# NC

### 1

#### Interpretation – the Aff may not specify a specific subset of medicines

#### Violation – They spec patents based on indigenous knowledge

#### Medicines is a generic bare plural

**Leslie and Lerner 16** [Sarah-Jane Leslie (Ph.D., Princeton, 2007) is the dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. She has previously served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. She is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy], and Adam Lerner, Ph.D, Postgraduate Research Associate in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University, 4-24-2016, accessed 9-4-2021, "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/>] HWIC

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) does not entail that animals are striped, but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### It applies to this topic – “Member nations ought to reduce IP for covid – therefore, member nations ought to reduce IP for all” is illogical

#### 1] Limits: There’s inf medicines they could specify, coupled with various types of countries. Kills neg burdens – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of the 195 countries and medicines.

#### 2] TVA Solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff. We aren’t stopping them from reading new FWs, mechanisms, or advantages. PICs don’t solve – it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff making it impossible for me to win

Drop the debater bc you can’t drop the arg on their advocacy

No rvis – they can dump on theory in the 1ar, chilling us from checking abuse

Competing interps – reasonability is arbtiary and causes race to the bottom

T before 1ar theory for norms – we only have two months to set T norms

### 2

#### Interpretation: reduce means to diminish

**Idaho State Court of Appeals 03**

(State v. Knutsen, 71 P. 3d 1065 - Idaho: Court of Appeals 2003) EE

By its plain language, Rule 35 grants a district court the authority within a limited period of time to reduce or modify a defendant's sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction. To "reduce" means to diminish in size, amount, extent or number, or to make smaller, lessen or shrink. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1905 (1993). To "modify" means to make more temperate and less extreme, or to lessen the severity of something. Id. at 1452. Thus, under the plain meaning of its language, Rule 35 authorizes a district court to diminish, lessen the severity of, or make more temperate a defendant's sentence. An order placing a defendant on probation lessens the severity of a defendant's sentence and thus falls within the district court's authority granted by Rule 35. Other state jurisdictions have held likewise in interpreting similar rules for reduction of sentence. See [State v. Knapp, 739 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Wy.1987)](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1318610396541051353&q=%22the+term+reduce%22+OR+%22the+word+reduce%22+OR+%22the+phrase+reduce%22+OR+%22reduce+means%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) (similar rule of criminal procedure authorizes reduction of a sentence of incarceration to probation); [People v. Santana, 961 P.2d 498, 499 (Co.Ct.App.1997)](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17890892396701062585&q=%22the+term+reduce%22+OR+%22the+word+reduce%22+OR+%22the+phrase+reduce%22+OR+%22reduce+means%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) (grant of probation is a "reduction" under Colorado Cr. R. 35(b)).

#### Reductions must be permanent

**New York Supreme Court 3rd Appellate Division**

(MATTER OF MONTESANI v. Levitt, 9 AD 2d 51 - NY: Appellate Div., 3rd Dept. 1959) EE

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway. The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### Violation: their aff is about elimination, not reduction

#### Vote neg for limits and ground –affs that use different words instead of reduce open the floodgates to delay and conditions affs that could hypothetically result in future reductions. These affs don’t materially change the status quo which destroys neg link uniqueness and avoids core topic questions of medical IP good/bad in favor of burner condition-of-the-week affs that gain advantages from the most extreme of crises.

#### No 1ar theory – it’s irresolvable since their responses to my counterinterp will always be new. 2] it splits the 2N since we have to cover substance and overcover theory 3] worst case, it’s just a reason to drop the arg, not the team bc we’re not that unfair

### 2

#### The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently eliminate patents on medicines based on Indigenous knowledge from patentability

Afghanistan Albania Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Belize Benin Bolivia, Plurinational State of Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cabo Verde Cambodia Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Côte d’Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Estonia Eswatini European Union (formerly EC) Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong, China Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea, Republic of Kuwait, the State of Kyrgyz Republic Lao People’s Democratic Republic Latvia Lesotho Liberia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao, China Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova, Republic of Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Macedonia Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia Solomon Islands South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Suriname Sweden Switzerland Chinese Taipei Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change.

The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization.

We should abolish it.

#### Solves the case---abolition allows free trade and permits nations govern without the pitfalls of the WTO

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

Abandoning the W.T.O. is a start. The United States must seek new arrangements and new rules, in concert with other free nations, to restore America’s economic sovereignty and allow this country to practice again the capitalism that made it strong. History can be our guide. For nearly 50 years before the W.T.O.’s founding, the United States and its allies maintained a network of reciprocal trade that protected our national interests and the nation’s workers. We can do it again, for the 21st century. That means returning production to this country, securing our critical supply chains and encouraging domestic innovation and manufacturing. It means striking trade deals that are truly mutual and truly beneficial for America and walking away when they are not. It means building a new network of trusted friends and partners to resist Chinese economic imperialism.

#### Counterplan competes ---

#### 1] Normal means---it’s a TRIPs waiver, which doesn’t make sense if TRIPs and the WTO doesn’t exist

James **Bacchus 20**. Member of the [Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies](https://www.cato.org/herbert-stiefel-center-trade-policy-studies), the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. “An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines,” CATO, December 16, 2020, <https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

In a sign of their increasing frustration with global efforts to ensure that all people everywhere will have access to COVID-19 vaccines, several developing countries have asked other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to join them in a sweeping waiver of the intellectual property (IP) rights relating to those vaccines. Their waiver request raises anew the recurring debate within the WTO over the right balance between the protection of IP rights and access in poorer countries to urgently needed medicines. But the last thing the WTO needs is another debate over perceived trade obstacles to public health.

#### 2] “Member” is defined as part of a group---the counterplan abolishes the broader group

**Merriam Webster n.d.** “Member,” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/member>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

**:**one of the individuals composing a group

#### 3] “Member of” means “to be contained in” “to be included in” and “be part of” --- none of those are possible if the broader group is gone.[[1]](#footnote-1)

#### The WTO as an institution is unethical and perpetuates colonialism

Godrej 20

(Dinyar, Co-editor @ New Internationalist, 4-20, https://newint.org/features/2020/02/10/brief-history-impoverishment)

