# 1ac

## Framing

#### Subjectivity is the basis of ethics because asking what we ought to do begs the question of what constitutes the subject in the first place

#### Thinking is only a feature of me and doesn’t determine the subject. Subjectivity is fluid— The subject is always fractured through time, each fracture being constantly filled and reopened, meaning stable subjecthood fails.

Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repitition. Translated by Paul Patton. 1968. SHS KS

Temporally speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito. It is as though Descartes's Cogito operated with two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. The determination (I think) implies an undetermined existence (I am, because 'in order to think one must exist') - and determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. The entire Kantian critique [is] amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. The determination ('I think') obviously implies something undetermined ('I am'), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the 'I think': 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'8 Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the deter­ mination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ...9 The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the 'I think' cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the self - that is, the passive position (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, namely time. Nor is 'add' entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the I were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the 'I' for the point of view of 'God' = than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an identity that it owes precisely it. If the greatest tmttattve of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis. On the contrary, we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive (contemplation ontraction). · The possibility of receiving sensations or impressions follows from this. It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation: here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. The Kantian initiative can be taken up, and the form of time can support both the death of God and the fractured I, but in the course of a quite different understanding of the passive self. In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant - rather, it is Holderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self.10 Holderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though these were complementary figures of the same death instinct. Is it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus?

#### Our instability means that we’re temporally bound and connected by affect – Our encounters with the world change the way we form relations with everything else.

The Power to be Affected Michael Hardt Published online: 12 December 2014 # Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Int J Polit Cult Soc (2015) 28:215–222 DOI 10.1007/s10767-014-9191-x SHS KS

By focusing on the causes of the affects, however, Spinoza points toward a practical project. All affects can be either active (that is, caused internally) or passive (caused externally). Indeed one advantage of using “affect” instead of the more colloquial “emotion” or “feeling” to translate Spinoza’s Latin term “affectus” is that it highlights the causes and effects of actions by and upon us. Once the causes are revealed, the project becomes to shift from passive to active affections, from external to internal causes. The reason to prefer active over passive does not reside in the experience of the affect, which does not change depending on cause or source. A passive affection, Deleuze explains, “does not express its cause, that is to say, the nature or essence of the external body: rather, it indicates the present constitution of our own body, and so the way in which our power to be affected is filled at that moment” (1992, pp. 219–220, translation modified). Just like passive affections, active affections too indicate the present constitution of our body. The crucial difference is really a temporal one and regards duration and repetition. We need the ability to select, as Nietzsche would say, in order to extend and repeat those encounters and affects that are beneficial and prevent those that are detrimental. The repetition of passive affections is completely out of our control. Some random encounters, of course, do bring us joy, but that passes quickly if we cannot make them last or repeat them. And most random encounters, unfortunately, result in sadness. If we leave this to hazard, we will stay stuck with no way forward. “As long as you don’t know what is the power to be affected of a body, as long as you understand it like that, in chance encounters, you will not have a wise life, you will not have wisdom” (1978 “L’affect et l’idée”). The great advantage of the active over the passive affection is that it is no longer dependent on the vagaries of external forces. Since the body causes itself to be affected, chance is removed and it is able to control the duration and repetition of encounters. The issue, then, is not only understanding and expanding your power to be affected but also augmenting proportion of that power that is filled with active rather than passive affections. This notion of active affection could appear obscure or, worse, moralistic if not linked to Spinoza’s definition of bodies (and, ultimately, subjects). From his perspective, there is no basic or default unitary body. “A body,” Spinoza explains, “is constituted by the relation among its parts” (1985 Ethics, IV P39 dem), and the number and constitution of those parts is changeable. We need to shift perspective so as no longer to consider a body as an entity (or even a cluster of entities) but instead as a relation. When a new relation is added, a larger body is composed, and when a relation is broken, the body diminishes or decomposes. All this simply means that the border between the inside and outside of bodies, and hence between internal and external causes, is fluid and subject to our efforts. In order for a passive affection to become an active one, then, it is not necessary for the body that previously experienced the effect of an external body somehow to cut off that relationship and learn to become itself the cause. The body instead can, under certain conditions, envelop the cause—this is the term Deleuze uses—by creating a relation with it or, really, by expanding the relation that constitutes the body. You only gain the knowledge of when these conditions exist through encounters with others: every encounter reveals the extent to which the relations that constitute your body agree with or are “composable” with those of another. And a joyful encounter always indicates that there is something in common to discover. “We must, then,” Deleuze explains, “by the aid of joyful passions, form the idea of what is common to some external body and our own” (1992, p. 283). Once we recognize those common relations, we can compose a new, greater body, which contains the cause of our joy. The cause, then, does not really change. It simply becomes internal—annexed, as it were, by the affected body. The real change is the border between inside and outside and hence the composition of the body. Once the cause is internal and the affection is active, then you are no longer subject to chance: the affect can be prolonged and repeated as long as it brings you joy.8 The practical project to transform passive into active affections thus ultimately involves a strategy of bonds and relations to maintain or transform the constitution of the body. The advice, if Spinoza were your therapist, could be as simple as this: first, discover your body’s power to be affected and the affects that compose it, and, then, if an encounter with someone or something results in joy, form a relationship with it, make it part of you, and transform the passive affection into an active one so that you can repeat the encounter or make it last until the joy no longer results. You have to recognize that you are not a fixed entity but a bundle of relations and your task is to compose new joyful relations and decompose sad ones. Increasing the proportion of active affections does not primarily mean becoming the cause, at least not in a direct way. The bad therapist is the one who simply berates you to take control of your life as if it were an act of sovereign will. Instead you must discover joyful encounters and then make the passive affection into an active one by forming a consistent relation with the cause, thereby enveloping the cause with a new relation that constitutes us as a new body. Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s technical vocabularies might make this process sound obscure when it is really a very practical project. Consider, for example, your power to think together with others. In many intellectual discussions and encounters, you find yourself more confused and less able to think. Occasionally, though, you encounter a person or a group with whom you are able to think more clearly and more powerfully than you could before. Suddenly, you understand things that previously seemed completely incomprehensible. This is a joy as pure as Spinoza can imagine. Well, the practical thing to do is not to leave such joyful encounters to chance and the fluctuations of external causes. Compose a stable relation with the source of intellectual joy; make the encounters repeat and last. Maybe form a discussion group or write a book together. This will change you, of course, since you are defined by relations, but it will change you for the better. It is never as simple as that, of course. Some of those people and things that bring you joy will simultaneously cause you sadness in other ways. Choosing whether to make or break bonds, compose or decompose relationships is always complicated. This tangled terrain of complex, contradictory affects is where so much of Berlant’s work resides. Consider, for example, her eminently Spinozian formulation, which could easily be added to his catalogue of the affects: “A relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing.” (2011, p. 1). Her recognition that we are so often filled by such self-thwarting desires is not, of course, cause for despair. That is the field in which we need to work, the core of the ethical and political project. Conceiving our ethical and political tasks, as do Berlant and Spinoza, in terms of not our power to act as sovereign subjects but instead our power to be affected shifts the orientation of our political landscape and opens new political possibilities. It makes clear, most obviously, that political projects are not only (and not even primarily) a matter of reason and interests but instead an engagement with our power to be affected in all its messiness and, sometimes, its ugliness. This does not mean, however, that we need to abandon the classical goals of human flourishing, the good life, or joy. The mandate Spinoza gives you is first to increase your power to be affected and then, within that power to be affected, seek a greater proportion of active rather than passive affections. And, finally, in order to maximize active affects, focus on your bonds and relations: discover those people and things that bring you joy and form with them lasting relationships to compose a new body and correspondingly decompose the bonds that hold you to what brings sadness. This where Spinoza and Berlant meet: in a political project for nonsovereign subjects.

