# 1n

## 1st

#### At the mirror stage, the subject is alienated from the Real, unable to articulate itself to the other. A desire for the lost object that the subject was separated from causes repetitive and destructive drives to fill the lack, that’s the root of all violence. Thus the role of the ballot is to expose and analyze these drives.

Matheson 15 [Matheson, Calum Lister. 2015. “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive.” Dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/6682x4537>] SHS KS

Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real is notoriously difficult to define. In his book on the subject, Tom Eyers calls it the “most elusive” of Lacan’s concepts, but one that is also one that is “central” and “determining” for psychoanalysis (1). There are common elements of the various definitions. First, an agreement that both the economy of tropes that allows the conditions for meaning to emerge (the Symbolic) and the meanings and values invested in these tropes, including the subject itself (the Imaginary), do not and cannot perfectly capture all of existence or experience. Second, this unassimilable remainder structures the Symbolic and Imaginary, just as they structure each other, and thus all three registers are knitted together as demonstrated in Lacan’s famous “Borromean Knot.” The Real is what escapes mediation, what disrupts language itself. To explain its significance and relationship to desire requires examining its foundational role in the formation of the subject. The Real can be understood as the constitutive lack of the subject, its separation from the rest of existence by the self-definition necessary for it to come into being in the first place. This is made clear in the mirror stage, where the subject moves from a fragmented, disorganized concept of the body to the “finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his [sic] entire mental development with its rigid structure” (Lacan, “Mirror Stage” 78). The formation of a discrete subject (a function in the Imaginary register) is a compromise. Its formation allows for participation in the Symbolic because to participate in that economy of exchange requires a “social I” (Lacan, “Mirror stage,” 79). This participation comes at the cost of alienation because the subject trades in a world of symbols which by their nature stand in for what is not present, and thus inescapably mediate the (Real) world outside of the subject, rather than making it present. This lack built in to the subject is the engine of desire: the subject’s divide from an object is a prerequisite for the desire of such an object, but the condition of mediation makes it impossible to ever incorporate it in a perfectly satisfying way. Thus desire remains unfulfilled and each chase for a symbol leads to another in loop which the very constitution of the subject dictates must be endless. This is the basic operation of the death drive which is not distinct from Eros. Were the impossible to occur and the drive of Eros to be fulfilled, it would be extinguished, as there would be nothing left to desire. Thus all drives aim, in a sense, at their own extinction, and therefore there is in a sense only one—the drive that aims towards the extinction of desire through its complete fulfillment in continuity with the world that was lost when the subject became distinct from it in the mirror stage. Although the death drive might stand in for the singular character of the drive, it should not be understood as a desire for the actual biological death of the subject’s body, or even the desire to inflict death on others. The self-destruction of the death drive is a desire to break the limits of the self as the alienating armor of the subject by experiencing unmediated contact with the Real. Death still defines its operation in other ways. The last portion of Lacan’s “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” explains the metaphorical centrality of death as the center of a torus formed by incessant symbolization. The fort-da game is most significant not because it shows that the child wishes to destroy its mother or even inoculate itself against that possibility, but because it assimilates the child into the Symbolic order through the repetition of the signifiers fort and da, which stand in for presence and absence. Death is central to language because the symbol itself invokes the absence and loss of non- existence since its function is to stand in for something that is gone. Language swirls around this absent center of death, a primordial absence encased in the inner ring of the torus, while the outer surfaces of language hold all else that cannot be symbolized at bay on the outside (Lacan, “Function and Field” 260-264). Paradoxically, death is necessarily evoked by the symbol as that which is absent and also made possible in the first place by that same symbol. The separation of the subject into its alienating identity as a social object makes a meaningful concept of death possible because without it there is no dasein, no individual, no singular human to die. George Bataille explains this with an entomological example. If a scientist picks one fly from a swarm, that fly is subject to death, because its end means the end of the discontinuous being selected by the entomologist. Without differentiation of its members, however, the swarm lives on; the selection of the fly is for the entomologist, not the animal (Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” 14-16). Thus it is with human beings. The subject is founded by a rejection of its sole animal nature by participating in a world of work and accumulation, mediated by language—essentially Lacan’s Symbolic. Thus individuals are made discontinuous with the general economy of matter and energy from which all things are formed by a conceptual separation inextricably bound up in death. Our existences are thus defined by discontinuity from a world of continuity, and for Bataille as for Lacan, our drives are singular in the sense that sex is a coupling that unifies with another and momentarily overcomes discontinuity just as death is the end of the subject’s brief separation from a universe differentiated only by the dismembering violence of our imposition of symbols upon it (Bataille, Erotism 13-17). The experience of death may still be unique because it suggests the absence implied by the sign and because it can be experienced only once by the subject—and for obvious reasons, cannot be symbolized by anyone with first-hand experience. As Freud argues in “Thoughts For The Times On War and Death,” we cannot even hope to imagine our own deaths because to do so demands that we imagine them from some perspective which would be destroyed in the experience itself. Death and the Real are therefore not identical, but are closely linked. The most important characteristic of the Real is not just that it suggests existence beyond language, but that this world-for-itself (to borrow from Eugene Thacker) intrudes on human reality and reveals it to be incomplete. Encompassing Max Picard’s concept of silence, the Real is not the absence of human reality so much as the traumatic revelation that that reality was always incomplete, always feigned in the face of existence so much more than human mediation has already covered. Chris Lundberg uses Lacan’s distinction between reality, being the social world of human construction, and the Real, being the occasional but inevitable failure of that reality, to develop his own distinction between failed unicity and feigned unicity. The Symbolic operates as an economy of interconnected and mutually-referential tropes weaving a kind of fabric that is the precondition for meaning, an environment in which social relationships can be understood in context. When the unified illusion of the social fails, we are compelled to stitch the tears in that fabric to maintain the world that gives us meaning (Lacan in Public 2-3). An account by Bill Laurence, the only journalist allowed to witness the Trinity test, provides evidence for this rupture and repair. While “not a sound could be heard” for the period after the flash and before the thunder, Laurence saw civilization itself collapse in an instant: The big boom came about one hundred seconds after the great flash—the first cry of a newborn world. It brought the silent, motionless silhouettes to life, gave them a voice. A loud cry filled the air. The little groups that had hitherto stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into a dance—the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring. They clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground...The dance of the primitive man lasted but a few seconds, during which an evolutionary period of about 10,000 years telescoped. Primitive man was metamorphosed into modern man—shaking hands, slapping his fellow on the back, all laughing like happy children. (12)

#### Their demand to “strike” against the government presumes that the government will actually listen. Attempts to place demands inevitably concede the authority of the structure they critique and cast the lack onto the other, only to realize that our understandings of the demands put on the state is distinct from the theirs

**Lundberg 12** (Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric by Christian O. Lundberg 201. Co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, Associate Professor) EG RCT//SR

A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the expense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. in the Ethics of Psycho analysis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hysteric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, insofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their demands. on one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the other. yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoying the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire.