For countries that were undergoing economic ravishment by structural adjustment, the 1990s brought new torments in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a club dominated by rich nations. In the name of creating a ‘level playing field’, the WTO required poorer countries to sign up to an all-or-nothing, binding set of rules, which removed protections for domestic industries and allowed foreign capital unhindered access. This was strongly prejudicial to the interests of local industries, which were not in a position to withstand foreign competition. Influence within the WTO is weighted by the size of a nation’s economy – thus even if all poorer nations joined forces to demand policy changes they would still not have a chance against wealthy nations. This trade injustice has drawn widespread protests and pressure for the WTO to reform. Meanwhile, wealthy nations are increasingly going down the route of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Usually negotiated in secret, the interests of their corporations are paramount in FTAs and include the ability to sue states for eye-watering sums (should they, for example, want to terminate a contract or nationalize an industry) with no provision for states to do the same. Such instruments are working to create a utopia for transnational corporations, creating a business-friendly climate, which translates as the demolition of labour protection, tax cuts for the wealthiest and a supine regulatory environment. Tax havens operated by the richest countries are home to huge sums of illicit wealth draining out of some of the poorest. Today, due to how the global economy has been engineered, for every dollar of aid sent to poorer countries, they lose 10 times as much in outflows – and that’s before one counts their losses through unfair trade rules and underpaid labour. Foreign investors take nearly $500 billion a year in profits from the Global South, and trade-power imbalances cost poorer nations $700 billion a year in lost export revenue. 7 CONCENTRATION In the 21st century wealth increasingly flows through corporate hands towards a small super-elite. In a trend that began in the 1990s, the lion’s share of equity value is being realized through squeezing workers: the classification ‘working poor’ so familiar in the Global South is now increasingly also being used in the wealthy North, where neoliberal capitalism is leading inevitably to wage erosion and work precarity, coupled with the withdrawal of state support. Inequality is rising dramatically. In 2018 the richest 26 people owned wealth equivalent to the poorest half of the world’s population. And their wealth was increasing at the rate of $2.5 billion a day. Meanwhile 3.4 billion people – nearly half the world – were living on less than $5.50 a day.

#### Allows rampant Chinese tech theft and enrichment

Josh **Hawley 20**. Senator from Missouri, JD @ Yale, “The W.T.O. Should Be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

The reformers wanted all the world to follow the same economic rules, so that capital, products, and people could move easily across national boundaries. Nation-states themselves would become less important in setting economic policy and new, multilateral institutions, like the W.T.O., would take on the role of managing the global economy.

It was a bold vision, and a major departure. The economic system it replaced had been created by America and its allies at the close of the Second World War and pursued more modest aims. The Cold War system sought to build up the free nations’ economies and to contain the Soviet Union. It took the independent nation-state as its basic building block, and encouraged trade and investment between nations as equal sovereigns. This system allowed each country to set its own internal economic policy and control its borders and trade.

But in the early 1990s, with America’s principal adversary gone, Western policymakers were in a messianic frame of mind. President George H.W. Bush [promised](https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-the-45th-session-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-new-york) a “new world order” of “open borders, open trade … and open minds,” a new international system based on liberal values to bring peace to the world. He and other internationalists wanted a new economic system to match.

That new order’s universal peace never quite arrived. Instead, the internationalists embroiled America in one foreign war after another. And their liberal economic order fared little better. It sent American production overseas, compromised American supply chains, and cost American jobs, all while enriching Communist China.

Take the World Trade Organization. Its mandate was to promote free trade, but the organization instead allowed some nations to maintain trade barriers and protectionist workarounds, like China, while preventing others from defending themselves, like the United States. Foreign agriculture won concession after concession, while American farmers struggled to get fair access to markets. Meanwhile, the W.T.O. required American workers to compete against Chinese [forced labor](https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/CECC%20Staff%20Report%20March%202020%20-%20Global%20Supply%20Chains%2C%20Forced%20Labor%2C%20and%20the%20Xinjiang%20Uyghur%20Autonomous%20Region.pdf) but did next to nothing to stop Chinese theft of American intellectual property and products.

Under the W.T.O.’s auspices, capital and goods moved across borders easier than before, no doubt, but so did jobs. And too many jobs left America’s borders for elsewhere. As factories closed, workers suffered, from small towns to the urban core. Inflation adjusted, working wages stagnated and upward mobility flatlined.

Enough is enough. The W.T.O. should be abolished, and along with it, the new model global economy. The quest to turn the world into a liberal order of democracies was always misguided. It always depended on unsustainable American sacrifice and force of arms. And its companion economic order has, in similar vein, succeeded mostly in weakening American workers and industry.

We must face facts. The only sure way to confront the single greatest threat to American security in the 21st century, Chinese imperialism, is to rebuild the U.S. economy and to build up the American worker. And that means reforming the global economic system.

#### Specifically, the WTO permits Chinese tech theft.

Stephen **Ezell 21**. Vice President, Global Innovation Policy, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, “False Promises II: The Continuing Gap Between China’s WTO Commitments and Its Practices,” ITIF, July 26, 2021, <https://itif.org/publications/2021/07/26/false-promises-ii-continuing-gap-between-chinas-wto-commitments-and-its>, **RJP, DebateDrills**

Nearly 20 years after joining the World Trade Organization, China remains woefully short of meeting a broad range of commitments and responsibilities, to the detriment of both its trading partners and the international economic system.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

China’s state-led economic model, driven heavily by innovation-mercantilist practices, stands at odds with the foundational WTO principles of pursuing market-oriented policies while providing non-discrimination, national treatment, and reciprocity.

China has failed to meet numerous WTO commitments on issues such as industrial subsidization, protection of foreign intellectual property, forcing joint ventures and technology transfer, and providing market access to services industries.

China’s behavior toward the WTO and its trading partners is that of a nation that knew what it had to promise to enter the organization, but its subsequent actions have demonstrated it never intended to keep those promises.

Decades of gaming the global trading system and failing to meet WTO commitments have enabled China to accumulate tremendous trade surpluses and foreign currency reserves, which it uses to pursue domestic and foreign policy objectives.

It is time for like-minded nations to join together to forcefully insist that China come into full and immediate compliance with all its WTO commitments and more broadly to contest China’s innovation-mercantilist strategies.

INTRODUCTION

As China nears its 20th year of World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, originally acceding to the organization on December 11, 2001, it has never been further away from faithfully committing to the foundational principles and tenets of the organization and its fundamental obligations and commitments. WTO membership comes with rights to enjoy preferential access to other nations’ markets, but also responsibilities. In particular, it commits nations to support and pursue “open, market-oriented policies” in accordance with the foundational principles of “non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, and fairness.”1

China has taken full advantage of its WTO rights. It has also largely ignored the responsibilities and commitments through its embrace of state-directed capitalism predicated upon an aggressive innovation mercantilism. This mercantilism denies foreign enterprises access to Chinese markets on reciprocal terms; distorts global markets, including for advanced-technology goods; and deprives nations of the benefits they believed they would receive when granting China accession into the community of trading nations.

In this report, China’s accession to the WTO is recounted along with the trade rules with which it fails to comply. The report also describes the economic benefits China has accrued in part by not complying with its WTO commitments. Lastly, it offers policy recommendations for policymakers from the United States and like-minded nations to address the continuing China trade challenge.

