# Emory Round 2 1NC

## 1st

#### Interpretation: The affirmative debater must not specify what type of appropriation by private entities of outer space is unjust.

#### “Appropriation of outer space” by private entities refers to the exercise of exclusive control of space.

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Violation: They spec large constellations

#### Standards:

#### Limits and ground: the aff interpretation explodes the topic to allow any aff about extracting resources which structurally alters the neg research burden because there’s a qualitative difference between appropriation of outer space and of resources. That alters neg ground because it means the aff can defend trivial middle grounds that go beyond just exclusive appropriation unbalancing the topic and also turns pics because smaller affs incentivize more cheaty pics like process because they need generics

#### jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### TVA solves – you could’ve just read whole rez w debris advantages

#### Use competing interps > reasonability – a] Topicality is a binary question, you can’t be reasonably topical, b] reasonability arbitrary

#### Drop the debater – a] deternece, b] epistemic skew

#### No Rvis – a] illogical, b] baiting

## 2nd

### K

#### At the mirror stage, the subject is alienated from the Real, unable to articulate itself to the other. A desire for the lost object that the subject was separated from causes repetitive and destructive drives to fill the lack, that’s the root of all violence. Thus the role of the ballot is to expose and analyze these drives.

Matheson 15 [Matheson, Calum Lister. 2015. “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive.” Dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/6682x4537>] SHS KS

Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real is notoriously difficult to define. In his book on the subject, Tom Eyers calls it the “most elusive” of Lacan’s concepts, but one that is also one that is “central” and “determining” for psychoanalysis (1). There are common elements of the various definitions. First, an agreement that both the economy of tropes that allows the conditions for meaning to emerge (the Symbolic) and the meanings and values invested in these tropes, including the subject itself (the Imaginary), do not and cannot perfectly capture all of existence or experience. Second, this unassimilable remainder structures the Symbolic and Imaginary, just as they structure each other, and thus all three registers are knitted together as demonstrated in Lacan’s famous “Borromean Knot.” The Real is what escapes mediation, what disrupts language itself. To explain its significance and relationship to desire requires examining its foundational role in the formation of the subject. The Real can be understood as the constitutive lack of the subject, its separation from the rest of existence by the self-definition necessary for it to come into being in the first place. This is made clear in the mirror stage, where the subject moves from a fragmented, disorganized concept of the body to the “finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his [sic] entire mental development with its rigid structure” (Lacan, “Mirror Stage” 78). The formation of a discrete subject (a function in the Imaginary register) is a compromise. Its formation allows for participation in the Symbolic because to participate in that economy of exchange requires a “social I” (Lacan, “Mirror stage,” 79). This participation comes at the cost of alienation because the subject trades in a world of symbols which by their nature stand in for what is not present, and thus inescapably mediate the (Real) world outside of the subject, rather than making it present. This lack built in to the subject is the engine of desire: the subject’s divide from an object is a prerequisite for the desire of such an object, but the condition of mediation makes it impossible to ever incorporate it in a perfectly satisfying way. Thus desire remains unfulfilled and each chase for a symbol leads to another in loop which the very constitution of the subject dictates must be endless. This is the basic operation of the death drive which is not distinct from Eros. Were the impossible to occur and the drive of Eros to be fulfilled, it would be extinguished, as there would be nothing left to desire. Thus all drives aim, in a sense, at their own extinction, and therefore there is in a sense only one—the drive that aims towards the extinction of desire through its complete fulfillment in continuity with the world that was lost when the subject became distinct from it in the mirror stage. Although the death drive might stand in for the singular character of the drive, it should not be understood as a desire for the actual biological death of the subject’s body, or even the desire to inflict death on others. The self-destruction of the death drive is a desire to break the limits of the self as the alienating armor of the subject by experiencing unmediated contact with the Real. Death still defines its operation in other ways. The last portion of Lacan’s “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” explains the metaphorical centrality of death as the center of a torus formed by incessant symbolization. The fort-da game is most significant not because it shows that the child wishes to destroy its mother or even inoculate itself against that possibility, but because it assimilates the child into the Symbolic order through the repetition of the signifiers fort and da, which stand in for presence and absence. Death is central to language because the symbol itself invokes the absence and loss of non- existence since its function is to stand in for something that is gone. Language swirls around this absent center of death, a primordial absence encased in the inner ring of the torus, while the outer surfaces of language hold all else that cannot be symbolized at bay on the outside (Lacan, “Function and Field” 260-264). Paradoxically, death is necessarily evoked by the symbol as that which is absent and also made possible in the first place by that same symbol. The separation of the subject into its alienating identity as a social object makes a meaningful concept of death possible because without it there is no dasein, no individual, no singular human to die. George Bataille explains this with an entomological example. If a scientist picks one fly from a swarm, that fly is subject to death, because its end means the end of the discontinuous being selected by the entomologist. Without differentiation of its members, however, the swarm lives on; the selection of the fly is for the entomologist, not the animal (Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” 14-16). Thus it is with human beings. The subject is founded by a rejection of its sole animal nature by participating in a world of work and accumulation, mediated by language—essentially Lacan’s Symbolic. Thus individuals are made discontinuous with the general economy of matter and energy from which all things are formed by a conceptual separation inextricably bound up in death. Our existences are thus defined by discontinuity from a world of continuity, and for Bataille as for Lacan, our drives are singular in the sense that sex is a coupling that unifies with another and momentarily overcomes discontinuity just as death is the end of the subject’s brief separation from a universe differentiated only by the dismembering violence of our imposition of symbols upon it (Bataille, Erotism 13-17). The experience of death may still be unique because it suggests the absence implied by the sign and because it can be experienced only once by the subject—and for obvious reasons, cannot be symbolized by anyone with first-hand experience. As Freud argues in “Thoughts For The Times On War and Death,” we cannot even hope to imagine our own deaths because to do so demands that we imagine them from some perspective which would be destroyed in the experience itself. Death and the Real are therefore not identical, but are closely linked. The most important characteristic of the Real is not just that it suggests existence beyond language, but that this world-for-itself (to borrow from Eugene Thacker) intrudes on human reality and reveals it to be incomplete. Encompassing Max Picard’s concept of silence, the Real is not the absence of human reality so much as the traumatic revelation that that reality was always incomplete, always feigned in the face of existence so much more than human mediation has already covered. Chris Lundberg uses Lacan’s distinction between reality, being the social world of human construction, and the Real, being the occasional but inevitable failure of that reality, to develop his own distinction between failed unicity and feigned unicity. The Symbolic operates as an economy of interconnected and mutually-referential tropes weaving a kind of fabric that is the precondition for meaning, an environment in which social relationships can be understood in context. When the unified illusion of the social fails, we are compelled to stitch the tears in that fabric to maintain the world that gives us meaning (Lacan in Public 2-3). An account by Bill Laurence, the only journalist allowed to witness the Trinity test, provides evidence for this rupture and repair. While “not a sound could be heard” for the period after the flash and before the thunder, Laurence saw civilization itself collapse in an instant: The big boom came about one hundred seconds after the great flash—the first cry of a newborn world. It brought the silent, motionless silhouettes to life, gave them a voice. A loud cry filled the air. The little groups that had hitherto stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into a dance—the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring. They clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground...The dance of the primitive man lasted but a few seconds, during which an evolutionary period of about 10,000 years telescoped. Primitive man was metamorphosed into modern man—shaking hands, slapping his fellow on the back, all laughing like happy children. (12)

#### Their fantasies of effectiveness lead to serial policy failure and the continuation of exploitation through corporate control. Only our analysis can expose the imaginary longings of the political psyche – this is a pre-requisite to any effective form of policymaking.

Fotaki 10 (Marianna Fotaki is a Professor of Business Ethics at Warwick Business School and a visiting professor at The University of Manchester, “Why do public policies fail so often? Exploring health policy-making as an imaginary and symbolic construction”, Organization) AqN

