# 1ac

## Framework

#### I value morality. Volition, or the structure of the will, is a pre-condition for ethics and has intrinsic value –

#### A) Proceduralism – the will is the mechanism by which every agent engages in any activity, which means regardless of the content of any ethical theory, the ability to will that theory is an intrinsic good

#### B) Foundations – the will is the basis for what constitutes an ethical subject which means its relation to the world is the primary ethical consideration

#### C) Motivation – the structure of the will is the primary source of all our desires, reasons, and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivational to the subject

#### D) Identity – the nature of the will is most constitutive to the creation of the subject since it determines what each subject considers intrinsic to its identity and what exists externally as a façade.

#### Ethics is approached in two ways: objective, which is too paternalistic, restricting the volition of subjects, or subjective, which is too arbitrary, destroying the possibility for moral obligations.

Jaeggi 1 Rahel Jaeggi (August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Pg. 28-30. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. SHS KS

From the perspective of liberal theory one aspect of the critique of alienation appears problematic above all others: theories of alienation appear to appeal to objective criteria that lie beyond the “sovereignty” of individuals to interpret for themselves what the good life consists in. Herbert Marcuse exemplifies this tendency of many theories of alienation in One Dimensional Man—a book that provided a crucial impulse for the New Left’s critique of alienation in the 1960s and 1970s—when, unconcerned with the liberal objection, he defends the validity of diagnoses of alienation with respect to the increased integration and identification with social relations that characterize the members of afflu- ent industrial societies: “I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own develop- ment and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion, but reality. However, the reality constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation. The latter has become entirely objective; the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence.”10 The subjective satisfaction of those who are inte- grated into objectively alienated relations is, according to Marcuse, “a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood.”11 Here, however, the theory of alienation appears to have made itself immune to refutation. It would seem, then, that the concept of alienation belongs to a perfectionist ethical theory that presupposes, broadly speaking, that it is possible to de- termine what is objectively good for humans by identifying a set of properties or a set of functions inherent in human nature—a “purpose”—that ought to be realized. But if the foundation of modern morality and the fundamental conviction of liberal conceptions of society is the idea “that it should be left to each individual how [they] he lives [their] his own life”12—that individuals are sovereign with respect to interpreting their own lives—then a theory of alienation that relies on objective perfectionist ideals appears to reject[s] this idea in favor of a paternalist perspective that claims to “know better.” For the latter (and as seems to be the case for Marcuse), it is possible for something to count as ob- jectively good for someone without him subjectively valuing it as such. By the same token, it is possible to criticize a form of life as alienated or false without there being any subjective perception of suffering. But can someone be alien- ated from herself in the sense outlined here if she herself fails to perceive it? Can we claim of someone that she is alienated from her own desires or driven by false (alienated) needs or that she pursues an alienated way of life if she claims to be living precisely the life she wants to lead? In diagnoses of alien- ation the question arises, then, whether there can be objective evidence of pathology that contradicts individuals’ subjective assessments or preferences. This is a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. On the one hand, the con- cept of alienation (this is what distinguishes it from weaker forms of critique) claims to be able to bring to individuals’ prima facie evaluations and prefer- ences a deeper dimension of critique—a critical authority—that functions as a corrective to their own assertions. On the other hand, it is not easy to justify the position of such a critical corrective. What could the objective criteria that overrule the assessments and preferences of individuals be in this case?13 The arguments from human nature frequently appealed to in this context demonstrate, even in their most methodologically sophisticated, “thin” vari- ants, the problems that plague attempts to derive normative standards from some conception of human nature.14 Even if there is—in a banal sense— something humans share on the basis of their natural, biological constitution, and even if—in a banal sense—certain functional needs can be derived from these basic presuppositions of human life (all humans need nourishment or certain climatic conditions in order to survive), these basic conditions imply very little when it comes to evaluating how humans, in relation to issues beyond mere survival, lead their lives. On the other hand, the more human nature is given a specific content such that it becomes relevant to (culturally specific) forms of life, the more controversial and contestable the claims be- come. How are we to define human nature when its extraordinary variability and malleability appear to be part of human nature itself?15 And how are we to pick out among diverse forms of human life those that really correspond to human nature, given that even forms of life criticized as alienated have been in some way developed, advanced, and lived by human beings?

