#### I value morality.

#### The starting point of morality is practical reason. Prefer:

#### [1] Regress –reason is inescapable because when you question why you should use it, you are reasoning. Anything else is infinitely regressive and nonbinding because you can always ask “why should I do that” continuously without any terminal justification. Bindingness is required in morality; otherwise people could opt out of it and have no moral guidance, making ethics useless.

#### [2] Action theory – Any action can be split into infinite smaller actions. For example, when I’m taking a bite of food, I am making infinite movements of my hand and mouth – only reason allows you to unify the action. If we can’t unify actions, then we can’t call actions moral or immoral because they are made up of infinite different combinations of smaller ones.

**[3] Transcendental idealism – what we see is not what is, but our representations of reality – only a priori knowledge is a lane to truth as perception is the lane to truth insofar as a lack of the subject removes material constitution and abstracts sensibility as it is then unknown.**

#### [4] Bindingness – to engage in any enterprise is to exercise reason. We move between different enterprises and identities but reason unifies us because it’s the source of these changes in the first place – means you can’t escape reason

#### And, practical reason requires that all actions are universalizable – there aren’t a priori differences between agents, so moral law must be applied universally. Agents acknowledge their ability to reason when they reason, which means they must acknowledge the rights to reason of all other agents; it is incoherent to say that 2+2=4 for one person but not another. Willing a maxim that violates freedom is a contradiction in conception – under the universal maxim you would not be free and you cannot violate someone’s freedom if you are not free in the first place.

#### Impact calc: The framework only evaluates intentions – actions that impede another agent’s ability to set and pursue ends are unjust under the framework.

#### Also, proving an obligation under any index is sufficient to affirm because there isn’t a higher-up framework to weigh theories under which means that you can only disprove a framework from the perspective of another and an obligation under one framework isn’t incompatible with a possibly stronger obligation under another framework.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Performativity – arguing against my framework presupposes freedom because without freedom to reason you would not be able to make arguments and try to win. – this means that contesting any of my arguments proves my framework true.

#### [2] Resolvability: Clarity of weighing under interpretation of Kantianism: perfect duties above imperfect duties. Duties in right. Explicit categories that supersede other categories. All other FWs are consequentialist that use unquantifiable prob, mag, or prob x mag. Resolvability is an independent voter cuz otherwise the judge can’t make a decision which means it’s a constraint on any rotb because otherwise the round is impossible

#### [3] Consequentialism fails –

#### A] Induction fails –

#### I. saying that induction works in the past uses induction, which means it’s circular and unjustified

#### II. It assumes specific causes of past consequences which can’t be verified as the actual cause.

#### B] Butterfly effect - every action has infinite stemming consequences so it is impossible to evaluate an action based off them.

#### C] Aggregation is impossible – pleasure and pain is qualitative and subjective; we have no idea how many headaches equal a migraine.

#### Thus the advocacy - Resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines. I’ll clarify or define anything in CX. PICs don’t negate – saying that penguins can’t fly doesn’t disprove that birds fly.

### Offense

#### 1) IPPs violate essential freedoms, including barring participation in the scientific community, and basic human rights

**Hale 18** (Zachary Hale, 4-4-2018, accessed on 8-22-2021, The Arkansas Journal of Social Change and Public Service, "Patently Unfair: The Tensions Between Human Rights and Intellectual Property Protection - The Arkansas Journal of Social Change and Public Service", <https://ualr.edu/socialchange/2018/04/04/patently-unfair/>) BHHS AK

Although the right to the protection of “moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production,”[32] is a human right as defined in the UDHR and the ICESCR, the current system of intellectual property protection conflicts with and even violates rights that are considered to be fundamental to human life. Although intellectual property instruments are certainly used to violate essential civil and political freedoms like the freedom of expression, and economic and social freedoms like the freedom to share in the scientific advancements of society, the most blatant violations of human rights caused by intellectual property protection occur in the fields of nutrition, healthcare, and culture.[33] Of these essential entitlements, the rights to food and health are made even more significant by their relationship to the most fundamental of all human rights: the right to life.

