## AC

#### Affect, the ability to experience and to be experienced, is the only constitutive feature: I am experiencing my Word doc, my opponent, just as much as you are experiencing me. There is no way to escape affection.

#### Thinking is only a feature of me and doesn’t determine the subject. Subjectivity is fluid—the only intrinsic feature of the subject is that everything is changing, thus stable subjecthood fails. Emphasis on particular aspects of subjectivity only drives division in the proletariat.

#### There are two kinds of affect, active and reactive— Active affect allows us to extend and compose our own boundaries whereas reactive affect only indicates our body’s ability to be affected.

#### Embracing active affect is key to breaking free from the pervasive state mindset and instead creating spaces for resistance and radical change so that we can reform the state

#### Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is to embrace a politics of active affect. To clarify, we reject things that reinforce stability or the majoritarian subject. Current systems of education only serve to produce majoritarian bodies that are unable to think outside the system and who become increasingly recognizable, killing the potential for any resistance.

Wallins, Jason. “Deleuze and Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbur Publishing, 2014, Pgs. 119-121 SHS KS

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’ (p. 6). Where education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its modes of production have taken as their teleological goal the production of a ‘majoritarian people’, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where education aspires to invest desire in the production of a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘molar’ public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed, not only through the paucity of enunciatory forms and images available for thinking education in the first place, but further, through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the singular, the ‘majoritarian’ and standardizing impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production the reification of common sense, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’, common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Active affect is able to organize to undermine static structures, whereas reactive affect becomes coopted and utilized by the state to ceaselessly destroy and form strict confines for identity and being — the aff is a form of negative state action where we sap power from conventionally oppressive institutions

Robinson 10 [Andre; Ceasefire; “Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation”; https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-deleuze-war-machine/; political theorist; LCA-BP]

So what, in Deleuzian theory, is the alternative to the state? Deleuze and Guattari argue for a type of assemblage (social group or cluster of relations) which they refer to as the ‘war-machine’, though with the proviso that certain kinds of ‘war-machines’ can also be captured and used by states. This should not be considered a militarist theory, and the term ‘war-machine’ is in many respects misleading. It is used because Deleuze and Guattari derive their theory from Pierre Clastres’ theory of the role of ritualised (often non-lethal) warfare among indigenous groups. Paul Patton has suggested that the war-machine would be better called a metamorphosis-machine, others have used the term ‘difference engine’, a machine of differentiation, and there is a lot of overlap with the idea of autonomous groups or movements in how the war-machine is theorised. We should also remember that ‘machine’ in Deleuze and Guattari simply refers to a combination of forces or elements; it does not have overtones of instrumentalism or of mindless mechanisms – a social group, an ecosystem, a knight on horseback are all ‘machines’. The term ‘war-machine’ has the unfortunate connotations of brutal military machinery and of uncontrollable militarist apparatuses such as NATO, which operate with a machine-like rigidity and inhumanity (c.f. the phrase ‘military-industrial complex’). For Deleuze and Guattari, these kinds of statist war-machines are also war-machines of a sort, because they descend from a historical process through which states ‘captured’ or incorporated autonomous social movements (particularly those of nomadic indigenous societies) and made them part of the state so as to contain their subversive power. Early states learned to capture war-machines because they were previously vulnerable to being destroyed by the war-machines of nomadic stateless societies, having no similar means of response. Hence, armies are a kind of hybrid social form, containing some of the power of autonomous war-machines but contained in such a way as to harness it to state instrumentalism and inhumanity. Captured in this way, war-machines lose their affirmative force, becoming simply machines of purposeless destruction – having lost the purpose of deterritorialisation (see below), they take on the purpose of pure war as a goal in itself. Deleuze and Guattari argue that state-captured war-machines are regaining their autonomy in a dangerous way, tending to replace limited war in the service of a state’s goals with a drive to total war. This drive is expressed for instance in the ‘war on terror’ as permanent state of emergency. There was a recent controversy about Israeli strategists adopting Deleuzian ideas, which reflects the continuities between state war-machines and autonomous war-machines, but depends on a selective conceptual misreading in which the drive to total war denounced by Deleuze and Guattari is explicitly valorised. The Israeli army is a captured war-machine in the worst possible sense, pursuing the destruction of others’ existential territories in order to accumulate destructive power for a state. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is not the Israeli army but the Palestinian resistance which is a war-machine in the full sense. The autonomous war-machine, as opposed to the state-captured war-machine, is a form of social assemblage directed against the state, and against the coalescence of sovereignty. The[y] way such machines undermine the state is by exercising diffuse power to break down concentrated power, and through the replacement of ‘striated’ (regulated, marked) space with ‘smooth’ space (although the war-machine is the ‘constituent element of smooth space’, I shall save discussion of smooth space for some other time). In Clastres’ account of Amazonian societies, on which Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is based, this is done by means of each band defending its own autonomy, and reacting to any potential accumulation of power by other bands. One could similarly think of how neighbourhood gangs resist subordination by rival gangs, or how autonomous social movements resist concentrations of political power. Autonomous social movements, such as the European squatters’ movement, the Zapatistas, and networks of protest against summits, are the principal example Deleuze and Guattari have in mind of war-machines in the global North, though they also use the concept in relation to Southern guerrilla and popular movements such as the Palestinian intifada and the Vietnamese resistance to American occupation, and also in relation to everyday practices of indigenous groups resisting state control. One could also argue that the ‘war-machine’ is implicit in practices of everyday resistance of the kind studies by James Scott. Marginal groups, termed ‘minorities’ in Deleuzian theory, often coalesce as war-machines because the state-form is inappropriate for them.