The origins of the ‘choice for all’ fantasy, and every other fantasy, are to be found in the need of the subject to be ‘recognized’ in the symbolic Other in order to exist. Let us not forget that the motivation and impetus for the Lacanian subject is always the desire to retrieve the illusory unity that has been sacrificed upon entry into the symbolic order via language. Language operates by signifying the object in its absence and this is why desire always contains loss within it. Without this loss of the sense of a unified identity and the fantasy it gives rise to, there would be no signification and no symbolic life. In other words, social reality is structured by our imaginary misperceptions, as well as our unsymbolizable unconscious longings, which have been given up (repressed) into the unconscious in the socialization process. Such is, for example, the fantasy of effective policy, of purposeful organization and of harmonious society—all stemming from an impossible desire for unity. The Lacanian perspective unveils the imaginary nature of such strivings which underpins various social and political projects, including idealistic and idealized public policies and dismisses them as vain attempts to counteract our ontological and temporal finitude as human beings. It also reveals why these unacknowledged imaginary and symbolic functions are indispensable for bringing policies to life, even if they cannot be achieved. Such is the example of pursuing ‘Choice for All’ (see Milburn, 2003; Reid, 2003) in a public health system with finite resources and tangible opportunity costs. It offers a stark testimony of the impossibility of realizing the policy objectives it proclaims, despite or perhaps because of its universalistic (and omnipotent) aspirations. Satisfaction of all individual wants will not be possible without limiting someone else’s access to resources and therefore options. This contravenes the founding collectivist principles of the NHS of offering equal access to all according to need. The attempt to attain the fantasy of the impossible can also explain policy recycling and repetition of the same ideas, despite many documented failures. However, the desire to attain the lost part of the self, which is the Lacanian objet petit á, and which in the case of (freedom of) patient choice stands in for freedom from the bounds of the human predicament, instigates the articulation of such and other improbable policies, only if and when the opportune moment arrives. Political expediency, a shift in dominant societal discourses and other massive social changes can all prompt such a move. Once policy makers are implicitly entrusted with formulating aspirational rather than realizable policies, their unworkable aspects are then further reinforced by psychological processes such as organizational defences in health settings. These involve separating off and denying unwanted reality (Heginbotham, 1999; Obholzer and Zagier-Roberts, 1994; Vince and Broussine, 1996). The illusory nature of many public health policies is evidenced whenever they are being formulated in denial of their contextual reality. An idealistic policy such as Choice for All must not be tested against reality and must therefore remain exterior to the organizations that will implement it. Socially sanctioned defensive reactions such as splitting between the idealized policy and its imperfect implementation, and the projection of blame onto various organizational members, are hence employed to protect against discarding this illusion. Object relations theorists came up with various elaborate theories on how social institutions enact psychodynamic mechanisms to defend individuals and groups from existential anxieties (see De Board, 1978; Obholzer, 1994).6 I have also suggested, that health policy must be idealistic to fulfil the impossible goal of the health care system, namely to defend us against the anxiety about disease and dying, a defence it can never fully accomplish (Fotaki, 2006). Although such defences might be necessary to keep destructive fears of annihilation at bay, at the same time they act as a dysfunctional barrier against attaining awareness of our own constructs and ultimately against our attempts to acknowledge fantasy and to survive its failure. To sum up, Kleinian analysis suggests how splits between policy design and organizational reality operate to ‘protect’ us from coming to terms with unrealistic policies, but the Lacanian conception of subjectivity explains why policies are designed in such way and why the splits are there in the first place. In a Lacanian perspective, while the policy tool can be seen to act as a defence against societal anxieties, these anxieties are not simply generated by the health risks themselves, but are sites in which the already existing (subjective) anxiety is expressed collectively. Put differently, we are all anxious anyway as, for Lacan, anxiety is the fear ‘of the lack of lack’ and this is why these symbolic manifestations of extant general anxiety float from one public issue to another, as was helpfully put by one reviewer.7 This leads me now to the central claim I make in this article, namely, that the imaginary construction of policy-making, if unacknowledged, leads to multiple splits and ultimately underscores its failure. The example of patient choice is so