Our initial 2015 Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) report on this topic, on which this report is based, is premised on China’s false promises to the WTO. Even with a full-scale Section 301 investigation initiated by the Trump administration, China has made little progress in fulfilling a wide range of its WTO commitments over the past two decades.2

#### Stopping tech stealing is key to avoid war

Timothy R. **Heath 18**. RAND Senior Defense and International Analyst, “Avoiding “Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; Asia Policy; Vol 13 No 2; April 2018, RJP, DebateDrills

This article argues that the structural drivers of U.S.-China competition are too deep to resolve through cooperative engagement and that policymakers must instead accept the reality of strategic rivalry and aim to manage it at a lower level of intensity. main argument Rising tensions between China and the U.S. have spurred fears that the two countries could end up in conflict or recreate the Cold War. To avoid these outcomes, analysts have proposed ways to defuse competition and promote cooperation. However, because these arguments do not address the structural drivers underpinning U.S.-China competition, such proposals are unlikely to end the rivalry. Conflict is not inevitable, however, and aggressive strategies that unnecessarily aggravate the sources of rivalry are likely to prove dangerously counterproductive. The best option at this point is, paradoxically, for the U.S. to accept the reality of the growing strategic rivalry and manage it at a lower level of intensity. policy implications • Maintaining a technological edge is critical for the U.S. to successfully manage the rivalry with China. Policies should be pursued to ensure that the U.S. continues to attract and nurture the best science and technology talent and retains its status as the global leader in technology. • To compete with China’s narrative about leading regional integration, the U.S. should both put forth a compelling vision for the region that encompasses widely held economic, security, and political values and continue to bolster its diplomatic and military positions in Asia. • To maintain the U.S.-China rivalry at a stable level, policymakers in both countries should prioritize measures that discourage the mobilization of popular sentiment against the other country and encourage cultural exchanges. • U.S.-China competition will likely become increasingly entwined with rivalries between China and U.S. allies and partners such as Japan and India. U.S. policymakers will need to take into account the independent dynamics of those separate rivalries when managing relations with China. The United States and China find themselves increasingly enmeshed in a strategic rivalry, the basic nature of which remains poorly understood in the United States. To be sure, disagreements between the two countries have gained widespread attention. Disputes involving Chinese confrontations with U.S. allies and partners such as Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan have frequently grabbed the headlines. At other times, disagreements over Chinese trade practices and U.S. military activities in the South China Sea have occasioned discord. All these sources of conflict are genuine, but they mask the main drivers of rivalry, which are twofold. First, the United States and China are locked in a contest for primacy—most clearly in Asia and probably globally as well. The United States has been the dominant power, and China seeks to eventually supplant it. By definition, two different states cannot simultaneously share primacy at either the regional or global level. Second, economic, demographic, and military trajectories suggest that China has the potential to contend in a significant way for leadership at the global systemic level. At this level, the most decisive competition will be for technological leadership. Should China supplant the United States as the world’s premier country in terms of technology, its claim to regional and global supremacy will be difficult to deny. And once it has gained that supremacy, China will be well positioned to restructure institutional arrangements to privilege itself and disadvantage the United States. Although this competition is occurring simultaneously at both levels, observers have focused primarily on the struggle for primacy at the regional level and overlooked or downplayed the competition at the global systemic level.1 To counter China’s pursuit of regional primacy, the United States has bolstered its alliances in Asia (albeit inconsistently), expanded diplomatic outreach to China and rising powers in Southeast Asia, and revised its military posture—efforts captured by President Barack Obama’s “rebalance to Asia.” President Donald Trump may have abandoned the rebalance, but many of the related initiatives remain more or less in place.2 China’s challenge at the global systemic level, especially in the field of technology, has received less attention. Confidence in the proven U.S. ability to produce new technologies and facile assumptions about the difficulties China will face in promoting innovation in new industries have led many to dismiss the challenge posed by China. **But the contest for technological leadership is actually even more consequential than that for regional primacy.** Should China succeed in surpassing the United States as the world’s technological leader, U.S. diplomacy and military power will not suffice to hold the line either in Asia or around the globe**.** Under those conditions, countries throughout the world, including U.S. allies in Asia, will be forced to come to terms with the new leading economy. Military power projection could be far less relevant as China moves to consolidate its leading status at both the regional and global levels in such a scenario. Accordingly, although the United States cannot abandon its efforts to bolster its diplomatic and military position in Asia, the country must step up its efforts to strengthen its faltering lead in new technology development. While China clearly grasps the stakes, it is not clear that the United States does. For example, China’s government has promoted R&D into quantum computing. The investment appears to be paying off, as the country has leaped ahead of the United States in developing quantum communications.3 Similarly, the U.S. Congress has proposed to dispense with subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles, even as China pushes ahead in its plan to become the lead producer of this technology.4 And while the U.S. government seeks to restrict immigration and discourage foreign students from attending U.S. universities (and staying after they receive their advanced training), China has revised its policies to welcome foreigners, prioritizing those with science and technology expertise. Moreover, Chinese investment in basic R&D is rapidly catching up to that of the United States.5 Studies have also noted a shrinking U.S. lead in science and technology as such investment is beginning to bear fruit.6 Similarly, the United States has lost its once-undisputed lead in the per capita number of engineers and scientists.7 Understanding the nature of the U.S.-China rivalry at the regional and global systemic levels, as well as how these two levels interact with one another, is essential if the United States is to successfully manage the challenge posed by China in a manner that avoids war. This study aims to contribute to that understanding. The article is organized into the following sections: u pp. 95–102 provide an overview of the growing rivalry between China and the United States, including a discussion of the meaning and role of strategic rivalry in interstate conflict and a comparison with the U.S.-China rivalry during the Cold War. u pp. 102–4 review the dynamics of the rivalry at the regional systemic level. u pp. 104–10 analyze the dynamics of the rivalry at the global systemic level. u pp. 110–15 examine why proposals to avoid rivalry through cooperation or aggressive competition are unlikely to succeed. u pp. 115–19 discuss the idea of strategic rivalry management and offer recommendations on ways to sustain the rivalry at a lower level of intensity the growing rivalry between the united states and china Strains between China and the United States have deepened in the past few years over a proliferating array of issues. President Trump has stepped up accusations against China of unfair trade practices and inadequate pressure on North Korea. He also provoked controversy early in his term when he floated the idea of increasing official contacts with Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province.8 These disputes add to tensions that had expanded under President Obama, who moved to strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia, promote a regional trade pact, criticize Chinese behavior in the cyber and maritime domains, and shift more military assets to the Asia-Pacific as part of the rebalance to Asia strategy.9 China has in turn dismissed U.S. concerns about the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, intensified its criticism of U.S. security leadership in Asia, and tightened its grip on disputed maritime territories.10 The baleful state of bilateral relations has spurred plenty of finger-pointing. On the Chinese side, officials denounce the United States’ “Cold War mindset” and warn of conflict if Washington does not adjust its policies.11 A 2015 defense white paper described an “intensifying competition” between the great powers.12 Military officials and many Chinese analysts regard increasing tension between the two countries as unavoidable, although they do not regard war as likely. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deputy chief of staff Qi Jianguo commented that “no conflict and no confrontation does not mean no struggle” between China and the United States.13 According to Chinese official media, polls in China suggest a large majority believes that the United States intends to pursue a containment policy.14 Reflecting this point of view, Niu Xinchun, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argued that the “greatest obstacle to the further integration of emerging countries such as China into the international system comes from the United States.”15 Western officials and commentators tend to blame China for current strains. Senior U.S. leaders have criticized “assertive” Chinese behavior, while some analysts blame Xi Jinping for pushing a more confrontational set of policies.16 Other Western observers worry that a further souring of relations could lead to conflict.17 But even if war remains unlikely, the deepening tensions increase the risks of miscalculation, crises, and potential military clashes involving the world’s two largest powers. Echoing a view widely held among U.S. foreign policy experts and officials, former CIA director General Michael Hayden has warned that mishandling the U.S.-China relationship could be “catastrophic.”18 Rivalry at the Heart of the U.S.-China Relationship This widespread concern reflects a realistic appraisal of the dangers inherent in the U.S.-China relationship. But developing successful policies to manage an increasingly sensitive and complex situation requires an accurate assessment of the phenomenon of interstate rivalry that lies at the heart of that relationship. Rivalry is a concept that, while widely acknowledged, remains poorly understood. To be sure, most experts take for granted the idea that powerful nations compete for status and influence, and they acknowledge the danger posed by a rising power’s challenge to a status quo power. Yet investigation into the phenomenon of rivalry too often stops at these well-trodden findings. Less often discussed are the conclusions regarding the dynamics of rivalry that experts on conflict studies have arrived at within the past few years. Much of this scholarship draws from improvements to the analyses and data regarding interstate crisis and conflict.19 This research has generated useful and interesting insights regarding the start and conclusion of rivalries, crises, and war, although these remain largely unexplored outside academic circles. Analysts have established, for example, that rivalry is perhaps the most important driver of interstate conflict. As defined by political scientists, “rivals” are states that regard each other as “enemies,” sources of real or potential threat, and as competitors. At the root of rivalries thus lie disputes over incompatible goals and perceptions that countries possess both the ability (real or potential) and the intention to harm each other. Wars have historically tended to be fought by pairings of these states and their allies. Rivals have opposed each other in 77% of wars since 1816 and in over 90% of wars since 1945.20 Not only are rivals more likely to fight than non-rivals, but rivals also have a tendency to be recidivists because they are unable to resolve their political differences on the battlefield. Yet that does not always discourage them from trying to do so repeatedly. Rivals that cannot prevail due to parity frequently compete for advantage by building internal strength through arms racing or by leveraging external power through the strengthening of alliances and partnerships. Rivals are also prone to serial militarized crises**.** Mutual perceptions of each other as hostile enemies and the inconclusive outcome of previous militarized disputes typically fuel a pattern of recurrent crises characterized by deepening resentment, distrust, and growing willingness to risk escalation. Studies have also established that the risk of conflict increases sharply after three episodes of militarized crises.21 Rivalries do not progress in a linear direction, however. Their intensity can wax and wane in response to shocks and other important developments. Periods of relative stability can alternate with turbulent periods of tension and conflict. Similarly, cooperative activities can be interspersed with periods of acute tension and hostility. Nevertheless, the link between rivalry, crises, and interstate conflict is pervasive. Drawing from these sources, one can describe the Sino-U.S. relationship as a rivalry characterized as a competition between two major powers over incompatible goals regarding their status, leadership, and influence over a particular region—in this case principally the Asia-Pacific. The dynamics of this type of strategic rivalry differ in significant ways from the far more numerous rivalries over territory that have characterized conflict between so many countries, especially weaker and poorer ones. In contrast with rivalries over territories, strategic rivals do not necessarily share borders, although allies of one power may be engaged in a territorial dispute with the other major power. Strategic rivalries among major powers tend to be especially long-lived, with the average enduring for about 55 years.22 Strategic rivalries are incredibly complex phenomena that include overlapping and often reinforcing layers of disputes over leadership, status, and territory between the principal rivals and their allies. Such rivalries are almost always multilateral affairs that also involve allies and partners, some of which have their own rivalries with the other side. Competition in the economic, political, and military domains can serve as expressions as well as drivers of rivalry, as can sports and cultural competition. Strategic rivalries can be confined to one region, with the basic conflict reducible in some respects to which rival will occupy the top rung of the regional hierarchy. In other cases, however, a rivalry can span regional and global domains either sequentially or simultaneously. The U.S.-China rivalry, for instance, is already both a regional and, to a lesser extent, a global rivalry, but there is still considerable room for competition to expand. The complex and overlapping nature of the disputes makes strategic rivalries extremely crisis- and conflict-prone. Strategic rivalries come in a grim package deal that includes strained and hostile relations, serial crises, and in some cases wars. The comprehensive and multifaceted nature of the disputes also explains why such rivalries have proved so durable and why their wars have been so devastating. Conflict between strategic rivals has historically occasioned the most destructive wars, of which World Wars I and II are the most recent examples. The fact that experts at the time of each historic episode of systemic conflict consistently underestimated the duration or extent of war offers cold comfort to analysts today who seek to predict the trajectory of any conflict that might involve China and the United States. Comparisons of the Current Environment with the U.S.-China Rivalry during the Cold War How did the two countries arrive at this position? The most widely accepted narrative argues that China’s rapid economic growth has provided the resources with which it can press demands on long unresolved issues such as unification with Taiwan. China and the United States may have enjoyed stable relations in the 1980s when they cooperated on a limited basis against the Soviet Union, but that foundation of cooperation eroded considerably once the Soviet bloc dissolved in the early 1990s. Moreover, China’s rapid growth in economic power has given the country fresh resources to press its own demands on the United States and U.S. allies. By 2010, China’s economy had outpaced that of Japan to become the second-largest in the world.23 The persistence of long-standing sources of antagonism, such as the U.S. security partnership with Taiwan, has both reflected and aggravated a broader competition for leadership. For its own reasons, Washington has resisted Beijing’s demands, and the result has been growing fear and distrust.24 The intensifying rivalry between the rising power and the status quo leader is as old as antiquity itself. Indeed, Graham Allison coined the term “Thucydides trap” to describe such a situation, a term that he subsequently applied to the current U.S.