#### Affect is divided into two groups – Active and reactive. Active affect embraces the constitution of difference and fluidity, while reactive affect embraces transcendence and stability.

#### Embracing active affect as opposed to reactive is key to breaking free from the pervasive state mindset and instead creating spaces for resistance and radical change so that we can reform the state

Manning and Massumi 18 [Erin and Brian; “A Cryptoeconomy of Affect”; interviewed by Uriah Todoroff for The New Inquiry; Massumi is known for his translations of French post-structuralist classics like Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987); Manning is a prolific author whose last published book was *The Minor Gesture* (2016). They work together at the SenseLab in Montreal, a research laboratory Manning created to experiment with collective pedagogy. The lab provides a base for intellectual and creative activity that is intended to spin off into projects that grow or die according to their own momentum.; https://thenewinquiry.com/a-cryptoeconomy-of-affect/; BP]

There are people all over the world we don’t know who are doing this kind of work, who are creating ways of working together, inventing new forms of collaboration, engaging with complex ecological models of encounter, who are inventing new forms of value. We never believe we are alone doing this work. The question we have isn’t the usual start-up question of how to scale up, it’s how do we create techniques for the registering of that which doesn’t register? The 3E Process Seed Bank is deeply allied to the question of what else learning and living can be, having grown out of its sister project the Three Ecologies Institute. We actually began there, with the Three Ecologies Institute, working from Félix Guattari’s definition of the three ecologies as the conceptual (psychic, mental), the environmental, and the social. It was only two years ago that we realized that thinking value transversally across the three ecologies required us to also take financial value into account. We see the 3E as a kind of intensifier of modes of thinking and living dedicated to inventing ways that we can continue to learn together, regardless of our age, background, or learning style. We don’t see it as an opposite to the university; we see it as a parasite. You could put the emphasis on the site: a para-site, a para-institution that maintains relations with the institution of the university but operates by a different logic. It would be very naive of us to think you could just walk out of capitalism. We’re not that naive. Neoliberalism is our natural environment. We therefore operate with what we call strategic duplicity. This involves recognizing what works in the systems we work against. Which means: We don’t just oppose them head on. We work with them, strategically, while nurturing an alien logic that moves in very different directions. One of the things we know that the university does well is that it attracts really interesting people. The university can facilitate meetings that can change lives. But systemically, it fails. And the systemic failure is getting more and more acute. And so what we imagine is that the Institute, assisted by the 3E Process Seed Bank, will create a new space that might overlap with some of the things the university does well, without being a part of it (or being subsumed by its logic). **MASSUMI.—** Going back to the question of value, we want to create an economy around the platform that does not follow any of the usual economic principles. There will be no individual ownership or shares. There will be no units of account, no currency or tokens used internally. The model of activity will not be transactional. Individual interest will not be used as an incentivizer. What there will be is a complex space of relation for people to create intensities of experience together, in emergent excess over what they could have created working separately, or in traditional teams. It’s meant to be self-organizing, with no separate administrative structure or hierarchy, and even no formal decision-making rules. It’s anarchistic in that sense, but through mobilizing a surplus of organizing potential, rather than lacking organization. You could also call it communistic, in the sense that there is no individual value holding. Everything is common. **MANNING.—** Undercommon. **MASSUMI.—** Yes, undercommonly. The undercommons is Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s word for emergent collectivity, which is one of our inspirations. We want to foster emergence and process, but at the same time find ways of making it sustainable. That means that the strategic duplicity has to extend to the economy as we currently know it. We have to be parasitical to the capitalist economy, while operating according to a logic that is totally alien to it. What we’re thinking of is making the collaborative process moving through the platform function according to the radically anti-capitalist principles we were just talking about, centering on the collective production of surplus values of life, and separating that from the dominant economy by a membrane. A membrane creates a separation, but at the same time allows for movements across. It has a certain porosity. The idea is that we would find ways, associated with the affect-o-meter we were describing earlier, to register qualitative shifts in the creative process as it moves over its formative thresholds, and moves back and forth between online operations and offline events. What would be registered is the affective intensity of the production of surplus value of life, its ebbs and flows. The membrane would consist in a translation of those qualitative flows into a numerical expression, which would feed into a cryptocurrency. Basically, we’d be mining crypto with collaborative creative energies—monetizing emergent collectivity. The currency would be “backed” by the confidence we could build in our ability to keep the creative process going and spin it off into other projects, as evidenced by the activities of the Three Ecologies Institute as an experiment in alter-education.

#### Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is to embrace a politics of active affect. To clarify, we reject things that reinforce stability or the majoritarian subject. Current systems of education only serve to produce majoritarian bodies that are unable to think outside the system and who become increasingly recognizable, killing the potential for any resistance.

Wallins, Jason. “Deleuze and Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbur Publishing, 2014, Pgs. 119-121 SHS KS

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’ (p. 6). Where education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its modes of production have taken as their teleological goal the production of a ‘majoritarian people’, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where education aspires to invest desire in the production of a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘molar’ public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed, not only through the paucity of enunciatory forms and images available for thinking education in the first place, but further, through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the singular, the ‘majoritarian’ and standardizing impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production the reification of common sense, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’, common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] The state is a neutral tool but can be used as a destructive force of reactive desire as it can codify and regulate all social interactions as well as destroy those deemed deviant. Robinson 09