#### The plan’s guarantee secures the worker’s symbolic identification with state power, recreating a fantasy of democratic, grassroot politics emblematic of the will to mastery and naturalizing illusory desire.

Anker 12 Elisabeth Anker, 2012, “Heroic Identifications: Or ‘You Can Love Me Too – I am so Like the State,’” Theory & Event, Vol. 15 Issue 1, <https://americanstudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs1806/f/downloads/Heroic-T&E-Anker.pdf>

“Look, You Can Love Me Too – I am So Like The State” The psychic process of identification may seem an odd place to begin examining how individuals could legitimate powers that diminish their own capacities as political agents, but identification is, at least for Freud, the very point where the individual intersects with the political. Identification mediates the relationship between the self and others; it is the process by which the political and social world shapes individuals at the same that that it is a way for individuals to attempt control over that world. Identification turns individuals into subjects through their engagement with what is outside of themselves, and produces not one stable or permanent subject but a series of subjectivating identifications throughout one’s life that continually adapt to changes in the social world. It is no coincidence that Freud’s most extended writings on identification come in Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego, his examination of group formation and behavior. Identification would seem to be the very point from which to begin taking the measure of the work of political legitimation, the process by which individuals sustain, acquiesce to, and influence political power. On Diana Fuss’ reading, there can be no politics without identification; she argues, “identification is not only how we accede to power, but it is how we learn submission.”7 For Freud, the process of identification begins out of an experience of losing something or someone that one has loved. This lost object can be a person, an abstract concept such as an ideal, or one’s country. Identification is a way of managing this loss, and it requires relinquishing one’s earlier desire to have what was loved and is now gone. In identification, individuals abandon a prior aim to possess their love object and adjust to more limited aims: not to have the loved one, or to be the loved one, but to be like the loved one that is gone.8 Identification is triggered when the individual realizes that it cannot have its loved one but still feels attached to what it loves, so it modifies its desire: it becomes like the one it had loved, and thus the individual preserves its attachment internally. Identification is the “endeavor to mold a person’s own ego after the fashion of the one taken as a model.”9 In identification, one substitutes oneself, part of one’s ego, for the lost object. Freud explains, “If one has lost a love object, the most obvious reaction is to identify with it, to replace it from within, as it were, by identification.”10 Identification becomes a substitute for an original tie with something desired. In identification, an unattainable external love object becomes an internal ideal upon which to pattern the self. Part of the ego molds itself into the object of desire in order to satisfy other desiring parts of the self. Freud argues, “When the ego assumes the features of the object, it is forcing itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object and is trying to make good the id’s loss by saying ‘Look, you can love me too – I am so like the object.”11 Identification is the nexus of the self and the social, and marks a process whereby the individual internalizes something in the world (indeed it is shaped by its relations with the external world) at the very moment it turns away from the world in an attempt to satisfy its own needs. Identification can be seen as a coping mechanism that constitutes subjectivity by its attempt to manage loss, an attempt to satisfy one’s own desires when they are not satisfied by others.12 It thus involves a reckoning with loss, but also with difference. As one becomes aware of loss, one becomes aware of the difference between what one is and who one wants to be. It marks a process in which the subject individuates itself from something else. Identification is how the self grapples with its own identity through its relationship to others, and it works by idealizing and modeling part of itself as another. Freud’s theory of the mechanisms of identification contributes to my reading of the development of a post-9/11 subjectivity that authorized violent state power. As in all identifications, the identification with state power would arise out of an awareness of loss – a knowledge of the impossibility of having something loved – and function as a mechanism in order to be like that which one cannot have. For this type of post-9/11 subject, the impossible loved one is, I offer, an ideal of power as sovereign, an ideal of freedom as the absence of impediments for individual self-making. These ideals have been “lost” by power’s increasingly pervasive operations in late modern life. While I will argue that this loss might always exist for those shaped by expectations of heroic autonomy, it is also historically and materially configured, and it was brought to the forefront of national consciousness on 9/11. Understanding the reasons behind the identification with state power first entails stepping back from the immediacy of 9/11 to examine the historical moment and political discourses that embed it. The post-9/11 desire for mastery derives from the juxtaposition between a desire for freedom and generalized conditions of political powerlessness in contemporary life. It stems from the ways in which formally free individuals are not only materially constrained by multiple and interweaving modes of social power, but are shaped by contemporary global crises such as empire, occupation, and imperialism across broad international populations; from the broadening control of the state and economy over aspects of social life previously ascribed to the “private” realm, such as education, child-rearing, and welfare; from neoliberal capital, terrorism, ethnic wars, racism, sexism, entrenched and broadening levels of poverty, environmental destruction, security privatization, and resource scarcity. Under these conditions, citizens are excluded from national politics and made into consumers rather than active players in the operations of collective decision-making; multinational corporate powers promote vast levels of exploitation while evading accountability and visibility; jobs and families are uprooted, severed, and micromanaged as a politics of fear pervades work and home life; systems of support from state, family, and community structures are financially broken and systematically destroyed; the nexus of capitalism and state governance pushes the goals of efficiency, subjugation, and flexibility to organize the terms of collective governance and individual citizenship at the expense of notions of justice, freedom, or the good; mediated information exposes various horrors and subjugations from around the world, yet at the same time insists that nothing can be done to change them; no viable political collectivity offers significant societal-wide change, as significant change does not seem probable. Under these conditions, individuals seem unable to experience freedom or effect change in the world. They are conditioned by the impinging effects of global capital and global interdependence, as well as the inability to master or singularly control the powers that generate them. Affecting individuals to significantly varying degrees depending upon their locations within structures of power and privilege, these conditions also shape ordinary and lived experiences of powerlessness across populations. Experiences of powerlessness are not only frightening but also confusing, as their causes are often difficult to discern. The modes of power that produce