#### 2. The aff is key to adopt and test new resistance for students as contemporary pedagogical sites – operating internally is essential to hearing from multiple perspectives and forming new affective relations

Manning and Massumi 18 [Erin and Brian; “A Cryptoeconomy of Affect”; interviewed by Uriah Todoroff for The New Inquiry; Massumi is known for his translations of French post-structuralist classics like Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987); Manning is a prolific author whose last published book was *The Minor Gesture* (2016). They work together at the SenseLab in Montreal, a research laboratory Manning created to experiment with collective pedagogy. The lab provides a base for intellectual and creative activity that is intended to spin off into projects that grow or die according to their own momentum.; https://thenewinquiry.com/a-cryptoeconomy-of-affect/; BP]

There are people all over the world we don’t know who are doing this kind of work, who are creating ways of working together, inventing new forms of collaboration, engaging with complex ecological models of encounter, who are inventing new forms of value. We never believe we are alone doing this work. The question we have isn’t the usual start-up question of how to scale up, it’s how do we create techniques for the registering of that which doesn’t register? The 3E Process Seed Bank is deeply allied to the question of what else learning and living can be, having grown out of its sister project the Three Ecologies Institute. We actually began there, with the Three Ecologies Institute, working from Félix Guattari’s definition of the three ecologies as the conceptual (psychic, mental), the environmental, and the social. It was only two years ago that we realized that thinking value transversally across the three ecologies required us to also take financial value into account. We see the 3E as a kind of intensifier of modes of thinking and living dedicated to inventing ways that we can continue to learn together, regardless of our age, background, or learning style. We don’t see it as an opposite to the university; we see it as a parasite. You could put the emphasis on the site: a para-site, a para-institution that maintains relations with the institution of the university but operates by a different logic. It would be very naive of us to think you could just walk out of capitalism. We’re not that naive. Neoliberalism is our natural environment. We therefore operate with what we call strategic duplicity. This involves recognizing what works in the systems we work against. Which means: We don’t just oppose them head on. We work with them, strategically, while nurturing an alien logic that moves in very different directions. One of the things we know that the university does well is that it attracts really interesting people. The university can facilitate meetings that can change lives. But systemically, it fails. And the systemic failure is getting more and more acute. And so what we imagine is that the Institute, assisted by the 3E Process Seed Bank, will create a new space that might overlap with some of the things the university does well, without being a part of it (or being subsumed by its logic). **MASSUMI.—** Going back to the question of value, we want to create an economy around the platform that does not follow any of the usual economic principles. There will be no individual ownership or shares. There will be no units of account, no currency or tokens used internally. The model of activity will not be transactional. Individual interest will not be used as an incentivizer. What there will be is a complex space of relation for people to create intensities of experience together, in emergent excess over what they could have created working separately, or in traditional teams. It’s meant to be self-organizing, with no separate administrative structure or hierarchy, and even no formal decision-making rules. It’s anarchistic in that sense, but through mobilizing a surplus of organizing potential, rather than lacking organization. You could also call it communistic, in the sense that there is no individual value holding. Everything is common. **MANNING.—** Undercommon. **MASSUMI.—** Yes, undercommonly. The undercommons is Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s word for emergent collectivity, which is one of our inspirations. We want to foster emergence and process, but at the same time find ways of making it sustainable. That means that the strategic duplicity has to extend to the economy as we currently know it. We have to be parasitical to the capitalist economy, while operating according to a logic that is totally alien to it. What we’re thinking of is making the collaborative process moving through the platform function according to the radically anti-capitalist principles we were just talking about, centering on the collective production of surplus values of life, and separating that from the dominant economy by a membrane. A membrane creates a separation, but at the same time allows for movements across. It has a certain porosity. The idea is that we would find ways, associated with the affect-o-meter we were describing earlier, to register qualitative shifts in the creative process as it moves over its formative thresholds, and moves back and forth between online operations and offline events. What would be registered is the affective intensity of the production of surplus value of life, its ebbs and flows. The membrane would consist in a translation of those qualitative flows into a numerical expression, which would feed into a cryptocurrency. Basically, we’d be mining crypto with collaborative creative energies—monetizing emergent collectivity. The currency would be “backed” by the confidence we could build in our ability to keep the creative process going and spin it off into other projects, as evidenced by the activities of the Three Ecologies Institute as an experiment in alter-education.

