## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may only defend that a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike – everything beyond that is extra t worst case

#### Resolved means a policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### A just government is a moral government – that’s a hypothetical gov

Cambridge Dictionary No Date, (Cambridge Dictionary, “Just”), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/just // MNHS NL

fair; morally correct:

#### A government is people who control a country

Merriam Webster ND Merriam Webster, “unconditional”, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconditional DD AG

: the group of people who control and make decisions for a country, state, etc.

#### Recognize means to accept as legal

Cambridge Dictionary No Date, (Cambridge Dictionary, “Recognize”), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/recognize // MNHS NL

to accept that something is legal, true, or important:

The international community has refused to recognize (= officially accept the existence of) the newly independent nation state.

[ + (that) ] He sadly recognized (that) he would die childless.

You must recognize the seriousness of the problems we are facing.

#### **Unconditional means without limits**

Merriam Webster ND Merriam Webster, “unconditional”, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconditional DD AG

Definition of unconditional

: not conditional or limited : ABSOLUTE, UNQUALIFIED

#### They violate— 1] They only defend a universal right to strike which isnt the same

#### Universal means something that can change to meet requirements

Merriam Webster ND Merriam Webster, “universal”, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/universal> DD AG

: adapted or adjustable to meet varied requirements (as of use, shape, or size)

#### 2] Enforcement – the right to strike must be regulated through a just government but they regulate it through ourselves

#### Vote neg to preserve substantive engagement --

#### 1] Preparation- changing the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for 6 months on an issue that catches us by surprise. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet- research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training – the process of debate outweighs the content – only our interp generates the argumentative skills needed to rigorously defend their affirmative out of round and create engaged citizens

#### 2] Limits- there are an infinite number of non topical affirmatives. not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### 3] Switch side debate is good -- it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives which prevents ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

#### 4] fairness – debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary for any benefit to the activity. That outweighs on decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented. This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

#### 5] small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely affected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities

#### TVA: read an aff about communicative workers in which the just government enforces the unconditional right to strike only for communicative workers – none of their offense indicts unconditionality, but even if it does, x-apply switch side debate – the aff can rectify problems in the squo via policy

#### Disads to the TVA prove there’s negative ground and that it’s a contestable stasis point, and if their critique is incompatible with the topic reading it on the neg solves

#### Winning their thesis doesn’t answer T because only through the process of clash can they refine their defense of it—they need an explanation of why we switch sides and why there’s a winner and loser under their model

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done. Drop the team on theory generally to deter infinite abuse

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary, you can’t be reasonably topical, and causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### RVIs and impact turns encourage all in on theory which decks substance and incentivize baiting theory with abusive practices.

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

## 2

#### Interp – affs must defend the absolute recognition of the right to strike, which includes all types of strikes

#### Unconditional means not restricted

Cambridge Dictionary "unconditional,", <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unconditional> //RL

unconditional

adjective

complete and not limited in any way:

the unconditional love that parents feel for their children

unconditional surrender

We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners.

#### Violation: They only defend communicative strikes

#### 1] Precision – hold them to the text of the rez about recognition of the right to strike. Anything else justifies them arbitrarily jettisoning words like unconditional or switching recognize to eliminate etc.

#### 2] Limits – allowing them to tweak to what degree the aff is implemented explodes the number of affs – they could introduce the right to strike in only a few instances and there are over 8 subcategories of strikes which artificially explodes the topic and creates infinite affs – we’ve inserted a list of strikes in the doc

Business Management ND - "Strike: Meaning, Definition, Types, Causes, Control and Prohibition," Essays, Research Papers and Articles on Business Management, https://www.businessmanagementideas.com/human-resources-management/industrial-relations-human-resources-management/strike-meaning/21155

Strikes are often classified on some distinct bases such as their purpose, coverage or technique used. In many cases, the forms specified on separate bases overlap, and it becomes difficult to identify the base on which the classification has been made. To avoid confusion and ensure easy understanding, it appears desirable to present a brief description of more common forms of strikes highlighting their basic features.

Cessation means stoppage for trade unions; strike is the most powerful weapon for forcing the management to accept their demands.

Strikes can be divided into two categories.

They are:

1. Primary strikes – Primary strike is done by workers when they have a dispute against their employer.

2. Secondary strike – In secondary strike employees remain in and occupy the employer’s premises as a protest and means of forcing compliance with demands.

1. Primary Strike:

The primary strikes are:

i. Economic Strike – Most of the strikes of workers are for more facilities and increase in wage levels. In economic strike, the labourers demand increase in wages, travelling allowance, house rent allowance, dearness allowance and other facilities such as increase in privilege leave and casual leave.

ii. General Strike – It means a strike by members of all or most of the unions in a region or an industry. It may be a strike of the workers in a particular region of industry to force demands common to all the workers. It may also be an extension of the strike to express generalised protest by the workers.

iii. Stay-in Strike – In this case, workers do not absent themselves from their place of work when they are on strike. They keep control over production facilities. But do not work. Such a strike is also known as ‘pen down’ or ‘tool down’ strike.

iv. Slow Down Strike – Employees remain on their jobs under this type of strike. They do not stop work, but restrict the rate of output in an organised manner. They adopt go-slow tactics to put pressure on the employers.

These are some of the primary strikes.

2. Secondary Strike:

The secondary strike is:

i. Sympathetic Strike: When workers of one unit or industry go on strike in sympathy with workers of another unit or industry who are already on strike, it is called a sympathetic strike. The workers of sugar industry may go on strike in sympathy with their fellow workers of the textile industry who may already be on strike.

ii. Boycott: The workers may decide to boycott the company in two ways. Firstly by not using its products and secondly by making an appeal to the public in general. In the former case, the boycott is known as primary and in the latter secondary. It is a coercive method whereby the management is forced to accept their demands.

iii. Picketing: When workers are dissuaded from work by stationing certain men at the factory gates, such a step is known as picketing. If picketing does not involve any violence, it is perfectly legal.

iv. Gherao: Gherao is a Hindi word, which means to encircle. The workers may gherao the members of the management by blocking their exits and forcing them to stay inside their cabins. The main object of gherao is to inflict-physical and mental torture to the person i.e., employers till the demands of workers are met. This weapon disturbs the industrial peace to a great extent.

#### 3] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

## 3

#### We endorse the entirety of the 1AC sans their defense of “radical self-governance.” A focus on the individualized refusal of agents as selves dooms the case. It makes the pursuit of radical change impossible. Beller agrees which is why he purposely speaks through “we” instead of “I” in his work

Wiegman 12—Professor of Women’s Studies & Literature at Duke [Robyn, *Object Lessons*, p. 214-223]