#### The only solution is a concept of alienation that which recognizes the functional capacity of willing – rather than discerning what we will, it is concerned with the how in which we will.

Jaeggi 2 Rahel Jaeggi (August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Pg. 33-36. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. SHS KS

In “The Ethics of Antiquity and Modernity” Tugendhat raises the problem of whether it is possible to reformulate antiquity’s inquiry into the nature of happiness (or the good life) under modern conditions. A modern inquiry into the good life must, on the one hand, do justice to the view that its answer cannot “deny the autonomy and thus the interpretive sovereignty of those concerned,” and its method must be such that it avoids committing itself to a “specific and unjustifiable picture of the human being.”3 On the other hand, if modern ethical theory is to recover the interpretive content of ancient ethics, it must be able to identify an objective criterion that allows us to say “whether it is going well or badly for a person independently of their actual perceptions of their present or future well-being.” What is needed, then, is a criterion that, on the one hand, is not identical with the desires or preferences a person actually has and that, on the other hand, does not call into question the interpretive sovereignty of the person and with it the modern ideal of self-determination. Tugendhat’s proposed solution is to develop a formal conception of psycho- logical health. Starting from (what appears to him to be) an unproblematic definition of physical health in terms of “functional capacity,” he develops for psychological health a conception of the “functional capacity of willing” and its possible impairment.4 Tugendhat elaborates his criterion with the example of compulsive behavior: a volition that is compulsive in some sense would count as impaired and hence as being disturbed in its functional capacity. This provides a standpoint that is immanent to the subject’s will and, at the same time, not subjective in the sense in which contingent and unevaluated preferences are: “In this way we would attain precisely what is sought, a point of view that is independent of the respective subjective goals of our willing but that nevertheless derives its authority from the perspective of willing itself. As willing (freely choosing) beings, we always will to be unlimited in our free choosing.”5 With the standard of the “impairment of the functional capacity of willing,” which asks whether we have ourselves at our command in what we will, Tugendhat has achieved a middle ground between subjectivistic and objectivistic positions of the sort he was looking for. One could call such a position a “qualified subjectivism.”6 This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition be- tween modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: whether something is good for me always depends (antipat- ernalistically) on my personal view, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be a “true volition” and therefore not subject to internal constraints. I must be free in what I will; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. This criterion is, in the first place, formal: it concerns the How, not the What, of willing. That is, I need not will anything in particular; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. It is not necessary, then, to identify a “true object of willing,” but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills. As Tugendhat puts it, “the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing.”7 Second, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, “I want to be able to do what I will,” I must also mean, “I want to be able—freely—to will.” My account of the problem of alienation can be linked up with this con- ception of willing in the following way: instances of alienation can be under- stood as obstructions of volition and thereby—formulated more generally—as obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s com- mand, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom. My thesis is that alienation can be understood as a particular form of the loss of freedom, as an obstruction of what could be called, following Isaiah Ber- lin, positive freedom.8 Formulating the notoriously controversial distinction as briefly as possible, freedom in this sense refers not (merely negatively) to the absence of external coercion but (positively) to the capacity to realize valuable ends. In the sense described (and criticized) by Berlin, positive freedom has a variety of implications: The “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.9 As unsystematic and indeterminate the various dimensions of positive free- dom might be, the important point is that conceptions of positive freedom always depict the free life as not alienated and vice versa.10 As Robert Pippin puts it, only those acts and intentions that I can “link . . . with me such that they count as due to me or count as mine” are “instances of freedom.”11 Being a human being rather than a thing means, according to this view, ascribing to oneself what one wills and does, taking responsibility for it and (therefore) being able to identify with it. Understood in this way, the concept of alienation concerns itself with the complex conditions of “linking” one’s actions and desires (or, more gener- ally, one’s life) with oneself, “counting them as due to” oneself, or making them “one’s own.” It also concerns itself with the various obstructions and disturbances that can affect these relations. One is not always already “with oneself;” one’s actions and desires are not always one’s own from the start, and one’s relation to the surrounding natural and social world is equally constitu- tive and threatened. Positively formulated, clarifying the various dimensions of alienation enables us to specify the conditions for being able to understand one’s life as one’s own (and therefore to lead one’s life freely). An unalienated life, according to this view, is not one in which specific substantial values are realized but one that is lived in a specific—unalienated—manner. The belief that everyone should be able to live her own life no longer stands in opposition, then, to the project of alienation critique. Rather, the absence of alienating impediments and the possibility of appropriating self and world without such impediments is a condition of freedom and self-determination.