them are often nonagentic and spatially unlocatable – global yet micropolitical, impinging yet intangible, faceless yet moving, and replicating with alacrity. They create a widespread and constant sense of precariousness and constraint that is not so much explicitly expressed as experienced as nagging, unarticulated affects of impotence, anxiety, constriction, and anger. Identification with the state aims to address these experiences by heroically overcoming them. Identification with state action is also, in part, an effect of a specific type of liberal individualism that valorizes expectations of mastery over and autonomy from the social world. American political subjects, often shaped by individualism’s expectations of individual sovereignty and self-determinism, struggle with the continual process of power’s regulatory capacity as well as lived experiences of dependence. Both demonstrate their failure to live up to individualism’s ideal image: to be, in Etienne Balibar’s words, the “subject without subjection,” to be self-reliant, to master power, to pull oneself up by one’s bootstraps, to actively and unilaterally determine the course of one’s existence.13 Awash in the tenets of liberal individualism, freedom here means autonomy from others and from power, and is experienced through a type of self-determinism that implies the capacity to control historical and political uncertainty. It is understood to be both the lived experience of mastery and the absence of power over the self. Interdependence of any sort is considered unfreedom, so that freedom is sustained through an aggressive stance toward other individuals, nations, and even nature.14 To subjects who want yet are unable to live up to this model of agency, bold and unilateral state actions can seem to be one place where a strong autonomy is still possible. State action seems to harbor the possibility of unrestrained power over the contingencies of the world, where the ability to control others and the world still gains credence. Analyzing the post-9/11 moment of intense state support and patriotic loyalty, Wendy Brown has similarly posited that citizens identified with the nation-state.15 Brown is concerned with how individuals both idealized the desired object of the nation-state and identified with each other based on the collectively shared experience of idealization. The patriotic fervor in post-9/11 politics was a product of citizens who were together in love with something none of them could singularly possess. She writes that in group idealization, “We are bound to one another through our collective experience of being in love with the same object,” which joins the nation together partly through the strength the nation expresses: “the attachment achieved through idealization is likely to glory in the power of the nation, a power expressed in state action.”16 After 9/11, idealization produced a patriotism that both stifled dissent and uncritically celebrated state power. The question that remains from this analysis is why the nation became idealized at the moment of a terrorist attack. What it is about 9/11 that creates the desire to love the nation-state? What is satisfied, exactly, when the nation-state becomes a desired object in the wake of the terrorist attack? What makes the nation-state an unattainable object? My answer to these questions does not reside in the sublimated pleasures satisfied by group bonds (which may seem the most obvious suggestion) but about the specific forms of power that idealization satisfied at the moment it arose: the individualized desire for omnipotence. The state is the weighted site of identification after 9/11 because it seems to possess the power that individuals desire to possess for themselves, especially after a shocking event in which contingency is highlighted and the possibility for mastery seems threatened or impossible. Identification with the state, I am arguing, was an individualized experience that aimed to cast off lived experiences of heteronomy by identifying with that which most prominently holds the promise of mastery: a subjugator, an enforcer, the sovereign Hero. Various modes of state action were read as the performance of a singular self-emancipating autonomy. Combined, they seem to congeal into a great act that could re-assert mastery, the ultimate expression of what William Connolly calls ontological narcissism: the belief that one has innate capacity to master contingency and domesticate the world, and is inherently sovereign, beholden to no power but one’s own.17 Identification with state expansion thus posits that the subject can be like what it now idealizes: “Look, you can love me too – I am so like the state.” Individual Identification with the State After 9/11 After 9/11, state identification happens once the terrorist events reveal, in a spectacular way, the fiction of state power as autonomous and sovereign. As Jodi Dean argues, it is a moment that entails “the specific horror of destruction of the social link, the symbolic pact promising security and holding society together.”18 The terrorist attacks punctured the fantasy of invulnerable state and individual boundaries that had, for much of the later 20th century, shaped both American foreign policy and the norms of liberal individualism. The events of 9/11 forced an acknowledgement of the nation’s vulnerability to others, of the impossibility of state invincibility or sovereignty, of the triteness of an End of History narrative that proclaimed the historic mastery of an American-led neoliberal state militarism over all other political norms, desires, and institutions.19 The ability of a violent yet tiny group of individuals to work outside, underneath, and through state forms, to be elusive and unaccountable, undermined the standard narrative of heroic American power. Identification with the state aimed to shore up the weakened belief in the American state as global master. Identification only occurs with an object that is lost or dead, that does not or cannot exist in practice. Identification aims to reanimate what has been lost within the self. Identification with state power, therefore, aims to revive not only the promise that individuals can heroically overcome heteronomy but also the promise that the state has the ability to do this too. This is why a rugged, self-reliant individualism can be so enamored of violent state action and support a militant patriotism. These seemingly contradictory ideas share an intertwined fantasy of mastery over external events. In the contemporary moment, when individuals’ ability to experience autonomy is constantly thwarted and inhibited, unilateral state power seems to be the one place where a robust autonomy might still be displayed, and identification links that display to one’s own experience. The body of a triumphant George W. Bush in 2003, situated beneath the banner “Mission Accomplished” after the supposed end of combat operations in Iraq, was an exemplar for the individual stand-in for American power. His intentional swagger on top of the air force carrier aimed to revive the fantasy that an individual can be as sovereign as a war-winning state. Bush personified in individualized, bodily form the self-determinism, even omnipotence, of American mastery.20 Clad in military uniform, Bush merged the individual and the state into the presidential body, which, as Michael Rogin would remind us, is often figured to be both ordinary and heroic, at once mortal and institutional.21 The broader identification with state action personified and unified the fragmented conditions of state power into a heroic savior, condensed the myriad possible responses to the events of 9/11 into an idealization of militaristic state action, and legitimated warfare as a morally requisite action for gaining freedom. This reading puts post-9/11 unilateralism in a new light: it is an attempt to prove that American sovereignty is still possible. The legitimation of unilateral action contains a plea to prevent the twilight of state sovereignty that