# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may only defend that a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### Resolved means a policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### A just government is a moral government – that’s a hypothetical gov

Cambridge Dictionary No Date, (Cambridge Dictionary, “Just”), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/just // MNHS NL

fair; morally correct:

#### Recognize means to accept as legal

Cambridge Dictionary No Date, (Cambridge Dictionary, “Recognize”), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/recognize // MNHS NL

to accept that something is legal, true, or important:

The international community has refused to recognize (= officially accept the existence of) the newly independent nation state.

[ + (that) ] He sadly recognized (that) he would die childless.

You must recognize the seriousness of the problems we are facing.

#### A worker is one who works manually or in an industry for a certain wage

Merriam Webster ND <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worker> VM

“one that works especially at manual or industrial labor or with a particular material”

#### They violate— they don’t defend a just government implementing the right to strike.

#### Vote neg to preserve substantive engagement --

#### 1] Preparation- changing the topic gives the aff a huge edge, they can prepare for 6 months on an issue that catches us by surprise. Preparation is better than thinking on your feet- research demonstrates pedagogical humility and research skills are the only portable debate training – the process of debate outweighs the content – only our interp generates the argumentative skills needed to rigorously defend their affirmative out of round and create engaged citizens

#### 2] Limits- there are an infinite number of non topical affirmatives. not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months.

#### 3] Switch side debate is good -- it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives which prevents ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

#### 4] fairness – debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary for any benefit to the activity. That outweighs om decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented. This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

#### 5] small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely affected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities

#### TVA: read an aff about workplace discrimination and harassment towards queer people and why they need the right to strike, which would help us orient ourselves towards the past, present and future of queerness – they didn’t prove that working through bodies like a just government is a bad thing either. Even if governments aren’t just in the squo, by using policy, you can make them more just – they conceded that you can read things like the right to strike is good for epistemic disruption. The rez isn’t utopian – they say only the US isn’t just not that other govts can’t be just

#### Disads to the TVA prove there’s negative ground and that it’s a contestable stasis point, and if their critique is incompatible with the topic reading it on the neg solves

#### Winning their thesis doesn’t answer T because only through the process of clash can they refine their defense of it—they need an explanation of why we switch sides and why there’s a winner and loser under their model

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done. Drop the team on theory generally to deter infinite abuse

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary, you can’t be reasonably topical, and causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### RVIs and impact turns encourage all in on theory which decks substance and incentivize baiting theory with abusive practices.

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

#### 1] Debate is a game. It's driven by competitive incentives. You adhere to speech times, coin flips, speech order, etc, want your arguments evaluated fairly and dropped arguments taken into consideration

#### 2] Debate can be other things but its best benefits are amplified by fair evaluation which presumes that the game constrains other reasons we might want to be here.

#### 3] The idea that debate should be a site for deliberation over surivival strategies is violent and hypercharges the space as a site of violence. It makes negation over strategies tantamount to material violence and makes judges arbiters over peoples lives. if they are right about queer violence in and out of debate, this model is infinitely more violent because homophobic judges forefront those biases without game based constraints

## 2

#### Their idea that by hacking the resolution and debate they can challenge capitalist capture is false. Capitalism thrives on that narrative of “escape”. Disrupting a logic or social system cannot solve, boring analysis of structures is necessary.

Bluhdorn 07 – (May 2007, Ingolfur, PhD, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology, University of Bath, “Self-description, Self-deception, Simulation: A Systems-theoretical Perspective on Contemporary Discourses of Radical Change,” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1–20, May 2007, google scholar)

Yet the **established patterns of self-construction, which** thus **have to be defended and** further **developed** at any price, **have fundamental problems** attached to them: ﬁrstly, **the attempt to constitute, on the basis of** product choices and acts of **consumption, a Self and identity** that are **distinct from and autonomous vis-a`-vis the market is a contradiction in terms**. Secondly, **late-modern society’s established patterns of consumption are known to be socially exclusive and environmentally destructive**. Despite all hopes for ecological modernization and revolutionary improvements in resource efﬁciency (e.g. Weizsa¨cker et al., 1998; Hawkenet al., 1999; Lomborg, 2001), **physical environmental limits imply that the lifestyles and established patterns of consumption** cherished by advanced modern societies **cannot even be extended to all residents of the richest countries**, let alone to the populations of the developing world. For the sake of the (re)construction of an ever elusive Self, **in their struggle against self-referentiality** and in pursuit of the regeneration of difference, **late-modern societies are** thus **locked into the imperative of maintaining** and further developing the principle of **exclusion** (Blu¨hdorn, 2002, 2003). At any price they have to, and indeed do, defend **a lifestyle that requires ever increasing social inequality, environmental degradation, predatory resource wars, and the tight policing of potential internal and external enemies**.14 For this effort, **military and surveillance technology provide ever more sophisticated and efﬁcient means**. Nevertheless, the principle of **exclusion is ultimately still unsustainable, not only because of spiralling ‘security’ expenses but also because it** directly **contradicts the** modernist **notion of the free and autonomous individual** that late-modern society desperately aims to sustain. For this reason, late-modern society is confronted with the task of having to sustain both the late-modern principle of exclusion as well as its opposite, i.e. the modernist principle of inclusion. Very importantly, the conﬂict between the principles of exclusion and inclusion is not simply one between different individuals, political actors or sections of society. Instead, it is a politically irresolvable conﬂict that resides right within the late-modern individual, the late-modern economy and late-modern politics. And if, as Touraine notes, late-modern society no longer believes in nor even desires political transcendence, the particular challenge is that the two principles can also no longer be attributed to different dimensions of time, i.e. the former to the present, and the latter to some future society. Instead, late-modern society needs to represent and reproduce itself and its opposite at the same time. If considered **within this framework** of this analysis, the function of Luhmann’s system of protest communication, or in the terms of this article, **the signiﬁcance of** late-modern societies’ **discourses of radical change becomes immediately evident**. **At a stage when the possibility** and desirability **of transcending** the principle of **exclusion has been pulled into** radical **doubt but when**, at the same time, the principle of **inclusion is vitally important**, **these discourses simulate the validity of the latter as a social ideal**. In other words, **latemodern society reconciles the tension between the** cherished but exclusive **status quo** – for which there is no alternative – **and the non-existent** inclusive **alternative** – on whose existence it depends – **by means of simulation**. The analysis of Luhmann’s work has demonstrated how the societal self-descriptions produced by the system of protest communication, or late-modern society’s discourses of radical change, fulﬁl this function exactly. **They are** an **indispensable** function system not so much because they help to resolve late-modern society’s problems of mal-coordination, but because by performing the possibility of the alternative they help to cope with the fundamental problem of self-referentiality. In this sense, late-modern society’s discourses of sustainability, democratic renewal, social inclusion or global justice, to name but a few, suggest that advanced modern society is working towards an environmentally and socially inclusive alternative – genuinely modern – society, but they do not deny the fact that the big utopia and project of late-modern society is the reproduction and further enhancement of the status quo, i.e. the sustainability of the principle of exclusion. Protest movements as networks of physical actors and actions complement the purely communicative **discourses of radical change** in that they bring their narrative and societal selfdescription to life. Whilst the declarations of institutionalized mainstream politics cannot escape the generalized suspicion that they are purely rhetorical, social movements **provide an arena for** the physical expression and **experience of the authenticity and reality of the alternative**

#### Their model of queer activism through transgression replicates neoliberalism by refusing the promise of collective transformation

Drucker 15 [Peter Drucker (Peter has emerged in the 21st century as a leading Marxist scholar in queer studies. His special contributions concern the roots of 'homonormativity' in neoliberalism, the impact of neoliberal globalization on same-sex sexualities in dependent countries, and links between queer and anti-capitalist resistance. He is also working on a series of studies on gender and sexual dimensions of Islamophobia, in both Europe and the Middle East. Finally, he continues his long-term work on the history of US and European socialism, connecting it to the left's record on feminist and LGBTIQ issues.); 2015; “Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism”; <https://books.google.com/books?id=_ByoBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA301> //BWSWJ]

