an encounter concerning our jouissance. By definition jouissance is in itself strange, other, and dissimilar; thus it is not the Other who makes it disruptive. But, as Zupancˇicˇ (1998: 43–44) puts it: ‘it is not simply the jouissance of the neighbour […] that is strange to me. The kernel of the problem is that I experience my own jouissance as strange, dissimilar, other and hostile’. In other words, it is my experience of something within me that I find hostile and that in turn I externalize and recognize it in the image of the Other (my neighbour). Hence psychoanalysis intervenes in the field of politics and ethics at the level of jouissance or the level which was more traditionally ascribed to evil. The psychoanalytic accounts thus consider ethical that which addresses the subject’s repressed material, and deals with moments in which it comes to the surface.

#### 7 – Appeals towards absolute truth are epistemically inaccessible through the lack – this masks the symbolic order.

Glynos 10 – Jason Glynos, “The grip of ideology: a Lacanian approach to the theory of ideology”, Department of Government, University of Essex, p196-198

In this view, **the objective laws of history** can be known with the certainty of natural science. These laws **make possible the prediction of positively describable stages of history** (communism follows capitalism follows feudalism, etc.) **and determine the necessary relations between revolutionary tasks and positively identifiable agents** (only workers can bring about the overthrow of capitalism). **This particular view** is sustained by an epistemological infallibilism which **suggests that anything that denies the true essence of society embodied in such scientific knowledge is ideological**. Here, ideological critique involves an epistemological operation whereby one substance (positive appearances) is dissolved to reveal another substance (the positive essence of what society is and will be). Ideological critique involves displacing false knowledge by true knowledge. A particular strand of **liberalism** can also be said to **appeal to a substantive ‘truth’ concerning the way society is organized or how it can best be organized. This knowledge**, however, **is not** immediately **accessible** with the desired certainty. Governed by a fallibilist epistemology of the (J.S.) Millian sort, and in contrast to the above-described Marxian infallibilis t epistemology, **such a liberal approach** effectively **collapses ideology into** just another perspective that might or might not be true, relegating it to **the private sphere of social and market relations**. The most promising way forward, in this view, is to allow as many views as possible to compete in the hope of approximating the truth as closely as possible. Only when an emergent truth achieves the requisite consensus can it be adopted by public institutions. Here, ideological critique again involves an epistemological operation whereby a view is declared ideological if it seeks to promote itself as a truth for which consensus is lacking. Like the Marxian viewpoint, such a liberal approach posits the existence of a substantive truth about society. But it does not share the epistemological certainty of the former. Nevertheless, in both cases ideological critique is an epistemological issue concerning knowledge and our capacity to access it. In contrast to both these approaches, **Laclau treats society not as something whose true substantive nature we can access directly** through careful scientific scrutiny or asymptotically through the free competition of different views, **but as constitutively lacking**. In order to understand this it is important to recall that his conception of **society is a discursive conception**. It is here that **the full force of the constitutive nature of language is brought to bear**: **all meaningful conceptions of society**, in this view, **are discursive**. From this perspective, **the opposition is** not between representations of society on the one hand and society as such on the other, but **between representations of society and the failure of representation itself**. Or: the **opposition is not between substantive truth on the one side, and a ‘false’ or ‘approximately true’ ideas on the other**, but between substance and non-substance. Here, in other words, epistemological incapacity is transformed into the positive ontological condition of politics and political subjectivity. It is because our symbolic representations of society are constitutively lacking that politico-hegemonic struggle is made possible. **The elimination of ideological misrecognition** therefore **involves not uncovering a true substance beneath a false substance**, nor the progressive approximation to a true substance, **but revealing the non-substance that marks all substance**. In short, **nothing positive can be said about the ‘truth’ of society except that it is incomplete**—in Lacanian terms, that **there is a ‘lack in the symbolic Other’**. Thus, society exists as a totality only insofar as **the social subject posits its existence** as such **through** the mediation of **empty signifiers**. In explaining this Laclau has recourse to the Lacanian process of symbolic identification. Earlier I noted how society is lacking an ultimate signifier that would render the socio-symbolic order complete. This was an ontological postulate. This means that **any signifier that claims to close off this field will never be adequate** to the task, and will play the role of an impostor. Ideology describes the situation in which the social subject misrecognizes the lack in the symbolic Other by identifying a particular concrete content with what Laclau calls an empty signifier (in Lacanian terms, the ‘master’ signifier). A social subject identifies with, for example, the signifier ‘Justice for All’ insofar as the latter carries a content that appears to promise a fullness, insofar as it promises to resolve issues that are perceived as directly affecting the social subject. I conclude this section with Laclau’s description of the hegemonic logic: Let us consider the extreme situation of radical disorganization of the social fabric. In such conditions—which are not far away from Hobbes’s state of nature—people need an order, and the actual content of it becomes a secondary consideration. ‘Order’ as such has no content, because it only exists in the various forms in which it is actually realized, but in a situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To hegemonize something, i.e., exactly to carry out this filling function. (We have spoken about ‘order’, but obviously ‘unity’, ‘liberation’, ‘revolution’, etcetera belong to the same order of things. Any term which, in a certain political context becomes the signifier of the lack, plays the same role. **Politics is possible because the constitutive impossibility of society can only represent itself through the production of empty signifiers**.)16

#### 8 – no TT – it’s NSDA rules.

**NSDA 21** – 2021-22 Lincoln-Douglas Ballot, https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/Sample-Lincoln-Douglas-Debate-Ballot-Blank.pdf // JB

Each **debater** has the burden to **prove** their **side** of the resolution **more valid** as a **general principle**. It is **unrealistic** to expect a debater to prove **complete validity or invalidity** of the resolution. The **better debater** is the one who, on the whole, proves their side of the resolution **more valid** as a general principle.