#### I value morality.

#### The metaethic is practical reason. Prefer:

#### [1] Regress – practical reason is inescapable because when you question why you should use practical reason, you are using reason itself. Anything else is infinitely regressive and nonbinding because you can always ask “why should I do that” continuously without any terminal justification. Bindingness is required in morality; otherwise people could opt out of it and have no moral guidance.

#### [2] Action theory – Any action can be split into infinite smaller actions. For example, when I’m taking a bite of food, I am making infinite movements of my hand and mouth – only reason allows you to unify the action. If we can’t unify actions, then we can’t call actions moral or immoral because they are made up of infinite different combinations of smaller ones.

#### [3] Bindingness - Agency has the largest jurisdiction of any possible enterprise – even constant temporal changes in the subject presuppose agency

#### Ferrero 09 (Luca Ferrero, [Luca Ferrero is a Philosophy professor at University of California, Riverside. His areas of interest are Agency Theory, including Intentionality and Personal identity; Practical Reasoning; and Meta-Ethics], “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency”. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV, Jan 12, 2009. https://philarchive.org/archive/FERCATv1

Agency is special in two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.¹² All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessarily belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ‘radical re-evaluation’ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.

#### And, practical reason requires that all actions are universalizable – moral law has to apply to everyone. Agents acknowledge their ability to reason when they reason, which means they must acknowledge the rights to reason of all other agents; it is incoherent to say that 2+2=4 for one person but not another. an agent must respect the right of another to pursue the same end. Willing a maxim that violates freedom is a contradiction in conception – you cannot violate someone’s freedom without having your own freedom to do so. Thus, the standard is consistency with equal and outer freedoms. Prefer additionally:

#### [1] All actions presuppose the unconditional goodness of humanity – we have to treat others as ends in themselves. This hijacks other frameworks because the only reason we care about finding moral truths is the value of humanity.

**Korsgaard 83** (Christine Korsgaard, [Christine Marion Korsgaard is an American [philosopher](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosopher) and Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University whose main scholarly interests are in moral philosophy and its history; the relation of issues in moral philosophy to issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of personal identity; the theory of personal relationships; and in normativity in general], “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) SHS AK

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, [they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of [are] objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### [2] Humans naturally aspire to be rational and impulsively attempt to reason from a perspective that transcends their unique circumstance – proves my framework is key to a stable concept of agency. This hijacks other frameworks because they presuppose a consistent concept of an agent; without a clearly defined agent, ethics have nothing to guide and fail.

**Velleman 05** David J. Velleman. [J. David Velleman is Professor of Philosophy and Bioethics at New York University and Miller Research Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. He primarily works in the areas of ethics, moral psychology, and related areas such as the philosophy of action, and practical reasoning], “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics.” *Self to Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005, <https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/logic/self-self-selected-essays?format=HB&isbn=9780521854290> SHS AK

Why not accept "I don't feel like it" as a reason on this occasion while resolving to reject it on all others? Again the answer is clear. If a consideration counts as a reason for acting, then it counts as a reason whenever it is true. And on almost any morning, it's true that you don't feel like swimming. Yet if a reason is a consideration that counts as a reason whenever it's true, then why not dispense with reasons so defined? Why do you feel compelled to act for that sort of consideration? Since you don't feel like swimming, you might just roll over and go back to sleep, without bothering to find some fact about the present occasion from which you're willing to draw similar implications whenever it is true. How odd, to skip exercise in order to sleep and then to lose sleep anyway over finding a reason not to exercise! ~ Kant offered an explanation for this oddity. His explanation was that acting for reasons is essential to being a person, something to which you unavoidably aspire. In order to be a person, you must have an approach to the world that is sufficiently coherent and constant to qualify as a single, continuing point-of-view. And part of what gives you a single, continuing point-of-view is your acceptance of particular considerations as having the force of reasons whenever they are true. We might be tempted to make this point by saying that you are a unified, persisting person and hence that you do approach practical questions from a point-of-view framed by constant reasons. But this way of making the point wouldn't explain why you feel compelled to act for reasons; it would simply locate acting for reasons in a broader context, as part of what makes you a person. One of Kant's greatest insights, however, is that a unified, persisting person is something that you are because it is something that you aspire to be. Antecedently to this aspiration, you are merely aware that you are capable of being a person. But any creature aware that it is capable of being a person, in Kant's view, is ipso facto capable of appreciating the value of being a person and is therefore ineluctably drawn toward personhood. The value of being a person in the present context is precisely that of attaining a perspective that transcends that of your current, momentary self. Right now, you would rather sleep than swim, but you also know that if you roll over and sleep, you will wake up wishing that you had swum instead. Your impulse to decide on the basis of reasons is, at bottom, an impulse to transcend these momentary points-of-view, by attaining a single, constant perspective that can subsume both of them. It's like the impulse to attain a higher vantage point that overlooks the restricted standpoints on the ground below. This higher vantage point is neither your current perspective of wanting to sleep, nor your later perspective of wishing you had swum, but a timeless perspective from which you can reflect on now-wanting-this and later-wishing-that, a perspective from which you can attach constant practical implications to these considerations and come to a stable, all-things-considered judgment.