As long as alliances with broader forces of the anti-capitalist left remain few and limited, radical queer activists face the task themselves of working out positions for queer anti-capitalist politics and translating them into public organ-ising and activism. Self-identified radical queer groups have existed, at least intermittently, for the past quarter-century, as a `punky, anti-assimilationist, transgressive movement on the fringe of lesbian and gay culture',7' and a milieu that is 'disgusted by marriage and military and that longs to return' to a radical vision.72 Politically, a wave of Queer Nation groups, following on the 1987 March on Washington and the rise of ACT UP, originated in the us as part of the largest and most militant wave of LGBT activism since the 197os. The different forms of AIDS activism and queer activism that emerged initially in the us and Britain in the late 198os and early 199os posed a radical challenge to established lesbian/gay rights organisations. Self-defined queer activist groups have also appeared more recently in a number of countries in continental Europe. The Pink Panthers in Paris and Lisbon73 have forged a dynamic, Latin European variant of international queer radicalism. Queer-identified groups are also beginning to spring up here and there in dependent countries. But queer radicals' ability to contend for influence in LGBT movements or to set the agenda of sexual politics more generally has been held in check by a number of factors. Queer radicalism emerged in an overall context of societal reaction, in which LGBT militancy was largely isolated from and unsupported by its logical allies. This led to some disturbing ambiguities. Queer ideology has been hard to pin down. In the imperialist countries that have so far been radical queers' main base, the predominant ideological current among them has been a fairly diffuse anarchism. Queer groups have yet to show much of an orientation towards large-scale mobilisation, to take root among the racially and nationally oppressed, or to prove their lasting adaptability to the dependent world.74 While large anti-capitalist parties have rarely made links with Queer radicalism, queer radicals have rarely found their way to a broad political audience. In this sense, the limits of anti-capitalist parties and of small radical queer groups mirror each other. The early Queer Nation groups reflected a certain break in the movement's memory. Although many of the practical stands and philosophical or theoretical points they made had originally been made by an earlier generation of the lesbian/gay liberation movement, young queers were often unaware of this. The emergence of Queer Nation as a distinctive, insurgent current thus showed the failure of lesbian/gay liberation to transmit its history, to make its values prevail in actually existing LGBT communities, or to sustain a vibrant left wing in the LGBT movement. By comparison with early lesbian/gay liberationists, early Queer Nation groups had an even more voluntarist or even idealist mind-set. They tended to see queer identity as consciously chosen and crafted. Many LGBT identities have in fact had a voluntary dimension. In some cases, this has distinguished LGBT oppression from oppression based on race, gender or disability, which are generally not chosen but visible, material and unavoidable. But this is only one aspect of LGBT oppression. The fact that women living apart from men have lower living standards is not chosen; the fact that even the most closeted LGBT people could for generations lose their jobs or homes was not chosen; the fact that the great majority of LGBT people still grow up in straight families is not chosen. Many trans people, however well they fit into a queer milieu as 'gender queers, also do not feel that they have chosen their identities. As early as 1992, failure to tackle trans issues effectively in Queer Nation San Francisco led to the formation of a separate Transgender Nation, though overall the queer milieu proved more supportive than lesbian/gay and feminist milieus had been in the 1970s. The intersex community, which began organising politically with the founding in 1993 of the Intersex Society of North America,75 seems less easy to include under a queer umbrella, largely because intersex people usually have no choice at all about being intersex. Despite its implicit and increasingly explicit opposition to neoliberalism, queer radicalism has also had an ambivalent relationship to the commercial gay scene. It has resisted the assimilationism that it sees the commercial scene as promoting. But a whole series of Queer Nation actions in the 199os focused on invading shopping malls and modifying logos on t-shirts — a tac-tic that risked replacing critiques of consumerism with alternative forms of consumption.76 This contrasted with more frontal rejections of consumerism that were also present in queer direct action groups, like the chant We're here, we're queer, we're not going shopping!' used by ACT UP San Francisco a few years earlier. The sexual radicalism of queer politics has had a complex and contradic-tory relationship to the realities of gender, race and class. Initially, ACT UP reflected the manifest need to respond to AIDS with 'a new kind of alliance politics ...across the dividing lines of race and gender, class and national-ity, citizenship and sexual orientation'.77 Yet queer activism has sometimes obscured rather than highlighted these realities

, with an exclusive focus on sex that can erase its intersections with gender, class and race. This erasure can be facilitated by queer politics' slippage from radical anti-separatism to one more form of identity politics, which can rest on 'an unspoken appeal' to a white middle-class model.78 For women in particular, the emphasis on sexual agency that has always been central to queer, while avoiding seeing women exclusively as victims, risks divorcing 'pleasure and sexuality ... from the social structures that organize them'.79 Although the name Queer Nation and its angry separatist spirit were reminiscent of Lesbian Nation, only 20 percent of the original group was lesbian. Its lesbian, working-class and black members began reproaching it early on for being oblivious to their concerns.80 Barbara Smith complained that for Queer Nation 'racism, sexual oppression and economic exploitation [did] not qualify' as queer issues.81 Queer politics in the late 198os and early 1990s largely failed to appeal to alternative scenes and identities rooted among people of colour and women; a number of Queer Nation groups split amid charges of racism and sexism. Nor did the queer contingents and groups that emerged within or joined in the global justice movement, particularly after the 1999 Seattle protests — a promising component of the queer left — succeed to any great extent in linking up with or contributing to shaping alternative queer identities. Clearly there is no straightforward correlation between queer radicalism and working-class politics as such. On the contrary, LGBT working people and particularly non-whites have sometimes reacted against queer radicalism when it demanded visibility of them that would make their lives more difficult in their communities, families or unions. The problem arises when the alternative to assimilation or homonormativity is defined not as organised resistance in forms compatible with long-term survival, but as 'transgression' or 'freedom from norms. This implies the exclusion of those who are 'positioned as not free in the same way'.82 Even when queer anti-capitalists work inside existing queer radical groups, they need to put forward a distinctive approach that challenges the limitations of these groups' politics. Resisting the retreat from class in LGBT activism, queer anti-capitalists should challenge not only heterosexism among straights and gay normality, but also blanket hostility to straights and non-queer-iden-tified gays where it exists among some self-identified queers. When directed against gay men, this hostility risks selectively reproducing traditional homophobic stereotypes of gays as privileged and powerful: images that are seduc-tive in a time of rising homonormativity, but problematic if they do not reflect the ongoing reality of gay oppression. Avoiding all these pitfalls will require seeking new tactics and forms of organising within queer groups.

#### The aff’s rejection of the specific details of political engagement is not radical but continues the prevailing mode of leftist cynicism that eviscerates our ability to construct alternatives to political domination

Burgum ‘15 (Samuel, PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Warwick and has been conducting research with Occupy London since 2012, “The branding of the left: between spectacle and passivity in an era of cynicism,” *Journal for Cultural Research*, Volume 19, Issue 3)