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In this article, I have chosen to concentrate on the conceptual pairing of states and war-machines as a way of understanding the differences between autonomous social networks and hierarchical, repressive formations. **Deleuze and Guattari view the ‘state’ as a** particular kind of **institutional regime derived from a set of social relations** which can be **traced to a way of** seeing **focus**ed **on** the construction of **fixities and representation.** There is thus a basic form of the state (a “state-form”) in spite of the differences among specific states. Since Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is primarily relational and processual, the state exists primarily as a process rather than a thing. **The state-form is defined by the processes or practices of ‘overcoding’, ‘despotic signification’ and ‘machinic enslavement’.** These attributes can be explained one at a time. The concept of **despotic signification**, derived from Lacan’s idea of the master-signifier, **suggests that**, in statist thought, **a particular signifier is elevated to the status of standing for the whole, and the other of this signifier** (remembering that signification is necessarily differential) **is defined as radically excluded.** ‘**Overcoding**’ **consists in the imposition of** the regime of **meanings arising from this fixing of representations on the various processes through which social life and desire operate.** In contrast to the deep penetration which occurs in capitalism, states often do this fairly lightly, but with brutality around the edges. Hence for instance, **in historical despotic states, the inclusion of peripheral areas only required their symbolic subordination, and not any real impact on everyday life in these areas. Overcoding** also, however, **entails the destruction of anything which cannot be represented** or encoded. ‘**Machinic enslavement**’ **occurs when** assembled groups of social relations and desires, known in Deleuzian theory as **‘machines’, are rendered subordinate to the regulatory function of the despotic signifier and hence incorporated in an overarching totality.** **This** process **identifies Deleuze** and Guattari’s view of the state-form **with Mumford’s idea of the megamachine, with the state operating as a kind of absorbing and enclosing totality**, a bit like the Borg in Star Trek, **eating up** and assimilating **the social networks with which it comes into contact**. Crucially, while these relations it absorbs often start out as horizontal, or as hierarchical only at a local level, their absorption rearranges them as vertical and hierarchical aggregates. **It tends to destroy or reduce the intensity of horizontal connections, instead increasing the intensity of vertical subordination.** Take, for instance, the formation of the colonial state in Africa: loose social identities were rigidly reclassified as exclusive ethnicities, and these ethnicities were arranged in hierarchies (for instance, Tutsi as superior to Hutu) in ways which created rigid boundaries and oppressive relations culminating in today’s conflicts. According to this theory of the state-form, **states are** at once **‘isomorphic’, sharing a basic structure and function**, and heterogeneous, **differing** in how they express this structure. In particular, states vary **in terms of** the relative balance between **‘adding’ and ‘subtracting axioms’** (capitalism is also seen as performing these two operations). **An axiom** here **refers to** the **inclusion of a particular group** or social logic or set of desires as something **recognised by a state: examples** of addition of axioms **would be the recognition of minority rights** (e.g. gay rights), the recognition and systematic inclusion of minority groups in formal multiculturalism (e.g. Indian ‘scheduled castes’), the creation of niche markets for particular groups (e.g. ‘ethnic food’ sections in supermarkets), **and the provision of inclusive services (e.g. support for independent living for people with disabilities**). It is most marked in social-democratic kinds of states. **The subtraction** of axioms **consists in the encoding of differences as problems to be suppressed,** for example in the classification of differences as crimes, **the institutionalisation of unwanted minorities** (e.g. ‘sectioning’ people who are psychologically different), or the restriction of services to members of an in-group (excluding ‘disruptive’ children, denying council housing to migrants). This process reaches its culmination in totalitarian states. It is important to realise that **in both cases, the state is expressing the logic of the state-form, finding ways to encode and represent differences; but that the effects of the two strategies on the freedom and social power of marginalised groups are very different.** **The state is also** viewed as **a force of ‘antiproduction’**. This term is defined **against** the ‘productive’ or creative power Deleuze and Guattari believe resides in processes of **desiring**-production (the process through which desires are formed and connected to objects or others) **and social production** (the process of constructing social ‘assemblages’ or networks). **Desiring-production** tends to **proliferate differences**, **because desire operates through fluxes and breaks**, overflowing particular boundaries. The state as machine of **antiproduction operates to restrict**, prevent or channel these **flows of creative energy** so as **to preserve fixed social forms and restrict** the extent of **difference** which is able to exist, **or** the **connections** it is able to form. Hence, **states try to restrict** and break down the **coming-together of social networks by** prohibiting or **making difficult the formation of hierarchical assemblages**; it operates to block ‘subject-formation’ in terms of social groups, or the emergence of subjectivities which are not already encoded in dominant terms. **Take** for instance the laws on **‘dispersal’,** in which the **British** state **allows police to break up groups** (often of young people) **congregating in public spaces.** Absurdly, **the state defines** the social act of **coming-together as anti-social, because it creates a space in which different kinds of social relations can be formed. The state wishes** to have **a monopoly on how people interrelate**, and so acts to prevent people from associating horizontally. Another example of antiproduction is the way that participation in imposed activities

## Offense

#### Thus, I affirm—Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I’ll defend the resolution as a general principle and PICS don’t negate because general principles tolerate exceptions. I’ll spec whatever you want me to in cx as long as it doesn’t force me to abandon my maximum.

