# 1NC

### 1

#### Interpretation – the aff may not defend that the appropriation of outer space by a certain set of private entities is unjust.

#### Entities is a generic bare plural

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 August 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a definite singular since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with bare singulars (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to this topic – a] entities is an existential bare plural bc it has no determiner b] The sentence “The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust” does not imply “the appropriation of outer space by private and public entities is unjust” c] Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### Violation – they spec South Korean entities

#### Standards

#### 1] Limits – they can spec infinite different countries like India, Jordan, Syria, Iran, US, SoKo, NoKo, etc.. - that’s supercharged by the ability to spec combinations of types of entities. This takes out functional limits – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of entities, governments, and appropriation.

#### 2] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

#### Competing interps – it tells the negativewhat we do and do not have to prepared for – reaosnability is artbirary and causes race to the bottom

#### DTD to deter future abuse and bc we get no new DAs to whole rez in the nr

#### No RVIs – incentivizes baiting theory

### 2

#### The Republic of Korea ought to:

#### --Announce that appropriation of outer space by private actors violates the Outer Space Treaty and that this is a settled matter of customary international law

#### --Announce that this action is taken pursuant to *opinio juris* (the belief that the action is taken pursuant to a legal obligation) and that non-compliant actors are in violation of international law

#### --Fully comply, not appropriating outer space in a manner inconsistent with these proclamations

#### Solves the Aff.

[Fabio](https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021) **Tronchetti 8**. Dr. Fabio Tronchetti works as a Co-Director of the Institute of Space Law and Strategy and as a Zhuoyue Associate Professor at Beihang University, “The Non–Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of International Law: A New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,” Air and Space Law, Volume 33, No 3, 2008, <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021>, RJP, **DebateDrills**.

The non–appropriation principle represents the fundamental rule of the space law system. Since the beginning of the space era, it has allowed for the safe and orderly development of space activities. Nowadays, however, the principle is under attack. Some proposals, arguing the need for abolishing it in order to promote commercial use of outer space are undermining its relevance and threatening its role as a guiding principle for present and future space activities. This paper aims at safeguarding the non–appropriative nature of outer space by suggesting a new interpretation of the non–appropriation principle that is based on the view that this principle should be regarded as a customary rule of international law of a special character, namely ‘a structural norm’ of international law.

#### That competes ---

#### 1] Widespread support for OST overhaul means a new treaty is likely---top military leaders are pushing it.

Theresa **Hitchens 21**. Theresa Hitchens is the Space and Air Force reporter at Breaking Defense. The former Defense News editor was a senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Before that, she spent six years in Geneva, Switzerland as director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). “US Should Push New Space Treaty: Atlantic Council,” Breaking Defense, April 12, 2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/04/us-should-push-new-space-treaty-atlantic-council/>, RJP, **DebateDrills**

WASHINGTON: The US should push hard to overhaul the entire international legal framework for outer space — including replacing the foundational [1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST),](https://breakingdefense.com/tag/outer-space-treaty/) a new report from the Atlantic Council says.

As it moves to do so, the US also should more aggressively court allies with an eye to establishing a “collective security alliance for space” among likeminded countries to “deter aggression” and defend “key resources and access.”

“The 1967 Treaty is dated. It was written, literally, in a different era,” said former Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James in an Atlantic Council briefing today. “At present it is too broad, and in some cases it’s probably overly specific.”

The year-long study, [“The Future of Security In Space: A Thirty-Years US Strategy”](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TheFutureofSecurityinSpace.pdf)was co-chaired by James and retired Marine Corps Gen. Hoss Cartwright, former vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In essence, it argues that the US needs to lead international efforts to craft a new rules-based regime to govern all space activities — from exploration to commercial ventures to military interactions. As the two argued in a recent [op-ed in Breaking D,](https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/the-space-rush-new-us-strategy-must-bring-order-regulation/) “Great-power competition among the United States, China, and Russia has launched into outer space without rules governing the game.”

“The international law of space, centered on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is outdated and insufficient for a future of space in which economic activity is primary. The international community needs a new foundational space treaty, and the United States should precipitate its negotiation,” the study argues.

James elaborated that the idea would be to craft a more expansive treaty that covers emerging issues like debris mitigation and removal and [commercial extraction of resources](https://breakingdefense.com/tag/space-resource-extraction/) from the Moon and/or asteroids. That said, she stressed that the US should not abandon the OST — which has been signed by 193 nations — unless and until something new is there to replace it.

#### 2] Space law is typically treaty-based---Russian and Chinese proposals prove.

Stephanie **Nebehay 8**. Reporter, Reuters, “China, Russia to Offer Treaty to Ban Arms in Space,” Reuters, January 26, 2008, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arms-space/china-russia-to-offer-treaty-to-ban-arms-in-space-idUSL2578979020080125>, RJP, **DebateDrills**

GENEVA (Reuters) - China and Russia will submit a joint proposal next month for an international treaty to ban the deployment of weapons in outer space, a senior Russian arms negotiator said on Friday.