Rather than the Situationist spectacle, then, I argue that the reason those on the left are rendered post-politically impotent to bring about change is not because we are deceived, but because we enact apathy despite ourselves. In other words, the relationship between the resistive subject and ideology is not one of false consciousness, but one of cynicism: we are not misdirected by shallow spectacles, but instead somehow distracted by our cynical belief that we are being “distracted”. In this section, I begin by outlining the concept of cynicism as it has been theorised by Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek. This then leads us to an analysis of the cynical position adopted by Brand’s critics, which I argue actually demonstrates more political problems on the part of the left than those suggested by Brand himself. For Sloterdijk, cynicism is an attitude that emerges right at the centre of the enlightenment project, where, in contrast to a modernist illumination of truth, “a twilight arises, a deep ambivalence” (1987, p. 22). Rather than the promised heightened consciousness of science that would allow us to see the hidden essential truths behind appearances, the very conception of truth as unconcealedness (aletheia)3 instead creates a widespread mistrust and suspicion of every appearance. Subsequently, “a new form of realism bursts forth, a form that is driven by the fear of becoming deceived or overpowered … everything that appears to us could be a deceptive manoeuvre of an overpowering evil enemy” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 330). The surface becomes suspect and the subject therefore retreats from all appearances: judging them to be spectacles that are seeking to oppress through falsity. The result is cynicism. Subsequently, this leads Sloterdijk to his well-known paradoxical definition of cynicism as “enlightened false consciousness” which he describes as a “modernized, unhappy consciousness on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain … it has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, probably was not able to, put them into practice” (1987, p. 5). In other words, in the search for a higher consciousness behind appearances, the subject is paradoxically “duped” by their very suspicion of being duped. Furthermore, because the subject thinks they “know” that appearances are just a mask, they disbelieve the truth when it does appear. Like the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes, they fancy themselves to know what is right in front of their eyes (that the emperor is nude and vulnerable) yet they choose “not to know” and don’t act upon it (they still act as if the emperor is all-powerful). As such, cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular hidden interest hidden behind the ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it. (Žižek, 1989, p. 23) The audience to the parade of power can see that the emperor is not divine – just a fragile human body like the rest of us – yet they cynically choose not to know and objectively retain his aura. They congratulate themselves on “knowing” that Brand is a trivial spectacle, yet they choose to remain apathetic towards his calls for action. As such, the dismissive reaction to Brand reveals a regressive interpassive tendency of the left to subjectively treat ourselves as “enlightened” to authentic politics and yet objectively render ourselves passive. In a kind of defence mechanism, the left believes that it can avoid becoming the dupe of the latest fashion or advertising trend by treating everything as a matter of fashion and advertising, reassuring ourselves as we flip through television channels or browse through the shopping mall that at least we know what’s really going on. (Stanley, 2007, p. 399) The critics disbelieve Brand, distrusting his motives and seeing him as inauthentic, yet they continue to “believe” objectively in their own marginalisation. As such, the cynical left believe they are dismissing shallow spectacle in the direction of a stronger authentic radicalism, yet what their “doing believes” is the maintenance of their apathetic position. More precisely, it maintains the attitudes of left melancholy and anti-populism. The problem of “left melancholy” points towards the forever-delayed search for authenticity on the part of a cynical left that is in mourning. Coined by Walter Benjamin (1998), the concept points towards “the revolutionary who is, finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal – even to the failure of that ideal – than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present” (Brown, 1999, p. 19). Suffering from a history of defeat and embarrassment, the left persist in a narcissistic identification with failure, fetishising the “good old days” and remaining faithful to lost causes. As Benjamin himself points out, the cynical kernel of this attitude is clear, as “melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge … but in its tenacious self-absorption it embraces dead objects in its consumption in order to redeem them” (1998, p. 157). In other words, the sentiment is a deliberate self-sabotage that takes place even before politics proper has a chance to begin or “the paradox of an intention to mourn that precedes and anticipates the loss of the object” (Žižek, 2001, p. 146). This then leads us to the second problem of leftist cynicism: anti-populism. As a result of melancholia, the left has developed the bad habit of prejudging all instances of popular radical expression (such as Brand’s) as necessarily flawed. However, to return to Dean again, she points out that this aversion to being popular and successful is a defining feature of a contemporary left, who prefer to adopt an “authentic” underdog position in advance than take risks towards political power. As she argues, “we” on the left see “ourselves” as “always morally correct but never politically responsible” (Dean, 2009, p. 6) prepositioned as righteous victims and proud political losers from the outset. What this cynicism towards instances of popular radicalism ultimately means, therefore, is that any concern for authenticity is ultimately a regressive one, a defence mechanism for a left that “as long as it sees itself as defeated victims, can refrain from having to admit is short on ideas” (Dean, 2009, p. 5). Such an attitude means never risking potential failure and residing in the safety of marginal righteousness. It is the contention here, therefore, that both melancholia and anti-populism can be seen in the cynical reaction to Brand’s radicalism. Somewhat ironically, Brand (2013) even recognised these problems himself when he wrote in his *New Statesman* piece that the right seeks converts while the left seeks traitors … this moral superiority that is peculiar to the left is a great impediment towards momentum … for an ideology that is defined by inclusiveness, socialism has become in practice quite exclusive. Automatically, then, the left denounce Brand and self-proclaimed “radical left-wing thinkers and organisers” bitterly complain how he is getting so much attention for the arguments they have been making for years (for example, Park & Nastasia, 2013). The left maintain distance and label Brand trivial, yet such a distance only renders these critiques even more marginal and prevents them from becoming popular, effective or counter-hegemonic. As Žižek has pointed out, the political issue of cynicism is “not that people ‘do not know what they want’ but rather that cynical resignation prevents them from acting upon it, with the result that a weird gap opens up between what people think and how they act”, adding that “today’s post-political silent majority is not stupid, but it is cynical and resigned” (2011, p. 390). In terms of Brand, this blanket cynical melancholy is typical of the left’s distrust of anything popular, rendering them “like the last men” whose “immediate reaction to idealism is mocking cynicism” (Winlow & Hall, 2012, p. 13). Proponents of a radical alternative immediately adopt caution with the effect of forever delaying change, holding out for that real and authentic (unbranded) struggle and therefore denying it indefinitely.

#### The alternative is to theorize through Marxist Materialism – only collective action focused on a unified front can produce a queer anti-capitalism

Drucker 11 [Peter Drucker; “The Fracturing of LGBT Identities under Neoliberal Capitalism”; Historical Materialism 19.4 (2011) 3–32; <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1000.69&rep=rep1&type=pdf> //BWSWJ]

Recognising the deep roots of the fracturing of same-sex identities necessarily puts in question any universalism that ignores class, gender, sexual, cultural, racial/ethnic and other differences within LGBT communities. These communities and identities are being fractured in large part by fundamental changes in the productive and reproductive order of gendered capitalism. Young queers, working-class and poor LGBTs, transgendered people and other marginalised groups have increasingly found themselves in objectively different situations from people in the consolidating gay mainstream. It is thus no surprise that they have tended to some extent to define distinct identities. The forms taken by alternative, non-homonormative sexual identities do not necessarily win them easy acceptance among feminists or socialists. The lesbian/gay identity that emerged by the 1970s had much to commend it from the broad-Left’s point of view (once the Left had largely overcome its initial homophobia). By contrast, transgendered and other queers can raise the hackles of many on the Left, since their sexuality strikes many as at variance with the mores to be expected and hoped for in an egalitarian, peaceful, rational future. One may doubt, however, whether any sexuality existing under capitalism can serve as a model for sexualities to be forecast or desired under socialism. Nor is it useful to privilege any particular existing form of sexuality in present-day struggles for sexual liberation. Socialists’ aim should not be to replace the traditional ‘hierarchical system of sexual value’85 with a new hierarchy of our own. As Amber Hollibaugh pointed out many years ago, sexual history has first of all to be ‘able to talk realistically about what people are sexually’.86 And in radical struggles over sexuality, as in radical struggles over production, the basic imperative is to welcome and stimulate self-organisation and resistance by people subjected to exploitation, exclusion, marginalisation or oppression, in the forms that oppressed people’s own experience proves to be most effective. This is not to say that Marxists should simply adopt a liberal attitude of unthinking approval of sexual diversity in general, in a spirit of ‘anything goes’. Our central concern must be to advance the sexual liberation of the working class and its allies, who today include straights, LGBs and – particularly among its most oppressed layers – transgendered and other queers. Resisting the retreat from class in LGBT activism and queer studies, Marxists should combat heterosexism and bourgeois hegemony among straights, homonormativity and bourgeois hegemony among LGBs, and blanket hostility to straights and non-queer-identified gays where it exists among self-identified queers. This will require seeking new tactics and forms of organising within LGBT movements. The post-Stonewall lesbian/gay movement waged an effective fight against discrimination and won many victories on the basis of an identity widely shared by those engaged in same-sex erotic or emotional relationships. But this classic lesbian/gay identity has not been the only basis in history for movements for sexual emancipation. In the German homophile-struggle from 1897 to 1933, for example, Magnus Hirschfeld’s Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, the wing of the movement closer to the social-democratic Left, tended to put forward polarised ‘third sex’-theories.87 This is what one might predict on the basis of the evidence that egalitarian gay identities were at first primarily a middle-class phenomenon, while transgender and gender-polarised patterns persisted longer in the working class and among the poor.88 Today in the dependent world as well, transgender identities seem to be more common among the less prosperous and less Westernised.89 Rather than privileging same-sex sexualities more common among the less oppressed, however superficially egalitarian, the Left should be particularly supportive of those same-sex sexualities more common among the most oppressed, however polarised. Another important consideration is the challenge that alternative, nonhomonormative sexualities can sometimes pose to the reification of sexual desire that the categories of lesbian, gay, bisexual and straight embody. Marxists question the fantasy of consumers under neoliberalism that obtaining the ‘right’ commodities will define them as unique individuals and secure their happiness; we should not uncritically accept an ideology that defines individuals and their happiness on the basis of a quest for a partner of the ‘right’ gender.90 How will LGBT communities and movements be structured in a time of increasingly divergent identities? Self-defined queer activist-groups, which emerged initially in the US and Britain in the early 1990s, have also appeared in recent years in a number of countries in continental Europe. They pose a radical challenge to mainstream lesbian/gay organisations, although they have yet to show much of an orientation towards large-scale mobilisation

