### 1

#### Interpretation – appropriation means taking possession of something

**Dictionary ND**, Dictionary.com, “appropriation”, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/appropriation>, DD AG

**the act of** appropriating or **taking possession of something**, often without permission or consent.

#### Appropriation of outer space is the exercise of exclusive control.

**Trapp 13** (TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ‘13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4])//DebateDrills AY

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“**Appropriation of outer space**, **therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.**”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219 Though the legitimacy of such a regime may be questionable, it remains in effect, showing that it is at least tolerable under the edict of the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty.220 There must, therefore, be something about the ITU that differentiates it from something like the Bogotá Declaration.221 The most immediate difference is the character of the body promulgating the regulation. The Bogotá Declaration is an agreement between eight countries claiming rights to all space above them.222 The ITU’s regulations are promulgated under the auspices of the U.N.223 While the Bogotá Declaration is an international agreement, it is still a very limited cooperation.224 The ITU, through the U.N., comprises the largest possible cooperation of international actors, giving it an international character as opposed to simply a multinational character.225 Furthermore, the allocation of orbital slots by the ITU is a response to the limited character of geostationary orbits.226 While the Bogotá Declaration was probably promulgated in response to a few nations’ fears that they may be excluded from the space arena,227 **the allocation system of the ITU is a measure to make sure that the GEO resource is efficiently managed for the use of all mankind**.228

#### Violation: they defend ISS and similar stations which is not a form of appropriation

Timothy Justin Trapp 2013, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY ,<https://www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2013/4/Trapp.pdf>, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, accessed 2/20/22 | DD JH

The **I**nternational **S**pace **S**tation presents a unique application of the nonappropriation principle. All spacecraft must inherently occupy some amount of space. If this were to constitute appropriation by occupation and thus violate the nonappropriation article, the result would be absurd and would render the nonappropriation article unenforceable. The International Space Station, however, is different from regular satellites in that it actually contains a livable area within itself, making it a sort of man-made celestial body.182 Thus, it would seem that any exclusion of any party from the space inside the spacecraft would count as appropriation by exclusion. It would even stand to reason that any claim of ownership of any part of the spacecraft would be appropriation by claim of sovereignty. In fact, the Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station (ISS Agreement) sets up a regime of national control, ownership, and exclusion.183 So why does this not count as appropriation? Though it may seem that the International Space Station has appropriated the space it occupies through the terms of the ISS Agreement, this agreement has one important bit of language to keep it safe.184 Specifically, the ISS Agreement says that “[n]othing in this agreement shall be interpreted as . . . constituting a basis for asserting a claim to national appropriation over outer space or over any portion of outer space.”185 The effectiveness of such a proclamation may make it seem that it is enough for an actor merely to say that it is not appropriating space. That cannot be the case, however, because any actor could make such a claim and then act in direct violation of it. Something more subtle must be going on in the context of the International Space Station. One of the saving graces of the International Space Station must be that the ISS Agreement makes sure that the space station complies with the general principles guiding the exploration and exploitation of outer space.186 Indeed, the space station is a cooperative effort, furthering the goal of international harmony through space exploration.187 The agreement establishing the space station also directly states that it “will enhance the scientific, technological, and commercial use of outer space,” thus furthering the Outer Space Treaty’s goal of making sure that use is for the benefit of all.188 Furthermore, the ISS Agreement provides that the International Space Station will be used for peaceful purposes, again complying with the Outer Space Treaty’s mandate of the same.189 By complying with the underlying principles of the Outer Space Treaty, it seems that the International Space Station gains legitimacy and is thus not subject to stricter interpretations of the nonappropriation article.190 Another characteristic of the International Space Station that separates it from other acts of appropriation is that it is a multi-national entity.191 Though different nations do have different rights with respect to certain parts of the spacecraft, those rights are subject to a multinational agreement.192 Thus, it may accurately be said that while there has been no national appropriation of space, there has been international appropriation of space, which may be allowed under the current regime.193 The combination of the international character of the International Space Station and its compliance with the underlying principles of the Outer Space Treaty allow it a presumed legitimacy,194 or these aspects have at least kept any nation from attacking it under the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty.195 This creates further leeway in the application of the nonappropriation article and may allow for a similar international cooperation in the regulation of the creation of space debris

#### Standards:

#### Limits: there are infinitely many combinations that entities could send into space AND resources they can use. That explodes neg prep – it’s impossible for me to research every possible technology and resource, from type of satellite to type of mineral.

#### TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to the whole rez. We aren’t stopping them from reading new FWs, mechanisms, or advantages. PICs don’t solve – it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff making it impossible for me to win

CI

Comes first

Fairness > edu

No RVI

### 2

#### Threats are constructed – their security discourse creates a self fulfilling prophecy that makes true understanding of structural causes behind “threats” impossible.

**Mack 91:** Dr. Mack, professor at Harvard Medical School, 1991, (John E., “The Psychodynamics of International Relationships” Vol 1 p. 58-59)

Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with an argument that, reduced to its essentials , goes something like this: “It’s very well to psychologize but my enemy is real. The Russians (or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans) are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real struggles between us and them and differing national interests: competition over oil, land or scarce resources and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations (or political systems) It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance of superiority of (military and political) power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness.” This argument is neither wrong nor right, but instead simply limited. It fails to grapple with a critical distinction that informs the entire subject. Is the threat really generated by the enemy as it appears to be at any given moment, or is it based on one’s own contribution to the threat, derived from distortion of perception by provocative words and actions in a cycle of enmity and externalization of responsibility? In sum, the enemy IS real, but we have not learned to identify our own role in creating that enemy or in elaborating the threatening image we hold of the other group or country and its actual intentions or purposes. “we never see our enemy’s motives and we never labor to asses his will with anything approaching objectivity.”

#### Securitization of China is a form of American hegemony that attempts to create American identity- they are a police force that sustains itself by doing good under the guise of the ambiguous threat of the evil Others but that’s *why* tense relations happen.

Solomon 15 [Ty Solomon is a prof @ international relations @ UofGlasgow, The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses, pp. 210-211, 1-23-2019 amrita]

These elements of fantasy underpinned the neoconservative attempts at discursive hegemony in the late 1990s. Logics of equivalence and difference function here in much the same way as they have in other neoconservative discourses. Boundaries of the collective subject and its Others are constructed through strings of signifiers that attempt to pin down or represent the subject within discourse, and Others are constructed through strings of differences. The Others against which the subject is defined are constructed through different predications that attempt to express who and what they are and what they share against the US. American forces "deter Chinese aggression against democratic Taiwan" in East Asia, help deter a “possible invasion" of South Korea by the North, and help deter "possible aggression by Saddam Hussein or the fundamentalist regime in Iran” in the Persian Gulf (Kristol and Kagan 1996:20-21). Both “rogue states" such as North Korea and “nuclear intimidation” by the Chinese pose threats to the US mainland (25). China and Iran “entertain ambitions of upsetting the present world order” (26). For Kristol and Kagan, all of these examples illustrate how John Quincy Adams’s warning that the US “ought not go 'abroad in search of monsters to destroy'” is now outdated (31). “But why not?,” the authors ask, questioning Adams (31). "The alternative is to leave monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging to their hearts’ content, as Americans stand by and watch” (31). "Aggression,” “invasion,” "fundamentalist,” **"rogue,”** "intimidation,” “upsetting,” even "monsters”—these various names and signifiers constitute not just a series of Others (mainly China, Iran, and Iraq) in Kristol and Kagan's discourse, but all seem to express a common underlying similarity. "Fundamentalists” and "rogues” are almost by definition here “aggressive” and “monsters," enjoying a combination of "ravaging,” "pillaging," "aggression,” and "upsetting.” As they are produced in the discourse, the similarities they share may seem to be some "essence” common to such outlaw states. Yet their unfixed definition is passed along this string of signifiers. When one's definition is interrogated, one must rely on the other signifiers in the chain to fill in the definition. Their meanings, then, both differ and are deferred: they differ to the extent that they are deployable as different signifiers so that one can speak of them as different, yet each of their individual meanings is deferred to the others in the chain. Similarly, logics of equivalence are at work in the construction of the “American" subject. “Moral clarity,” “American exceptionalism,” “moral confidence," “American principles," “American influence,” “patriotic mission," “spirit,” “remoralization,” “honor,” “national greatness,” “heroic,” “elevated patriotism,” “responsibility,” and “moral and political leadership” all attempt to tie together what “America” and the “United States” mean. While each of these signifiers seems to point to a different quality or characteristic of the subject, they also seem to express a certain underlying similarity. Like the construction of difference in the chains constituting America's Others, the signifiers constructing “America” seem to share a quality that cannot be expressed by any of them individually. Their meanings thus differ and are deferred; each of the signifiers differs from the others in one sense, yet their meanings within the text are deferred to other signifiers in the chain constructing the subject “America." Their meanings are blurred to the extent that even though they are viewed as expressing a fundamental "Americanness,” nothing fundamental underlies any of the signifiers or the chain as a whole. The meaning of one is deferred to another without touching an underlying essence of the subject, simply because there is no such essence. The meanings circle around that which underlies the chain, which is simply a place of lack—a void (Laclau 1996:57). Thus, logics of equivalence and difference are at work in the chains constructing both the American subject and America’s threatening Others.Desire itself brings together these chains of identification. Desire for full representation, for a signifier that will represent the split subject in a way that its divisions and ambiguities will be healed, moves from object to object**.** Without lack there is no desire, and without desire there is no subjectivity. Within Kristol and Kagan's discourse, the desire for subjectivity is constructed along the series of equivalences that construct both "America” and the Other(s). The desire for a signifier that will fully represent the subject and that will heal its divisions and erase its ambiguity shifts along the series of signifiers that attempt to represent it. "Moral clarity," "American exceptionalism “moral confidence,” “national greatness,” and so on offer the promise of wholeness as laid out in the fantasy, yet all fail in their promise to heal the subject’s split. Thus, desire is constantly frustrated and constantly shifts to avoid this frustration, just as desire is frustrated in its inevitable encounter with the signifiers of the Other(s). The two chains are mutually constitutive of each other, and desire is frustrated in the lack of representation in "our” chain and by the Other(s) that are perceived to block our representation (yet actually function as the signifying patches that allow the subject some coherence). The complete subject that they imply is nothing other than the retroactive construction of itself that did not exist before it was presumed by the fantasy. The equivalences attempt to touch this "America” that is/was without division, yet the fantasy implicit in these signifiers merely covers over a lack.

