# 1AC

### Plan

#### Plan: The People’s Republic of China ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. We’ll spec anything they want us to in CX – that checks most theory args

### Advantage 1 - Democracy

#### Democracy is failing right now – a revival is necessary

Hoyama 20 Taisei Hoyama, 11-2-2020, "Authoritarian regimes prevailing over democracies across the world," Nikkei Asia, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Authoritarian-regimes-prevailing-over-democracies-across-the-world> DD AG

The U.S., which won the Cold War with the former Soviet Union about 30 years ago, is putting itself first and has stepped down as the champion of global freedom and democracy.

Other countries that once pursued freedom are turning into authoritarian regimes.

The ancient Roman goddess of peace and order called "Pax" has disappeared. The values humankind has won by making many sacrifices are losing their luster, and democracy is not being properly defended.

In its first report on the rule of law compiled at the end of September, the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union, said there are serious concerns about judicial independence in some members of the bloc.

Hungary came under particular scrutiny. Viktor Orban, the prime minister, has declared that the doctrine that democracy can only be liberal has been toppled.

Since its inauguration in 2010, the Orban administration has repeatedly revised important laws, including the constitution, increased the number of pro-administration judges and contained the judiciary's role of checking power.

The source of the Orban administration's power lies in his ruling party's two-thirds parliamentary majority.

Hungary switched from communism during the Cold War to democracy, and joined the EU in 2004. But wage levels are still one-third of the EU average, and its population has shrunk 7% over the past 30 years.

The dream of becoming affluent after democratization has yet to come true. Low growth and a concentration of wealth are shaking democracy.

The world economy grew by an average of more than 3% in the 1980s, but the rate sank to the lower 2% range between 2010 and 2020. Meanwhile, the income share of the top 1% of earners has risen from 16% in the 1980s to 21%.

Orban has attacked his "enemies" such as refugees, the EU headquarters and liberalism, and has garnered support from people who cannot vent their pent-up frustrations elsewhere.

The paradox of liberal democracy is that citizens are freer but feel powerless, Ivan Krastev, a Bulgaria-born political scientist, wrote about the situation in Central Europe.

In Poland, which pursued democratization during the Cold War, the hard-line right-wing administration also established a law in February to ban judges from objecting to reforms carried out by the government.

According to Swedish research organization V-Dem, the number of democratic countries and regions stood at 87 in 2019, while the number of nondemocratic countries and regions came to 92. It was the first time in 18 years that democratic countries and regions had been outnumbered by nondemocratic ones. Hungary and Albania returned to the ranks of nondemocratic countries in 2018, as did other countries such as the Philippines last year.

The number of people living in democracies now accounts for 46% of the world population, the lowest figure since 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed.

The nightmare of an elected government destroying democracy was also witnessed about 90 years ago.

Germany, which had the most advanced democratic constitution at the time, was devastated by World War I reparations and the Great Depression, leading it to come under the totalitarianism of the Nazis, led by Adolf Hitler.

#### Specifically, Chinese authoritarianism spearheads the authoritarian push that is devastating democracy

Law 2/17 Nathan Law [former student leader, elected representative, and political prisoner in Hong Kong, now resident in London.], “The West Turned a Blind Eye to China’s Threat to Democracy”, Foreign Policy, 2/17/2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/17/china-us-democracy-autocracy-freedom/> DD AG

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, theorists once thought democracy was both optimal and inevitable. After decades of democratic backsliding, this proved far too optimistic. So was the global perception of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) future path. The champions of engagement policies thought that by interacting with China, enhancing economic ties, binding them with international agreements, and then coupling them with a stronger middle class and the pursuit of the rule of law in the country, China would be free and democratic eventually.

It has not happened. On the contrary, China moved the world toward a much more autocratic system. Even so, the world has been reluctant to face reality: Western democracies’ wishful thinking led to the rise of authoritarianism and the decline of democracy. Theorists who once advocated appeasement strategies bear the responsibility of mending it and redirecting the free world to a position far more capable of combating authoritarianism. This starts with a proper strategy toward China and by treating the crisis of democracy as a global problem that demands coordinated global action.

