# 1ac

## 1st

#### Interpretation – Debaters may not read extinction impacts, claim extinction has infinite magnitude and reasons why we should use epistemic modesty

#### Violation – They read EM, an extinction impact, and their pummer 15 card says extinction has inf magnitude

#### Standards:

#### 1. Infinite abuse – means you’ll always win since you’ll just assert extinction has infinite magnitude and win under EM, that links back to fairness and also kills clash since you’ll just go all in on extinction and EM and pay minimal attention to other layers

#### 2. Philosophical education – kills phil ed by letting you win with low risk extinction claims that outweigh infinitely under some probabilityxmagnitude framing and getting out of the framework debate when we are supposed to be learning about and debating philosophy. That’s an independent voter because phil ed is constitutive to LD Debate and controls the internal link to other voters because we need a concept of noramtivity to even care about fairness or education.

#### Fairness is a voter

Neg theory outweighs

#### DTD, 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die out 2. TS – Otherwise you’ll read a bunch of abusive practices for the time trade off 3. Epistemic Skew – The round has already been skewed so it’s impossible to evaluate the rest of the flow

#### No RVIs, a] baiting, b] norming: justifies you dumping on the shell for 7 min in the 1ar and 2ar but a 7 min 1n shell is impossible

#### CI > reasonability, 1] reasonability is arbitrary and judge intervention, 2] reasonability encourages a race to the bottom

#### No cross-apps, overviews, meta theory, or 1AR theory – make them win the CI cause they know they’re abusive and have to read takeouts to theory to win when called out, anything else recreates their abuse and assumes it was justified in the first place since they just try to commit more abuse to take out the shell

## 2nd

#### The subject is fundamentally unstable: being is in flux due to things such as time, I am not the same person that I was 10 years ago, which proves personal evolution.

#### Affect is constitutive: it is the capacity to experience and to be experienced. I am experiencing my laptop, my opponent, just as much as you are experiencing me. There is no way any person or thing can escape affection.

#### Fluidity determines the subject: because affect and instability ensure that subjects always change, the only intrinsic feature of the subject is that everything remains in flux. Emphasis on particular aspects of subjectivity only drives division in the proletariat.

#### Subjects are gridded against the legal system to be surveilled by the state, which mandates a precondition to rights: are you oppressed enough to deserve equality? Even when the state affirms the rights of white, cis, wealthy gay men, it oppresses gender nonconforming, indigenous, queers. Thus, the role of the ballot is to deconstruct western Man.

Weheliye 2 [Alexander Weheliye; Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University; 2014; “Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human”; LCA-BP] \*brackets for gendered lang