#### Their security discourse causes genocide and interventionism in the name of cleansing the world of violent “others”

Friis 2k - Friis, UN Sector at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2k, (Karsten, Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” <http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2>). NS

The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by representation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

#### The alternative is to reject securitization – this opens up space for emancipatory political engagement.

**Neocleous:** [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of securityaltogether **-** to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world'and reiteration of one fear**,** anxiety and insecurity after **another** will also make it hard to do**.** But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles **t**hat arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character ofsecurity on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole**."**' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word.What this might mean**,** precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state;it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

#### Representations must precede policy discussion – they determine what is politically thinkable.

Crawford 02 — Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 19-21

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignore as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical importof representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

### 3

#### The plan requires clarifying international space law---causes strategic bargaining to extract concessions – they say that it’s up to debate so we stick them with normal means and means give us high risk – no fiat that lets them get away with murder

Alexander William Salter 16, Assistant Professor of Economics, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, "SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS", 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 (2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf

V. MITIGATION VS. REMOVAL

Relying on international law to create an environment conducive to space debris removal initially seems promising. The Virginia school of political economy has convincingly shown the importance of political-legal institutions in creating the incentives that determine whether those who act within those institutions behave cooperatively or predatorily.47 In the context of space debris, the role of nation-states, or their space agencies, would be to create an international legal framework that clearly specifies the rules that will govern space debris removal and the interactions in space more generally. The certainty afforded by clear and nondiscriminatory48 rules would enable the parties of the space debris “social contract” to use efficient strategies for coping with space debris. However, this ideal result is, in practice, far from certain. To borrow a concept from Buchanan and Tullock’s framework,49 the costs of amending the rules in the case of international space law are exceptionally high. Although a social contract is beneficial in that it prevents stronger nation-states from imposing their will on weaker nation-states, it also creates incentives for the main spacefaring nations to block reforms that are overall welfare-enhancing but that do not sufficiently or directly benefit the stronger nations.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty) is the foundation for current international space law.50 All major spacefaring nations are signatories. Article VIII of this treaty is the largest legal barrier to space debris removal efforts. This article stipulates that parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction over objects they launch into space, whether in orbit or on a celestial body such as the Moon. This article means that American organizations, whether private firms or the government, cannot remove pieces of Chinese or Russian debris without the permission of their respective governments. Perhaps contrary to intuition, consent will probably not be easy to secure.

A major difficulty lies in the realization that much debris is valuable scrap material that is already in orbit. A significant fraction of the costs associated with putting spacecraft in orbit comes from escaping Earth’s gravity well. The presence of valuable material already in space can justifiably be claimed as a valuable resource for repairs to current spacecraft and eventual manufacturing in space. As an example, approximately 1,000 tons of aluminum orbit as debris from the upper stages of launch vehicles alone. Launching those materials into orbit could cost between $5 billion and $10 billion and would take several years.51 Another difficulty lies in the fact that no definition of space debris is currently accepted internationally. This could prove problematic for removal efforts, if there is disagreement as to whether a given object is useless space junk, or a potentially useful space asset. Although this ambiguity may appear purely semantic, resolving it does pose some legal difficulties. Doing so would require consensus among the spacefaring nations. The negotiation process for obtaining consent would be costly.

Less obvious, but still important, is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, normally referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention expanded on the issue of liability in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under the Liability Convention, any government “shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”52 In other words, if a US party attempts to remove debris and accidentally damages another nation’s space objects, the US government would be liable for damages. More generally, because launching states would bear costs associated with accidents during debris removal, those states may be unwilling to participate in or permit such efforts. In theory, insurance can partly remediate the costs, but that remediation would still make debris removal engagement less appealing.

A global effort to remediate debris would, by necessity, involve the three major spacefaring nations: the United States, Russia, and China.53 However, any effort would also require—at a minimum—a significant clarification and—at most —a complete overhaul of existing space law.54 One cannot assume that parties to the necessary political bargains would limit parleying to space-related issues.

Agreements between sovereign nation-states must be self-enforcing.55 To secure consent, various parties to the change in the international legal-institutional framework may bargain strategically and may hold out for unrelated concessions as a way of maximizing private surplus. The costs, especially the decision-making costs, of changing the legal framework to secure a global response to a global commons problem are potentially quite high.

#### The US will use that opportunity to push Artemis Accords and bilateralization – undermines multilateral space law.

Wall 20 – Senior Space Writer with Space.com, former herpetologist and wildlife biologist, Ph.D. in evolutionary biology from the University of Sydney, Australia; citing Boley (Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver) and Byers (Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver)

Mike Wall, 10-8-2020, “US policy could thwart sustainable space development, researchers say,” Space.com, https://www.space.com/us-space-policy-mining-artemis-accords DD

The United States' space policy threatens the safe and sustainable development of the final frontier, two researchers argue.

The U.S. is pushing national rather than multilateral regulation of space mining, an approach that could have serious negative consequences, astronomer Aaron Boley and political scientist Michael Byers, both of the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, write in a "Policy Forum" piece that was published online today (Oct. 8) in the journal Science.

Boley and Byers cite the 2015 passage of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, which explicitly granted American companies and citizens the right to mine and sell space resources. That right was affirmed this past April in an executive order signed by President Donald Trump, they note.

The researchers also point to NASA's announcement last month that it intends to buy moon dirt and soil collected by private companies, and its plan to sign bilateral agreements with international partners that want to participate in the agency's Artemis program of crewed lunar exploration.

Artemis, one of NASA's highest-profile projects, aims to return astronauts to the moon in 2024 and establish a long-term, sustainable human presence on and around Earth's nearest neighbor by the end of the decade. Making all of this happen will require the extensive use of lunar resources, such as the water ice that lurks on the permanently shadowed floors of polar craters, NASA officials have said.

Boley and Byers take special aim at the planned bilateral agreements, known as the Artemis Accords. In promoting them, the U.S. "is overlooking best practice with regard to the sustainable development of space," the researchers write.

"Instead of pressing ahead unilaterally and bilaterally, the United States should support negotiations on space mining within the UN [United Nations] Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the same multilateral body that drafted the five major space treaties of the 1960s and '70s," they write in the Science piece. (The most important of the five is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which forms the basis of international space law.)

"Meanwhile, NASA’s actions must be seen for what they are — a concerted, strategic effort to redirect international space cooperation in favor of short-term U.S. commercial interests, with little regard for the risks involved," Boley and Byers add.

The researchers worry that the U.S. is setting an unfortunate precedent for other countries to follow, and that space mining and other exploration activities may therefore proceed in a somewhat careless and chaotic fashion in the not-too-distant future.

