# 1NC

## 1st

#### Interpretation: debaters may not read substantive and theoretical justifications for their fw

#### Violation: you did

#### Standard

#### 1] Phil-ed: kills phil ed by forcing a theory debate in framework when we are supposed to be learning about and debating philosophy. That’s an indepedant voter because the only thing intrinsic to LD debate is discussion over philosophy and morality. Phil ed also controls the internal link to other voters because we need a concept of noramtivity to even care about fairness or education.

#### 2] Strat skew: TJFs force me to win on both theory and framework to win framework while you may only debate one, extending the other. Kills fairness since I have to engage on different layers with minimal time.

#### Fairness is a voter because debate is a competitive activity that requires fair evaluation, otherwise the judge could insert their bias

#### Drop the debater: A) deterrence, b] epistemic skew, C) time skew – time spent on theory is already lost and I couldn’t spend it on substance, so I need a route to the ballot on theory. No new 2AR weighing since I can’t respond to it and they can misconstrue the 2N.

#### Competing interpretations over reasonability: A) reasonability is arbitrary – it invites arbitrary judge intervention since someone has to decide what’s reasonable, B) competing interps is key to setting norms for debate – that’s good since we stop future abuse.

#### No RVIs: A) illogical – they shouldn’t win just for proving you weren’t abusive, logic ow since it is a metaconstriant on all other arguments, B) substantive education – we should go back to substance after theory so we can learn more instead of spending all our time on incorrect theory, C) they’ll say reciprocity, but 1AR theory solves all their offense since they can still win on theory, d) forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, which checks back the chilling effect.

## 2nd

#### Permissibility negates:

#### [1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics outweighs – A. it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res B. It’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### [2] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e. if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both “P” and “~P” are true

### Framing

Note: brackets used for grammatical clarity

#### Objectivity as the basis of ethics fails because moral reasoning cannot prescribe objectively verifiable moral outcomes for all moral agents since their conceptions are necessarily internal.

Coburn Coburn, Robert C. “A defense of ethical noncognitivism.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 62, no. 1, April 1991, pp. 67-80. // SHS KS

If criteria like these encapsulate the kinds of considerations that have in fact been appealed to in criticizing and supporting moral theories, then it is easy to see why it is so dubious that all rational agents will agree about the correct moral theory once they have gone through a process of type M. The central thought is just that judgments about the extent to which a given moral theory satisfies (or fails to satisfy) various of these criteria, as well as judgments about the weights the different criteria should receive, are bound to reflect facts about the inquirers that do not hold of rational agents qua rational. In other words, such judgments are bound to be affected by idiosyncratic features of the inquirers, such as their genetic constitutions and the physical and cultural environments in which the phenotypic expressions of these genotypes have developed. Think, for example, about the ways the intuitive judgments of members of the human species differ as regards right and wrong in various actual and imaginable cases or what the ideal person is like. And must the judgments of rational agents agree about the relative weights "conformance utility" and "acceptance utility"8 should receive in assessing the extent to which a moral code satisfies the welfare criterion, or when a set of "priority rules" is "readily surveyable," or whether it is easy to establish that certain principles have been applied correctly? Surely not. In any case, it is easy to conceive of rational beings who differ from us on these matters, and that is all that is required to undermine[s] the claim that there would be agreement among all possible rational agents once they had undergone a process of type M - at least if I am right about the kinds of considerations that would be considered in undergoing such a process. Or, finally, recall the psychological adaptation criterion. It virtually ensures disagreement among inquirers who have undergone an M-process, since it cannot fail to be true that somewhere in logical space there exist rational beings whose natures are significantly different from ours. And this fact makes it likely that the stability, publicity, and congruence criteria will also give rise to disagreement, too, since how a code fares vis-'a-vis these criteria depends on the natures of the beings whose conduct the code will govern. In sum, if the considerations the history of moral thought indicates have in fact been appealed to in assessing moral theories are indeed relevant to their evaluation, then AR-Cognitivism cannot be correct. For AR-Cognitivism requires that there be agreement among all rational agents, actual and possible, once they have undergone a certain kind of intellectual process, and the likelihood of such agreement's obtaining if moral codes are properly assessed by appeal to the kinds of considerations indicated is vanishingly small. For what will determine the selection of a code for a set of rational agents is bound to reflect "arbitrary" facts about these agents and not just their rationality.