**This proves strategies of subversion and infiltration lead to movements that won’t be coopted- serve as red herrings.**

## Offense

#### Thus, I affirm—Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I’ll defend the resolution as a general principle and PICS don’t negate because general principles tolerate exceptions. I’ll spec whatever you want me to in cx as long as it doesn’t force me to abandon my maximum.

### Contention 1:

#### Oppression staticizes subjects as “workers” creating an interlocking effects that prevent fluidity to become more than a worker

Gourevitch 18 [Alex Gourevitch is an associate professor political science at Brown University. “The Right to Strike: A Radical View.” 2018. American Political Science Review. https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]

THE FACTS OF OPPRESSION IN TYPICAL LIBERAL CAPITALIST SOCIETIES To explain why the right to strike is a right to resist oppression, I first must give an account of the relevant oppression. Oppression is the unjustifiable deprivation of freedom. Some deprivations or restrictions of freedom are justified and therefore do not count as oppression. The oppression that matters for this article is the class-based oppression of a typical liberal capitalist society. By the class-based oppression, I mean the fact that the majority of able-bodied people find themselves forced to work for members of a relatively small group who dominate control over productive assets and who, thereby, enjoy unjustifiable control over the activities and products of those workers. There are workers and then there are owners and their managers. The facts I refer to here are mostly drawn from the United States to keep a consistent description of a specific society. While there is meaningful variation across liberal capitalist nations, the basic facts of class-based oppression do not change in a way that vitiates my argument’s applicability to those countries too. Empirical analysis of each country to which the argument applies, and how it would apply, is a separate project. The first element of oppression in a class society resides in the fact that (a) there are some who are forced into the labor market while others are not and (b) those who are forced to work—workers—have to work for those who own productive resources. Workers are forced into the labor market because they have no reasonable alternative but to find a job.8 They cannot produce necessary goods for themselves, nor can they rely on the charity of others, nor can they count on adequate state benefits. The only way most people can gain reliable access to necessary goods is by buying them. The most reliable, often only, way most people have of acquiring enough money to buy those goods is through employment. That is the sense in which they have no reasonable alternative but to find a job working for an employer. Depending on how we measure income and wealth, about 60–80% of Americans are in this situation for most of their adult lives.9 This forcing is not symmetrical. A significant minority is not similarly forced to work for someone else, though they might do so freely. That minority has enough wealth, either inherited or accumulated or both, that they have a reasonable alternative to entering the labor market. So, this first dimension of oppression comes not from the fact that some are forced to work, but from the fact that the forcing is unequal and that asymmetry means some are forced to work for others.10 That is to say, what makes it oppressive is the wrong of unequally forcing the majority to work, for whatever purpose, while others face no such forcing at all.11 That way of organizing and distributing coercive work obligations, and of imposing certain kinds of forcing on workers, is an unjustifiable way of limiting their freedom and therefore oppressive. To fix ideas, I call this the structural element of oppression in class societies. 8 For a fuller analysis of workers being asymmetrically forced to work, or forced into particular occupations see Cohen (1988a,1988b), Ezorsky (2007), and Stanczyk (unpublished). These are primarily analytic descriptions of forcing, not normative analyses of what is wrong with that forcing. 9 For the 60–80% statistic, see Henwood (2005, 125). The statistics on wealth among the lower deciles is complex. A recent study shows that the net wealth of the bottom 50% is roughly 0. So at least 50% of US households are forced to use job-related income to meet annual expenses, though that has to be modified for those who receive (insufficient to live on) welfare benefits (Saez and Zucman 2014; Wolff 2012). 