**Refusing What**? It is surely no surprise to find the entity that internationalization has so productively identified- the American Americanist- in a certain crisis of self-recognition. If she laughs at the prospect of pursuing happiness and if her laughter ignites a wave of shame, it is not because the topic has no intrinsic critical value, nor that the significance of its historical or cultural meaning has now passed. What "dates" the pursuit is not the pursuit itself but the progressive political narrative that underwrites American American Studies, which seeks to critically unburden the Geld from its prior nationalist attachments, especially those that have been too identified with "America" and its exceptionalist self-imaginings to manage the necessary critique of its violent imperial ambitions. From this perspective, happiness **is** a casualty in the field's New Americanist transformation, too weighty an emblem of nationalist self-obsession, too profoundly idealist for the grip of critique through which practitioners seek to defend themselves against the global power of their object of study. So the American Americanist must travel to Rome to pursue happiness. What (and who) does she find there? International observers armed with enough dispassion and globality to be comprehensive in the face of complicit natives, who are too overwhelmed with proximity to know what they see? Of course not. But she does find herself confronted with the critical traveler's dilemma, becoming **not** only more ''American" and more decisively ''American Americanist," but more curious about the practices through which she is learning to become what others already take her to be- and more interested too in what they, at such a distance, may not find **compelling** about the institutional, political, and epistemological entanglements in which she finds herself All this, even as she also knows that the multiple and disparate relationships in which she and others are made-along with the production and circulation of their objects of study- are never entirely comprehensible, and not simply because there are no perspectives on them that are not also produced from within them. From the vantage point of Object Lessons, the problem has to do with the difficulty of negotiating the present as much as with the enormity of accounting for the ways in which knowledges, like their practitioners, are situated in a range of differentially produced geopolitical and analytic relations, ones so dense they are difficult to fully imagine, let alone enumerate. 24 From this perspective, internationalization begs the question of whether the Geld transformation it heralds is about catching up to a present that has already transformed us or producing a relation to the future that can rescue us from what seems like the present's characteristic incoherence. (Why else do so many narratives about the present rely on the idea that it is more complex than any historical present before it?) Field transformation is routinely caught in this temporal dilemma, so much so, it seems to me, that part of the fantasy that propels it is that practitioners are the agents of field revision- this, instead of the more fateful supposition that changes in the narrative formation and critical priorities of fields of study are generated by the very processes critics hope to decipher and transform. After all, it is not simply out of nowhere that scholars have learned to read the imperial power of "America" onto the field's critical relations, such that renderings of hierarchy, discrimination, and complicity in critical practice have come to stand as politics writ large. This is one of the distinctive marks of New Americanism's own production as an identity knowledge, as the critique of the Cold War consensus model was effected precisely by locating the question of politics at the level of the critical relationship. In learning to situate itself, in wish if not always in fact, as resolution to that which it critiqued, New Americanism became relentlessly focused on differentiating its critical act from the power of its object of study. It is this field imaginary that generates the paradox I am trying to track: where the charge of U.S.-centrism and provincialism can remain unintelligible to New Americanism at the same time that the refusal of identification that grounds the internationalist critique is fully at home as a critical maneuver within American American Studies itself. To explicate how this paradox is produced and sustained, I want to delve more fully into the repudiative operations of New Americanism, as the identificatory refusal the field cultivates does not belong to it alone. In fact, throughout the U.S. university today, scholars rely on refused identification to generate a critical practice that evokes their commitment to academic knowledge production as a realm not of neutral or dispassionate observation but of political engagement. 25 It might be true to say that refused identification was first deployed as a tactic for revisionary work in disciplines that had long claimed to be universalizing and objective, even as they routinely occluded both the specificity and the diversity of the human subject in gendered, racial, sexual, and economic terms. It is certainly true to say that whole generations of scholars have now been trained to practice refused identification as the means by which they challenge the normative assumptions of their disciplines, undoing canons, transforming methodologies, and resisting not simply particular disciplinary histories but the privileges such histories ascribe to specific critical vocabularies and habits of thought. Think here of the deliberative refusals of the "critical humanities," which have dismantled universalizing ideas of Western masterworks and the hierarchies of "civilization" and authorial intention that have accompanied them. Or of cultural studies, which refuses to grant value solely to aesthetics and its mode of understanding culture as high art by turning to everyday life and the complex agency that renders meaning productive, not merely consumptive. In numerous interdisciplinary projects-from postcolonial studies to Ethnic, Women's, and Sexuality Studies-refused identification has provided the founding gesture, differentiating objects, analytics, and critical habits from those privileged by dominant organizations of knowledge. This does not mean that such knowledges have not also produced their own identificatory practices; indeed, part of what refused identification performs is the transference of identification away from the priorities of the dominant model toward the dispossessed identities and categories of analysis that it is taken to have implicitly or explicitly ignored. These transferences not only transform the field in question by making both legible and legitimate new objects of study, methodological priorities, analytic practices, and critical questions, but they establish an oppositional political imaginary through which practitioners understand their scholarship as socially significant, if not ethical and just. In U.S. American Studies, refused identification has been the primary response to the purported exceptionalism of the Cold War object of study, opening scholarly investigations to a range of people, practices, and critical questions previously subordinated, if not conceptually excluded. 26 The now-generic narration of the New American Studies as an outcome of the counter hegemonic logics and ambitions of social movement dissent in the 196os is critical to the refusal the field performs, as it establishes an origin for the field that is external to both the U.S. university and the state apparatus of which it is a part. But the consolidation of New Americanism as the Cold War successor did not take shape in the immediate aftermath of social movement dissent. Tellingly, its narrative began to emerge in 1988, a few short months before the world historical event that would mark the end not simply of a geopolitical era but of living alternatives to capitalism and its global pursuit. In his review essay "Whose American Renaissance?" Crews would register the critical turn by deploying the neologism "New Americanist," and in the next few years, others would generate field-defining statements that countered or differently refracted the critical present that Crews lamentedY Robert Berkhofer Jr.'s essay in 1989, a longer version of a paper he delivered at the American Studies Association meeting in 1988, put forward the idea that there was a "new approach to American Studies, if not a new American Studies."28 His essay supported the emergence of a new set of priorities: of ethnic and gendered differences over homogeneous national identity, dissensus over consensus, everyday life over aesthetic practice, and interrogations of culture over political history and the official narratives of the state. But Berkhofer was cautious, as the question mark in his title, "A New Context for a New American Studies?" suggests, about whether the new scholarship was developing an equally new critical capacity to handle the complexities of the relationship between text and context on one hand and past and present on the other. Would it, he wondered at his essay's end, be as theoretically sophisticated in its historical narration as it was in its analysis of the social construction of "reality"? Or would it revamp the field in vocabulary and self-narration without substantively transforming the dominant habit of converting "the past into present use"?29 The answers to his questions seem not to have been extensively debated, perhaps because Crews's essay, cast as a review of seven recently published works of Americanist scholarship, was so negatively inclined toward the New Americanism it named and so prominently published (in the twentyfi fth anniversary issue of the New York Review of Books) that it generated immediate repudiation.30 (The ending was especially acerbic: "The New Americanists," Crews wrote, are "destined to become the next establishment in their field. They will be right about the most important books and the most fruitful ways of studying them because, as they always knew in their leaner days, those who hold power are right by definition.") By the spring of 1990, Donald E. Pease had collected a set of new essays and published an introduction to them as the now signatory statement, "New Americanists: Revisionist Interventions into the Canon."31 Pease had not one but two books under review by Crews, and a good many pages of"Whose American Renaissance?" used these works to delineate the failures of the New Americanism.32 "What chiefly marks Pease as a New Americanist," Crews wrote, "is his eagerness for moral certainties about the relation between the books and the politics he admires." In the end, Crews faulted the New Americanism for "self-righteousness," along with "its tendency to conceive of American history only as a highlight film of outrages, its impatience with artistic purposes other than 'redefining the social order,' and its choice of critical principles according to the partisan cause at hand." Pease's subsequent essay-what might properly be called the founding manifesto of New Americanism-repudiated Crews's repudiation andestablished refused identification as foundational to New Americanism's critical mode. Where Crews questioned what he saw as the New Americanist conflation of culture and politics, Pease affirmed their inextricable relation and read Crews's resistance as symptomatic of the political unconscious of the Cold War's liberal anticommunist consensus, which had operated through repression, including the repression of the historical violence of conquest. Pease thus defined the New Americanist project as linking the "repressed sociopolitical contexts within literary works to the sociopolitical issues external to the academic field," such that "questions of class, race, and gender" could be returned to the field.33 In this way, New Americanists "occup[ied] a double relation": "For as liaisons between cultural and public realms, they are at once within the field but external to it**.** Moreover, as representatives of subjects excluded from the field-Imaginary by the previous political unconscious, New Americanists have a responsibility to make these absent subjects representable in their field's past and present" (31). In Pease's hands, Crews's essay became not only an ungenerous attempt to reclaim the field for the Cold War consensus but a politically inflected psychic map of the ideological crisis that the New Americanism had already effected-one that did more than forward a set of new texts or critical questions. Indeed, for Pease, the New Americanism was an interruption of the field imaginary that had become dominant in the 1950s and that underwrote the institutional consolidation of American Studies in the U.S. university during the postwar period. It exposed the field's "fundamental syntax-its tacit assumptions, convictions, primal words, and the charged relations binding them together" (n). While Crews was unable to register the identifications that had come to legitimate his own authority as a practitioner within the field imaginary that governed him, Pease's refusal of identification with it both demanded and made possible the narrative transformation of the field that his essay celebrated as New American Studies. But how exactly did the New Americanist gain critical insight into the Cold War field imaginary without becoming subsumed by the "fundamental syntax" its critique put into place? Or more to the point, what enabled Pease to herald New Americanism as the alternative to the Cold War formation of the field without worrying about its own disciplinary determinations? After all, in Pease's definition, "A field specialist depends upon th[e] field-Imaginary for the construction of her primal identity within the field. Once constructed out of this syntax, the primal identity can neither reflect upon its terms nor subject them to critical scrutiny. The syntactic elements of the field-Imaginary subsist instead as self-evident principles" (n-n). In these terms, a field practitioner is immune to knowledge of the identifications that compel her because disciplinarity is the effect of the unconscious operations of the field imaginary. For this reason, Pease cast the New Americanist as "at once within the field yet external to it," which gave practitioners the ability to not only narrate but inhabit the conscious political intentions that defined it (31). Hence when a New Americanist "makes explicit the relationship between an emancipatory struggle taking place outside the academy and an argument she is conducting within the field, the relationship ... can no longer be described as imaginary. Such realized relations undermine the separation of the public world from the cultural sphere" (r9). From a position of exteriority, then, the New Americanist project refuses identification with its predecessor's imperial object of study in order to claim the political force of social movement as its own critical agency. In doing so, Pease figured the significance of New American Studies as nothing less than the means to "change the hegemonic self-representation of the United States' culture" (32). There is, of course, much to say about the political desire that underlies New Americanist claims-the desire, that is, to retrieve the repressed interiority of the field's Cold War imaginary without risking complicity with it or with the ideological sphere in which "America" might be said to secure its imperial and universalizing self-definition. To be situated in the mobility of "outside/in," as Pease called it, enabled the New Americanism to assert its authority for field transformation from within the political imaginaries established by social movements, thereby placing it outside the field of American Studies-or in contemporary terms, outside American American Studies, conceived not as a territorial or identity formation but as the field's fundamental syntax in the Cold War period. Because the terms of that syntax are inexplicable to the subject constructed within it, "an Americanist," Pease writes, cannot delineate "uncritically held assumptions without disaffiliating himself from the field of American Studies" (3). He must, in other words, be outside the field in order to have analytic purchase on what lies inside its dominant logics. While critics might take issue with the psychoanalytic vocabulary (of primal scenes, repression, and trauma) by which Pease delivers New Americanism to this complex location, most U.S.-based Americanist scholarship produced in the last two decades is beholden to the double relation that Pease defined, which not only casts critical practice as an alternative political agency but rejects the possibility that a new disciplinary apparatus guides it. The consequences of these investments on American Studies today are far reaching, especially given the fact that New American Studies has established its authority, as Crews predicted, as the dominant formation of the field in the United States. As preamble to understanding how refused identification underwrites the discourse of internationalization that shapes the present, I want to devote the next section to reflecting on some of the most prominent trajectories of scholarship that might now be said to have resituated U.S.-based American Studies within the field imaginary that New Americanism defines. In their collective turn away from the Cold War project of the fieldthrough questions of empire, transnationality, borders, and diaspora, and in critical frameworks aligned with postcolonial, postnational, hemispheric, and comparative studies-each of these trajectories takes its externality to the nationalist "Americanness" of American Studies as the means to found its own critical and political self-definition. Their use of refused identification is profoundly a self-conscious maneuver, one aimed at disarticulating field practices from what are generally considered past complicities with an exceptionalist object of study and a field imaginary in service, not resistance, to the state. Each trajectory thus marshals the utility of its own in- vestigations and critical attachments as a committed formulation of the lefit politics of the field, and each perceives itself, often quite explicitly, as essential to current critical efforts to attend to what has been called the "worlding of American Studies."34 Understood less as a cartography of new subject orientations in the field than as a remapping of its political desires, these trajectories demonstrate how familiar internationalization is as an idiom within the New Americanist field imaginary and thus prepare the way for considering the paradox that internationalization's own turn to definitive self-narration entails: being at once a discourse aimed at getting outside the Americanness of American Studies at a time when the dominant field imaginary in the United States understands itself to be committed to precisely the same thing.