#### Thus, moral obligations must be based on internal moral considerations. Only internal moral considerations can motivate action since they are the basis of each agent’s moral judgements.

Bedke Bedke, M.S. [Dept of Philosophy, University of Arizona] “Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism.” Philosophical Studies, 144: 189-209, 2009. // SHS KS

Similarly, individual psychologies will need mental states that play a role in translating recognitions of moral actions into behavior, thereby contributing their part to the moral practices that enable social cooperation. I propose that first person moral judgments were selected in part to play this role. Moral judgments with some connection to motivational states would be selected for over moral judgments that merely recognize moral situations and obligations without helping to translate those into appropriate motivational states. Consequently, they would have a corresponding nested proper function: a purpose (or proper function) of moral judgments is to motivate individuals to act in accordance with the judgment. Note that purposes correspond to functions selected for, so we do not say that a purpose of moral judgments is to be a part of a wider social practice (that makes it unclear how it functions and why it was selected), but rather that a purpose of moral judgments is one of motivating behavior. This is not to deny the importance of other selected functionings in our moral practices, including the point and purpose of other-directed moral judgments in enforcing moral behaviors, but merely to point out a role (not the role) of first person moral judgments. 14 There are various ways that moral judgments might play a motivational role. One possibility is that moral motivation, when it occurs, comes from moral judgments directly.

#### Judgments based on external considerations are not moral judgments because they arise from considerations other than right and wrong.

Bedke 2 Bedke, M.S. [Dept of Philosophy, University of Arizona] “Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism.” Philosophical Studies, 144: 189-209, 2009. // SHS KS

Consider a distant community very much like our own, but unrelated to our own (perhaps they are on another planet) that developed a very stringent, heavy-handed system of punishment and coercion to keep its citizens in line. The residents of this community are ruled by a single dictator that metes out severe punishments, but only for behaviors that by and large happen to violate our ethical norms. As a result, individuals in this community generally keep their contracts, respect each other's property, and help those in need because they fear punishment and coercion should they fail to do so. As external observers we would say that their behaviors by and large conform to our ethical norms, though we realize that they are never motivated by anything other than their own interests and fear of harm to their interests. Let us call this place Amoralsville.

#### And the idea of external considerations arises from the background that we have internal motivations. Motivation is required since otherwise agents could opt out of fwks and we’d have no reason to follow them

Bedke 3 Bedke, M.S. [Dept of Philosophy, University of Arizona] “Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism.” Philosophical Studies, 144: 189-209, 2009. // SHS KS

My own judgment on this debate is that externalists can win individual battles. They can certainly point to possible psychologies about which the right thing to say is that the agent knows what it is good or right to do, and then deliberately and knowingly does something else. And they can point to psychologies like that of Satan, in which it can become a reason for doing something precisely that it is known to be evil. But internalists win the war for all that, in the sense that these cases are necessarily parasitic, and what they are parasitic upon is a background connection between ethics and motivation. They are cases in which things are out of joint, but the fact of a joint being out presupposes a normal or typical state in which it is not out.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with internal moral considerations. Prefer additionally—

#### 1] performativity: the only reason we are debating is because we have our own internal motivations for joining the activity which means justifying any aff argument proves the validity of the neg framework

### offense

#### “The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust” externally restricts what private entities are able to do, that’s immoral since a] agents have the right to appropriation since it allows them to extend and act upon their internal moral thoughts, b] the aff imposes an externalist restriction on private entities.