, to take root among the racially and nationally oppressed, or to prove their adaptability to the dependent world.91 In countries where civil rights and same-sex marriage have been won, the process of seeking new horizons and finding appropriate forms of organising seems likely to be a prolonged one – especially since the LGBT social and political landscape seems likely to remain more fragmented and conflict-ridden than it was in the immediate post-Stonewall period. While lesbian/gay identity has lost the central place it occupied in the LGBT world of the 1970s and ’80s, it is still far from marginalised; on the contrary, the new homonormativity shows no signs of succumbing to queer assaults in the foreseeable future. In the dependent world particularly, the diversity of LGBT communities has resulted in an alliance-model of organising as an alternative or a supplement to the model of a single, broad, unified organisation. The broadest possible unity across different identities remains desirable in basic fights against violence, criminalisation and discrimination as well as more ambitious struggles for equality, for example in parenting. On other issues, LGBT rights can be best defended by working and demanding space within broader movements, such as trade-unions, the women’s movement and the global justice movement.92 At the same time, an alliance-model has in some cases facilitated the process of negotiating unity among constituencies – such as transgendered people on the one hand and lesbian/gay people on the other93 – who are unlikely to feel fully included in any one unitary structure. It can constitute a united front between those whose identities fit the basic parameters of the gay-straight divide and those whose identities do not, fostering the development of a truly queer conception of sexuality that, in Gloria Wekker’s words, is ‘multiple, malleable, dynamic, and possessing male and female elements’.94 In a more visionary perspective, developing an inclusive, queer conception of sexuality can be seen as a way to move towards that ‘truly free civilization’ that Herbert Marcuse described a half-century ago in Eros and Civilization, in which ‘all laws are self-given by the individuals’, the values of ‘play and display’ triumph over those of ‘productiveness and performance’, the entire human personality is eroticised, and the ‘instinctual substance’ of ‘the perversions . . . may well express itself in other forms’.95

#### Capitalism is the root cause of heteronormativity and a politics that queers socialism provides the best analytical tools to solve it

Sears 13 [Alan Sears (Sears is the author of, among other works, "Queer in a Lean World" and “Queer Anti-Capitalism: What's Left of Lesbian and Gay Liberation?” and co-author with James Cairns of The Democratic Imagination) interviewed by Andrew Sernatinger & Tessa Echeverria (Andrew Sernatinger and Tessa Echeverria are socialists based in Madison, Wisconsin. This interview was recorded for their podcast, Black Sheep Radio); November 6, 2013; Queering Socialism: An Interview with Alan Sears; New Politics; <http://newpol.org/content/queering-socialism-interview-alan-sears>; //BWSWJ]

TWE: I see that issue all the time where there's a lot of new queer theory coming out, but how do you relate that back to real world experiences and everyday lives in the U.S.? How do your take that language and make it be inclusive not just to people who have those different identities that fall under queer but also for allies and those who want to work together without making it sound like if you don't have our language you can't be my ally. It’s a fine line to walk.

Sears: One of the things that will begin to change that, or solve the puzzle for us, will be when gender and sexual liberation becomes more of a movement again. When there's not a movement, one is less concerned with persuading anybody of anything, so your political terms can become more of a test of whether you have the prerequisites or not than they are terms to move and excite people. It becomes much more of an issue when you're actually trying to build a movement, and building alliances that really do matter.

I firmly believe that we in Canada have more formal rights than in the United States, and these are explicitly lesbian and gay rights: marriage, workplace benefits, and that kind of stuff. A lot of that has to do with the way the union movement in Canada from the early 1980's on really took on lesbian and gay rights. That required a whole lot of alliance building and careful work, so that when the Canadian Union of Postal Workers went on strike in 1981, they fought for both full pay for maternity leave for women and non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the workplace. That wasn't because it was primarily a queer union. It was because people did the hard alliance work in what was a very radical union, to say, “If we're radical, we need to defend the rights of women, the rights of gays and lesbians, and so on.”

Andrew Sernatinger (AS): That's a good transition because I was going to ask about some of your work where you've written about how gender and sexual identities develop and change in capitalism, and how that has a lot to do with how capitalist work is organized. I was hoping you could run this through because it's a very interesting idea and it's a meeting place of Marxist ideas and queer theory. It strikes me as being really different because there's a mantra that “gay has always existed throughout history,” and now we're arriving at a new place where it can finally just come out. But you're saying something a little more nuanced...

Sears: The idea of the eternal, unchanging “gay” is partly a product of attempting to use human rights legislation—and that part of it makes sense. I think you have to use every tool you can to fight discrimination while building movements to overturn the system. But in doing that the claim became, “it's not a choice at all, we're born this way.” Somehow that should mean we have intrinsic rights, as though if there was any choice at all we'd be outside the realm of intrinsic rights and thus outside of court challenges and so on. But it's a really dubious political distinction: that it's only what you're born with that gives you rights as opposed to choices you make in your life.

It is also a really bad anthropology and a very undynamic view of human sexuality. What we would now call “heterosexuality,” which is only a term that arose in the 1800's,

has also changed over time. All kinds of arrangements existed over time, so the idea that at the heart of it was the essential heterosexual or essential homosexual that go unchanged, until finally we've earned the right to express our various sexualities in modern North America, seems to me to be pretty wrong-headed to begin with.

The best works on this, which I first found through John D'Emelio and Barry Adam, basically asked, “What began to change?” since the term “homosexual” was only coined in the 1860's. Why didn't they need a word before? There were certainly same-sex practices. Huge varieties of human societies have had same-sex practices that have taken all kinds of forms. But the “homosexual,” which is kind of the “full-timer,” the dedicated, unvarying same-sex practitioner, only arose as a word in the 1860's, and that's not bashfulness, but it tells us that that full-timers really didn't exist very much up until then.

What made that possible? There were lots of same-sex practices, but the idea that one has a primary orientation towards your own gender or towards another one became possible largely with the rise of capitalism and the separation of work and home life. The relationships in which you keep yourself alive, sustain new life, take care of your emotional needs, wash yourself, rest yourself—those relationships are different in capitalist society for most of us than our working relationship, where we earn the money to make the rest of that possible. Most of us go out to work and then come home. Once that happened, the relationships at home can take a whole bunch of different forms. There is a certain kind of space created for exploration that would not have been possible before.

The basic capitalist structure created new kinds of possibilities. And a range of different people, including Foucault but also Marxists have looked at the rise of sexuality specifically in this context. Foucault looks much less at the capitalist character of it, but they look at that separation of work and home.

Now, from the point of view of governments and state-policy makers, this was a bad thing. In England in the 1840's and 50's, there were all these “Condition of the Working Class” reports, where state officials went into so-called slums and were very worried with what they thought of as amorality among working people. So then you began to get, from the point of view of capitalist states, a whole new direction, which was to ban homosexuality and regulate sexuality and gender behavior through schools and so on. In the 1880's, you get male-homosexuality outlawed in Britain, and in Canada, which was following Britain. Not women's same-sex practices, or lesbianism; it wasn't outlawed basically because Parliament would not admit that women had enough of a sexuality to be sexual with each other. It wasn't a positive measure, but a total denial of women's sexual agency at all. The rise of capitalism created certain possibilities but also, from the point of view of the state, different kinds of constraints.