Valery Loshchinin, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations-sponsored Conference on Disarmament, said the draft treaty would be presented to the 65-member forum on February 12.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is due to address the Geneva forum, which constitutes the world’s main disarmament negotiating body, on that day. Loshchinin gave no details on the proposal which has been circulated to some senior diplomats.

Tensions between Russia and the United States have deepened in recent years over U.S. plans to revive its stalled “Star Wars” program from the 1980s with a new generation of missile defense shields.

Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are banned from space under a 1967 international treaty. But Washington’s plans have stirred concerns about non-nuclear arms in space.

#### 3] Treaties are the foundation of space law.

Sophie **Goguichvili et. al 21**. Program Associate, the Wilson Center, “The Global Legal Landscape of Space: Who Writes the Rules on the Final Frontier?” The Wilson Center, October 1, 2021, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/global-legal-landscape-space-who-writes-rules-final-frontier>, RJP, **DebateDrills**

As previously mentioned, a series of treaties adopted by the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) form the foundation of the global space governance system. The first and most significant of these treaties is the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” more commonly known as the **Outer Space Treaty**or**OST** for short (1967). The Outer Space Treaty is considered the most comprehensive space treaty and provides the basic framework for international space law, namely: the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes by all States for the benefit of mankind (Art. I); the outlaw of national appropriation or claims of sovereignty of outer space or celestial objects (Art. II); a ban on the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies (Art. IV); that astronauts should be regarded as the envoys of mankind (Art. V); and that States are required to supervise the activities of their national entities (Art. VI).

#### We solve better, since CIL is far superior to treaties for space AND causes follow-on.

Koplow, 9 – Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.

David A. Koplow, “ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 30, Summer 2009. <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1452&context=facpub>

Finally, the Article concludes with some policy recommendations, suggesting mechanisms for the world community to press forward with autonomous efforts to promote stability and security in outer space, even in the face of recalcitrance from the leading space powers. I would certainly support the negotiation and implementation of a comprehensive new treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space, and a carefully drafted, widely accepted accord could accomplish much, well beyond what customary law alone could create. But the treaty process, too, has costs and disadvantages, and the world need not pursue just one of these alternatives in isolation.

If the absence of global consensus currently inhibits agreements that countries could already sign, perhaps the world community can nevertheless get some "satisfaction" via the operation of CIL, constructing a similar (although not completely equivalent) edifice of international regulation of ASATs based simply on what countries do.

### 3

#### The plan requires clarifying international space law---causes strategic bargaining to extract concessions – no normal means defended by the aff means we get to stick them with it

Alexander William Salter 16, Assistant Professor of Economics, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, "SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS", 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 (2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf

V. MITIGATION VS. REMOVAL

Relying on international law to create an environment conducive to space debris removal initially seems promising. The Virginia school of political economy has convincingly shown the importance of political-legal institutions in creating the incentives that determine whether those who act within those institutions behave cooperatively or predatorily.47 In the context of space debris, the role of nation-states, or their space agencies, would be to create an international legal framework that clearly specifies the rules that will govern space debris removal and the interactions in space more generally. The certainty afforded by clear and nondiscriminatory48 rules would enable the parties of the space debris “social contract” to use efficient strategies for coping with space debris. However, this ideal result is, in practice, far from certain. To borrow a concept from Buchanan and Tullock’s framework,49 the costs of amending the rules in the case of international space law are exceptionally high. Although a social contract is beneficial in that it prevents stronger nation-states from imposing their will on weaker nation-states, it also creates incentives for the main spacefaring nations to block reforms that are overall welfare-enhancing but that do not sufficiently or directly benefit the stronger nations.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty) is the foundation for current international space law.50 All major spacefaring nations are signatories. Article VIII of this treaty is the largest legal barrier to space debris removal efforts. This article stipulates that parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction over objects they launch into space, whether in orbit or on a celestial body such as the Moon. This article means that American organizations, whether private firms or the government, cannot remove pieces of Chinese or Russian debris without the permission of their respective governments. Perhaps contrary to intuition, consent will probably not be easy to secure.

A major difficulty lies in the realization that much debris is valuable scrap material that is already in orbit. A significant fraction of the costs associated with putting spacecraft in orbit comes from escaping Earth’s gravity well. The presence of valuable material already in space can justifiably be claimed as a valuable resource for repairs to current spacecraft and eventual manufacturing in space. As an example, approximately 1,000 tons of aluminum orbit as debris from the upper stages of launch vehicles alone. Launching those materials into orbit could cost between $5 billion and $10 billion and would take several years.51 Another difficulty lies in the fact that no definition of space debris is currently accepted internationally. This could prove problematic for removal efforts, if there is disagreement as to whether a given object is useless space junk, or a potentially useful space asset. Although this ambiguity may appear purely semantic, resolving it does pose some legal difficulties. Doing so would require consensus among the spacefaring nations. The negotiation process for obtaining consent would be costly.

Less obvious, but still important, is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, normally referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention expanded on the issue of liability in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under the Liability Convention, any government “shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”52 In other words, if a US party attempts to remove debris and accidentally damages another nation’s space objects, the US government would be liable for damages. More generally, because launching states would bear costs associated with accidents during debris removal, those states may be unwilling to participate in or permit such efforts. In theory, insurance can partly remediate the costs, but that remediation would still make debris removal engagement less appealing.

