# Emory Round 1 AC

## Framework

#### Ethics must be derived from the constitutive features of agents – ethics based internally fail because they can’t generate universal obligations and ethics based externally fail because they are nonbinding as agents could opt-out and have no motivation to follow them which means they fail to guide action.

#### Constitutivism solves – it allows for universal obligations among all agents but they are binding and cannot be opted out of. Thus, the meta ethic is constitutivism.

#### Next, only practical reason is constitutive:

#### [1] Regress – to question why one should reason concedes its authority since it is an act of reasoning itself which proves it’s binding and inescapable

#### [2] Agents can shift between different identities but doing so requires reason - it unifies the subject and is the only enterprise agents cannot escape

#### Ferrero 09 (Luca Ferrero, [Luca Ferrero is a Philosophy professor at University of California, Riverside. His areas of interest are Agency Theory, including Intentionality and Personal identity; Practical Reasoning; and Meta-Ethics], “Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency”. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV, Jan 12, 2009. <https://philarchive.org/archive/FERCATv1> BHHS AK recut

Agency is special in two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.¹² All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional agency but it does not necessarily belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a ‘radical re-evaluation’ of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.

#### That justifies universalizability - insofar as there is no a priori distinction between reasoners, a reason for one agent must also be a reason for another; if all agents cannot set and pursue an end, it is not constitutive of agency. Willing a maxim that violates freedom is a contradiction in conception – you cannot violate someone’s freedom without having your own freedom to do so.

#### **The right to freedom necessitates a state to enforce it – objections to the state are unjust under the framework because they would involve justifying coercion**

Ripstein 04 [Arthur Ripstein, (University Professor of Law and Philosophy, [University of Toronto](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_org&hl=en&org=8515235176732148308)) "Authority and Coercion" Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32: 2–35, 2004, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, DOA:12-16-2017 // WWBW]

Kant explains the need for the three branches of government in Rousseau’s vocabulary of the “general will.” Kant finds this concept helpful, since it manages to capture the way in which the specificity of the law and the monopoly on its [the law’s] enforcement do [is] not thereby make it the unilateral imposition of one person’s will upon another. Instead, it is what Kant calls an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible. All must agree, because without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible. But the sense in which they must agree is not just that they should agree; it is that they [one] cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally. Once the concept of the General Will is introduced, it provides further constraints on the possibility of a rightful condition, and even explains the ways in which a state can legitimately coerce its citizens for reasons other than the redress of private wrongs. Kant’s treatment of these issues of “Public Right” has struck many readers as somewhat perfunctory, especially after his meticulously detailed, if not always transparent, treatment of private right. He treats these issues as he does because he takes them to follow directly from the institution of a social contract. The details of his arguments need not concern us here, because he does not claim that these exhaust the further powers of the state. Instead, he puts them forward as additional powers a state must have if it is to create a rightful condition, and it is the structure of that argument that is of concern here.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will.

#### Impact calc: Intentions first – only the intention in pursuing a certain end is relevant when considering whether or not it is universalizable. Prefer for action theory - Any action can be split into infinite smaller actions. For example, when I’m taking a bite of food, I am making infinite movements of my hand and mouth – only the intention unifies the action. If we can’t unify action, we can’t call actions moral or immoral because they are made up of infinite parts. Prefer additionally:

**[1] Performativity – arguing against my framework presupposes freedom because without freedom to reason you would not be able to make arguments and try to win. – this means that contesting any of my arguments proves my framework true.**

#### [2] Humans have unconditional value since they have the power to confer value onto objects – means humans are ends in themselves and must not be treated as a mere means

**Korsgaard 83** (Christine Korsgaard, [Christine Marion Korsgaard is an American [philosopher](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosopher) and Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University whose main scholarly interests are in moral philosophy and its history; the relation of issues in moral philosophy to issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of personal identity; the theory of personal relationships; and in normativity in general], “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) BHHS AK recut

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, [they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of [are] objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them.

#### [3] A posteriori ethics fail:

#### [a] Problem of induction

Vickers 14, John Vickers, 2014, The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/

The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved.

[b] **Is/Ought Gap – experience just describes how the world is but doesn’t indicate how it ought to be which means there must be an a priori conception of good**

[c] **Inability to know each other’s experience makes it an unreliable basis for ethics because different experiences bring different concepts of truth – only a priori ethics solve since a priori truths are accessible to all agents**

#### [4] Oppression is caused by arbitrary exclusion of others – only universalizability makes sure that include everyone equally. Farr 02

Farr, Arnold. Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative? 2002, blog.ufba.br/kant/files/2009/12/Can-a-Philosophy-of-Race-Afford-to-Abandon-the.pdf.

