# AC

#### I value morality.

#### First, ethics are split between the deontic and aretaic. Deontic theories answer what agents should do according to a moral code, while aretaic theories answer what kind of agent people should be to make the right decisions.

Gryz 11 [Jarek, professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies. “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. November 2011, Issue 5. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257560765\_On\_the\_Relationship\_Between\_the\_Aretaic\_and\_the\_Deontic] SHS ZS recut

There are two fundamental classes of terms traditionally distinguished within moral vocabulary: the deontic and the aretaic. The terms from the first set serve in the prescriptive function of a moral code. This function consists in providing answers to questions like: What am I (morally) required to do? Answers to such questions usually have the grammatical form of an imperative and are called “prescriptions”, “moral norms”, “rules”, “precepts”, or “commands”. They are expressed by means of such terms as: ‘right’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’, etc. The second class contains terms used for a moral evaluation of an action (or an actor). Such moral evaluation is not primarily intended to direct actions, although it seems capable of performing this function as well. Terms used for evaluations include: ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘blameworthy’, ‘praiseworthy’, ‘virtuous’, etc. The ‘right’ is the key notion of the normative part of a moral theory; the ‘good’ is used to express moral judgments.

#### To clarify, deontic theories guide ethics by looking at the actions of moral actors, whereas aretaic theories guide ethics by looking at the character of moral actors themselves. By developing good moral character, good actions will naturally follow.

#### Prefer the aretaic:

#### [1] Hijacks – Every action in the deontic can be expressed in the aretaic, but only the aretaic can break free of the right/wrong binary with its richer vocabulary.

**Gryz, 2** (Jarek Gryz, Professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies., 12-15-2010, accessed on 8-21-2021, Springer, "On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic", DOI 10.1007/s10677-010-9258-3) SHS ZS recut

The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. Goodness and badness come in degrees, hence we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’; we lack similar terms for deontically evaluated actions. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; an all-or- nothing choice, implied by the use of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on only one quantum quality.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary. For example, by saying that something is praiseworthy we impl[ies] that it deserves approval or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems just impossible. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic, and in particular, Stocker’s identification of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. If our task is just to substitute every particular deontic evaluation with an aretaic one, there are no logical reasons that would make it impossible (it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction). From that perspective, attractive ethical theories seem to be much better off than the imperative ones.

#### [2] Collapses – A. Engaging in ethics concedes to the authority of attempting to become a better person, which is an aretaic quality. B. If agents were conditioned properly, they would independently take the right actions, which hijacks deontic theories. C. Infinite regress – we can always ask why to follow a deontic rule, but the answer will terminate in attempting to achieve some aretaic property.

#### [3] Prerequisite – A. Philosophy has to frame who we are as individuals before dictating how we should act; I would not tell a serial killer to follow the categorical imperative but try to reform their character first. B. The origin of philosophy had to start through an aretaic paradigm since there were no preconceived notions or rules that we needed a guide towards the good; they chose to develop the good out of their own volition. C. Absent the aretaic, there would be no reason to care about the morality of our actions without it being grounded in trying to become a better person.

#### [4] Motivation – The aretaic improves citizens’ moral standing. People can always opt-out of a deontic theory but by focusing on the aretaic we improve the moral character of citizens, causing them to act ethically out of their own volition.

#### [5] Consequences fail – Ethical theories have to always guide action. Even if they work 99% of the time that is not sufficient because there would be instances where agents do not know what to do. A. Induction fails – the logic of looking to the past to predict the future is all premised in the past, so it’s circular. B. Aggregation fails – there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure. C. Butterfly effect – no way to know when we cut off looking at consequences. D. Culpability – there are an infinite number of pretenses for actions which means assigning culpability is impossible which is necessary for a moral theory to ascribe blame for actions.

