#### Affect, the ability to experience and to be experienced, is the only constitutive feature: I am experiencing my Word doc, my opponent, just as much as you are experiencing me. There is no way to escape affection.

#### Thinking is only a feature of me and doesn’t determine the subject. Subjectivity is fluid—the only intrinsic feature of the subject is that everything is changing, thus stable subjecthood fails. Emphasis on particular aspects of subjectivity only drives division in the proletariat.

#### There are two kinds of affect, active and reactive— Active affect allows us to extend and compose our own boundaries whereas reactive affect only indicates our body’s ability to be affected.

#### Embracing a politics of active desire – one that is based in the present rather than the future – is key to break free of reactive desire. This resists logics of majoritarian control and becomes the space for potential resistance. [K&R 16] Karatzogianni & Robinson 2

Karatzogianni, Athina and Robinson, Andy. “Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: A Deleuzo-Nietzchean Perspective on State, Security, and Active/Reactive Networks.” University of Leicester, . 2013. Scarsdale CC

The impulse to condemn deviance, resistance and insurrection is disturbingly strong in academia, and doubtless strengthened by revulsion against network terror. Yet this networked rebellion of the excluded is the key to hopes for a better world. In the spiral of terror between states and movements, it is important to recognise that the source is the state and the weak point is in the movements. In today’s social war, the Other is not even accorded the honour of being an enemy in a fair fight. As long as social conflicts are seen through a statist frame, social war is doomed to continue, because discursive exclusion produces social war as its underside, and renders resistance both necessary and justified. The cycle of terror starts with the state: its terror at an existential level of losing control and fixity. This terrified state produces state terror and thereby creates the conditions for movement terror. It is naive to look for a way out from this side of the equation. State terror can end only when the state, both accepts the proliferation of networks beyond its control, and adopts a more humble role for itself, or when it collapses or is destroyed. On the other side, **we should find hope in the proliferation of resistance among the excluded. We need to see in movements of the excluded the radical potential and not only the reactive distortions**. To take Tupac Shakur’s metaphor, we need to see the rose that grows from concrete, not merely the thorns. The problem is, rather, that many of the movements on the network side of the equation are still thinking, seeing and feeling like states. **Such movements are potential bearers of the Other of the state-form, of networks as alternatives to states, affinity against hegemony, abundance against scarcity. The question thus becomes how they can learn to valorise what they are -- autonomous affinity-networks -- rather than internalising majoritarian norms.** For instance, in terms of the impact of technosocial transformations on agency, the negotiation of ideology, order of dissent in relation to capitalism as a social code, remains hostage to labor processes and to thick identities of local/regional or national interests, which fail to move contemporary movements to an active affinity to a common humanity and a pragmatic solution for an ethical, non exploitative form of production (Karatzogianni and Schandorf, 2012). Here the exception may like in the global justice movements and Occupy, although still here the discourse remains often in reactive mode, due to state crackdowns experienced by the movements. There is a great need to find ways to energise hope against fear. **Hope as an active force can be counterposed to the reactive power of fear. People are not in fact powerless, but are made to feel powerless by the pervasiveness of the dominant social fantasy and of separation. This yields a temptation to fall back on the power of ‘the powerful’, those who gain a kind of distorted agency through alienation.** But powerlessness and constituted power are both effects of alienation, which can be broken down by creating affinity-network forms of life. An emotional shift can thus be enough to revolutionise subjectivities. Hence, as Vaneigem argues, ‘[t]o work for delight and authentic festivity is barely distinguishable from preparing for a general insurrection’ (Vaneigem 1967: 50-1). It has been argued in utopian studies that fear and hope form part of a coxntinuum, expressing ‘aspects of affective ambivalence’ connected to the indeterminacy of the future (McManus 2005). **The type of hope needed is active and immanent, brought into the present as a propulsive force rather than deferred to the future. Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘absolute deterritorialisation’ for this possibility.** In his work on conflict transformation, John Paul Lederach emphasises the need to turn negative energies into creative energies and mobilising hope against fear (Lederach and Maiese, n.d.: 2-3; Lederach, 2005). **How is this change in vital energies to be accomplished? Deleuze and Guattari invoke a figure of the shaman as a way to overcome reactive energies** (1983: 167-8). **They call for a type of revolutionary social movement ‘that follows the lines of escape of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery’, countering reactive energies** (ibid. 277). In looking at how this might operate in practice, let us examine briefly the Colombian feminist anti-militarist group La Ruta Pacifica de las Mujeres. In particular, the aspects of social weaving and collective mourning prominent in their methodology are crucial forms of creative shamanism, which turns fear into hope. Their approach involves ‘the deconstruction of the pervasive symbolism of violence and war and the substitution of a new visual and textual language and creative rituals’ (Cockburn, 2005: 14; Brouwer, 2008: 62). Weaving as a metaphor refers to social recomposition, the reconstruction of affinity; being ‘bound’ through social weaving is believed to control fear. It is taken as a way to counter everyday violence on the frontlines of the ‘war on terror’. Rituals of mourning and weaving are believed by participants to disarm the armed and create invisible connections among participants (Colorado, 2003). La Ruta seek to create new combinations of cognitive and emotional elements strong enough to disrupt dominant monologues (Cockburn, 2005: 14). Weaving reconstructs social connections and life-cycles, and thereby enhances wellbeing (ibid. 15). Participants recount inner strength and physical recovery as effects of such rituals (Brouwer, 2008: 85). **Hence, it is in open spaces, safe spaces, and spaces of dialogue that hope can be found to counter the spiral of terror. This opening of space, this creation of autonomous zones, should be viewed as a break with the majoritarian logics of social control. The coming ‘other worlds’ counterposed to the spaces of terror are not an integrated ‘new order’, but rather, a proliferation of smooth spaces in a horizontality without borders. These ‘other worlds’ are being built unconsciously, wherever networks, affinity and hope counterpose themselves to state terror and the desire for fixed identity be it national, ethnic, religious or cultural.** It is in the incommensurable antagonism between the autonomous zones of these ‘other worlds’ and the terror state’s demands for controlled spaces to serve capital, that the nexus of the conflicts of the present and near-future lies. And interestingly, there is also a certain active/reactive difference between state responses in the Turkey and Brazil protests of June 2013.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to embrace a politics of active affect. To clarify, we reject things that reinforce stability or the majoritarian subject. Current systems of education only serve to produce majoritarian bodies that are unable to think outside the system and who become increasingly recognizable, killing the potential for any resistance.

Wallins, Jason. “Deleuze and Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbur Publishing, 2014, Pgs. 119-121 SHS KS

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’ (p. 6). Where education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its modes of production have taken as their teleological goal the production of a ‘majoritarian people’, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where education aspires to invest desire in the production of a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘molar’ public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed, not only through the paucity of enunciatory forms and images available for thinking education in the first place, but further, through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the singular, the ‘majoritarian’ and standardizing impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production the reification of common sense, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’, common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### 1] creolization: resist the colonized conception of humanity by focusing on relationality, or how identities converge and crash, melding together in a symphony of distinct tones. The world is defined by the continual creation of new futures rooted in and strengthened by trauma.