10 To be clear, the oppression here is not with any and all unequal and asymmetric forcing but with the inequality that arises from the class structure of society. For instance, it is not oppressive nor an unjust constraint on individual freedom, to force the able-bodied to do some work to support the disabled, children, the sick, the elderly, or the otherwise socially dependent who cannot perform a share of necessary labor. Though even there, there is some presumption that that burden of working for those who cannot work should be shared equally, and that individuals should not be forced to work for any purpose and under any conditions whatsoever. What I am describing as oppression is not the very fact that some work and others don’t, but the inequality and asymmetry that arises from the inequalities in ownership and control. This forcing is unequal in that some ablebodied—and even some who by all rights should not have to work at all—are forced to work while other able-bodied individuals are not forced to work. And it is asymmetric in that those who have to work are, on the whole, forced to work for those who hire them, under conditions controlled primarily by employers. This structural element leads to a second, interpersonal dimension of oppression in the workplace itself. Workers are forced to join workplaces typically characterized by large swathes of uncontrolled managerial power and authority. This oppression is interpersonal in the sense that it is power that specific individuals— employers and their managers—have to get other specific individuals—employees—to do what they want. We can distinguish between three overlapping forms that this interpersonal, workplace oppression takes: subordination, delegation, and dependence. Subordination: Employers have what are sometimes called “managerial prerogatives,”12 which are legislative and judicial grants of authority to owners and their managers to make decisions about investment, hiring and firing, plant location, work process, and the like.13 These powers come from judicial precedent and from the constellation of corporate, labor, contract, and property law. Managers may change working speeds and assigned tasks, the hours of work, or even force workers to spend up to an hour going through security lines after work without paying them (Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk 2014). Managers may fire workers for Facebook comments, their sexual orientation, for being too sexually appealing, or for not being appealing enough (Emerson 2011; Hess 2013; Strauss 2013; Velasco 2011). Workers may be given more tasks than can be performed in the allotted time, locked in the workplace overnight, required to work in extreme heat and other physically hazardous conditions, or punitively isolated from other coworkers (Greenhouse 2009, 26–27, 49–55, 89, 111–112; Hsu 2011; JOMO 2013; Urbina 2013). Managers may pressure employees into unwanted political behavior (HertelFernandez 2015). In all of these cases, managers are exercising legally permitted prerogatives.14 The law does not require that workers have any formal say in how those powers are exercised. In fact, in nearly every liberal capitalist country, employees are defined, in law, as “subordinates.”15 This is subordination in the strict sense: workers are subject to the will of the employer. Delegation: There are also other discretionary legal powers that managers have not by legal statute or precedent but because workers have voluntarily delegated these powers in the contract. For instance, workers might sign a contract that allows managers to require employees to submit to random drug testing or unannounced searches (American Civil Liberties Union 2017). In the United States, 18% of current employees and 37% of workers in their lifetime work under noncompete agreements (Bunker 2016). These clauses give managers legal power to forbid workers from working for competitors. The contract that the Communications Workers of America had with Verizon until 2015 included a right for managers to force employers to perform from 10 to 15 hours of overtime per week and to take some other day instead of Saturday as an off-day (Gourevitch 2016a). These legal powers are not parts of the managerial prerogatives that all employers have. Rather, they are voluntarily delegated to employers by workers. In many cases, though the delegation is in one sense voluntary, in another sense it is forced. This will especially be the case if workers, who are forced to find jobs, can only find jobs in sectors where the only contracts available are ones that require these kinds of delegations. Dependence: Finally, managers might have the material power to force employees to submit to commands or even to accept violations of their rights because of the worker’s dependence on the employer. A headline example is wage-theft, which affects American workers to the tune of $8– $14 billion per year (Eisenbray 2015; Judson and Francisco-McGuire 2012; NELP 2013; Axt 2013). In other cases, workers have been forced to wear diapers rather than go to the bathroom, refused legally required lunch breaks, or pressured to work through them, forced to keep working after their shift is up, or denied the right to read or turn on air conditioning during break (Oxfam 2015; BennettSmith 2012; Egelko 2011; Greenhouse 2009, 3– 12; Little 2013; Vega 2012). Other employers have forced their workers to stay home rather than go out on weekends or to switch churches and alter religious practices on pain of being fired and deported (Garrison, Bensinger, and Singer-Vine 2015). In these cases, employers are not exercising legal prerogatives, they are instead taking advantage of the material power that comes with threatening to fire or otherwise discipline workers. This material power to get workers to do things that employers want is in part a function of the class structure of society, both in the wide sense of workers being asymmetrically dependent on