#### [6] The deontic fails – A. It’s impossible for a moral law to account for every single situation; there will always be cases in which the rule fails B. Fails to account for differences in cultures or norms, the aretaic solves by allowing people to determine and weigh between their own virtues C. Moral laws can be interpreted in an infinite number of ways and there’s no way to hold people accountable for following them correctly

#### Next, the only ethics consistent with the aretaic is a virtue paradigm. Instead of prescribing normative claims to action, virtue focuses on developing agents to make them virtuous.

**Reader 2k** [Soran Reader, Soran Reader is Lecturer in Philosophy at Durham University and is editor of The Philosophy of Need (Cambridge University Press, 2006)., December 2000, accessed on 8-22-2021, Springer, "New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.”", <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504153>] SHS DH

The centrality of virtue ethics emerges clearly in relation to the themes of the previous two sections. With the first theme, the naturalness of ethics, virtue ethics leads the field in making available a second-natural explicatory account of ethics. A virtue just is a capacity, learnable by beings with our biological nature, which both manifests the flourishing nature of the agent and seeks the flourishing of that to which it responds. With the sec ond theme, of practical reasons, things are less straightforward. It is not obvious that the virtues are our moral reasons for acting, although we cannot explain what the good agent does without reference to their virtues. I explore this question further below. A virtue is a free disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions. Virtue ethics claims that what is to count[s] as a good action or what is a good outcome is conceptually dependent on claims about the virtue of an agent. How is this dependence supposed to work? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself, virtue ethicists instead explore the concrete dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from already virtuous agents. They hold that the key to moral rationality is found in moral education. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent ? the child, or the foreigner, or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. These beginner-agents learn from the experienced, wise moral agent by copying by mimicking in their actions the actions of the virtuous agent. This mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things, going on to do the same, then going on to do the same in new ways, once they have mastered the skill.16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: there is and can be nothing 'behind' the expertise of the phronimos which can explain or justify it (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learning of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-followers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it. The burden of proof now rests with those who want to resist the idea that ethics is, at bottom, a way of doing things (specifically, living a good human life), and want to find a more fundamental notion than the practi cal skill that the virtuous person has. We approach this problem after Wittgenstein: he argued that 'rules' or 'interpretations' cannot be fundamental in our rationality, but that an actual way of going on comes first.17 McDowell (1979) first applied this insight to moral philosophy; its import has yet fully to be appreciated.

#### Thus the standard is cultivating virtue.

#### Impact Calc –

#### [1] The framework is procedural – it is concerned with cultivating virtuous agents, not being consistent with a virtuous action because that is deontic and fails.

#### [2] Not consequentialist – Consequences only evaluate the direct consequences of the action but not the way that it affects someone’s moral character. Virtues aren’t end goods like pain and pleasure – it’s not something that should be maximized all the time unconditionally, instead, agents should focus on developing a character that can use virtue appropriately.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Constitutiveness – moral questions are derived from the life-form of a particular entity, which justifies following our true form. This outweighs – just as I would say a knife is bad if it is blunt, humans would be bad if they do not follow their true form. Any deontic theories are simply a deviation from our form. Foot:

[Foot, Phillipa; “Natural Goodness”; Oxford University (2001) Brackets and ellipses in original text.] SHS DH

Anscombe writes, ’[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by…other means.’ Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called an ‘Aristotelian necessity’: that which is necessary because and in so far as good hangs on it. We invoke the same idea when we say that it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill. These 'Aristotelian necessities’ depend on what the particular species of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making out that are in their repertoire. These things together determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should be, and to do what which they should do. And for all the enormous differences between the life of humans and that of plants and animals, we can see that human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do. We do not need to be able to dive like gannets, nor to see in the dark like owls; but our memory and concentration must be such as to allow us to learn language, and our sight such that we can recognize faces at a glance; while, like lionesses, human parents are defective if they do not teach their young the skills that they need to survive.

### Offense

#### I affirm – Resolved: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike for all strikes. I’m willing to spec anything in cx as long as I don’t have to abandon my maxim.

#### Affirm:

#### Strikes are key to fostering an ethical community that values mutual sacrifice and risk taking, new friendships, and is courageous.