#### 2) IPP is inconsistent with free market principles

**Kinsella 11** (Stephan Kinsella, 5-25-2011, accessed on 8-23-2021, Foundation for Economic Education, "How Intellectual Property Hampers the Free Market | N. Stephan Kinsella", <https://fee.org/articles/how-intellectual-property-hampers-the-free-market/>) BHHS AK

But are they? There are good reasons to think that IP is not actually property—that it is actually antithetical to a private-property, free-market order. By intellectual property, I mean primarily patent and copyright. It’s important to understand the origins of these concepts. As law professor Eric E. Johnson notes, “The monopolies now understood as copyrights and patents were originally created by royal decree, bestowed as a form of favoritism and control. As the power of the monarchy dwindled, these chartered monopolies were reformed, and essentially by default, they wound up in the hands of authors and inventors.” Patents were exclusive monopolies to sell various goods and services for a limited time. The word patent, historian Patricia Seed explains, comes from the Latin patente, signifying open letters. Patents were “open letters” granted by the monarch authorizing someone to do something—to be, say, the only person to sell a certain good in a certain area, to homestead land in the New World on behalf of the crown, and so on. It’s interesting that many defenders of IP—such as patent lawyers and even some libertarians—get indignant if you call patents or copyright a monopoly. “It’s not a monopoly; it’s a property right,” they say. “If it’s a monopoly then your use of your car is a monopoly.” But patents are State grants of monopoly privilege. One of the first patent statutes was England’s Statute of Monopolies of 1624, a good example of truth in labeling. Granting patents was a way for the State to raise money without having to impose a tax. Dispensing them also helped secure the loyalty of favorites. The patentee in return received protection from competition. This was great for the State and the patentee but not for competition or the consumer. In today’s system we’ve democratized and institutionalized intellectual property. Now anyone can apply. You don’t have to go to the king or be his buddy. You can just go to the patent office. But the same thing happens. Some companies apply for patents just to keep the wolves at bay. After all, if you don’t have patents someone might sue you or reinvent and patent the same ideas you are using. If you have a patent arsenal, others are afraid to sue you. So companies spend millions of dollars to obtain patents for defensive purposes. Large companies rattle their sabers or sue each other, then make a deal, say, to cross-license their patents to each other. That’s fine for them because they have protection from each other’s competition. But what does it do to smaller companies? They don’t have big patent arsenals or a credible countersuit threat. So patents amount to a barrier to entry, the modern version of mercantilist protectionism. What about copyright? The roots literally lie in censorship. It was easy for State and church to control thought by controlling the scribes, but then the printing press came along, and the authorities worried that they couldn’t control official thought as easily. So Queen Mary created the Stationer’s Company in 1557, with the exclusive franchise over book publishing, to control the press and what information the people could access. When the charter of the Stationer’s Company expired, the publishers lobbied for an extension, but in the Statute of Anne (1710) Parliament gave copyright to authors instead. Authors liked this because it freed their works from State control. Nowadays they use copyright much as the State originally did: to censor and ban books. (More below.) IP, American Style The American system of IP began with the U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 authorizes (but doesn’t require) Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Despite modern IP proponents’ claims to the contrary, the American founders did not view intellectual property as a natural right but only as a policy tool to encourage innovation. Yet they were nervous about monopoly privilege, which is why patents and copyrights were authorized only for a limited time. Even John Locke, whose thought influenced the Founding Fathers, did not view copyright and patent as natural rights. Nor did he maintain that property homesteading applied to ideas. It applied only to scarce physical resources. Granted, some state constitutions had little versions of copyright before the American Constitution. (See Tom W. Bell, Intellectual Privilege: Copyright, Common Law, and the Common Good, part 1, chapter 3, section B.1.) On occasion, the language of natural rights was used to defend it, but this was just cover for the monopolies they granted to special interests. Natural rights do not expire after 15 years. Natural rights are not extended to Americans only. Natural rights wouldn’t exclude many types of innovation and intellectual creativity and cover only a few arbitrary types. And what is the result of this system? In the case of patents we have a modern statute administered by a huge federal bureaucracy that grants monopolies on the production and trade of various things, which means holders may ask the federal courts to order the use of force to stop competitors. But the competitors have not done anything that justifies force. They merely have used information to guide their actions with respect to their own property. Is that compatible with private property and the free market?

#### That affirms: Free market economies are the only ones that allow people to be free to pursue their own interests.

**Richman 12** [Sheldon Richman, 8-5-2012, "The Free Market Doesn't Need Government Regulation," Reason, <https://reason.com/2012/08/05/the-free-market-doesnt-need-government-r/>] // SJ AME

What regulates the conduct of these people? Market forces. (I keep specifying "in a freed market" because in a state-regulated economy, competitive market forces are diminished or suppressed.) Economically speaking, people cannot do whatever they want—and get away with it—in a freed market because other people are free to counteract them and it's in their interest to do so. That's part of what we mean by market forces. Just because the government doesn't stop a seller from charging $100 for an apple doesn't mean he or she can get that amount. Market forces regulate the seller as strictly as any bureaucrat could—even more so, because a bureaucrat can be bribed. Whom would you have to bribe to win an exemption from the law of supply and demand? (Well, you might bribe enough legislators to obtain protection from competition, but that would constitute an abrogation of the market.) It is no matter of indifference whether state operatives or market forces do the regulating. Bureaucrats, who necessarily have limited knowledge and perverse incentives, regulate by threat of physical force. In contrast, market forces operate peacefully through millions of cooperating participants, each with intimate knowledge of her own personal circumstances and looking out for her own well-being. Bureaucratic regulation is likely to be irrelevant or (more likely) inimical to what people in the market care about. Not so regulation by market forces.