#### That functional capacity of willing is mediated by social roles – as the authentic self is inexplicably linked to the self that engages in social communities with others through duplication. Understanding the functionality of the will is impossible in a vacuum.

**Jaeggi 3,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa.

The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: **roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons and personality**. They are constitutive in the sense that they are directly bound up with a person’s development and, so, “productive.” At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the “productivity thesis” has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). “**The human being is always** himself only in **‘doubling’ in relation to a role** figure he can experience. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.22 **Roles** on this view **are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible**, whether this be a “being together” of individuals or a benign “passing each other by;” **interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself**. When Plessner speaks of a “doubling in relation to a role figure,” he means that one depends on roles not only to become a “figure” of experience for others but also in order to become such a figure for oneself. Plessner’s thesis that the human being is a Doppelgänger is grounded in a comprehensive theory of human nature that, beginning from the fundamental concept of “eccentric positionality,” is critical of every idea of immediacy or spontaneity.23 According to Plessner: The distance that the role creates in family life, as well as in one’s profession, work, or public offices, is the human being’s characteristic detour to his fellow human being; it is the means of his immediacy. Whoever wants to see in this an instance of selfalienation misunderstands the human essence and foists on it a possibility of existence such as animals have on the level of life or angels have on the spiritual level. . . . Only the human being appears as a Doppelgänger, on the outside in the figure of his role and on the inside, privately, as himself. 24 Although at first glance the talk of a Doppelgänger raises the suspicion that Plessner, too, is trapped in a model of doubling that relies on an opposition between authenticity and role behavior—between the inner and the outer—this suspicion turns out to be unwarranted: **the Doppelgänger character of human beings is illusory because there are not two real entities there; our character as a “double” is a construct. There is not an internal division** here to be overcome; **rather, doubling is constitutive of the human self. “The human being cannot abolish his status as a Doppelgänger without negating his humanity.** He cannot complain of this doubling and play it off against the ideal of an original oneness, for I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself. **The human being gets a hold of himself in others. He encounters these others on a detour via roles, exactly as the others encounter him.**”25 If the other “gets a hold of himself” in the other, and if these two can encounter each other only through roles, then **a self that is prior to or outside roles is a fiction**. When Plessner says that “I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself,”26 he is referring to a constitutive internal division that precedes all possible unity—it points to the fact that **one’s relation to oneself must also be conceived of as a certain kind of relation, namely, one mediated by a relation to the outside or to others. Thus I am not “someone” already at the outset; I can become someone only in relation to others and hence only via the roles in which we reciprocally encounter one another**: “The human being gets a hold of himself in others.” Behind all roles, then, there is nothing or, in any case, there is no “authentic being” there. No matter where we look, behind roles we find nothing we can grab hold of except for more roles that one “plays before oneself and others.” **We could call this an onion conception of the self: there are various layers but no inner core**.