has already occurred, and that was demonstrated by the 9/11 events. The exercise of state power thus functions doubly as the lost object of identification, in both literal and figurative forms. Literally, the identifying subject realizes it has “lost” what it desired: mastery of, or domination over, the exercise of a key form of political power that governs itself. Figuratively, the state stands in symbolically for a certain type of power that the subject has “lost”: a power that is self-determining and unbound, and that is embodied in visible and spectacular articulations of state sovereignty. Identification with sovereign state action aims to (re)claim lost power by overcoming the sense of powerlessness saturating contemporary political subjectivity, performing a spectacular experience of ontological narcissism. For the post-9/11 political subject, terrorism became the identifiable cause of thwarted sovereignty. Conquering it would restore the freedom of the subject. The deeper complications of contemporary power and agency were, I offer, displaced onto the 9/11 attacks as the singular source of constraint. Defeating terrorism could thus allow the subject to reverse its experiences of powerlessness through a triumphant act of self-emancipation. The war on terror became an attempt to gain control over powers that control the self, to break off one’s shackles of heteronomy. The vital importance of the “Shock and Awe” military campaign in Iraq, for instance, was that its shock and awe was aimed as much at American viewers as at the Iraqi military. The media coverage of the bombing of Baghdad was crucial to the production of legitimation through identification; the visual proof of overwhelming power cemented state identification. Live video of bombing campaigns and detailed descriptions of military firepower did not merely reflect a national obsession with military equipment but an intense desire to see the moment of power’s impact, to understand and verify the massive forcefulness of state action. I’ll address the misrepresentation that these military targets “caused” American powerlessness later in the essay. For now, I am arguing that by delimiting 9/11 as a singular and clear moment of thwarted freedom, identification held out the promise of a bound field to fight against unfreedom, to resist 9/11’s exposure of more extensive and longstanding forms of powerlessness. Identification with state action created an equivalence between the state and the individual, which worked in part because the state continues to be the primary source of accountable public power. Even in a deterritorialized era of globalization – as multinational regulatory bodies and neoliberal corporate power might seem to make state capacities increasingly irrelevant to the flow of people, goods, and power – the state remains the discursive locus of power, the conferrant of rights and political recognition in public life. Paul Passavant refers to this as the “strong neoliberal state” in order to highlight how contemporary neoliberal governmentality contributes to, rather than weakens, state expansion and regulatory power in the twenty-first century.22 Brown similarly argues that the state continues to be the primary power visible, and responsible, as political power. 23 This is certainly not to say that state functions are the only source of political power, but that they are the primary ones that are formally accountably and publicly verifiable. State functions are aggregated as a key nodal point for political identity, knowledge, power and influence. They seem to embody and employ instruments of protection and strength – military power, juridical authority, legal legitimacy – that wield power visibly and on a large scale. Within political life, the state is the most obvious symbol of autonomous power. Identification with state power is also enabled because the categories that define individual agency also often shape American interpretations of state agency. The state is figured as a singular, self-reliant individual, its actions an expression of a sovereign subject. Various governmental agencies and actions are discursively consolidated into a unilateral, personified force that conquers its external enemies and services the domestic population. Combined, they signify the type of power recognized and understood within the possessive individualism of mainstream liberal discourses: an autonomous power that is self-governing, and that is ontologically capable of self-emancipation in situations of duress or heteronomy.24 In the later 20th century, the discourse of individualism has increasingly described and personified American state power. As Sheldon Wolin and Michael Rogin have suggested, the post-isolationist, global superpower reconfiguration of America after WWII drew in part from individualism’s norms for mastery and power.25 Historians Steven Ambrose and Gary Wills argue that during the Cold War it seemed to many political officials, and eventually the public, that as long as America married a nationwide selfreliance to political and military might, it could control world events; for many policymakers and citizens, world problems would only exist if America couldn’t muster the will it needed to solve its problems effectively.26 The norms of American individualism thus seemed to shape the possibilities for various modes of state power. Individualism was nationalized in the political discourses that postulated that international politics could be controlled and molded to America’s needs.27 Failure to do so demonstrated only a lack of desire, not lack of capacity. Individualism narrated political crisis by categorizing America qua individual; it articulated a personified notion of state action and state capacity through the concept of the heroic, self-reliant individual. Identification with state action relies not only on the mimetic constitution of self and state but also on America’s democratic promise that individuals author the state, as electoral accountability and the people-as-the-origin-of-political-power claim enable the fantasy that state action can be one’s own. Identification with the state relies upon the formal structure of America’s representative democracy, which promises that state power originates in its citizens. It is as longstanding as America’s founding moments – what Alexander Hamilton referred to as the constitutional premise that the people are the “fountain” of all political power.28 State power is, uneasily, both an extension of the civic self and source of potential domination. The American state is seen to be created by laws formally authorized by all, electorally accountable to the people, steered toward their vision of the good life, and an expression of the might of the nation. It is also a likely tyrant that citizens are wary of, that threatens their freedom at every turn, yet one that they tame and steer through electoral accountability and civic participation. It produces what Murray Edelman once diagnosed as the continuous slippage in referents to the state as both “us” and “them.”29 Foreign policy provides the arena for demonstrating autonomous state power vis-à-vis other entities, and the democratic, state-as-civic-self model of governance yokes the individual to state power’s operations. In other words, liberal individualism has not been necessarily opposed to the state but has also mapped on to, and directed, the very notion of state agency. Individualism leads to the state, not only to a distrust of state power but also to its uncritical support. America’s historically recent iterations of national individualism are therefore not exclusively antistatist, as the trope of individualism generally is; in many ways, it is a heroic, self-making individualism realized most fully at the state level. It paves the way for how the national identifications arising out of 9/11 involved identifying not only with other fellow-Americans or with a larger sense of patriotic nationhood, but also with the very governing mechanisms of the federal state.