**Next, the Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the resolution. The aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false.**

**1] Constitutivism – Five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true, and tab and ballot software tell the judge to vote aff or neg – the ballot is constitutively asking for a truth value of the res. Other role of the ballots are justified by their consequences; only TT is justified by what the ballot actually is in the first place. Constitutivism outweighs – the judge only has the jurisdiction to vote on the truth or falsity, even if there are possibly better options; in a game of chess, even if you think of something that would break the rules to make the game more interesting, you don’t do it because the rules determine how the game even works. Jurisdiction controls the internal link to all other voters – disregarding it causes judge intervention doesn’t let the judge know what they can vote on.**

**2] Collapses - all counter ROBs assume the truth value of every statement – saying “my ROB is better” is the same as saying “it is true that my ROB is better” which concedes to the authority of truth testing; you are just truth testing between ROBs when weighing them.**

**3] Coordination – the topic is the only focal point that both debaters can use to work together to have a debate. In order for us to debate each other, we have to use this focal point and shifting it makes the discussion impossible, which means it also controls the internal link to your education arguments.**

#### Affirm:

**[1] A statement is logical if the conclusion conceivably follows from premises. The rules of logic claim that the only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.**   
**SEP** [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] “An Introduction to Philosophy.” Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> TG

Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false. For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true.

#### 3 impacts: a) neg a priori’s affirm – denying the assumptions of a statement proves it valid b) this means that neg arguments only challenge an assumption of the aff but are not sufficient to disprove the aff c) “if the aff is winning, they get the ballot” is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot.

#### [2] Trivialism is true – two warrants:

#### [a] Liar’s paradox – all statements are both true and false – this disproves the Law of Non-Contradiction, which means you can’t disprove any statement so all statements are true.

#### Kabay 08 (Paul Douglas Kabay, Australian philosopher, August 2008, Pdfs.semanticscholar, "A Defense of Trivialism", <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6714/93693da32d0b9c38aad857672021a950486a.pdf>)

#### Here L is simply the self-referential liar sentence: ‘L is false’. Note that one could substitute for L any so called dialetheia (i.e. sentence that is both true and false). The most obvious alternative is the Russell paradox generated by the naïve conception of set (i.e. the set of all sets that fail to have self-membership). One then could have as premise (1), ‘R is a member of itself’, and for (2), ‘It is not the case that R is a member of itself’. I will not examine R as an alternative to L, as much of what I have to say about the latter applies to the former. The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is traditionally known as ex contradictione quodlibet, and it takes the general form of p, ¬p├ q. More recently it has come to be referred to as explosion.74 Note that the argument can be modified to prove 50 the truth of any arbitrary proposition, p. If sound, this argument would provide independent evidence for every belief held by the trivialist. Is this argument sound? Well there are reasons to think that the premises are true and that inference is valid. Let’s begin with the truth of the premises. The liar sentence in some form or another has been known for some time. It was supposedly discovered or first uttered by the Megaric philosopher Eubilides. Normally taken as a paradox that requires solution, it has more recently been argued that it is an instance of a dialetheia i.e. a true contradiction.75 The argument for thinking that L is both true and false goes as follows. Either L is true or L is false (by the Law of Excluded Middle or LEM). If it is true, then what it says is the case and it says that it is false, so it is false. If it is false, then this is what it says it is, so it is true. Either way it is both true and false.