Griffiths 14 [Michael; “Toward Relation: Negritude, Poststructuralism, and the Specter of Intention in the Work of Edouard Glissant”; 2014; prof at the school of arts, english and media @ U of Wollongong; LCA-BP]

Much of Glissant’s meditation on this communal aspect of the individual writer’s experience is played out through the imprint of Creole on the Caribbean writer expressing himself or herself through French. Yet Glissant’s Caribbean, with its privi- leged experience of transit, movement, and relation that produces this Creole, will not be labeled as utopia. Creole, for all its experience of relation, does not emerge in Glissant’s work as simply a perfected realization of the inten- tion manifest as relation but instead is an essential strategy in the opening onto the prospect of such relation, manifest as an equal encounter of different linguistic worlds. Creole is only one historically impacted instance of the relation between cultures whose full promise must be held out in relation to an uncertain future. Relation—between cultures, between the written and oral, and between each link in the chain that leads the author’s unrealized intention as a manifestation of a particular people—emerges as the possible force for cultivating an intention that would manifest not only a people but an other humanism and an other globalization. What remains to ask is how this humanism differs from the particular Western form of humanism grounded in the property- holding economic individual. Glissant locates the emergence or potentiality for an intention realized paradoxically through rela- tion between subjects and cultures not in Creole or in Western humanism but instead in the gap between Creolite and the colonizing force of individual humanism. As he puts it, moving crypti- cally and poetically through the 1969 work, “Intention perfects itself in Relation.”27 How does Glissant arrive at relation through intention in order to better describe the natural process of an increasing globalization of intention as the manifestation of cross- cultural logics? Through an account of the particularly Caribbean and Martiniquan impasses of the oral and the written, Creole and French, Glissant develops a model for worldliness (though not a universalism) that begins with the particular and opens onto cross-cultural relation, a worldliness not of one experience (whether of colonizer or of colonized) but emergent from the intersection of the diverse and the multiple. It is to this elabora- tion that I now turn.

#### 2] All philosophical interpretations of the world implicitly assume that their discursive regimes can be attached to real subjectivity, but static conceptions are incompatible with subjectivity and are cruelly optimistic. Schaefer 13

Schaefer ’13. Schaefer, D. "The Promise of Affect: The Politics of the Event in Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness and Berlant's Cruel Optimism." Theory & Event 16.2 (2013). Project MUSE. Web. LHP MK