A global effort to remediate debris would, by necessity, involve the three major spacefaring nations: the United States, Russia, and China.53 However, any effort would also require—at a minimum—a significant clarification and—at most —a complete overhaul of existing space law.54 One cannot assume that parties to the necessary political bargains would limit parleying to space-related issues. Agreements between sovereign nation-states must be self-enforcing.55 To secure consent, various parties to the change in the international legal-institutional framework may bargain strategically and may hold out for unrelated concessions as a way of maximizing private surplus. The costs, especially the decision-making costs, of changing the legal framework to secure a global response to a global commons problem are potentially quite high.

#### Russia uses negotiations to push the PPWT---erodes US space dominance---unilat solves

Michael Listner 18, JD, Regent University School of Law, the founder and principal of the legal and policy think-tank/consultation firm Space Law and Policy Solutions, Sept 17 2018, "The art of lawfare and the real war in outer space", The Space Review, www.thespacereview.com/article/3571/1

A battle for primacy in outer space took place on August 14, 2018, among the Russian Federation, the United States, and, indirectly, the People’s Republic of China. This battle did not involve the exotic technology of science fiction, antisatellite weapons (ASATs), or the incapacitation of satellites; it was not part of a hot war and did not even occur in outer space. Rather, it took place in the halls of the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, and concerned the interdiction of the hypothetical deployment of instrumentalities of a hot war in outer space. The carefully orchestrated arena for this battle by the proponents of banning so-called space weapons involved methodologies, institutions, and agents of international law but was undermined by a vigorous counterattack by the United States using the same forum and suite of instruments so skillfully levied against it.1 This battle, of course, is not a single instance but the latest skirmish of a much larger conflict involving real war in space.

There’s been significant attention—and overstatem­ent— about the effect of a proposed Space Force by the United States, including an arms race and dominance as articulated by the United States,2 yet little attention has been given to the contest that continues to be fought over outer space using the tools of international law and policy, both of which are instruments of “lawfare.” Maj. General Charles N. Dunlap, Jr. (retired)3 first defined lawfare in the paper “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts,” as “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”4 This definition can be expanded to the use of hard law, soft law, and non-governmental organizations and institutions within the international arena to achieve a national objective and geopolitical end that would otherwise require the use of hard power. As observed by General Dunlap, lawfare imputes the teachings of Sun Tzu in particular this teaching: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”5

Lawfare is not a new concept and has been used in many domains, but the tools brought to bear have become more prolific, and the domain of outer space has been and continues to be a theater where it is applied. The earliest example of lawfare (even though the term was not yet coined) in outer space occurred pre-Sputnik with Soviet Union attempting to use customary law to make claims of sovereignty extending beyond the atmosphere to the space above its territory. This claim was preempted by the launch of Sputnik 1 and the act of the satellite flying over the territory of other nations.6 The Eisenhower Administration saw this as an opportunity to meet a national space policy goal and likewise used customary law as an implement of lawfare and successfully created the principle of free access to outer space, which it utilized for photoreconnaissance activities in lieu of overflights of another nation’s sovereign airspace.7 The Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted to defeat this move using lawfare in the United Nations through a proposal that would have prohibited the use of outer space for the purpose of intelligence gathering.8

Since that setback, the art of lawfare in outer space has settled on the objective ascribed to another teaching of Sun Tzu:

“With regard to precipitous heights, if you proceed your adversary, occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. Remember, if the enemy has occupied precipitous heights before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.”9

The second part of this teaching exemplifies the role of lawfare in the present war in outer space: to employ the tools and institutions of international law as a means to legally corner an adversary and gain geopolitical advantage in soft power, with the aim of slowing and eroding the advantage that adversary has attained through preeminence in the domain of outer space, and replace it with their own. This objective is accomplished by two general means: legally-binding measures, most commonly in the form of treaties, and so-called non-binding measures couched as sustainability.

Lawfare in space continued in the intervening years between Sputnik-1 and the signature and ratification of the Outer Space Treaty and afterward. The weapon of choice: disarmament proposals for outer space. Provisions for banning so-called space weapons in the Outer Space Treaty were rejected by the Soviet Union in favor of separate arms control measures.10 These measures included proposals, some of which related to the proscription of ASATs, designed to not only gain an advantage in outer space but to gauge political intent and resolve.11

The lawfare offensive escalated after the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative with an effort curtail space-based missile defense technology through a ban on so-called space weapons and a proverbial arms race in outer space. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), introduced in 1985, continues to seek a legally binding measure to place any weapon in outer space, including those designed for self-defense. It spawned measures such as the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), co-sponsored by Russia and China. This and other measures have met resistance as unverifiable and certainly are not likely to gain the advice and consent of the US Senate for ratification. The end game of the use of lawfare in the form of efforts like PAROS—the latest attempt at which was defeated in Geneva—is to propose legally binding measures that proponents would ignore to their advantage in any event. The sponsors and advocates of these hard-law measures recognize they will not come to fruition but, in the process of promoting them, will enhance their soft power and moral authority, which can be applied to entice their adversary down.