evidently suffused with unrealizable promises, as is chosen to highlight the undesirable effects of unrecognized fantasies in the policy-making process and the difficulty of translating value driven statements into organizational realities. The use of abstract economic models simplifying human decisions and devoiding them of real life messiness, and the Labour government’s belated enchantment with the market and competition (Le Grand, 2006; Le Grand and Dixon, 2006) to solve the insoluble efficiency/equity dilemma, ensures that policy formulation is distanced from organizational reality. When such realization of an intrinsic conflict between fantasy and reality and the potential for failure is absent from policy making, defensive mechanisms (projection and splitting) cascade down into health care organizations. These are necessary in order to maintain the splits between a good policy and the flawed implementation should the policy fail, as it must, and for apportioning the blame towards those who must be held responsible for policy failure. Politicians blame health professionals for not meeting their impossible ideals, insisting that more managers are required in order to police their choices. Various groups of health professionals are pitted against each other (doctors versus managers or doctors versus nurses for example) as they are simultaneously idealized and denigrated, offering protection against the inevitability of failure of the unworkable policies while better policies are awaited in the future. Clearly, the process of articulating impossible policies and the difficulties involved in implementing them are all underscored by the idealization and defences around working in health care, as the seminal work of Menzies (1960) has illustrated. The alleged beneficiaries of policies are subject to idealization too: patient choice is after all introduced in the name of empowering the deserving users of services against the dominance of all-powerful professionals who do not always have their patents’ best interest in mind.8 Yet those who do not accept responsibilities for their health related choices are exempted from the category of deserving users as they are stigmatized and refused treatment (see the example of obese patients and smokers turned down by some health authorities in England—BBC, 2005). Inherent in New Labour’s project of modernization is the assumption that the modern citizen should be both managerial and entrepreneurial (Scourfield, 2007). The price of greater autonomy and involvement is that users must assume active responsibility for these activities, both for carrying them out and for their outcomes. This new form of ‘responsibilization’ corresponds to the new ways in which the governed are encouraged to act freely and rationally while conducting themselves in accordance with the appropriate (or approved) model of action (Burchell, 1993: 276, cited in Scourfield, 2007). Their subordinated citizenship then becomes doubly underlined by their ‘choice’ to have services arranged for them, while they are required to acquire the flexibility of ‘the person’ (Scourfield, 2007). Choice and independence are powerful concepts but dependency and interdependency are part of all our lives, for some of us more than others. It is clear that such policies invariably ignore the reality of non-uniform patients, who are themselves fragmented and divided subjects; more so in times of dislocation and stress Scourfield (2007) reminds us. But the Lacanian analysis of policy making does not simply suggest that the glorification of choice would not have been possible in the absence of an underlying fantasy. It gives us conceptual tools to explore how the inherent idealization involved in articulating aspirational policy objectives such as Choice for All, for example, might enable policy capture by powerful political groups and/ or organized interests for their own ideological and political ends. This is because various (conscious and less conscious) forms of political exploitation are more likely to occur when policy content coheres with the imaginary longings of the psyche. The desire for unity in the subject may be more easily written into political projects, especially when it is being translated into the language of the alleged wants of the disembodied and idealized patient and/or user of health care desiring the abstract notion of ‘choice’. Because choice for all could mean anything and appeal to everybody, it can be easily used as a vehicle to articulate the concerns of a particular segment of society (mostly the vocal and educated middle-classes). In reality, however, patient choice more often than not implies the co-option of calls for greater user empowerment into the neoliberal discourse of greater responsibility. This serves as an excuse for policies that are aimed at the retrenchment of the welfare state and the transfer of public responsibilities to the individual. Similarly, the discourse of inefficiency and irresponsiveness in public services is employed to legitimize managerialism as the sole remedy for these ills. However, this reframes the value of professional ethos and expertise by relegating them to the category of secondary attributes in order to establish neo-Taylorist methods of work as an uncontested norm for every professional group in the NHS (Newman et al., 2008).