### Contention 1:

#### Oppression staticizes subjects as “workers” creating an interlocking effect that prevents us from becoming more than a worker

Gourevitch 18 [Alex Gourevitch is an associate professor political science at Brown University. “The Right to Strike: A Radical View.” 2018. American Political Science Review. https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]

THE FACTS OF OPPRESSION IN TYPICAL LIBERAL CAPITALIST SOCIETIES To explain why the right to strike is a right to resist oppression, I first must give an account of the relevant oppression. Oppression is the unjustifiable deprivation of freedom. Some deprivations or restrictions of freedom are justified and therefore do not count as oppression. The oppression that matters for this article is the class-based oppression of a typical liberal capitalist society. By the class-based oppression, I mean the fact that the majority of able-bodied people find themselves forced to work for members of a relatively small group who dominate control over productive assets and who, thereby, enjoy unjustifiable control over the activities and products of those workers. There are workers and then there are owners and their managers. The facts I refer to here are mostly drawn from the United States to keep a consistent description of a specific society. While there is meaningful variation across liberal capitalist nations, the basic facts of class-based oppression do not change in a way that vitiates my argument’s applicability to those countries too. Empirical analysis of each country to which the argument applies, and how it would apply, is a separate project. The first element of oppression in a class society resides in the fact that (a) there are some who are forced into the labor market while others are not and (b) those who are forced to work—workers—have to work for those who own productive resources. Workers are forced into the labor market because they have no reasonable alternative but to find a job.8 They cannot produce necessary goods for themselves, nor can they rely on the charity of others, nor can they count on adequate state benefits. The only way most people can gain reliable access to necessary goods is by buying them. The most reliable, often only, way most people have of acquiring enough money to buy those goods is through employment. That is the sense in which they have no reasonable alternative but to find a job working for an employer. Depending on how we measure income and wealth, about 60–80% of Americans are in this situation for most of their adult lives.9 This forcing is not symmetrical. A significant minority is not similarly forced to work for someone else, though they might do so freely. That minority has enough wealth, either inherited or accumulated or both, that they have a reasonable alternative to entering the labor market. So, this first dimension of oppression comes not from the fact that some are forced to work, but from the fact that the forcing is unequal and that asymmetry means some are forced to work for others.10 That is to say, what makes it oppressive is the wrong of unequally forcing the majority to work, for whatever purpose, while others face no such forcing at all.11 That way of organizing and distributing coercive work obligations, and of imposing certain kinds of forcing on workers, is an unjustifiable way of limiting their freedom and therefore oppressive. To fix ideas, I call this the structural element of oppression in class societies. 8 For a fuller analysis of workers being asymmetrically forced to work, or forced into particular occupations see Cohen (1988a,1988b), Ezorsky (2007), and Stanczyk (unpublished). These are primarily analytic descriptions of forcing, not normative analyses of what is wrong with that forcing. 9 For the 60–80% statistic, see Henwood (2005, 125). The statistics on wealth among the lower deciles is complex. A recent study shows that the net wealth of the bottom 50% is roughly 0. So at least 50% of US households are forced to use job-related income to meet annual expenses, though that has to be modified for those who receive (insufficient to live on) welfare benefits (Saez and Zucman 2014; Wolff 2012). 10 To be clear, the oppression here is not with any and all unequal and asymmetric forcing but with the inequality that arises from the class structure of society. For instance, it is not oppressive nor an unjust constraint on individual freedom, to force the able-bodied to do some work to support the disabled, children, the sick, the elderly, or the otherwise socially dependent who cannot perform a share of necessary labor. Though even there, there is some presumption that that burden of working for those who cannot work should be shared equally, and that individuals should not be forced to work for any purpose and under any conditions whatsoever. What I am describing as oppression is not the very fact that some work and others don’t, but the inequality and asymmetry that arises from the inequalities in ownership and control. This forcing is unequal in that some ablebodied—and even some who by all rights should not have to work at all—are forced to work while other able-bodied individuals are not forced to work. And it is asymmetric in that those who have to work are, on the whole, forced to work for those who hire them, under conditions controlled primarily by employers. This structural element leads to a second, interpersonal dimension of oppression in the workplace itself. Workers are forced to join workplaces typically characterized by large swathes of uncontrolled managerial power and authority. This oppression is interpersonal in the sense that it is power that specific individuals— employers and their managers—have to get other specific individuals—employees—to do what they want. We can distinguish between three overlapping forms that this interpersonal, workplace oppression takes: subordination, delegation, and dependence. Subordination: Employers have what are sometimes called “managerial prerogatives,”12 which are legislative and judicial grants of authority to owners and their managers to make decisions about investment, hiring and firing, plant location, work process, and the like.13 These powers come from judicial precedent and from the constellation of corporate, labor, contract, and property law. Managers may change working speeds and assigned tasks, the hours of work, or even force workers to spend up to an hour going through security lines after work without paying them (Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk 2014). Managers may fire workers for Facebook comments, their sexual orientation, for being too sexually appealing, or for not being appealing enough (Emerson 2011; Hess 2013; Strauss 2013; Velasco 2011). Workers may be given more tasks than can be performed in the allotted time, locked in the workplace overnight, required to work in extreme heat and other physically hazardous conditions, or punitively isolated from other coworkers (Greenhouse 2009, 26–27, 49–55, 89, 111–112; Hsu 2011; JOMO 2013; Urbina 2013). Managers may pressure employees into unwanted political behavior (HertelFernandez 2015). In all of these cases, managers are exercising legally permitted prerogatives.14 The law does not require that workers have any formal say in how those powers are exercised. In fact, in nearly every liberal capitalist country, employees are defined, in law, as “subordinates.”15 This is subordination in the strict sense: workers are subject to the will of the employer. Delegation: There are also other discretionary legal powers that managers have not by legal statute or precedent but because workers have voluntarily delegated these powers in the contract. For