Non-binding resolutions and measures in the form of political agreements and guidelines are being used concurrently in the lawfare engagement in outer space, where proposals for legally binding measures alone fall short of the goal of creating hard law and challenging dominance in outer space. These resolutions and measures, which emphasize sustainability, are designed to perform an end run around the formalities of a treaty to entice agreement on issues that would otherwise be unacceptable in a hard-law agreement. These measures have the dual effect to create soft-power support on the one hand and hard law on the other. This tool of lawfare, which uses clichés of cooperation and sustainability, is a ploy that applies the ambiguous nature of customary international law to achieve what cannot be done through treaties: to “entice the adversary away” and create legal and political constraints to bind and degrade its use of outer space or prevent it from maintaining its superiority, all the while allowing others to play catchup and replace one form of dominance with another. While lawfare is by nature asymmetric, this indirect approach could be considered a subset an irregular tactic of lawfare, as opposed to the use of formal treaties in lawfare.

The crux is that, like space objects used in outer space, international law and its implements are dual-use in that they can be used for proactive ends or weaponized, with those using the appliances of lawfare to encourage cession of the high ground choosing the latter rather than the former. The decision to weaponize international law and its institutions to prosecute this war in space brings into question the efficacy of new rules or norms. Indeed, the idea of expanding the jurisprudence of outer space through custom, as being suggested by the United States, and more recently gap-filling rules being suggested by academia that could become custom, presents the real chance that, rather than the creation of the ploughshare of sustainability, new and more effective swords for lawfare will be forged.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, “all war is deception.” In the case of outer space, the pretext in the current war in space is that an arms race and a hot war in outer space is inevitable, and can only be avoided by formal rules or international governance. Conversely, a hot war can be prevented in no small part by using lawfare to engage in the contemporary war in space using the tools of, and the abundant resources found in, the experience of attorneys and litigators in particular to supplement and support diplomats to extend the velvet glove when applicable, and bare knuckles when necessary. If the August 14 statement in Geneva is any indicator, the United States may have just done that and begun the shift from light-touch diplomacy to bringing its legal warriors to bear in full-contact lawfare to engage and win the current war in outer space and help deter a more serious hot war from occurring without sacrificing the superiority it possesses in outer space.

#### The PPWT prohibits space-based missile defense

Jack M. Beard 16, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, Feb 15 2016, "Soft Law ’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities", University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2016, <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1086&context=spacelaw>

B. Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space

Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on military activities or weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives or run afoul of issues that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.306 Some seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to ensure failure.

The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms control agreements or other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space. Unfortunately, the integration of modern military systems on earth, sea, air and space guarantees that at some point states seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary (such as the United States) to project power will find space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early stages of a crisis or conflict.307 The presence of so many things of military value in space thus makes actions by an adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.308

The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems certain to ensure stalemate involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent the weaponization of space. Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding arms control agreement is a daunting task, one which is made particularly challenging by the “essentially military nature of space technology.”309 As noted, space technologies are routinely viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses. Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may thus depend on discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal evaluation. 310

Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent difficulty in distinguishing most space weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive roles or even their specific missions.311 For example, this problem lies at the heart of debates over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, since the technology underlying BMD systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.312 Vague and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, but create instead their own confusion and insecurity. Vague and broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic.

These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT and BMD systems, have figured prominently in complicating negotiations on space weapons over previous decades.313 Similarly, these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the PPWT) since it prohibits states from placing any type of weapon in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus effectively prohibiting the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. 314 Furthermore, even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to technology in orbit around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by China with respect to its own proposed PPWT).315

#### Causes rogue state missile threats---that escalates

Patrick M. Shanahan 19, Acting Secretary of Defense from January to June 2019, previously vice president and general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems, Jan 2019, "2019 MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW", US Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF

U.S. Homeland Missile Defense will Stay Ahead of Rogue States’ Missile Threats

Technology trends point to the possibility of increasing rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Vulnerability to rogue state missile threats would endanger the American people and infrastructure, undermine the U.S. diplomatic position of strength, and could lead potential adversaries to mistakenly perceive the United States as susceptible to coercive escalation threats intended to preclude U.S. resolve to resist aggression abroad. Such misperceptions risk undermining our deterrence posture and messaging, and could lead adversaries to dangerous miscalculations regarding our commitment and resolve.

It is therefore imperative that U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective protection against rogue state missile threats to the homeland now and into the future. The United States is technically capable of doing so and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure for protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this MDR.

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense is fully consistent with the 2018 NPR, and in order to keep pace with the threat, DoD will utilize existing defense systems and an increasing mix of advanced technologies, such as kinetic or directed-energy boost-phase defenses, and other advanced systems. It is technically challenging but feasible over time, affordable, and a strategic imperative. It will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. Further, because the related requirements will evolve as the long-range threat posed by rogue states evolves,

it does not allow a static U.S. homeland defense architecture. Rather, it calls for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or conflict.

In coming years, rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland will likely expand in numbers and complexity. There are and will remain inherent uncertainties regarding the potential pace and scope of that expansion. Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people.

