## 1

**Permissibility negates- Lack of obligation proves the resolution false- the res specifically says you have to prove obligation because ought is defined as a moral obligation, you cannot be obligated and lack an obligation simultaneously.**

**Presume neg- A. We assume statements to be false until proven true takes out all of there presumption and permissibility claims. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories. The lack of a reason something is false does not me it is assumed to be true. B. Statements are more often false then true . If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true in one way by demonstrating that it is indeed red, where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways.**

## 2

#### The metaethic is perspectivism – truth is not absolute but rather created by individuals based on their own individual perspective. Prefer it

#### [1] Opacity – we can never access another person’s perspective because we can never fully understand who someone else is or what they think. Every truth I create cannot be universalized because I can’t guarantee that they will create the same truth because they do what they want

#### [2] Linguistics – Truth is constructed by language, which is completely arbitrary. Nothing tells me that a chair is a chair; I only assign it that name arbitrarily because I want to. Meaning can’t be contained within language if we make it up ourselves, and truth doesn’t exist absent language.

#### In the State of Nature, every action is considered a threat. The brutality of the State of nature is a result of our own egoistic desires to be the dominate meaning creator

Parrish 3, Rick. "Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event, vol. 7 no. 4, 2005. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/244119.

Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that “the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice.”29 A more simplistic understanding of the brutality of the state of nature, which David Gauthier calls the “simple rationality account,”30 has it that mere materialistic competition for goods is the cause of the war of all against all, but such rivalry is a secondary manifestation of the more fundamental competition among all persons to be the dominant creator of meaning. Certainly, Hobbes writes that persons most frequently “desire to hurt each other” because “many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that **the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword**.”31 But this competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators. **In the state of nature, “where every man is his own judge**,”32 persons will “mete good and evil by diverse measures,”33 creating labels for things as they see fit, based on individual appetites. One of the most significant objects that receives diverse labels in the state of nature is ‘threat’. Even if most people happen to construe threat similarly, there will be serious disagreement regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly-held definition. This is of course the key to the famous Security Dilemma that international relations theorists spend so much time trying to overcome34 — certain perfectly **innocent actions by one person**(or state) can easily be construed, and rationally **must be construed, as a threat**. Furthermore, any attempt by one person to allay another’s fears about the threatening nature of actions must be taken as strategic disinformation, rather than as genuine explanation. Even if “I agree with you in principle about your right to preserve yourself,” this agreement is useless “if I disagree about whether this is the moment for you to implement that right.”35 Given that **persons “are individual in experience**, they are individual in **their conceptions and in their speech**. Their power of reasoning with words . . . dissociates them and provokes violent competition”36 specifically because concepts that seem simple invoke very different interpretations. **If there were some universally objective** and knowable set of circumstances that constituted Threat as such, **the rationally self-interested persons** of the state of nature **would not have to seek control** over all things **for their own protection**. **All persons could both avoid actions** that would be defined as threat **and shed the overbearing suspicion that**, taken **together**, **make the** Hobbesian **state of nature so** unbearably **brutish**.

#### Only the sovereign can create moral truths; our ethical obligation is to the state. Otherwise, morality is infinitely regressive and impossible to determine.– Absent the sovereign, ethics fail, since everyone has competing conceptions of the good.

Parrish 4 (Rick Parrish. "Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event 7, no. 4 (2005) <https://muse.jhu.edu/>)

