## 1

### Shell

#### Interpretation: The aff must explicitly specify a comprehensive advocacy text in the 1AC where they clarify how their offense links back to the role of the ballot, is it post-fiat offense or pre-fiat offense and a clear explanation of the advocacy’s actor, action and object

#### Violation: They didn’t – supercharged by them not having an advocacy text

#### C. Standards:

#### Engagement – If I don’t know how the advocacy functions, its impossible for me to engage the aff, since knowing what their advocacy is is a prerequisite to being able to make meaningful arguments that clash with yours. Knowing what a legitimate advocacy is ensures that I read something that is relevant to your method, and knowing pre-fiat or post-fiat offense gives us a standard for what is relevant, This is true of kritikal affs since there is no norm on what “symbolic terrorism” is in the same way there is for what counts as a plan. Few impacts and voters:

#### a) Education – when two ships pass in the night we don’t learn anything, education is derived from analyzing and comparing each other’s arguments. This also guts novice inclusion because now they can never learn arguments in round.

#### b) Link turns the aff – your impacts are premised on actually having a debate and engaging with issues of oppression. Almost impossible to engage advocacies are uniquely bad since no one will take seriously a position that can’t be clashed with, so you harm any progress your position can create.

#### Framing: You can’t use your aff to exclude my shell. My shell allows you to read your aff, it just functionally constrains how you can do that. Additionally, as long as I win comparative offense to my interp it precludes on a methodological level -my method is your aff with specification, your is just the aff, so if the former is better it’s a reason to vote for me even if method debates in general preclude theory. Also, if they go for the Aff first that proves the abuse of my shell since they should have specified in the AC.

#### Education is a voter

**Dtd, a] deterrence, b] epistemic skew, c] dta is illogical since we indict your entire advocacy**

**Competing interps> reasonability, a] reasonability is arbitrary, b] race to the top good**

**No RVIs—**

**a. Baiting—they’ll just bait theory and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse and results in a chilling effect**

**b. its not logical—you don’t reward them for meeting the burden of being fair. Logic is a meta constraint on all args because it definitionally determines whether an argument is valid.**

## 2

### NC

#### Presumption and permissibility negate, especially if they don’t defend the topic –

#### a~ the aff has to prove an obligation to depart from the squo, if they don’t then we’ve done our job,

#### b~ they get to choose to defend anything they want – if they don’t win then we’ve done the better debating

#### Any moral system faces the problem of regress – I can keep asking “why should I follow this.” Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them.

#### Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” asks for a reason for reasons, which concedes its authority. Reason means we must be able to universally will maxims—our judgements are authoritative and can’t only apply to ourselves anymore than 2+2=4 can be true only for me. and

#### B) any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify the aff standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### Thus, counter-methodology: Vote negative to engage in a liberation strategy of universal reason. This entails a starting point where we abstract from individual perspectives to understand the universal, and use this starting point to apply it to empirical institutions and agents.

#### No perms: Uniquely non-sensical in a method debate: a] It assumes a notion of fiat that doesn’t make sense without a plan. The 1AC role of the ballot forefronts the performative and methodological which a permutation steals away b] non-T affs shouldn’t get perms since they can defend literally anything in the world – thus the burden is on them to prove their advocacy is the best solution to the problem they propose.

#### Negate

#### [1] Only univeralizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### [2] Independently not defending the topic is non-universalizable b/c if nobody defended the topic than a topic wouldn’t have even been created in the first place which is a contradiction in conception.

## Case

#### Afropess presumes a closed system which is an inaccurate description of contingent social systems, vote aff if I win a risk of defense to ontology because if they are true the plan has no impact, but if im right they cause massive violence ot black people

Gordon 15 --- Lewis, Afro-Jewish philosopher, political thinker, educator, and musician, Professor at the University of Connecticut in Philosophy and Africana Studies, European Union Visiting Chair in Philosophy; Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of Politics and International Studies at Rhodes University, South Africa; and Chairman of the Frantz Fanon awards committees of the Caribbean Philosophical Association, transcribed from <https://youtu.be/UABksVE5BTQ>, presenting and discussing his book “What Fanon Said”