LaborNotes 19 [Labor Notes. October 17, 2019. “Why Strikes Matter”. 10-17-2019. [https://www.labornotes.org/2019/10/why-strikes-matter. Accessed 11-5-2021](https://www.labornotes.org/2019/10/why-strikes-matter.%20Accessed%2011-5-2021)] SHS DH

DISCOVER YOUR POWER The key word is “force.” A strike is not just a symbolic protest. It works because we withhold something that the employer needs—its production, its good public image, its profits, and above all its control over us. As one union slogan has it, “this university works because we do”—or this company, or this city. A strike reveals something that employers would prefer we not notice: they need us. Workplaces are typically run as dictatorships. The discovery that your boss does not have absolute power over you—and that in fact, you and your co-workers can exert power over him—is a revelation. There’s no feeling like it. Going on strike changes you, personally and as a union. “Walking into work the first day back chanting ‘one day longer, one day stronger’ was the best morning I’ve ever had at Verizon,” said Pam Galpern, a field tech and mobilizer with Communication Workers Local 1101, after workers beat the corporate giant in a 45-day strike in 2016. “There was such a tremendous feeling of accomplishment. People were smiling and happy. It was like a complete 180-degree difference from before the strike,” when supervisors had been micromanaging and writing workers up for the smallest infractions. In a good strike, everyone has a meaningful role. Strikers develop new skills and a deeper sense that they own and run their union. New leaders emerge from the ranks and go on to become stewards. New friendships are formed; workers who didn’t know or trust one another before forge bonds of solidarity. A few stubborn co-workers finally see why the union matters and sign on as members. Allies from faith groups, neighborhood groups, or other unions adopt your cause. You and your co-workers lose some fear of the boss—and the boss gains some fear of you. In all these ways and more—not to mention the contract gains you may win—a strike can be a tremendous union-building activity. JUST THE THREAT Sometimes coming to the brink of a strike is enough to make your employer blink. Workers at an Indiana truck plant in 2016 got as far as hauling burn barrels to work every day to show they were ready to hit the picket lines. The company, Hendrickson International, averted a strike by agreeing to phase out two-tier wages and pensions. The benefits of a humbled employer can last beyond a single contract cycle. After Seattle’s grocery chains in 2013 came within two hours of a strike—the union dramatized the impending deadline with a giant countdown clock—the chains scrambled to avoid a repeat in 2016 by settling a new contract before the old one expired. The transformation can also reach beyond the workplace. Strikes open up our political horizons, expanding our sense of what’s possible if we use our power. This summer, a general strike in Puerto Rico brought down two corrupt governors in quick succession. This fall, Amazon workers struck for a day as they pushed their employer to take on climate change. Large-scale strikes will be crucial if we expect to rescue our world from the corporations that promote poverty and environmental collapse. The 1% are not going to hand us anything. A NEW UPSURGE? Strikes in the U.S. have declined dramatically over the past half-century. Since 1947 the Bureau of Labor Statistics has tracked strikes and lockouts involving 1,000 or more workers. From 1947 through 1981, there were hundreds of such big strikes each year. Last year there were 20. The decline in strikes is a reflection of unions’ diminishing power and numbers—and a reason for it. But strikes aren’t dead. Over the years it has gotten harder (in some ways) to strike and win. Some of the best tactics have been outlawed; some of the best sources of leverage have been neutralized. A hundred years ago, striking took physical bravery. Your employer might hire armed thugs to attack you. Today in the U.S. that’s less likely. Employers have found more sophisticated ways to weaken strikes. Still, it takes real courage to walk out. You might lose your job, and a court might deem your firing legal. If striking is illegal in your state or sector, you might have to break the law. If union leaders are reluctant to strike, you might have to out-organize them. Or the union could miscalculate—you might find you don’t have enough leverage to win. You might have to walk back in empty-handed. Workers today have to soberly assess their power up against rich, complex, global corporations. Sometimes a strike alone may not be enough to win; it might have to be part of a larger campaign. But the strike itself remains a powerful tool—economically powerful, personally transformative to the participants, and inspiring to the public. The spreading wave of teacher strikes has won many material improvements for teachers and schools, and has raised teachers’ expectations across the country for what they and their students deserve. It has caught the public imagination, rallied whole communities behind the strikers, and put strikes back on the agenda. Optimists in the labor movement (and worriers in the business world) are asking, who’s next? Will workers in the private sector catch the strike spirit? In 2019 we saw General Motors auto workers, Toledo nurses, Pennsylvania locomotive workers, Uber and Lyft drivers, and Stop & Shop grocery workers all hit the bricks. Could this be the beginning of the next big upsurge? Let’s make it so.

