TW: rape

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\_petition\_against\_age\_of\_consent\_laws

In 1977, a petition was addressed to the [French parliament](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_parliament) calling for the abrogation of several articles of the [age of consent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Age_of_consent) law and the decriminalization of all consensual relations between adults and minors below the age of fifteen (the age of consent in France). A number of French [intellectuals](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual) – including such prominent names as [Michel Foucault](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault), [Gilles Deleuze](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilles_Deleuze), [Jacques Derrida](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Derrida), [Louis Aragon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Aragon), [Louis Althusser](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Althusser), [Roland Barthes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Barthes), [Simone de Beauvoir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simone_de_Beauvoir), [Jean-Paul Sartre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Paul_Sartre), [Félix Guattari](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A9lix_Guattari), [Michel Leiris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Leiris), [Alain Robbe-Grillet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alain_Robbe-Grillet), [Philippe Sollers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippe_Sollers), [Jacques Rancière](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Ranci%C3%A8re), [Jean-François Lyotard](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Fran%C3%A7ois_Lyotard), [Francis Ponge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Ponge), [Bernard Besret](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bernard_Besret&action=edit&redlink=1) [[fr](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Besret" \o "fr:Bernard Besret)] and various prominent doctors and psychologists – signed the [petition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petition).[[1]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_petition_against_age_of_consent_laws#cite_note-1) In 1979 two open letters were published in French newspapers defending individuals arrested under charges of [statutory rape](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statutory_rape), in the context of [abolition of age of consent laws](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Age_of_consent_reform).

**If you buy their shell, that means you should also reject the aff, and you can vote neg on presumption. Their author directly endorsed pedophilia nad unsafe behaviors**

### Interpretation and Violation: T Implement

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend and garner offense off of the hypothetical implementation of a policy that brings about the state of affairs where in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory – they don’t.

#### Resolved means a policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Preparation – repacking the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for months on an issue that catches us by surprise and delink all policy based disads and counterplans which is functionally all the topic lit. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet- research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training – the process of debate outweighs the content – only our interp generates the argumentative skills needed to rigorously defend their affirmative out of round and create engaged citizens who have the self-reflexivity to advocate for positive change

#### 2] Truth testing – you can’t vote on the case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the AC claims. If we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts

#### 3] read the aff as a TVA solves- space is bad so women leaders should ban private appropriation

#### Paradigm issues:

#### 1] Fairness is an intrinsic good and the only possible impact to your ballot -- debate is a game: forced winner/loser, competitive norms, and the tournament invite prove. The ballot can’t change our subjectivities but it can rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins.

#### 2] Drop the debater – T indicts their method of engagement and proves we couldn’t engage fairly with their aff – cross apply truth testing

#### 3] Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary, you can’t be reasonably topical, and causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### 4] RVIs and impact turns encourage all in on theory which decks substance and incentivize baiting theory with abusive practices.

#### 5] No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

### 2

#### permissibility negate– a] the aff has to prove an obligation to depart from the squo, if they don’t then we’ve done our job, b] they get to choose to defend anything they want – if they don’t win then we’ve done the better debating

#### Negate on presumption –

#### **[A] Voting aff relies on neoliberal meritocracy – wins equate to visibility, the ballot is an act of recognition. This attachment to the ballot is cruelly optimistic because nothing leaves this round nor does it affect subjectivities – it just pits us against each other without breaking the game.**

#### **[B] It’s not enough to just assert that we should resist heteronorm– they don’t have any explanation for how voting aff for their method spills-up to institutional change or provides a strategy for making debate better writ-large for other people.**

#### **[C] Five dictionaries define affirm as to prove true which means they must prove the resolution true and the judge’s obligation is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity. That negates – they haven’t met their burden since they don’t engage in the resolution and thus have no offense.**

#### **[Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true]**

#### Independently use a comparative worlds paradigm

1] Real world – People actually enact the policy options they debate about, which would be how comparative worlds would debate it. Real world is key for education and also ow on proximity to debate-

2] Inclusivity- debate is not just a space for debates on gender; other things and literature is excluded under their rotb; ow on accessibility bc it means some people who cant access gender lit or didn’t prep it would be excluded; also means better for clash because more arguments can be interacted with eachother

#### The starting point of morality is practical reason.

#### 1] Regress: A theory is only binding when you can answer the question “why should I do this?” and not continue to ask “why”. Only practical reason provides a deductive foundation for ethics since the question “why should I be rational” already concedes the authoritative power of agency since your agency is at work.

#### 2] Action theory: only evaluating action through reason solves since reason is key to evaluate intent, otherwise we could infinitely divide actions. For example: If I was brewing tea, I could break up that one big action into multiple small actions. Only our intention, to brew tea unifies these actions if we were never able to unify action, we could never classify certain actions as moral or immoral since those actions would be infinitely divisible.

#### And, reason must be universal – [A] a reason for one agent is a reason for another agent. I can’t say 2+2=4 is true for me but not for you – that’s incoherent.

#### [B] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others.

#### Thus, counter-methodology: Vote negative to engage in a liberation strategy of universal reason. This entails a starting point where we abstract from individual perspectives to understand the universal, and use this starting point to apply it to empirical institutions and agents. No perms: Uniquely non-sensical in a method debate: a] It assumes a notion of fiat that doesn’t make sense without a plan. The 1AC role of the ballot forefronts the performative and methodological which a permutation steals away b] non-T affs shouldn’t get perms since they can defend literally anything in the world – thus the burden is on them to prove their advocacy is the best solution to the problem they propose.