The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. **The** Kantian **subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject.** However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. **We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check by something,** or else I behave like a Freudian id. **My empirical character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence**. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: **In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally significant is that it makes our own case no special exception** (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, **universalizable moral principles require that the individual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation**. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, **the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents.

## Offense

#### Thus I defend “Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.” as a general principle. PICs don’t negate because general principles tolerate exceptions. I’m willing to clarify or specify whatever you want in cx as long as it doesn’t force me to abandon my maxim.

#### Out of the possibility of extraterrestrial reasoners, we have an obligation to respect their habitats and not interfere through exploration.

Brian Patrick Green 2014, Santa Clara University, "Ethical Approaches to Astrobiology and Space Exploration: Comparing Kant, Mill, and Aristotle," Scholar Commons, https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/markkula/5/

But to assume that Kant has not considered these questions is an enormous mistake. In 1755, quite early in his career, Kant published the book Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, where he described the solar nebular hypothesis (now the accepted theory for how the solar system formed).4 More than that, Kant not only allowed that extraterrestrial intelligences might exist, he believed that if they did not yet exist, that someday they would,5 and that some of these ETIs would be inferior and some superior to humans in intelligence.6 One might wonder if the young Kant’s belief in ETIs continued into his older years, when he was writing on ethics. There is good evidence that it does. Writing his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 30 years after his work on the nebular hypothesis, Kant is explicit – he is not just discussing humans, but “all rational beings.” 7 So with respect deontology and extraterrestrial intelligent life, Case 1) on the chart, Kant would extend the same full dignity and respect to ETIs which humans owe to each other, in accord with his categorical imperative, which requires the universalizability of moral norms8 and treating all rational beings as ends in themselves.9 For deontology and non-intelligent life, Case 2), Kant argues that animals, as non-rational beings, are of only relative worth. They are not as ends in themselves, not persons, but things.10 If humans discovered non-intelligent life on other worlds (most likely microbes, but if larger then we would have to carefully evaluate what it means to be intelligent, and make sure the discovered life does not qualify), according to Kant, we could do with it as we pleased. While some contemporary moral philosophers have tried to reinterpret or rehabilitate Kant on animals, these works are developments of Kant’s philosophy; they are not his philosophy itself.11 So while Kantianism might be modifiable into a system which is more friendly towards the rest of the living world, without these modifications it is not. For non-life and Kantian deontology, Case 3), there is likewise a simple answer: nonliving things are just things. Non-living things are not a moral concern, they are merely instrumental, and as such intelligent creatures can treat these things as they wish. However, there is an odd exception to this conclusion which is worth mentioning (and which I note with a star in the table). Kant believed that if other planets were not yet inhabited, they someday would be. If this is the case, then what of planets currently without intelligent life but which may someday have it? Ought we to anticipate these intelligent creatures and therefore respect them proactively by respecting their prospective goods? Kant does not say (perhaps because he was not interested in speculating or because humans were, in his time, far from being in a position to affect the futures of these planets). However, given the importance of rational beings in Kant’s system (rationality, teleology, and morality are the purpose of universe) the answer is possibly, or even probably, yes.

#### Property is an external right – it is something that we don’t innately have a right to by virtue of existing, but acquire once we exercise our freedom. However, this is impossible when there is no state to create property divisions.