#### The strike is motivated by a desire for recognition, a desire internalized from the Other that sacrifices true enjoyment in the name of social authority.

McGowan 13 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London

When subjects enter into society, the social order confronts them with a demand. This demand for the sacrifice of enjoyment offers them social recognition in return. Recognition grounds the subjects’ identities and allows them to experience themselves as valuable. The socially recognized subject has a worth that derives solely from recognition itself. Popular kids may believe that their sense of worth is tied to an activity — playing football, obtaining good grades, being a cheerleader — but in fact it depends on the recognition that an anonymous social authority accords those who engage in these activities. Though we might imagine the football player fully enjoying himself and his popular status, the recognition that comes with this status renders enjoyment impossible insofar as popularity adheres to the social authority’s demand rather than its unarticulated desire.17 The demand that confronts the subject entering the social order is directly articulated at the level of the signifier. Social authority says to the subject, “Act in this way, and you will receive approval (or recognition).” But the demand conceals an unconscious desire that is not articulated on the level of the signifier. What the authority really wants from the subject is not equivalent to what it explicitly demands in signifiers. This desire of social authority or the Other engenders the subject’s own desire: the subject’s desire is a desire to figure out what the Other wants from it — to solve the enigma of the Other’s desire and locate itself within that desire. The subject becomes a desiring subject by paying attention not to what the social authority says (the demand) but to what remains unsaid between the lines (the desire). The path of desire offers the subject the possibility of breaking from its dependence on social authority through the realization that its secret, the enigma of the Other’s desire, does not exist — that the authority doesn’t know what it wants. Such a realization is not easy to achieve, but adopting the attitude of desire at least makes it possible. For the subject who clings to the social authority’s demand, dependence on this authority becomes irremediable and unrealizable. This is the limitation of pseudo-Hegelian political projects oriented around garnering recognition. They necessarily remain within the confines of the order that they challenge, and even success will never provide the satisfaction that the project promises. Full recognition would bring with it not the sense of finally penetrating into the secret enclave of the social authority but instead the disappointment of seeing that this secret does not exist. The widespread acceptance of gay marriage in the United States, for instance, would not provide a heretofore missing satisfaction, because the social authority that would provide the recognition is not a substantial entity fully consistent with itself. Even though institutional authority can grant a marriage certificate to gay couples and the majority of the popula- tion can recognize the validity of the marriage, there is no agency that can authorize such a marriage that is itself authorized. Social authority, in other words, is always unauthorized or groundless, and this is the ultimate reason why the pursuit of recognition leads to frustration. Those who seek social recognition structure their lives around the social authority’s demand, and recognition is the reward that one receives for doing one’s social duty. For instance, in order to gain popularity, one must adhere to the social rules that lead to popularity. This involves wearing the proper clothes, hanging out with the right people, playing the approved sports, and talking in the correct fashion. Too much deviation from the standard dissolves one’s popularity. Even those who disdain popularity most often align themselves with some other source of recognition and thereby invest themselves in another form of it. The outsider who completely rejects the trappings of the popular crowd but slavishly obeys the demands of fellow outsiders remains within the orbit of social recognition. This devotion to social recognition is more apparent, though not more true, among the young; the adult universe employs strictures with a similar severity.18 Fol- lowing the path of desire — going beyond the explicit demand of the social authority — has a cost in terms of social status. Those who restrict themselves to the authority’s demand do not neces- sarily evince more obedience to actual laws than others do. In fact, the social authority’s demand often conflicts with laws because it demands love, not just obedience. Criminals who flaunt the law for the sake of accumulating vast amounts of money are among those most invested in this demand. There is no inherent radicality in criminal behavior, and most criminals tend to be politically conservative.19 The object of the demand is the subject’s complete sacrifice for the sake of the social authority, not simply adherence to a set of laws. By imposing a demand that requires subjects to violate the law, the author- ity creates a bond of guilt among those who follow this demand. For instance, contemporary capitalist society demands the unrestricted accumulation of capital, even if this requires bypassing ethical or legal considerations at some point. Those who adhere to this demand to such an extent that they break the law or act against their own conscience find themselves all the more subjected to the social authority than if the demand didn’t include the dimension of transgression. The guilt that the demand engenders in them seals their allegiance. This is the logic of the hazing ritual, which always necessitates a violation of the law or common morality. The demand aims to redirect subjects away from their own enjoyment and toward social pro- ductivity. This turn is unimaginable without guilt, which is the fundamental social emotion. Subjects who sacrifice enjoyment for the sake of recognition do so with the expectation that this sacrifice will pay off on the other side, that the rewards of recognition will surpass the enjoyment that they have given up. This wager seems to have all the empirical evidence on its side: every day, images of the most recognized subjects enjoying themselves bombard us. We see them driving in the nicest cars, eating in the finest restaurants, wear- ing the most fashionable clothes, and having sex with the most attractive people, among other things. On the other side, we rarely see the enjoyment of those who remain indifferent to the appeal of recognition. By definition, they enjoy in the shadows. What’s more, the apparent misery of those who do not receive recognition is readily visible among the social outcasts we silently pass every day. To all appearances, the sacrifice of enjoyment for the sake of recognition is a bargain, as long as one ends up among the most recognized. The problem with this judgment stems from its emphasis on visibil- ity; it mistakes the display of enjoyment for the real thing. Someone who was authentically enjoying would not need to parade this enjoyment. The authentically enjoying subject does not perform its enjoyment for the Other but remains indifferent to the Other. As Joan Copjec notes, “Jouissance flourishes only there where it is not validated by the Other.”20 Enjoyment consumes the subject and directs all of the subject’s attention away from the Other’s judgment, which is why one cannot perform it and why being a social outcast doesn’t bother the enjoying subject. One immerses oneself completely in enjoyment, and the enjoyment suffices for the subject. In contrast, recognition, though it offers its own form of satisfaction, ulti- mately leaves the subject eager for something else. No matter what level of recognition subjects receive, they always find it insufficient and seek more. Unlike enjoyment, recognition is an infinite struggle.