#### Ethical communities are key to acting virtuously – means my offense procedurally outweighs.

#### Markulla 98 [“Ethics and Virtue.” Markkula Center. https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/ethics-and-virtue/. Published 1988] SHS ZS

At **the heart of** the **virtue** approach to **ethics** **is the** idea of "**community**". **A person's character traits are not developed in isolation, but within** and by the **communities to which he or she belongs**, including family, church, school, and other private and public associations. As people grow and mature, their **personalities are deeply affected by the values that their communities prize**, by the personality traits that their communities encourage, and by the role models that their communities put forth for imitation through traditional stories, fiction, movies, television, and so on. **The virtue approach urges us to** **pay attention to** the contours of **our communities and the habits of character they encourage and instill**. The **moral life,** then, **is not simply a matter of following moral rules** and of learning to apply them to specific situations. The **moral life is also a matter of** trying to **determine the kind of people we should be and of attending to the development of character within our communities** and ourselves.

# UV

#### [1] Utilitarianism fails – multiple warrants.

**Cleveland** [Cleveland, Paul A. “The Failure of Utilitarian Ethics in Political Economy.” Independent Institute. <https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602>. Published 1 September 2002]

The Problem of Making Interpersonal Comparisons Among the many difficulties encountered in Bentham?s approach, the first is that **it is impossible to make interpersonal comparisons**. It is a well-known fact that different **people have different tastes**. In addition, there are differences in personalities and talents that different people possess **and these differences give rise to differences in** their **goals** and ambitions. All these variations in turn give rise to a fundamental fact of human existence. Namely, that **it is impossible** for us **to** know or **measure the extent of either pleasure or pain for any specific person** in any particular situation. Such measures are beyond the capacity of our ability to know. **While human beings can** most certainly **empathize** with someone who is experiencing extreme hardship or enjoying great success, such **efforts are only accomplished by projecting one’s own inward feelings to someone else’s** circumstance. One person simply cannot accurately know the depth of another person’s pain nor the height of his joy. While Bentham at least recognized this problem, it did not discourage him from his ultimate pursuit. Instead, he continued to promote his new ethical philosophy and argued that it was the only way that we could go. Therefore, he pressed for a way to measure happiness. While he was never able to arrive at such a measure, he remained confident that one would soon be developed and even used the term utils as the units in which it would be measured. Economists have long since given up on the search for a cardinal measure of utility. Strangely enough however, welfare economists continue to act as if we can actually accomplish the impossible task by attempting to measure deadweight losses within the context of modern price theory. It is the rise in the prominence of welfare analysis that has given **utilitarianism** a standing in modern policy debates. However, such efforts **cannot escape the reality that** such **measures cannot be made**. With no adequate way to measure utility in order to make the necessary interpersonal comparisons, all such policy arguments are reduced to contests where each side claims that the rewards to be received by them would greatly outweigh whatever pain might be incurred by those who are forced to bear the costs. B. An Inadequate Conception of Human Nature Another problem with **utilitarianism** is that it **has a very narrow conception of what it means to be a human being**. Within Bentham’s view, human beings are essentially understood to be passive creatures who respond to the environment in a purely mechanical fashion. As such, **there are no “bad” motives, only “bad” calculations**. In these terms, **no person is responsible for his or her own behavior.** In effect, the idea being promoted is that human action is essentially the same as that of a machine in operation. **This** notion **reduces a human thought to** nothing more **than a series of bio-chemical reactions**. Yet, if this is true, **then there is no meaning to human thought or human action and all human reason is reduced to the point of being meaningless**.