#### [3] We adopt certain identities to govern our actions like a debater – this presupposes agency and hijacks ROBs and ROJs because a judge is a practical identity.

CHRISTINE M. **Korsgaard 92** Christine Korsgaard, [Christine Marion Korsgaard is an American [philosopher](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosopher) and Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University whose main scholarly interests are in moral philosophy and its history; the relation of issues in moral philosophy to issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of personal identity; the theory of personal relationships; and in normativity in general] “The Sources of Normativity”, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University 16-17 Nov 1992 /SHS AK recut

The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there [is] were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

#### [4] Oppression is caused by arbitrary exclusion of others – only universalizability makes sure that we include everyone equally. Farr 02

Arnold Farr. [Arnold Farr is a Philosophy professor at the University of Kentucky. His research interests are German idealism, Marxism, critical theory, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy. He has published numorous articles and book chapters on all of these subjects], “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?”, 2002, blog.ufba.br/kant/files/2009/12/Can-a-Philosophy-of-Race-Afford-to-Abandon-the.pdf. /SHS AK recut

The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empirical character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally significant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents.

#### [6] Consequentialism fails – A] Induction fails – 1. saying that induction works relies on induction itself because it assumes that past trends will continue, which means it’s circular and unjustified 2. It assumes specific causes of past consequences which can’t be verified as the actual cause B] Butterfly effect - every action has infinite consequences so it is impossible to evaluate an action, also means any brightline is arbitrary and self-serving; one government policy could end up causing nuclear war in a million years. C] Aggregation is impossible – pleasure and pain are subjective and qualitative

**[8] Performativity – arguing against my framework presupposes freedom because without freedom to reason you would not be able to make arguments and try to win. – this means that contesting any of my arguments proves my framework true.**

#### Thus the advocacy - A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I’m willing to spec what you want as long as I don’t abandon my maxim and you should check all interps in CX otherwise assume I-meet. PICs don’t negate: a] General principles don’t defend an absolute action, they tolerate exceptions b] Fails under my framework because they create arbitrary exceptions, which means it’s not universalizable.

### Offense

#### Agents’ freedom of will comes first. Protecting the unconditional right to strike is an example of free will that is both universalizable and protects workers from coercion by the employer. (protection of their humanity??)

Chima Sylvester C Chima 2013 Dec 19. Global medicine: Is it ethical or morally justifiable for doctors and other healthcare workers to go on strike? doi: 10.1186/1472-6939-14-S1-S5 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3878318/

Some philosophers have described moral obligations or duties, which ought to guide ethical behavior, such as the duty of fidelity or the obligation to keep promises, and beneficence - the obligation to do 'good' [10]. However, it has been suggested that some other equally compelling moral duties or ethical obligations may conflict with the above duties, such as the right to justice. Justice is the right to fair treatment in light of what is owed a person [63]. For example, it may be argued that everybody is equally entitled to a just wage for just work. The philosopher Immanuel Kant based his moral theory on a categorical imperative which encourages moral agents to act, based on a principle, which they would deem to become a universal law [64]. One can argue that the decision by any HCW to go on strike may not be universalisable. However, looking at this decision from the principle of respect for autonomy, or freedom of choice, one can conclude that individual autonomy is a sentiment which is desirable for all human beings. Accordingly, every worker should be free to choose whether to work or not, based on a whether any specific set of conditions of their own choosing have been met. Kant argues further that moral agents or individuals should be treated, "whether in your own person or in that of any other, never solely as a means, but always as an end" [64]. This idea that individuals should be treated as ends in themselves has influenced political philosophy for centuries, and stresses the libertarian ideology that people should not have their individual freedoms curtailed either for others or for the good of society in general [10,64]. From this axiomatic considerations, one can conclude that it would be unethical for people to be used as slaves or be forced to work for inadequate wages or under slave-like conditions [4,10,12,51].