-China situation.25 The popular narrative is not entirely incorrect, yet in some ways it remains incomplete. A closer look at history reminds us that antagonism between China and the United States is not unprecedented. In the 1950s and 1960s, the two countries engaged in an intense strategic competition for status and influence in Asia, one that occasionally burned hot, as it did when they clashed on the Korean Peninsula or more indirectly in Vietnam. This Cold War–era rivalry saw a complex network of competing alliances and partnerships, principally in Asia. The United States supported Taiwan and South Korea in bitter disputes with China and its allies, North Korea and the Soviet Union. This rivalry terminated in the 1970s primarily due to Beijing’s decision to counter a growing Soviet menace and the United States’ decision to pursue China as a potential partner for its own rivalry with the Soviet Union. But the existence of a period of intense U.S.-Chinese tension and competition provides a helpful baseline of comparison. What requires explanation is not the fact that the United States and China are engaged in a rivalry but the difference between today’s rivalry and that of the Cold War. What distinguishes the rivalry today from that of the earlier period is both the closer parity in relative power—albeit still more potential than real—between the two countries and the comprehensiveness, complexity, and systemic nature of the disputes between them. Paradoxically, these features make the current rivalry potentially far more threatening to the United States, despite the fact that so far U.S.-China relations have remained peaceful, and even though the U.S. and Chinese militaries fought each other in the Korean War. The dangerous potential of the current rivalry ultimately owes to the risk that China could rise to the position of global system leader and subordinate the United States accordingly. As has happened in previous power transitions, China as a system leader could exploit existing arrangements to its benefit and to the detriment of the outgoing leader, the United States. Due to the enormous rewards that accrue to a systemic leader and the high costs for the state that loses this position**,** struggles for global leadership have historically proved to be especially destructive. The possibility that China and the United States could find themselves in a similar struggle, while unlikely at this point, cannot be ruled out given the reality of the relative decline in U.S. power and the concomitant increase in Chinese comprehensive national power. At the most basic level, this fact may be measured superficially by the U.S. share of world GDP, which eroded from 40% in 1950 to 16% in 2014, adjusted for purchasing power parity. Over the same period, China’s share expanded from around 5% to 17%.26 An important consequence of the narrowing of the gap in comprehensive power has been an intensifying competition for leadership in the international economic and political order. In this way, the popular discussion of the Thucydides trap correctly recognizes the dangers of the U.S.-China competition. This feature contrasts sharply with the previous episode of rivalry. In the 1950s and 1960s, the asymmetry in power meant that the United States and China competed for influence and even clashed militarily in countries along China’s borders, but rarely elsewhere. As a largely rural, impoverished country, China had little stake in the system of global trade promoted by the industrialized West. Excluded from the United Nations, Maoist China also lacked the institutional ability to influence geopolitics and project power much beyond its immediate environs—and even that capability was sorely handicapped. Outside Asia, the United States faced minimal competition from China and generally regarded the Soviet Union as a more pressing threat. By contrast, the current competition features a China fully enmeshed in a political and economic order led by the United States. While generally supportive of this order, China is also seeking to revise aspects of the regional and international order that it regards as obstacles to the country’s revitalization as a great power. The main theater of this competition for influence and leadership is the Asia-Pacific, as it was in the Cold War, but U.S.-China rivalry increasingly is expanding globally. Moreover, unlike the largely military, regional, and ideological Cold War competition, the current contest is far more multifaceted and comprehensive in nature; it includes military, economic, technological, and political dimensions. The following two sections review the state of the competition at both the regional and the global systemic levels. the u.s.-china rivalry at the regional level At the regional level, U.S.-China competition spans the political, economic, and military realms. Politically, the two countries have feuded over the role of liberal values and ideals, a dispute that widened after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. However, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis elevated the potential threat of conflict between the two countries and may therefore be regarded as the starting point of the current rivalry. Coinciding with impressive gains in China’s economic and military power following two decades of market reforms, the standoff saw Washington and Beijing deploy military assets to back up their respective positions regarding Taiwan’s right to hold a presidential election, elevating the risk of a clash. Since then, the competition for political influence and leadership has intensified. In 2011, the United States announced its rebalance to Asia, which was aimed in part at shoring up U.S. alliances, partnerships, and influence.27 Although on the surface Washington has abandoned the effort, the Trump administration has reintroduced a vision for Asia’s economic and security order premised on values favorable to U.S. interests.28 The 2017 National Security Strategy stated, for example, that the United States upholds a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”29 Beijing, by contrast, has increased its efforts to advance a vision for a regional order premised on Chinese leadership. In recent years, China has promoted major economic and geostrategic initiatives to deepen Asia’s economic integration through the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and other initiatives.30 In 2017, China for the first time issued a white paper that outlined the government’s vision for Asia-Pacific security. The paper stated that China takes the advancement of regional prosperity and stability “as its own responsibility.”31 These policies build on directives issued by Xi Jinping in 2013, when he called for policies to bolster China’s attractiveness as a regional leader.32 Economically, the two countries are competing over the evolution of Asia’s economic future—a region anticipated to drive global growth in coming decades. Both countries are also competing to shape the terms of trade. President Trump may have abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but his advisers have advocated other measures to shape favorable trade terms.33 Meanwhile, China has stepped up advocacy of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a proposed free trade agreement for the region that excludes the United States.34 China also has promoted the AIIB, while the United States and Japan continue to instead support the Asian Development Bank.35 Militarily, the growing arms race and the establishment of rival security institutions stand among the most obvious manifestations of an increasing competition in this domain. China and the United States have designed an array of military capabilities and doctrines partly aimed at each other. The PLA has developed weapons systems to counter potential U.S. intervention in any contingency along China’s periphery, which the United States has in turn sought to counter with its own innovations, such as the Joint Operational Access Concept.36 U.S. secretaries of defense Chuck Hagel and Ashton Carter outlined a “third offset” strategy to compete with China and Russia in military technology.37 To promote regional security, the United States has strengthened its military alliances and partnerships, while China has strengthened ties with Russia and argued that regional security is best protected through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, and other Chinese-led institutions. In 2014, Xi indirectly rebuked the United States for seeking to bolster its security leadership in the region, stating that “it is for the people of Asia to uphold the security of Asia.”38