The 2020 Varieties of Democracy report found that 2020 was the first time since 2001 that the world has more autocratic institutions than democratic ones. Increasing autocracy threatens the rights of people in every corner of the world. This is a global emergency that awaits a coordinated response from the free world.

The decline in democracy means the lack of democratically accountable governments, resulting in increased corruption, human rights violations, and conflict. Like poverty, hunger, and climate emergencies, citizens suffer under autocratic systems. Yet the world lacks the willingness to tackle it like other global problems. Although there is humanitarian assistance worldwide to fight hunger and internationally orchestrated actions to decrease carbon emissions, the international community has not found a vision for how democracy can prevail after the delusional dreams of the “end of history” failed. The West walked the wrong path and fed the rise of authoritarianism by engaging them without accountability—it’s time for action to repair these mistakes.

When the military coup took place in Myanmar, global leaders joined hands to condemn it and demand democratic rights for people. At the same time, China defended the coup by claiming it “a major cabinet reshuffle.” The Thai junta also claimed the coup was an internal affair and others should not intervene. Authoritarian countries have abused the concept of sovereignty to evade the most basic monitoring from the rule-based international community and commit appalling human rights violations without being held accountable. Countries that are similar support one another, hence why autocracies grow. With China leading the way and Russia following closely, the world is faced with a camp of tyrants who despises universal value.

To tackle authoritarian expansion, the free world and its supporters have to consolidate their efforts and align their goals. It comes with a shift in perception: China is a threat to democracy, and the decline of democracy affects everyone, the same as with climate emergencies and public health crises. Democratic leaders must form alliances to discuss possible policies that can effectively curb the influence of these authoritarian regimes, including blocking their infiltration and propaganda.

#### Chinese authoritarianism beats down against existing strikes in Hong Kong, which promotes the decline of democracy

Wang 9/22 Maya Wang [Maya Wang is the senior China researcher in the Asia division at Human Rights Watch. Wang has researched and written extensively on the use of torture, arbitrary detention, human rights defenders, civil society, disability rights, and women’s rights in China.], 9-22-2021, "China Is Dismantling Hong Kong’s Unions," Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/22/china-dismantling-hong-kongs-unions> DD AG

Chinese state media outlets are railing against groups they claim are involved in money laundering, inciting riots, and supporting gangsters. They warn against “a chronic poison of society” and “a malignant tumor that must be destroyed.” The situation is so bad, the newspapers say, that it is time for the Hong Kong government to crack down.

One would think they’re talking about some major crime syndicate, perhaps a terrorist group. But no: The pro-Beijing press is talking about Hong Kong labor unions. For 48 years the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union has served 95,000 members; its members’ center is well-known for selling stationery supplies. And as with the teachers’ union, the Hong Kong Journalist Association, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU), and the Association of Hong Kong Nursing Staff have long and illustrious histories of defending civil liberties and workers’ rights.

Often, after Beijing spotlights people in its papers, Hong Kong police swoop into action. Fearing investigation and arrests, many civic groups—the teachers’ union and now the city’s second-largest labor union, the HKCTU—have opted to disband.

International attention to Beijing’s repression in Hong Kong has focused on widely recognized figures like the charismatic young protest leader Joshua Wong or the Apple Daily tycoon Jimmy Lai. But too few outside of Hong Kong realize that China is also dismantling the city’s unions and detaining unionists, a backbone of civil society.

Fighting for labor rights has always been a slog in a city known for hyper-capitalism, but doing so now is downright perilous. In late July, the police arrested five people from the Speech Therapist Union for “sedition” for publishing children’s books depicting cops as wolves and protesters as sheep. Prominent unionists and labor activists have been arrested and jailed for endangering national security and other vague charges.

#### Crackdown against labor unions in China prevent grassroots movements that promote democracy worldwide – strikes can collapse Chinese authoritarianism

Wang 9/22 Maya Wang [Maya Wang is the senior China researcher in the Asia division at Human Rights Watch. Wang has researched and written extensively on the use of torture, arbitrary detention, human rights defenders, civil society, disability rights, and women’s rights in China.], 9-22-2021, "China Is Dismantling Hong Kong’s Unions," Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/22/china-dismantling-hong-kongs-unions> DD AG

The Chinese government knows the power of grassroots organizing and doubtlessly sees the developments in Hong Kong as threatening. Nowadays, the top ranks of the Chinese Communist Party—far from its humble origins—are packed with billionaires whose family fortunes are entwined with the Party’s fate. They, like the capitalist elites they handpicked to run the city, know that empowered workers are antithetical to their political and business model.