Stilz 1 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st//recut SHS KS

One key reason Kant does not accept the skeptical view of political authority, as put forward by Simmons, is that, when it comes to rights over external resources, he does not see the value of freedom as having the moral structure that Simmons attributes to it. Kant and Simmons, however, (along with Rousseau, whom we will examine in the next chapter) do share the same conception of freedom at the most basic level, a conception we can call freedom as independence. Since this notion of freedom as independence is one I will use throughout this book, it is worth a few words of clarification here. To be free-as-independent, as all these thinkers conceive it, is not to be forced to obey the will of another person; it is to enjoy a sphere of independent self-government within which others cannot interfere. This notion of freedom is thus particularly concerned with the relationships between persons. It is not concerned in the same way with whatever restrictions may be placed on our choices by natural obstacles or constraints. Being unable to hike up a mountain because a tree blocks the path does not make me less free, on the freedom- as-independence view. But being unable to hike up a mountain because you have tied me up, or because I have to seek your permission to engage in any leisure activities, does make me unfree. Freedom as independence, therefore, always refers to a relation between one person’s will and anoth- er’s: to be unfree is to be forced to obey someone else’s will rather than one’s own. For both Kant and Simmons, attaining this sort of freedom as indepen- dence requires people possess rights of property in external things. This is because the only way one person can be free from subjection to another person’s will is to have exclusive control over a sphere of the physical world within which those others are not allowed to interfere with his actions. And to have that sort of control is to have property. This exclusive sphere of property includes (a) rights of control over one’s own body and (b) rights of control over specific objects. While Kant agrees with Sim- mons that freedom requires property, he also claims that property is only possible through the state. As a result, he concludes that freedom as inde- pendence is only possible through the state. Since Kant believes that there is a basis in natural right for claiming private property, and he believes that private property requires the state, he concludes that the state is not an optional or voluntary association. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that we may be forced into the state against our will.18 Kant: External Freedom as Independence How does Kant reach these conclusions? Kant begins his Metaphysics of Morals with the argument that every human being possesses an innate right to external freedom, which as we have seen, is a right to indepen- dence from being coerced or constrained by another person’s will in car- rying out our choices. This, he says, is the “only original right belonging to man by virtue of his humanity.” Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice [Willku ̈ r]), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of humanity. This principle of innate freedom al- ready involves the following authorizations, which are not really dis- tinct from it (as if they were members of the division of some higher concept of a right): innate equality, that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti), since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone; and finally, his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it—such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promis- ing them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere (veriloquium aut falsiloquium); for it is entirely up to them whether they want to believe him or not. (MM, 6:238) As the sole human right, for Kant, the right to freedom as independence gives us several kinds of prerogatives. First, it gives us the title to do any- thing to other people that we may do to them without actually diminish- ing their freedom as independence, like simply communicating our thoughts to them: it thus grounds rights to freedom of speech and thought. Second, it gives us title to insist that we not be bound by any restrictions to freedom that are not reciprocal restrictions, that do not bind other people in the same way: it justifies a right to equal treatment. In addition, Kant holds that the innate right includes a minimum of bodily inviolability: someone who physically interferes with my body without my consent “affects and diminishes what is internally mine (my freedom), so that his maxim is in direct contradiction with the axiom of right” (MM, 6:250). Since my faculty of self-determination can only be exercised through my body, anyone who uses direct physical force on my body interferes with all possible expressions of my freedom.19 These titles—to freedom of thought and communication, to equal treatment, and to a minimum of bodily inviolability—together comprise our original claims to freedom. Unlike