owners, and in the narrower sense of workers being legally subordinate to employers. Subordination, delegation, and dependence add up to a form of interpersonal oppression that employers and their managers have over their employees. The weight and scope of this oppression will vary, but those are variations on a theme. Employers and managers enjoy wide swaths of uncontrolled or insufficiently controlled power over their employees. This is the second face of oppression in a class society and it is a live issue. For instance, during the Verizon strike of 2016, one major complaint was that, when out on the job, hanging cable, or repairing lines, some technicians had to ask their manager for permission to go to the bathroom or to get a drink of water. As one striker said in an interview, “Do I have to tell my boss every single minute of what I am doing? This is basic human dignity” (Gourevitch 2016b). If they did not ask or wait to get clear approval from their manager, then they were guilty of a time code violation and were suspended for up to six weeks. The strike made workplace control a direct issue and one measure of its success was a change in disciplinary proceedings (ibid.). To take another example, the Fight for $15 strikes have made control over scheduling a central demand, even managing in certain states and municipalities to pass laws mandating minimal regularity and predictability in weekly schedules (Andrias 2016, 47–70). So, if the first face of oppression is that workers are forced to work for some employer or another who does not face a similar kind of forcing; the second face is that workers are forced to become de jure and de facto subordinates to a specific employer.16 The third face of oppression is the systematic distributive effects of structural and interpersonal oppression. While some instances of class-based oppression are idiosyncratic, in general it has consistent distributive effects. The structural and interpersonal oppression of workers produces wage-bargains and limits on wealth accumulation that reproduce workers’ economic dependence on employers, their over or underemployment, and thereby allows a relatively small group of owners and highly paid managers to accumulate most of the wealth and income. I cannot discuss the extensive literature on inequality. I can only cite some generally well-known facts and papers pointing to the role of inequalities in power as determining factors in these outcomes.17 To the degree that inequalities are a product of structural and workplace oppression, distributive outcomes are their own dimension of oppression and serve to reproduce those basic class relationships. Above all, there is one unjustifiable distributive effect of this oppression: that the majority of wage-bargains ensure the reproduction of that oppressive class structure. At any given point in time, a majority of workers do not earn enough to both meet their needs and to save such that they can employ themselves or start their own businesses. They must therefore remain workers or, to the degree they rise, they do so either by displacing others or by taking the structurally limited number of opportunities available.18 Each of these different faces of oppression— structural, interpersonal, and distributive—is a distinct injustice. Together they form an interrelated and mutually reinforcing set of oppressive relationships. The various ways in which workers are forced to work, made subject to dominating authority, and made asymmetrically dependent in the economy does not produce a fair way of distributing the obligation to work and the rewards of social production. Rather, it constrains their freedom in a way that secures the exploitation of one class by another. The weight of these different oppressions is unevenly experienced across different segments of workers. Various factors modify the basic facts about class and oppression. We have seen, for instance, the difference between being in a high labor supply versus a low labor supply sector. High labor supply sectors involve more intense labor competition, resulting in weaker bargaining power for workers and intensified oppression. The opposite holds for lower labor supply sectors—like software programmers or fiber-optics technicians—whose greater bargaining power means they face class-based oppression less intensively. This has downstream consequences for our analysis of particular strikes, but it does not affect the argument for the right to strike itself. My description of the economy is controversial. Some will either reject aspects of the empirical description, find it too underspecified to agree, or they will disagree with the normative interpretation of it as involving systematic, unjustified restrictions on workers’ freedom. Any attempt to give a more detailed account of this political economy of exploitation would leave no room for the rest of the argument. In what follows, the reader does not have to agree with every aspect of my description of liberal capitalist arrangements. One need only agree that the typical liberal capitalist economy is characterized by considerable, class-based oppression of workers, for reasons similar to the ones I have just provided, to then think that the right to strike can be seen as a right to resist oppression.