#### Util is another link – they can’t leverage it against the K because this indicts their ability to read it in the first place.

McGowan 13 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London, SJBE

Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierar- chies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experi- ence of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death — the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are — is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn’t extinguish but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, “With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death, which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity — science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continu- ally embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After sci- entists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can’t produce enough — crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one — but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capital- ism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death’s finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility.13 The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite — an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite — the infinite of modernity — depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsoles- cence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capital- ism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfac- tion lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societ- ies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explo- sions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity’s symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, “Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

#### The alternative is to embrace the death drive, recognizing and internalizing the limits to our society allows us to access the infinity of enjoyment.

McGowan 13 [Todd McGowan. 2013. “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London] SHS KS

There is no path leading from the death drive to utopia. The death drive undermines every attempt to construct a utopia; it is the enemy of the good society. It is thus not surprising that political thought from Plato onward has largely ignored this psychic force of repetition and negation. But this does not mean that psychoanalytic thought concerning the death drive has only a negative value for political theorizing. It is possible to conceive of a positive politics of the death drive.The previous chapters have attempted to lay out the political implications of the death drive, and, on this basis, we can sketch what a society founded on a recognition of the death drive might look like. Such a recognition would not involve a radical transformation of society: in one sense, it would leave everything as it is. In contemporary social arrangements, the death drive subverts progress with repetition and leads to the widespread sacrifice of self-interest for the enjoyment of the sacrifice itself. This structure is impervi- ous to change and to all attempts at amelioration. But in another sense, the recognition of the death drive would change everything. Recognizing the centrality of the death drive would not eliminate the proclivity to sacrifice for the sake of enjoyment, but it would change our relationship to this sacrifice. Rather than being done for the sake of an ultimate enjoyment to be achieved in the future, it would be done for its own sake. The fundamental problem with the effort to escape the death drive and pursue the good is that it leaves us unable to locate where our enjoyment lies. By positing a future where we will attain the ultimate enjoyment (either through the purchase of the perfect commodity or through a transcendent romantic union or through the attainment of some heavenly paradise), we replace the partial enjoyment of the death drive with the image of a complete enjoyment to come. There is no question of fully enjoying our submission to the death drive. We will always remain alienated from our mode of enjoying. As Adrian Johnston rightly points out, “Transgressively ‘overcoming’ the impediments of the drives doesn’t enable one to simply enjoy enjoyment.”1 But we can transform our relationship to the impediments that block the full realization of our drive. We can see the impediments as the internal product of the death drive rather than as an external limit. The enjoyment that the death drive provides, in contrast to the form of enjoyment proffered by capitalism, religion, and utopian politics, is at once infinite and limited. This oxymoronic form of enjoyment operates in the way that the concept does in Hegel’s Logic. The concept attains its infinitude not through endless progress toward a point that always remains beyond and out of reach but through including the beyond as a beyond within itself. As Hegel puts it, “The universality of the concept is the achieved beyond, whereas that bad infinity remains afflicted with a beyond which is unattainable but remains a mere progression to infinity.”2 That is to say, the concept transforms an external limit into an internal one and thereby becomes both infinite and limited. The infinitude of the concept is nothing but the concept’s own self-limitation. The enjoyment that the death drive produces also achieves its infinitude through self-limitation. It revolves around a lost object that exists only insofar as it is lost, and it relates to this object as the vehicle for the infinite unfurling of its movement. The lost object operates as the self-limitation of the death drive through which the drive produces an infinite enjoyment. Rather than acting as a mark of the drive’s finitude, the limitation that the lost object introduces provides access to infinity. A society founded on a recognition of the death drive would be one that viewed its limitations as the source of its infinite enjoyment rather than an obstacle to that enjoyment. To take the clearest and most traumatic example in recent history, the recognition of the death drive in 1930s Ger- many would have conceived the figure of the Jew not as the barrier to the ultimate enjoyment that must therefore be eliminated but as the internal limit through which German society attained its enjoyment. As numerous theorists have said, the appeal of Nazism lay in its ability to mobilize the enjoyment of the average German through pointing out a threat to that enjoyment. The average German under Nazism could enjoy the figure of the Jew as it appeared in the form of an obstacle, but it is possible to recognize the obstacle not as an external limit but as an internal one. In this way, the figure of the Jew would become merely a figure for the average German rather than a position embodied by actual Jews. Closer to home, one would recognize the terrorist as a figure representing the internal limit of global capitalist society. Far from serving as an obstacle to the ultimate enjoyment in that society, the terrorist provides a barrier where none otherwise exists and thereby serves as the vehicle through which capitalist society attains its enjoyment. The absence of explicit limita- tions within contemporary global capitalism necessitates such a figure: if terrorists did not exist, global capitalist society would have to invent them. But recognizing the terrorist as the internal limit of global capitalist society would mean the end of terrorism. This recognition would transform the global landscape and deprive would-be terrorists of the libidinal space within which to act. Though some people may continue to blow up buildings, they would cease to be terrorists in the way that we now understand the term. A self-limiting society would still have real battles to fight. There would remain a need for this society to defend itself against external threats and against the cruelty of the natural universe. Perhaps it would require nuclear weapons in space to defend against comets or meteors that would threaten to wipe out human life on the planet. But it would cease positing the ulti- mate enjoyment in vanquishing an external threat or surpassing a natural limit. The external limit would no longer stand in for a repressed internal one. Such a society would instead enjoy its own internal limitations and merely address external limits as they came up. Psychoanalytic theory never preaches, and it cannot help us to construct a better society. But it can help us to subtract the illusion of the good from our own society. By depriving us of this illusion, it has the ability to trans- form our thinking about politics. With the assistance of psychoanalytic thought, we might reconceive politics in a direction completely opposed to that articulated by Aristotle, to which I alluded in the introduction. In the Politics, Aristotle asserts: “Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.”3 Though later political thinkers have obviously departed from Aristotle concerning the question of the content of the good society, few have thought of politics in terms opposed to the good. This is what psychoanalytic thought introduces. If we act on the basis of enjoyment rather than the good, this does not mean that we can simply construct a society that privileges enjoyment in an overt way. An open society with no restrictions on sexual activity, drug use, food consumption, or play in general would not be a more enjoyable one than our own. That is the sure path to impoverishing our ability to enjoy, as the aftermath of the 1960s has made painfully clear. One must arrive at enjoyment indirectly. A society centered around the death drive would not be a better society, nor would it entail less suffering. Rather than continu- ally sacrificing for the sake of the good, we would sacrifice the good for the sake of enjoyment. A society centered around the death drive would allow us to recognize that we enjoy the lost object only insofar as it remains lost.