### 3

#### Extinction comes first!

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### Existential threats outweigh – all life has infinite value and extinction eliminates the possibility for future generations – err aff, because of innate cognitive biases

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>,

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted.

As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

#### Extinction isn’t white paranoia and apocalyptic reps are good

Thompson 18 [Nicole Akoukou. Chicago-based creative writer. 4-6-2018. "Why I will not allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed." RaceBaitR. http://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/#]

I couldn’t spare empathy for a white woman whose biggest fear was something that hadn’t happened yet and might not. Meanwhile, my most significant fears were in motion: women and men dying in cells after being wrongly imprisoned, choked out for peddling cigarettes, or shot to death during ‘routine’ traffic stops. I twitch when my partner is late, worried that a cantankerous cop has brutalized or shot him because he wouldn’t prostrate himself. As a woman of color, I am aware of the multiple types of violence that threaten me currently—not theoretically. Street harassment, excessively affecting me as a Black woman, has blindsided me since I was eleven. A premature body meant being catcalled before I’d discussed the birds and the bees. It meant being followed, whistled at, or groped. As an adult, while navigating through neighborhoods with extinguished street lights, I noticed the correlation between women’s safety and street lighting—as well as the fact that Black and brown neighborhoods were never as brightly lit as those with a more significant white population. I move quickly through those unlit spaces, never comforted by the inevitable whirl of red and blue sirens. In fact, it’s always been the contrary. Ever so often, cops approach me in their vehicle’s encouraging me to “Hurry along,” “Stay on the sidewalk,” or “Have a good night.” My spine stiffening, I never believed they endorsed my safety. Instead, I worried that I’d be accused of an unnamed accusation, corned by a cop who preys on Black women, or worse. A majority of my 50-minute bus ride from the southside of Chicago to the north to join these women for the birthday celebration was spent reading articles about citywide shootings. I began with a Chicago Tribute piece titled “33 people shot, seven fatally, in 13 hours,” then toppled into a barrage of RIP posts on Facebook and ended with angry posts about police brutality on Tumblr. You might guess, by the time I arrived to dinner I wasn’t in the mood for the “I can’t believe we’re all going to die because Trump is an idiot” shit. I shook my head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, I departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just some white shit.” Sadly, that thought would not last long. I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black people have lived under the specter of having our existence erased on a white man’s whim since we stepped onto the shore at Jamestown Landing.” However, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: nuclear strike would disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals. North Korea won’t target the plain sight racists of Portland, Oregon, the violently microaggressive liberals of the rural Northwest, or the white-hooded klansmen of Diamondhead, Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike densely populated urban areas, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. These locations stand-out as targets for a nuclear strike because they are densely populated U.S. population centers. Attacking the heart of the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me that the most populous cities in the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more plainly put: Black populations. This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart. The practice of preparing for a nuclear holocaust sometimes feels comical, particularly when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country. Blackness is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We are stuck by rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard. The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.” In light of this homecoming, we now flirt with a new, larger fear of a Black genocide. America has always worked towards Black eradication through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality, but nuclear war on American soil would be swift. And for this reason I’ve grown tired of whiteness being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false. “The Day After,” the iconic, highest-rated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the devastation from the attack is completely white-washed, leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas. Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and brown folks would outpace that number, due to placement and poverty. That number would be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle Black and brown communities and would mark us for generations. It’s for that reason that we have to do more to foster disaster preparedness among Black people where we can. Black people deserve the space to explore nuclear unease, even if we have competing threats, anxieties, and worries. Jacqui Patterson, Director of the Environmental and Climate Justice Initiative, once stated: African American communities are disproportionately vulnerable to and impacted by natural (and unnatural) catastrophes. Our socio-economic vulnerability is based on multiple factors including our lack of wealth to cushion us, our disproportionate representation in lower quality housing stock, and our relative lack of mobility, etc.

### 4

#### CP Text - The United States and the European Union should eliminate patents on medicines based on Indigenous knowledge from patentability

#### Solves the CP – other countries model off of the US for things like large scale foreign policy – that spills over and solves the aff over time since there’s nothing in the aff that says it’s try or die right now.

#### Their Breske evidence is about solving IPR problems in the US and EU – we read blue

**Breske 4** [Ashleigh, visiting assistant professor of international studies in the global politics and societies (GPS) department @ Hollins University. She earned her Ph.D. in planning, governance, and globalization at Virginia Tech, her M.A.L.S. in social sciences with a focus on Roman history from Hollins University, and her B.S. in biology with a concentration in classical studies and chemistry. Her current research explores how institutions and cultural values mediate changes in repatriation policy for indigenous cultural property, “Biocolonialism: Examining Biopiracy, Inequality, and Power”, Spectra, 6(2), pp.58–73. DOI: http://doi.org/10.21061/spectra.v6i2.a.6]//pranav

Looking at the production of pharmaceuticals, **we can see the importance of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in the debate over the accessibility of indigenous knowledge to outside corporations and investors**. IPRs impact many different fields: healthcare, biodiversity, technology, human and cultural rights, research and development, and agricultural innovations; but, the international system that established international intellectual property rights was hastily organized and linked to trade agreements. xli Shiva claims **IPR laws, under the development of TRIPS and the World Trade Organization (WTO), “have unleashed an epidemic of the piracy of nature’s creativity and millennia of indigenous innovation**.” xlii Transnational corporations are taking advantage of slight “innovations” on traditional knowledge to maintain many of their IPRs. xliii **Together, IPRs and TRIPS, work to suppress indigenous peoples’ ability to control their traditional way of life**. The regulatory system includes domestic laws of developed areas of the world, like the United States, Japan, and Europe, and broader international intellectual property rights agreements. **These agreements resemble doctrines promoting colonialism since they are legal documents fostering the idea of ownership by the dominant colonizers.** Xliv Attempts have been made to establish a declaration that would negate corporate intellectual property rights if public health issues were brought forward by struggling nations’ governments. xlv **But this does not address the issue of restoring indigenous intellectual property rights. Large pharmaceutical corporations in the United States and the European Union have used their vast corporate wealth to prevent the nullification of their IPRs. The inability to invalidate their IPRs means that pharmaceutical companies have ensured rigidity in the trade agreements and prevented generics from being manufactured. This has also ensured their continued legal right to Indigenous knowledge, if not an ethical right**. xlvi Patents are an apparatus of power with universal political and social consequences. Patent policies are developed in western countries but affect poorer, marginalized areas of the world. Unfortunately, there is no international governing body through which all patents are channeled, and they are granted according to individual national domestic laws. These patents are generally established in western countries like Canada, the European Union, and the United States. For all intents and purposes, pharmaceutical companies have more legal rights than people due to trade liberalization.

### Case

#### The Role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who wins whether the plan is good or bad. Prefer:

#### A] fairness - Fairness—Arbitrary frameworks moot the 1NC and destroy our possibility of engaging with the affirmative on an equal playing field. Our scholarship is tied to the consequences of the plan so it makes no sense to separate assumptions from implementation.

#### B] Clash—Debate is not about the content of what we debate about but the process of iterative testing through specific points of contestation. There is no 1-1 correspondence between the arguments we read and our ideologies. This turns the Aff—no matter your political worldview, critical thinking skills through an unrestrained framework is necessary for any revolutionary strategy.