At a recent talk at the University of Pennsylvania, Lauren Berlant was asked a question about the relationship between her work—she had just finished a lecture on the theme of flat affect in Gregg Araki's 2004 film Mysterious Skin—and the political. "Because I work on affect," she responded, "**I think everything is realism"** (Berlant: 2012). Like the dense introductory segments of each of her chapters—thick but fast-moving genealogical waterslides—I think that unpacking statements like this from Berlant is best repaid by taking them in a low gear. **When Berlant maps her method as affect theory, she is suggesting that the works she examines in her capacity as a scholar of literature cannot be divorced from the political-material contexts out of which they emerge, but at the same time must be recognized as incarnations of aparticular embodied iteration within this field.** **Texts are produced by bodies that are both enmeshed in their political worlds and trying to negotiate those worlds in their own distinct way. Everything we do is realism**: Berlant's **textual objects of study are mediations**, **attempts to work something out**, exhibitions of tensed, embodied, **affective realities**.1 This is the promise of affect theory, the possibility sliding together analytical tools used to pick apart both highly individuated and highly social contact zones—bodies and histories—as incarnated realities. **Affect theory wants to maintain the insights of high theory, the doctrinaire approach that says "historicize everything," while at the same time thinking of how bodies inject their own materiality into spaces**. This means using language that enters the orbit of the biological. In the introduction to their 1995 edited volume Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader (later reprinted in Sedgwick's Touching Feeling)—one of the earliest manifestoes of contemporary affect theory— Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank acerbically catalog what theory "knows today," first and foremost that 1: The distance of [an] account from a biological basis is assumed to correlate near precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference (individual, historical, and cross-cultural), to contingency, to performative force, and to the possibility of change (Sedgwick: 2003, 93). And 2: Human language is assumed to offer the most productive, if not the only possible, model for understanding representation (Sedgwick: 2003, 93). **Affect theory in this vision is designed to explore the "crucial knowledges" of bodies outside a purely theoretical determination, outside the traditional domains of humanist scholarship—reason, cognition, and language** (Sedgwick: 2003, 114). **Affect, for Lauren Berlant, is thus understandable as "sensual matter that is elsewhere to sovereign consciousness but that has historical significance in domains of subjectivity"** (Berlant: 2011, 53). **Affect theory is about how systems of forces circulating within bodies—forces not necessarily subsumable or describable by language—interface with histories**. It is about how discourses form ligatures with pulsing flesh-and-blood creatures. Two recent texts, Sara Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness (2010) and Berlant's Cruel Optimism (2011), can be seen as developing this strand, and in particular, of indicating new ways of feeling out politics through the membrane of affect theory. Both of these authors suggest that the repertoire of the analytics of power (Foucault: 1990) must be supplemented with resources from the affective turn. Recent critiques of affect theory2 have focused on a branch of affect theory heavily informed by Gilles Deleuze's reading of Spinoza. In this strand, affect is rendered as a set of ontological properties, as an ensemble of mutable attributes.3 Contemporary Deleuzians such as Brian Massumi4 and William Connolly5 have been targeted by these critics for their attempts at absorbing scientific research into the Spinozistic discourse of affect. But Spinoza and Deleuze are second-tier characters in Ahmed and Berlant's work—which is perhaps why Ahmed situates herself in a lineage—stretching back to Sedgwick—that she calls "feminist cultural studies of affect"6 (Ahmed: 2010, 13). Where the Deleuzian strands focuses on affect as the raw material of becoming, as the play of substances, **Ahmed and Berlant locate affect theory as a phenomenological, rather than ontological enterprise.** **It is in the phenomenology of the political that Ahmed and Berlant ground their projects.** For Ahmed, this comes in the form of a new attention to happiness as an object of analysis. This does not mean a circumscribed exploration of happiness as a thing, but rather programmatically asking the question "what does happiness do?" (Ahmed: 2010, 2). Happiness is not autonomous, Ahmed argues, but a relationship of evaluation that creates the horizon of the self. For Ahmed, the "near sphere" of the self is constituted by a perimeter studded with "happy objects." This cluster of objects is what gives the field of mobile operations of the self its shape. In this "drama of contingency," we "come to have our likes, which might even establish what we are like" (Ahmed: 2010, 24). But for Ahmed, happiness as an affective field settling in proximity to bodies is not necessarily transparent in its shape or its function to the self. Happiness often takes the form, she suggests, of a promise, of a deferred possibility. Taking the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl as a springboard for a discussion of time-consciousness, she suggests that happiness as a promise—from the Latin verb promittere, "to let go or send forth"—is an anticipation rather than a felt presence (Ahmed: 2010, 38). Rather than simply an affect that circulates between bodies and objects, happiness is also a promise that is passed around. This analysis of the promise of happiness underpins the genealogy Ahmed organizes in the opening chapter of the book: an exploration of the contemporary "happiness turn" in scholarship and the "happiness industry" emerging in parallel in popular media marketplaces. This discourse, she suggests, moves happiness further away from its etymological origin point—in the Middle English hap or fortune, cognate with "perhaps" and "happenstance"— suggesting chance to a sense of happiness as a scheme, a program that, if followed, leads to ultimate good (Ahmed: 2010, 6). This sense of the promise of happiness is the elimination of contingency by guaranteeing the futurity of happiness: "The promise of happiness takes this form: if you have this or have that, or if you do this or do that, then happiness is what follows" (Ahmed: 2010, 29). Happiness as a guarantee—a promise that circulates through power-knowledge regimes—but one that defers happiness rather than making happiness present, is one of the mechanisms by which happiness is translated into the skin of a political organism, an "affective community"—such as a family or a society. Through the promise of happiness, bodies are brought together by a shared expectation of future comfort. But because this is a promise rather than immediate happiness, an interstice is formed between this promise and individual experiencing bodies— an interstice that can either be full and complete or disconnected. The family, for instance, does not share a happiness, but a happiness deferred, a promise or image of happiness to-come (Ahmed: 2010, 46). It is in this interstice, either blockaded or fluid, that Ahmed articulates the need for a politics of killing joy, of breaking down the promise of happiness as a regime that demands fidelity without recourse. For Ahmed, the discourse of happiness is performative: it produces a politics of promise (or nostalgia) that suffocates alternative promises and alternative explorations. Here Ahmed produces biographies of a range of "affect aliens," bodies that are called on to be silent and accept the happiness that has been promised, while their actual desires and hopes are out of joint with the world around them: feminist killjoys, unhappy queers, melancholic migrants. The promise of happiness, Ahmed suggests, must be interrupted to make room for emancipatory politics. "I am not saying that we have an obligation to be unhappy," she writes, "I am simply suggesting that we need to think about unhappiness as more than a feeling that should be overcome" (Ahmed: 2010, 217). In the closing passage of the book she writes that since "the desire for happiness can cover signs of its negation, a revolutionary politics has to work hard to stay proximate to unhappiness" (Ahmed: 2010, 223). Political change, Ahmed contends, is paralyzed by the imperative to be happy, to stay within the narrow guidelines of happiness's promise. Where Ahmed's background is in a western philosophical lineage that leads up to contemporary questions of affect, the immediate theoretical precursor of Lauren Berlant's Cruel Optimism is Kathleen Stewart's Ordinary Affects (2007), which develops the notion of the "ordinary" as a felt reality. "Ordinary affects," Stewart writes, "are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences" (Stewart: 2007, 1f). Berlant is interested in particular in how the ordinary comes to take the form of a sort of affective impasse, a set of felt relationships that cannot be moved through. Cruel Optimism is a focused study of a particular category of impasse, what she calls "cruel optimism." **Cruel optimism, she explains at the book's outset, refers to a relation that emerges "when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing.** It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be a fantasy of the good life, or a political project" (Berlant: 2011, 1). Berlant explores a range of situations where these attachments emerge, as a response to trauma or out of the ongoing pressures of the ordinary, in particular through the parameters of what she calls "genres of precarity," a range of aesthetic practices and styles—"mass media, literature, television, film, and video"—that ... emerge during the 1990s to register a shift in how the older state-liberal-capitalist fantasies shape adjustments to the structural pressures of crisis and loss that are wearing out the power of the good life's traditional fantasy bribe without wearing out the need for a good life (Berlant: 2011, 7). **Realism: texts always reflect an affective situation, a force field of desires, a labile contact zone between bodies and intersecting historical frames**. Framing literary criticism (broadly construed) as a practice of tracing the connective tissue between bodies and situations is what lets Berlant speak to the political uses of affect. She suggests that affect theory is a "another phase in the history of ideology theory," that it "brings us back to the encounter of what is sensed with what is known and what has impact in a new but also recognizable way" (Berlant: 2011, 53). **Affect—especially ordinary affect—is the missing link between discursive regimes and bodies, the arterial linkages through which power is disseminated.