AS: Thinking about it through the twentieth century and linking it back to today, it seems like one of the major markers that starts to distinguish the gay rights movement, and then the mark between gay and queer, is the Post-War Accord and the change of the family structure. Maybe you could run that through for us?

Sears: What happens with the end of World War II and the development of new social systems is that you began to get the stabilization in new ways of particular family forms within layers of the working class -- though the Post-War Accord didn't include everyone.

That at first was incredibly gender-normative. There was a kind of gender panic after World War II, where large numbers of women had been involved in paid labor. After that there was a period of incredible repression. In Canada, that took the form of a purge of basically anyone who they identified as gay or lesbian from the civil service. The idea was that people who are homosexual are more likely to be black-mailed by the Russians, and thus in a Cold War era are a threat to national security. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the police force who did the major security work in Canada like the FBI does in the States, actually tried to invent a “fruit machine” that would identify gay civil servants so they could be fired.

The first impact of the post-war period was an attempt to force a heterosexual normative family form, and to use the increased income, assistance, and social security that working people had won to try and create a very specific model of the family within sections of the working class: disproportionately among white folks. Then, beginning with the women's liberation movement, people began to refuse that—not that there wasn't resistance along the way, but in the 1960's women quite assertively mobilized around these things and began to demand a change in the way this post-war stabilization was affecting the family form. Feminism, the rise of the women's movement, and the beginning of the Black Power movement, began to create models and new ways of thinking so that gays actually began to identify what they were facing as a political oppression, which a very small number of political gays had done before that. Most communities' people just thought that this is the way it is. Then it became politicized by a movement that fought against the dominant normative form that developed after the war.

There's some opening up in the family form, but at the same time not breaking the bounds of capitalism that began to have huge influences on what ultimately got achieved by that movement. It's much more about coupledom than it is about liberation; about couples' rights rather than sexual liberation in any sort of way. The whole movement became so defined by purchasing and lifestyle and so on that capitalism has had its influences on this end as well.

TWE: It's interesting where you ended that because I did want to talk about the commercialization of gay and lesbian identity. During Pride Month, part of me is excited as a queer person to celebrate that, but then I go to events and I see corporation after corporation and the message of “Buy Gay Things” as a way to prove your gay identity. Could you go into how capitalism changed to commodify gay identity while it's still silent on the rights? How can capitalism change to adapt while still exclude the vast majority of gay or queer people?

Sears: In terms of a new low for Pride in Toronto, this year the Executive Director for Pride Toronto, which is one of the three biggest in North America, opened the Toronto Stock Exchange with all kinds of Pride signs, ringing the bell. It really was a sign of where things have come.

I was at a couple of the early Pride Marches in Toronto, and it was scary. It's hard to imagine now what it was like to feel that there's a good chance that you're going to get attacked, people throw things, you are being exposed to a lot of contempt and there's very few of you. It felt pretty daunting at the time. Anything except for a mass march did at the time. So to see the change from these scary little gatherings to this festival with streets lined across the Toronto community is shocking. In a way there's excitement with that: I do think that even though queer bashing continues, and we have to be clear that the violence hasn't gone away and that people are still afraid, there are changes that are important that need to be celebrated.

But the question needs to be asked at some point, why is it that we made gains at a time when in fact most movements seeking change were pushed backward? Affirmative action, abortion rights, and migrants were hugely under attack and being brutalized; unions are being attacked and workers are giving up all kinds of gains; general labor law is going backwards. Why is it that we've made advances? Some of it is because people fought, that does make a difference that people were defiant, and angry, and mobilized. But what we gained, and it's only in retrospect that you see it, is largely what was most compatible with capitalism.

Of all the things we were fighting for, there was the idea of generally opening up gender and sexuality in real ways, so that people would have realms of play, both in the engineering sense and in the creative unalienated activity sense. Instead what happened was that we won the rights that were most compatible: coupledom, where marriage is becoming officially monogamous, certain workplace benefits (which make a huge difference and should be fought for), but also this idea that we mark ourselves by the consumption of very specific commodities. You see that in terms of clothing and hairstyles, going to certain places. That cuts out people with low-income; they can't be visibly queer. Often people of color are excluded because the character of that commercialization has whiteness built into it, often in fairly clear ways. It seems like we've won a lot, and then you realize that what we've won is the relatively easy stuff that fits with this system. In fact, it risks dividing ourselves much more and potentially limits what we can gain.

TWE: Chelsea Manning (at the time referred to as Bradley) was going to be one of the honorary grand marshals at the Pride Parade in San Francisco this year; then they decided to cut Manning from the line-up. I thought that was interesting to show how nervous people are about the Pride Parade's receptions, and the unwillingness to engage with other controversial issues that connect with gay and queer issues, such as military resisters or antiwar movements—keeping those as separate things from “gay rights.”

Sears: Earlier you referred to alliance building. You can build radical alliances for change with other people who are facing deep exclusion and oppression, or you can try to build alliances with essentially elements of the mainstream ruling order, with Democratic or Republican politicians, to try and become an insider. That's a different kind of alliance-building than the kind we were referring to before, but it's unfortunately what the main body of the movement has gone for, insofar as the term movement can even apply. That means you don't want to do anything that would offend corporate bosses, mayors, Democratic politicians, and so on. You end up pushing out anything that's controversial.

To their credit, Toronto Pride hasn't pushed out Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QAIA) despite the fact that the City Council has threatened to defund Pride if QAIA, opposed to Israeli pink-washing, marches on Pride day. They've marched each time, and Pride has stuck with their right to march and City Hall has backed off. Occasionally some guts are still shown, but overall it's all about showing yourself off to those who you want to see you as allies, who are sadly the most powerful and that means massive compromise.

TWE: Here in the States, there's been a lot of gearing up around marriage equality and getting laws passed state-by-state. I've been to a lot of meetings, like Occupy last year, where people were having a lot of discussions about marriage equality. The issue that always came up was healthcare, and I would go and talk about the need for healthcare for everyone (single-payer), so I really appreciate you pointing out that instead we're winning rights to coupledom. The issue I saw coming out of the AIDS movement was the fight for healthcare and not just for marriage.

Sears: I agree completely. Personally, I believe we should always oppose legal discrimination; therefore I support marriage rights only because it ends the heterosexual monopoly. The other side of it is the cost of focusing explicitly on marriage rights. If it's only about workplace benefits for a limited portion of the population, there are a lot of queers, or just couples, who don't benefit from that because they're working in situations where they don't have benefits. That's true of a lot of the workforce now.

Remember that we are not fighting for couple rights, but universal rights ultimately, rights that should apply to anybody. We're a little bit closer to that in Canada than in the United States because of single-payer health care. Part of what's remarkable in the differences between the two countries is that it was easier for unions in Canada to win same-sex workplace benefits for unmarried gay couple simply because the cost of healthcare in the U.S. means that employers hate adding to the family.

The basic thing is that it's about healthcare, it's not about couples, but it's also about sexual freedom! That means different things to different people. That may mean couples, that may mean having sex with a lot of people; different people have different preferences and needs. If we are talking about sexual liberation, we're talking about the idea that as long as everyone is consenting, people should have the right to do those things. In general, there's shame that exists in this society about sexuality, where people can't even talk to their partners about what they want to do or what they don't want to do. Images of sexuality are everywhere, every billboard, every car ad, and yet in reality people are incredibly silenced about their sexualities, about what they want and need. There's some locker-room bravado that some men have, but that's not really sexuality, it's bragging about conquest.

We've made some gains, but we haven't really achieved some of the most basic things around sexual openness, non-stigma, and choices.

AS: One of the reasons we wanted to do this interview is that we wanted to push-back against some of the guiding wisdom in the socialist movement, which seems very hesitant about queer politics. Now people are against a lot of concepts that came through queer theory: the word queer, notions of privilege, and a lot of the more challenging concepts that are not as clearly delineated in Marxist theory. It seems like there is a kind of tension about sexuality with Marxists, but it's something I hope will change. Maybe you could comment on that, and what your experience has been in this area.