#### This culminates in the act of appropriation – the ability to view yourself as a practical agent capable of taking up a project that actively changes your own subject and the role itself.

Jaeggi 4 Rahel Jaeggi (August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Pg. 37-40. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. SHS KS

What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s ap- peal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psycho- analytic process of “working through”—means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropria- tion. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropri- ated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who ap- propriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: ap- propriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a conse- quence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. In a process of appro- priation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed. In the process of incorporation (appropriative assimilation) the incorporator does not remain the same. This point can be given a constructivist turn: what is appropriated is itself constituted in the process of appropriation; by the same token, what is appropriated does not exist in the absence of appropriation. (In some cases this is obvious: there is no public space as such without its being publicly appropriated; but even social roles exist only insofar as they are con- stantly reappropriated.) One now sees the potential and the peculiar character of the concept: the possibility of appropriating something refers, on the one hand, to a subject’s power to act and form and to impose its own meaningful mark on the world it appropriates. (A successful appropriation of social roles or activities and, by extension, the appropriating relation one can take to one’s life in general constitute something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life.) On the other hand, a process of appropriation is always bound to a given, previously existing content and thereby also to an independent mean- ing and dynamic over which one does not have complete command. (Thus a role, for example, in order to be appropriated, must always be “found” as an already existing model and complex of rules; it can be reinterpreted but not invented from scratch. Skills that we appropriate are constrained by success conditions; leading our own life depends on circumstances over which we do not have complete command.) There is, then, an interesting tension in the idea of appropriation between what is previously given and what is form- able, between taking over and creating, between the subject’s sovereignty and its dependence. The crucial relation here is that between something’s being alien and its accessibility: objects of appropriation are neither exclusively alien nor exclusively one’s own. As Michael Theunissen puts it, “I do not need to appropriate what is exclusively my own, and what is exclusively alien I am unable to appropriate.”14 In contrast to Marx, then, for whom appropriation is conceived of according to a model of reappropriation, the account of the dynamic of appropriation and alienation that I am proposing reconceives the very concept of appropriation. This involves rehabilitating what is alien in the model of appropriation and radicalizing that model in the direction of a nonessentialist conception of appropriation. Appropriation would then be a permanent process of transformation in which what is appropriated first comes to be through its appropriation, without one needing to fall back into the myth of a creatio ex nihilo. Understanding appropriation as a relation in which we are simultaneously bound to something and separated from it, and in which what is appropriated always remains both alien and our own, has important implications for the ideas of emancipation and alienation bound up with the concept of appropriation. The aspiration of a successful appropria- tion of self and world would be, then, to make the world one’s own without it having been already one’s own and in wanting to give structure to the world and to one’s own life without beginning from a position of already having complete command over them.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with non-alienated relations.

#### Impact calc: 1. There are four key types of relations the framework defines as alienating:

#### A) Objectification – treating an agent with normative potential as a passive object

#### B) Standardization – Enforcing one particular way to engage in a role such that the subject has no interpretive leeway

#### C) Fixation – preventing the acquisition of new experiences within a particular role rather than fostering the development of an agent and

#### D) Over-identification – allowing the portrayal of a particular role to over-identify you as merely that role

#### 2. Consequences fail –

#### A) To account for all foreseen impacts would prevent action because individuals would become morally culpable for all actions and states of affairs not just those that factor into the will

#### B) Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events and

#### Prefer additionally –

#### [1] Epistemology – only my framework can account for the types of moral knowledge that become practically relevant, anything else fails to bridge the is/ought gap by merely making claims about what is the case theoretically.

#### [2] Action theory – only viewing an agent as an active body capable of generating intentions can hold agents culpable and decipher the difference between actions and wishes.

#### [3] Performativity – Every exercise you engage in is an instance of using your volition to establish some relation to the world and only non-alienation can establish that relationship as normatively legitimate.