#### That returns space to might-makes-right imperial conflict.

O’Brien 20 – member of the International Institute of Space Law and founder of The Space Treaty Project, retired attorney and former member of the NASA-Hastings Law Project

Dennis O’Brien, 6-29-2020, “The Artemis Accords: repeating the mistakes of the Age of Exploration,” *The Space Review*, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3975/1 DD

In the spring of 1493, the King and Queen of Spain sent an envoy to the Pope in Rome. Along with Portugal, Spain had just used its advanced sailing and navigation technology to reach “new worlds,” areas of the Earth that had not been previously discovered by Europeans. But they had a problem: they wanted to establish sovereign property rights in the lands they had discovered, but they weren’t sure they could do so under their own authority. So, they turned to the only international authority in Europe at that time, the Catholic Church, which held sway over governments from Portugal to Poland, from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. If the Church would establish a legal framework that granted them sovereignty, then those nations would be bound to recognize it.[2]

This is the first lesson that the current governments of the world can learn from the Age of Exploration & Empire that began five centuries ago. Even then, the most powerful nation in Europe, with the largest army and most advanced technology, realized that it could not unilaterally establish property rights or any other kind of sovereignty without the approval of an international authority. After the Church granted that authority, Spain was able to create one of the greatest empires in history. Spain and Portugal formalized the arrangement with a binding international agreement, the Treaty of Tordesillas, whose purpose was to ensure peaceful cooperation between their nations, primarily by establishing a line of demarcation that separated their areas of activity.[3]

Unfortunately, the legal framework so established was based on national dominance, not multilateral international cooperation. The grant of sovereignty was exclusive, made only to Spain and Portugal, and it required them to subjugate the “savages” in the lands they discovered by taking along Church missionaries. This exclusivity did not sit well with other nations as they also developed the technologies of exploration; it was one of the reasons many northern European nations joined the Protestant Reformation and rejected the authority of the Pope in Rome. Without a fair and equitable international agreement that honored the interests of emerging states, the Church lost its ability to act as an arbiter between nations.

Even worse, the dominance model set up centuries of conflict among the major powers in Europe. Militant nationalism and economic colonialism became the principles guiding national policy. The result was centuries of war, suffering, and neglect among the major powers and the nations they subjugated. This pattern did not end until the 20th century, when the major powers fought two world wars and finally dismantled their colonial empires: sometimes peacefully, sometimes by force.

By the mid-1960s, most countries on Earth were independent or on their way to becoming so. But a new conflict had started, one that threatened to repeat the mistakes of five centuries earlier. The great powers were once again using their advanced technology to explore new worlds, and the race was on to plant their flag on the Moon first. Under the ancient traditions, the country that did so would have a claim against all others for possession and use of the territory. The Cold War was about to expand into outer space.

But then something wonderful happened. In 1967, the United Nations proposed, and the world’s space powers accepted, an international agreement known as the Outer Space Treaty.[4] The treaty was an intentional effort to avoid the mistakes of the Age of Exploration & Empire. Article I states, “The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.” Article II is even more specific: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Because of this treaty, the United States carried a plaque to the Moon that said, “We came in peace for all mankind.”[5] When the Apollo 11 astronauts planted the US flag, they did so out of pride, but did not establish any claim or national priority.

This legal framework worked well initially, but people soon started wondering about what to do when countries or private entities wanted to start commercial activity on the Moon, or build settlements. The solution was the Moon Treaty, proposed by the United Nations and adopted by enough nations to come into force in 1984.[6] But it has not yet been adopted by any major spacefaring nation. The United States, by a recent executive order, has specifically renounced the treaty and stated its intentions to extract materials from the Moon without any international agreement.[7]

The newly announced Artemis Accords go even further. Although the actual Accords have not been released pending consultation with possible partners, the summary provided by NASA[8] indicates that the United States will unilaterally interpret the Outer Space Treaty to allow “space resource extraction,” despite the prohibition against appropriation in Article II of the Treaty. There will also be “safety zones” to avoid “harmful interference” with such operations. The effect is to establish exclusive economic zones, especially if “harmful interference” is defined to include economic harm, not just safety. Will the new Space Force be used to protect such economic interests? Will other nations be excluded if they support the Moon Treaty?[9] Will private actors be required to follow the same rules as states, as recommended in the recently drafted Moon Village Principles?[10] This is the slippery slope of using unilateral action to establish economic rights rather than an international agreement.

The Artemis Accords acknowledge many beneficial agreements and policies: The Outer Space Treaty, Rescue Agreement, and Registration Convention (though not the Liability Convention); peace, transparency, interoperability, protecting heritage sites and sharing scientific information. But its unilateral authorization of space mining is a continuation of the Trump Administration’s underlying foreign policy strategy: unilateral dominance over international cooperation. The United States has withdrawn from the Paris Accords, the Iranian nuclear deal, and, in the middle of a pandemic, the World Health

Organization. Dominance has even become the theme of the administration’s domestic policy, with President Trump recently telling governors, “If you don't dominate, you're wasting your time… You have to dominate.”[11] That core philosophy is now being applied to outer space, as Vice President Mike Pence proudly announced in 2018. Despite the lessons of history, the United States is going full speed ahead with the “dominance” model of space development rather than working with the nations of the world to develop a “cooperation” model. Outer space, which so far has been preserved for peace and cooperation, is about to be spoiled, perhaps forever.

#### Goes nuclear – space conflict is uniquely escalatory.

Farley 22 – PhD, Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky

Robert Farley, 1-9-2022, “Does A Space War Mean A Nuclear War?” 1945, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/does-a-space-war-mean-a-nuclear-war/ DD

The recent Russian anti-satellite test didn’t tell the world anything new, but it did reaffirm the peril posed by warfare in space. Debris from explosions could make some earth orbits remarkably risky to use for both civilian and military purposes. But the test also highlighted a less visible danger; attacks on nuclear command and control satellites could rapidly produce an extremely dangerous escalatory situation in a war between nuclear powers. James Acton and Thomas Macdonald drew attention to this problem in a recent article at Inside Defense. As Acton and MacDonald point out, nuclear command and control satellites are the connective tissue of nuclear deterrence, assuring countries that they’re not being attacked and that they’ll be able to respond quickly if they are.

For a long time, these strategic early-warning satellites were akin to a center of gravity in ICBM warfare. Nuclear deterrence requires awareness that an attack is underway. Attacks on the monitoring system could easily be read as an attempt to blind an opponent in preparation for general war, and could themselves incur nuclear retaliation. Thus, the nuclear command and control satellites are critical to the maintenance of nuclear deterrence. They make it possible to distribute an order from the chief of government to the nuclear delivery systems themselves. Consequently, their destruction might lead to hesitation or delay in performing a nuclear launch order.

It was only later that the relevance of satellites for conventional warfare became clear. Satellites could reconnoiter enemy positions and, more importantly, provide communications for friendly forces. Indeed, the expansion of the role of satellites in conventional warfare has complicated the prospect of space warfare. States have a clear reason for targeting enemy satellites which support conventional warfare, as those satellites enable the most lethal part of the kill chain, the communications and recon networks that link targets with shooters. Thus, we now have a situation in which space military assets have both nuclear and conventional roles.

In a conflict confusion and misperception could rapidly become lethal. If one combatant views an attack against nuclear command and control as a prelude to a general nuclear attack, it might choose to pre-empt.

Nuclear powers have dealt with problems in this general category for a good long while; would a conventional attack against tactical nuclear staging areas represent an escalation, for example? Would the use of ballistic missiles that can carry either conventional or nuclear weapons trigger a nuclear response? Do attacks against air defense networks that have both strategic and tactical responsibilities run the risk of triggering a nuclear response? There’s also the danger that damage to communications networks designated for conventional combat could force traffic onto the nuclear control systems, further confusing the issue.

No one has ever fought a nuclear war, and no two nuclear powers have engaged in a prolonged, high-intensity conventional conflict. Now that conventional systems have become implicated in space technologies for reconnaissance, targeting, and communications, leaders will have to make very difficult, very careful decisions on what enemy capabilities they want to disrupt. Acton and MacDonald propose a straightforward ban on attacks against nuclear satellite infrastructure, which would also require agreement to keep nuclear and conventional communications networks separate. This is the little ask; countries should plan to fight more carefully. The big ask is for a multilateral ban to prevent future anti-satellite weapons tests in space. This would reduce the danger that debris could close off, temporarily or permanently, human access to certain locations in earth orbit. But given that countries use satellites for the conduct of conventional military operations, it’s a lot to ask for warfighters to consider critical military infrastructure off-limits in any particular conflict.

### 4

#### States ought to:

#### --Announce that appropriation of outer space by private actors violates the Outer Space Treaty and that this is a settled matter of customary international law

#### --Announce that this action is taken pursuant to *opinio juris* (the belief that the action is taken pursuant to a legal obligation) and that non-compliant actors are in violation of international law

#### --Fully comply, not appropriating outer space in a manner inconsistent with these proclamations

#### Solves the Aff

[Fabio](https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021) **Tronchetti 8**. Dr. Fabio Tronchetti works as a Co-Director of the Institute of Space Law and Strategy and as a Zhuoyue Associate Professor at Beihang University, “The Non–Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of International Law: A New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,” Air and Space Law, Volume 33, No 3, 2008, <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021>, RJP, **DebateDrills**.