#### The lbl proper

#### 1] Reverse causality- there’s no causal reason why corporations patenting something like turmeric reduces the ability of Indians to use turmeric as well. At most, its that they lack credit, but that form of politics is exactly what our thesis criticizes

#### 2] White People DA-- Their moral crusading about indigenous medicine is a silly, superficial analysis—their definition of indigenous medicine amounts to “plants” and naturally-occurring substances which is ahistorical, offensive, and a horrible bastardization of Native thought. All modern medicine is derived from natural substances- take a biology class. This is proved by their conclusion that we should implement the plan- this is a soft left, liberal understanding of how to rectify the actual land loss committed which doesn’t break down settler colonialism, but rather strengthens it because the state uses the aff as a method to justify its existence. Every negative state action argument they’ll make in combination with their horrid interpretation of indigenous medicine is a reason why the aff gets coopted into a girlboss movement where the government can portray itself as a woke entity while never actually dealing with issues of knowledge exploitation as a result of settler colonialism. LAND BACK NOW.

#### 3] Every form of verbal remedy and other medicines that have been passed down over generations is what created modern medicine which would mean that they eliminate all modern medicines – proves there’s no brightline for the aff bc there’s no real way to differentiate in what is an indigenous based patent and what isnt

#### 4] Double-bind—their Barker indicates that settler research spaces use the politics of recognition for assimilation but A] how is the ballot not a form of recognition B] how is the aff plan not recognition given the helb evidence talks about necessity of recognition and also the plan is a form of recognition

#### 5] The way the aff removes patents is by indigenous people having to ask white people to remove patents – this was in cross x – that is an even harder link and proves that white people think they are entitled to GIVING things to indigenous folks

#### 6] Trips waivers may seem docile but are a *calculated risk* to remedy liberalism’s terminal collapse.

[Patanè, Andrea. COVID-19 Pandemic: Patents and Profits, 15 May 2021, [www.marxist.com/covid-19-pandemic-patents-and-profits.htm.]//nagisatm](http://www.marxist.com/covid-19-pandemic-patents-and-profits.htm.%5d//nagisatm)

--- peep the UQ trick – Liberalism decline now by America first policy means that alt is not neccesary

A “calculated risk” Far from an act of ‘international solidarity', [Vaccine Waivers] this latest move from the US government is a calculated political risk, and will be implemented in the interests of US imperialism. A section of the more serious wing of the bourgeoisie understands that a proper economic recovery can happen only if the pandemic is suppressed worldwide. As we have explained elsewhere, wealthy countries risk losing billions of dollars if the pandemic is brought under control only within their own borders, because new variants (like those in India and Brazil) can always mutate elsewhere and reinfect their populations, causing further economic disruption. Therefore, even on a capitalist basis, it is expedient in the long-term for the rich countries to facilitate a global vaccination campaign. Even Pope Francis anointed the demand from his seat in Rome! Biden’s announcement is also an act of vaccine diplomacy. America’s main rivals, China and Russia, have been shoring up their spheres of influence by distributing their Sinopharm and Sputnik V vaccines to poor countries left out by the vaccine nationalism of the US and Europe. Chinese and Russian vaccines have been exported into countries traditionally under western spheres of influence, including Brazil and Hungary. Pushing to waive IP protections on COVID-19 vaccines is therefore partly an effort to push back against the encroachment of rival imperialist powers, which have so far outcompeted Washington in the global vaccination drive. Biden’s announcement is also an attempt to restore the standing and authority of US imperialism on the world stage, which has been bruised by the ‘America First’ vaccine nationalist policy started by Donald Trump, and continued by Biden. According to the FT, Katherine Tai (top US trade envoy) and Jake Sullivan (national security adviser) made the case to Biden that pushing for the waiver “was a low-risk way to secure a diplomatic victory”, after coming under fire for not “respond[ing] quickly enough to the unfolding COVID-19 crisis in India”. Here you have it, straight from the horse’s mouth. Under capitalism, vaccines – rather than providing a way out of the pandemic – are tools for ‘low-risk diplomatic victories’.

As if this was some sort of football match between world leaders! In short, Biden is stepping in to prioritise the interests of US imperialism as a whole over the immediate interests of the Big Pharma capitalists. But we should say clearly: this cynical attempt to claim the moral high ground came only after the US used its massive economic clout to secure enough vaccines to inoculate its own population several times over.

### 5

#### Counterplan text: [Countries] should establish a government-financed Pharmaceutical Innovation Fund, which will financially reward companies for therapeutic drugs, cost-reducing innovations, and reward those who prove patents to be invalid.

#### That incentivizes better therapeutic drugs and boosts innovation

Hollis 04

Aidan Hollis [Dr. Aidan Hollis is Professor in Economics at the University of Calgary, and President of Incentives for Global Health, a US-based NGO focused on the development of the Health Impact Fund proposal], 10 June 2004, “An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation”, [https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf //](https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf%20//) AK

This section describes a method for rewarding patented pharmaceuticals with payments or rewards paid out of a government-financed Pharmaceutical Innovation Fund (PIF). When a drug is approved for use in a country, it would be registered by a firm, normally by the owner of related patents required in the production of the drug.18 The PIF would make payments to registrants, and in exchange for such payments, registrants would be compelled to grant zero-priced licenses for all listed patents when used to make and sell the drug. The payments would be annual during the period in which the registrant’s drugs were patented. Rewards would also be paid for patented cost-reducing process innovations, for exceptional discoveries not protected by patents, and for court verdicts of invalidity or non-infringement which allowed for generic production without a compulsory license. The purpose of this section is to outline how the fund should determine the reward for a given innovation. Payments from the PIF would be made based on the proportion of points attributable, according to the following categories: (1) Drugs which advance health should be given points reflecting the gain in average therapeutic value less costs of treatment over that of the next best pre-existing treatment, for all units of the drug sold by the registrant and by other manufacturers in a given year. Therapeutic value is determined by multiplying the incremental QALYs of the treatment by the dollar value of a QALY.19 (In determining the next best treatment, the PIF should exclude patented medicines registered by the same firm and medicines relying on the same patented innovations as the medicine under consideration.) In other words, the PIF agency will determine the net benefit of a drug, and then compare it to the net benefit of the next most effective pre-existing therapy, and award points based on the improvement. These points would be awarded to the registrant for each year in which the registrant’s patents would, in the absence of compulsory licensing, be sufficient to prevent other firms from producing bio-equivalent products. Evaluation would be undertaken annually, based on the available information about a drug.20 See the appendix (S. 8) for more details on quantifying this amount. (2) Cost-reducing innovations should be granted points equal to the price reductions enabled by implementation of the patented innovation. Specifically, points allocated for cost-reducing innovations should be equal to the difference between the average price of the medicine set by all sellers using the patented innovation and the average price of those not using the innovation, times the number of pills in which the innovation was implemented. See the appendix for more details on quantifying this amount. (3) A person who was able to show in court the invalidity of all remaining patents on a drug should be rewarded with a share (say 10%) of the previous year’s reward for that drug. Payment of monetary awards would be according to the following ordering. First, the PIF would pay out any awards under (3). Each registrant (for type (1)) or patentee of a cost- saving process (for type (2)) would obtain a payment equal to the total remaining monetary reward multiplied by its share of the total points allocated under (1) and (2). 21