** "**The present" is not an assemblage of texts and knowledges, bloodless discursive inscriptions on the body, but a felt sense out of which political circumstances emerge**. "**We understand nothing about impasses of the political," she writes, "without having an account of the production of the present**" (Berlant: 2011, 4). Cruel optimism as a byproduct of political situations colliding with bodies plays out in ongoing, semistable routines, in ordinariness. This focus on the ordinary frames Berlant's conception of the political as a slow-motion reaction rather than a series of staccato punctuations. This comes out, for instance, in her exhortation to move away from trauma theory as a way of "describing what happens to persons and populations as an effect of catastrophic impacts" (Berlant: 2011, 9). Rather, Berlant suggests that trauma is only one facet of the ordinary, a precursory event that yields new historical trajectories lived out in slow-motion. "Trauma," she writes, ... forces its subjects not into mere stuckness but into crisis mode, where they develop some broad, enduring intuitions about the way we live in a now that's emerging without unfolding, and imagining a historicism from within a discontinuous present and ways of being that were never sovereign (Berlant: 2011, 93). Rather than the instantiating event, Berlant is interested in the fallout of politics, the long-running reverberations. It is in these interwoven aftermaths following in the wake of bodies that Berlant locates the tropic of cruel optimism. Optimism, she is careful to point out, can "feel" any number of different ways, can come clothed in any number of affective orientations. "Because optimism is ambitious," she writes, "at any moment it might not feel like anything, including nothing: dread, anxiety, hunger, curiosity, the whole gamut from the sly neutrality of browsing the aisles to excitement at the prospect of 'the change that's gonna come'" (Berlant: 2011, 2). Rather than a singularly identifiable feeling, optimism takes the phenomenological form of a "knotty tethering to objects, scenes, and modes of life that generate so much overwhelming yet sustaining negation" (Berlant: 2011, 52). Optimism binds bodies to "fantasies of the good life," to horizons of possibility that may or may not be defeated by the conditions of their own emergence. Cruel optimism is the outcome of this circumstance of tethering confused by itself, of Möbius-strip cycles of ambition and frustration. The ordinary, precisely because of its complexity, can contain the intransigent contradictions of cruel optimism (Berlant: 2011, 53). It is the space of the rubble, the hovering dust, the shockwaves that follow the event rather than the piercing clarity of the punctum itself. Berlant is interested in the ways that habits form out of situations of impossibility—for instance, in her reading of Gregg Bordowitz's documentary filmHabit (2001), about the body rituals that structure the daily lives of a gay man living with AIDS and his partner in New York City in the 1990s. Bordowitz's work maps a crisis that reflects Berlant's delineation of the field of the political: with the new availability of anti-retroviral drugs in the 1990s, AIDS ceased to be "a death sentence," and thus "turned fated life back into an ellipsis, a time marked by pill- and test-taking, and other things, the usual" (Berlant: 2011, 58). For Berlant, the event is a rarity, and is only secondarily the zone of the political, which is itself constituted by ongoing patterns of response and desire—slow-motion echoes producing new forms as they cross-cut and interfere with one another (Berlant: 2011, 6). In this sense, Berlant explains, her work meshes with Sedgwick's queer reading of affect as the histories that make us desire in unexpected, perverse ways. "The queer tendency of this method," Berlant writes, "is to put one's attachments back into play and into pleasure, into knowledge, into worlds. It is to admit that they matter" (Berlant: 2011, 123). Berlant sees the terrain of the political emerging out of this tissue of affectively-embroidered histories. Although both Ahmed and Berlant write about the uses of affect as a phenomenological bridge to the political, and the slipperiness of happiness or the good life—the way that pleasure can be wrapped up with a strain of unease— there is a distinction between their respective scopes of inquiry. Where Ahmed's book is about frustration/promise/deferral, Berlant's is about addiction. When I asked my students to come up with examples of cruel optimism, they brainstormed the following list: heroin, abusive relationships, candy, horcruxes. Each of these instances suggests a vital but destructive need, an ambivalent compulsion—an addiction, where the tectonic plates of the body's affects shift in friction with one another. **Cruel optimism indexes these moments where a body desires and needs an arrangement of the world that is also frustrating or corrosive. Politics is one of these zones of fractious attraction. Berlant writes, for instance, that Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy. People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps ideology, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate, face-to-face" (Berlant: 2011, 223). Politics produces fantasies, tethers that draw us forward to particular attachments in the form of images, narratives, bodily practices. But these fantasies also contain the elements of their own frustration or refusal.** President George W. Bush, for example, is able to use the affective elements of statecraft (a practice which, Berlant assures us, is decidedly non-partisan) to create a façade that diverts attention from his flailing foreign and economic policies (Berlant: 2011, 226). **Berlant's focus in Cruel Optimism is on politics as a field of attachments, a skein of affectively pulsing tissues linking bodies together**. "Pace Žižek," she writes, ... **the energy that generates this sustaining commitment to the work of undoing a world while making one requires fantasy to motor programs of action, to distort the present on behalf of what the present can become. It requires a surrealistic affectsphere to counter the one that already exists, enabling a confrontation with the fact that any action of making a claim on the present involves bruising processes of detachment from anchors in the world, along with optimistic projections of a world that is worth our attachment to it** (Berlant: 2011, 263). **Berlant looks at how politics pulls on bodies using the ligaments of affect, how politics becomes irresistible, even when it is self-frustrating**. Ahmed's focus is very different: she is interested in thinking through politics as the space of unhappiness and deferment. In a section of Chapter 5 entitled "The Freedom to Be Unhappy," Ahmed writes that revolutionary practices may need to follow from the willingness to suspend happiness, to dissolve the imbricated promises of happiness that produce hermetically sealed political systems. Affect aliens are forged in the pressure of unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises of happiness, sealed in a relationship of anticipation pinned to the guarantee of ultimate good. Thus Ahmed writes that "any politics of justice will involve causing unhappiness even if that is not the point of our action. So much happiness is premised on, and promised by, the concealment of suffering, the freedom to look away from what compromises one's happiness" (Ahmed: 2010, 196). The revolutionary politics Ahmed wants to advance is willing to put happiness at risk, to dissolve promises of happiness. Ahmed is clear, though, that this is not to make politics about unhappiness: It is not that unhappiness becomes our telos: rather, if we no longer presume happiness is our telos, unhappiness would register as more than what gets in the way. When we are no longer sure of what gets in the way, then 'the way' itself becomes a question (Ahmed: 2010, 195). Neither happiness nor unhappiness is the telos of revolutionary politics. Rather, Ahmed wants to connect the political back to the "hap" of happiness. Rather than a critique of happiness, I would suggest that the broader channel of her project is best understood as a critique ofpromise. Thus she ends Chapter 5 with the later work of Jacques Derrida, indicating the need to keep politics open to the event, to the unexpected possibilities to-come. She proposes a vision of happiness that "would be alive to chance, to chance arrivals, to the perhaps of a happening" (Ahmed: 2010, 198). Where for Berlant the event is in the past, the ancestor of our tensed bodily habits today, for Ahmed, the event is ahead, the always-anticipated but radically unknown future. There is also a complementarity to these books, a sense in which both come at the relationship between affect and the political from different sides of the problem, but are nonetheless hurtling towards a common point of impact. Is Ahmed describing scenes where cruel optimism unravels under the internal pressure of a frustrated promise? Is cruel optimism the deferral of happiness implicit in the temporal structure of the promise? These are not fully resolved or resolvable questions, in part because Ahmed and Berlant roll their theoretical lens over such a wide range of circumstances. I would suggest that deepening the conversation between these approaches will hinge in part on exploring the relationship between affect and time—a question that is surfaced by both of these texts but not resolved. Ahmed wants to play inside the deconstructive thematics of the promise that allows us to view affect as a state of deferral. But Ahmed comes closest to Berlant when she writes that "[i]f we hope for happiness, then we might be happy as long as we can retain this hope (a happiness that paradoxically allows us to be happy with unhappiness)" (Ahmed: 2010, 181). Is deferred happiness really divided from happiness? What if fantasies—what Silvan Tomkins calls "images"7—are so crucial to the production of affect that to save and savor fantasies in one's near sphere is "worth" their eventual frustration? What if a promise deferred is itself a form of happiness—even if the deferral turns out, in retrospect, to have been endless? What happens while we wait? This is in no way to acquiesce to those situations, sketched by Ahmed in the inner chapters of the book, where promises are made that produce affect aliens— investment in a community of promise that will never materialize as happiness. But it is to suggest that the economic flows of affect are more complex than a simple binary of presence/deferment. There may be a clearer divergence in Berlant and Ahmed's respective emphases on the felt temporality of politics. Ahmed suggests that political transformation happens by orienting us to the perhaps, towards an evental horizon constituted by uncertainty, rather than promise. Berlant seems more skeptical about the possibility of untethering ourselves from an orientation to future happiness. As in her response to Žižek, she emphasizes the intransigence of fantasy, especially as a conduit that can produce political energy. I wonder if Berlant's answer here points to a different way of resolving the problem of temporality hovering over Ahmed's work: what if the dissolution of promise did not leave us at the mercy of a pure politics of hap, of chance, but opened us up to new horizons of hope—neither guaranteed nor radically accidental? This dynamic interfaces with an equally provocative question lodged early on and left unresolved in Berlant's book: "I have indeed wondered," she writes in her Introduction, "whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself" (Berlant: 2011, 24). In mapping affectively mediated politics, how do we assess the cruelty of hope? What are the singular psychic costs of disappointment that must be risked or countenanced in the production of a politics without promise? These books are profoundly important contributions advancing the still-new and in some ways still-tentative field of affect theory. They open up two distinct but interrelated methodological templates for thinking through issues of globalization, race, gender and sexuality, media, philosophy, and religion: the thematics of frustration and of addiction in the moving affectsphere of the political. What both Ahmed and Berlant demonstrate is that **affect theory offers a crucial set of resources for thinking through the relationship between bodies and discourses. The enterprise of thinking politics, of mapping the enfolding of bodies by power, cannot move forward without affect.**