internal or metaphysical freedom, though, on Kant’s theory, ex- ternal freedom is defined by the individual’s capacity to set and pursue ends in the outside world, by acting. So in order to be externally free, I must be able to take up and use physical means—at the very least, spaces and also potentially objects—in order to carry out my choices. I am not externally free merely by thinking or wishing or setting myself a goal, without taking any concrete actions; I cannot be externally free in chains. I am externally free only when I can do something to further my projects. And this means that I must be able to actually take up some means to my ends without fear of your interference with my acts. External freedom thus involves the use of pieces of the physical world, where this use is potentially subject to interference by other persons.20 While all rights involve some sort of claim to external freedom, Kant draws a important distinction between rights that belong to us innately (like all those described above) and those we must acquire. Here, Kant differentiates between what he calls the internal and external “mine” (meum). Some rights—like the innate titles—are internally mine: I am born with them; they are my inalienable property; I do not have to do anything to acquire them. Other rights are acquired, and so belong to what Kant calls the external mine: these rights do not belong to us by birth, but require a particular act to be established (MM, 6:237). Kant refers to three broad kinds of acquired rights: rights to “(1) a (corporeal) thing external to me; (2) another’s choice to perform a specific deed (praestatio); (3) another’s status in relation to me” (MM, 6:248). These three kinds of acquired rights specify (1) my claims of ownership or prop- erty; (2) my contractual claims against others; and (3) my status as an occupant of a role, as a spouse, parent, or head of household.21 And shortly after introducing the innate right, interestingly, Kant suggests that it can more or less be laid aside in his political theory, in favor of a discus- sion of acquired rights: “It can be put in the prolegomena and the division of the doctrine of right can refer only to what is externally mine or yours” (MM, 6:238). Most of Kant’s political theory, then, is concerned not with the innate right, but instead with acquired rights, which define the precise bounds of our sphere of control over the external world. The fundamental task of a science of right, as Kant sees it, is to show how these rights to an “external mine” should be defined and guaranteed: “The doctrine of right wants to be sure that what belongs to each has been determined (with mathematical exactitude)” (MM, 6:233). As we shall see, Kant con- cludes that we cannot acquire these sorts of rights without a state. One reason for this is that unlike our titles to freedom of thought and communication or to minimal bodily inviolability, our rights to specific external objects are not naturally determinate. Freedom as independence requires that I have rights of control over a particular body (my own), but not that I have rights of control over a particular object. In order to be free-as-independent, I must have a right to some sphere of property, but it does not matter which specific objects I have a right to.22 Kant’s position can perhaps be made more intuitive if we reflect that any system of prop- erty will require the existence of a set of rules that is complex and to some extent conventional: rules about what sorts of things are eligible to be held as private property, what precisely are the conditions defining voluntary exchange, what constitutes an exploitative agreement, what are the condi- tions of publicly recognized spousal or parental rights, and how to distrib- ute opportunities, education, and income. The conditions specifying these sorts of rights would be imprecise and difficult to judge in a state of nature. The basic thought here is that while a principle of equal freedom pro- vides us some information about what just property distributions should look like, the principle’s content is underspecified, and therefore cannot be directly applied. The equal freedom principle suggests that whatever system of property we implement, it ought to be consistent with every- one’s possession of a zone of freedom that is guaranteed against others’ coercive interference. Nevertheless, many possible systems of property— collective allocation, market socialism, unfettered private ownership— are potentially consistent with that sense of equal freedom. And under each one of these many possible systems, there will again be many possible particular rules consistent with everyone’s freedom—rules about the pre- cise bundle of claims conferred by ownership, about how exchange is to be regulated, about which objects belong to which particular persons. And finally, any system of property will also have to include some aspects that are wholly conventional: rules about what precise formalities are required to conclude a contract, exactly how long a statute of limitations to institute, down, indeed, to what side of the road to drive on.