#### Strikes disrupt the codification processes enforced by the state, creating revolutionary and non-linear power that realizes the subjects affective potential and allows them to embrace active affect.

Holland 12 [Eugene Holland; Non-Linear Historical Materialism; Or, What is Revolutionary in Deleuze & Guattari’s Philosophy of History?; from Chapter 2 of Time and History in Deleuze and Serres (2012) (Dr. Holland is Professor and Chair of Comparative Studies at the Ohio State University.)] SHS KS

Political struggle thus necessarily involves two co-existent kinds of activity: on one hand, there is struggle within the axiomatic, for whatever ameliorations can be wrung from capital and/or the State through direct confrontation – and this is a mode of struggle that Deleuze and Guattari insist is perfectly valid and necessary (Deleuze et al., 1987, p. 471). On the other hand, there is the struggle to escape axiomatization and codifi cation altogether –the mode of struggle via de-coding and “ lines-of-flight ”that they in some sense prefer. What is given is always ‘ the coexistence and inseparability of that which the system conjugates, and that which never ceases to escape it following lines of flight that are themselves connectable ’ , as Deleuze &Guattari put it in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze et al., 1987, p. 473). And this connectability of lines-of-fl ight is crucial, politically. What in the fi rst volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia were called “ schizophrenic ”lines-of-fl ight are politically useless –or worse –if they do not intersect and connect up to constitute some kind of critical mass, as Deleuze &Guattari are careful to specify more clearly in the second volume. Yet even here, the conditions for such a critical mass becoming revolutionary are left somewhat vague: the slogan ‘ a new people on a new earth ’echoes throughout their collaborative work as a kind of refrain; and they do suggest that the ultimate challenge is to ‘ construct revolutionary connections over and against [contre] the conjugations of the axiomatic ’(Deleuze et al., 1987, p. 473). But we need to try to get clearer about just which conditions are conducive to the formation of connections among lines-of-fl ight and about how a critical mass of revolutionary connections could overcome the conjugations of the capitalist axiomatic. For insight into these questions, I propose that we return to the process with which we started: reading Capital backwards. This would mean focusing less on the power of capital accumulation than on so-called “ primitive accumulation ” , which as we saw is not really primitive but always ongoing, and not really accumulation but rather dispossession; and it would mean, like Althusser, highlighting in our considerations the non-linear conditions of reproduction rather than the linear causality of production/accumulation. And I propose that we examine in this light the key political-economic strategies of anti-capitalist struggle –and I specify “ political-economic ”strategies (those of radical syndicalism, if you will) to rule out of consideration what we might call more narrowly political strategies –state-centric or party-electoral strategies –as insuffi - ciently revolutionary. These political-economic strategies are the strike, and especially the general strike. As Walter Benjamin has very clearly noted, the general strike is distinctive in that it is non-confrontational (although he would say non-violent, which is not quite the same thing, and perhaps a little too optimistic) (Benjamin, 1978, pp. 277 – 300). In principle, a strike does not involve[s] one power bloc directly confronting another, but rather one bloc withdrawing from its previous mode of engagement (wage-slavery) vis- à -vis the other. The same is true of the general strike, which expands the act of withdrawal to a larger scale: here we have a critical mass of workers walking away en masse from their engagement with capital. Yet from the perspective of reproduction and so-called primitive accumulation –and this is key –what the masses are walking away “ from ” –capital accumulation –is actually less important than what they are able to walk “ towards ” : rejecting capital is less important than having something sustaining and sustainable to rely on. You will recall that the crucial catalyst entailed by primitive accumulation was enforced dependence on capitalist markets: remove this catalyst, and capitalism no longer “ becomes necessary ” , to invoke Althusser once again. More important than directly confronting capital, in other words, is securing alternative means of life, an alternative mode of reproduction. Even more important: such alternatives already exist. One of the great virtues of Gibson-Graham ’ s work is to demonstrate how incomplete capitalism actually is and how many alternative economies co-exist within or beside it (Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2006). Community Supported Agriculture; the co-op movement; the Open-Source Software movement; Fair Trade –all these, and many more, constitute viable, actually existing alternatives to capitalism. And all it will take for them, in connection with others, to become revolutionary –in the specifi cally non-linear sense I am proposing –is for a critical mass of people to invest their life-activity in them, rather than in capitalist markets. We tend to think of linear revolutions as punctual: 1917, 1848 and so on –even though they probably were not. But the non-linear revolution I am talking about is even less punctual: it entails instead what I elsewhere call the strategy of the ‘ slowmotion general strike ’(Holland, forthcoming). Critical masses of people in various aspects of their life-activity just walk away from capital –having secured in advance at least the rudiments of alternative means of life. This does not have to happen all at once: but as soon as suffi cient numbers of people in enough areas of life do so, a tipping point will have been reached, a non-linear bifurcation threshold crossed, beyond which capitalism will not only no longer be necessary, it will actually become-unnecessary. As the slow-motion general strike reaches completion, that is to say, it is not just the State, but also capitalism itself that ends up withering away.