## 4

#### CP: A just government should recognize the right of workers to engage in any nonviolent communicative strikes. The CP solves their relationality and communication offense but impact turns their belief in universal strikes and self-governance. Both independently straight turn the case.

**Butler 20** JudithButler, Comparative Literature @ Berkeley, 20, “The force of nonviolence: The ethical in the political.” Verso Books, 2020.29-32.

One of **the most popular argument**s on the left **to defend the tactical use of violence** begins with the claim that many people already live in the force field of violence. Because violence **is** already happening, the argument continues, there is no real choice about whether or not to enter into violence through one’s action: **we are already inside the field of violence**. According to that view, the distance that moral deliberation takes on the question of whether or not to act in a violent way is a privilege and luxury, betraying something about the power of its own location. In that view, the consideration of violent action is not a choice, since one is already—and unwillingly—within the force field of violence. Because violence is happening all the time (and it is happening regularly to minorities), such resistance is but a form of counter-violence. 7 Apart from a general and traditional left claim about the necessity of a “violent struggle” for revolutionary purposes, there are more specific justificatory strategies at work: violence is happening against us, so we are justified in taking violent action against those who (a) started the violence and (b) directed it against us. We do this in the name of our own lives and our right to persist in the world. As for the claim that resistance to violence is counter-violence, we might still pose a set of questions: Even if violence is circulating all the time and we find ourselves in a force field of violence, do we want to have a say about whether violence continues to circulate? If it circulates all the time, is it therefore inevitable that it circulates? What would it mean to dispute the inevitability of its circulation? The argument may be, “Others do it, and so should we”; or else, “Others do it against us, so we should do it against them, in the name of self-preservation.” These are each different, but important claims. The first holds to a principle of straightforward reciprocity, suggesting that whatever actions the other takes, I am licensed to take as well. **That line of** **argumentation**, however, sidesteps the question of whether what the other does is justifiable. The second claim **links violence with self-defense and self-preservation**, an argument we will take up in the subsequent chapters. For the moment, though, let us ask: **Who is this “self” defended in the name of selfdefense? 8 How is that self delineated from other selves, from history, land, or other defining relations?** Is the one to whom violence is done not also in some sense part of the “self” who defends itself through an act of violence? There is a sense in which violence done to another is at once a violence done to the self, but only if the relation between them defines them both quite fundamentally. This last proposition indicates a central concern of this book. For if the one who practices nonviolence is related to the one against whom violence is contemplated, then there appears to be a prior social relation between them; they are part of one another, or one self is implicated in another self. **Nonviolence would**, then, be a way **of acknowledg**ing that **social relation**, however fraught it may be, and of affirming the normative aspirations that follow from that prior social relatedness. As a result, an ethics of nonviolence cannot be predicated on individualism, and it must take the lead in waging a critique of individualism as the basis of ethics and politics alike. An ethics and politics of nonviolence would have to account for this way that selves are implicated in each other’s lives, bound by a set of relations that can be as destructive as they can be sustaining. The relations that bind and define extend **beyond the dyadic human encounter**, which is why nonviolence pertains not only to human relations, but to all living **and inter-constitutive relations**. To launch this inquiry into social relations, however, we would have to know what kind of potential or actual social bond holds between both subjects in a violent encounter. **If the self is constituted through its relations with others, then part of what it means to preserve or negate a self is to preserve** or negate the extended social ties that define the self and its world. **Over and against the idea that the self will be bound to act violently in the name of its individual self-preservation**, this inquiry supposes that nonviolence requires a critique of egological ethics as well as of the political legacy of individualism in order to open up the idea of selfhood as a fraught field of social relationality. That relationality is, of course, defined in part by negativity, that is, by conflict, anger, and aggression. The destructive potential of human relations does not deny all relationality, and relational perspectives cannot evade the persistence of this potential or actual destruction of social ties. As a result, **relationality is not by itself a good thing**, a sign of connectedness, an ethical norm to be posited over and against destruction: rather, relationality is a vexed and ambivalent field in which the question of ethical obligation has to be worked out in light of a persistent and constitutive destructive potential. Whatever “doing the right thing” turns out to be, it depends on passing through the division or struggle that conditions that ethical decision to begin with. That task is never exclusively reflexive, that is, dependent on my relation to myself alone. Indeed, when the world presents as a force field of violence, the task of nonviolence is to find ways of living and acting in that world such that violence is checked or ameliorated, or its direction turned, precisely at moments when it seems to saturate that world and offer no way out. The body can be the vector of that turn, but so too can discourse, collective practices, infrastructures, and institutions. **In response to the objection that a position in favor of nonviolence is simply unrealistic, this argument maintains that nonviolence requires a critique of what counts as reality, and it affirms the power and necessity of counterrealism in times like these**. Perhaps nonviolence requires a certain leavetaking from reality as it is currently constituted, laying open the possibilities that belong to a newer political imaginary. Many on the left argue that they believe in nonviolence but make an exception for self-defense. To understand their claim, we would need to know who the “self” is—its territorial limits and boundaries, its constitutive ties. If the self that I defend is me, my relatives, others who belong to my community, nation, or religion, or those who share a language with me, then I am a closet communitarian who will, it seems, preserve the lives of those who are like me, but certainly not those who are unlike me. Moreover, I apparently live **in a world in which that “self” is recognizable as a self**. Once we see that **certain selves are considered worth defending while others are not,** is there not a problem of inequality that follows from the justification of violence in the service of selfdefense? One cannot explain this form of inequality, which accords measures of grievability to groups across the global spectrum, without taking account of the racial schemes that make such grotesque distinctions between which lives are valuable (and potentially grievable, if lost) and those which are not. Given that self-defense is very often regarded as the justifiable exception to the norms guiding a nonviolent practice, we have to consider both (a) who counts as such a self and (b) how encompassing is the “self” of self-defense (again, does it include one’s family, community, religion, nation, traditional land, customary practices?). For lives not considered grievable (those treated as if they can be neither lost nor mourned), dwelling already **in what** Frantz **Fanon called “the zone of non-being,”** the assertion of a life that matters, as we see in the Black Lives Matter movement, can break through the schema. Lives matter in the sense that they assume physical form within the sphere of appearance; lives matter because they are to be valued equally. And yet, the claim of self-defense on the part of those who wield power is too often a defense of power, of its prerogatives, and of the inequalities it presupposes and produces. **The “self” who is defended in such cases is one who identifies with others who belong to whiteness**, to a specific nation, to a party in a border dispute; and so the terms of self-defense augment the purposes of war. Such a “self” can function as a kind of regime, including as part of its extended self all those who bear similitude to one’s color, class, and privilege, thus expelling from the regime of the subject/self all those marked by difference within that economy. Although we think of self-defense as a response to a blow initiated from the outside, **the privileged self requires no such instigation to draw its boundaries and police its exclusions. “Any possible threat”—that is, any imagined threat, any phantasm of threat—is enough to unleash its self-entitled violence**. As the philosopher Elsa Dorlin has pointed out, only some selves are regarded as entitled to selfdefense. 9 Whose claims of self-defense, for instance, are more readily believed in a court of law, and whose are more likely to be discounted and dismissed? Who, in other words, bears a self that is regarded as defensible, an existence that can appear within the legal frames of powe