#### The alternative is to embrace the death drive, recognizing and internalizing the limits to our society allows us to access the infinity of enjoyment.

McGowan 13 [Todd McGowan. 2013. “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London] SHS KS

There is no path leading from the death drive to utopia. The death drive undermines every attempt to construct a utopia; it is the enemy of the good society. It is thus not surprising that political thought from Plato onward has largely ignored this psychic force of repetition and negation. But this does not mean that psychoanalytic thought concerning the death drive has only a negative value for political theorizing. It is possible to conceive of a positive politics of the death drive.The previous chapters have attempted to lay out the political implications of the death drive, and, on this basis, we can sketch what a society founded on a recognition of the death drive might look like. Such a recognition would not involve a radical transformation of society: in one sense, it would leave everything as it is. In contemporary social arrangements, the death drive subverts progress with repetition and leads to the widespread sacrifice of self-interest for the enjoyment of the sacrifice itself. This structure is impervi- ous to change and to all attempts at amelioration. But in another sense, the recognition of the death drive would change everything. Recognizing the centrality of the death drive would not eliminate the proclivity to sacrifice for the sake of enjoyment, but it would change our relationship to this sacrifice. Rather than being done for the sake of an ultimate enjoyment to be achieved in the future, it would be done for its own sake. The fundamental problem with the effort to escape the death drive and pursue the good is that it leaves us unable to locate where our enjoyment lies. By positing a future where we will attain the ultimate enjoyment (either through the purchase of the perfect commodity or through a transcendent romantic union or through the attainment of some heavenly paradise), we replace the partial enjoyment of the death drive with the image of a complete enjoyment to come. There is no question of fully enjoying our submission to the death drive. We will always remain alienated from our mode of enjoying. As Adrian Johnston rightly points out, “Transgressively ‘overcoming’ the impediments of the drives doesn’t enable one to simply enjoy enjoyment.”1 But we can transform our relationship to the impediments that block the full realization of our drive. We can see the impediments as the internal product of the death drive rather than as an external limit. The enjoyment that the death drive provides, in contrast to the form of enjoyment proffered by capitalism, religion, and utopian politics, is at once infinite and limited. This oxymoronic form of enjoyment operates in the way that the concept does in Hegel’s Logic. The concept attains its infinitude not through endless progress toward a point that always remains beyond and out of reach but through including the beyond as a beyond within itself. As Hegel puts it, “The universality of the concept is the achieved beyond, whereas that bad infinity remains afflicted with a beyond which is unattainable but remains a mere progression to infinity.”2 That is to say, the concept transforms an external limit into an internal one and thereby becomes both infinite and limited. The infinitude of the concept is nothing but the concept’s own self-limitation. The enjoyment that the death drive produces also achieves its infinitude through self-limitation. It revolves around a lost object that exists only insofar as it is lost, and it relates to this object as the vehicle for the infinite unfurling of its movement. The lost object operates as the self-limitation of the death drive through which the drive produces an infinite enjoyment. Rather than acting as a mark of the drive’s finitude, the limitation that the lost object introduces provides access to infinity. A society founded on a recognition of the death drive would be one that viewed its limitations as the source of its infinite enjoyment rather than an obstacle to that enjoyment. To take the clearest and most traumatic example in recent history, the recognition of the death drive in 1930s Ger- many would have conceived the figure of the Jew not as the barrier to the ultimate enjoyment that must therefore be eliminated but as the internal limit through which German society attained its enjoyment. As numerous theorists have said, the appeal of Nazism lay in its ability to mobilize the enjoyment of the average German through pointing out a threat to that enjoyment. The average German under Nazism could enjoy the figure of the Jew as it appeared in the form of an obstacle, but it is possible to recognize the obstacle not as an external limit but as an internal one. In this way, the figure of the Jew would become merely a figure for the average German rather than a position embodied by actual Jews. Closer to home, one would recognize the terrorist as a figure representing the internal limit of global capitalist society. Far from serving as an obstacle to the ultimate enjoyment in that society, the terrorist provides a barrier where none otherwise exists and thereby serves as the vehicle through which capitalist society attains its enjoyment. The absence of explicit limita- tions within contemporary global capitalism necessitates such a figure: if terrorists did not exist, global capitalist society would have to invent them. But recognizing the terrorist as the internal limit of global capitalist society would mean the end of terrorism. This recognition would transform the global landscape and deprive would-be terrorists of the libidinal space within which to act. Though some people may continue to blow up buildings, they would cease to be terrorists in the way that we now understand the term. A self-limiting society would still have real battles to fight. There would remain a need for this society to defend itself against external threats and against the cruelty of the natural universe. Perhaps it would require nuclear weapons in space to defend against comets or meteors that would threaten to wipe out human life on the planet. But it would cease positing the ulti- mate enjoyment in vanquishing an external threat or surpassing a natural limit. The external limit would no longer stand in for a repressed internal one. Such a society would instead enjoy its own internal limitations and merely address external limits as they came up. Psychoanalytic theory never preaches, and it cannot help us to construct a better society. But it can help us to subtract the illusion of the good from our own society. By depriving us of this illusion, it has the ability to trans- form our thinking about politics. With the assistance of psychoanalytic thought, we might reconceive politics in a direction completely opposed to that articulated by Aristotle, to which I alluded in the introduction. In the Politics, Aristotle asserts: “Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.”3 Though later political thinkers have obviously departed from Aristotle concerning the question of the content of the good society, few have thought of politics in terms opposed to the good. This is what psychoanalytic thought introduces. If we act on the basis of enjoyment rather than the good, this does not mean that we can simply construct a society that privileges enjoyment in an overt way. An open society with no restrictions on sexual activity, drug use, food consumption, or play in general would not be a more enjoyable one than our own. That is the sure path to impoverishing our ability to enjoy, as the aftermath of the 1960s has made painfully clear. One must arrive at enjoyment indirectly. A society centered around the death drive would not be a better society, nor would it entail less suffering. Rather than continu- ally sacrificing for the sake of the good, we would sacrifice the good for the sake of enjoyment. A society centered around the death drive would allow us to recognize that we enjoy the lost object only insofar as it remains lost.