#### For the aff to have any offense they have to prove that no companies want to appropriate outer space, but that’s impossible. One example – asteroid mining

Glibert 4/21 [Alex Glibert, “Mining in Space is Coming”, April 16 2021 (alex gilbert, is a complex systems researcher and a PhD student in space resources at the Colorado School of Mines.) <https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming>] SHS KS

Space exploration is back. after decades of disappointment, a combination of better technology, falling costs and a rush of competitive energy from the private sector has put space travel front and center. indeed, many analysts (even some with their feet on the ground) believe that commercial developments in the space industry may be on the cusp of starting the largest resource rush in history: mining on the Moon, Mars and asteroids. While this may sound fantastical, some baby steps toward the goal have already been taken. Last year, NASA awarded contracts to four companies to extract small amounts of lunar regolith by 2024, effectively beginning the era of commercial space mining. Whether this proves to be the dawn of a gigantic adjunct to mining on earth — and more immediately, a key to unlocking cost-effective space travel — will turn on the answers to a host of questions ranging from what resources can be efficiently. As every fan of science fiction knows, the resources of the solar system appear virtually unlimited compared to those on Earth. There are whole other planets, dozens of moons, thousands of massive asteroids and millions of small ones that doubtless contain humungous quantities of materials that are scarce and very valuable (back on Earth). Visionaries including Jeff Bezos imagine heavy industry moving to space and Earth becoming a residential area. However, as entrepreneurs look to harness the riches beyond the atmosphere, access to space resources remains tangled in the realities of economics and governance. Back up for a moment. For the record, space is already being heavily exploited, because space resources include non-material assets such as orbital locations and abundant sunlight that enable satellites to provide services to Earth. Indeed, satellite-based telecommunications and global positioning systems have become indispensable infrastructure underpinning the modern economy. Mining space for materials, of course, is another matter. In the past several decades, planetary science has confirmed what has long been suspected: celestial bodies are potential sources for dozens of natural materials that, in the right time and place, are incredibly valuable. Of these, water may be the most attractive in the near-term, because — with assistance from solar energy or nuclear fission — H2O can be split into hydrogen and oxygen to make rocket propellant, facilitating in-space refueling. So-called “rare earth” metals are also potential targets of asteroid miners intending to service Earth markets. Consisting of 17 elements, including lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium, these critical materials (most of which are today mined in China at great environmental cost) are required for electronics. And they loom as bottlenecks in making the transition from fossil fuels to renewables backed up by battery storage. The Moon is a prime space mining target. Boosted by NASA’s mining solicitation, it is likely the first location for commercial mining. The Moon has several advantages. It is relatively close, requiring a journey of only several days by rocket and creating communication lags of only a couple seconds — a delay small enough to allow remote operation of robots from Earth. Its low gravity implies that relatively little energy expenditure will be needed to deliver mined resources to Earth orbit. The Moon may look parched — and by comparison to Earth, it is. But recent probes have confirmed substantial amounts of water ice lurking in permanently shadowed craters at the lunar poles. Further, it seems that solar winds have implanted significant deposits of helium-3 (a light stable isotope of helium) across the equatorial regions of the Moon. Helium-3 is a potential fuel source for secondand third-generation fusion reactors that one hopes will be in service later in the century. The isotope is packed with energy (admittedly hard to unleash in a controlled manner) that might augment sunlight as a source of clean, safe energy on Earth or to power fast spaceships in this century. Between its water and helium-3 deposits, the Moon could be the resource stepping-stone for further solar system exploration. Asteroids are another near-term mining target. There are all sorts of space rocks hurtling through the solar system, with varying amounts of water, rare earth metals and other materials on board. The asteroid belt between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter contains most of them, many of which are greater than a kilometer in diameter. Although the potential water and mineral wealth of the asteroid belt is vast, the long distance from Earth and requisite travel times and energy consumption rule them out as targets in the near term. Wannabe asteroid miners will thus be looking at smaller near-Earth