instance, workers might sign a contract that allows managers to require employees to submit to random drug testing or unannounced searches (American Civil Liberties Union 2017). In the United States, 18% of current employees and 37% of workers in their lifetime work under noncompete agreements (Bunker 2016). These clauses give managers legal power to forbid workers from working for competitors. The contract that the Communications Workers of America had with Verizon until 2015 included a right for managers to force employers to perform from 10 to 15 hours of overtime per week and to take some other day instead of Saturday as an off-day (Gourevitch 2016a). These legal powers are not parts of the managerial prerogatives that all employers have. Rather, they are voluntarily delegated to employers by workers. In many cases, though the delegation is in one sense voluntary, in another sense it is forced. This will especially be the case if workers, who are forced to find jobs, can only find jobs in sectors where the only contracts available are ones that require these kinds of delegations. Dependence: Finally, managers might have the material power to force employees to submit to commands or even to accept violations of their rights because of the worker’s dependence on the employer. A headline example is wage-theft, which affects American workers to the tune of $8– $14 billion per year (Eisenbray 2015; Judson and Francisco-McGuire 2012; NELP 2013; Axt 2013). In other cases, workers have been forced to wear diapers rather than go to the bathroom, refused legally required lunch breaks, or pressured to work through them, forced to keep working after their shift is up, or denied the right to read or turn on air conditioning during break (Oxfam 2015; BennettSmith 2012; Egelko 2011; Greenhouse 2009, 3– 12; Little 2013; Vega 2012). Other employers have forced their workers to stay home rather than go out on weekends or to switch churches and alter religious practices on pain of being fired and deported (Garrison, Bensinger, and Singer-Vine 2015). In these cases, employers are not exercising legal prerogatives, they are instead taking advantage of the material power that comes with threatening to fire or otherwise discipline workers. This material power to get workers to do things that employers want is in part a function of the class structure of society, both in the wide sense of workers being asymmetrically dependent on owners, and in the narrower sense of workers being legally subordinate to employers. Subordination, delegation, and dependence add up to a form of interpersonal oppression that employers and their managers have over their employees. The weight and scope of this oppression will vary, but those are variations on a theme. Employers and managers enjoy wide swaths of uncontrolled or insufficiently controlled power over their employees. This is the second face of oppression in a class society and it is a live issue. For instance, during the Verizon strike of 2016, one major complaint was that, when out on the job, hanging cable, or repairing lines, some technicians had to ask their manager for permission to go to the bathroom or to get a drink of water. As one striker said in an interview, “Do I have to tell my boss every single minute of what I am doing? This is basic human dignity” (Gourevitch 2016b). If they did not ask or wait to get clear approval from their manager, then they were guilty of a time code violation and were suspended for up to six weeks. The strike made workplace control a direct issue and one measure of its success was a change in disciplinary proceedings (ibid.). To take another example, the Fight for $15 strikes have made control over scheduling a central demand, even managing in certain states and municipalities to pass laws mandating minimal regularity and predictability in weekly schedules (Andrias 2016, 47–70). So, if the first face of oppression is that workers are forced to work for some employer or another who does not face a similar kind of forcing; the second face is that workers are forced to become de jure and de facto subordinates to a specific employer.16 The third face of oppression is the systematic distributive effects of structural and interpersonal oppression. While some instances of class-based oppression are idiosyncratic, in general it has consistent distributive effects. The structural and interpersonal oppression of workers produces wage-bargains and limits on wealth accumulation that reproduce workers’ economic dependence on employers, their over or underemployment, and thereby allows a relatively small group of owners and highly paid managers to accumulate most of the wealth and income. I cannot discuss the extensive literature on inequality. I can only cite some generally well-known facts and papers pointing to the role of inequalities in power as determining factors in these outcomes.17 To the degree that inequalities are a product of structural and workplace oppression, distributive outcomes are their own dimension of oppression and serve to reproduce those basic class relationships. Above all, there is one unjustifiable distributive effect of this oppression: that the majority of wage-bargains ensure the reproduction of that oppressive class structure. At any given point in time, a majority of workers do not earn enough to both meet their needs and to save such that they can employ themselves or start their own businesses. They must therefore remain workers or, to the degree they rise, they do so either by displacing others or by taking the structurally limited number of opportunities available.18 Each of these different faces of oppression— structural, interpersonal, and distributive—is a distinct injustice. Together they form an interrelated and mutually reinforcing set of oppressive relationships. The various ways in which workers are forced to work, made subject to dominating authority, and made asymmetrically dependent in the economy does not produce a fair way of distributing the obligation to work and the rewards of social production. Rather, it constrains their freedom in a way that secures the exploitation of one class by another. The weight of these different oppressions is unevenly experienced across different segments of workers. Various factors modify the basic facts about class and oppression. We have seen, for instance, the difference between being in a high labor supply versus a low labor supply sector. High labor supply sectors involve more intense labor competition, resulting in weaker bargaining power for workers and intensified oppression. The opposite holds for lower labor supply sectors—like software programmers or fiber-optics technicians—whose greater bargaining power means they face class-based oppression less intensively. This has downstream consequences for our analysis of particular strikes, but it does not affect the argument for the right to strike itself. My description of the economy is controversial. Some will either reject aspects of the empirical description, find it too underspecified to agree, or they will disagree with the normative interpretation of it as involving systematic, unjustified restrictions on workers’ freedom. Any attempt to give a more detailed account of this political economy of exploitation would leave no room for the rest of the argument. In what follows, the reader does not have to agree with every aspect of my description of liberal capitalist arrangements. One need only agree that the typical liberal capitalist economy is characterized by considerable, class-based oppression of workers, for reasons similar to the ones I have just provided, to then think that the right to strike can be seen as a right to resist oppression.