As U.S. active defenses for the homeland continue to improve to stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats, they could also provide a measure of protection against accidental or unauthorized missile launches. This defensive capability could be significant in the event of destabilizing domestic developments in any potential adversary armed with strategic weapons, and as long-range missile capabilities proliferate in coming years.

U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.

### 4

#### Counterplan text: North Korea and South Korea should establish a hotline to reduce miscalculation in space operations

Erwin 21

Sandra Erwin, [Senior staff writer; Writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector; She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense], 3 November 2021, “One way to help prevent wars in space? Military hotlines with Russia and China”, [https://spacenews.com/one-way-to-help-prevent-wars-in-space-military-hotlines-with-russia-and-china //](https://spacenews.com/one-way-to-help-prevent-wars-in-space-military-hotlines-with-russia-and-china%20//) AK

WASHINGTON — Hotlines between heads of states have long been established to reduce the risk that an accident or miscalculation might trigger a nuclear war. During recent U.S. military operations in the airspace above Syria, a hotline was set up with Russia to ensure safety of flight. With space now considered a domain of war, hotlines between U.S. and foreign rivals might be worth contemplating, said Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, U.S. Space Force deputy chief of space operations for operations, cyber and nuclear. Before joining the Space Force, Saltzman led air campaigns at U.S. Air Forces Central Command in the Middle East. “We had a hotline to the Russians because we were very concerned that a miscommunication with aircraft flying in close proximity in Syria would lead to a problem,” he said Nov. 3 during a conference call with U.S. and European reporters. “I don’t see any reason why a similar approach couldn’t work for the space domain,” Saltzman said. Saltzman is in Europe this week visiting allies. He said many of the conversations were about the “strategic competition” that is unfolding in the space domain between the U.S., China and Russia and the “lessons learned from history about miscommunication,” he said. During the air campaign over Syria, “the hotline that we used was to make as many of our operations as transparent as possible and attempt to avoid those miscommunications.” The risk of a mischaracterizing what any country is doing in space is even greater than in the air because objects in orbit are “hard to see,” he said. A civilian satellite conducting surveillance, for example, could be mistaken for a hostile counterspace weapon. “In space we literally can’t use our visual reference points. We have to rely on radar. We have to rely on telescopes, and that creates a level of uncertainty.” If there was a hotline, “at least we would have a discussion before we draw the wrong conclusions. And we currently don’t have that capability. But I think the idea merits a full scale discussion.” Saltzman on Nov. 3 gave a keynote speech at the Global Milsatcom 2021 conference in London. He said one of the themes was the desire for greater cooperation on space security. “Establishing responsible norms and behaviors is really a global concern. No one nation can establish those independently, and there’s so much shared capacity that we could leverage.” He said the United States remains “the most capable spacefaring nation in terms of the capabilities that we have on orbit.” But China poses a major challenge. “They can see that if they can take some of those capabilities from us, they can shift the tables in terms of of that strategic advantage,” Saltzman added. “And the most significant challenge isn’t any one system. It’s really the pace at which they’re developing all their systems. It’s such a broad array of counterspace capabilities that they’re pursuing and high end technologies, that what’s most concerning is just the speed at which they are going from ‘good idea’ to full scale capability that’s being demonstrated on orbit.” For the United States, “our challenge is going to be matching that pace, making sure that we’re paying attention, keeping good situational awareness of their developments.”

### Case

#### 1] 0 risk of solvency – nothing specific to the privte sector – the 1ar and 2ar on this are going to be about the Si-Soo evidence, but read through it – it literally flows neg by proving that there’s a state run tech developer that is making key pushes in the space industry in SoKo - means impact non uq

#### 2] Impact empirically denied – Clarke evidenc eindicates that SoKo has been part of this space race for years but nothing has come of it – that’s reason to be skeptical

#### 3] Launches non uq – NoKo has been annoyed about SoKo launches and tests of things like ICBMs for years but done nothing about it

#### 4] No impact – The Davis card is awful and just says that NoKo will be mad not that there is going to be any form of escalation and just says NoKo is devastatingly powerful – no escalation internal link

#### 6] They’ve read their internal in the wrong direction. South Korea’s private entities are being funneled by the military not the other way around, so the plan doesn’t stop public military engagement.

**1AC Si-soo 21** (Park Si-soo covers space industries in South Korea, Japan and other Asian countries. Park worked at The Korea Times — South Korea's leading English language newspaper — from 2007 to 2020. He earned a master’s degree in science journalism from Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology and a bachelor’s degree in business from Hanyang University. “South Korea to spend $593 million on public-to-private transfer of rocket technologies”. September 8, 2021.)