Even more generally, the acknowledgment and granting of full personhood of those excluded from its precincts requires the overcoming of physical violence, while epistemic and economic brutalities remain outside the scope of the law. Congruently, much of the politics constructed around the effects of political violence, especially within the context of international human rights but also with regard to minority politics in the United States, is constructed from the shaky foundation of surmounting or desiring to leave behind physical suffering so as to take on the ghostly semblance of possessing one's personhood. Then and only then will previously minoritized subjects be granted their humanity as a legal status. Hence, the glitch Brown diagnoses in identity politics is less a product of the minority subject's desire to desperately cling to his or her [their] pain but a consequence of the state's dogged insistence on suffering as the only price of entry to proper personhood, what Samera Esmeir has referred to as a “juridical humanity” that bestows and rescinds humanity as an individualized legal status in the vein of property.5 Apportioning personhood in this way maintains the world of Man and its attendant racializing assemblages, which means in essence that the entry fee for legal recognition is the acceptance of categories based on white supremacy and colonialism, as well as normative genders and sexualities. We need only to consult the history of habeas corpus, the “great” writ of liberty, which is anchored in the U.S. Constitution (Article 1, Section 9), to see that this type of reasoning leads to reducing inclusion and personhood to ownership.6 The Latin phrase habeas corpus means “You shall have the body,” and a writ thereof requires the government to present prisoners before a judge so as to provide a lawful justification for their continued imprisonment. This writ has been considered a pivotal safeguard against the misuse of political power in the modern west. Even though the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which denied habeas corpus to “unlawful enemy combatants” imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, remains noteworthy and alarming, habeas corpus has been used both by and frequently against racialized groups throughout U.S. history, as was the case when habeas corpus was suspended during World War II, allowing for the internment of Japanese Americans. The writ has also led to gains for minoritized subjects as, for instance, in the well-known Amistad case (1839), in which abolitionists used a habeas corpus petition to free the “illegally” captured Africans who had staged a mutiny against their abductors. Likewise, when Ponca tribal leader Standing Bear was jailed as a result of protesting the forcible removal of his people to Indian Territory in 1879, the writ of habeas corpus affected his release from incarceration as well as the judge's recognition that, as a general rule, Indians were persons before U.S. law, even though Native Americans were not considered full U.S. citizens until 1924.7 Nevertheless, the benefits accrued through the juridical acknowledgment of racialized subjects as fully human often exacts a steep entry price, because inclusion hinges on accepting the codification of personhood as property, which is, in turn, based on the comparative distinction between groups, as in one of the best-known court cases in U.S. history: the Dred Scott case. In 1857, the Supreme Court invalidated Dred Scott's habeas corpus, since, as an escaped slave, Scott could not be a legal person. According to Chief Justice Taney: “Dred Scott is not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, because he is a negro of African descent; his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves.”8 In order to justify withdrawing Dred Scott's legal right to ownership of self, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the decision contrasts the status of black subjects with the legal position of Native Americans vis-a-vis the possibility of U.S. citizenship and personhood: “The situation of [the negro] population was altogether unlike that of the Indian race. These Indian Governments were regarded and treated as foreign Governments.... [Indians] may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized...and become citizens of a State, and of the United States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.”9 While slaves were not accorded the status of being humans that belonged to a different nation, Indians could theoretically overcome their lawful foreignness, but only if they renounced previous forms of personhood and citizenship. Hence, the tabula rasa of whiteness—which all groups but blacks can access—serves as the prerequisite for the law's magical transubstantiation of a thing to be possessed into a property-owning subject.10 The judge's comparison underscores the dangers of ceding definitions of personhood to the law and of comparing different forms of political subjugation, since hypothetical Indian personhood in the law rests on attaining whiteness and the violent denial of said status to black subjects. Additionally, while the court conceded limited capabilities of personhood to indigenous subjects if they chose to convert to whiteness, it did not prevent the U.S. government from instituting various genocidal measures to ensure that American Indians would become white and therefore no longer exist as Indians. In other words, the legal conception of personhood comes with a steep price, as in this instance where being seemingly granted rights laid the groundwork for the U.S. government's genocidal policies against Native Americans, since the “racialization of indigenous peoples, especially through the use of blood quantum classification, in particular follows...‘genocidal logic,’ rather than simply a logic of subordination or discrimination,” and as a result “whiteness constitutes a project of disappearance for Native peoples rather than signifying privilege.”11 Beginning in the nineteenth century the U.S. government instituted a program in which Native American children were forcibly removed from their families and placed in Christian day and boarding schools, and which sought to civilize children by “killing the Indian to save the man,” representing one of the most significant examples of the violent and legal enforced assimilation of Native Americans into U.S. whiteness.12 Though there is no clear causal relationship between Taney's arguments in the Scott decision and the boarding school initiative, both establish that legal personhood is available to indigenous subjects only if the Indian can be killed—either literally or figuratively—in order to save the world of Man (in this case settler colonialism and white supremacy). Furthermore, the denial of personhood qua whiteness to African American subjects does not stand in opposition to the genocidal wages of whiteness bequeathed to indigenous subjects but rather represents different properties of the same racializing juridical assemblage that differentially produces both black and native subjects as aberrations from Man and thus not-quite-human. The writ of habeas corpus—and the law more generally—anoints those individualized subjects who are deemed deserving with bodies even while this assemblage continually enlists new and/or different groups to exclude, banish, or exterminate from the world of Man. In the end, the law, whether bound by national borders or spanning the globe, establishes an international division of humanity, which grants previously excluded subjects limited access to personhood as property at the same time as it fortifies the supremacy of Man.13

#### Focusing on legal integration, i.e. the aff wanting governments to legally recgnoize the right to strike, reinforces the western Man by forcing groups the beg for empathy and degrade themselves for simple rights. It encourages infighting – a bourgeois strategy that forces oppression olympics while affirming political violence.

Weheliye 3 [Alexander Weheliye; Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University; 2014; “Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human”; LCA-BP]

Even though it would be fairly easy to dismiss one position, either the traditionally humanist (suffering is human) or the racially particularistic (suffering is experienced only by those groups upon which it is inflicted), in favor of the other, both these stances rely on the same logic that deems one incompatible with the other, since the humanist brand would erase particularities in favor of a universalist sweep and the particularistic variant insists on its irreducibility by excluding all nonmembers from the group's affliction. Rather than urging us to choose sides, Farah's juxtaposition of these viewpoints draws attention to the ways racialized and gendered suffering at the hands of political brutalization are always already imbricated in the construction of modern humanity. Suffering, especially when caused by political violence, has long functioned as the hallmark of both humane sentience and of inhuman brutality. Frequently, suffering becomes the defining feature of those subjects excluded from the law, the national community, humanity, and so on due to the political violence inflicted upon them even as it, paradoxically, grants them access to inclusion and equality. In western human rights discourse, for instance, the physical and psychic residues of political violence enable victims to be recognized as belonging to the “brotherhood of Man.” Too often, this tendency not only leaves intact hegemonic ideas of humanity as indistinguishable from western Man but demands comparing different forms of subjugation in order to adjudicate who warrants recognition and belonging. As W. E. B. Du Bois asked in 1944, if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not offer provisions for ending world colonialism or legal segregation in the United States, “Why then call it the Declaration of Human Rights?”2 Wendy Brown maintains, “politicized identity” operates “only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future...that triumphs over this pain.”3 Brown suggests replacing the identitarian declaration “I am,” which merely confirms and solidifies what already exists, with the desiring proclamation “I want,” which offers a Nietzschean politics of overcoming pain instead of clinging to suffering as an immutable feature of identity politics. While I recognize Brown's effort to formulate a form of minority politics not beholden to the aura of wounded attachments and fixated almost fetishistically on the state as the site of change, we do well to recall that many of the political agendas based on identity (the suffragette movement, the movement for the equality of same-sex marriages, or the various movements for the full civil rights of racialized minority subjects, for instance) are less concerned with claiming their suffering per se (I am) than they are with us[e]ing wounding as a stepping stone in the quest (I want) for rights equal to those of full citizens. Liberal governing bodies, whether in the form of nation-states or supranational entities such as the United Nations or the International Criminal Court make particular forms of wounding the precondition for entry into the hallowed halls of full personhood, only acknowledging certain types of physical violence. For instance, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees passed a resolution in 2008 that includes rape and other forms of sexual violence in the category of war crimes, there are many forms of sexual violence that do not fall into this purview, and thus bar victims from claiming legal injury and/or personhood.4