The non–appropriation principle represents the fundamental rule of the space law system. Since the beginning of the space era, it has allowed for the safe and orderly development of space activities. Nowadays, however, the principle is under attack. Some proposals, arguing the need for abolishing it in order to promote commercial use of outer space are undermining its relevance and threatening its role as a guiding principle for present and future space activities. This paper aims at safeguarding the non–appropriative nature of outer space by suggesting a new interpretation of the non–appropriation principle that is based on the view that this principle should be regarded as a customary rule of international law of a special character, namely ‘a structural norm’ of international law.

#### That competes ---

#### Widespread support for OST overhaul means a new treaty is likely---top military leaders are pushing it.

Theresa **Hitchens 21**. Theresa Hitchens is the Space and Air Force reporter at Breaking Defense. The former Defense News editor was a senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). Before that, she spent six years in Geneva, Switzerland as director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). “US Should Push New Space Treaty: Atlantic Council,” Breaking Defense, April 12, 2021, <https://breakingdefense.com/2021/04/us-should-push-new-space-treaty-atlantic-council/>, RJP, **DebateDrills**

WASHINGTON: The US should push hard to overhaul the entire international legal framework for outer space — including replacing the foundational [1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST),](https://breakingdefense.com/tag/outer-space-treaty/) a new report from the Atlantic Council says.

As it moves to do so, the US also should more aggressively court allies with an eye to establishing a “collective security alliance for space” among likeminded countries to “deter aggression” and defend “key resources and access.”

“The 1967 Treaty is dated. It was written, literally, in a different era,” said former Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James in an Atlantic Council briefing today. “At present it is too broad, and in some cases it’s probably overly specific.”

The year-long study, [“The Future of Security In Space: A Thirty-Years US Strategy”](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TheFutureofSecurityinSpace.pdf)was co-chaired by James and retired Marine Corps Gen. Hoss Cartwright, former vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In essence, it argues that the US needs to lead international efforts to craft a new rules-based regime to govern all space activities — from exploration to commercial ventures to military interactions. As the two argued in a recent [op-ed in Breaking D,](https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/the-space-rush-new-us-strategy-must-bring-order-regulation/) “Great-power competition among the United States, China, and Russia has launched into outer space without rules governing the game.”

“The international law of space, centered on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is outdated and insufficient for a future of space in which economic activity is primary. The international community needs a new foundational space treaty, and the United States should precipitate its negotiation,” the study argues.

James elaborated that the idea would be to craft a more expansive treaty that covers emerging issues like debris mitigation and removal and [commercial extraction of resources](https://breakingdefense.com/tag/space-resource-extraction/) from the Moon and/or asteroids. That said, she stressed that the US should not abandon the OST — which has been signed by 193 nations — unless and until something new is there to replace it.

#### We solve better, since CIL is far superior to treaties for space AND causes follow-on.

Koplow, 9 – Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.

David A. Koplow, “ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 30, Summer 2009. <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1452&context=facpub>

Finally, the Article concludes with some policy recommendations, suggesting mechanisms for the world community to press forward with autonomous efforts to promote stability and security in outer space, even in the face of recalcitrance from the leading space powers. I would certainly support the negotiation and implementation of a comprehensive new treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space, and a carefully drafted, widely accepted accord could accomplish much, well beyond what customary law alone could create. But the treaty process, too, has costs and disadvantages, and the world need not pursue just one of these alternatives in isolation.

If the absence of global consensus currently inhibits agreements that countries could already sign, perhaps the world community can nevertheless get some "satisfaction" via the operation of CIL, constructing a similar (although not completely equivalent) edifice of international regulation of ASATs based simply on what countries do.

### Case

#### 1] Double turn - the Ortega evidence says space weaponization causes escalation, the Elvevold evidence says space heg is good because it lets the US achieve dominance through space weaponization - thats an explicit unavoidable double turn and an independent disad to the aff

#### 2] Brands is a dumbass who misreads history and his literal job relies on worst-case fearmongering huge link to the K – its not a coincidence he got the Henry Kissinger distinguishment, he has a vested interest in upholding US military dominance.

Glaser ‘18

John. [John Glaser is Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute]“Truth, Power, and the Academy: A Response to Hal Brands - War on the Rocks.” War on the Rocks, 26 Mar. 2018, warontherocks.com/2018/03/truth-power-and-the-academy-a-response-to-hal-brands/. Accessed 7 Nov. 2021. |Harun|