In June 2020, Beijing imposed a draconian National Security Law on Hong Kong, arresting activists, banning protests, enveloping the city with pervasive fear. To square the circle of the purported people’s proletariat repressing workers’ advocates, the authorities portray these unions and other civil society groups with the usual authoritarian trope—that they are “foreign agents” out to “destabilize Hong Kong.” Beijing-controlled unions—such as the Hong Kong Federation of Education Workers—are poised to claim the mantle of workers’ sole representatives in the city, much like their counterparts in China.

The demise of Hong Kong’s unions is not just a loss for the territory. These unions have long been part of overlapping communities of labor organizations that promote workers’ rights and democracy in China and Asia. With the Chinese government also cracking down on labor rights groups in mainland China, a valuable window is being lost into the plight of workers amid a global supply chain heavily dependent on China-made products.

Labor unions around the world can support their embattled counterparts in Hong Kong, reviving an important legacy of similar efforts from Poland to South Africa. They can press the Chinese government for the release of Hong Kong union leaders, urge their own governments to place escalating sanctions targeting Chinese and Hong Kong officials and entities responsible for the crackdown, and assist counterparts who are still able to promote labor rights in Hong Kong and mainland China.

#### Democratic backsliding causes extinction.

Kendall-Taylor 16 [Andrea; Deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, Senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” CSIS; 7/15/16; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order>/] // recut DD AG

It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising. The norms, values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are [the ascent of China](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-sees-world-order-15846) and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the [specter of widespread democratic decline](http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/facing-democratic-recession). Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system, but they receive [far less attention](http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2016-5e13/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-april-may-2016-eb2d/58-2-03-boyle-6dbd) in discussions of the shifting world order.

In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. [A 2015 Freedom House report](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf) stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.”

Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of [key trends](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/democracy-decline) that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global order.

Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad. [Research demonstrates](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/18/1/49.abstract) that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system.

Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing.

Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.

A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the [United Nations](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/christopher-walker-authoritarian-regimes-are-changing-how-the-world-defines-democracy/2014/06/12/d1328e3a-f0ee-11e3-bf76-447a5df6411f_story.html) , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests.

Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become [fragmented and less effective](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2016.1161899?journalCode=tsur20#.V2H3MRbXgdI).

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. [International relations literature](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/1995-05-01/democratization-and-war) tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows.

Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics.

Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. Rising levels of instability, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability. U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations.

While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor. Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single country. From this perspective, the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries.

Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control. Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes. Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support. Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.

#### The plan solves by promoting strikes that bolster democracy in China – existing trade unions can’t get by. A further push is necessary

Wu 20 Sarah Wu [Correspondent at Reuters. Bachelor’s from Harvard], 1-10-2020, "Hong Kong workers flock to labor unions as new protest tactic," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-unions/hong-kong-workers-flock-to-labor-unions-as-new-protest-tactic-idUSKBN1Z9007> DD AG

His aim is to ramp up pressure on Hong Kong’s government, which has so far made no political concessions to protesters’ demands for greater democracy in the Chinese-ruled city, despite millions of people marching in the street.

“The ongoing pro-democracy movement has fundamentally changed people’s lives,” Ngai told Reuters, the day before he set up a booth along the route of a Jan. 1 march, to sign up new members. “It has forced many who were ignorant about society to stand up.”

As violent clashes with police become more common, the pro-democracy movement has reached a point of “anger and hopelessness,” said Ngai, and needs new tactics.

Ngai said he and his team persuaded about 90 engineers, architects and construction workers to join his Hong Kong Construction and Engineering Employees General Union in the past month.

His booth was only one of dozens along the 4 km (2.5 mile) route of the New Year’s Day march, each with a distinct flag and logo, attracting queues of hundreds of people to join new unions for civil servants, hotel staff, theater professionals and others.