#### Strikes disrupt the codification processes and capitalism system enforced by the state, creating revolutionary and non-linear power that allows the subject to embrace active affect.

Holland 12 [Eugene Holland; Non-Linear Historical Materialism; Or, What is Revolutionary in Deleuze & Guattari’s Philosophy of History?; from Chapter 2 of Time and History in Deleuze and Serres (2012) (Dr. Holland is Professor and Chair of Comparative Studies at the Ohio State University.)] SHS KS

Political struggle thus necessarily involves two co-existent kinds of activity: on one hand, there is struggle within the axiomatic, for whatever ameliorations can be wrung from capital and/or the State through direct confrontation – and this is a mode of struggle that Deleuze and Guattari insist is perfectly valid and necessary (Deleuze et al., 1987, p. 471). On the other hand, there is the struggle to escape axiomatization and codifi cation altogether –the mode of struggle via de-coding and “ lines-of-flight ”that they in some sense prefer. What is given is always ‘ the coexistence and inseparability of that which the system conjugates, and that which never ceases to escape it following lines of flight that are themselves connectable ’ , as Deleuze &Guattari put it in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze et al., 1987, p. 473). And this connectability of lines-of-fl ight is crucial, politically. What in the fi rst volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia were called “ schizophrenic ”lines-of-fl ight are politically useless –or worse –if they do not intersect and connect up to constitute some kind of critical mass, as Deleuze &Guattari are careful to specify more clearly in the second volume. Yet even here, the conditions for such a critical mass becoming revolutionary are left somewhat vague: the slogan ‘ a new people on a new earth ’echoes throughout their collaborative work as a kind of refrain; and they do suggest that the ultimate challenge is to ‘ construct revolutionary connections over and against [contre] the conjugations of the axiomatic ’(Deleuze et al., 1987, p. 473). But we need to try to get clearer about just which conditions are conducive to the formation of connections among lines-of-fl ight and about how a critical mass of revolutionary connections could overcome the conjugations of the capitalist axiomatic. For insight into these questions, I propose that we return to the process with which we started: reading Capital backwards. This would mean focusing less on the power of capital accumulation than on so-called “ primitive accumulation ” , which as we saw is not really primitive but always ongoing, and not really accumulation but rather dispossession; and it would mean, like Althusser, highlighting in our considerations the non-linear conditions of reproduction rather than the linear causality of production/accumulation. And I propose that we examine in this light the key political-economic strategies of anti-capitalist struggle –and I specify “ political-economic ”strategies (those of radical syndicalism, if you will) to rule out of consideration what we might call more narrowly political strategies –state-centric or party-electoral strategies –as insuffi - ciently revolutionary. These political-economic strategies are the strike, and especially the general strike. As Walter Benjamin has very clearly noted, the general strike is distinctive in that it is non-confrontational (although he would say non-violent, which is not quite the same thing, and perhaps a little too optimistic) (Benjamin, 1978, pp. 277 – 300). In principle, a strike does not involve[s] one power bloc directly confronting another, but rather one bloc withdrawing from its previous mode of engagement (wage-slavery) vis- à -vis the other. The same is true of the general strike, which expands the act of withdrawal to a larger scale: here we have a critical mass of workers walking away en masse from their engagement with capital. Yet from the perspective of reproduction and so-called primitive accumulation –and this is key –what the masses are walking away “ from ” –capital accumulation –is actually less important than what they are able to walk “ towards ” : rejecting capital is less important than having something sustaining and sustainable to rely on. You will recall that the crucial catalyst entailed by primitive accumulation was enforced dependence on capitalist markets: remove this catalyst, and capitalism no longer “ becomes necessary ” , to invoke Althusser once again. More important than directly confronting capital, in other words, is securing alternative means of life, an alternative mode of reproduction. Even more important: such alternatives already exist. One of the great virtues of Gibson-Graham ’ s work is to demonstrate how incomplete capitalism actually is and how many alternative economies co-exist within or beside it (Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2006). Community Supported Agriculture; the co-op movement; the Open-Source Software movement; Fair Trade –all these, and many more, constitute viable, actually existing alternatives to capitalism. And all it will take for them, in connection with others, to become revolutionary –in the specifi cally non-linear sense I am proposing –is for a critical mass of people to invest their life-activity in them, rather than in capitalist markets. We tend to think of linear revolutions as punctual: 1917, 1848 and so on –even though they probably were not. But the non-linear revolution I am talking about is even less punctual: it entails instead what I elsewhere call the strategy of the ‘ slowmotion general strike ’(Holland, forthcoming). Critical masses of people in various aspects of their life-activity just walk away from capital –having secured in advance at least the rudiments of alternative means of life. This does not have to happen all at once: but as soon as suffi cient numbers of people in enough areas of life do so, a tipping point will have been reached, a non-linear bifurcation threshold crossed, beyond which capitalism will not only no longer be necessary, it will actually become-unnecessary. As the slow-motion general strike reaches completion, that is to say, it is not just the State, but also capitalism itself that ends up withering away.