## Case

#### ROB – vote for the better debater – anything else is self serving and arbitrary and moves the debate away from the core controversies of the resolution which also decks clash by making it impossible for the negative to engage

### Presumption

#### 1. Vote neg on presumption –

#### A) Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and changing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### B) No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.

#### C) Debate – none of their evidence is specific to it – sets a high threshold for solvency and ignores how communicative norms operate.

#### D) Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

### AT Beller

#### Their thesis is wrong. The world is not encoded by algorithmic accumulation.

Markland, 21—Teaching Fellow in Politics and International Relations at Aston University (Alistair, “Epistemic Transformation at the Margins: Resistance to Digitalisation and Datafication within Global Human Rights Advocacy,” Global Society, February 3, 2021, dml)

As established in the first section of this article, proponents of what I have heuristically defined as the “transformation thesis” have emphasised the revolutionary ruptures wrought by digital connectivity and datafication. Some of these proponents illustrate these changes using field specific case studies, as with Duffield’s (2018) suggestion that the transition to a “cybernetic episteme” is reflected in humanitarian practice. Other authors have taken a more abstract view, including Chandler’s (2018) discussion of new modes of governance in the digital era, or the post-humanist drive to reconceptualise “humanity” under conditions of technological entwinement (Cudworth and Hobden 2013). These assertions of macro-level transformation are also supported by network sociology, led principally by Manuel Castells (2010) analysis of how revolutions in information technology, economic globalisation and an emergent “space of flows” interact to produce a new kind of “network society”. This linkage of societal transformation to economic forces is also characteristic of more critical anti-capitalist perspectives, as with the Marxist critique of “cognitive capitalism” (Moulier-Boutang 2012; Zukerfeld 2017). Although these approaches differ in their conceptual frameworks, they are united in their ambition to highlight universal epistemic transformations brought about by technological change.

One of the pitfalls of these totalising perspectives is the neglect of the particular in favour of the universal. For instance, networked thinking encourages assumptions about lateral transformation across socio-political fields that are connected to the digital universe. But not all spheres of social or political activity move at the same pace when they are exposed to technological innovation. Datafication

and digitalisation are processes that have uneven impacts on different social and political fields. For example, the testimony of Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg to the Senate Judiciary and Commerce Committees in April 2018, where US lawmakers appeared confused by the social media giant’s basic business model, is a stark illustration of the gap that still exists between the world of Big Tech and the operating logics of mainstream democratic politics (Stewart 2018). Bigo and Bonelli (2019, 115) have found that even in the field of transnational intelligence, a sphere that could have much to gain from algorithmic techniques, technological expertise tends to be contracted out to third parties while traditional, human-sourced intelligence approaches remain dominant. Therefore, grasping for totalising processes risks ignoring the empirical specificity of divergent social microcosms.

To remedy this blind side in transformationalist thinking, I assert the utility of applying Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory when conceptualising how certain spheres of social or political activity—including the field of global human rights advocacy discussed in the previous section—mediate pressures for epistemic transformation and potentially isolate technological changes and agents to the margins. Employing field theory, Ole Jacob Sending (2015, 11) sees global governance as divided into separate fields, where “actors compete with each other to be recognised as authorities on what is to be governed, how, and why”. Examples of such fields include international development, security, peacebuilding, humanitarianism, and human rights advocacy. However, each field varies in terms of its specific “rules of the game” (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992, 99). Fields are bounded, game-like social structures that are constituted by a unique constellation of actors. These actors struggle for authority according to the field’s principles of legitimation (Bourdieu 1989, 17). These principles of legitimation, which define a field’s cultural capital, are durable to the extent that dominant actors remain invested in their reproduction. Actors’ prolonged immersion in these fields subsequently shapes their own practical sensibilities, so that the field’s logics are internalised as common sense within the habitus (Bourdieu 1990, 53). It is the embedment of the field’s doxa (common sense) within the habitus of invested actors that makes fields durable and resistant to radical transformations. As seen in the previous section, the rules governing the human rights field are associated with its logic of political influence, persuasion, and moral authority.

Critics of Bourdieusian field theory have argued that it is overly structuralist, reproductive, and cannot grasp “the ever-shifting constellations of actors, institutions, data and forms of expression that make up the expertise” (Waever and Leander 2018, 2). However, alternative approaches such as actor-network theory or assemblage-based theories fail to centralise the importance of social and political struggles between agents which are key in defining the trajectory of digitalisation and datafication. As Ruppert, Isin, and Bigo (2017, 3), “[d]ata does not happen through unstructured social practices but through structured and structuring fields in and through which various agents and their interests generate forms of expertise, interpretation, concepts, and methods that collectively function as fields of power and knowledge”. Similarly, “data is not an already given artefact that exists (which then needs to be mined, analysed, brokered) but an object of investment (in the broadest sense) that is produced by the competitive struggles of professionals who claim stakes in its meaning and functioning” (Bigo, Isin, and Ruppert 2019, 11). Technological change can influence the trajectory of different global political fields by enabling the entry of new types of actors (such as data consultants in the case of human rights advocacy), as well as by producing emergent sources of cultural capital and associated epistemic practices (such as expertise in geospatial imaging).

As Bigo and Bonelli (2019, 120) have observed in the case of the transnational intelligence field, technological change can be accompanied by the growing influence of private companies who “have played a substantial role in the recruitment of IT specialists, network engineers, data analysts, integration platform software designers, language and coding specialists, cryptologists, and mathematicians tasked with creating or combining algorithms”. Such entryism can have a revolutionary effect if those new actors are able redefine a field’s organising logic, cultural capital, and principles of legitimation. For example, looking at the case of Sudan in the 1990s as an antecedent to the transformation of humanitarianism, Duffield (2018, 85) traces how donor governments asserted greater control over NGOs, who subsequently “seamlessly morphed into the ‘implementing partners’ of donor governments”. Alongside growing private sector partnerships, these developments stimulated the neoliberal re-alignment of the humanitarian field away from Third World solidarity and the progressive support for autonomous change and towards the governance of precarity. This exposed the field to an epistemic transformation that privileged datafication based on a “surveillance logic of command and control” (ibid., 168).