Academic expertise should guide U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, it does not really work that way. On a host of issues, there is an enormous gap between scholarship on international relations and the policy consensus in Washington. The United States persistently pursues foreign strategies that run contrary to the policy implications of the academic consensus. And on questions that are hotly debated in academia, Washington displays inviolable bipartisan unity. Hal Brands addressed the gap in an article in the American Interest last fall that was recently the subject of renewed interest on social media. There is “systematic evidence,” he writes, “that the scholarship-policy gap is real and widening.” And he accurately identifies the many disparities. “For decades, there has been a bipartisan policy consensus” that U.S. non-proliferation policies are vital for global security. “Scholars, however, are generally more sanguine.” Policymakers in the post-Cold War era arrived at a consensus to expand NATO eastward, while international relations scholars “overwhelmingly opposed” it. Washington thinks credibility is so important that it is worth fighting elective wars to preserve it, while “most scholars argue that credibility is a chimera.” On Iraq, “most foreign policy elites, and significant bipartisan majorities in the Congress” supported the case for war, which was “vociferously rejected by most international relations scholars.” And in Washington, “there has long been an unassailable consensus” around a grand strategy of primacy, Brands notes; “within the academy, however…the dominant school of thought favors American retrenchment.” Why this gap? According to Brands, scholars are “first and foremost citizens of the world,” and therefore less interested in pursuing the “national interest” than policymakers. Academics “see patriotic fervor as the enemy of objectivity,” and are therefore skeptical of “American power.” Third, scholars emphasize the costs of action while neglecting the costs of inaction. Fourth, they get swept up by “beautiful concepts” and elegant theories, naively blinding themselves to “the messiness of reality.” Prudent practitioners, he insists, incorporate unlikely worst-case scenarios into their policy decisions, while academics are free to privilege abstract risk assessment. Finally, policymakers face penalties for being wrong, whereas scholars get to spout off ideas while escaping the consequences. Brands is likely correct that scholars are more inclined to think systematically about issues than policymakers. Indeed, scholars are privileged in having positions that encourage them to think rigorously. And it might be true that academics care more about objectivity than patriotic zeal – thankfully so, given the deleterious effects exuberant patriotism can have on foreign policy. Brands doesn’t argue for unhinged nationalism, but he does seem to look favorably on the fact that much Washington-based analysis is tinged with love of country and patriotic puffery, emphasizing America’s enlightened intentions and special prerogatives for imposing global order. This sort of sentiment should be irrelevant if one is trying to get to objective answers to hard questions. Most of Brands’ account, however, is just flat out wrong. The evidence repudiates the suggestion, for example, that policymakers are held accountable for their ideas. The Obama administration’s war in Libya is widely considered a failure (Obama said not being prepared for the chaotic aftermath was the “worst mistake” of his presidency). Who in officialdom was held accountable? Which member of the Bush administration – or its Republican and Democratic enablers – suffered real consequences for the crime of preventive war against Iraq? Some point to Republican losses in subsequent elections, or the fact that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was fired for mismanagement of the war, as examples of accountability. But Rumsfeld got canned because of particular operational ideas he held about deployment and tactics, not because he favored the war. And short-term electoral losses in the mid-terms or the next presidential election are weak sauce, not just because these fickle changes can hardly rectify past wrongs of such magnitude, but because the same crop of analysts and politicians for whom the Iraq War made perfect sense continue to dominate the foreign policy establishment, both in and out of government. Trump’s decision this week to hire John Bolton, a paragon of everything that is wrong with the war-prone and expert-allergic nature of U.S. foreign policy, as national security advisor is a perfect example of this lack of accountability. As Steve Walt recently pointed out, none of the scholars that signed the famed 2002 full page advertisement in the New York Times opposing the Iraq War have served in policy positions, whereas plenty of people in elected office, the unelected national security apparatus, and the foreign policy commentariat who did support the war continue to dominate these arenas. But it’s not just the big failures like Iraq and Libya. The ideas that drive these failed policies continue to dominate in Washington. The notion that America should fight preventive wars for the sake of non-proliferation is still widely shared. Fighting wars for the sake of credibility is also popular. Expanding NATO, despite the lack of benefit to U.S. interests and the instability it causes in Eastern Europe, almost amounts to religious doctrine. Despite its steep costs and risky adventurism, a grand strategy of primacy continues to monopolize U.S. foreign policy decision-making. The scholarship-policy gap persists because the people and ideas that drive foreign policy in Washington are not held accountable for their failures, and instead are often rewarded with a lifetime of high-status revolving door positions in the policy and think tank worlds. Bad ideas, particularly hawkish ones, and the people that hold them continue to win the day in Washington. That is not accountability. Nor does Brands’ discussion of worst-case scenario policymaking ring true. Brands speaks favorably of former Vice President Dick Cheney’s “one percent doctrine,” which says that if a threat has even a one percent chance of becoming a reality, it requires enormous resources to mitigate. The argument that Washington ought to design policies based on inflated threats of worst-case scenarios, instead of the rational cost-benefit risk assessments done by scholars, is dangerously wrong. America’s post-9/11 “War on Terror” policies have done exactly that, and it has led to a host of destabilizing elective wars and egregious overspending on homeland security. Plus, Brands’ reading of history here is selective. On issues ranging from NATO expansion and competition with China, to humanitarian intervention in Libya and beyond, policymakers have roundly espoused best-case scenarios for the outcomes of their policies. Instead, it has been scholars who have warned of worst-case scenarios – citing standoffs with Russia, escalatory risks with China, and the impossibility of reconstructing broken states at any reasonable cost. In short, Brands has presented the problem in reverse: What needs to be explained is not why academics are out of touch, but why policymakers have been so doggedly resistant to their more reliable counterparts in academia. One reason is that states resist dissent. Government bureaucracies tend to suppress ideas that challenge the reigning doctrine. The State Department purged officials in the 1940s and 1950s who questioned U.S. support for Chang Kai Shek’s government and presented Communist China as something other than a monolithic threat. During the Vietnam War, the CIA silenced analysts who warned about the strength of the Vietcong. The analysis of intelligence officials who poked holes in the WMD case for the Iraq War were shoved into the footnotes of the National Intelligence Estimate, and dissent from Energy Department scientists about the infamous “aluminum tubes” was quashed. In addition, states are bad at self-evaluation. As Steven Van Evera argues, “Myths, false propaganda, and anachronistic beliefs persist in the absence of strong evaluative institutions to test ideas against logic and evidence, weeding out those that fail.” Socialization and status quo bias play a big role in the policy echo chamber as well. As Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp underscore, “Ideological thinking also tends to characterize staff members who have had a long period of involvement in a particular area and become committed to a particular doctrine, such as the need for American hegemony.” Parochial self-interest is a factor, too. As Micah Zenko and Michael Cohen argue, “The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government – defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments.” Nobody whose job depends on inflating foreign threats wants to confront their own redundancy or hear that their searching for monsters to destroy is dangerous. Nor is this just a bureaucratic issue. Elite politicking plays a role as well. As Jack Snyder shows, domestic coalition-building among various political, bureaucratic, and special interest groups in the Cold War era helped “pav[e] the way for a Cold War consensus behind expanded military commitments.” These factions sometimes “resorted to disingenuous strategic exaggerations to sell their program,” resulting in a “spiral of myth-making” that provided “political and intellectual pressure toward global military entanglements.” Then there are think tanks. One might assume think tanks help mitigate these problems in government. In reality, they are subject to their own perverse incentives that reinforce them. Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan wrote recently that America’s current grand strategy of primacy “serves the interests of U.S. political leaders,” so “there is little demand for arguments questioning it.” Think tank analysis is plagued by an “operational mindset,” which takes existing objectives as a given and provides analysis mostly on how best to implement them, not whether they are wise to begin with. In this, think tanks are frequently beholden, consciously or not, to their funders’ policy preferences. The history of the RAND Corporation’s work on the Vietnam War is a good example. Projects on operational questions got more funding, and research that contradicted official thinking was shunned. In short, since most think tanks service policymakers rather than guide them, their work tends to reflect the policy preferences of Washington rather than the scholarly consensus. Analysts who want to have an influence on policy face powerful incentivizes to conform to Washington’s preferences. Think tanks thrive on maintaining relevance and the appearance of policy influence, and if advocating for the scholarly consensus on an issue goes against the grain and gets analysts uninvited to the next closed-door meeting or high-prolife event, organizations are wont to assimilate to the agenda in Washington. This is not to condemn analysts and practitioners as mendacious sell-outs. Most are earnest, well-meaning, and genuine adherents to the policies for which they advocate. Nevertheless, many often knowingly buck ideas that challenge the consensus du jour. I have personally listened to former officials privately take views popular in academia, but abstain from public advocacy because they feel constrained by the narrow parameters of debate in Washington. Fellow think tank analysts have told me of their reluctance to publicly tout policies that lie outside these parameters for fear of sabotaging their viability for a future job in government. Scholars are not angels. They face their own institutional pathologies and perverse incentives, like everybody else. We should not slip into the logical fallacy of the Appeal to Authority. Still, scholars are far more insulated in this respect than the policy communities in Washington, and the fact that bad ideas, popular in D.C. but unsupported in academia, keep getting the United States into trouble abroad, should say something about the imperative of giving greater credence to scholarship. Ultimately, Brands is right that there is a gap between scholarship and practice. The problem, however, lies far more with a policymaking establishment that is resistant to external input than it does with scholars who often go to great lengths and bear real costs to make their insights known to Washington. Before placing blame with the academy, we should pause to reflect on the policymaking establishment’s own problematic record over the last several decades. Bridging the gap is indeed important, but the solution lies in opening up the policymaking process to scholarly insights – not encouraging scholars to embrace Washington’s self-congratulatory discourse.

#### 3] Their Heiwell evidence says that Jeff Bezos has pitched the Idea of a private space satellite similar to the ISS but there isn’t even a formal agreement about this yet which means they have 0 inherency saying that the ISS will be overtaken and not just re-extended in the future, Their jones evidence once again just says that it might happen not that it is going to happen.

#### 4] They have an extremely basic take on space cooperation, they assume that the companies that would build the space station would also operate out of it, that is untrue their Jones evidence says that they would be contracted meaning it would just replace the ISS. International coop over scientific and technological development that occur multilaterally over space would still occur and that is what their smith card discusses.

#### 5] No internal link to solving Militarization, they say that its inevitable but their evidence says that the only way that multi-lat will solve is if china, india, Israel and iran are on the table, NONE OF THESE COUNTRIES HAVE EVER BEEN TO THE ISS

Table

Description automatically generated

Source- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\_of\_visitors\_to\_the\_International\_Space\_Station

#### 6] No space wars --- dependence on space creates a de facto taboo

Triezenberg, 17

Bonnie Triezenberg, Senior engineer at RAND. Previously, she was the senior technical fellow at the Boeing Company, specializing in agile systems and software development. “Deterring Space War: An Exploratory Analysis Incorporating Prospect Theory into a Game Theoretic Model of Space Warfare,” RAND Corporation. 2017. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD400.html>

The above discussion suggests that a likely means to achieve deterrence of acts of war in outer space is to increase civilian dependence on space to support day-to-day life—if everyone on earth is equally dependent on space, no one has an incentive to destroy space. Largely by accident, this dependence appears to have, in fact, occurred. The space age was born in an age of affluence and rapid economic expansion; space quickly became a domain of international commerce as well as a domain of national military use. Space assets and the systems they enable have transformed social, infrastructure and information uses perhaps more visibly than they have transformed military uses. In fact, in the current satellite database published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, of the 1461 satellites in orbit 40% support purely commercial ventures, while only 16% have a strictly military use.46 The first commercial broadcast by a satellite in geo-synchronous orbit was of international news between Europe and the United States.47 The first telephony uniting the far flung islands of Indonesia was enabled by satellite48. Those of us who are old enough remember the 1960s “magic” of intercontinental phone calls and international “breaking news” delivered by satellite. Today, most social and infrastructure uses of space are taken for granted – even in remote locales of Africa, people expect to be able to monitor the weather, communicate seamlessly with colleagues and to find their way to new and unfamiliar locations using the GPS in their phones. All of us use space every day.49 These unrestricted economic and social uses of space may be the best deterrent, making everyone on all sides of combat equally dependent on space and heightening the taboo against weaponizing space or threatening space assets with weapons.

#### Public sector thunps – will creat more

#### 7] We’ll impact turn Heg

#### Stokes fails – the idea of benign hegemony fails – a] directly contradictory with Elvevold which says soft heg fails b] this means that they have no internal link to Elvevold about absolute dominance to space c] this just describes an idealized multilateral world, not one that has ever existed or will exist in practice – empirlcally proven that US refuses to use soft power and rules with an iron fist

#### US hegemony is dead – there’s no coming back – proves even if it is more stable with a dominant power, the US isn’t the one running the world

* COVID, economic downturns, nationalistic politics, security internationally
* Rise in other great powers to rival
* Weaker states can seek alternatives to US support
* Rise in right-wing networks vs liberal policies

Cooley and Nexon 20 (Alexander Cooley is the Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, Daniel H. Nexon is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 6/9/2020, Foreign Affairs, “How Hegemony Ends”, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends>) //EG

Multiple signs point to a crisis in global order. The uncoordinated international response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the resulting economic downturns, the resurgence of nationalist politics, and the hardening of state borders all seem to herald the emergence of a less cooperative and more fragile international system. According to many observers, these developments underscore the dangers of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America first” policies and his retreat from global leadership.