## Offense

#### Thus, I affirm—Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I’ll spec whatever you want me to in cx as long as it doesn’t force me to abandon my maximum. I’ll defend the resolution as a general principle meaning pics don’t negate because general principles tolerate exceptions

#### [1] The aff rectifies conditions of alienation –

#### A) Objectification – individuals self-alienate when they treat themselves as passive agents incapable of affecting change. Employers view agents as objects unable to be given rights and consideration.

#### B) Standardization – voting neg is standardization because the aff provides the option to strike if they will to do so whereas the neg prevents individuals in the squo from striking.

#### [C] Appropriation – recognizing the right to strike ensures every agent has the ability to positively and productively reshape their work environment by forming more meaningful relations

**Nielson et al 19** “No Future: Alienation as Futurelessness in an Era of Financial Capitalism” Tad Skotnicki tpskotni@uncg.edu University of North Carolina – Greensboro Kelly Nielsen knielsen8@ucmerced.edu University of California – Merced // [https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/jkstw/ ] ahs emi

Though it goes unconceptualized, we can see the role of possibility in both Jaeggi and Rosa’s efforts to resuscitate the concept. The language of possibility suffuses Jaeggi’s account of alienation, in particular. In turning toward the question of alienation’s negation, she writes, “For the possibility of regarding something as a potential object of a decision precedes the question of who decides or what should guide one’s decision. **Being able to perceive a space for action in which the practical question is possible is a precondition of being able to raise and answer this question oneself**” (2014:201 [emphases added]). **The practical work of appropriation requires possibility;** to be able to perceive “is a precondition” of autonomy. In this way, a sense of possibility is a condition for the work of appropriating the world **in an unalienated manner.** Further, she insists that **autonomy depends on “having meaningful options at one’s disposal**” (204 [emphasis added]). Rosa, for his part, describes a world that has “become cold and grey, harsh and nonresponding, experienced by a subject that inwardly feels deaf, mute, cold, and empty” (2018:44). There is a “loss of the world.” In such a condition, Rosa claims, “we end up turning the business of increasing our scope and horizon of the available, attainable, and accessible, and collecting resources into an end in itself, into an endless, escalatory cycle which permanently erodes its own basis and thus leads nowhere” (45). Here, clamoring after possibility – the available, accessible, and attainable – undermines itself. One loses the possibility to connect to the world. While Jaeggi locates alienation in the failure **to** appropriate the world, Rosa locates alienation in this loss of resonance. Although both describe deficient relations with oneself and the world, Rosa stresses a crisis of meaning while Jaeggi stresses a crisis of action. Yet both accounts describe obstructed, diminished, or ossified senses of future possibility. If we understand alienation as futurelessness, must we remain indifferent to action, or what Jaeggi calls “active appropriation of the world” (2014:206)? If, per our account, alienation refers to the manner in which one conceives of and relates to the future as possibility, must our notion of alienation remain aloof from activity? Or does the crucial moment of alienation or disalienation lie in the appropriation of the world, as Jaeggi would have it? **Jaeggi’s pragmatic emphasis on active appropriation would benefit, we argue, from a phenomenological emphasis on possibility. Appropriation must be possible, not just practiced, and this condition of possibility defines the actions that Jaeggi calls appropriating, or those practical actions that express meaningful, self-determining, and coherent relations with oneself and the world** (p. 202). If that is the case, then these meaningful, self-determining, and coherent relations with oneself and the world depend on the possibility that we also could not act. If appropriation becomes compulsory, it is itself alienated and alienating: one who is forced to act will not, by definition, relate to that act as possible.4 In other words, one must have the sense that not acting is a possibility.

#### [D] Over-identification – Employers reduce employees to mere laborers with a price tag, alienating them and violating the structure of the will, recognizing strikes is necessary to recognize workers are more than just workers.