[[6]](https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602" \l "_ftn6" \o ") Beyond this problem, it also seems a little absurd to argue that since all human beings seek pleasure and avoid pain, that we can conclude that such a fact ought then be used as the foundation upon which an ethical theory ought to be constructed. As Opitz points out, **Words like pleasure** happiness, or satisfaction **are** what might be called “**container words**.” **They are words needing a content,** like the word “assistant.” When someone tells you he is an assistant, you are told nothing about his actual job. All you know is that he is not an executive. To make it specific, the job of being an assistant needs some entity to hook up with. Similarly, happiness or pleasure. **There is no such entity as pleasure or happiness**; these are mental states which may be associated with many different things.[[7]](https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602" \l "_ftn7" \o ") Since this is true, **pleasure cannot be the goal of human action in and of itself**. **It is simply the by-product** of human action which is actually aimed at the attainment of some specific goal or end. To be sure, people rarely seek to refine their tastes by considering such qualitative issues until they are well fed, clothed, and housed, but that fact does not mean that such issues are unimportant. Even that great proponent of utilitarianism, J. S. Mill, came to understand this point. As a result, he too began to recognize that happiness was not something that could be had directly and tried to introduce qualitative factors into his utilitarianism. Regrettably, Mill did not press the implication of this insight to its final conclusion. If he had, he would have abandoned his utilitarianism in favor of some other ethical philosophy. The reason why this is so is that **an effort to include qualitative factors into one’s ethical thinking** necessarily **requires an appeal to some ideal**. That is, Mill must have in mind some concept or idea of what human beings ought to be, rather than what they in fact are, if he is going to include qualitative factors in his analysis. When this is done, one is forced back into the mode of the traditional ethical philosophies that existed prior to the utilitarian project. If one has an ideal of what men should be, then that ideal establishes a standard of moral behavior apart from the pursuit of pleasure itself. As Copleston comments on the matter: Hence **there must be a standard of excellence**; and this is not fully worked out. The relevant point in the present context, however, is not Mill’s failure to elaborate a theory of human nature. Rather is it the fact that he grafts on to Benthamism a moral theory which has little or nothing to do with balancing of pleasures and pains according to the hedonistic calculus of Bentham, and that he does not see the necessity of subjecting his original starting-point to a thorough criticism and revision.[[8]](https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602" \l "_ftn8" \o ") C. The Fallacy of Composition A final problem with **utilitarianism** that ought to be mentioned is that it **is subject to** being criticized because of **a** potential **fallacy of composition**. **The common good is not** necessarily **the sum of the interests of individuals**. In their book, A History of Economic Theory and Method, Ekelund and Hebert provide a well-conceived example to demonstrate this problem. They write: **It is** presumably **in the** general **interest of American society to have every automobile** in the United States **equipped with** all **possible safety devices**. **However**, a majority of **individual car buyers may not be willing to pay the cost** of such equipment in the form of higher auto prices. **In this case, the collective interest does not coincide with the sum of the individual interests.** The result is a legislative and economic dilemma. [[9]](https://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602" \l "_ftn9" \o ") Indeed, individuals prone to political action, and held under the sway of utilitarian ethics, will likely be willing to decide in favor of the supposed collective interest over and against that of the individual. But then, **what happens to individual human rights**? Are they not sacrificed and set aside as unimportant? In fact, this is precisely what has happened. In democratic countries the destruction of human liberty that has taken place in the past hundred years has occurred primarily for this reason. In addition, **such thinking largely** **served as** the **justification for the mass murders of millions** **of innocent people in communist countries** where the leaders sought to establish the “workers’ paradise.” To put the matter simply, utilitarianism offers no cohesive way to discern between the various factions competing against one another in political debates and thus fails to provide an adequate guide for ethical human action. The failure of utilitarianism at this point is extremely important for a whole host of policy issues. Among them, the issue of the government’s provision of public goods is worth our consideration.