Even before the pandemic, Trump routinely criticized the value of alliances and institutions such as NATO, supported the breakup of the European Union, withdrew from a host of international agreements and organizations, and pandered to autocrats such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. He has questioned the merits of placing liberal values such as democracy and human rights at the heart of foreign policy. Trump’s clear preference for zero-sum, transactional politics further supports the notion that the United States is abandoning its commitment to promoting a liberal international order.

Some analysts believe that the United States can still turn this around, by restoring the strategies by which it, from the end of World War II to the aftermath of the Cold War, built and sustained a successful international order. If a post-Trump United States could reclaim the responsibilities of global power, then this era—including the pandemic that will define it—could stand as a temporary aberration rather than a step on the way to permanent disarray.

After all, predictions of American decline and a shift in international order are far from new—and they have been consistently wrong. In the middle of the 1980s, many analysts believed that U.S. leadership was on the way out. The Bretton Woods system had collapsed in the 1970s; the United States faced increasing competition from European and East Asian economies, notably West Germany and Japan; and the Soviet Union looked like an enduring feature of world politics. By the end of 1991, however, the Soviet Union had formally dissolved, Japan was entering its “lost decade” of economic stagnation, and the expensive task of integration consumed a reunified Germany. The United States experienced a decade of booming technological innovation and unexpectedly high economic growth. The result was what many hailed as a “unipolar moment” of American hegemony.

But this time really is different. The very forces that made U.S. hegemony so durable before are today driving its dissolution. Three developments enabled the post–Cold War U.S.-led order.

First, with the defeat of communism, the United States faced no major global ideological project that could rival its own. Second, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its accompanying infrastructure of institutions and partnerships, weaker states lacked significant alternatives to the United States and its Western allies when it came to securing military, economic, and political support. And third, transnational activists and movements were spreading liberal values and norms that bolstered the liberal order.

Today, those same dynamics have turned against the United States: a vicious cycle that erodes U.S. power has replaced the virtuous cycles that once reinforced it. With the rise of great powers such as China and Russia, autocratic and illiberal projects rival the U.S.-led liberal international system. Developing countries—and even many developed ones—can seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support. And illiberal, often right-wing transnational networks are pressing against the norms and pieties of the liberal international order that once seemed so implacable. In short, U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling. And the decline is not cyclical but permanent.

#### That means trying to fight back ensures counterbalancing and war

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America’s place in the world is experiencing an historic turning point. All the mumbo-jumbo about being the “exceptional” and “indispensable” nation, the natural “leader” of something called the “West,” the guarantor of some kind of international system of “rules” is finally being cast into the dustbin of history.

This moment is not just about leaving the Iran nuclear agreement, or even the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate agreement. It is not simply attributable to the unpredictable, childish impulses of the current president. Nor is it the result of Obama’s failure to enforce a red line in Syria, or “leading from behind” in Libya. It is not even about Bush’s invasion of Iraq with the goal of regime change, setting in motion the destruction of what little political stability existed in the Middle East.

Of course, it is about all these decisions. But in every case, those decisions, and even the critics of those decisions, have failed to realize how they have played into, helped cause, and now accelerate a fundamental shift in global realities—the centrifugal redistribution of power and influence in the international system that has brought to an end the “American century.” The United States has become just another power in a system for which it no longer sets or enforces the rules, if it ever really did.

Both political parties fail to cope with this reality. Democrats and liberals insist that Trump’s foreign-policy decisions threaten the “rules-based” international order America built and dominated. A simple change in leadership, they believe, can restore order and America’s primacy. Republicans [demand](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/24/john-bolton-wants-regime-change-in-iran-and-so-does-the-cult-that-paid-him/?utm_term=.68aa7b4e3cce) bellicose American assertiveness, believing that force and military strength guarantee that the world will behave. Columnists bewail America’s declining status, [arguing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-has-put-america-in-the-worst-of-all-possible-worlds/2018/05/11/ff68940c-5553-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.76f57dea9018) that greater iinvestment in allies and diplomacy, combined with military engagement might reverse the tide. Think tanks scurry to [define](https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/credibility-matters-strengthening-american-deterrence-in-an-age-of-geopolit) new national security and military policies that can put America back on top.

This debate is a circular firing squad. Both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are struggling to recreate a myth: that the US dominates the world by dint of power, values, wisdom, even God’s decisions. America, and only America, can bring order and security to the world. Any other option spells chaos.

Power Shifts

The latest foreign policy whim—withdrawing from the nuclear agreement with Iran—is the most recent nail in the coffin lid in which the myth is buried. Rather than restore leadership, withdrawing from the agreement simply accelerates the global rebalancing already underway, a tectonic shift that began with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The signs are everywhere.

In the Middle East, the power shift is palpable. The United States has treated Iran as a pariah since 1979, trying to stuff the ayatollahs back into some imaginary bottle, hoping that they will go away or be overthrown. This approach has failed, and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal will only make that failure more evident. Iran is a regional power, defending its interests, engaging other powers and movements inside and outside the region, such as Russia. US regime change in Iraq not only destabilized the region but helped usher the Iranians into this active regional role. The other influential countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, will have to deal with this reality.

In addition to these three countries, Russia is also key to regional stability and instability. There’s no way of pushing the Russians out, short of direct conflict.

Nor can Turkey be forced to comply with American policy. It is clearly asserting its own interests and influence in three directions at the same time: Central Asia and Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq may have helped open this Pandora’s box. The US is rapidly becoming a marginal player in the chaotic security environment of the Middle East. In Asia, decades of US condemnation and containment of China have failed. How dare China rise? How dare China steal intellectual property, stifle democracy, arm its artificial islands in the South China Sea, develop a powerful military, mess in Africa (complete with a military base in Djibouti), and intrude into Latin America? And yet, to paraphrase Galileo, “they move.” There is a new, global, competitive player in the system, a reality the United States can not contain or reverse. That player is disrupting that lovely system of rules, acting without U.S. permission or approval. It is even creating new international institutions—an infrastructure development bank and a global trading infrastructure programs (the Belt and Road initiative) to which the US is not even a party. The balance has changed, permanently, and the rules are being rewritten, whether the United States likes it or not.

At the end of the Cold War, American power surrounded Russia, coopting its former satellites, provoking a Russian reaction. Today, the Russian government is, poisoning its citizens overseas, arming Assad, intruding on elections globally, stifling dissent and killing dissenters, and rebuilding its military. Confront Russia, condemn Putin, pretend that they are isolated, treat them with contempt and moral judgment, but Putin does not go away. He is asserting his view of Russia’s interests and Russia’s role in the world, like any great power is likely to do. No amount of US pressure, sanctions, or policy is likely to change that reality. Russia is consciously and actively rebalancing the United States, with some success.

American bullying and presidential rhetoric may have played a role in the apparent, but uncertain, willingness of the North Korean regime to put its nuclear program on the table. But if that program disappears, the putative Nobel Peace Prize may actually belong to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and even Kim Jong Un, for seizing an opportunity. Even that regional balance and the key players are shifting.

Reckoning with the Shift

America has not been able to use its dominant military to prevent this evolution or restore order. Where it has been deployed in large numbers—Iraq and Afghanistan—U.S. military force has failed. War grinds on in Afghanistan with no light suddenly appearing at the end of the tunnel, despite the promises of generations of officers. Rousting the Islamic State from Iraq has not solved the internal problems of that unhappy country, which is still recovering from a US occupation. Special Operations forces in dozens of countries whack at terrorist moles only to find others arising in their place, stimulated by the confrontation. Order is not restored; the American rules are not being obeyed.

If the US fails to read global rebalancing accurately and tries either to bully the rest of the world or to “restore” the liberal international order, the entire world will find itself at an even more dangerous moment. Bullying will only accelerate the centrifugal trend. Asserting the superiority of an American “order” and American “rules” will no longer persuade other rising powers.

The rules will change with the rebalancing. Eliminating the Trump presidency will not restore the previous order. His actions are not an aberration, but an accelerant, spreading the fires that were already under way.

The challenge is to completely redesign US foreign and national security policy to fit with a world where America is just another power, competing and cooperating for influence. The United States must learn to play well with others in the global sandbox.

#### Expanded US influence leads to the US hijacking North Korea denuclearization deals --- causes failure --- history proves

Lee 17 Dong Sun-Lee, Professor at Korea University. Professor Dong-Sun Lee has expertise in theories of international relations and military Security. “America's International Leadership in Transition: From Global Hegemony towards Offshore Leadership.” Journal of International and Area Studies. Volume 24, No 1. Pp. 1-19. June 2017.