Ngai and his fellow organizers are spearheading the biggest push to unionize the laissez-faire, ultra-capitalist finance mecca - where collective bargaining rights are not even recognized - since Britain handed the city back to China in 1997.

They are also at the forefront of the ever-experimenting Hong Kong pro-democracy movement as it looks for more effective forms of protest.

“The movement has been thriving on its ad-hoc character,” said Ma Ngok, a political scientist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “Now more people think the movement may be a long haul, so they need a more organized base to sustain it.”

About 40 pro-democracy unions, including Ngai’s, have formed in recent months or are in the process of registering with the government, with dozens more starting to organize, according to the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU).

The confederation, which last month started running crash courses on establishing unions, said about 2,000 people have already joined unions this year and thousands more joined in late 2019. The city has a population of about 7.4 million.

Labor Department records show that 25 new unions registered last year, compared to 13 in 2018. Of those, 18 formed in the second half of the year, as protests escalated.

Like many new protest tactics, the call to unionize first spread via the encrypted messaging app Telegram, where a channel promoting labor organization has grown to more than 74,000 subscribers in less than three months.

‘TIME TO STRIKE’

Traditional unions in Hong Kong are seen by citizens primarily as clubs for hobby classes, banquets and retail discounts. The new unions are motivated more by protecting workers from being punished by employers for expressing their views.

About two months after protests began in June over a now-withdrawn bill that would have allowed extraditions of suspected criminals to China, protesters got a wake-up call on Beijing’s powers of coercion. The mainland’s aviation regulator demanded Hong Kong’s flag carrier Cathay Pacific suspend staff involved in or supporting demonstrations

Many new unionists say the problem is widespread, especially where bosses are keen to avoid conflict with China for fear of damaging business.

A 26-year-old woman who identified herself as Cynthia told Reuters she heard of an auditing firm that hastily organized a lunch for all employees at the same time as a large protest which many of her fellow professionals wanted to attend during their break. She described that as “oppression” and said it was one of the reasons she is helping to establish the Accounting Bro’Sis Labor Union.

Some employees have been reprimanded for expressing political views on their personal Facebook accounts, said Gary Chan, secretary of the Hong Kong Financial Industry Employees General Union, which he said has recruited 160 members since late September.

Programer Alex Tang said his newly formed, 280-member Hong Kong Information Technology Workers’ Union was developing a database of employers who would not threaten or dismiss staff for supporting protests.

Many believe unions will provide safety in numbers.

“If we strike as individuals, we may be suppressed by companies,” said a 23-year-old assistant architect surnamed Lam, who was lining up at Ngai’s booth, wearing a black face mask, on Jan. 1.

The drive to unionize comes as Hong Kong is grappling with a recession as tourist numbers and retail sales decline in the face of violent protests.

While the new unions cannot promise much in terms of immediate economic benefits, they may in time be able to organize more effective strikes and address the city’s deep inequalities, said Eli Friedman, an associate professor at Cornell University who studies labor in China.

“It’s too soon to tell if they will get the union density to exercise that kind of power,” said Friedman.

Many new union leaders say they recognize that gaining members and changing cultural attitudes to unions will take time. But they are committed to improving workers’ rights, with a long-term goal of organizing mass strikes to increase pressure on the government to allow everyone the right to vote for the city’s leader.

“It’s a numbers game,” said Lee Cheuk-yan, general secretary of HKCTU and a former pro-democracy politician.

“We have to stay organized in the long run and consolidate the consciousness of the people of Hong Kong that has arisen over the past half-year,” Lee said. “All of the unions will decide together when it is time to strike.”

### Advantage 2 – Climate Change

#### China accounts for a majority of greenhouse gases in the air that contribute to climate change – it’s try or die to solve

Pidcock 16 Roz Pidcock [I am a writer, editor and climate change communications specialist. Former oceanographer, Deputy Editor of Carbon Brief and Head of Communications for Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)], 3/17/2016, “China is responsible for 10% of human influence on climate change, study says”, The Carbon Brief, <https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-is-responsible-for-10-of-human-influence-on-climate-change-study-says> DD AG

Boasting one of the world’s largest economies, China has overtaken the EU and the US as the world’s largest emitter, with CO2 emissions from fossil fuels tripling over the past 30 years.

