#### I value morality.

#### The metaethic is practical reason. Prefer:

#### [1] Regress – practical reason is inescapable because when you question why you should use practical reason, you are using reason itself. Anything else is infinitely regressive and nonbinding because you can always ask “why should I do that” continuously without any terminal justification. Bindingness is required in morality; otherwise people could opt out of it and have no moral guidance.

#### [2] Action theory – Any action can be split into infinite smaller actions. For example, when I’m taking a bite of food, I am making infinite movements of my hand and mouth – only reason allows you to unify the action. If we can’t unify actions, then we can’t call actions moral or immoral because they are made up of infinite different combinations of smaller ones.

#### And, practical reason requires that all actions are universalizable – moral law has to apply to everyone. Agents acknowledge their ability to reason when they reason, which means they must acknowledge the rights to reason of all other agents; it is incoherent to say that 2+2=4 for one person but not another. an agent must respect the right of another to pursue the same end. Willing a maxim that violates freedom is a contradiction in conception – you cannot violate someone’s freedom without having your own freedom to do so. Thus, the standard is consistency with categorical imperative. Prefer additionally:

#### [1] All actions presuppose the unconditional goodness of humanity – we have to treat others as ends in themselves. This hijacks other frameworks because the only reason we care about finding moral truths is the value of humanity.

**Korsgaard 83** (Christine Korsgaard, [Christine Marion Korsgaard is an American [philosopher](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosopher) and Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University whose main scholarly interests are in moral philosophy and its history; the relation of issues in moral philosophy to issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of personal identity; the theory of personal relationships; and in normativity in general], “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) SHS AK

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, [they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of [are] objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### [2] Parameters –

#### [A] Accessibility – Other frameworks like Util require massive amounts of research that under resourced kids can’t access – encouraging research heavy debates always favors big schools. My framework solves – you only need to learn about Kantianism, which is super easy to understand and you only need to think of analytic arguments in round

#### [3] Actor spec: a) governments use side-constraints like constitutions in order to protect b) Governments are made to enforce equal restraints on the people. Ripstein 09

Ripstein, Arthur.  Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  2009. Pg 194-196.

**When officials act within their roles, they act for the state**; Kant also makes the stron ger claim that they act for the people. This might appear to collapse back into a private law model by presupposing conclusive pri- vate rights as the basis for a civil condition. Kant’s claim, however, is not that citizens actively entrust their affairs to the state, nor even that of fi cials act for citizens considered separately. Instead, **officials act for the citizens considered as a collective** body**.** Kant introduces the term “people” as “a multitude of human beings”;16 taken together, they create what he characterizes in the Critique of Pure Reason as a “totality,” that is, a plurality considered as a unity.17 A multitude of human beings is a people just because institutions act for them; the **institutions are the principle of their unity,** and the acts of those institutions are the acts of the people**.** Kant’s claim is thus not that each citizen has in fact consented to or transferred power to the state, nor even that the people have somehow united themselves and then transferred power to the state, but that **the state,** through its institutions,creates the people, because **only through institutions can “a multitude of human beings” make itself into a people.** So if a group of of fi cials make, apply, and enforce law in a given region of the Earth’s surface, in so doing they thereby unite the in hab i tants of that region into a people. By becoming an agent for the people, the state creates that people as a moral subject to whom its acts can be imputed. **The state’s entitlement to rule does not depend on “whether a state began with an actual contract of submission** (pactum subiectionis civilis) as a fact, or whether power came first and law arrived only afterward, or even whether they should have followed in this order.”18 What matters is that officials create a rightful condition; if they do, it is a rightful condition for the people in it. Kant can thus agree with Hobbes that a people is created by the institutions that act for it.19 The existence of representative institutions—that is, institutions in which the of fi cials act on behalf of the citizens considered as a collective body—makes it possible for the people to live together under laws and so to become a collective body.20 Its sta tus as a collective body is antecedent to any questions about its ability to rule itself through those institutions. Powers exercised within a rightful condition provide the omnilateral will required to repair each of the three defects in a state of nature. **Public acts are** omnilateral because they are not any particular person’s unilateral choice, but instead are **exercised on behalf of the citizens** considered as a collective body**.** They are also omnilateral in a further sense: a unilateral will always has some particular end, some matter of choice. **The omnilateral will** is different, because all that it **provides** is a form of choice, by providing **procedures through which laws can be made, applied, and enforced.** To return to Kant’s initial example, when the state authorizes the acquisition of private property, it does not make the having of property, or the accumulation of wealth, its purpose. Its purpose is to enable individual human beings to have things as their own as against each other, in accordance with the postulate of private right. **When the state acts to sustain a rightful condition**, in the ways to be discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, **it does not have the happiness of its citizens or the gross national product as its end; it only acts to preserve the formal conditions through which people can rule themselves**. And when the state punishes criminals, the topic of Chapter 10, it does not do so to prevent harm or to see to it that wrongdoers get what they deserve. It simply upholds the supremacy of its own law.