## 2nd

#### The economy is soaring but unemployment remains a glaring weakness.

Cox 3/2

[10% GDP growth? The U.S. economy is on fire, and is about to get stoked even more, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/02/10percent-gdp-growth-the-us-economy-is-on-fire-and-is-about-to-get-stoked-even-more.html>, Jeff Cox, March 2, 2021, finance editor for CNBC.com where he manages coverage of the financial markets and Wall Street. His stories are routinely among the most-read items on the site each day as he interviews some of the smartest and most well-respected analysts and advisors in the financial world. He also is a frequent guest on CNBC.] [SS]

**The** U.S. **economy has roared back to life in 2021**, with first-quarter growth set to defy even the rosiest expectations as **another fresh influx of cash looms**. **Manufacturing** data Monday showed the sector **at its highest growth level since** August **2018.** That report from the Institute for Supply Management in turn helped confirm the notion among economists that **output to start the year is far better than** the low single-digit growth **many had been predicting** in late 2020. **The A**tlanta **Fe**deral **R**eserve, **which tracks data in real tim**e to estimate changes in gross domestic product, now **is indicating a 10% gain** for the first three months of the year. The GDPNow tool generally is volatile early in the quarter then becomes more accurate as the data rolls in through the period. That comes on the heels of a report Friday showing that **personal income surged 10%** in January, thanks largely to $600 stimulus checks from the government. **Household wealth increased nearly $2 trillion** for the month while spending rose just 2.4%, or $340.9 billion. Those numbers, along with **a burst of nearly $4 trillion in savings, point**ed **to an economy** not only **growing powerfully** but also one that is **poised to continue that path** through the year. “The V-shaped recovery in real GDP will remain V-shaped during the first half of this year and probably through the end of the year,” Ed Yardeni of Yardeni Research wrote in his daily note Tuesday. “However, it will no longer be a ‘recovery’ beyond Q1 because real GDP will have fully recovered during the current quarter. Thereafter, **GDP will be in an ‘expansion’ in record-high territory.**” Economists previously hadn’t expected the $21.5 trillion U.S. economy to regain its pandemic-related losses until at least the second or third quarter of this year, if not later. WATCH NOW VIDEO03:21 Global growth expectations are driving rates, not inflation fears, says UBS’s Alli McCartney But a combination of systematic resilience combined with previously unimaginable doses of fiscal and monetary stimulus have helped speed the recovery along considerably. The final quarter of 2020, in which **GDP increased 4.1%,** left the total of goods and services produced **just $270 billion shy of** the same period a year previous, **before Covid-19** struck. “With strong federal fiscal support and continued progress on vaccination, **GDP growth this year could be the strongest we’ve seen in decades**,” New York Federal Reserve President John Williams said in a speech last week. In fact, questions persist about whether the $1.9 trillion spending plan from the Biden administration is necessary, at least to that magnitude. An economy poised to show its fastest annual growth pace since at least 1984 doesn’t seem like a very good candidate for more spending at a time when the federal government already is expected to run a $2.3 trillion budget deficit this year. Respondents to the ISM report indicated soaring prices and trouble with supply chains, with one manager in electrical equipment, appliances and components noting: “Things are now out of control. Everything is a mess, and we are seeing wide-scale shortages.” Markets have worried lately that overheated growth could generate inflation, particulary with the Federal Reserve continuing to keep its foot on the policy pedal. “Too much of a good thing is often just too much,” Yardeni wrote. “The economy is hot and will get hotter with the bonfire of the fiscal and monetary insanities.” A major area of weakness To be sure, **frailties remain** in the economy. **Paramount among them is the gap in employment, particularly in** the **services** sector. As of January, **there were 8.6 million fewer employed than** there were **a year ago**, just before the pandemic began threatening the U.S., according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. About **4.3 million Americans have left the labor force** in that time. Despite a drop in the headline unemployment rate from a pandemic high of 14.8% to 6.3%, **employment in** the **hospitality** sector **has fallen by more than 3.8 million** from a year ago, and **the jobless rate for the industry is stuck at 15.9%, fully 10 percentage points higher than January** 2020. “**The most glaring issue** with where we stand now **has to be the labor market**. We still have [nearly] **10 million jobs** which **are** just simply **missing**,” said Troy Ludtka, U.S. economist at Natixis. “You’re going to see a situation in the coming years, looking back to this moment, where official statistics on things like food insecurity, poverty and inequality are going to reach generational highs.” However, Ludtka sees promise ahead, thanks in part to measures taken to address the ills of the current era. “The good news is that we are very quickly rebounding, and that is a sign of great promise,” he said. “We’re going to see an economy back to pre-pandemic levels of output, we’re going to see a situation in which unnecessary economic insecurity is mitigated.” There’s even some better news coming out of the jobs market, which despite the gaps that remain has recovered nearly 12.5 million nonfarm payroll jobs since the recovery began in May 2020. For one, job postings are on the rebound. Employment network Indeed reports that listings through Feb. 12 were up a seasonally adjusted 3.9% from Feb. 1, 2020, which it uses as the pre-Covid baseline. In early May 2020, postings lagged the baseline by 39%. **Economists are counting on pent-up demand that vaccinations and falling coronavirus numbers will bring to drive job growth.** Nonfarm payrolls for February are expected to show a gain of 210,000 when the BLS reports the numbers Friday.