Starting next year, **South Korea’s government will transfer state-owned space launch vehicle technologies to domestic aerospace companies** in a move to help them penetrate an expanding global space launch market. To that end, **the government will spend 687 billion** won ($593 million) from 2022 through 2027, said the Ministry of Science and ICT, Sept. 7. Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) — **a state-run space technology developer** that **has played a central role in developing the nation’s first domestic space launch vehicle**, KSLV-2 — will be responsible for the public-to-private transfer, according to the ministry. KSLV-2, nicknamed Nuri, is a three-stage liquid-propellant rocket capable of sending a 1.5-ton satellite into low Earth orbit. The rocket is set to make its first demonstration flight in October from Naro Space Center in Goheung, the only launch site in South Korea. The transfer will be done in a way KARI and selected companies do joint development and launch tests. “The time has come to make a departure from state-led development of space launch vehicles toward one in which the private sector plays an expanded and more active role,” said Yong Hong-taek, the science ministry’s vice minister, in the statement. **The policy reconfirms the government’s commitment to accelerating public-to-private transfer of space technologies**. It comes as SpaceX and other innovative private companies play increasingly important roles in the global space industry. In the first move of this kind, since May, KARI and Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) have transferred their satellite-manufacturing technologies to a handful of major aerospace companies here. While the science ministry didn’t identify the companies that would benefit from the latest tech transfer, the most likely beneficiaries include Hanwha Aerospace, Innospace, Perigee Aerospace and Korean Air.

#### 7] This advantage is laughable. Their evidence is about space launches being bad and they have not nor can they read a single piece of evidence that rocket launches are private appropriation.

#### 8] By definition, they can engage in BMD drills terrestrially which is an alt cause to the advantage.

#### 9] US alliance commitments to SoKo as well as US private tests are all alt causes. They’ve read an impact card abut the NoKo targeting the US directly so the internal is next to nothing compared to our own tests.

#### 10] South Korean military space work is still squarely with the public. Future efforts are directly linked to public space appropriation not private.

**Kim 21** (Brian Kim is a Seoul based Reporter for DefenseNews. “With restrictions lifted, South Korea launches $13B space power scheme”. Sep 6, 2021)

**South Korea has launched a task force to further develop space capabilities for its military, following U.S. approval earlier this year to lift a restriction on the country’s missile production program.** The vice chief of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, which made the announcement Aug. 19, will lead the team made up of key personnel from the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Agency for Defense Development and other government organizations. “**The task force will** draw up a master plan, in cooperation with related organizations and industries, to **develop regulations, technologies, industries, facilities and** infrastructure concerned,” DAPA said in a statement. A week earlier, the agency **endorsed a plan to invest nearly $13 billion over the next decade to help local industries develop technologies for military satellites.** To that end, the Agency for Defense Development decided to transfer core satellite technologies to local defense contractors in preparation for the mass production of military satellites. “**Space programs can be developed further through active and organic cooperation between government agencies** to address the various demands from defense, science and technology, and industry,” Seo Hyung-jin, vice commissioner of DAPA, told reporters. “In that regard, the space task force will play an active role in boosting the space industry under a midterm and long-term road map.” The effort to bolster its space defense capability comes as the country saw limits removed on its rocket development in May. U.S. President Joe Biden and his South Korean counterpart, **Moon Jae-in, agreed to end a 42-year-old bilateral missile guideline that restricted Seoul’s ballistic missile range to 800 kilometers.**

#### 11] No kessler syndrome - **Military space satelties have already been broken up by space debris – their escalation scenario is absurd**

Wall 21’ Home News Spaceflight Space collision: Chinese satellite got whacked by hunk of Russian rocket in March By Mike Wall published August 17, 2021 We may see more and more of these orbital smashups in the coming years. //RD Debatedrills