However, not all global political fields are so structurally conducive to this kind of radical transformation. The example of the human rights advocacy field illustrates how a strong autonomous organising logic—a logic of persuasion—generates entrenched forms of field-specific cultural capital—qualitative and humanistic accounts of raw suffering that establish clear legal responsibilities. Actors can mobilise digital or data infrastructures to diversify the range of tools and media at their disposal, as illustrated by the (limited) use of geospatial technology, data visualisations in human rights reporting, and a growing reliance on social media platforms to engage audiences. However, they do not necessarily threaten the epistemic practices that are at the centre of human rights advocacy. This is because the transformative potential of new technologies and methods depends on their epistemic, political, social, or moral value in the eyes of the fields’ dominant actors. The integration of data-based approaches has been one of slow adaptation, not revolution, and technological specialists—often employed as third-party consultants rather than as full-time human rights professionals—remain at the margins. The Bourdieusian concept of habitus is also helpful in illuminating how fields with strong professional structures and specific educational and career trajectories can endow members with enduring dispositions that favour both the reproduction of existing epistemic practices and resistance to new ones. The habitus of human rights professionals is still primarily defined by legal, journalistic, and liberal-cosmopolitan moral/political dispositions, rather than technological expertise. So long as processes of doxic reproduction remain stable, the potential for epistemic transformation through datafication remains limited.

Conclusion

This article has cautioned against the analytical trend towards treating datafication as a general process acting to radically transform the epistemic and governance practices across global political fields. Because different social and political fields are unique social microcosms that contain divergent organising principles, readers should be wary of post-humanist analyses making totalising claims about alleged transformations in the human condition. The polemical teleology of transformationalism, an approach that is in vogue among Silicon Valley hype merchants like Elon Musk, public intellectuals, and a growing number of social scientists, is certainly attention grabbing, but it does not measure up against the actual way in which technological and methodological innovations are instituted within different fields of practice. International relations and global governance scholars working on the interstitial cross-roads between technology and various political or social lifeworlds need to be attentive to how digital and data transformations are mediated at the meso level of global politics. This article has demonstrated how epistemic transformation can be resisted at the meso level through observing changes and continuities among elite human rights organisations. Bourdieusian field theory, with its emphasis on legitimacy, social reproduction, and the durability of practical dispositions, offers a suitable framework for conceptualising the absence of epistemic rupture within the field of human rights advocacy. However, because digitalisation and datafication processes are mediated through the specific logics of a given field, more work needs to be done on examining how different organising principles shape the potentialities for epistemic transformation. Thus, in the future, more comparative empirical research will be needed to observe technological changes across different areas of global governance.

#### Even if Beller’s thesis is correct, it’s reactive and has literally nothing past explanatory power.

**Shaviro 07** (Steven Shaviro is an American academic, philosopher and cultural critic whose areas of interest include film theory, time, science fiction, panpsychism, capitalism, affect and subjectivity. He earned a PhD from Yale in 1981, and teaches Film, Culture and English at the University of Washington. He is currently a DeRoy Professor of English at Wayne State University Department of English. “The Cinematic Mode of Production”. February 27, 2007.)

Of course, I don’t think **Beller’s** book is without **flaws**. There are things I disagree with, or have difficulty with. One of these concerns forms of response, or resistance. **Beller fluctuates between a sense that capital logic** is so totalizing, so all-embracing, that it **is** nearly **impossible to escape it**; **and** a contrary insistance, which is (unfortunately) more **rhetorically asserted** than theoretically articulated, that celebrates the possibility of **resistance** and revolution. This latter, optimistic strain takes the form of a repetition of Hardt and Negri’s thesis that the creativity of the working class (or, today, of the multitude) is primary, and that all the machinations of capital, which have resulted today in the nightmare of neoliberal, post-Fordist globalization, are merely secondary and defensive recuperations (or, in Nietzschean-Deleuzian parlance, reactive). Yet **little** of the book’s **concrete analysis** **supports this revolutionary optimism**. Through most of the book, when Beller cites the possibility of an oppositional cinematic practice (or image practice) at all, he **simply calls** (rather lamely) **for works that “relentlessly endeavor to decode the conditions of their own formation”** (page 82, note 15) — which is just the old-style idea of self-reflexivity-as-critical-distanciation, something that was beloved of the avant-garde of the first half of the twentieth century, **but** that “postmodern” image practice has almost entirely co-opted and defanged. Anyone who watches contemporary music videos, for instance, knows that **this strategy doesn’t work any more**; the image/commodity’s explicit reflection on the the conditions of **it**s own formation, **only adds to its fetishistic allure**

. The book ends with citations from theory (Angela Davis) and cultural practice (Immortal Technique) as examples of alternative, resistant cultural forms. The problem is both that these come across merely as isolated instances, and that the resistance they express seems to be articulated exclusively on the plane of content, so that they do not really address (or provide counter-examples to) the issues of media form that the book as a whole so powerfully addresses. (In fairness, I haven’t seen Beller’s other book, Acquiring Eyes, which he presents as the praxis-oriented companion text to The Cinematic Mode of Production. This other book is published in the Philippines, and is not available in the US through Amazon, Barnes and Noble, or Powell’s — which tells you something about international systems of distribution). I think that the properly “dialectical” answer to this dilemma is not to assert that capital is merely “reactive” after theorizing its nearly omnipotent power; but rather to look at the ambiguities, and points of breakdown, in capital logic (which is also to say, cinematic/image logic) itself. We know today that crisis (whether economic, or aesthetic/affective) no longer provides the leverage Marx thought it would have for dislodging or overthrowing the system, because Capital itself uses its unavoidable crises in order to rejuvenate itself. But this doesn’t mean that what Deleuze and Guattari call lines of flight, or points of undecidability, are impossible. It just means that, when Capital has swallowed, internalized, and extracted surplus value from every conceivable Outside, it is from within its horizon that we can, and must, find (or manufacture) new Outsides, new points of articulation**. Beller is very aware of this sort of slippery, ambiguous, yet absolutely necessary margin of slippage within capital logic itself** in his wonderful discussion of Vertov; but it seems to vanish when he gets closer to the present moment. And this brings me to my other point of contention. Despite everything Beller says, and despite the power of his genealogy of the commodity-as-image, I remain unconvinced that “cinema” is the right word to use for the image/commodity mode of production that we find ourselves inside today, in the age of neoliberalism and post-Fordism. That is to say, **while I find Beller’s genealogy** entirely **convincing**, I wonder whether we haven’t reached a point where (as Beller likes to say) changes in quantity have led to a change in quality, as we move from cinema (imbricated with the Fordist assembly line) to television and video, and today to computer-mediated communications and digital media of expression. **I don’t think we live in a cinematic age (or mode of production) any longer, but in another media regime entirely.** This is a case, I am afraid, in which critical theory is failing to keep up with the metamorphoses of Capital itself, in which we still do not know how to be “as radical as reality itself.” **Beller’s theorization therefore ultimately fails**, in much the way that (according to his analysis) Vertov failed in his nonetheless brilliant and inspiring cinematic project. I certainly don’t have any of the answers that I find missing in Beller; but I think that, at the very least, The Cinematic Mode of Production is a necessary starting point for any future discussions.

### Technics Good

#### The World Computer is good. Algorithmic governance solves every existential and impact turns the case.

#### War- Structuring governance around info-technics is key to establishing credible space and cyberspace deterrence and avoiding war.

**Dorman 18** (U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Edward F. Dorman III, director for logistics, J-4, U.S. Central Command. “The Critical and Foundational Role of Strategic Logistics in the New Era of Deterrence”. 2018.)