### Contention 2:

#### Strikes allows workers to use active affect to reclaim their own authority and resist the territorializing barriers of workplaces

**Gourevitch 18**, A. (2018). The Right to Strike: A Radical View. American Political Science Review, 1–13. doi:10.1017/s0003055418000321 (Alex Gourevitch is an Assistant Professor of Political Sci- ence, Brown University) // SHS KS

There is more than one way to justify the right to strike and, in so doing, to explain the shape that right ought to have. As we shall see, there is the liberal, the social- democratic, and the radical account. Any justi cation of a right must give an account not just of the interest it protects but of how that right is shaped to protect that interest. In the case of the radical argument for the right to strike, which I will defend against the other two con- ceptions, the relevant human interest is liberty. Work- ers have an interest in resisting the oppression of class society by using their collective power to reduce that oppression. Their interest is a liberty interest in a dou- ble sense. First, it is an interest in not being oppressed, or in not facing certain kinds of forcing, coercion, and subjection to authority that they shouldn’t have to. Any resistance to those kinds of unjusti ed limitations of freedom carries with it, at least implicitly, a demand for liberties not yet enjoyed.19 That is a demand for a control over portions of one’s life that one does not yet enjoy. Second, and consequently, the right to strike is grounded in an interest in using one’s own individual and collective agency to resist—or even overcome— that oppression. The interest in using one’s own agency to resist oppression ows naturally from the demand for liberties not yet enjoyed. After all, that demand for control is in the name of giving proper space to work- ers’ capacity for self-determination, which is the same capacity that expresses itself in the activity of striking for greater freedom. On this radical view, the right to strike has both an intrinsic and instrumental relation to liberty. It has in- trinsic value as an (at least implicit) demand for self- emancipation or the winning of greater liberty through one’s own efforts. It has instrumental value insofar as the strike is on the whole an effective means for resist- ing the oppressiveness of a class society. For the right to strike to enjoy its proper connection to liberty, work- ers must have a reasonable chance of carrying out an effective strike, otherwise it would lose its instrumen- tal value as a way of resisting oppression. If prevented from using a reasonable array of effective means, ex- ercising the right to strike would not be a means of reducing oppression and, therefore, strikes would also be of very limited value as acts of self-emancipation. It would not be an instance of workers attempting to use their own capacity for self-determination to increase the control they ought to have over the terms of their daily activity.

## Underview

#### [1] 1AR Theory – a] the aff gets it because otherwise the 1NC could engage in unchecked, infinite abuse which outweighs anything else, b] it’s drop the debater because the 2AR is too short to win a shell AND substance so theory can only check abuse for the aff if it’s a win condition, c] no neg RVI because otherwise they could dump on the shell for 6 minutes and get away with anything by sheer brute force, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time. I don’t take a stance on whether theory is good or not, just that if it’s good, the aff gets it