Yunhai 1-02's wounds are not self-inflicted. In March, the U.S. Space Force's 18th Space Control Squadron (18SPCS) reported the breakup of Yunhai 1-02, a Chinese military satellite that launched in September 2019. It was unclear at the time whether the spacecraft had suffered some sort of failure — an explosion in its propulsion system, perhaps — or if it had collided with something in orbit. We now know that the latter explanation is correct, thanks to some sleuthing by astrophysicist and satellite tracker Jonathan McDowell, who's based at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Sponsored Links Cupertino: Startup Is Changing the Way People Retire SmartAsset Related: The worst space debris events of all time Click here for more Space.com videos... CLOSE On Saturday (Aug. 14), McDowell spotted an update in the Space-Track.org catalog, which the 18SPCS makes available to registered users. The update included "a note for object 48078, 1996-051Q: 'Collided with satellite.' This is a new kind of comment entry — haven't seen such a comment for any other satellites before," McDowell tweeted on Saturday. He dove into the tracking data to learn more. McDowell found that Object 48078 is a small piece of space junk — likely a piece of debris between 4 inches and 20 inches wide (10 to 50 centimeters) — from the Zenit-2 rocket that launched Russia's Tselina-2 spy satellite in September 1996. Eight pieces of debris originating from that rocket have been tracked over the years, he said, but Object 48078 has just a single set of orbital data, which was collected in March of this year. "I conclude that they probably only spotted it in the data after it collided with something, and that's why there's only one set of orbital data. So the collision probably happened shortly after the epoch of the orbit. What did it hit?" McDowell wrote in another Saturday tweet. Yunhai 1-02, which broke up on March 18, was "the obvious candidate," he added — and the data showed that it was indeed the victim. Yunhai 1-02 and Object 48078 passed within 0.6 miles (1 kilometer) of each other — within the margin of error of the tracking system — at 3:41 a.m. EDT (0741 GMT) on March 18, "exactly when 18SPCS reports Yunhai broke up," McDowell wrote in another tweet. Thirty-seven debris objects spawned by the smashup have been detected to date, and there are likely others that remain untracked, he added. Despite the damage, Yunhai 1-02 apparently survived the violent encounter, which occurred at an altitude of 485 miles (780 kilometers). Amateur radio trackers have continued to detect signals from the satellite, McDowell said, though it's unclear if Yunhai 1-02 can still do the job it was built to perform (whatever that may be). Space Junk Clean Up: 7 Wild Ways to Destroy Orbital Debris Click here for more Space.com videos... McDowell described the incident as the first major confirmed orbital collision since February 2009, when the defunct Russian military spacecraft Kosmos-2251 slammed into Iridium 33, an operational communications satellite. That smashup generated a whopping 1,800 pieces of trackable debris by the following October. However, we may be entering an era of increasingly frequent space collisions — especially smashups like the Yunhai incident, in which a relatively small piece of debris wounds but doesn't kill a satellite. Humanity keeps launching more and more spacecraft, after all, at an ever-increasing pace. "Collisions are proportional to the square of the number of things in orbit," McDowell told Space.com. "That is to say, if you have 10 times as many satellites, you're going to get 100 times as many collisions. So, as the traffic density goes up, collisions are going to go from being a minor constituent of the space junk problem to being the major constituent. That's just math." We may reach that point in just a few years, he added. The nightmare scenario that satellite operators and exploration advocates want to avoid is the Kessler syndrome — a cascading series of collisions that could clutter Earth orbit with so much debris that our use of, and travel through, the final frontier is significantly hampered. RELATED STORIES — Who's going to fix the space junk problem? — Space junk removal is not going smoothly — The world needs space junk standards, G7 nations agree Our current space junk problem is not that severe, but the Yunhai event could be a warning sign of sorts. It's possible, McDowell said, that Object 48078 was knocked off the Zenit-2 rocket by a collision, so the March smashup may be part of a cascade. "That's all very worrying and is an additional reason why you want to remove these big objects from orbit,"

#### 12] No space wars --- dependence on space creates a de facto taboo

Triezenberg, 17

Bonnie Triezenberg, Senior engineer at RAND. Previously, she was the senior technical fellow at the Boeing Company, specializing in agile systems and software development. “Deterring Space War: An Exploratory Analysis Incorporating Prospect Theory into a Game Theoretic Model of Space Warfare,” RAND Corporation. 2017. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD400.html>

The above discussion suggests that a likely means to achieve deterrence of acts of war in outer space is to increase civilian dependence on space to support day-to-day life—if everyone on earth is equally dependent on space, no one has an incentive to destroy space. Largely by accident, this dependence appears to have, in fact, occurred. The space age was born in an age of affluence and rapid economic expansion; space quickly became a domain of international commerc

e as well as a domain of national military use. Space assets and the systems they enable have transformed social, infrastructure and information uses perhaps more visibly than they have transformed military uses. In fact, in the current satellite database published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, of the 1461 satellites in orbit 40% support purely commercial ventures, while only 16% have a strictly military use.46 The first commercial broadcast by a satellite in geo-synchronous orbit was of international news between Europe and the United States.47 The first telephony uniting the far flung islands of Indonesia was enabled by satellite48. Those of us who are old enough remember the 1960s “magic” of intercontinental phone calls and international “breaking news” delivered by satellite. Today, most social and infrastructure uses of space are taken for granted – even in remote locales of Africa, people expect to be able to monitor the weather, communicate seamlessly with colleagues and to find their way to new and unfamiliar locations using the GPS in their phones. All of us use space every day.49 These unrestricted economic and social uses of space may be the best deterrent, making everyone on all sides of combat equally dependent on space and heightening the taboo against weaponizing space or threatening space assets with weapons.

#### 12] Cyber war is massively exaggerated

Valeriano 13

BRANDON VALERIANO is Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow, RYAN MANESS is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Illinois at Chicago, The Ducks of Minerva, January 29, 2013, " Perceptions and Opinions of the Cyber Threat", http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/01/perceptions-and-opinions-of-the-cyber-threat.html

Cyberwar is a pressing international security problem. The news media breathlessly covers any potential attack before the facts are in. Policy briefs and reports are produced on all levels of government and private industry. It would then behoove us to take a step back and examine opinions about the cyber security threat according to perceptions among policymakers, academics, and cyber security experts in order to understand how the threat emanating from the cyber security realm is constructed in the public discourse. Each constituency has its own view on the issue and how these views manifest is critical to perceptions about the wider societal threat coming from cyberspace.

According to Allison’s bureaucratic model of politics, where you sit in government determines where you stand or what opinions you have. Through surveys we can see that process play out. It is in the interest of cyber security experts to inflate the cyber threat. It is also in the interests of the news media to breathlessly hype up cyber fears to gain more page views. The threat of cyberwar is a real and pressing threat, but constrained by institutions and systems that limit the damage the tactic can do. Just how serious this threat is perceived can be predicted by one’s institutional setting and standard operating procedures.