The first thing to bear in mind you may wonder why in the beginning of the talk I talked about philosophical anthropology. And many people when they are trying to talk about social change they never think about what a human being is and this is something Fanon pays attention to. **Many people want to have closed conceptions of human beings because then human beings can be predicable**. In fact, in fanons writing he gave an example. One of the problems is that when he would walk in reason seems to walk out. **One problem we have to bear in mind when we try to look at the question of human beings** **in terms of rigid closed systems** **is that we often are trying to get as a model of how we work as theorists on issues of social change that are actually based on what we can call law like generalizations**. Now what is a law like generalization? It is when you make sure that whatever you say has no contradiction down the line. So if you are to say this much [gestures with hand] the next stage must be consistent with that, and the next stage until you are maximally consistent. Do you get that? But here is the problem – and I can just put it in a nut shell- nobody, nobody in this room would like to date, be married to, or be a best friend with a maximally consistent person. You know what that is. Its hell. And this tells you something, because if somebody where maximally consistent, you know what you would say that person is not reasonable. And we have a person here who does work on Hegel that can point out this insight, that a human being has the ability to evaluate rationality. Now why is that important? Because you see the mistake many of us make is **many of us want to push the human being into that maximized law like generalization model**. So when we think about our philosophical anthropology, some people, our question about intersectionality for instance, what some people don’t understand is nowhere is there ever a human being who is one identity. **People talk about race – do you ever really see a race walking? You see a racialized** **man or woman, or transman or transwoman**. Do you ever see a class walking? Class is embodied in flesh and blood people. And we can go on and on. So **if we enrich our philosophical anthropology we begin to notice certain other things. A**nd one of the other things we begin to realize is that **we commit a serious problem when we do political work.** And the problem is this. **The question about Wilderson for instance**. There is this discussion going on (and allot of people build it out of my earlier books). I have a category I call, as a metaphor, **an antiblack world. You notice an indefinite article** – **an anti-black world**. The reason I say that is because **the world is different from an anti-black world**. **The project of racism is to create a world that would be completely anti-black or anti-woman.** **Although that is a project, it is not a fait accompli**. **People don’t seem to understand how recent this phenomenon** we are talking **about is. A lot of people talk about race they don’t even know the history of how race is connected into theonaturalism. How, for instance, Andalucia and the pushing out of the Moors. The history of how race connected to Christianity was formed. A lot of people don’t understand – from the standpoint of a species whose history is 220,000 years old, what the hell is 500 years?** **But the one thing that we don’t understand to is we create a false model for how we study those last 500 years**. **We study the 500 years as if the people who have been dominated have not been fighting and resisting.** **Had they not been fighting and resisting we wouldn’t be here.** And then we come into this next point because you see **the problem in the formulation of pessimism and optimism is they are both based on forecasted knowledge, a prior knowledge. But human beings don’t have prior knowledge. And in fact – what in the world are we if we need to have guarantees for us to act.** You know what you call such people? Cowards. The fact of the matter is our ancestors – let’s start with enslaved ancestors. The enslaved ancestors who were burning down those plantations, who were finding clever ways to poison their masters, who were organizing meetings for rebellions, none of them had any clue what the future would be 100 years later. Some had good reason to believe that it may take 1000 years. But you know why they fought? Because they knew it wasn’t for them. One of the problems we have in the way we think about political issues is we commit what Fanon and others in the existential tradition would call a form of political immaturity. Political immaturity is saying it is not worth it unless I, me, individually get the payoff. When you are thinking what it is to relate to other generations – remember Fanon said the problem with people in the transition, the pseudo postcolonial bourgeois – is that they miss the point, you fight for liberation for other generations. And that is why Fanon said other generations they must have their mission. But you see some people fought and said no I want my piece of the pie. And that means the biggest enemy becomes the other generations. And that is why the postcolonial pseudo-bourgeoisie they are not a bourgeoisie proper because they do not link to the infrastructural development of the future, it is about themselves. And that’s why, for instance, as they live higher up the hog, as they get their mediating, service oriented, racial mediated wealth, the rest of the populations are in misery. The very fact that in many African countries there are people whose futures have been mortgaged, the fact that in this country the very example of mortgaging the future of all of you is there. What happens to people when they have no future? It now collapses the concept of maturation and places people into perpetual childhood. So one of the political things – and this is where a psychiatrist philosopher is crucial – is to ask ourselves what does it mean to take on adult responsibility. And that means to **understand that in all political action it’s not about you**. **It is what you are doing for a world you may not even be able to understand**. Now that becomes tricky, because how do we know this? **People have done it before**. **There were people**, for instance, **who fought anti-colonial struggles**, there are people (and now I am not talking about like thirty or forty years ago, I am talking about the people from day one 17th 18th century all the way through) and **we have no idea what we are doing for the 22nd century**. And **this is where developing political insight comes in.** Because **we commit the error of forgetting the systems we are talking about are human systems**. **They are not systems in the way we talk about the laws of physics. A human system can only exist by human actions maintaining them**. **Which means every human system is incomplete.** **Every human being is by definition incomplete**. Which means **you can go this way or** you can go **another way.** **The system isn’t actually closed.**