But despite soaring CO2 emissions, China’s relative contribution to climate change has remained steady – around the 10% mark – over the whole industrial period, says a study published in Nature.

It’s a pretty complicated picture. But in recent times, this is because cooling from aerosols has been masking part of the warming signal. The upshot of this is that cutting some types of aerosol in a much-needed bid to improve air quality could drive faster warming in the coming decades, say the authors.

China’s single biggest source of warming is CO2 from fossil fuel burning (red line). With emissions rising steeply over the past few decades, fossil fuels overtook land-use change as the biggest source of CO2 from China in 1992 (brown line).

Warming as a result of changing land use rose throughout the 20th century, before declining in the 1980s as reforestation programmes turned the land from a net emitter to a net absorber.

Despite this, past emissions from land-use change still account for a third of atmospheric CO2 attributable to China, with fossil-fuel burning making up the other two thirds, the paper notes.

The warming caused by emissions of nitrous oxide (yellow) and halogen compounds (pink) increased over the past two or three decades – to a far lesser extent than fossil fuel CO2, while methane-induced warming increased three-fold between 1950-2010 (orange line).

Relative contribution

To put the changes within China into a global context, the inset graph in the figure above shows the warming effect of Chinese greenhouse gases as a percentage of the global total.

Again, the impact of China’s recent fossil fuel expansion is clear, with the country’s contribution to total global fossil fuel CO2 almost tripling in the 30-year period between 1980-2010.

China currently accounts for 12% of the total greenhouse gases in the atmosphere – a figure that has remained fairly steady over the industrial period, at around 8-12% (blue line). This is effectively the balance of impacts from all China’s greenhouse gas emissions over time – i.e. carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and halogen compounds – and from all anthropogenic sources.

The 10% figure is lower than might be expected for the country topping of the list of the biggest emitters. But it reflects the fact that others, such as the US and the EU, have been emitting far longer, the paper notes. The paper does not calculate the contributions from these other entities, so a direct comparison is not possible.

Relative to the rest of the world, China’s share of greenhouse gas warming fell slightly in the 1960s, 70s and 80s before starting to climb again as economic growth and fossil fuel burning accelerated.

But there’s something else going on, too. China is responsible for a disproportionate amount of the aerosols emitted around the world, some of which have a strong cooling effect.

But given the upwards trend in fossil fuel CO2 emissions, the long lifetimes of existing infrastructure and the social and political systems in place, it is “unlikely” that China’s relative contribution to global greenhouse gas warming will come down any time soon, say the authors in the paper.

#### Decreasing CO2 emissions in China is specifically key – it faces the biggest challenges to solving climate change

Brown 10/14 David Brown [Senior Journalist at BBC], 10/14/21, “Why China's climate policy matters to us all”, BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57483492> DD AG

China's carbon emissions are vast and growing, dwarfing those of other countries.

Experts agree that without big reductions in China's emissions, the world cannot win the fight against climate change.

China's President Xi Jinping has said his country will aim for its emissions to reach their highest point before 2030 and for carbon neutrality to be achieved by 2060.

But he has not said how China will achieve this extremely ambitious goal.

Explosive growth

While all countries face problems getting their emissions down, China is facing the biggest challenge.

Per person, China's emissions are about half those of the US, but its huge 1.4 billion population and explosive economic growth have pushed it way ahead of any other country in its overall emissions.

China became the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 2006 and is now responsible for more than a quarter of the world's overall greenhouse gas emissions.

It is expected to come under intense scrutiny at the COP26 global climate summit in November over its commitments to reduce these.

Along with all the other signatories to the Paris Agreement in 2015, China agreed to make changes to try to keep global warming at 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, and "well below" 2C.

China strengthened its commitments in 2020, but Climate Action Tracker, an international group of scientists and policy experts say its current actions to meet that goal are "highly insufficient".

#### Strikes are a silver bullet and force Chinese government to scale back emissions and combat climate change. Independently, these strikes fight back against Chinese capitalism, leading to the switch to socialism faster

China Worker 10/24 China Worker, 10-24-2021, "Climate change: Prepare for mass protests at COP26," <https://chinaworker.info/en/2021/10/14/30694/> DD AG

The initial waves of school strikes pointed toward an approach based on mass mobilisations of young people, linking up with the organised working class, particularly in the Trade Unions. When workers take strike action, they can grind society to a halt. Although smaller-scale actions can be effective, a movement with the backing of the workers’ movement will be essential in winning action on climate change.