asteroids. While they are much further away than the Moon, many of them could be reached using less energy — and some are even small enough to make it technically possible to tow them to Earth orbit for mining. Space mining may be essential to crewed exploration missions to Mars. Given the distance and relatively high gravity of Mars (twice that of the Moon), extraction and export of minerals to Earth seems highly unlikely. Rather, most resource extraction on Mars will focus on providing materials to supply exploration missions, refuel spacecraft and enable settlement. Technology Is the Difference The prospects for space mining are being driven by technological advances across the space industry. The rise of reusable rocket components and the now-widespread use of off-the-shelf parts are lowering both launch and operations costs. Once limited to government contract missions and the delivery of telecom satellites to orbit, private firms are now emerging as leaders in developing “NewSpace” activities — a catch-all term for endeavors including orbital tourism, orbital manufacturing and mini-satellites providing specialized services. The space sector, with a market capitalization of $400 billion, could grow to as much as $1 trillion by 2040 as private investment soars. But despite the high-profile commercial advances, governments still call the shots on the leading edge of space resource technologies. The United States extracted the first extraterrestrial materials in space from the Moon during the Apollo missions, followed by the Soviet Union’s recoveries from crewless Luna missions. President Biden recently borrowed one of the Apollo lunar rocks for display in the Oval Office, highlighting the awe that deep space can still summon. For the time being, scientific samples remain the goal of mining. Last October, NASA’s OSIRIS-REx mission — due to return to Earth in 2023 — collected a small amount of material from the asteroid Bennu. In December, Japan returned a sample of the asteroid Ryugu with the Hayabusa2 spacecraft. And several weeks later, China’s Chang’e 5 mission returned the first lunar samples since the 1970s. Sample collection is accelerating, with recent missions targeting Mars. Japan is planning to visit the two moons of Mars and extract a sample from one. NASA’s robotic Perseverance rover will collect and cache drilled samples on Mars that could later be returned to Earth. Perseverance also carries gear for the unique MOXIE experiment on Mars — an attempt to produce oxygen on the planet with technologies that could eventually extract oxygen for astronauts to breath and refuel spacecraft. To be viable, commercial space mining will, of course, have to operate at a much larger scale than the scientific digs. Whereas all samples collected to date consist of less than one ton of material, a single space mining operation would have to be able to manage hundreds or thousands of tons. Stripped to the basics, the stages of a space mining operation resemble those of terrestrial mining, with prospecting followed by extraction, processing and distribution to users. But the unique conditions of outer space environments make this progression far more daunting. Most space mining targets have little or no atmosphere and experience extreme temperature swings between shade and sunlight. Radiation, from both the sun and cosmic sources, permeates the space environment and threatens electronics — not to mention human health. The list of challenges goes on. Launching to space is a stressful process, and equipment must survive high acceleration and acoustic forces. Due to orbital mechanics and the immense energies required to navigate large distances, all space missions are limited to minimal payloads. Missions in deep space operate in microgravity — a challenge when mining an asteroid — or reduced gravity on the Moon or Mars. Even the surfaces of celestial bodies pose a challenge to mining machinery, since they consist of unconsolidated rocky materials called regolith instead of more familiar soil. The most basic technologies needed for space mining are as simple as shovels and drills. But water and other materials that are volatile can be extracted using more exotic techniques: on the Moon, thermal mining would sublimate ice directly to vapor and trap it in a tent. One of the space mining startups, Transastra, proposes a similar method on a far grander scale for small asteroids, trapping the volatile resource in a bag surrounding the whole body. Remember, too, that after space resources are gathered, a supply chain must deliver the material to customers. If you’re curious about the details, check out a 2018 report, Commercial Lunar Propellant Architecture, which describes a mining cycle to extract water on the Moon, convert it to fuel and deliver it to customer spacecraft. Before committing billions to the real thing, public and private investors will need to spend millions testing plans in environments that resemble the conditions of outer space. Regolith simulants, vacuum chambers, computer modeling and other aerospace testing equipment are all needed to verify mining technologies can work in space. Beyond space technologies, advances in other sectors