#### By emphasizing the distinctions between humans, not-quite humans, and non-humans, whiteness becomes viewed as Truth and the bar at which everyone is compared in the color line. The color line emphasizes phenotypical distinctions as the standard for which bodies enter spaces of liminality.

Wynter [Sylvia; 2003; “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 3, Number 3,257-337]  
The Argument proposes that the new master code of the bourgeoisie and of its ethnoclass conception of the human - that **is,** the code of selected by Evolution/dysselected by Evolution- was now to be mapped and anchored **on** the only available "objective set of facts" that remained. This was the set of **environmentally, climatically determined phenotypical differences between human hereditary variations as these had developed in the wake of the human diaspora both across and out of the continent of Africa;** that is, as a set of (so to speak) totemic **differences**, which **were** now **harnessed to the task of projecting the Color Line drawn institutionally and discursively between whites/nonwhites** - and at its most extreme between the Caucasoid physiognomy (as symbolic life, the name of what is good, the idea that some humans can be selected by Evolution) and the Negroid phys- iognomy (as symbolic death, the "name of what is evil," the idea that some humans can be dysselected by Evolution)- as **the new extrahuman line,** or projection of genetic nonhomogeneity that **would** now **be made to function**, analogically, **as the status-ordering principle based upon** ostensibly differ- ential degrees of evolutionary selectedness/eugenicity and/or dysselected- ness/dysgenicity. **Differential degrees,** as **between** the **classes** (middle and lower and, by extrapolation, between capital and labor) as well as between **men and women**, **and** between the **hetero**sexual **and homosexual** erotic preference - and, even more centrally, as between Breadwinner (job- holding middle and working classes) and the jobless and criminalized Poor, with this rearticulated at the global level as between Sartre's "Men" and Natives (see his guide-quote), before the end of politico-military colonial- ism, then postcolonially as between the "developed" First World, on the one hand, and the "underdeveloped" Third and Fourth Worlds on the other. **The Color Line was now projected as the new "space of Otherness**" principle of nonhomogeneity, **made to reoccupy the** earlier **places of** the motion-filled heavens/non-moving Earth, **rational humans/irrational animal lines, and to recode in new terms their ostensible extrahumanly determined differences of ontological substance**. While, if the earlier two had been indispen- sable to the production and reproduction of their respective genres of being human, of their descriptive statements (i.e., as Christian and as Mam), and of the overall order in whose field of interrelationships, social hierarchies, system of role allocations, and divisions of labors each such genre of the human could alone realize itself- and with each such descriptive state- ment therefore being rigorously conserved by the "learning system" and order of knowledge as articulated in the institutional structure of each order - this was to be no less the case with respect to the projected "space of Otherness" of the Color Line. With respect, that is, to its indispensability to the production and reproduction of our present genre of the human Mam, together with the overall global/national bourgeois order of things and its specific mode of economic production, alone able to provide the material conditions of existence for the production and reproduction of the ethnoclass or Western-bourgeois answer that we now give to the question of the who and what we are.

#### The alternative is habeas viscus. We reconfigure our view of the human to be framed by flesh (suffering, actualized, material) instead of the legal body (legible, coherent, perceived) to focus on affective bonds. By synthesizing our experiences and identities, we can embrace liminality to better strategize and dismantle systems of oppression while emphasizing collective action and collaboration.

Weheliye 4 [Alexander Weheliye; Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University; 2014; “Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human”; LCA-BP]

The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson's apt phrasing, “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve [and I would add also to reimagine] the collective being, the ontological totality.”31 Though the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus defies domestication both on the basis of particularized personhood as a result of suffering, as in human rights discourse, and on the grounds of the universalized version of western Man. Rather, habeas viscus points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law given that the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, habeas viscus diverges from the discourses and institutions that yoke the flesh to political violence in the modus of deviance. Instead, it translates the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity. To envisage habeas viscus as a forceful assemblage of humanity entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties. As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 Claiming and dwelling in the monstrosity of the flesh present some of the weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human. As an assemblage of humanity, habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; assemblages of freedom that sway to the temporality of new syncopated beginnings for the human beyond the world and continent of Man.

## Case