All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign's first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes' theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign. Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes' mention of people as wolves, PaulJohnson argues that "one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the primary terms in which men try to conduct their social lives." 58 "The whole raison d'être of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes," 59 without which humans would "fly off in all directions" 60 and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition. 26. It is not surprising that so many noted students of Hobbes have reached this conclusion, given how prominently he himself makes this claim. According to Hobbes, "in the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from others concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things, that might fall in controversy." 61 The main categories of the sovereign's tasks are "to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, [and] to know and judge of all controversies," 62 but each of these duties is a subspecies of its ultimate duty to be the sole and ultimate definer in matters of public importance. It is only through the sovereign's effective continued accomplishment of this duty that the people of a commonwealth avoid the definitional problems that typify the state of nature. 27. Judging controversies, which Hobbes lists as the third main task of the sovereign, is the duty most obviously about being the ultimate definer. In fact, Hobbes declares it a law of nature that "in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein." 63 As I repeatedly alluded to above, this agreement to abide by the decision of a third party arbitrator, a sovereign in the commonwealth, is necessary because of the fundamentally perspectival and relative nature of persons' imputations of meaning and value into the situations they construct. Hobbes understands this problem, as evidenced by his claim that "seeing right reason is not existent, the reason ofsome man or men must supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power" 64 to dictate meanings that will be followed by all. The sovereign is even protected from potential democratic impulses, by which a 'true' meaning would be that agreed upon by the greatest number of people. Because "no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty," they willstill "come to blows . . . for want of a right reason constituted by nature" 65 unless both the majority and the minority agree to abide by the meanings promulgated by the sovereign. 28. These meanings are usually created and promulgated by the sovereign in the form of laws, another of the tasks with which 7/29/13 RickParrish | Derrida's Economyof Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract | Theory& Event 7:4 https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v007/7.4parrish.html 13/42 Hobbes charges it. In one of his clearest explanations of the law, Hobbes writes that "it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life." 66 The civil law is the set of the sovereign's definitions for ownership, justice, good, evil, and all other concepts that are important for the maintenance of peace in the commonwealth. When everyone follows the law (that is, when everyone follows the sovereign's definitions) there are far fewer conflicts among persons because everyone appeals to the same meanings. This means that people know what meanings others will use to evaluate the actions of themselves and others, so the state of nature's security dilemmas and attempts to force one's own meanings upon others are overcome.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the will of the sovereign. Prefer it because it outweighs on bindingness: Only the sovereign is able to get everyone to follow their rule and enforce the law, it creates motivations for any moral rules we create. Impact Calc: Only evaluate impacts to structural purpose – what you justify through doing the action. We can control what we justify but we can’t control what we cause.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Moral Discourse- outside of the state there is no regulative authority to ensure that individuals are capable of engaging in the same moral language. For example, one party can think good means x and another thinks that good means y. The state clarifies this dispute by being an ultimate arbiter and declaring what is good and bad. This means that absent my standard, moral language makes no sense.

#### [2] Infinite Regress- other moral theories inevitably fail because individuals can question why they follow them, but state based morality escapes this because individuals consent to the state by virtue of engaging in it.

#### [3] Constitutivism– other moral theories might matter in the abstract but obligations differ based on the nature of agency. For example, a janitor has different obligations than teachers, in the same vein the state has unique obligations that might be inconsistent with morality in general.

#### Now, negate:

#### 1] The aff obligates governments to act – this is incoherent because it implies an authority higher than the state to constrain the sovereign. Only sovereign entities can create moral obligations, so the state can’t have an obligation to act.

#### 2] Restrictions – you can’t make the state do something that contradicts or restricts itself – the resolution places an obligation on the sovereign, but that’s impossible bc the sovereign creates morality.

#### 3] Allowing people like government workers to strike directly decreases the power of the state, meaning that an unconditional right to strike would mean that the sovereign loses power, which is bad because we would end up in the state of nature.

## 3

#### [A] Interpretation: Debaters may not read independent framework justifications that are not part of a complete syllogism or theory of power. To clarify, an independent justification defends only one part of the complete framework and can be extended by itself to justify the entirety of their standard

#### [B] Violation: They read aspecc, act omission distinction, reject calc indicts, etc.

#### [C] Standards:

[1] time skew: I necessarily have to respond to every framework justification because conceding even one is damning, but they can extend any to win the round. Makes them functionally NIBs since a response can’t be offensive and they each need to be line by lined. Outweighs on magnitude since their frameworks take a longer time to line by line but the utility of each response is marginal since they don’t need to extend it.

[2] phil ed: their model incentivizes debaters to bastardize utilitarianism by extending one justification that only partially makes the framework true and spinning it to defend all of the standard – kills clash since we only debate the least contested aspect of util and it’s an inaccurate defense of the theory.

#### [D] Fairness is a voter because unfair args arbitrarily skew round evaluation. Education is a voter because schools have an a priori commitment to teaching students. Drop the debater on neg theory – [1] drop the argument incentivizes abusive affs that bait theory and then collapse to substance by kicking case or extending tricks – means neg always loses [2] 2ar collapse ensures the aff will always win if they have free range of arguments – drop the debater is key to neg layering. No aff rvi’s – [A] incentivizes aff to read abusive interps and arguments and just focus on prepping a long counterinterp to always win [B] creates a chilling effect – aff is uniquely dangerous on theory because they get to read a long counterinterp in the 1ar and then get the 2ar to collapse, weigh, and contextualize: negs would always be disincentivized from reading theory against good theory debaters which leads to infinite abuse. Prefer competing interps – reasonability creates a race to the bottom with both debaters being as abusive as possible and collapses to competing interps because it uses an offense-defense paradigm.

## Case