#### In outer space, there is no governing authority and thus claiming property imposes your will over others.

Stilz 2 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

It might seem, then, that Kant, like Simmons, would hold that although our acquired rights are initially indefinite, our private acts of appropria- tion in a state of nature can function to more clearly delimit their contours. Once I appropriate an external object—for example, my piece of land in the state of nature—the boundaries of my right to external freedom might simply be equivalent to those of the things and spaces that I have appropriated. If this were so, then individuals could succeed in more precisely defining property without the help of the state, and simply by coordinating expectations based on their private acts. In order to respect and acknowledge my external freedom, on this view, you would just have to cede me the spot I have rightfully occupied and to refrain from infringing on my choices within that sphere. Yet Kant does not take this position: he argues that the rights made possible by the postulate of practical reason are problematic. Whatever rights our private acts of appropriation outside the state confer upon us can only be understood as provisional rights, that is, they are not conclusive and settled (peremp- torische): indeed, for him, “It is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful condition, giving laws publicly, that is, a civil condition” (MM, 6:255). What is the problem with these private methods of defining our rights to property? Why are they so unsatisfactory, from Kant’s perspective? The essential problem with acquiring property rights in a state of nature, for Kant, seems to be that we cannot unilaterally—through private will— impose a new obligation on other persons to respect our property that they would not otherwise have had.30 “By my unilateral choice I cannot bind another to refrain from using a thing, an obligation he would not otherwise have; hence I can do this only through the united choice of all who possess it in common” (MM, 6:261).31 Even claiming to interpret the a priori general will on another person’s behalf, says Kant, is at- tempting to impose a law on them on my own private authority, since every act of appropriation is “the giving of a law that holds for everyone” (MM, 6:253).32 And he worries that this claim to private authority over others is a potential source of injustice: “Now when someone makes ar- rangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit inuria)” (MM, 6:314). My will to appro- priate, in the belief that my appropriation is justifiable to others, cannot yet serve as a (coercive) law for everyone else, because it cannot put them under an obligation. Kant suggests, in other words, that figuring out how to carve up shares of the external world consistently with everyone’s freedom does not ex- haust the entire problem of justice involved in acquiring rights to prop- erty. We might appeal to criteria of salience or convention to help coordi- nate our expectations on which of the many possible property distributions to choose. But we face an additional difficulty: how do we impose one of these distributions without at the same time arrogating to ourselves the private authority to lay down the law for an equally free being, one who has an innate right not to be constrained by our private will? In coercing someone to respect our view of our property rights, we are also necessarily claiming the right to impose our private will upon that person. If it is to really respect everyone’s freedom, Kant thinks, a property distribution cannot be unilaterally imposed in this way. This additional dimension of the problem of justly acquiring rights— the problem of unilateral imposition—is rooted in each person’s basic “right to do what seems right and good to him and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this” (MM, 6:312). This right to do what seems right and good to him derives from the moral equality of persons: no one has an innate right to decide in another person’s behalf. And be- cause each person is an equally authoritative judge, it is therefore impossi- ble—in a state of nature—to put [them] under an obligation of justice that [they] himself does not recognize. The will of all others except for himself, which proposes to put him under obligation to give up a certain possession, is merely unilateral, and hence has as little lawful force in denying him possession as he has in asserting it (since this can be found only in a general will). (MM, 6:257) In conditions of equal authority—such as those that exist in any state of nature—one is obligated only by what one recognizes, by one’s own lights, as an objectively valid requirement of justice. For that reason, no other person’s merely unilateral will can bind one in the face of one’s own disagreement. Kant concludes from this that “no particular will can be legislative for the commonwealth” (TP, 8:295), since no private person’s will can effec- tively claim to impose an obligation on others. Instead, Kant says that “all right,” that is to say all claims that impose binding duties on others, “depends on laws” (TP, 8:294). Law overcomes the problem of unilater- alism inherent in imposing new obligations on others on one’s own au- thority, by substituting an omnilateral will in place of a unilateral one: “Only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all, and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative” (MM, 6:314). But why is law—imposed from a public perspective—consistent with everyone’s freedom in a way that particular wills—based on our private judgments—are not? Fundamentally, Kant argues that defining and enforcing both our rights over our bodies and our rights to external objects through public and nonarbitrary laws is the only way to secure ourselves against the coercive interference of other private persons in our affairs. For Kant, then, the only sort of property distribution to which we could all hypothetically consent must necessarily be one that is defined and enforced by the state, since all privately enforced distributions have the inevitable side-effect of subjecting us to the wills of others. To show this in more detail, Kant points out two different ways that unilateral private enforcement under- mines our right to independence: first, through unilateral interpretation— a particularly pervasive problem in the enforcement of property rights, since these rights are fully conventional in a way our rights over our bod- ies are not; and second, through unilateral coercion, which threatens in- terference by others in all our rights, both our rights over our bodies and our rights over external things.

#### In the state of nature, everyone is an equal arbitrator of justice – that makes rights violations impossible to resolve.