I believe that in addition to the nuclear deterrent — and perhaps eclipsing it in the “new era” — are innovative, synchronized and resilient logistics across multiple domains. **Credible deterrence** **relies on signaling** the capability and resolve to deny or punish an adversary. As we all know, deterrence is about **risk calculation and preserving** decision space while creating **options** for senior leaders who are most often weighing their considerations from a point of national will across their own nation and that of allies and partners. **Nothing creates the flexibility for deterrent options** and decision space **more than** national **logistics** **that are underpinned by** a vibrant, thriving economy that in turn is linked to partners and allies through engaged diplomacy and **information-sharing** agreements. **These links enable the United States and its partners to leverage** industrial capacity, expeditionary mobility, and **joint** force projection **capabilities** to rapidly project and aggregate military forces at a time and place of our choosing — **and then sustain it indefinitely**. Given the many factors driving change and uncertainty across the globe, U.S. and allied and partner commitment in the CENTCOM region remains as important as ever. **As we adapt to** the new National Defense Strategy and implementation guidance, we recognize the revised prioritization of **global threats** and the changes in applications of force. However, recent experience has shown that of the “2+3” about which our new NDS is most concerned — Russia and China, plus the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran and VEOs — the fact is that all five are currently operating within the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Therefore, I see CENTCOM’s contributions to strategic deterrence from both a regional and global perspective. And keep in mind that deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. For deterrence to work, **all** the **elements of** national power must be applied and understood by adversaries and potential adversaries alike. In my view, the formula for successful **deterrence** is: Capability plus Credibility to the power of Logistics x Resolve x Signaling = Deterrence. (D=CL+ CL \*R\*S). The CENTCOM View Our combatant commands **are** a critical component of our deterrence both regionally and globally due to the transregional nature of today’s threats. As I noted in the introduction, the commander’s strategic approach is one of “prepare, pursue, prevail” — all **underpinned by a solid foundation of strategic logistics** synchronized from the national strategic to tactical levels nested inside the new National Defense Strategy. The NDS directs us **to deter adversaries from aggression** against our vital interests **and** to **discourage destabilizing behaviour.**

Our method of working “by, with, and through” partners and allies ensures we are training host nation forces to take the lead in operations, enabling them with key assets like **logistics**. First we prepare the environment by ensuring the right forces, footprints and agreement are in place. This **ensures that conditions are set for stabilization post contingency operations and** to **enable deterrence broadly.** Effective preparation enables CENTCOM to compete with the other major actors in the region through strengthening alliances and partnerships. For example, CENTCOM did not lead the fight to defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but prepared the environment by advising, assisting, and enabling Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Syrian Democratic Forces. The Office for Security Cooperation–Iraq worked daily with the government of Iraq to plan execute the acquisition, logistics and distribution of capabilities necessary to man, train, equip, posture and execute operations. Theater logisticians engaged the ISF and the Iraqi government daily to help reform Iraqi repair-and-maintenance facilities. I was able to link the Army Materiel Command (AMC) to this fledgling Iraqi organic industrial base. The linking of industrial bases delivers the capability to produce repair parts to sustain weapon systems platforms that the US no longer produces ensures credible forces. A prepared environment along with exercises and operations are a powerful signal to friend and foe alike that contribute to deterrence. This is essential in contributing to deterring state on state aggression as well as exportation of threat vectors to our collective homelands, preserving regional balances of power, and thus substantially achieving strategic objectives and interests in our national strategies.

#### Cyber-attacks cause nuclear retaliation. Credible deterrence is essential.

James S. Johnson, Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations, M.A. in Asia-Pacific Studies, honorary fellow with the School of History & International Relations at the University of Leicester, 3.25.19, ’19, “China’s vision of the future network-centric battlefield: Cyber, space and electromagnetic asymmetric challenges to the United States,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 37, No. 5, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2018.1526563) vw

IR theorists of various stripes generally agree that the security dilemma is an inescapable condition in world politics, which at best only be ameliorated or mitigated.104 Broadly defined, defensive-realist IR scholars posit that a variety of ‘material regulators’ can reduce the intensity of the dilemma, which may improve the prospects for cooperation (i.e. arms control measures and moderate military policies) and strategic stability between states.105 The ‘material regulators’ most relevant to conceptualize C4ISR systems (and related high-tech domains) include: the offense-defense balance, and in particular, sharpening the distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities and strategies; the prevailing military balance; and closely related, the asymmetric distribution of military power.106 The prospects for mitigating the emerging U.S.-China technologically-driven arms-race, however, appear bleak for the following reasons: First, the offense-defense line in the cyberspace is inherently obscured. Network intrusions (or hacking), for example, are equally useful for defensive as for offense operations. Thus, a cyber espionage could be interpreted (accurately or otherwise) as a precursor for an offensive preemptive cyber-attack.107 As the former head of the U.S. National Security Agency, General Michael Hayden opined: “operationally and technologically cyber espionage is not distinguishable from cyberattack”.108 As this paper described, in cases where the offense-defense line is blurred states’ intentions are harder to fathom; creating space for misperceptions and worse-case scenario defense planning, which worsens the security dilemma. In the cyber domain, the prevailing conventional wisdom is that the offense has the advantage - or offensive-dominant. That is, it is much easier and cheaper to create malicious code than to develop effective counters; which reinforces the doctrinal preference for preemptive and first strikes, and increases the risks of cross-domain (and possibly inadvertent) military escalation.109 To be sure, there is little agreement between states on what is the appropriate balance between offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Second, and closely related, the opacity surrounding U.S. and Chinese cyber (offensive and defensive) capabilities and related technologies have proven particulary difficult to verify; thus, complicating further the ability of policy-makers to determine the others’ intention. Furthermore, given the diverse range of actors (state and non-state) involved in cyberspace, the absence of well-defined international norms governing cyberspace (and ‘cyber-warfare’), the increasing sophisticated and integrated nature of C4ISR military systems, and the implications of emerging technologies for the survivability of states’ nuclear weapons (i.e. hardening and concealment), the risks of arms racing increase.110 Third, as C4ISR systems become further integrated with U.S. and Chinese war-fighting capabilities, and as both sides vulnerabilities to these systems increases, these risks will be amplified. In future conflict, a non-kinetic cyber attack may be used in conjuction with kinetic (conventional or nuclear) military force; for example, C4ISR enabled precision-guided munitions or a blinding denial of service cyber attack on U.S. communication satellites as a precursor to an ASAT strike.

Chinese analysts at the National Defense University (NDU) recently reported that even though U.S. military satellites operate independently of the wider internet infrastructure advancements in network, intrusion technologies (i.e. quantum computing) has meant that electronic warfare capabilities can be used as a “spring board” to attack hitherto secure U.S. military command and control networks.111 In sum, the diffusion and integration of emerging technologies into broader war-fighting capabilities, together with, the challenges posed by cross-domain (or ‘multi-domain’) warfare to traditional - war and intra-war - deterrence models, and the proliferation of C4ISR dependent weapons which continues to shift the asymmetric distribution of military power (or the ‘information center of gravity’) in China’s favor; will likely further reduce the chances of successfully restraining a U.S.-China technology-driven arms race, and intractable security dilemma. To be sure, if the present trajectory in several strategic defense innovations holds, China will soon challenge the U.S. lead in several emerging military-technological strategic fields (e.g. A.I. and quantum computing).112 That in turn, will likely accelerate the Pentagon’s drive to innovate offsetting initiatives and concepts, and reduce the prospects for finding solutions to restrain a technologically-driven arms race driven by ‘great power competition’.113å

#### Space war goes nuclear.

Johnson-Freese 17 (Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor and chair of space science and technology @ Naval War College, *Space Warfare in the 21st Century*, Routledge, ISBN 978131552917, p 18-20. 2017.)