#### [4] Consequentialism fails – A] Induction fails – 1. saying that induction works relies on induction itself because it assumes that past trends will continue, which means it’s circular and unjustified 2. It assumes specific causes of past consequences which can’t be verified as the actual cause B] Butterfly effect - every action has infinite consequences so it is impossible to evaluate an action, also means any brightline is arbitrary and self-serving; one government policy could end up causing nuclear war in a million years. C] Aggregation is impossible – pleasure and pain are subjective and qualitative, we don’t know how many headaches equals a concussion

**[5] Performativity – arguing against my framework presupposes freedom because without freedom to reason you would not be able to make arguments and try to win. – this means that contesting any of my arguments proves my framework true.**

#### Advocacy – A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike–PICs don’t negate because single instances don’t negate a general principle. Vote Aff –

### Offense

#### Agents’ freedom of will comes first. Protecting the unconditional right to strike is an example of free will that is both universalizable and protects workers from coercion by the employer. (protection of their humanity)

Chima Sylvester C **Chima** 20**13** Dec 19. Global medicine: Is it ethical or morally justifiable for doctors and other healthcare workers to go on strike? doi: 10.1186/1472-6939-14-S1-S5 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3878318/

Some philosophers have described moral obligations or duties, which ought to guide ethical behavior, such as the duty of fidelity or the obligation to keep promises, and beneficence - the obligation to do 'good' [10]. However, it has been suggested that some other equally compelling moral duties or ethical obligations may conflict with the above duties, such as the right to justice. Justice is the right to fair treatment in light of what is owed a person [63]. For example, it may be argued that everybody is equally entitled to a just wage for just work. The philosopher Immanuel Kant based his moral theory on a categorical imperative which encourages moral agents to act, based on a principle, which they would deem to become a universal law [64]. One can argue that the decision by any HCW to go on strike may not be universalisable. However, looking at this decision from the principle of respect for autonomy, or freedom of choice, one can conclude that individual autonomy is a sentiment which is desirable for all human beings. Accordingly, every worker should be free to choose whether to work or not, based on a whether any specific set of conditions of their own choosing have been met. Kant argues further that moral agents or individuals should be treated, "whether in your own person or in that of any other, never solely as a means, but always as an end" [64]. This idea that individuals should be treated as ends in themselves has influenced political philosophy for centuries, and stresses the libertarian ideology that people should not have their individual freedoms curtailed either for others or for the good of society in general [10,64]. From this axiomatic considerations, one can conclude that it would be unethical for people to be used as slaves or be forced to work for inadequate wages or under slave-like conditions [4,10,12,51].

#### Corporations must respect the diginity of employees; the right to strike is an extension of human dignity.

**McCrudden 08** Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, European Journal of International Law, Volume 19, Issue 4, September 2008, Pages 655–724, https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chn043