This could include coordinated strike action between unions between different countries to bring the globalised capitalist system to its knees, as part of a genuinely international movement against climate change.

A mass climate movement would need to link up with other struggles of workers and young people, such as the struggles against attacks on our right to protest internationally, against sexist and racist oppression, and of workers fighting against mass job losses as a result of the pandemic — all of which have an interest in ending climate change. It would also highlight the systemic nature of climate change, and how it ties into the wider capitalist system responsible for the multi-faceted crisis facing ordinary people right now. This would be an important step not just in fighting for climate change, but for making the popular idea of “climate justice” a reality as well.

Socialism is survival

This would have to be linked to a clear programme for fundamental system change. That means challenging capitalism and fighting for a socialist society where decisions about what is produced and how are decided democratically. Under capitalism, where production is based on the endless drive for greater profits, environmental effects are treated as an “externality”. This focus on short term profit is an inbuilt feature of capitalism. As a result, we see that it is the big corporations themselves that contribute vastly toward the destruction of our planet, with over 70% of CO2 emissions coming from just the top 100 companies worldwide.

**Warming is linear—every decrease in rising temperatures radically mitigates the risk of existential climate change.**

Xu and Ramanathan 17, Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323//recut CHS PK

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

### Framework

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. To clarify, that’s hedonism

#### 1] Actor specificity – comes first since different agents have different ethical obligations.

#### A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission.

#### 2] Extinction comes first!

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 3] Substitutability—only consequentialism explains necessary enablers.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

#### 4] No intent-foresight distinction— If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.

#### 5] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 6] Reject calc indicts and util triggers permissibility arguments:

#### A] Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### B] Theory—they’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual philosophical debate, killing valuable education

#### C] Morally abhorrent – it would say we have no obligation to prevent genocide and that slavery was permissible which is morally abhorrent and makes debate unsafe for minority debaters

#### 7] Nothing in the 1AC triggers presumption or permissibility – but they should affirm:

#### A] 1ar time skew means 1ar has to answer 7 minutes of offense and hedge against a 6 minute 2nr collapse, if the neg can’t prove the aff false you should presume its true

#### B] You presume statements true unless proven false – If I tell you my name is Arnav you believe me unless you have evidence to the contrary

#### C] Presuming statements are false is impossible – we can’t operate in the world if we can’t trust anything we hear

#### D] Allow 2ar responses to blippy 1nc tricks—key to protect time-crunched 1ars and disincentivize blip-storms that aren’t complete arguments. Evaluate every speech in the debate—key to assessing the better debater otherwise the neg always wins

#### 8] Truth testing makes up rules to constrain discussion of race and cement the status-quo and is just plain wrong

Overing and Scoggin 15 “In Defense of Inclusion”; September 10, 2015; John Scoggin (coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and former debater for the Blake School in Minneapolis. His students have earned 77 bids to the Tournament of Champions in the last 7 years. He’s coached 2 TOC finalists, a TOC quarterfinalist, and champions of many major national tournaments across the country) and Bob Overing (former debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, and current student at Yale Law School. As a senior in high school, he was ranked #1, earned 11 bids and took 2nd at TOC. In college, he cleared at CEDA and qualified to the NDT. His students have earned 98 career bids, reached TOC finals, and won many championships.); <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2015/09/10/in-defense-of-inclusion-by-john-scoggin-and-bob-overing/> //BWSWJ