On January 30, 2012, technological experts from around the globe were surveyed by McAfee and the Security and Defense Agenda (SDA) about the issue of cyberwar. Fifty-seven percent of these practitioners believe that states are currently engaged in a cyber “arms race.” It is unclear what a cyber arms race really is in this context (the raw data from the survey is not online) but the general idea is that capabilities and the threat from this issue area are increasing at all levels. Other findings in the survey are just as troubling and mystifying. Forty-three percent believe the worst case scenario, damage and disruption to a state’s critical infrastructure is also the most likely. A further forty five percent believe that cyber-security is just as pressing an issue as border security. Apparently, the great powers such as the US, UK, and Germany are lacking in their “cyber-readiness” when compared to smaller states such as Israel and Sweden mainly because they fail to share information internally rather than having any specific deterrent capabilities, at least according to the McAfee report.

With these opinions in mind, the SDA asked respondents which actions should be taken to curb this newest threat to international security. Opinions on the next course of action are just as troubling as the survey results. Apparently, a “global information sharing network should be established by states.” This is an odd perspective in that cyber threats are not uniform across states and centralizing the network could put states in a more vulnerable position. The next idea is to provide “financial incentives for improvements in security in both the private and public sectors.” An interesting proposal advocating bribery to improve networks much in the same way a parent bribes a child to do their homework. Finally, “diplomats need to start addressing this issue with more urgency,” with the help of cyber security experts (the subjects of the survey) of course. I would guess the next step is for a color coded cyber terror warning indicator (I suggest the highest threat be the color of Mountain Dew in order to honor the true cyber warriors – teenage hackers and computer programmers).

Why would the majority of cyber security practitioners argue for such expensive, expansive, and urgent measures when the biggest attack, arguably Stuxnet, required a physical injection of software to take effect? Clearly there is an interest to promote this threat

in the cyber security community.

In contrast, the TRIP survey asked a sample of academics from U.S. universities “What are the top foreign policy problems facing the United States?” They were pitted against practitioners within the U.S. government who work within the national security apparatus (PDF). Academics deemed cybersecurity the least pressing foreign policy problem with only eight percent suggesting it is a top problem. This falls right behind the fear of oil reliance (12%) and global poverty (12%). Policymakers rank cybersecurity nearly as low as academics with 17 percent finding this a top foreign policy problem right above the issue of climate change (eight percent), global poverty (three percent), and oil reliance (four percent).

Academics find cybersecurity one of the least pressing threats in the system and policymakers tend to agree generally. So why is cybersecurity such a pressing issue according to the news media and cyber security practitioners? One might argue that cyber security practitioners know the reality better than academics and policymakers; suggesting their warnings about the coming cyber threat is just a harbinger to the future. Using the bureaucratic politics model, others might conclude that the cyber security industry is a biased party whose interests lie in promoting the cyber threat. The news media just parrots these perspectives because the quotes come easy and the news stories prey on the fear the average citizen holds towards technology. The danger in declaring cyberwar a ‘top threat’ comes from distracting our attention from more pressing problems like collapsing states, human rights abuses, the proliferation of terrorism and WMDs, and internal violence in the form of civil war. Cyberwar is a dangerous issue in contemporary security politics, but it is nowhere near the top threat facing the United States.

### 5

#### Threats are constructed – their security discourse creates a self fulfilling prophecy that makes true understanding of structural causes behind “threats” impossible.

**Mack 91:** Dr. Mack, professor at Harvard Medical School, 1991, (John E., “The Psychodynamics of International Relationships” Vol 1 p. 58-59)

Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with an argument that, reduced to its essentials , goes something like this: “It’s very well to psychologize but my enemy is real. The Russians (or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans) are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real struggles between us and them and differing national interests: competition over oil, land or scarce resources and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations (or political systems) It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance of superiority of (military and political) power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness.” This argument is neither wrong nor right, but instead simply limited. It fails to grapple with a critical distinction that informs the entire subject. Is the threat really generated by the enemy as it appears to be at any given moment, or is it based on one’s own contribution to the threat, derived from distortion of perception by provocative words and actions in a cycle of enmity and externalization of responsibility? In sum, the enemy IS real, but we have not learned to identify our own role in creating that enemy or in elaborating the threatening image we hold of the other group or country and its actual intentions or purposes. “we never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to asses his will with anything approaching objectivity.”

#### We’ve inserted lines from their aff in the doc that prove the link:

Salter – “we could **avoid** the dangers of **factionalism**”

Harrison - counterspace capabilities that could threaten the U.S. military

Dvorsky 15 – “that a single Kessler event could hit the LEO zone or the GEO zone”

#### Their security discourse causes genocide and interventionism in the name of cleansing the world of violent “others”

Friis 2k - Friis, UN Sector at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2k, (Karsten, Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” <http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2>). NS

The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by representation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation

. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

#### The alternative is to reject securitization – this opens up space for emancipatory political engagement.

**Neocleous:** [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of securityaltogether **-** to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world'and reiteration of one fear**,** anxiety and insecurity after **another** will also make it hard to do**.** But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles **t**hat arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character ofsecurity on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole**."**' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word.What this might mean**,** precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state;it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'