## Offense

Thus, I defend the resolution as a general principle: Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust

**The modern appropriation of space is an inextricably capitalistic pursuit that enables the institution to expand. Cap commodifies our affect and dictates our desires, preventing fluidity**

Shammas 19 Shammas, V.L., Holen, T.B. One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space. Palgrave Commun 5, 10 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0218-9

But how are we to understand NewSpace? In some ways, NewSpace signals the emergence of capitalism in space. The production of carrier rockets, placement of satellites into orbit around Earth, and the exploration, exploitation, or colonization of outer space (including planets, asteroids, and other celestial objects), will not be the work of humankind as such, a pure species-being (Gattungswesen), but of particular capitalist entre- preneurs who stand in for and represent humanity. Crucially, they will do so in ways modulated by the exigencies of capital accumulation. These enterprising capitalists are forging a new political-economic regime in space, a post-Fordism in space aimed at profit maximization and the apparent minimization of government interference. A new breed of charismatic, starry-eyed entrepreneurs, including Musk’s SpaceX, Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic, and Amazon billionaire Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin, to name but a selection, aim at becoming ‘capitalists in space' (Parker, 2009) or space capitalists. Neil Armstrong’s famous statement will have to be reformulated: space will not be the site of ‘one giant leap for mankind', but rather one giant leap for capitalistkind.5 With the ascendancy of NewSpace, humanity’s future in space will not be ‘ours', benefiting humanity tout court, but will rather be the result of particular capitalists, or capita- listkind,6 toiling to recuperate space and bring its vast domain into the fold of capital accumulation:

…

The trope of humanity plays a key role in the rhetoric of the adherents of NewSpace. To fulfill the objectives of NewSpace, including profit maximization and the exploitation of celestial bodies, the symbolic figure of a shared humanity serves a useful purpose, camouflaging the conquest of space by capitalism with a dream of humanity boldly venturing forth into the dark unknown, thereby also providing the legitimacy and enthusiasm needed to support bolster the legitimacy of NewSpace. So long as the stargazers and SpaceX watchers are permitted their fill of ‘collective effervescence', to use Durkheim’s (1995, p. 228) con- cept, capitalist entrepreneurs will be able to pursue their business interests more or less as they please. The spectacle of outer space is crucial in this regard. Crucially, however, and despite this spectacle, SpaceX’s tech- nology might not necessarily be more sophisticated than its competitors or predecessors. Some industry insiders have rebuffed some of the more the spectacular claims of NewSpace’s proponents, arguing that launch vehicle reusability requires a (perhaps prohibitively) expensive refurbishing of the rocket engines involved in launches: ‘The economics will depend on how many times a booster can be flown, and how much the individual expense will be to refurbish the booster...each time' (Chang, 2017). Reusability may be a technological dead-end because of the inherently stressful effects of a rocket launch on the launch vehicle’s components, with extreme limitations on reusability beyond second-use as well as added risks of malfunctions that customers and insurers are likely to wish to avoid. Furthermore, the Falcon Heavy still has not matched the power and payload capacity of NASA’s Saturn V, a product of 1960s military- industrial engineering and Fordist state spending programs. What SpaceX and other NewSpace corporations do with great inge- nuity, however, is to manage the spectacle of outer space, pro- ducing outpourings of public fervor, aided by a widespread adherence to the ‘Californian Ideology' (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996), or post-statist techno-utopianism, in many post- industrialized societies. The very centrality of these maneuvers has initiated a new phase in the history of capitalist relations, that of ‘charismatic accumulation'—certainly not in the sense of any ‘objective' or inherent charismatic authority, but with a form of illusio, to speak with Bourdieu, vested in the members of capitalistkind by their uncanny ability to spin mythologizing self-narratives. This has always been part of the capitalist game, from Henry Ford and onwards, but the charismatic mission gains a special potency in the grandiose designs of NewSpace’s entrepreneurs. Every SpaceX launch is a quasi-religious spectacle, observed by millions capable of producing a real sense of wonder in a condition of (legit- imizing) collective effervescence. Outer space necessarily reduces inter-human difference to a common denominator or a shared species-being. An important leitmotiv in many Hollywood science fiction movies, including Arrival (2016), is that a first encounter with an alien species of intelligent beings tends to flatten all human difference (including ethnoracial and national categories), thereby restoring human- kind to its proper universality (see also Novoa, 2016). Ambas- sadors of Earth as a whole, not representatives of particular nations, step forth to meet alien emissaries. But even in the absence of such an encounter, the search for habitable domains (or rather, profitable locales) beyond Earth will necessarily forge a shared conception of the human condition, initiated with the Pale Blue Dot photograph in 1990. Typical of this sentiment are the words of the astronomer Carl Sagan, who famously observed of this photograph: ‘On it everyone you love, everyone you know, everyone you ever heard of, every human being who ever was, lived out their lives'. This naïvely humanistic vision has been one of the dominant tropes in the discourse on space since the 1950s, and it remains strong today, as with the claims of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) that their task is to ‘uphold the vision of a more equitable future for all humankind through shared achievements in space'. This representational tendency mobilizes humanism to generate enthusiasm about space-related activities. But such representations are increasingly being recup- erated by capitalist enterprise, so that it is not humankind but its modulation by space capitalists that will launch into the dark unknown. It is not humankind but capitalistkind that ventures forth. In early 2018, NASA was set to request $150 million in its 2019 budget to ‘enable the development and maturation of commercial entities and capabilities which will ensure that commercial successors to the ISS...are operational when they are needed', only one of many signs that space is becoming a space for capitalism. According to one estimate, the value of just one single asteroid would be more than $20 trillion in rare earth and platinum-group metals (Lewis, 1996), a precious prize indeed for profit-hungry corporations.10 Even the UNOOSA spoke vocifer- ously in favor of the commercialization of space, appealing var- iously to the ‘industry and private sector' and elevating the ‘space economy' to a central pillar in its Space2030 Agenda (including the ‘use of resources that create and provide value and benefits to the world population in the course of exploring, understanding and utilizing space'), even as the UN agency falls back on a humanistic, almost social-democratic vision of the equitable distribution of benefits (and profits) from space mining, exploration, and colonization (UNOOSA, 2018). We find evidence of this strategic humanism in all manner of pronouncements from NewSpace entrepreneurs. To take but one example: Naveen Jain, the chairman and co-founder of MoonEx, a lunar commercialization firm, has claimed that ‘from an entrepreneur’s perspective, the moon has never truly been explored'. The moon, Jain has claimed, ‘could hold resources that benefit Earth and all humanity' (Hennigan, 2011). We should note the recourse to the trope of all of humanity by this NewSpace entrepreneur, mimicked in the 1979 Moon Agreement, a UN treaty, which also held that the Moon’s resources are ‘the common heritage of mankind' (Tronchetti, 2013, p. 13).11 In a purely factual sense, of course, Jain is wrong: Google Moon offers high-resolution images of the lunar surface,12 and the moon has already been explored, in the sense of being mapped, albeit rudimentarily and with room for further data collection. Cru- cially, however, these cartographic techniques have not been put to capitalist uses: mapping minerals, for instance, or producing detailed schemata that might one day turn the Moon into a ‘gas station' for commercial space ventures, as Wilbur Ross, Trump’s Secretary of Commerce, has proposed (Bryan, 2018). What is lacking, in short, are capitalist maps of the Moon, i.e., a carto- graphy for capital. But as Klinger (2017: 199) notes, even though no one is ‘actively mining the Moon' at present, at least ‘six national space programs, fifty private firms, and one graduate engineering program, are intent on figuring out how to do so'; furthermore, Klinger draws attention to mapping efforts that have revealed high an abundance of rare earth metals, thorium, and iron in the Moon’s ‘Mare Procellarum KREEP' region (Klinger, 2017, p. 203). We have already noted that it is not humanity, conceived as species-being, a Gattungswesen, that makes its way into space. The term Gattungswesen, of course, has a long intellectual pedi- gree, harking back to Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and others. The term can ‘be naturally applied both to the individual human being and to the common nature or essence which resides in every individual man and woman', Allan Wood (2004, p. 17) writes, as well as ‘to the entire human race, referring to humanity as a single collective entity or else to the essential property which char- acterizes this entity and makes it a single distinctive thing in its own right'. Significantly, the adherents of NewSpace often resort to the idea of humanity in its broad universality (e.g., Musk, 2017), but this denies and distorts the modulation of humanity by its imbrication with the project of global (and post-global, i.e., space-bound) capitalism. It is precisely the sort of false uni- versality implied in the humanism of the supporters of NewSpace that Marx subjected to a scathing critique in the sixth of his Theses on Feuerbach. Here Marx noted that the human essence is not made up of some ‘abstraction inherent in each single indi- vidual' (1998, p. 570). Instead, humans are defined by the ‘ensemble of social relations' in which they are enmeshed. Under NewSpace, it is not humanity, plain and simple, that ventures forth, but a specific set of capitalist entrepreneurs, carrying a particular ideological payload, alongside their satellites, instru- ments, and supplies, a point noted by other sociologists of outer space, or ‘astrosociologists' (Dickens and Ormrod, 2007a, 2007b). The spatial fix of outer space No longer terra nullius, space is now the new terra firma of capitalistkind: its naturalized terroir, its next necessary terrain. The logic of capitalism dictates that capital should seek to expand outwards into the vastness of space, a point recognized by a recent ethnography of NewSpace actors (Valentine, 2016, p. 1050). The operations of capitalistkind serve to resolve a series of (potential) crises of capitalism, revolving around the slow, steady decline of spatial fixes (see e.g., Harvey, 1985, p. 51–66) as they come crashing up against the quickly vanishing blank spaces remaining on earthly maps and declining (terrestrial) opportu- nities for profitable investment of surplus capital (Dickens and Ormrod, 2007a, p. 49–78). A ‘spatial fix' involves the geographic modulation of capital accumulation, consisting in the outward expansion of capital onto new geographic terrains, or into new spaces, with the aim of filling a gap in the home terrains of capital. Jessop (2006, p. 149) notes that spatial fixes may involve a number of strategies, including the creation of new markets within the capitalist world, engaging in trade with non-capitalist economies, and exporting surplus capital to undeveloped or underdeveloped regions. The first two address the problem of insufficient demand and the latter option creates a productive (or valorizing) outlet for excess capital. Capitalism must regularly discover, develop, and appro- priate such new spaces because of its inherent tendency to gen- erate surplus capital, i.e., capital bereft of profitable purpose. In Harvey’s (2006, p. xviii) terms, a spatial fix revolves around ‘geographical expansions and restructuring...as a temporary solution to crises understood...in terms of the overaccumulation of capital'. It is a temporary solution because these newly appropriated spaces will in turn become exhausted of profitable potential and are likely to produce their own stocks of surplus capital; while ‘capital surpluses that otherwise stood to be deva- lued, could be absorbed through geographical expansions and spatio-temporal displacements' (Harvey, 2006, p. xviii), this out- wards drive of capitalism is inherently limitless: there is no end point or final destination for capitalism. Instead, capitalism must continuously propel itself onwards in search of pristine sites of renewed capital accumulation. In this way, Harvey writes, society constantly ‘creates fresh productive powers elsewhere to absorb its overaccumulated capital' (Harvey, 1981, p. 8). Historically, spatial fixes have played an important role in conserving the capitalist system. As Jessop (2006, p. 149) points out, ‘The export of surplus money capital, surplus commodities, and/or surplus labour-power outside the space(s) where they originate enabled capital to avoid, at least for a period, the threat of devaluation'. But these new spaces for capital are not necessarily limited to physical terrains, as with colonial expansion in the nineteenth century; as Greene and Joseph (2015) note, various digital spaces, such as the Internet, can also be considered as spatial fixes: the Web absorbs overaccumulated capital, heightens consumption of virtual and physical goods, and makes inexpen- sive, flexible sources of labor available to employers. Greene and Joseph offer the example of online high-speed frequency trading as a digital spatial fix that furthers the ‘annihilation of space by time' first noted by Marx in his Grundrisse (see Marx, 1973, p. 524). Outer space serves at least two purposes in this regard. In the short-to medium-term, it allows for the export of surplus capital into emerging industries, such as satellite imaging and commu- nication. These are significant sites of capital accumulation: global revenues in the worldwide satellite market in 2016 amounted to $260 billion (SIA, 2017, p. 4). Clearly, much of this activity is taking place ‘on the ground'; it is occurring in the ‘terrestrial economy'. But all that capital would have to find some other meaningful or productive outlet were it not for the expansion of capital into space. Second, outer space serves as an arena of technological innovation, which feeds back into the terrestrial economy, helping to avert crisis by pushing capital out of tech- nological stagnation and innovation shortfalls. In short, outer space serves as a spatial fix. It swallows up surplus capital, promising to deliver valuable resources, techno- logical innovations, and communication services to capitalists back on Earth. This places outer space on the same level as tra- ditional colonization, analyzed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which Hegel thought of as a product of the ‘inner dialectic of civil society', which drives the market to ‘push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are either deficient in the goods it has over- produced, or else generally backward in creative industry, etc.' (Hegel, 2008, p. 222). In this regard, SpaceX and related ventures are not so very different from maritime colonialists and the trader-exploiters of the British East India Company. But there is something new at stake. As the Silicon Valley entrepreneur Peter Diamandis has gleefully noted: ‘There are twenty-trillion-dollar checks up there, waiting to be cashed!' (Seaney and Glendenning, 2016). Capitalistkind consists in the naturalization of capitalist consciousness and practice, the (false) universalization of a par- ticular mode of political economy as inherent to the human condition, followed by the projection of this naturalized uni- versality into space—capitalist humanity as a Fukuyamite ‘end of history', the end-point of (earthly) historical unfolding, but the starting point of humanity’s first serious advances in space. What role, then, for the state? The frontiersmen of NewSpace tend to think of themselves as libertarians, pioneers beyond the domain of state bureaucracy (see Nelson and Block, 2018). ‘The government should leave the design work and ownership of the product to the private sector', the author of a 2017 report, Capitalism in Space, advocates. ‘The private companies know best how to build their own products to maximize performance while lowering cost' (Zimmerman, 2017, p. 27). One ethnographer notes that ‘politically, right-libertarianism prevails' amongst NewSpace entrepreneurs (Valentine, 2016, p. 1047–1048). Just as Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the opponents to the Iraq War as ‘Old Europe', so too are state entities’ interests in space exploration shrugged off as symptoms of ‘Old Space'. Elon Musk, we are told in a recent biography, unlike the sluggish Big State actors of yore, ‘would apply some of the start-up techniques he’d learned in Silicon Valley to run SpaceX lean and fast...As a private company, SpaceX would also avoid the waste and cost overruns associated with government contractors' (Vance, 2015, p. 114). This libertarianism-in-space has found a willing chorus of academic supporters. The legal scholar Virgiliu Pop introduces the notion of the frontier paradigm (combining laissez-faire economics, market competition, and an individualist ethic) into the domain of space law, claiming that this paradigm has ‘proven its worth on our planet' and will ‘most likely...do so in the extraterrestrial realms' as well (Pop, 2009, p. vi). This frontier paradigm is not entirely new: a ‘Columbus mythology', centering on the ‘noble explorer', was continuously evoked in the United States during the Cold War space race (Dickens and Ormrod, 2016, pp. 79, 162–164). But the entrepreneurial libertarianism of capitalistkind is undermined by the reliance of the entire NewSpace complex on extensive support from the state, ‘a public-private financing model underpinning long-shot start-ups' that in the case of Musk’s three main companies (SpaceX, SolarCity Corp., and Tesla) has been underpinned by $4.9 billion dollars in govern- ment subsidies (Hirsch, 2015). In the nascent field of space tourism, Cohen (2017) argues that what began as an almost entirely private venture quickly ground to a halt in the face of insurmountable technical and financial obstacles, only solved by piggybacking on large state-run projects, such as selling trips to the International Space Station, against the objections of NASA scientists. The business model of NewSpace depends on the taxpayer’s dollar while making pretensions to individual self- reliance. The vast majority of present-day clients of private aerospace corporations are government clients, usually military in origin. Furthermore, the bulk of rocket launches in the United States take place on government property, usually operated by the US Air Force or NASA.13 This inward tension between state dependency and capitalist autonomy is itself a product of neoliberalism’s contradictory demand for a minimal, “slim” state, while simultaneously (and in fact) relying on a state reengineered and retooled for the purposes of capital accumulation (Wacquant, 2012). As Lazzarato writes, ‘To be able to be “laissez-faire”, it is necessary to intervene a great deal' (2017, p. 7). Space libertarianism is libertarian in name only: behind every NewSpace venture looms a thick web of government spending programs, regulatory agencies, public infrastructure, and universities bolstered by research grants from the state. SpaceX would not exist were it not for state-sponsored contracts of satellite launches. Similarly, in 2018, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the famed origin of the World Wide Web—announced that it would launch a ‘responsive launch competition', meaning essentially the reuse of launch vehicles, representing an attempt by the state to ‘harness growing commercial capabilities' and place them in the service of the state’s interest in ensuring ‘national security' (Foust, 2018b). This libertarianism has been steadily growing in the nexus between Silicon Valley, Stanford University, Wall Street, and the Washington political establishment, which tend to place a high value on Randian ‘objectivism' and participate in a long American intellectual heritage of individualistic ‘bootstrapping' and (alleg- edly) gritty self-reliance. But as Nelson and Block (2018, p. 189–197) recognize, one of the central symbolic operations of capitalistkind resides in concealing its reliance on the state by mobilizing the charm of its entrepreneurial constituents and the spectacle of space. There is a case to be made for the idea that SpaceX and its ilk resemble semi-private corporations like the British East India Company. The latter, “incorporated by royal charter from Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth I in 1600 to trade in silk and spices, and other profitable Indian commodities,” recruited soldiers and built a ‘commercial business [that] quickly became a business of conquest' (Tharoor, 2017). SpaceX, too, is increasingly imbricated with an attempt on the part of a parti- cular state, the United States, to colonize and appropriate resources derived from a particular area, that of outer space; it, too, depends on the infrastructure, contracts, and regulatory environment that thus far only a state seems able to provide. Its private character, like that of the East India Company, is troubled by being deeply embedded in the state. As one commentator has observed of SpaceX, ‘If there’s a consistent charge against Elon Musk and his high-flying companies...it’s that they’re not really examples of independent, innovative market capitalism. Rather, they’re government contractors, dependent on taxpayer money to stay afloat' (cit. Nelson and Block, 2018, p. 189).