#### Form over content – a] their speech-act controls the way that we understand and interpret their framework, b] it shouldn’t matter how correct you are if you engaged in unethical practices along the way, both of these mean that you should evaluate the K as a side-constraint on how we view things like the affirmative framework.

## Case

### ADV 1

#### Collision risk is infinitesimally small

Fange 17 Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.

#### Low risk of collisions – it’s overhyped

Albrecht 16 [Mark Albrecht, chairman of the board of USSpace LLC, head of the White House National Space Council from 1989 to 1992, and Paul Graziani, CEO and founder of Analytical Graphics, a company that develops software and provides mission assurance through the Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC), Congested space is a serious problem solved by hard work, not hysteria, 2016, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-congested-space-is-a-serious-problem-solved-by-hard-work-not-hysteria/]

Popular culture has embraced the risks of collisions in space in films like Gravity. Some participants have dramatized the issue by producing graphics of Earth and its satellites, which make our planet look like a fuzzy marble, almost obscured by a dense cloud of white pellets meant to conceptualize space congestion. Unfortunately, for the sake of a good visual, satellites are depicted as if they were hundreds of miles wide, like the state of Pennsylvania (for the record, there are no space objects the size of Pennsylvania in orbit). Unfortunately, this is the rule, not the exception, and almost all of these articles, movies, graphics, and simulations are exaggerated and misleading. Space debris and collision risk is real, but it certainly is not a crisis. So what are the facts? On the positive side, space is empty and it is vast. At the altitude of the International Space Station, one half a degree of Earth longitude is almost 40 miles long. That same one half a degree at geostationary orbit, some 22,000 miles up is over 230 miles long. Generally, we don’t intentionally put satellites closer together than one-half degree. That means at geostationary orbit, they are no closer than 11 times as far as the eye can see on flat ground or on the sea: That’s the horizon over the horizon 10 times over. In addition, other than minute forces like solar winds and sparse bits of atmosphere that still exist 500 miles up, nothing gets in the way of orbiting objects and they behave quite predictably. The location of the smallest spacecraft can be predicated within a 1,000 feet, 24 hours in advance. Since we first started placing objects into space there have been 11 known low Earth orbit collisions, and three known collisions at geostationary orbit. Think of it: 135 space shuttle flights, all of the Apollo, Gemini and Mercury flights, hundreds of telecommunications satellites, 1,300 functioning satellites on orbit today, half a million total objects in space larger than a marble, and fewer than 15 known collisions. Why do people worry?