#### Unions and worker strikes hurt AI innovation.

Skolink 3/16

[Big Tech is fueling an AI "arms race": It could be terrifying — or just a giant scam, <https://www.salon.com/2021/03/16/big-tech-is-fueling-an-ai-arms-race-it-could-be-terrifying--or-just-a-giant-scam/>, March 16 2021, Jon Skolink, staff writer at Salon. His work has appeared in Current Affairs, The Baffler, AlterNet, and The New York Daily News.] [SS]

"It should not come as a surprise that a commission packed with tech billionaires would call for increased intellectual property protections, oppose regulation (including on Lethal Autonomous Weapons), propose toothless ethics principles, and call for more federal funding of their industry," Poulson said in a statement. Indeed, many commission members are past and present tech executives of companies on the fore of AI — companies that have much to gain from future contracting deals with the Pentagon. The commission's chair, for example, is Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google, who remains — as Poulson pointed out — a major shareholder in Alphabet, Google's parent company. Google's head of AI, Andrew Moore, is also a member of the NSCAI. **Google already has an extensive history of working with the Pentagon.** According to The Intercept, in a federally-funded $70 million program called Project Maven, **Google developed "algorithmic warfare initiative to apply artificial intelligence solutions to drone targeting."** The company expecting that revenue would steadily rise from $15 million to $250 million a year for such defense projects. Advertisement: In April of 2018, **however, 3,000 Google employees signed an open letter decrying the company's involvement in defense technology, a move that eventually led to Google'**s ultimate decision **to back out of the deal**. Schmidt strongly objected to Google's decision, calling it an "aberration" within the tech industry, which he felt was otherwise inclined to collaborate with the Defense Department. Former Undersecretary of the Navy Robert Work, the vice chairman of NSCAI, called Google's decision "hypocritical," using language that suggested a new cold war is already underway: "Anything that's going on in the AI center in China is going to the Chinese government and then will ultimately end up in the hands of the Chinese military." chief Jeff Dean is an adviser at China's Tsinghua University, which opened an Institute for Artificial Intelligence in June 2018. Stanford University's Artificial Intelligence lab has a partnership with one of China's biggest retailers. In other words, an arms race in which the two nations are locked in silos of information, research and development is not just ethically dubious but logistically impossible. Advertisement: Will China and Russia explore uses of AI in weapons of the future? Almost certainly — both countries have already signaled movement in that direction. But if American politicians and scientists want to maximize the potential of AI, framing its development in terms of an international "arms race" seems like a strategic and philosophical mistake on a huge scale. AI has the potential to revolutionize health care, education, climate science and many other fields — and those things all play a fundamental role in national security. But **these new technologies will not make America more secure if they are understood as weapons of international combat.**

#### The negative effects of strikes spill over to hurt wages, unemployment, and the overall economy.

McElroy ‘19

[Strikes Hurt Everybody, <https://www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody>, 10/25/19, John McElroy, editorial director of Blue Sky Productions and producer of "Autoline" for WTVS-Channel 56 Detroit and "Autoline Daily" the online video newscasts.] [SS]

The recent strike at General Motors shows traditional labor practices must change. Not only did the strike cause considerable financial damage at GM, it drove another wedge between the company and its workers. And worst of all, it hurt a lot of innocent bystanders. Thanks to the UAW, the hourly workforce at GM earns the highest compensation in the U.S. auto industry. But you would never know that by listening to union leaders. They attack GM as a vile and heartless corporation that deliberately tries to oppress honest working men and women. Of course, they kind of have to say that. Union officials are elected, not appointed, and they are just as political as any Republican or Democrat. No UAW official ever got elected by saying, “You know what? Management is right. We’ve got to make sure our labor costs are competitive.” It’s the opposite. **Union leaders get elected by attacking management’s greed and arrogance. This creates a poisonous relationship between the company and its workforc**e. Many GM hourly workers don’t identify as GM employees. They identify as UAW members. And they see the union as the source of their jobs, not the company. It’s an unhealthy dynamic **that puts GM at a disadvantage to non-union automakers** in the U.S. like Honda and Toyota, **where workers take pride in the company** they work for and the products they make. **Attacking the company in the media also drives away customers**. Who wants to buy a shiny new car from a company that’s accused of underpaying its workers and treating them unfairly? Data from the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in Ann Arbor, MI, show that **GM loses market share during strikes** and never gets it back. GM lost two percentage points during the 1998 strike, which in today’s market would represent a loss of 340,000 sales. Because GM reports sales on a quarterly basis we’ll only find out at the end of December if it lost market share from this strike. UAW members say one of their greatest concerns is job security. But causing a company **to lose market share is a sure-fire path to** more plant closings and **layoffs.** Even so, unions are incredibly important for boosting wages and benefits for working-class people. GM’s UAW-represented workers earn considerably more than their non-union counterparts, about $26,000 more per worker, per year, in total compensation. Without a union they never would have achieved that. Strikes are a powerful weapon for unions. They usually are the only way they can get management to accede to their demands. If not for the power of collective bargaining and the threat of a strike, management would largely ignore union demands. If you took away that threat, management would pay its workers peanuts. Just ask the Mexican line workers who are paid $1.50 an hour to make $50,000 BMWs. But **strikes** don’t just hurt the people walking the picket lines or the company they’re striking against. They **hurt suppliers, car dealers and the communities l**ocated **near the plants**. The Anderson Economic Group estimates that **75,000 workers at supplier companies were temporarily laid off because of the GM strike**. Unlike UAW picketers, **those supplier workers won’t get any strike pay** or an $11,000 contract signing bonus. No, **most of them lost** close to **a month’s worth of wages, which must be financially devastating** for them. **GM’s suppliers** also lost a lot of money. So now they’re **cut**ting **budgets and delay**ing **capital investments** to make up for the lost revenue, **which is a further drag on the economy**. According to CAR, the **communities** and states **where GM’s plants are located** collectively **lost a couple of hundred million dollars in payroll and tax revenue**. Some economists warn that **if the strike were prolonged it could knock** the state of **Michigan** – home to GM and the UAW – **into a recession**. That prompted the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, to call GM CEO Mary Barra and UAW leaders and urge them to settle as fast as possible. So, while the UAW managed to get a nice raise for its members, the strike left a path of destruction in its wake. That’s not fair to the innocent bystanders who will never regain what they lost. John McElroyI’m not sure how this will ever be resolved. I understand the need for collective bargaining and the threat of a strike. But there’s got to be a better way to get workers a raise without torching the countryside.

#### Ow under their fwk bc –