Sears: I recently was reading a book by Sheila Rowbotham about “utopian socialists.” They were people in the 1800's who considered themselves socialists and had great aspirations for what a better world would be like. It's clear that many of them, especially women but also some men, were thinking about sexual politics as part of what we would now call the liberation struggle. Some of them were thinking explicitly around same-sex practices, but a lot of them were thinking about what real sexual freedom would mean.

That strain of utopian socialism gradually got pushed out through the twentieth century by Marxism within the socialist movement. Even though there were some places where Marxism and sexual liberation found new meeting places, overall there was a lot of interpretation of Marxism in terms of economic categories: class, the workplace. You'll find a lot of Marxists to this day who talk obsessively about the power that workers have at the point of production, meaning in the workplace -- it's true that is an important source of power and I'm not trying to deny the power of a general strike. But if our politics only focus on the workplace, it's a place where sexuality is largely excluded.

At the very best, the better end of Marxism has tended to adopt and work out the best ideas liberals have about sexual freedom. Through the twentieth century, certainly in my period as a socialist and queer activist, my view looking back on the record of a socialist-queer movement was that it was largely picking up the best knowledge of the liberal-left of the existing movement and putting out a liberal political practice. I think one of the things that we've learned from the queer movement is that that's not good enough. There are all kinds of people who are left out of that. We need to be on the leading edge of those who are asking the tough questions about who's left out and why, and what do we do about that? How does “gay” work with patterns of racialization—it's not an accident that white folks tend to come out more, it actually has to do with the whole definition of who counts as gay or lesbian and how that works culturally, racially.

Marxism, or socialism in its broad sense, provides tools for thinking about all this. If the separation of work and home is part of the way “gay” begins to exist as a category, what does it tell us about this category? There are all kinds of questions we can look into, like, “Why is the workplace so gender-normative?” “Why do particular kinds of workplaces run around a very explicit kind of masculinity?” It's not simply that “those guys are like that” -- so what are the dynamics of the workplace that operate to create gendered behavior in certain ways and then police it?

If we're talking about liberation, how do we begin to address that part of sexual freedom that is having a place to have sex? That means we should be deeply concerned about homelessness. We should also be concerned about young people who often have no space as they're becoming sexually active and end up having their sexuality in the cracks. As long as we, as socialists, don't think that our tools are exclusive, as long as we're engaging with queer theories, with anti-racist theories, with feminist theories, there's a lot we can do.

This gets to what real freedom looks like. Marx's ideas about alienation and un-alienation, the idea that humans thrive by making our mark on the world, are tools that can be helpful in offering a vision of gender and sexual liberation that begins to ask questions about why the gender system persists, why sexuality occurs only in the cracks; what is it about work that is a rejection of hedonism, work as duty, the squeezing out of the joyful aspects of life. That means challenging the kind of socialism that's often there in organizations: “All work and no play makes socialism a dull boy.” A lot of the focus on the workplace and the economy, as if capitalism exists simply as a set of economic relations and not also as a set of cultural and interpersonal relations, that kind of socialism is heading towards a dead-end. Part of the revitalization, building the next-New Left, will be restoring the excitement: what would revolution really bring about?

TWE: How do you see socialism and queer activism partnering up, and where can those be providing strengths for each other so that we can start to move forward?

Sears: The more that I've thought about this, the more I've come to believe that the best socialist thinking in all areas is hybrid thinking. It's not purely “socialist,” but involves deep engagement with the theories, thoughts, and actions of those involved in struggles and how the world appears to them. “Queering” socialism offers opportunities, not only in the realm of gender and sexual liberation, but also in terms of approaches to work and all areas of life.

In queer theory right now, there's a lot of talk about queers as transgressors: we act up against the dominant set of sexual relations, which is non-queer. But permanent transgression is kind of unsatisfying, and socialism can help us move from transgression to transformation. The goal is to change the whole set of relations to a new realm of freedom, and then we wouldn't even know what queer would look like anymore.

Together, queers, socialists and anti-racists can begin to ask questions about how it is that the idea of “gay” is now being used globally as part of a western imperialist power strategy. How did that happen? What is it about “gay” that is exclusionary? How is it that all kinds of other same-sex practices in the world don't count, or are seen as a lesser-form, a not-yet-out form of sexuality, and a particular kind of self-proclaimed gay and lesbianness that has tended to occur among certain layers of disproportionately white folks in Europe and North America. Socialism provides some of the tools, but not all of them.

What about this joyous, challenging, gutsy liberation movement, that when I first came into politics was just fun: dirty, nasty, celebratory, fun. How do we bring the ethos of that kind of movement into socialism? If we can do that, we'll have a way more potent set of tools, because it won't just be about the dull duty, and not about disapproving of everyone else and their crimes and political deviations, but talking about where we're heading and the incredible celebration of human potential: what we could be, the way we could be living, the stuff you see in every human being that gets crushed out of them. When you get together the queer, the socialist, the anti-racist, then you start to point to what it all could begin to look like

#### Capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction and extinction

Robinson 14(William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; *1984 has arrived;*  3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that *intensive* expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political powe

r with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

## 3

#### We endorse the entirety of the 1AC sans their presentation of dead black children, parents, brothers and sisters and siblings of all stripes AND ALL COLORS. The PIC solves the case but subtracts the frame of presenting black death as the starting point for their politics. Its an insidious and necropolitical desire that turns the case and solidifies antiblackness

#### Attempts to repair images of black suffering reproduces a visual paradox – it reinforces the marginalization of black visuality, while deepening the hegemony of the visual field as a site for controlling, circumscribing, and containing blackness

Fleetwood 11

(Nicole R Fleetwood, assistant professor of American Studies at Rutgers University, *Troubling Vision: Performance, Visuality, and Blackness*, pgs. 11)

Moreover, scholars writing about black visual artists and/or race and art history have pointed out that while black intellectual thought and public discourse have remained fixated on “the problem” of black images for much of the twentieth century, criticism has focused largely on television and film to the neglect of the practices of black visual artists. In her closing remarks to the “Black Popular Culture” conference—a field-defining event held in 1991—Michele Wallace criticized the audience of primarily black scholars and critics for marginalizing the visual arts in black culture.35 She spoke of (p.13) the general disinterest, bordering on contempt, for the works of contemporary black artists whose works had been curated as a visual component to the conference.36 Wallace's comments were well placed given that the conference highlighted scholars whose research grappled with contemporary imagery and historical legacies of black representation in dominant visual media. Building upon Wallace's assertion of the neglect of black visual arts, art historian Lisa Gail Collins frames the issue as “a visual paradox” in which there is a preoccupation with visual culture in its representations of blacks while simultaneously black visual art and artists are neglected. Collins argues that black American political leaders and intellectuals have placed emphasis on how blacks are represented visually, while ignoring or showing ambivalence toward the contributions of black visual artists throughout the last century.37¶ In essence, the visual sphere has been understood in black cultural studies as a punitive field—the scene of punishment—in which the subjugation of blacks continues through the reproduction of denigrating racial stereotypes

that allow whites to define themselves through the process of “negative differentiation.”38 Based in a ruthless history of representing blacks as abject, the mobilization against dominant visual representations of blacks, particularly throughout the twentieth-century cultural history of the United States, has led to a fixation on getting images of blacks “right” as a way of countering racist stereotypes, or what Michele Wallace and others have described as the debate over “negative/positive images.” This is a well-treaded area in writings on black visibility and one that I will not rehearse here but to mention its significance in shaping how blackness is conceptualized and made visible in scholarship. Visual representations of blacks are meant to substitute for the real experiences of black subjects. The visual manifestation of blackness through technological apparatus or through a material experience of locating blackness in public space equates w

ith an ontological account of black subjects. Visuality, and vision to an extent, in relationship to race becomes a thing-in-itself.

## Case

### Presumption

#### 1. Vote neg on presumption –

#### A) Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and chancing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### C) Debate – none of their evidence is specific to it – sets a high threshold for solvency and ignores how communicative norms operate.