#### Dignity has functioned, thirdly, as a source from which new rights may be derived, and existing rights extended. In the Israeli context, for example, human dignity has been seen as providing a basis on which to import rights that had not, intentionally, been included in the text of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. As Kretzmer observes, ‘the Basic Law does not mention many of the fundamental rights that are protected under most constitutions and international human rights instruments …. The most blatant exclusions are equality, freedom of religion and conscience and freedom of speech.’414 These were excluded because of the inability to generate a consensus among the parties in the Knesset that they should be included at that time. Notably, several of the religious parties objected to their inclusion. Given that the self-perceived role of the Israeli Supreme Court is to assist in the building of an Israel that is committed to the broad range of human rights, that was unsatisfying. Conceptualizing human dignity as a general value ‘has enabled the Court to resort to the concept to create rights in various situations’, including in those contexts where the excluded rights would otherwise have been expected to operate.415 In some cases, the Court has used this method to recognize precisely those rights which were deliberately omitted from the Basic Law because of the lack of political consensus.416 For example, in the Hupert case, the Court asserted that the right to equality could be derived from human dignity and as a consequence merited constitutional protection.417 Other rights that have been derived from dignity in a similar manner include freedom of religion, the right to strike, the right of minors not to be subject to corporal punishment, and the right to know the identity of one's parents.418

#### AND

#### Bowie 98

A Kantian Theory of Meaningful, Norman E. Bowie Vol. 17, No. 9/10, How to Make Business Ethics Operational: Creating Effective Alliances: The 10th Annual EBEN Conference (Jul., 1998), pp. 1083-1092 [**https://www.jstor.org/stable/25073937?origin=JSTOR-pdf**](https://www.jstor.org/stable/25073937?origin=JSTOR-pdf)

1. A corporation can be considered moral in that Kantian sense only if the humanity of employees is treated as an end and not as a means merely. 2. If a corporation is to treat the humanity of employees as an end and not as a means, merely, then a corporation should honor the self-respect of the employees.3. To honor the employees’ self respect, the employee must have a certain amount of independence as well as the ability to satisfy a certain amount of their desires. Thus, the corporation should allow a certain amount of independence and make it possible that employees can satisfy a certain amount of their desires. 4. In an economic system, people achieve independence and satisfaction of their desires using their wages which they earn as employees. Thus a corporation should pay employees a living wage, that is, a wage sufficient to provide a certain amount of independence and some amount of satisfaction of desires. though this is as much as one can say given the Kantian text, I believe one can begin to formulate a Kantian theory of meaningful work. First, meaningful work provides a salary sufficient for the worker to exercise her independence and provides for her phsyical well-being and the satisfaction of some of her desires. Second, it seems obvious that meaningful work in a capitalist economy, be it the work of managers or the work of employees, must support the dignity of human beings. That is, capitalist work should support or enhance the dignity of human beings as moral agents. And since for Kant autonomy and rationality are necessary for moral agency. Work that deadens autonomy or that undermines rationality is immoral.

#### The unconditional right to strike is the obligation for the government because in order for workers to enter the workplace, governments must prevent employers from being arbitrarily able interfere or use workers as a mere means to an end. Without it, there are no inhibitions to corporations exploiting workers through treatment as a mere means. Thus, a legitimate pre-fiat agreement between employer and employee could not exist.

Gourevitch 16 Gourevitch, A. (2016). Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike. Perspectives on Politics, 14(02), 307–323. doi:10.1017/s1537592716000049

We now have a way of explaining the right to strike as something decidedly more modern than just residual protection of some feudal guild privilege. The right to strike springs organically from the fact of structural domination. Striking is a way of resisting that domination at the point in that structure at which workers find themselves—the particular job they are bargaining over. It is not that workers believe they have some special privilege but quite the opposite. It is their lack of privilege, their vulnerability, that generates the claim. Structural domination makes its most immediate appearance in the threat of being exploited by a particular employer, even though the point of structural domination is that workers can be exploited by any potential employer. The sharpest form that the structural domination takes is through the threat of being fired, or of never being hired in the first place. The claim that strikers make to their job is therefore, in the first instance, a dramatization of the fact that their relationship is not voluntary, it is not accidental and contingent. They are always already forced to be in a contractual relationship with some employer or another. The refusal to perform work while retaining the right to the job is a way of bringing to the fore this social and structural element in their condition. It vivifies the real nature of the production relationship that workers find themselves in. Quitting the work but not the job is a way of saying that this society is not and cannot be just a system of voluntary exchanges among independent producers. There is an underlying structure of unequal dependence, maintained through the system of contracts, that even the “most voluntary” arrangements conceal.