Gilabert 17 [Pablo Gilabert (2017) “Kantian Dignity and Marxian Socialism” https://philarchive.org/archive/GILKDA-2] SHS KS

Capitalists exploit workers by using their superior bargaining power (resulting from their private control of the means of production) to extract from them more than they might (and ought to) give if they were not so vulnerable. The Kantian dignitarian account explains what’s wrong with this. One of the most evident ways in which capitalism is an affront to dignitarian ideals is that it enshrines instrumental treatment of others as a typical aspect of production and exchange. As the competitive economic agents that they are, capitalists seek profit, and show concern for the freedom and well-being of their workers only if, and to the extent that, doing so would add to their profit margin. Workers have price, not dignity, for them. This has a systemic dimension as well, as capitalists normally throw their significant weight behind political agents and processes that sustain institutional schemes that cement their privileged position by making capitalist relations of production the law of the land. Capitalist exploitation is a social pattern of reduction of some human beings to mere instruments for the self-regarding benefit of others.

## Underview

#### [1] 1AR Theory – a] the aff gets it because otherwise the 1NC could engage in unchecked, infinite abuse which outweighs anything else, b] it’s drop the debater because the 2AR is too short to win a shell AND substance so theory can only check abuse for the aff if it’s a win condition, c] no neg RVI because otherwise they could dump on the shell for 6 minutes and get away with anything by sheer brute force, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time.

#### [2] Permissibility Affirms –

#### [a] logic

#### [b] Negation by contradiction – Both P and not P cannot be true simultaneously, which means proving not P is false proves P true, meaning lack of sufficient reason for not P justifies P

#### [3] Presumption affirms

#### [a] logic

#### [4] advantage - democracy

#### The US is instigating a global democratic crisis – any lapse in US policy spills over

Werner 7/9 [(Jake, a Postdoctoral Global China Research Fellow at the Boston University Global Development Policy Center.) “Does America Really Support Democracy—or Just Other Rich Democracies?” Foreign Affairs, 7/9/2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-09/does-america-really-support-democracy-or-just-other-rich] BC

In a speech he delivered in February, U.S. President Joe Biden painted a portrait of a world fundamentally divided between democracy and autocracy. “We’re at an inflection point,” he said, “between those who argue that, given all the challenges we face . . . that autocracy is the best way forward, . . . and those who understand that democracy is essential . . . to meeting those challenges.” Biden has insisted that both his domestic and foreign agendas put the United States in the best possible position to win this epochal conflict.

But this fixation on a clash between autocracy and democracy obscures a deeper divide in geopolitics. The United States asserts leadership of the world’s democracies, but it actually stands opposed to most democracies on many of the most significant global issues. From the COVID-19 pandemic to global trade rules, from climate change to economic development, the United States is actively frustrating the priorities of most of the world’s democracies. In the process, U.S. foreign policy is—in the name of democracy—compounding the global crisis of democracy and delegitimizing U.S. power.

Rich and poor democracies share many problems. Forty years of increasingly concentrated wealth, deteriorating public goods, eroding stability for workers, and a disintegrating sense of collective belonging have provided raw material for nationalism, racism, and authoritarianism in democracies of all levels of wealth. The Biden administration understands this. In speech after speech, Biden has made an essential point: people are losing faith in democracy because democracy is not meeting their needs. In his domestic agenda, Biden recognizes that investing in the common good, providing greater power and security to labor, and mobilizing people to confront the climate crisis are all crucial to the project of fending off illiberal politics and reviving democracy in the United States.

Yet Biden’s foreign policy suffers from a strange disconnect. Rather than pursuing a global strategy to revive faith in the common good, Biden focuses on outcompeting China—as if people outside the United States value democracy not because it empowers them but because it is synonymous with U.S. power. Biden argues that for the sake of democracy, Americans must “develop and dominate the products and technologies of the future.” That would certainly help Americans and people in other rich, technologically advanced democracies. That might help U.S. investors, but is not a vision of a global economy in which all democracies can deliver for their people.