America's voluntary assumption of leading roles also may have unintentionally hindered the solution of major international problems. The North Korean nuclear development may be a case in point. Since Pyongyang's nuclear program became an international issue in the late 1980s, Washington has willingly taken up the principal responsibility of resolving the matter. It was the United States that single-handedly negotiated and signed the 1994 Framework Agreement with North Korea in Geneva. When the arrangement failed to surmount mutual distrust and collapsed a decade later, Washington began to play a leading role again

in the search for a replacement, although other members of the Six-Party Talks played significant supporting roles as well. Its multilateral appearance notwithstanding, the joint statement of September 19, 2005 essentially had two primary contracting parties - North Korea and the United States; so did two follow-up plans for implementation concluded on February 13 and October 3, 2007. Unfortunately, these Washington-led initiatives have failed, by inadvertently setting the process of North Korean denuclearization on a particularly difficult path. All these agreements required close cooperation between two adversaries with a long history of acute conflict and deep mistrust. Among all participants of the Six-Party Talks, the United States overall had the most inimical relationship with North Korea. (Over the period when the participants negotiated and concluded those multilateral agreements, inter-Korean relations were not so confrontational, as Seoul pursued a policy of unconditional engagement and accordingly tolerated Pyongyang's unilateral actions.) Therefore, it was especially difficult for Pyongyang to trust Washington's promises on economic assistance and security guarantee; Washington for its own part found Pyongyang's commitments to denuclearization untrustworthy. Such mutual distrust eventually wrecked the series of agreements designed to stop Pyongyang's nuclear development. The distrustful Pyongyang pursued a secret Plan B (uranium enrichment) to hedge against possible US perfidy. The equally doubting Washington put on hold, or brought to a halt, the implementation of the nuclear deals at the first sign of Pyongyang's apparent noncompliance.7 Had some other country with lesser mistrust - such as China in its capacity as North Korea's ally - taken charge of striking and implementing a deal with North Korea, the denuclearization process might have had a better prospect for success, as was the case with South Korea. Seoul gave up nuclear development in the late 1970s in exchange for security guarantees and under economic pressures not from its communist adversaries, but from its American ally (Monteiro and Debs, 2014). This formula owed its success in part to the general tendency that sanctions and inducements offered by an ally are more effective than those by an adversary: allies tend to possess more credibility and leverage than do adversaries (Drezner, 1999).8 Had Moscow or Beijing similarly taken the lead in persuading Seoul to denuclearize, success would have been far less likely because of the deep-seated mistrust between them. These US-led nuclear deals proved to be not only ineffectual but also counterproductive. Their breakdowns further deepened the mutual distrust between Washington and Pyongyang, as each felt cheated by the other. Expressing this sense of betrayal, the then US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated in 2009 "I'm tired of buying the same horse twice," as the Six-Party Talks slipped into indefinite suspension as the result of Pyongyang's second nuclear test and its international repercussions (Sanger, 2009). One of the former President Obama's chief strategists said in a similar vein: "Clinton bought it once, Bush bought it again, and we're not going to buy it a third time" (Sanger, 2009). Pyongyang for its own part has blamed Washington for turning the 2005 agreement into a "dead document" (KNS, 2009), and declined to resume denuclearization talks precisely on the grounds that previous such attempts had failed due to US hostile policy (Reuters, 2015b).9 In the wake of each collapsed deal, the United States also resorted to economic pressures and/or military threats, with the hopes that North Korea would return to the bargaining table or even disarm itself unconditionally. However, these coercive measures rather heightened Pyongyang's sense of insecurity and thereby reinforced its aspiration for nuclear armament. For these reasons, diplomacy presently has an even lower chance of success than it did in 1994 or 2005. The recent Iranian nuclear deal has not imbued Pyongyang and Washington with any more eagerness to take proactive steps toward a third agreement of their own, despite their rhetorical avowals of being "open" to negotiations (Gale, 2015; Mullen, 2015; National Journal, 2013; Reuter, 2015a).

#### Denuclearization is key to solve US-North Korean war that goes nuclear --- yielding diplomacy to China is the only way to make deals effective

Diamond 17 Larry Diamond, Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. “There Is a Peaceful Way Out of the North Korea Crisis.” The Atlantic. April 26, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/

The drama that is playing out now over North Korea’s nuclear and missile program—accentuated Tuesday by that regime’s large-scale artillery drill—represents one of the most dangerous challenges for U.S. national security since the end of the Cold War. It is a crisis that has been building for a long time, as North Korea has broken through the nuclear barrier and possesses fissile material sufficient for 20 to 25 nuclear weapons, by one estimate. After many failed attempts, through pressure and negotiations, to bring an end to North Korea’s nuclear program, three new elements have heightened the urgency of the situation.

First, North Korea is racing to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the continental United States. In his annual New Years address in January, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un [declared](http://www.ncnk.org/resources/news-items/kim-jong-uns-speeches-and-public-statements-1/kim-jong-uns-2017-new-years-address) his country to be “in the final stage of preparation for the test launch” of such a missile. Moreover, experts warn, North Korea could at some point in the next few year years make the terrifying technological leap to a hydrogen bomb, which could be up to 1,000 times more destructive than the nuclear weapons that now comprise the North Korean arsenal.

Currently there are only two adversarial powers capable of hitting the U.S. with such awesome destructive power, Russia and China. That a regime so murderous, megalomaniacal, and unpredictable as North Korea’s—the last truly totalitarian regime on earth, holding more than 100,000 of its own people in political concentration camps—could have the potential to inflict such destruction on the United States should be considered unacceptable.

The second relatively new element is North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong Un. Although he has been North Korea’s absolute and “supreme” leader for more than five years, the world is still learning the full measure of his ambition, paranoia, and recklessness. This is a man who has not hesitated to murder even family members, including allegedly his half-brother, to consolidate absolute control. In pushing an ambitious program of nuclear testing and missile development, he also appears more inclined to take risks to expand his power and eliminate imagined threats than his father, Kim Jong Il. Even the faint glimmers of a possible loosening of absolute political control by North Korea’s communist party, the Worker’s Party of Korea, have been suffocated under Kim Jong Un.

The third element is the tough-talking new American president, Donald Trump.  While the new American administration has declared the end of “[strategic patience](http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/rex-tillerson-declares-end-to-strategic-patience-with-iran-slams-nuclear-deal/article/2620719)” and vowed that the North Korean missile threat “[will be taken care of,](http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/donald-trump-north-korea-strike)” Trump is pursuing a more “transactional” approach to engaging China in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. Thus, North Korea is reported to have figured prominently in the first head-to-head meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the president’s Mar-a-Lago estate recently.

It is difficult to exaggerate the stakes here. A preemptive strike on North Korea’s military facilities would have nothing like the limited scope of containment or punishment conveyed by the recent American cruise missile strike on Syria. To accomplish anything meaningful, an American strike on North Korea would have to be on a scale many, many times larger. Even then, it would likely fail to eliminate all of Kim’s short-range missiles (many of which are mobile) or his nuclear weapons (which are surely hidden). And so it could bring on the [worst of all scenarios](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea/523080/), a furious military response from North Korea with its nuclear arsenal still intact, putting millions of lives in South Korea and potentially Japan as well at imminent risk.

It is no wonder, then, that the Trump administration has rather quickly discovered the virtues of a diplomatic track. Yet the six-party talks, launched in 2003 among Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, the U.S., and North Korea to find a diplomatic formula to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, have been suspended since 2009. While efforts to resume those talks have been surrounded by mutual threats and false starts, North Korea has raced ahead to build an ever more menacing nuclear weapons program, which is now bringing the region to a crisis potentially more serious than anything since the end of the Korean War.

As the old saying goes, however, in crisis there is both danger and opportunity. In his summit with the Chinese leader, President Trump clearly became aware of the complexity of the situation as seen by the Chinese regime: North Korea is not a mere client state of China, and a Chinese attempt to use its economic leverage (such as cutting off essential food and oil supplies) to pressure the Kim dictatorship could bring unpredictable consequences, including, the Chinese fear, a collapse of the North Korean regime that would send millions of North Korean refugees streaming across the border into China.

Yet the Chinese leadership is clearly deeply frustrated with North Korea’s erratic and menacing behavior, which increasingly endangers China’s vital interests in regional peace and stability. It is this incipient shift in China’s thinking that presents the most promising opportunity for a breakthrough on the long-stalled diplomatic front. Whether through a resumption of the six-party talks or initiation of direct three-party negotiations involving China, the U.S., and North Korea (with the U.S. closely coordinating with Japan and South Korea), a diplomatic breakthrough must be pursued.