In establishing affirmative and negative truth burdens, truth-testing forecloses important discussions even of the resolution itself. Consider the fact that in 1925-1926, there were two college policy topics, one for men and one for women. Men got to debate child labor laws, and women had to debate divorce law. On the truth-testing view, the women debating the women’s topic would be barred from discussing the inherent sexism of the topic choice and the division of topics to begin with. Or consider the retracted 2010 November Public Forum topic, “Resolved: An Islamic cultural center should be built near Ground Zero.” Many debaters would feel uncomfortable arguing that resolution, just like they did on the 2012 January/February LD topic about domestic violence. We both know individuals who felt the domestic violence topic was so triggering that they did not want to compete at all. We can draw two conclusions from examples like these. First, there are good reasons to not debate a particular topic. These reasons have been spelled out over decades of debate scholarship ranging from Broda-Bahm and Murphy (1994) to Varda and Cook (2007) to Vincent (2013). Second, truth-testing prevents either team from making the argument that the topic is offensive or harmful. A hypothetical case, such as a resolution including an offensive racial epithet, makes the problem more obvious. Maybe the idea behind the resolution is good, but there’s something left out by analysis that stops there and ignores the use of a derogatory slur. Truth-testing makes irrelevant the words in the topic and the words used by the debaters. Thus, it fails to capture the reasons that any good person would “negate” or even refuse to debate an offensive topic. Clearly, there are elements of a topical advocacy beyond its truth that are worthy of questioning. Nebel (2015) acknowledges that some past resolutions were potentially harmful to debate (1.2, para. 5). Rather than exclude affected students as ‘not following the rules’ of semantics or truth-testing, we conclude that they should not be required to debate the topic. Nebel grapples with harmful topics in the following passage: I don’t think there is a magic-bullet response to critiques of the topic…I think they must be answered on a case-by-case basis, in their own terms…The question boils down to whether or not the topic is harmful for students to debate, and whether those harms justify breaking, or making an exception to, the topicality rule (1.2, para. 5) This statement is hard to square with Nebel’s thesis that semantic interpretations of the resolution come “lexically prior” (in other words, they always come first). He wants to allow exceptions, but doing so proves that harmfulness concerns can and do trump the topicality rule. As Nebel’s struggle with the critique of topicality illustrates, every article that claims to espouse a comprehensive view of debate must allow some exceptions to comply with our intuitions. The exceptions do not prove the rule. They prove there is a high level of concern in debate for affording dignity and respect to different kinds of arguments and modes of argumentation. There is no one principle of proper debate. Once the door is open for external factors like harmfulness, the inference to the priority of pragmatics is an easy one to make. If we care about the effects of debating the resolution on the students debating it, then other values like exclusion, education, and fairness start to creep in. If we can justify avoiding discussion of a bad topic on pragmatic grounds, we can also justify promoting discussion of a good topic. Any advantage to allowing discursive kritiks, performances, and roles of the ballot further justifies this pragmatic view against truth-testing. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) warns that without these argument forms, we “distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day”. Christopher Vincent (2013) built on that idea, arguing that universal moral theory “drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation” (para. 3). While we don’t agree wholesale with these authors, their work unequivocally demonstrates the value of departures from pure truth-testing. While we may not convince our opposition that they should presume value in kritik-based strategies, they should remain open to them. In a recent article for the Rostrum, Pittsburgh debate coach Paul Johnson (2015) extolled the ‘hands-off’ approach. Let the debaters test whether the arguments have merit, rather than deciding beforehand: In a debate round, one may argue the impertinence of theses about structural racism with regards to a particular case…But when we explicitly or implicitly suggest such theses have little to no value by deciding in advance that they are inaccurate, we are forswearing the hard, argumentative work of subjecting our own beliefs to rigorous testing and interrogation (p. 90) Suggesting that non-topical, race-based approaches are “vigilantist” and “self-serving” “adventure[s]” is to demean the worth of these arguments before the debate round even starts (Nebel 2015, 1.1, para. 2). The claim that they ‘break the rules’ or exist ‘outside the law’ otherizes the debaters, coaches, and squads that pursue non-traditional styles. Especially given that many of these students are students of color, we should reject the image of them as lawless, self-interested vigilantes. Students work hard on their positions, often incorporating personal elements such as narrative or performance. To defend a view of debate that excludes their arguments from consideration devalues their scholarship and the way they make debate “home.” That’s unacceptable. Branse notes “the motivation for joining the activity substantially