### AT Hauntology

#### Their defense of hauntology is incorrect. Hauntological projects enable colonialism because it mythologizes colonialism and erases historical context. Their inherency argument is about erasure—means we turn the case

**O’Riley 07**

, Michael O’Riley, Ohio State University, “Postcolonial Haunting: Anxiety, Affect, and the Situated Encounter,” Postcolonial Text, 2007, Vol. 3, No. 4, pg. 11-12//

In many ways, the affective domain related to a haunting aura is always implicated in such endeavors, particularly because of the complex colonial legacy still circulating in and between former imperialist centers and their peripheries. There is, on one hand, the imperative of an awareness of histories that have never been recorded, a desire to relate to that which is, and was made, other. Yet, there is also a widespread tendency in such endeavors to create monuments of the colonial, to transform it into a mythical and unproblematic domain, unproblematic precisely because it is always assumed to be so problematic, so utterly disruptive to the way we think of it.13 The hauntings of the colonial examined above include both of these tendencies. They do so because the obsessive desire to relate to the Other, to establish a “relational” form of memory through the image and memory of the colonial Other, often collapses into a type of thought that is ultimately not at all relational or plural and, moreover, hardly seems disruptive (Hallward 329). In this respect, Peter Hallward’s examination of these postcolonial tendencies is most useful to my discussion. Although he does not discuss the hauntings of the colonial, Hallward’s contention that the postcolonial is by and large characterized by a “singular,” rather than relational, or plural, orientation is directly relevant to cultural memory and its hauntings by the colonial. According to Hallward, the postcolonial proceeds through a process of self-generation, becoming “its own absolute and exclusive point of reference” (23). This is so not because it doesn’t gesture toward a relation with the Other, but because in doing so it ultimately creates singular definitions of the Other and of difference

, categories that are always inherently hybrid and plural anyway.14 Hallward’s observations are important to my discussion of the hauntings of the colonial because they illustrate how the impulse of returning to colonial memory sites as a means of establishing a relational theory is often a singular project, one that establishes its own privileged, oft situated, and frequently mythical version of the Other that excludes those conditions in which others find themselves today. The relational intent of a haunting memory thus frequently excludes those encounters that really affect our relationships with others. Often, such hauntings of cultural memory by the colonial experience suggest an appropriation of the experience of occluded history rather than a relation to its Other.

### Trans Erasure Turn vs Queer Time

**The 1AC’s travel through queer time is transphobic. Trans bodies lost through history do not fit within the schematic because their reconstruction of historical building blocks assume they are visible in a vision of history**.

**Stone 87**  
(Sandy Stone teaches Digital Arts and New Media Production in the Advanced Communication Technologies Laboratory (ACTLab) at UT Austin. “The Empire Strikes Back: A Post-Transsexual Manifesto” accessed 12 November 2015, <http://sandystone.com/empire-strikes-back.pdf> rVs, edited for binary language)

“Making” history, whether autobiographic, academic, or clinical, is partly a struggle to ground an account in some natural inevitability. Bodies are screens on which we see projected the momentary settlements that emerge from ongoing struggles over beliefs and practices within the academic and medical communities. These struggles play themselves out in arenas far removed from the body. Each is an attempt to gain a high ground that is profoundly moral in character, to make an authoritative and final explanation for the way things are and consequently for the way they must continue to be. In other words, each of these accounts is culture speaking with the voice of an individual. The people who have no voice in this theorizing are the transsexuals themselves. As with men theorizing about women from the beginning of time, theorists of gender have seen transsexuals as possessing something less than agency. As with genetic women, transsexuals are infantilized, considered too illogical or irresponsible to achieve true subjectivity, or clinically erased by diagnostic criteria; or else, as constructed by some radical feminist theorists, as robots of an insidious and menacing patriarchy, an alien army designed and constructed to infiltrate, pervert, and destroy “true” women. In this construction as well, the transsexuals have been resolutely complicit by failing to develop an effective counterdiscourse. Here on the gender borders at the close of the twentieth century, with the faltering of phallocratic hegemony and the bumptious appearance of heteroglossic origin accounts, we find the epistemologies of white male medical practice, the rage of radical feminist theories, and the chaos of lived gendered experience meeting on the battlefield of the transsexual body: a hotly contested site of cultural inscription, a meaning machine for the production of ideal type.

Representation at its most magical, the transsexual body is perfected memory, inscribed with the “true” story of Adam and Eve as the ontological account of irreducible difference, an essential biography that is part of nature. A story that culture tells itself, the transsexual body is a tactile politics of reproduction constituted through textual violence. The clinic is a technology of inscription. Given this circumstance in which a minority discourse comes to ground in the physical, a counterdiscourse is critical. But it is difficult to generate a counterdiscourse if one is programmed to disappear. The highest purpose of the transsexual is to erase ~~his/herself~~,[themself] to fade into the “normal” population as soon as possible. Part of this process is known as constructing a plausible history-learning to lie effectively about one’s past. What is gained is acceptability in society. What is lost is the ability to authentically represent the complexities and ambiguities of lived experience, and thereby is lost that aspect of “nature” that Donna Haraway theorizes as Coyote-the Native American spirit animal who represents the power of continual transformation that is the heart of engaged life. Instead, authentic experience is replaced by a particular kind of story, one that supports the old constructed positions. This is expensive, and profoundly disempowering. Whether desiring to do so or not, transsexuals do not grow up in the same ways as “GGs,” or genetic “naturals.”~~ Transsexuals do not possess the same history as genetic “naturals,” and do not share common oppression, prior to gender reassignment. I am not suggesting a shared discourse. I am suggesting that in the transsexual’s erased history we can find a story disruptive to the accepted discourses of gender, that originates from within the gender minority itself and that can make common cause with other oppositional discourses. But the transsexual currently occupies a position that is nowhere, that is outside the binary oppositions of gendered discourse. For a transsexual, as a transsexual, to generate a true, effective, and representational counterdiscourse is to speak from outside the boundaries of gender, beyond the constructed oppositional nodes that have been defined as the only positions from which discourse is possible. How, then, can the transsexual speak? If the transsexual were to speak, what would ~~s/he~~ [they] say?

### Localism Turn

#### Their Mignolo evidence describes this as a performative intervention. That is ultimately a resilience project that strips away agency in favor of capitulation to neoliberalism and deradicalizes future resistance.

**Evans and Reid 14** [Brad Evans, professor of international relations at the University of Lapland, Finland and Julian Reid, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Bristol, *Resilient Life*, 2014, p. 102-4]

The significance of linking self-worth and achievement to the ‘social norm’ cannot be underestimated as it allows us to illustrate the differences between the learning processes of resilience as compared to a properly critical pedagogy which would encourage children to question the fundamental tenets of power and inequality in the world. **Strategies of** resilience when applied to children take the form of training exercises which enable them to deal with the localized effects of their vulnerability and the forms of attachments and dependencies they have created which amplify the problems. The examples of youths falling into membership of inner-city gangs become a prime example of a vulnerable child that has fallen through the cracks. Countering this is the idea of ‘educational resilience**’**, defined as the ‘heightened likelihood of success in school and other life accomplishments despite environmental adversities brought about by early traits, conditions, and experiences’.20 But how exactly do we measure success? Is the educationally resilient the vulnerable subject who goes on to fulfill their neoliberal potential, or is it the subject who goes to war with the system that seeks to render them resilient as such? Resilience, as we have learned, is more a code for social compliance than a political ambition to transform the very sources of inequality