could aid space mining missions. Among them: additive manufacturing (3D printing) to support base construction, AI to run robots and even nuclear power reactors to provide large amounts of energy. The Economics of Mining the Cosmos Claims about the economic value of space mining are often nine parts hyperbole. Newspaper headlines point to asteroids like 16 Psyche, a 226-kilometer-diameter rock whose iron and nickel resources are estimated to be worth $10 quintillion dollars at current commodity prices (100,000 times the size of the Earth’s GDP). But setting aside the blarney, there really is gold (water? helium-3? praseodymium?) in them thar hills. Neil DeGrasse Tyson famously predicted that the world’s first trillionaire will be a space miner. Great minds seem to agree: many of the major private players in space (a group that includes Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk and Richard Branson) are billionaires prepared to risk a whole lot of money to add a few more zeros to their net worth. That said, a common joke in this new industry (as in many others) is that the best way to become a millionaire in space is to start as a billionaire. Even with recent commercial advances, the cost of putting a payload into space remains very high, and the elasticity of demand for space-mined resources is uncertain. A chicken-egg problem underlies all NewSpace activities, but especially mining: without space miners supplying materials, there will be no customers. But without customers, there is no incentive to mine. Even NASA’s solicitation for four companies to extract lunar regolith on the Moon and sell samples to the agency underscores the nascent nature of mining: NASA is paying no more than $15,000 for a half-kilo, a fraction of a fraction of the cost of such a mission. Large asteroid valuations, like that of 16 Psyche, also do not reflect market realities, since delivering large quantities of expensive commodities like platinum or gold would crash market prices. Markets for such metals are small on a mass basis, and it is not clear that Earth markets provide sufficient demand to support enough space mining to Second Quarter 2021 55 justify the fixed costs of production. In broad terms, the uses of space resources can be broken into two categories: return to Earth or use in space. Early startups, like Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries, focused on mining metals with the goal of selling them back on Earth. However, the market uncertainty was a major factor in the decline of both industry leaders. In the long term, production in space to supply Earth could drive massive growth in the space industry — but not with commodities competing with terrestrial production. Rather, Earth markets are likely to be most receptive to the exotic: specialized materials and alloys manufactured in microgravity conditions, large-satellite services such as space-based solar power, or unique products like helium-3. The latter two are particularly promising, as they could provide large contributions to global decarbonization after 2050. In the near term, what’s found in space will stay in space. The support of crewed and robotic exploration with on-site resource utilization — plausibly, on the Moon in the 2020s and Mars in the 2030s — has the greatest promise to jumpstart space mining. Construction of Moon bases from local materials could greatly reduce mass requirements. If water-derived propellant is developed at a competitive price, it could find a ready market in spacecraft heading from low-earth orbit to geosynchronous orbit or deep space. Of course, questions about the economic value of space resources assume that property rights are well-defined and assured. Space law on property rights is developing quickly. But many questions remain, exacerbating economic uncertainties. You’re Stepping On My Regolith As human industrial activity spreads into the high frontier, disputes over ownership and governance follow. Outer space is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation, meaning international law is the basis for space law and space-resources law. The primary governing treaty for international space law, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, prohibits appropriation of celestial bodies, such as the Moon or asteroids, by individual nations. Whether space mining is allowed under the treaty remains highly contentious. Drafted at the height of the Cold War to head off an arms race in space and a “land” rush, the Outer Space Treaty did not envision the private and commercial ventures of today. The non-appropriation clause prevents nations from claiming celestial bodies by planting a flag or by occupying an area. However, it does not clearly prohibit owning and using resources once they are extracted from a celestial body. Indeed, other parts of the treaty imply that such use is allowed.

# AC

Cx doesn’t check,

No 1ar theory

Tjfs

#### Negate under the ac fwk

#### Acquisition of property can never be unjust – to create rights violations, there must already be an owner of the property being violated, but that presupposes its appropriation by another entity.

Feser 1, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7