#### [b] Possibilism proves trivialism – this can also apply to any proposition.

#### Kabay 08 (Paul Douglas Kabay, Australian philosopher, August 2008, Pdfs.semanticscholar, "A Defense of Trivialism", <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6714/93693da32d0b9c38aad857672021a950486a.pdf>) Scarsdale AK

The next argument for trivialism I wish to spell out can perhaps be dubbed a modal argument for trivialism and can be expressed as follows: (1) Possibilism is true [prem.] (2) If possibilism is true, then there is a world (either possible or impossible or both)99, w, in which trivialism is true [prem.] (3) w is a possible world [prem.] (4) It is true in w that w is identical to the actual world, A [(2)] (5) If it is true that there is a world, w, and w is a possible world, and it is true in w that w is identical to A, then trivialism is true [prem.] (6) Trivialism is true [(1)-(5)]. Is premise 1 true? Possibilism is the view that every proposition is possible and is to be contrasted with the view known as necessitarianism: the view that there is at least one impossible proposition. Possibilism has been seriously advocated by a number of philosophers in the last forty years or so.100 The doctrine is said to have a number of advantages over its rival, necessitarianism. There seems a genuine sense in which socalled necessary truths could have been false. Mortenson, for example, points out that if we make use of a model-theoretic account of necessity (i.e. truth in all models, whether these be understood as possible worlds or what not), it is easy enough to show that one 99 By ‘possible world’ I mean a world which shares the same laws of logic as the actual world. By ‘impossible world’ I mean a world in which the laws of logic are different from the actual world. For example, the law of identity may fail to hold in an impossible world, but it will hold (by definition) in a possible world. 100 The term was first coined and defended in Naess, Pluralist and Possibilist. It has been more recently defended in Mortenson, “Anything is Possible,” and Mortenson, “It isn’t so, But Could it Be?” The doctrine has also been proposed to solve certain problems concerning divine nature – see, for example, Plantinga, Does God have a Nature? 64 can construct models in which anything fails to be true – so called impossible worlds, for example, if you understand models in terms of world semantics.101 In order for necessitarianism to hold true, one would need independent reason for restricting the relevant models.102 But such reasons, according to Mortenson, are usually not forthcoming

### Underview

#### [1] Presumption Affirms:

#### [a] When a statement is proposed, people presume that it is true. For example, if I tell you my name, you presume that it is true unless proven false.

#### [b] If we don’t facially trust things then knowledge ceases to exist. The process of gaining knowledge requires accepting a truth first, then verifying it. We have an opportunity cost to proving it false in the future, but not otherwise.

#### [2] Permissibly affirms:

#### [a] If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong.

#### [b] Probability: in a world where anything is permissible people don’t just do nothing they do whatever which means there’s a higher probability of the aff than the squo.

#### [3] 1AR Theory Paradigm

#### a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible,

#### b) drop the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse,

#### c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible,

#### d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time.

#### e) Highest layer first because it indicts the neg’s positions and skews my time allocation on other flows like T or the K

#### f) no 2nr theory or paradigm issues otherwise the neg gets 6 minutes to dump on this layer which is impossible for a 3 minutes 2ar.

#### [4] Affirming is harder – all theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard because of huge side bias – reject neg theory and fairness arguments unless they prove how it uniquely outweighs the disparity since it’s structural.

Shah 19 Sachin “A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC” NSD, 15 February 2019. <http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/> SJCP//JG

To further quantify the side-bias, the proportion of negative wins when the affirmative was favored (p1) can be compared with the proportion of affirmative wins when the negative is favored (p2). Ideally the difference between the proportions would be 0; however, p1 = 34.84% while p2 = 28.77, a staggering 6.07% difference. Now the question is whether this difference is statistically significant. In order to determine the answer, a two-proportion z-test was used. The null hypothesis is p1 – p2 = 0 , because that means both sides are able to overcome the debating level skew equally. The alternative hypothesis is then p1 – p2 > 0, meaning the negative is able to overcome the skew more than the affirmative is able, demonstrating a side-bias. This two-proportion z-test rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative (p-value < 0.0001). There is sufficient evidence that the negative is able to overcome the skew more often than the affirmative can. This implies there is a less than 0.01% chance that there is no side-bias because it demonstrates the higher proportion of negative wins when the affirmative is favored is significant. In short, the negative has a greater ability to win difficult rounds than the affirmative does, which indicates there exists a skew in the negative’s favor. This analysis is statistically rigorous and relevant in several aspects: (A) The p-value is less than the alpha. (B) The data is on the current January-February topic, meaning it’s relevant to rounds these months [2]. (C) The data represents a diversity of debating and judging styles across the country. (D) This analysis accounts for disparities in debating skill level. (E) Type I error was reduced by choosing a small alpha level. The combination of these points validates this analysis. As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99% of ballots (p-value < 0.0001) and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2019 January-February topic [3]. So don’t lose the flip!

**[5] If I win one layer vote aff:**

**a) The NC is reactive and has the ability to uplayer to exclude or preclude the layer I spend half the round justifying what makes mooting that layer extremely unfair**

**b) I don’t have time to win multiple layers since I have to preclude your 2n responses, answer NC arguments, and extend my own in 4 min.**