and injustices experienced by marginalized populations. We find this in early educational theories where resilience is again conflated with strategies of resistance such that the resilient child, individualistically conceived, pathologically outlives its conditions of impoverishment to exhibit social achievement in ways that are altogether in tune with the normal functioning of society.21 Indeed, more than simply learning to cope in conditions of impoverishment and vulnerability, as Steven Condly succinctly puts it in an approving review of the prevailing mainstream educational approaches, the doctrine of resilience offers new ways to assess qualities, competences and capabilities, as ‘resilient children tend to possess an above average intelligence and have a temperament that endears them to others and that also does not allow them to succumb to self-pity’.22 What of course qualifies as ‘self-pity’ in another setting could easily be read as a conscious attempt to challenge that which is beyond the control or individual responsibility of the particular subject. Sheila Martineau is attuned to this and writes of the political dangers of resilience in education with considerable foresight: ‘Though resilience conveyed anomalous childhood behaviour in the context of traumatic events in the 1970s, it has become detached from the traumatic context … dangerously, resilience has become constructed as a social norm modelled on the behavioural norms and expectations of the dominant society’.23 Resilience, in other words, becomes a normalized standard for mapping out (ab)normal behaviours such that the very terms of success are loaded with moral claims to a specific maturity, wherein the maturity itself is qualified through one’s ability to connect to the liberal order of things and partake in the world such that to resist means, without contraction, that one successfully learns to conform. Or to put it in more critical terms, since the ‘solution’ is to teach children to overcome ‘obstacles’ to personal development without ultimately challenging wider relations of power, the resilient child (which, although said to include all children, overwhelmingly concentrates on those from poorer, culturally and racially distinct backgrounds) encounters policies which, instead of ‘treating the individual’, end up by virtue of its logic ‘blaming the victim’.24 Disadvantage as such becomes once again the means to author new forms of discrimination that plays the vulnerable card to remove any political claims that things could be otherwise. Today we can situate these earlier demands for resilience within the strategic context of what Henry Giroux calls the ‘war on youth’. Indicative of **the neoliberal** assault on the education **system** more generally, Giroux maintains that youth has become a privileged object for power in a way that seeks to strip away any sense of critical awareness and political agency at the earliest possible stages of intellectual development. As he wr**it**es, since ‘neoliberalism is also a pedagogical project designed to create particular subjects, desires, and values defined largely by market considerations’, questions of ‘destiny’ become ‘linked to a market-driven logic in which freedom is stripped down to freedom from government regulation, freedom to consume, and freedom to say anything one wants, regardless of how racist or toxic the consequences might be’.25 This has a profound bearing upon education policy as ‘Critical thought and human agency are rendered impotent as neoliberal rationality substitutes emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to political problems’**.**26 Hence, within this ‘depoliticized discourse, youths are told that there is no dream of the collective, no viable social bonds, only the actions of autonomous individuals who can count only on their own resources and who bear sole responsibility for the effects of larger systemic political and economic problems’. Whilst education therefore should have a pedagogical commitment to the globally oppressed, what takes its place is a substitution for education that produces vulnerable consumers whose very training renders the political impossible**.**

### Ontology

#### There’s been incredible progress for LGBTQ individuals but there’s more to do---targeting bad policies and institutional engagement is key

Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of HRW, “LGBT: Moving Towards Equality,” 1/23/’15, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/23/lgbt-moving-towards-equality

Almost 2.8 billion people are living in countries where identifying as gay could lead to imprisonment, corporal punishment or even death. In stark contrast, only 780 million people are living in countries where same-sex marriage or civil unions are a legal right. These figures, reported by the International Lesbian and Gay Association in May 2014, show there is still much to be done in the effort to attain universal rights for LGBT communities worldwide. **Yet there has also been significant progress over the past 10 years**, and **this** too **should be acknowledged**. Here, the Outlook on the Global Agenda looks at what has been achieved so far and profiles the challenges that still lie ahead. What progress has there been on LGBT rights since you established Human Rights Watch’s LGBT rights programme? There’s been enormous progress globally and locally. It’s important to note that the fight for LGBT rights is not a Western phenomenon; many of the governments at the forefront of the defence of LGBT rights are from the developing world. The historic LGBT resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council, adopted in September 2014, was led by governments from the global south, primarily Latin America, and backed by others from **all over the world**,

including South Africa. Even governments usually opposed to human rights enforcement, such as Cuba, Venezuela and Vietnam, supported it. How do LGBT rights differ around the world? Yet, because of this global support, we’re recently witnessing an intensifying backlash. To a large degree, this is due to the greater visibility of the LGBT community in societies that have begun to recognize their rights. But LGBT people are also convenient scapegoats for embattled leaders, who are trying to rally support from more conservative sectors of their society. Whether it’s Uganda, Nigeria or Russia, the decision to scapegoat the LGBT community is an outcome of serious challenges to the regime, for widespread corruption or abusive authoritarianism. The status of the LGBT community is a good litmus test for the status of human rights in society more broadly, precisely because it is such a vulnerable minority – similar to the proverbial canary in the coal mine. Where the rights of LGBT people are undermined, you can be sure that the rights of other minorities and critical members of civil society will soon also be in jeopardy. When you look back over the last decade, what do you think was the main driver for change, in regulation and people’s mindset? Broader changes in society have driven some of the greater recognition of LGBT rights, such as more equitable relations between genders, the rights revolution generally and the greater respect for individual autonomy. Within that context, you saw the LGBT population gradually coming out, so people suddenly discovered that they had a gay brother or son or neighbour or close colleague, which started shaping public perception and reinforced the social changes. It’s easy for bigotry to exist in a context of ignorance, but when you’re being bigoted toward a close friend or neighbour, you start thinking: “Maybe LGBT people are really just people; maybe I should recognize their rights. Why can’t they love whom they choose, just like I can?” Yet the lingering fear of ‘the other’ is also applicable to some of the other trends we see in this year’s Outlook on the Global Agenda – like increasing nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Conversely, that ties back to what you said about scapegoating; by making the LGBT community less visible – and thus less relatable – unscrupulous leaders can take political advantage... Yes. In Uganda for example, the LGBT community is scapegoated in an artificial context – the narrative is that homosexuality in general is a foreign import, not part of the traditional culture. There’s a great irony here because much of that homophobia is the product of interventions by a well financed US evangelical movement, and the prohibitions in place are a continuation of the British colonial-era bans on same-sex relations. Moreover, it’s not like the West has been secretly airdropping gays into other cultures – an LGBT population has existed in all societies for all time; gays have simply been more or less open, depending on the politics and the mentality of the moment. Given the backlash, **who should we be targeting to combat it? Begin with the leaders** doing the scapegoating **and their** policies. In response to the homophobic environment created around the Sochi Olympics, the International Olympic Committee recently announced new rules for the selection of host cities, including a requirement of full non-discrimination. That implicitly says that if Russia had been fostering the homophobic environment at the time of selection, Sochi would not have been selected. **That’s a** very important signal **to send.** At the same time, there must be a broader coordinated educational effort. Anything that helps to increase the visibility of LGBT people, to move beyond past stereotypes and ignorance, to show that gays occupy the same range of positions in life and society as everyone else, that will help to make societal change happen more quickly. The young are the core of societal change; what pressures do they face? In many ways the younger generation is much more accepting than their elders. I see a positive trajectory as young people grow up with variations in sexual orientation around them being the norm. But the younger generation is also a battleground. A lot of the leaders that promote homophobia do so by insisting that they’re not anti-gay, but just trying to shelter the impressionable young from ‘gay propaganda’. In many ways, they see that the trends are going in favour of LGBT rights and they’re trying to fight back with the younger generation. What role can non-governmental stakeholders play, such as businesses? Business is a very important stakeholder in this debate. A significant section of consumers insist on respect for LGBT rights, so the global corporate giants can’t get away with permitting discrimination in the workplace or embracing homophobia in any sense. That becomes important, because these companies operate globally and so can become oases of respect for LGBT rights, even in societies where the government hasn’t caught up with the agenda. Where business currently falls short, though, is in embracing role models. Lord Browne regretted not being more open about being gay when he was CEO of BP, and it’s sad that many corporate leaders still feel that they have to live in the closet. The more that corporations can highlight the LGBT people among their leadership, the quicker these societal transformations will be encouraged. That said, if you look at the number of business or political leaders coming out now compared to a decade ago, we’re seeing good progress. Do you think the international community is a good driver for LGBT rights? Positive action is taken at several different levels – local, national and global. What happened at the UN is important as part of the effort to legitimise LGBT rights; to have such an overwhelmingly positive vote is an important rebuke to those governments that want to pretend homophobia and bigotry are consistent with international human rights standards. They’re not. Other things the international institutions can do is to collect information on the treatment of the LGBT community worldwide to probe governments that fall short of recognition of its rights. Perhaps most critical, though, is to defend the **political space** **in which** local **human rights and LGBT activists operate**. International multistakeholder **organizations**, such as the World Economic Forum, could **clearly play a leadership role in this debate**, by holding sessions devoted to trends in the rights of LGBT people. For example, a session on best business practices with respect to LGBT rights would give an opportunity to talk about, not just the formal non-discrimination steps, but also the more personal leadership role that corporations might play.