#### Drug prices will drop significantly

Hollis 04

Aidan Hollis [Dr. Aidan Hollis is Professor in Economics at the University of Calgary, and President of Incentives for Global Health, a US-based NGO focused on the development of the Health Impact Fund proposal], 10 June 2004, “An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation”, [https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf //](https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf%20//) AK

Prices of medicines under this proposal would fall to approximately the average cost of production. Based on experience with drugs facing generic competition today, this implies that patented drug prices would decrease by on average 50% to 80%. This would obviously be beneficial for consumers and insurers, with total savings in the US of on the order of $100bn annually. Globally, savings might be on the order of $200bn.25 Aside from the reduction in total expense to consumers, there would be a welfare gain from increased consumption of lower-priced medicines. The deadweight loss (DWL) from the current patent system is certainly immense in pharmaceutical markets. The gains from pricing drugs at approximately the average cost of production could easily be valued at $100bn, and gains in terms of saved lives would likely be very large.

#### Perm fails – complete replacement of the patent system is fiscally impossible and drives down innovation

Stevens & Ezell 20

Philip Stevens, Stephen Ezell [His main research interests are the intersection of intellectual property, trade, and health policy. Formerly he was an official at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva, where he worked in its Global Challenges Division on a range of IP and health issues. Prior to his time with WIPO, Philip worked as director of policy for International Policy Network, a UK-based think tank, as well as holding research positions with the Adam Smith Institute and Reform, both in London.], 3 February 2020, “Delinkage Debunked: Why Replacing Patents With Prizes for Drug Development Won’t Work”, [https://itif.org/publications/2020/02/03/delinkage-debunked-why-replacing-patents-prizes-drug-development-wont-work //](https://itif.org/publications/2020/02/03/delinkage-debunked-why-replacing-patents-prizes-drug-development-wont-work%20//) AK

Governments worldwide would need to come up with nearly $200 billion a year to comprehensively replace the current market- and patent-based system with a prize system. As noted, in America, U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders’s plan calls for an $80-billion-a-year prize fund. As Dean Baker has written, “The [U.S.] government already spends more than $30 billion a year to finance biomedical research through the National Institutes of Health. It would probably be necessary to increase this amount by $50–$60 billion a year in order to replace the funding currently supported through patent monopolies.”11 In fact, drug companies invest in excess of $180 billion per year in R&D related to drug development.12 But even accepting Baker’s lower number, in a political and fiscal environment wherein the U.S. Congress cannot even index the gas tax to inflation to pay for badly needed roads and bridges (even with gas prices close to their lowest levels in nearly a generation), the chances Congress would be willing to appropriate the funds needed for any of these proposals is close to zero.13 In fact, the U.S. Congress’s modus operandi is to enact policies to shift public-sector costs to the private sector through mandates, not to take away private-sector costs with public-sector spending. And with government balance sheets tight everywhere (government debt as a share of GDP in Europe reached an all-time high in the mid-2010s, for instance), it is equally unlikely governments in other countries would be willing to allocate the sums needed. Given the general unwillingness of the public or lawmakers to support higher taxes or spending (in the United States or elsewhere), such proposals to replace private revenue with government spending would almost certainly lead to reduced overall investment (combined private and public) in biomedical innovation. Moreover, if the United States did not step up to the plate, the effort would be stillborn from the start. That is because the United States currently accounts for just under half of global biomedical R&D investment.14 And even that figure belies how significant U.S. contributions have been to biomedical R&D in recent years, with one study finding that the United States has been the world’s largest global funder of biomedical R&D investment over the past two decades, with a share some analyses suggest reached as high as 70 to 80 percent over that time period.15 A prize-based system would largely replace U.S. private capital with U.S. taxpayers as the leading funder of global biomedical innovation, and make the resulting IP and innovation a freely available global public good—a key reason why so many developing countries favor the scheme. Indeed, in a prize system, innovators would hold few cards. Their R&D costs would already be sunk at the time of prize disbursement, and to qualify for the prize, details of the invention would have to be disclosed to the government (or an international agency) at a level of detail far beyond that currently required by the patent system. Thus, the main advantage of a delinkage system for countries such as China—which as part of its “Made in China 2025” plan has targeted building the largest generic drug industry in the world—would be to obtain free IP for its budding industry, the lion’s share of which would be funded by prizes paid for by taxpayers from developed nations.16 In other words, what delinkage proponents really want is for taxpayers in developed countries (principally the United States) to finance the bulk of global biomedical research and innovation, which would then become freely available for generic drug manufacturers to immediately copy at marginal cost and then export back to the countries paying the most for the prizes. As such, a prize model would almost surely mean large trade deficits in biopharmaceutical products for developed nations. Delinkage would further advance proponents’ fundamental goal of undermining a global IP system they abhor, as reflected in reports such as Dean Baker’s “Is Intellectual Property the Root of All Evil? Patents, Copyrights, and Inequality.”17 Or, as Baker wrote with Joseph Stiglitz and Arjun Jayadev in a Project Syndicate article, “The IP standards advanced countries favor typically are designed not to maximize innovation and scientific progress, but to maximize the profits of big pharmaceutical companies and others able to sway trade negotiations.”18 In this way, delinkage isn’t much different from the compulsory licensing policies they’ve advocated for several middle-income countries—including Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—to issue on patents for innovative medicines over the past 20 years. Whether through delinkage or compulsory licenses, advocates want to weaken global IP rights, and force divulgence of IP at prices that would usually be far below market (if not outright free). But returning to the underlying underinvestment and free-riding challenge; this challenge isn’t just theoretical, it’s already a reality. That’s because a drug development system in which prizes replaced intellectual property would have very limited impact if only one country chose to adopt it. Companies would be discouraged from applying for prizes in that country because unless the award were large enough to cover what otherwise would have been their global revenues from development of a patent-protected drug, they would not apply. Instead, they would focus their efforts elsewhere on countries that retained robust standards of IP protection.

1. https://www.thesaurus.com/browse/be%20a%20member%20of [↑](#footnote-ref-1)