#### Space colonization exists in a hyper libertarian and white sphere, fundamentally operating agaist the theory of the aff.

Saldanha 07 Saldanha, Arun. Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race. First edition ed. University of Minnesota Press, 2007. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/book/32311.

Meanwhile ecofeminist, eco-anarchist, and new age imaginations present the earth as pushed out of equilibrium and violated by man, technology, or power, and demand a return to a wholesome relationship between community and deeper strata and rhythms. All such holistic and communitarian reterritorialization risks invoking “the wrong earth” and “the wrong people,” as Deleuze and Guattari said of Heidegger at the beginning of this chapter. Most environmentalism does not see the anthropic stratum is itself machinic, while anarchism doesn’t see assemblages cannot be purified of territoriality and orderings from above. Neither would Deleuze [would not] and Guattari have time for the libertarian and mostly white and male fantasies of a cyberspatial noosphere or planet-brain preparing to revolutionize life on the genetic level and colonize other planets. Without a concept of mechanosphere all such new myth-making ultimately reproduces the age-old optimism in which man is separate, already a reasonable and universal individual able to transcend mere earth. Deleuzian materialism can aid in rethinking the universality that has come to the middle of the global political agenda by avoiding this kind of hubristic humanism.

…

The colonization of territories and populations happens not by technology as such, but its speeds. The essence of war is speed, said Sun Tzu already, and all strategists plotting the rhythms and vectors of battle show he was correct. Ballistics has always been central to warfare and the improvements in precision, range, detonation power, visibility, and discipline haven’t changed that: “the weapon invents speed, or the discovery of speed invents the weapon (the projective character of weapons is the result)” (ATP 395). States are driven not by interests or ideologies but by a geo-power based on the complementarity between weapons and technological sophistication. War makes social formations fragment and coalesce. Deleuze and Guattari call Virilio their favorite among authors with “an apocalyptic or millenarian sense” (ATP 467), but he is easily misunderstood if he is taken to mean that governance by destructive speed – what he calls dromocracy – is actual and complete. Dromocracy is a tendency linked to a death drive and changes with the conditions in which it becomes dominant. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the twin imperatives of growth and acceleration make catastrophe each year more likely and frequent, but too much disaster would bring down the system. In any case, more potential for disaster demands more militarization and commodification (insurance) in an ever tighter spiral, bringing ever closer the apocalyptic and racialized scenarios of network failure, peak oil, earthquake zones, climate displacement, overcrowding, the extinction of entire genera, pandemics, famine, terrorism, genocide, and exodus. But Virilio’s insistence on acceleration is the reflex of a conservative thinker, and he misses what is new about modernity. Deleuze and Guattari remind us that in the last few centuries it is capital not military technology as such that pushes and requires ever more dromocratization. The generalization of a preparedness for war is especially constitutive of capitalism only because it exacerbates the conditions of scarcity requiring defense and attack strategies in the first place.

#### Private space appropriation is an instance of colonization that homogenizes a group or territory, thereby staticizing it.

McCormick, Ted Associate Professor of History, Concordia University The billionaire space race reflects a colonial mindset that fails to imagine a different world August 15, 2021 https://theconversation.com/the-billionaire-space-race-reflects-a-colonial-mindset-that-fails-to-imagine-a-different-world-165235

It was a time of political uncertainty, cultural conflict and social change. Private ventures exploited technological advances and natural resources, generating unprecedented fortunes while wreaking havoc on local communities and environments. The working poor crowded cities, spurring property- holders to develop increased surveillance and incarceration regimes. Rural areas lay desolate, buildings vacant, churches empty — the stuff of moralistic elegies. Epidemics raged, forcing quarantines in the ports and lockdowns in the streets. Mortality data was the stuff of weekly news and commentary. Depending on the perspective, mobility — chosen or compelled — was either the cause or the consequence of general disorder. Uncontrolled mobility was associated with political instability, moral degeneracy and social breakdown. However, one form of planned mobility promised to solve these problems: colonization. Europe and its former empires have changed a lot since the 17th century. But the persistence of colonialism as a supposed panacea suggests we are not as far from the early modern period as we think. Colonial promise of limitless growth Seventeenth-century colonial schemes involved plantations around the Atlantic, and motivations that now sound archaic. Advocates of expansion such as the English writer Richard Hakluyt, whose Discourse of Western Planting (1584) outlined the benefits of empire for Queen Elizabeth: the colonization of the New World would prevent Spanish Catholic hegemony and provide a chance to claim Indigenous souls for Protestantism. But a key promise was the economic and social renewal of the mother country through new commodities, trades and territory. Above all, planned mobility would cure the ills of apparent overpopulation. Sending the poor overseas to cut timber, mine gold or farm cane would, according to Hakluyt, turn the “multitudes of loiterers and idle vagabonds” that “swarm(ed)” England’s streets and “pestered and stuffed” its prisons into industrious workers, providing raw materials and a reason to multiply. Colonization would fuel limitless growth. As English plantations took shape in Ulster, Virginia, New England and the Caribbean, “projectors” — individuals (nearly always men) who promised to use new kinds of knowledge to radically and profitably transform society — tied mobility to new sciences and technologies. They were inspired as much by English philosopher Francis Bacon’s vision of a tech-centred state in The New Atlantis as by his advocacy of observation and experiment. Discovery and invention The English agriculturalist Gabriel Plattes cautioned in 1639 that “the finding of new worlds is not like to be a perpetual trade.” But many more saw a supposedly vacant America as an invitation to transplant people, plants and machinery. The inventor Cressy Dymock (from Lincolnshire, where fen-drainage schemes were turning wetlands dry) sought support for a “perpetual motion engine” that would plough fields in England, clear forest in Virginia and drive sugar mills in Barbados. Dymock identified private profit and the public good by speeding plantation and replacing costly draught animals with cheaper enslaved labour. Projects across the empire would employ the idle, create “elbow-room,” heal “unnatural divisions” and make England “the garden of the world.”Extraterrestrial exploration Today, the moon and Mars are in projectors’ sights. And the promises billionaires Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos make for colonization are similar in ambition to those of four centuries ago. As Bezos told an audience at the International Space Development Conference in 2018: “We will have to leave this planet, and we’re going to leave it, and it’s going to make this planet better.” Bezos traces his thinking to Princeton physicist Gerald O’Neill, whose 1974 article “The Colonization of Space” (and 1977 book, The High Frontier) presented orbiting settlements as solutions to nearly every major problem facing the Earth. Bezos echoes O’Neill’s proposal to move heavy industry — and industrial labour — off the planet, rezoning Earth as a mostly residential, green space. A garden, as it were. Musk’s plans for Mars are at once more cynical and more grandiose, in timeline and technical requirements if not in ultimate extent. They center on the dubious possibility of “terraforming” Mars using resources and technologies that don’t yet exist. Musk planned to send the first humans to Mars in 2024, and by 2030, he envisioned breaking ground on a city, launching as many as 100,000 voyages from Earth to Mars within a century. As of 2020, the timeline had been pushed back slightly, in part because terraforming may require bombarding Mars with 10,000 nuclear missiles to start. But the vision – a Mars of thriving crops, pizza joints and “entrepreneurial opportunities,” preserving life and paying dividends while Earth becomes increasingly uninhabitable — remains. Like the colonial company-states of the 17th and 18th centuries, Musk’s SpaceX leans heavily on government backing but will make its own laws on its newly settled planet. A failure of the imagination the techno-utopian visions of Musk and Bezos betray some of the same assumptions as their early modern forebears. They offer colonialism as a panacea for complex social, political and economic ills, rather than attempting to work towards a better world within the constraints of our environment. And rather than facing the palpably devastating consequences of an ideology of limitless growth on our planet, they seek to export it, unaltered, into space. They imagine themselves capable of creating liveable environments where none exist. But for all their futuristic imagery, they have failed to imagine a different world. And they have ignored the history of colonialism on this one. Empire never recreated Eden, but it did fuel centuries of growth based on expropriation, enslavement and environmental transformation in defiance of all limits. We are struggling with these consequences today. Ethical Exploration and the Role of Planetary Protection in Disrupting Colonial Practices ethicists, philosophers, and social scientists, as well as the general public. All of these perspectives are essential for creating a responsible policy framework that governs how scientists, engineers, and others interact with other worlds. This expertise is necessary to establish just norms for future space societies. Here we briefly present examples of how space exploration will replicate colonial structures if they are left unchallenged, and the role planetary protection will play in propagating these structures if left unexamined. We also delve into an exploration of the ethical questions that must be addressed on the above topics, including:

● Agency and moral consideration of extraterrestrial microbial life;

● Responsibility towards the potential for future life on any planetary body;

● Parameters for inevitable interactions between microbiomes from different planetary bodies, if

humans are to travel to potentially habitable worlds;

● Preservation of environments on planetary bodies for reasons beyond scientific justifications,

including historical, environmental, intrinsic, or aesthetic value;

● Long-term environmental impacts of resource extraction on planetary bodies;

● Short-term impact of largely unrestrained resource extraction on wealth inequality.