#### Prefer:

#### Performativity: freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments through talking freely. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, denying self-ownership in the round automatically implies the truth of the aff framework.

#### Humans naturally aspire to be rational and impulsively attempt to reason from a perspective that transcends their unique circumstance – proves my framework is key to a stable concept of agency. This hijacks other frameworks because they presuppose a consistent concept of an agent; without a clearly defined agent, ethics have nothing to guide and fail.

**Velleman 05** David J. Velleman. [J. David Velleman is Professor of Philosophy and Bioethics at New York University and Miller Research Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. He primarily works in the areas of ethics, moral psychology, and related areas such as the philosophy of action, and practical reasoning], “A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics.” *Self to Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005, <https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/logic/self-self-selected-essays?format=HB&isbn=9780521854290> SHS AK

Why not accept "I don't feel like it" as a reason on this occasion while resolving to reject it on all others? Again the answer is clear. If a consideration counts as a reason for acting, then it counts as a reason whenever it is true. And on almost any morning, it's true that you don't feel like swimming. Yet if a reason is a consideration that counts as a reason whenever it's true, then why not dispense with reasons so defined? Why do you feel compelled to act for that sort of consideration? Since you don't feel like swimming, you might just roll over and go back to sleep, without bothering to find some fact about the present occasion from which you're willing to draw similar implications whenever it is true. How odd, to skip exercise in order to sleep and then to lose sleep anyway over finding a reason not to exercise! ~ Kant offered an explanation for this oddity. His explanation was that acting for reasons is essential to being a person, something to which you unavoidably aspire. In order to be a person, you must have an approach to the world that is sufficiently coherent and constant to qualify as a single, continuing point-of-view. And part of what gives you a single, continuing point-of-view is your acceptance of particular considerations as having the force of reasons whenever they are true. We might be tempted to make this point by saying that you are a unified, persisting person and hence that you do approach practical questions from a point-of-view framed by constant reasons. But this way of making the point wouldn't explain why you feel compelled to act for reasons; it would simply locate acting for reasons in a broader context, as part of what makes you a person. One of Kant's greatest insights, however, is that a unified, persisting person is something that you are because it is something that you aspire to be. Antecedently to this aspiration, you are merely aware that you are capable of being a person. But any creature aware that it is capable of being a person, in Kant's view, is ipso facto capable of appreciating the value of being a person and is therefore ineluctably drawn toward personhood. The value of being a person in the present context is precisely that of attaining a perspective that transcends that of your current, momentary self. Right now, you would rather sleep than swim, but you also know that if you roll over and sleep, you will wake up wishing that you had swum instead. Your impulse to decide on the basis of reasons is, at bottom, an impulse to transcend these momentary points-of-view, by attaining a single, constant perspective that can subsume both of them. It's like the impulse to attain a higher vantage point that overlooks the restricted standpoints on the ground below. This higher vantage point is neither your current perspective of wanting to sleep, nor your later perspective of wishing you had swum, but a timeless perspective from which you can reflect on now-wanting-this and later-wishing-that, a perspective from which you can attach constant practical implications to these considerations and come to a stable, all-things-considered judgment.

#### Negate:

#### [1] Only univeralizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

[2] Negate, the appropriation of outer space by private entities is just

#### Acquisition of property can never be unjust – to create rights violations, there must already be an owner of the property being violated, but that presupposes its appropriation by another entity.

Feser 1, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

3

我总是很伤心

一切都让我不开心

我希望找到幸福

我喜欢做饭和吃东西

但这还不够

This outweighs because I’m an underrepresented minority- it does more to break from the white hetero sphere of the aff

## 4

#### The term witch, bewitching, and witchcraft is used to describe how women don’t fit traditional roles. You should drop them for their in round discourse because misogyny creates an unsafe debate space where no one can participate in the benefits of the activity. You can achieve liberation without using the word “witch”, just say “other”

**Smith 16** [Michelle Smith, 1-5-2016, "Witches both mad and bad: a loaded word with an ugly history," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/witches-both-mad-and-bad-a-loaded-word-with-an-ugly-history-52804]

**Bewitching women** Throughout Western history, women have typically been denied the right to own property, become literate or educated, pursue careers, participate in politics, or make decisions independently of their husbands. Within this context of men’s control over women, the one limited power that women possessed was their ability to be sexually attractive to men. It is therefore no surprise that beauty is linked with witchcraft in language. **A number of terms that relate to women’s ability to appear desirable have magical connotations. Most obviously, a woman can be “bewitching” in her power to lure men.** In addition, the word “glamour”, which we associate with stylish women, originally referred to the occult and a spell that made the viewer see an object or person differently to its actual appearance. **Cultural stereotypes of witches as old, ugly, and childless situate the witch as the antithesis of everything a desirable woman should be.** Nevertheless Diana Purkiss has shown that the Early Modern witch was not only a patriarchal creation. She explains that women, in some ways like those who are now embracing the “Mad F—king Witches” title, **Other women have also sent up Dutton’s text, sharing photos of household brooms on their doorsteps as well as images of witches in popular culture.** It even won international attention, with a tweet from the account of American TV superhero Jessica Jones**. While Maiden and others have embraced the term “**mad **witch”, there’s little doubt that it was intended as an insult. Labelling a woman a “**mad **witch” brings with it unmistakable discomfort and hatred. It is a name that was applied to former Prime Minister Julia Gillard on the infamous “Ditch the witch” placard, providing a clear instance of how the word continues to be evoked for strong women who do not embrace traditional feminine roles in the home.**