### Contention 2:

#### Strikes allows workers to use active affect to reclaim their own authority and resisting the territorializing barriers of workplaces

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There is more than one way to justify the right to strike and, in so doing, to explain the shape that right ought to have. As we shall see, there is the liberal, the social- democratic, and the radical account. Any justi cation of a right must give an account not just of the interest it protects but of how that right is shaped to protect that interest. In the case of the radical argument for the right to strike, which I will defend against the other two con- ceptions, the relevant human interest is liberty. Work- ers have an interest in resisting the oppression of class society by using their collective power to reduce that oppression. Their interest is a liberty interest in a dou- ble sense. First, it is an interest in not being oppressed, or in not facing certain kinds of forcing, coercion, and subjection to authority that they shouldn’t have to. Any resistance to those kinds of unjusti ed limitations of freedom carries with it, at least implicitly, a demand for liberties not yet enjoyed.19 That is a demand for a control over portions of one’s life that one does not yet enjoy. Second, and consequently, the right to strike is grounded in an interest in using one’s own individual and collective agency to resist—or even overcome— that oppression. The interest in using one’s own agency to resist oppression ows naturally from the demand for liberties not yet enjoyed. After all, that demand for control is in the name of giving proper space to work- ers’ capacity for self-determination, which is the same capacity that expresses itself in the activity of striking for greater freedom. On this radical view, the right to strike has both an intrinsic and instrumental relation to liberty. It has in- trinsic value as an (at least implicit) demand for self- emancipation or the winning of greater liberty through one’s own efforts. It has instrumental value insofar as the strike is on the whole an effective means for resist- ing the oppressiveness of a class society. For the right to strike to enjoy its proper connection to liberty, work- ers must have a reasonable chance of carrying out an effective strike, otherwise it would lose its instrumen- tal value as a way of resisting oppression. If prevented from using a reasonable array of effective means, ex- ercising the right to strike would not be a means of reducing oppression and, therefore, strikes would also be of very limited value as acts of self-emancipation. It would not be an instance of workers attempting to use their own capacity for self-determination to increase the control they ought to have over the terms of their daily activity.