Space warfare runs two untenable risks: the creation of destructive debris and escalation to terrestrial, even nuclear, warfare. Kinetic warfare in space creates debris traveling at a speed of more than 17,000 miles per hour, which then in itself becomes a destructive weapon if it hits another object—even potentially triggering the so-called Kessler Syndrome,86 exaggerated for dramatic effect in the movie Gravity. Ironically, both China and the United States learned the negative lessons of debris creation the hard way. In 1985, the United States tested a miniature homing vehicle (MHV) ASAT launched from an F-15 aircraft. The MHV intercepted and destroyed a defunct US satellite at an altitude of approximately 250 miles. It took almost 17 years for the debris resulting from that test to be fully eliminated by conflagration re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere or being consumed by frictional forces, though no fragment had any adverse consequences to another satellite—in particular, no collisions. China irresponsibly tested a direct-ascent ASAT in 2007, destroying one if its defunct satellites. That test was at an altitude almost twice that of the 1985 US test. The debris created by the impact added 25 percent to the debris total in low Earth orbit87 and will dissipate through the low Earth orbit, heavily populated with satellites, for decades, perhaps centuries, to come. Perhaps most ironically, because of superior US debris-tracking capabilities, the United States—even though not required to do so—has on more than one occasion warned China that it needed to maneuver one of its satellites to avoid a collision with debris China itself had likely created.88 In 2013, a piece of Chinese space junk from the 2007 ASAT test collided with a Russian laser ranging nanosatellite called BLITS, creating still more debris.89 The broader point is that all nations have a compelling common interest in avoiding the massive increase in space debris that would be created by a substantial ASAT conflict. Gen. Hyten has said that not creating debris is “the one limiting factor” to space war. “Whatever you do,” he warns, “don’t create debris.”90 While that might appear an obvious “limiting factor,” preparing to fight its way through a debris cloud had been a Pentagon consideration in the past. Now, however, sustaining the space environment has been incorporated into Pentagon space goals. Beyond debris creation, MacDonald points out that as China becomes more militarily capable in space and there is more symmetry between the countries, other risks are created – specifically, escalation. That is, the United States could threaten to attack not just Chinese space assets, but also ground-based assets, including ASAT command-and-control centers and other military capabilities. But such actions, which would involve attacking Chinese soil and likely causing substantial direct casualties, would politically weigh much heavier than the U.S. loss of space hardware, and thus might climb the escalatory ladder to a more damaging war that both sides would probably want to avoid.91 MacDonald isn’t alone in concerns about escalation. Secure World Foundation analyst Victoria Samson has also voiced apprehension regarding US rhetoric that does not distinguish between actions against unclassified and classified US satellites, stating that “things can escalate pretty quickly should we come into a time of hostility.”92 Theresa Hitchens explained the most frightening, but not implausible, risk of space war escalation in a 2012 Time magazine interview. Say you have a crisis between two nuclear-armed, space-faring countries, Nation A and Nation B, which have a long-standing border dispute. Nation A, with its satellite capability, sees that Nation B is mobilizing troops and opening up military depots in a region where things are very tense already, on the tipping point. Nation A thinks: “That’s it, they’re going to attack.” So it might decide to pre-emptively strike the communications satellite used by Nation B to slow down its ability to move toward the border and give itself time to fortify. Say this happens and Nation B has no use of satellites for 12 hours, the time it takes it to get another satellite into position. What does Nation B do? It’s blind, it’s deaf, it’s thinking all this time that it’s about to be overwhelmed by an invasion or even nuked. This is possibly a real crisis escalation situation; something similar has been played out in U.S. Air Force war games, a scenario-planning exercise practiced by the U.S. military. The first game involving anti-satellite weapons stopped in five minutes because it went nuclear – bam. Nation B nuked Nation A. This is not a far-out, “The sky’s falling in!” concern, it is something that has been played out over and over again in the gaming of these things, and I have real fears about it.93 While escalation to a nuclear exchange may seem unthinkable, in war games conducted by the military, nuclear weapons are treated as just another warfighting weapon. Morgan also voiced concerns about escalation generally and nuclear escalation specifically in the 2010 RAND report, stating: The adversary would also likely be deterred from damaging U.S. satellite early-warning system (SEWS) assets to avoid risking inadvertent escalation to the nuclear threshold, but that firebreak would almost certainly collapse with the conclusion that such escalation is inevitable and that it is in the adversary’s interest to launch a preemptive nuclear strike.94

#### Datazation of individuals is useful, it creates large structures of data to help combat structural issues that occur. Big data specifically helped resolve significant portions of the covid pandemic and is continuing to provide innovative ways to combat COVID and save lives using information technologies

Haleem, 20, Abid Haleem isa professor and doctor of Mechinical engineering at the largest university in India "Significant Applications of Big Data in COVID-19 Pandemic," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7204193/

Dear Editor, New cases of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) are increasing rapidly at astonishing rates globally; more than 1.2 billion people have developed an infection and out of these, around 65,000 have died of this disease, until today. This immediate burst of cases and their health data have created a vital source of information and knowledge. There is an immediate requirement to store such a large amount of data of these cases, using different data storage technologies. These data are used to undertake research and development about the virus, pandemic and measures to fight this virus and its after-effects. Big data is an innovative technology which can digitally store a large amount of data of these patients. It helps to computationally analyse to reveal patterns, trends, associations and differences. It can also help in revealing the insights into the spread and control of this virus. With detailed data capturing capability, big data can be used gainfully to minimise the risk of spreading this virus [[1](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7204193/#CR1), [2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7204193/#CR2)]. Big data technology can store a massive amount of information about these people infected with this COVID-19 virus. It helps in understanding the nature of this virus in detail. The data obtained can further be trained over again for developing future preventive methods. This technology is used to store the data of all types of cases (infected, recovered and expired) affected by COVID-19. This information can be effectively used for case identification and helping to allocate the resources for better protection of public health [[3](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7204193/#CR3), [4](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7204193/#CR4)].Several modalities of digital data including patient location, proximity, patient-reported travel, co-morbidity, patient physiology and current symptoms can be digitised

and used for generating actionable insights at both community and demography levels. Table [​Table11](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7204193/table/Tab1/) provides significant applications of big data in COVID-19 pandemic.

Significant applications of big data in COVID-19 pandemic

| S. No. | Applications | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Identification of infected cases | It is capable of storing the complete medical history of all patients, due to its capability of storing a massive amount of data By providing the captured data, this technology helps in identification of the infected cases and undertake further analysis of the level of risks |
| 2 | Travel history | Used to store the travel history of the people to analyse the risk Helps to identify people who may be in contact with the infected patient of this virus |
| 3 | Fever symptoms | Big data can keep the record of fever and other symptoms of a patient and suggest if medical attention is required Helps to identify the suspicious cases and other misinformation with the appropriate data |
| 4 | Identification of the virus at an early stage | Quickly helps to identify the infected patient at an early stage Helps to analyse and identify persons who can be infected by this virus in future |
| 5 | Identification and analysis of fast-moving disease | Helps to effectively analyse the fast-moving disease as efficiently as possible Potential to handle appropriate information regarding the disease |
| 6 | Information during lockdown | This technology collects information regarding this virus during the lockdown Track and monitor the movement of people and entire health management |
| 7 | People entered or leaving the affected area | It helps to analyse the number of people entered or leaving from the affected city With these vast amount of data, health specialist can quickly identify the chances of the virus in those peoples |
| 8 | Faster development of medical treatments | Assist in fast-tracking the development of new medicines and equipment needed for current and future medicinal needs Provides previous data of virus inhabited or spread and, thus, helps in gaining a giving advantage over newer pandemic/epidemic with previously analysed results |

### AT Solvency

#### Private Actor Fiat is a voting issue –its unpredictable – u can choose a billion actors, organizations, and turns off because it’s literally impossible for that kind of action to happen because they don’t have the infrastructure to succeed ie sorry judges, but you can’t singlehandedly start a revolution

#### Turn- The body is not a site of resistance, it’s a site of incorporation – the cybernetic processes of capitalism flow through bodies, producing constant crises and transgressive strategies that become knowable and predicted which turns their attempt at embodied resistance.

**Liu 19** (Xiao, Assistant Professor of East Asian Studies at McGill University, “Information Fantasies," *E-Flux Journal #96*, January 2019, https://www.e-flux.com/journal/96/246020/information-fantasies/)

Second, striking in the topmost photo is a belief in the necessity of a seamless incorporation of the human body into information environments. **The human body is conceived** simultaneously **as a medium with immense potentiality** and as an inadequate medium that always requires some facilitation, such as that of the “information pot,” to strengthen its connectivity. It is precisely this precarious nature of mediation that gives rise to various **politics and technocratic visions in manipulating the body and making it the locus for the competition of powers and economic interests**. Although the “information pot” scenario appeared as a revival of an ancient philosophical idea, the human body in this scenario was more of a black box for information input and output. The body not only received information from outer space, but it also exchanged information, and thus formed feedback loops between the body and the environment. This had to do with the dissemination of cybernetics, information theory, and systems theory in China, which Qian Xuesen and other enthusiasts adopted as a new frontier of scientific research, but, more important, as a method for analyzing human society, economic structure, Chinese history, and even literature and the arts. The human body as a medium is not a new phenomenon. Traditional Chinese philosophy and religious practices, as well as spiritualism in the nineteenth century, had featured different versions of the body-as-a-medium within different epistemological modes. Increasingly pervasive computational environments bring the human body to the center of current media studies, especially in new media scholarship on digitization and networks. But the emergence of an “information body”—the body as a medium for information processing—in China in the 1980s, on the one hand, registered the ways in which contemporary media technologies transform the perceptions and interactions of the human body with the world, and, on the other hand, was a discursive construction deeply entrenched in the politics of the postsocialist world, accompanying the production and unleashing of consumer desire in the process of marketization, and concurrent with the privilege of “information workers” over factory workers and peasants, who were once valorized as socialist subjects. This “information body,” however, is not merely a passive receiver or transmitter of information. Mark **Hansen** in his New Philosophy for New Media highlights the role of the human body in “enframing” information, and the process through which the body, in conjunction with various apparatuses, renders information perceptible and gives forms to digital images. He argues that because digital data “explodes” the framed image that is the basic unit of photography and film, the human body is empowered as a “convertor” of polymorphous digital data, able to actualize singular experience. **According to Hansen, this process demonstrates the human body as a final site to resist the universalizing and homogenizing power of capitalism** epitomized in the unlimited interconvertibility of digital data. Because of its “sensorimotor power to create the unpredictable, the experimental, the new,” the body becomes a site that can resist the capitalist imposition