Stilz 3 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

The Problem of Unilateral Interpretation Kant centrally appeals to the idea that to conclusively possess a right, it must be an objective right, rather than a subjective right based on one individual’s private interpretation of what justice requires. A subjective right is an individual’s good-faith belief about his rights: this belief gives him title to coerce others to keep off his property or to allow him bodily inviolability. But it does not yet place other people under a correlative duty. That would be so only if all individuals shared [their] interpretation of justice. But since individuals are equally authoritative judges in the state of nature, whenever they do not share another person’s belief about jus- tice, his belief imposes no duty on them at all. Instead, they are obliged only by the duties imposed by their own good-faith interpretation of jus- tice, which may not be concordant with his. It might be said, by someone of a more Lockean persuasion, that one of these competing interpreta- tions is the one that simply is valid as a matter of moral fact. That may be so. But as long as we remain in a state of nature, even this true view of right must remain unrealized, since each person, being an equally au- thoritative judge, has a right to enforce [their] own interpretation of justice, which means the true view of right places the person under no duties when it does not correspond with the person’s own. So as long as we remain our own judges and self-enforcers, there is no means by which we might establish which interpretation of right is morally valid without claiming the authority to serve as judge in another person’s behalf and forcibly subject the person to our will. And to claim that authority over someone else, Kant thinks, is refuse to recognize a person’s independence as an equally free being. For this reason, Kant thinks a procedure for the determination of objec- tive rights is a constitutive feature of justice, since a common process of adjudication is logically necessary if anyone’s rights are to impose any objective duties on other people.33 Objective rights are rights that are de- termined through such a process of adjudication, and that impose recog- nizable duties on us even when we disagree about what justice requires. If each person is threatened with violence every time another person’s private interpretation of justice disagrees with her own, [they] cannot possi- bly enjoy a secure sphere of freedom, since this other person is able to interfere with it whenever he sees fit. Instead, it is a constitutive part of justice that there be one univocal interpretation of the rights and duties to which everyone is subject, because only then can people securely enjoy independence from each other. Part of what justice demands, then, is a mechanism by which people can have their rights guaranteed in the exter- nal world without depending on the concordance of other people’s beliefs. Justice cannot be attained in the absence of such a procedure: only once it is in place are we fully independent of interference by other people, as we have an innate claim to be. To see how the unilateralism of interpretation undermines indepen- dence, imagine for a moment that you and I are state-of-nature neighbors. Say we have managed to resolve the indeterminacy of our property rights somewhat, perhaps by appropriating only in accordance with our inter- pretation of Kant’s a priori general will, or by coordinating our expecta- tions based on the most salient just system. So we have hit on some right- ful boundary that sets off your property from mine, such that if I desire to live side by side with you in peace, simply by respecting your basic rights, I ought to be able to do so. Let’s call our initial “property-owning” equilibrium E1. Now suppose some dispute arises between us over whether your prop- erty right has in fact been infringed. Perhaps I have built a huge garage in my area, which blocks the sunlight to your property and makes your gar- den unusable. Any number of examples are possible; what unites them all is that they represent new contingencies, the disposition of which is going to be indefinite enough according to whatever original criterion of appro- priation we are working with to make it likely parties acting in good faith might disagree. In our state-of-nature system, however, the interpretation of what right actually requires in this contingency is left up to you, along with the choice of whether or not to exercise your coercive rights to re- dress any (perceived) violation. So let’s say that you decide my garage is a violation of your acquired rights, since it makes your entire garden unusable, and so you cross our boundary in order to prevent me from blocking the light and to exact compensation from me. If I do not agree with your interpretation of your rights, I am under no obligation to submit to you: I am an equally authori- tative interpreter of justice. I may object to the rightfulness of your bound- ary-crossing in this case, or, even if I concede that you had a right to exact punishment, I may (in all good faith) think that you have exceeded the bounds of the compensation you are entitled to. So I may struggle against you, and regard myself as doing so rightfully. In this situation we both regard ourselves as having a claim of justice, and since we both act in good faith, we act with full subjective right. But in our state of nature, the only thing that can decide the matter between us is a contest of strength, since both sides are equally right from their point of view. As Jeremy Waldron puts it: there is an affront to the idea of justice when force is used by opposing sides, confrontationally and contradictorily, in justice’s name. The point of using force in the name of justice is to assure people of that to which they are entitled. But if force is being used to further contradic- tory ends, then its connection with assurance is ruptured.3 Let’s say that in this case you are the stronger, and that you succeed in demolishing my garage and in exacting what you regard as rightful com- pensation for my supposed infringement—say, one-quarter of my prop- erty. Now we have a new property-owning equilibrium, E2, in which you possess 125 percent of our combined share and I possess only 75 percent. And keeping with our initial assumption that both parties were acting in good faith, with full subjective right, this new equilibrium would not have come about unrightfully. Yet there is a real sense in which I retain a claim here, since the only reason you now possess more of the total is that you were stronger, not that I was convinced by your interpretation of justice. But the bounds of our sphere of control in the external world ought not to depend on the contingencies of who is stronger, and our innate independence ought not to be subject to continual interference by others who may coerce us at any moment in accordance with their private views. For this reason, Kant thinks it is a constitutive feature of justice that it be administered by an authoritative legal system, which can impose one set of objective rules about what constitutes an infringement of property—rules we must re- spect even when we disagree about what justice requires—and adjudicate our conflicting claims in a way that is consistent with our continued inde- pendence from each other. The idea is that if we want to possess claims that, as objective rights, are actually respected by others in the external world, we will need to recognize one and only one common set of rules about rights, not a variety of competing private interpretations that coer- cively struggle for the upper hand.

## Underview

#### [1] 1AR Theory – a] the aff gets it because otherwise the 1NC could engage in unchecked, infinite abuse which outweighs anything else, b] it’s drop the debater because the 2AR is too short to win a shell AND substance so theory can only check abuse for the aff if it’s a win condition, c] no neg RVI because otherwise they could dump on the shell for 6 minutes and get away with anything by sheer brute force, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time. Fairness is a voter, education is a voter