Ethical Exploration and the Role of Planetary Protection in Disrupting Colonial Practices

**Tavares et al** 20 October 15, 2020 Ethical Exploration and the Role of Planetary Protection in Disrupting Colonial Practices Frank Tavares, Denise Buckner, Dana Burton, Jordan McKaig, Parvathy Prem, Eleni Ravanis, Natalie Trevino, Aparna Venkatesan, Steven D. Vance, Monica Vidaurri, Lucianne Walkowicz, Mary Beth Wilhelm https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.08344

Colonial expansion and the trans-Atlantic slave trade have been foundational to our present world. What we call globalization “is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and the colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power.”4​ The result is a world where political and economic systems, namely capitalism, prioritize profit over human welfare, producinganenvironmentalcrisis5 andvastinequalitiesfurthercompoundedbyclimatechange.​6 As Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz writes,​ ​“[c]hoices were made that forged that path toward destruction of life itself--the moment in which we now live and die as our planet shrivels, over-heated.”​7 Coloniality, the enduring system of domination born from colonialism that we are left with today,8​ is the product of those choices. Understanding what those choices were, and how we are on the precipice of making them again, is essential to ensuring an ethical, anticolonial framework for exploring space. Several of these mechanisms of colonial violence are of particular relevance, as they connect to current practices in space exploration, planetary science, and astrobiology today: Biological Contamination and Ecological Devastation: ​The spread of deadly pathogens was used as a form of biological warfare, playing a part in genocide against Indigenous peoples, both intentionally and unwittingly.9​ Colonial expansion caused the population in the Americas to decrease by 90 percent, an enormous loss of life that the dispersal of these pathogens contributed to, alongside concerted warfare and the appropriation of land.​10 All of these practices, including biological contamination, had an impact on the ecosystems Indigenous peoples were a part of--and the destruction of those environments provided an additional way to attack the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples. Settler colonial dominance can be described “as violence that disrupts human relationships with the environment,”​11 a framework that allows us to clearly see how coloniality continues to enact violence on Indigenous lives as well as many other communities through pollution​12 and other environmentally-related effects. Biological contamination ​is not a politically neutral or accidental phenomenon and ​will always have an effect in the environment in which it is taking place amongst all actors involved – both human and nonhuman. This is true for both forward and backward contamination in missions to other planetary bodies. Forward contamination will irreversibly change any extant extraterrestrial microbiome. In the unlikely, but potentially disastrous scenario of backwards contamination, we must also reflect on how structural racism allowed the COVID-19 pandemic to disproportionately impact Black and Indigenous communities.​13 ​It is crucial that the planetary science community, with community input, take the opportunity before uncrewed and crewed exploration of other worlds to think ecologically – and seek to equitably address the consequences of our presence on these other worlds. Race Science: ​Western science built the lie of racial difference that became a core justification underlying colonial expansion, the slave trade, and genocide against Indigenous peoples.​14 White supremacy is a key aspect of almost all other forms of colonial violence and race science is fundamental to its logic to this day.1​ 5 ​Moreover, the spread of deadly pathogens and ecological devastation due to colonialism were enabled by this codified disregard for the livelihoods of those that took the brunt of that violence. Modern science is not immune from these antiquated notions-- and science is often invoked to justify and extend racist power structures.1​ 6 There is even peer-reviewed literature replicating the arguments of eugenics--an ideology fundamentally tied to white supremacy in its pursuit of maximizing “favorable characteristics”--in discussions of how reproduction should be handled in future communities on Mars.​17,18 Though the context of human space exploration is a different context with differing moral stakes, white supremacy and related systems of power, if left unchecked, can have deep impacts on future missions. Who we initially send to Mars, and how we come to that decision, will define the nature of those communities going forward. Commodification and Appropriation of Land and Resource Extraction: ​The commodification of land through extractive practices has led to significant disruption of the ecosystems that Indigenous communities rely upon for their livelihoods. Examples of extractive exploitation and colonialism abound; while many people in the US think only of the gold rush, mining of rare minerals in Central and South America and Africa incentivize and continue to accelerate colonial expansion even today. Agricultural practices throughout the colonial world have been and continue to be damaging, transforming environments and destroying human lives and cultures.​19 From cotton fields in the American south to sugar plantations and rubber tappers in Brazil, the combination of land and people as property was key to the generation of wealth that built up the Western world.​20 The field of planetary science and space exploration in the present day is not divorced from these practices,​and both existing and planned space infrastructure continue to encroach upon Indigenous land. This is often justified by falsely framing opposition to such encroachments as "obstructions" to "the future."​21 For example, construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope atop Mauna Kea has begun despite ​opposition from many Kanaka ʻŌiwi (Native Hawaiians), who note that previous astronomy development atop Mauna Kea has already had substantial adverse effects.​22 Current structures for in-situ resource utilization on other worlds are analogous to some of these past and current practices on Earth. Most immediately, lunar resource maps seek to enable public and private sector mining actors to plan for extraction of water ice and other resources. Similar proposals exist for asteroid mining. This is presented under a guise of “sustainability,” but in actuality replicates the practices of extractive capitalism that have contributed to the environmental degradation of Earth. In the long-term, this exploitative approach to extraterrestrial exploration will be similarly detrimental, and recommendations provided in the white paper “Asteroid Resource Utilization: Ethical Concerns and Progress” address these issues in more depth.2​ 3 Ethical Exploration and the Role of Planetary Protection in Disrupting Colonial Practices Public-Private Partnerships as a Colonial Structure: ​Private individuals and institutions, in collaboration with governments, are a key aspect of the colonial structure. For example, the East India Company was fundamental to British expansion across the Eastern hemisphere and took a central role in colonial domination and political control as well as trade.​24 More recent examples include the influence of American fruit companies in the United States’ interventions into Latin American politics during the Cold War.2​ 5 In the United States, treaties signed with Native American nations have repeatedly been broken, often by settler colonialist individuals working in tandem with the US government and military. The Dakota Access Pipeline, a modern reframing of the ongoing Indigenous demand to honor the Black Hills Treaty,2​ 6 illustrates how capitalist interest intersects with colonialism today. These examples are mirrored in the active role private industry is currently taking in space exploration. Presently, there is little to no oversight by national governments or international structures. Private partnerships are encouraged to plan missions to the Moon and Mars, often supported by state funding. However, there is a lack of concrete and effective policy to guide their actions, and no consequences are levied when existing policies are violated.2​ 7 For example, the privately-funded and state-operated Beresheet lunar lander crashed on the Moon and accidentally released thousands of tardigrades.2​ 8 At present, bodies like the Moon and Mars are in practice free reign for private entities. An unfortunately accurate euphemism is that we are in a “wild west” of space policy in this regard. When faced with complex and nuanced ethical questions like the ones we will face in space exploration, private actors, by their very structure, will prioritize economic considerations above moral ones. History, through the examples above and others, shows us that they will.

Saldanha 07 Saldanha, Arun Psychedelic Whiteness, 2007 pg 20 https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/psychedelic-white

:built my conceptual appara- tus with ample aid from Deleuze, who, unlike most theorists of race and colonialism, doesn’t ground his thought in negativity and representation. To anticipate my theoretical conclusion, race is a shifting amalgamation of human bodies and their appearance, genetic material, artifacts, land- scapes, music, money, language, and states of mind. Racial difference emerges when bodies with certain characteristics become viscous through the ways they connect to their physical and social environment. Race is a machinic assemblage, to use a concept of Deleuze’s collaborator Félix Guattari. Machinic assemblage is an ontological concept and therefore apt for tackling the question “What is race?” Basically, the concept pre- sents constellations, especially biological and sociological constellations, as fully material, machinelike interlockings of multiple varied components, which do not cease to be different from each other while assembled