A different approach is possible, one capable of reversing the global antidemocratic tide by opening new opportunities for people around the world. It will require a better framework for understanding today’s conflicts, one more capacious than a myopic binary that pits liberal democracy against its authoritarian other.

INVISIBLE DEMOCRACIES

The claim that the United States is at odds with most democracies may feel jarring, but that is only because U.S. leaders and media so often conflate the “world’s democracies” with the handful of rich countries, including former colonial powers in Europe (and Japan) and states that began as settler colonies, such as Australia and Canada. A 2020 New York Times article, for example, headlined the findings of a Pew Research Center poll this way: “Distrust of China Jumps to New Highs in Democratic Nations.” The poll was not, however, about “democratic nations.” Most of the world’s largest democracies—countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa—were not included, nor were many smaller democracies such as Botswana, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka. It was instead a poll of people in (as Pew itself put it) “advanced economies.”

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, democratic developing countries are home to twice as many people as rich democracies—three times as many, if one counts semidemocratic “hybrid regimes” such as those in Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Turkey. Yet the world’s many poor democracies remain largely peripheral to the worldview of U.S. policymakers. They enter into Beltway conversations only when they threaten regional stability or become useful in wider geopolitical conflicts.

This invisibility is understandable. Precisely because they are poor, the democracies of the global South exert far less influence over world politics and the global economy than their wealthy counterparts. The rich democracies account for about 15 percent of world population but enjoy 43 percent of global GDP as measured by purchasing power (59 percent in dollar terms), and their military budgets amount to nearly two-thirds of the world’s war spending. Many Americans also share a feeling of cultural or ethnic affinity with the rich democracies that does not extend to the poor democracies.

Confusing democracy with wealth fundamentally distorts strategic thinking about what U.S. leaders so often proclaim to be a top priority: ensuring that democracy flourishes around the world. Poor and rich democracies alike have been moving in an illiberal direction in recent years. But a foreign policy aimed at renewing and supporting democracy will fail if it is based solely on the preferences of rich countries. That’s because the democracies of the global South, more often than not, have interests that are very different from those of the rich democracies—interests that frequently align with more authoritarian developing countries. In other words, one effect of framing the major struggle in the world today as a fight between democrats and authoritarians is to render invisible the inequality that characterizes the global economy, which is often the more consequential division.

#### A right to strike solves

#### Worker strikes withhold labor from wealthy elites to make way for new progressive legislature.

Pope 18 [(James Gray, a distinguished professor of law at Rutgers Law School and serves on the executive council of the Rutgers Council of AAUP/AFT Chapters, AFL-CIO.) “Labor’s right to strike is essential,” PSC Cuny, September 2018. <https://www.psc-cuny.org/clarion/september-2018/labor%E2%80%99s-right-strike-essential>] RR

POLITICAL CLIMATE

What provoked Cuomo and de Blasio to close ranks and launch a simultaneous attack on workers’ rights? Gubernatorial candidate Cynthia Nixon had the audacity to include in her platform a plank endorsing public workers’ right to strike. No wonder Cuomo and de Blasio struck back: Like Bernie Sanders, Nixon threatened the grip of Wall Street-backed politicians on what was once the party of working people.

The right to strike should be a no-brainer for any self-respecting candidate who claims to care about working people. It isn’t some transitory policy fix; it’s a fundamental human right, recognized in international law. Without the right to strike, workers have no effective recourse against unhealthy conditions, inadequate wages, or employer tyranny. Before the American labor movement began its long decline, unions made the right to strike a litmus test for supporting candidates. Labor leaders held that anti-strike laws imposed “involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Corporate interests ridiculed this claim, arguing that the Amendment guaranteed only the individual right to quit and go elsewhere. But workers and unions held their ground. “The simple fact is that the right of individual workers to quit their jobs has meaning only when they may quit in concert, so that in their quitting or in their threat to quit they have a real bargaining strength,” Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) General Counsel Lee Pressman explained. “It is thus hypocritical to suggest that a prohibition on the right to strike is not in practical effect a prohibition on the right to quit individually.”