It is probably not realistic at this point to think that North Korea will give up its current stockpile of nuclear weapons. But at a minimum, resolution of the current crisis requires a version of what my Stanford colleague Siegfried Hecker first proposed—that the Kim regime [commit to “four no’s”](http://thebulletin.org/hecker-assesses-north-korean-hydrogen-bomb-claims9046): no more bombs that would enlarge its current stockpile; no better bombs, and hence an end to nuclear weapons testing; no missile testing or production that would enhance their current range; and no export of bombs or other nuclear weapons or missile technology.

These will be hugely difficult goals to achieve through diplomacy. But there are some inducements the United States and its allies could offer the North that might help bring it (reluctantly) to agree. There is also significant leverage that the U.S. and China could jointly bring to bear on Kim Jong Un to raise the costs of his continuing on the current immensely dangerous path. And there are some things that the U.S. could offer China that might help persuade it to assume the risks of pressuring an unstable and unpredictable “ally.”

North Korea has depicted its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons as a defensive maneuver to deter an attack on it by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. But the problem is that any new weapon changes the balance of power among adversaries. The greater North Korea’s nuclear weapons capacity, the more emboldened it may be to engage in reckless, bullying behavior in the region.

We are now at an existential moment, where North Korea must be confronted with a fundamental choice: Either it will face crippling global economic sanctions (including a Chinese oil embargo) that could trigger the collapse of the regime, or it will negotiate a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons development program.

The North’s willingness to give up its weapons program would serve as a prerequisite for talks about new ways to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula—including a peace treaty that recognizes the North Korean regime, normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea, and flows of investment and trade that would help to modernize the North’s economy. Toward the end of Bill Clinton’s presidency, when he was pursuing a diplomatic approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear threat, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry [found](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/north-korea-nuclear-deal-donald-trump-china-215034) the North Koreans to be seriously interested in the prospect of normalizing relations with the U.S.

With respect to economic incentives, more would be possible for North Korea in terms of investment and trade from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to the extent that North Korea takes the reform path that China did in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping. This would mean not only greatly accelerating market-oriented reforms in the North but also closing down the country’s concentration camps and allowing a modicum of political openness as well. America’s goal in this process would not be to bring an end to the North Korean regime, but to bring an end to its failed policies, which propel it toward militarism and aggression to cover up for its manifest developmental failures.

What could induce China to take risks for peace? One irony of having elected a U.S. president who repeatedly threatened a trade war with China is that a retreat from those ill-considered warnings now appears as a conciliatory gesture. But there is something more the U.S. can offer. China’s fear of a sudden collapse of the Kim regime is not just about massive refugee flows. It also dreads a “German-style” reunification, in which South Korea would politically absorb the north and China would then confront a newly powerful American ally—hosting nearly 30,000 American troops—right on its border.

Because the North Korean regime is not irrational, it will probably opt for the above deal under Chinese pressure and American inducements. But should Kim Jong Un balk and his regime then unravel, leading to reunification under a democratic constitution, American troops would no longer be needed to stabilize the Korean peninsula, and they could be withdrawn. Neither should there be a need for the missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD) that is now being deployed in South Korea, over real but misplaced Chinese concerns that the system is aimed partly at them. Agreement to withdraw THAAD and American troops following Korean reunification would be huge elements of strategic reassurance for China. On the flip side, however, the U.S. retains coercive inducements to get China on its side, [namely](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/one-powerful-weapon-to-use-against-north-korea/2017/04/21/ddbb9702-26c2-11e7-bb9d-8cd6118e1409_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4d24efb00424) the option of imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese banks that do business with North Korean front companies.

#### No aff offense --- empirics prove no relationship between fluctuations in hard power, GDP, or grand strategy and violence

Fettweis 17

Christopher Fettweis, Associate Professor of Political Science—Tulane University, Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies 26.3, 5/8/2017

How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut under President Clinton, in other words, and kept declining (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance commitments, and forward military presence. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace. It is possible that absolute military spending might not be as important to explain the phenomenon as relative. Although Washington cut back on spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. The United States has accounted for between 35 and 41 percent of global military spending every year since the collapse of the Soviet Union.70 The perception of relative US power might be the decisive factor in decisions made in other capitals. One cannot rule out the possibility that it is the perception of US power—and its willingness to use it—that keeps the peace. In other words, perhaps it is the grand strategy of the United States, rather than its absolute capability, that is decisive in maintaining stability. It is that to which we now turn. Conflict and US Grand Strategy The perception of US power, and the strength of its hegemony, is to some degree a function of grand strategy. If indeed US strategic choices are responsible for the New Peace, then variation in those choices ought to have consequences for the level of international conflict. A restrained United States is much less likely to play the role of sheriff than one following a more activist approach. Were the unipole to follow such a path, hegemonic-stability theorists warn, disaster would follow. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke for many when he warned that “outright chaos” could be expected to follow a loss of hegemony, including a string of quite specific issues, including new or renewed attempts to build regional empires (by China, Turkey, Russia, and Brazil) and the collapse of the US relationship with Mexico, as emboldened nationalists south of the border reassert 150-year-old territorial claims. Overall, without US dominance, today’s relatively peaceful world would turn “violent and bloodthirsty.” 71 Niall Ferguson foresees a post-hegemonic “Dark Age” in which “plunderers and pirates” target the big coastal cities like New York and Rotterdam, terrorists attack cruise liners and aircraft carriers alike, and the “wretchedly poor citizens” of Latin America are unable to resist the Protestantism brought to them by US evangelicals. Following the multiple (regional, fortunately) nuclear wars and plagues, the few remaining airlines would be forced to suspend service to all but the very richest cities.72 These are somewhat extreme versions of a central assumption of all hegemonic-stability theorists: a restrained United States would be accompanied by utter disaster. The “present danger” of which Kristol, Kagan, and their fellow travelers warn is that the United States “will shrink its responsibilities and—in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference— allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse.” 73 Liberals fear restraint as well, and also warn that a militarized version of primacy would be counterproductive in the long run. Although they believe that the rule-based order established by United States is more durable than the relatively fragile order discussed by the neoconservatives, liberals argue that Washington can undermine its creation over time through thoughtless unilateral actions that violate those rules. Many predicted that the invasion of Iraq and its general contempt for international institutions and law would call the legitimacy of the order into question. G. John Ikenberry worried that Bush’s “geostrategic wrecking ball” would lead to a more hostile, divided, and dangerous world.74 Thus while all hegemonic stability theorists expect a rise of chaos during a restrained presidency, liberals also have grave concerns regarding primacy. Overall, if either version is correct and global stability is provided by US hegemony, then maintaining that stability through a grand strategy based on either primacy (to neoconservatives) or “deep engagement” (to liberals) is clearly a wise choice.75 If, however, US actions are only tangentially related to the outbreak of the New Peace, or if any of the other proposed explanations are decisive, then the United States can retrench without fear of negative consequences. The grand strategy of the United States is therefore crucial to beliefs in hegemonic stability. Although few observers would agree on the details, most would probably acknowledge that post-Cold War grand strategies of American presidents have differed in some important ways. The four administrations are reasonable representations of the four ideal types outlined by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross in 1996.76 Under George H. W. Bush, the United States followed the path of “selective engagement,” which is sometimes referred to as “balance-of-power realism”; Bill Clinton’s grand strategy looks a great deal like what Posen and Ross call “cooperative security,” and others call “liberal internationalism”; George W. Bush, especially in his first term, forged a strategy that was as close to “primacy” as any president is likely to get; and Barack Obama, despite some early flirtation with liberalism, has followed a restrained realist path, which Posen and Ross label “neo-isolationism” but its proponents refer to as “strategic restraint.” 77 In no case did the various anticipated disorders materialize. As Table 2 demonstrates, armed conflict levels fell steadily, irrespective of the grand strategic path Washington chose. Neither the primacy of George W. Bush nor the restraint of Barack Obama had much effect on the level of global violence. Despite continued warnings (and the high-profile mess in Syria), the world has not experienced an increase in violence while the United States chose uninvolvement. If the grand strategy of the United States is responsible for the New Peace, it is leaving no trace in the evidence. Perhaps we should not expect a correlation to show up in this kind of analysis. While US behavior might have varied in the margins during this period, nether its relative advantage over its nearest rivals nor its commitments waivered in any important way. However, it is surely worth noting that if trends opposite to those discussed in the previous two sections had unfolded, if other states had reacted differently to fluctuations in either US military spending or grand strategy, then surely hegemonic stability theorists would argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. Many liberals were on the lookout for chaos while George W. Bush was in the White House, just as neoconservatives have been quick to identify apparent worldwide catastrophe under President Obama.78 If increases in violence would have been evidence for the wisdom of hegemonic strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between US power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. The rest of the world appears quite capable and willing to operate effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise have precious little empirical support upon which to build their case. Hegemonic stability is a belief, in other words, rather than an established fact, and as such deserves a different kind of examination.