#### Libidinal economy/Signifier arguments are wrong – implicit bias is socially produced and materially mediated, that means it’s subject to change

Lester 12 [Professor of Historical Geography, University of Sussex, 2012, Alan, “Humanism, race and the colonial frontier,” Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 37 132–148]

-even if antiblack violence is unique and gratuitous, that doesn’t speak to whether that’s a permanent condition or how it might be altered

**The processes of racial objectification on colonial frontiers involved** much more than language. As Saldanha argues, when race is understood as merely ‘an ideology, a narrative, a discourse’, it ‘refers to the cultural representation of people, not to people themselves’. **Race** **needs, rather, to be approached ‘ontologically, as a real** process **demanding** particular concepts **and commitments.** **Not so much representations, but bodies and** physical events’ are foregrounded in his analysis, with the phenotype of humans playing ‘an active part in the event called race’ (Saldanha 2006, 9). This is not to say that narrative and discourse can simply be set aside, however. As DeLanda writes, **words are simply one component entering into relations of exteriority** **with a** variety of other material and expressive components, **and the processes of coding and decoding based on these specialized lines of expression operate** **side by side with** . . . **non-linguistic processes of territorialisation and deterritorialisation.** (2006, 26) The problem of this decentring of language for the historian of racial thought is, however, that words are usually the only trace that we have of past human agency. We have to find ways of indicating the affective and the material, as well as the expressive, within the expressive itself. **British settler communities were** not uniformly involved **in violent relations** **with phenotypically different people**, even those located on the very frontiers of colonial expansion. But **those who ‘pioneered’ the dispossession of indigenous peoples’ land during the period of mass emigration to frontiers in North America**, **southern Africa, Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand** from the 1820s to the 1840s were uniformly subject to immediate and continual fears of violent resistance. As Peter Wade points out, **bodily appearance is often taken to be the** raw material **on which concepts of race are built** . . . But, **as analysts** such as Haraway . . . have **argued** . . . there can be no pre-discursive encounter with biology or nature. **Thus the phenotype that is taken to underlie race is itself a** social construction . . . After all, phenotype includes all aspects of appearance . . . **so why do specific aspects come to signify race:** **particular variations in skin colour rather than height;** **particular types of hair rather than eye colour;** specific facial features rather than muscularity? **The answer is that only some aspects of phenotype are worked into racial signifiers and they are the aspects that were originally seen** **to be ways of distinguishing between Europeans and those they encountered in their colonial explorations** (2002, 4) and, above all, I would add, frontier wars. As Wade concludes, ‘**Phenotype is thus** linked to a particular history’ (2002, 4) – **one in which invading British settlers distinguished themselves from those likely to resist their very presence**. The role of colonial frontier violence in determining those aspects of phenotype that signify race was critical. I think that Rachel Standfield is right when she argues that **we need to accompany Stoler’s call for a new attention to relations of intimacy between coloniser and colonised in the domains of ‘sex, sentiment, domestic arrangement and child rearing’** (Stoler 2001, 829) **with an appreciation of ‘the brute realities of violence’ and an examination of ‘the cultural and intellectual consequences of conflict’** (Standfield 2009, 31–2). We need to recognise that besides hurting the body, **the experience [and threat] of violence shapes thought-patterns** (generating fears, anxieties, memories and fantasies), **and affects the ability to** form, or not to form, **relationships – dynamics crucial in thinking about processes of ‘othering’, colonial or otherwise.** (Cleall 2009, 215; see also Bourke 1999; Scarry 1985) **Locating the origins of innatism among settler communities engaged in relations of violence emphasises the point made by Saldanha that**, **Far from being an arbitrary classification system imposed upon bodies**, **race is a nonnecessary and irreducible effect of the ways those bodies themselves interact with each other.** (2006, 10)