#### Corporations must not provide workers with methods to satisfy their desires and set their own ends. The unconditional right to strike allows for this right. Bowie 98

A Kantian Theory of Meaningful, Norman E. Bowie Vol. 17, No. 9/10, How to Make Business Ethics Operational: Creating Effective Alliances: The 10th Annual EBEN Conference (Jul., 1998), pp. 1083-1092 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25073937?origin=JSTOR-pdf>

1. A corporation can be considered moral in that Kantian sense only if the humanity of employees is treated as an end and not as a means merely. 2. If a corporation is to treat the humanity of employees as an end and not as a means, merely, then a corporation should honor the self-respect of the employees.3. To honor the employees’ self respect, the employee must have a certain amount of independence as well as the ability to satisfy a certain amount of their desires. Thus, the corporation should allow a certain amount of independence and make it possible that employees can satisfy a certain amount of their desires. 4. In an economic system, people achieve independence and satisfaction of their desires using their wages which they earn as employees. Thus a corporation should pay employees a living wage, that is, a wage sufficient to provide a certain amount of independence and some amount of satisfaction of desires. though this is as much as one can say given the Kantian text, I believe one can begin to formulate a Kantian theory of meaningful work. First, meaningful work provides a salary sufficient for the worker to exercise her independence and provides for her phsyical well-being and the satisfaction of some of her desires. Second, it seems obvious that meaningful work in a capitalist economy, be it the work of managers or the work of employees, must support the dignity of human beings. That is, capitalist work should support or enhance the dignity of human beings as moral agents. And since for Kant autonomy and rationality are necessary for moral agency. Work that deadens autonomy or that undermines rationality is immoral.

#### The unconditional right to strike is the obligation for the government because in order for workers to enter the workplace, it must be an equal playing field, preventing employers from being in able to arbitirarily interfere or use workers as a mere means to an end. Without it, there are no inhibitions to corporations exploiting workers through treatment as a mere means. Thus, a legitimate pre-fiat agreement between employer and employee could not exist.

Borowski, P. J. (1998). *Journal of Business Ethics, 17(15), 1623–1632.*

#### <https://sci-hub.se/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1006071503101>

In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant writes: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”8 People are not objects that we simply have for use at our disposal. The manager who is above us, the employee who works under us must never be treated as anything less than a human person in the thought of Kant. A principle that governs business by saying the most ineffective people reach management positions goes against the heart of Kant’s theory. Treating people simply as a means is to regard them as something that we use for our own purposes without their full and free consent. Such actions are inherently wrong. Being used against one’s will simply as a means to someone else’s end violates individual freedom. In an age where technology continues to run nearly every aspect of our lives, there may be a tendency to treat one another as simply an object that is programmed to perform a task. Managers are more than computers who have been programmed to increase the company’s profits; employees are more than mere robots who have been given the job to complete their assigned tasks. Businesses are made up of human beings who work together for a common goal. Business is people who work together to supply other humans with goods and services. Business is primarily an activity for and by human beings. The philosophy of Kant reflects an essential element of business: it is made up of rational beings. With that in mind, those who make up business (managers and employees) should begin to act as rational beings. This thinking is echoed in the writings of Pope Paul II in his encyclical, Laborem Exercens (On Human Work). The belief of Kant in the value of the human person is paralleled by Pope John Paul II as we read: . . . the primary basis of the value of work is man himself, who is its subject. This leads immediately to a very important conclusion of an ethical nature: however true it may be that man is destined for work and called to it, in the first place work is “for man” and not man “for work.” . . . Given this way of understanding things, and presupposing that different sorts of work that people do can have greater or lesser objective value, let us try nevertheless to show that each sort is judged above all by the measure of the dignity of the subject of work, that is to say the person, the individual who carries it out. 9 What does being ethical entail? To Kant it entails treating others as rational human beings. Where does work receive its value? To Pope John Paul II it is rooted in the very person of the individual worker. The basic work relationship between management and employee needs to reflect these values. It is in a relationship between two people that businesses are founded on.

#### UNDV:

#### Interp:

#### 1] 1AR and 1AC Theory – a] the aff gets it because otherwise the 1NC could engage in unchecked, infinite abuse which outweighs anything else, b] it’s drop the debater because the 2AR is too short to win a shell AND substance so theory can only check abuse for the aff if it’s a win condition, c] no neg RVI because otherwise they could dump on the shell for 6 minutes and get away with anything by sheer brute force,

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#### [1] Let me weigh the case against the K - otherwise it a) moots 6 minutes of the 1ac and b) I don’t have any perspective to respond to the K from so I can’t test its truth value

#### [2] The K is impact-justified – you have not normatively and logically proven a framing mechanism so there no actual given reason why the K is bad – even if the impact is bad you haven’t proven why – takes out the K

**[3] Conceded indexicals – it’s impossible to weigh between frameowrks because they presuppose a higher up framework and thus presuppose their own truth, so proving an obligaiton under any index is sufficient to vote aff - You conceded indexicals – this still applies to the K and means you still vote aff even if they win the K in two ways: a) I make a philosophical claim about the world and how it should be and they do too in their kritik which means their role of the ballot logically cannot exclude my offense and you can still vote aff because I’m winning under** my index of truth and b) even if their arg is prefiat the argument I made still applies to role of the ballots because they are framing mechanisms that presuppose they are good so if I have offense under my model of debate you affirm

#### [4] Xapply consequentialism fails – this is completely consequentialist