of universal exchangeability as manifested in digital convergence. As insightful an intervention as it is, **this idealized notion of the human body** nonetheless **is ahistorical, abstracted from any specific socioeconomic conditions**. **Hansen assumes that the body itself is automatically capable of resistance**. My task here is to historicize the ways in which **the informationization of the body** in post-Mao China **concurred with the process of depoliticizing political subjects and the transformation of revolutionary “people” into postsocialist subjects.** **This** **process was exhilarating** because it stimulated utopian and techno-futuristic imaginations and unleashed desires, senses of freedom, and aspirations for multiple possibilities, but it also turned out to be depressing and **dystopian**. **As socialist subjects were emptied out and marginalized, the** human **body turned into a** ceaseless **information**-processing **machine for value extraction** and was increasingly subject to various ideological and marketing “information bombs.” Finally, but no less significantly: in the photo a cooking pot, usually not used for communication, is turned into what we may call a medium, which produces and facilitates new relations between the human body and the information environment. This transformation of a pot into a medium destabilizes a fixed, conventional conception of medium and raises the question of what media do. Alexander Galloway, Eugene Thacker, and McKenzie Wark have recently expressed dissatisfaction with the general understanding of media as devices and apparatuses in current media studies because this understanding obstructs broader discussions of the modes of mediation. Instead of asking what media are, they call for probing more into the question of “what is mediation?” Moving away from the fixed, narrow notion of media as merely devices, we may ask: How is mediation generated and what is generated from the process of mediation? In this instance of the information pot, the becoming of medium provokes us to rethink mediation as the production of relations and the redrawing of boundaries. MARK The reconfiguration of boundaries in both social and technical realms, as Katherine Hayles remarks, is a most salient feature of cybernetics. Cybernetics provides a vision of information flowing across humans and machines, life-forms and non-life-forms, which is also a vision of ubiquitous mediation. Yet **the seemingly obstruction-free information flows are never a politically neutral process**, **but**, as Hayles insightfully points out, are **imbricated in imperial powers and the expansion of capitalism in its drastic removal and redrawing of boundaries**. I would argue that, in the context of 1980s China, the seemingly free information flows have to be considered as an effect of mediation that involves the constant negotiation of contradictions and the reconfiguration of relations and boundaries. **It is** therefore **crucial to examine the conditions that make the information flows possible—the redistribution of powers, the eliding and reconstruction of regional, racial, gender, and class differences**. Such a critique of cybernetics is yet to be done, especially beyond the context of Western “developed countries,” which are often assumed as the “origin” and the main ground for the development of information science and technology. Moving away from the one-directional influence mode, my project contextualizes **the circulation of cybernetics** and informatics in post–Cold War geopolitics and examines the “information fantasies” in post-Mao China **as inseparable from the boundary-destroying and boundary-redrawing processes in various social arenas, the reshuffling of Cold War powers, and the emergence of new sorts of connectivity that are generated during socioeconomic changes**. The sense of liberation and excitement accompanied by these processes inspired imaginations of information technologically advanced futures, but **the boundary-breaking forces of the market** also **engendered** a postsocialist **precariousness that put** social values, morality, and human **identities in constant crises**. It is precisely such rich contradictions of post-Mao China that provide me with a pivotal point to launch a critique of the postwar discourses of cybernetics in explicating its complex entanglement with postsocialist politics.

### Neolib Turn

#### Turn- The 1AC’s localized resistance is ultimately a resilience project that strips away agency in favor of capitulation to neoliberalism. Debate creates a market economy for this which saps future resistance of radical potential

**Evans and Reid 14** [Brad Evans, professor of international relations at the University of Lapland, Finland and Julian Reid, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Bristol, *Resilient Life*, 2014, p. 102-4]

The significance of linking self-worth and achievement to the ‘social norm’ cannot be underestimated as it allows us to illustrate the differences between the learning processes of resilience as compared to a properly critical pedagogy which would encourage children to question the fundamental tenets of power and inequality in the world. **Strategies of** resilience when applied to children take the form of training exercises which enable them to deal with the localized effects of their vulnerability and the forms of attachments and dependencies they have created which amplify the problems. The examples of youths falling into membership of inner-city gangs become a prime example of a vulnerable child that has fallen through the cracks. Countering this is the idea of ‘educational resilience**’**, defined as the ‘heightened likelihood of success in school and other life accomplishments despite environmental adversities brought about by early traits, conditions, and experiences’.20 But how exactly do we measure success? Is the educationally resilient the vulnerable subject who goes on to fulfill their neoliberal potential, or is it the subject who goes to war with the system that seeks to render them resilient as such? Resilience, as we have learned, is more a code for social compliance than a political ambition to transform the very sources of inequality and injustices experienced by marginalized populations. We find this in early educational theories where resilience is again conflated with strategies of resistance

such that the resilient child, individualistically conceived, pathologically outlives its conditions of impoverishment to exhibit social achievement in ways that are altogether in tune with the normal functioning of society.21 Indeed, more than simply learning to cope in conditions of impoverishment and vulnerability, as Steven Condly succinctly puts it in an approving review of the prevailing mainstream educational approaches, the doctrine of resilience offers new ways to assess qualities, competences and capabilities, as ‘resilient children tend to possess an above average intelligence and have a temperament that endears them to others and that also does not allow them to succumb to self-pity’.22 What of course qualifies as ‘self-pity’ in another setting could easily be read as a conscious attempt to challenge that which is beyond the control or individual responsibility of the particular subject. Sheila Martineau is attuned to this and writes of the political dangers of resilience in education with considerable foresight: ‘Though resilience conveyed anomalous childhood behaviour in the context of traumatic events in the 1970s, it has become detached from the traumatic context … dangerously, resilience has become constructed as a social norm modelled on the behavioural norms and expectations of the dominant society’.23 Resilience, in other words, becomes a normalized standard for mapping out (ab)normal behaviours such that the very terms of success are loaded with moral claims to a specific maturity, wherein the maturity itself is qualified through one’s ability to connect to the liberal order of things and partake in the world such that to resist means, without contraction, that one successfully learns to conform. Or to put it in more critical terms, since the ‘solution’ is to teach children to overcome ‘obstacles’ to personal development without ultimately challenging wider relations of power, the resilient child (which, although said to include all children, overwhelmingly concentrates on those from poorer, culturally and racially distinct backgrounds) encounters policies which, instead of ‘treating the individual’, end up by virtue of its logic ‘blaming the victim’.24 Disadvantage as such becomes once again the means to author new forms of discrimination that plays the vulnerable card to remove any political claims that things could be otherwise. Today we can situate these earlier demands for resilience within the strategic context of what Henry Giroux calls the ‘war on youth’. Indicative of **the neoliberal** assault on the education **system** more generally, Giroux maintains that youth has become a privileged object for power in a way that seeks to strip away any sense of critical awareness and political agency at the earliest possible stages of intellectual development. As he wr**it**es, since ‘neoliberalism is also a pedagogical project designed to create particular subjects, desires, and values defined largely by market considerations’, questions of ‘destiny’ become ‘linked to a market-driven logic in which freedom is stripped down to freedom from government regulation, freedom to consume, and freedom to say anything one wants, regardless of how racist or toxic the consequences might be’.25 This has a profound bearing upon education policy as ‘Critical thought and human agency are rendered impotent as neoliberal rationality substitutes emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to political problems’**.**26 Hence, within this ‘depoliticized discourse, youths are told that there is no dream of the collective, no viable social bonds, only the actions of autonomous individuals who can count only on their own resources and who bear sole responsibility for the effects of larger systemic political and economic problems’. Whilst education therefore should have a pedagogical commitment to the globally oppressed, what takes its place is a substitution for education that produces vulnerable consumers whose very training renders the political impossible**.**