Labor leaders quoted the Supreme Court’s statement that the Amendment was intended “to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit which is the essence of involuntary servitude.” Although they never convinced the Supreme Court that this principle covered the right to strike, Congress did embrace the core of their claim when it protected the right to strike in two historic statutes, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the Wagner National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The “individual unorganized worker,” explained Congress, “is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor.”

A DEMOCRATIC NEED

The recent teacher strikes underscore another, equally vital function of the strike: political democracy. It is no accident that strikers often serve as midwives of democracy. Examples include Poland in the 1970s, where shipyard strikers brought down the dictatorship, and South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, where strikers were central to the defeat of apartheid. Even in relatively democratic countries like the United States, workers often find it necessary to withhold their labor in order to offset the disproportionate power of wealthy interests and racial elites. During the 1930s, for example, it took mass strikes to overcome judicial resistance to progressive economic regulation. Today, workers confront a political system that has been warped by voter suppression, gerrymandering and the judicial protection of corporate political expenditures as “freedom of speech.” With corporate lackeys holding a majority of seats on the Supreme Court, workers may soon need strikes to clear the way for progressive legislation just as they did in the 1930s.

#### Democracies are key to solve climate change— US democratic leadership is key.

Fiorino 9/22 [(Daniel J, is the Director of the Center for Environmental Policy at American University in Washington DC. He his author of Can Democracy Handle Climate Change? (Polity, 2018). ) “Democracy is suited to tackle climate change,” Democracy Without Borders, 9/22/21. <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/20869/democracy-is-suited-to-tackle-climate-change/>] RR

Comparing democratic and authoritarian systems

Climate change is a complex challenge, the largest collective action problem in history, and a classic illustration of the concept of a wicked problem. It is distinctive in many ways: unlike most forms of air or water pollution, the effects are not immediately obvious; harms occur mostly in the future, with a perceived temporal mismatch of costs and benefits. Scientific uncertainty allows opponents of action at least to raise doubt. Further, acting on the causes of the problem requires basic changes in economic and social systems, not just incremental fine-tuning.

Democracies overall are more suited to handling climate change

There is good reason to believe, however, that democracies overall are more suited to handling climate change than their authoritarian counterparts. Among the reasons studied in the literature are the relatively free flows of information on problems and solutions in democracies; their administrative capacities and lower levels of corruption; their more active engagement in global problem-solving; multiple points of access in policy making (pluralism); superior scientific and technical capacity; and dynamic, innovative economies. Overall better governance capacities, such as less corruption, are part of their advantage (see for instance Dasgupta and De Cian 2018 as well as Povitkina 2018).

The research on the climate capacities of democracies strongly suggests they are no less and probably more capable then authoritarian regimes. A 2013 study of national policies found that countries with a history of and experience with democracy generally have better climate mitigation laws and policies. In another study of climate policy, authoritarian regimes did not perform better than established democracies and actually lag far behind.

Democracy critics often point to recent experience in the United States, where the Trump administration had reversed nearly every climate initiative of the Obama administration and withdrew from the 2015 Paris agreement. These policy reversals do not bode well for democratic arguments about climate change. Nonetheless, only hours after being sworn in, President Biden moved to reinstate the US to the Paris accord. Overall, the United States also illustrates the strengths of democracies: pluralism, innovation, open flows of information, and political accountability. In particular, federalism enables states—California, New York, Washington, and Hawaii, among them—to act as innovative clean energy and climate leaders.

Why the democracy issue matters

Lovelock has said in this book that surviving climate change “may require, as in a war, the suspension of democratic government for the duration of the survival emergency” (p. 95). The problem is that this will be a perpetual war. Climate change is not something one just solves. Mitigating its causes and adapting to its effects is a constant struggle. And democracy is not something we can put on the shelf and revive when a crisis passes, if it does.