varies from person to person” yet excludes some debaters’ motivations while promoting others (5, para. 4). We agree with Smith on the very tangible effects of such exclusion: “If black students do not feel comfortable participating in LD they will lose out on the ability to judge, coach, or to force debate to deal with the truth of their perspectives” (para. 5). Of course, we do not believe that Nebel or Branse intend their views to have these effects, but they are a concern we need to take seriously. III. Changing the Rules In Round One thought is that rejecting truth-testing is the wrong solution. Instead, we should create a better topic-selection process or an NSDA-approved topic change when the resolution is particularly bad. These solutions, however, are not exclusive of a rejection of truth-testing. An offensive topic might be reason to reform the selection process and to stop debating it immediately. Good role of the ballot arguments are the best solution because they pinpoint exactly why a debater finds the resolution inadequate. They highlight the problems of the proposed topic of discussion, and outline reasons why a different approach is preferable. While Branse believes these examples of in-round rule-making are problematic, we think debate rounds are an excellent location for discussing what debate should be. The first reason is the failure of consensus. Because there are a wide variety of supported methods to go about debating, we should be cautious about paradigmatic exclusion. While we don’t defend the relativist conclusion that all styles of debate are equally valuable, there is significant disagreement that our theories must account for. Truth-testing denies a number of ways to debate that many find valuable. The second reason is the internalization of valuable principles. Even people who do not think kritiks are the right way to debate have taken important steps like removing gendered language from their positions. NDT champion Elijah Smith (2013) identified hateful arguments and comments “you expect to hear at a Klan rally” as commonplace in LD rounds and the community (para. 2). We’d like to think those instances are at least reduced by the argumentation he’s encouraged. For instance, the much-maligned “you must prove why oppression is bad” argument now sees little play in high-level circuit rounds. Truth-testing forecloses this kind of learning from the opposition. Roles of the ballot and theory interpretations are examples of how in-round argumentation creates new rules of engagement. We welcome these strategies, and debaters should be prepared to justify their proposed rules against procedural challenges. The arguments we have made thus far are objections to truth-testing as a top-down worldview used to exclude from the get-go, not in-round means of redress against certain practices. There is a major difference between a topicality argument in a high school debate round and a prominent debate coach and camp director’s glib dismissal of non-topical argument as follows: [Y]ou can talk about whatever you want, but if it doesn’t support or deny the resolution, then the judge shouldn’t vote on it (Nebel 2015, 1.2, para. 4) Branse is equally ideological: Within the debate, the judge is bound by the established rules. If the rules are failing their function, that can be a reason to change the rules outside of the round. However, in round acts are out of the judge’s jurisdiction (2, para. 12) We take issue with debate theorists’ attempts to define away arguments that they don’t like. At one point, Jason Baldwin (2009) actually defended truth-testing for its openness, praising the values of the free market of ideas: That’s how the marketplace of ideas is supposed to work. But it is supposed to be a free marketplace where buyers (judges) examine whatever sellers (debaters) offer them with an open mind, not an exclusive marketplace where only the sellers of some officially approved theories are welcome (p. 26) Unfortunately for the truth-tester, debate has changed, and it will change again. What was once a model that allowed all the arguments debaters wanted to make – a prioris, frameworks, and meta-ethics – is now outdated in the context of discursive kritiks, performance, and alternative roles of the ballot. IV. Constitutivism, Authority, and the Nature of Debate Branse’s goal is to derive substantive rules for debate from the ‘constitutive features’ of debate itself and the roles of competitors and judges. We’ll quote him at length here to get a full view of the argument: [P]ragmatic benefits are constrained by the rules of the activity….education should not be promoted at the expense of the rules since the rules are what define the activity. LD is only LD because of the rules governing it – if we changed the activity to promoting practical values, then it would cease to be what it is (2, para. 7) Internal rules of an activity are absolute. From the perspective of the players, the authority of the rules are non-optional. (2, para. 12) The resolution, in fact, offers one of the only constitutive guidelines for debate. Most tournament invitations put a sentence in the rules along the lines of, “we will be using [X Resolution].” Thus, discussion confined to the resolution is non-optional (3, para. 5) [T]he delineation of an “affirmative” and a “negative” establishes a compelling case for a truth testing model…two debaters constrained by the rules of their assignment – to uphold or deny the truth of the resolution…[J]udging the quality of the debaters requires a reference to their roles. The better aff is the debater who is better at proving the resolution true. The better neg is the debater who is better at denying the truth of the resolution. The ballot requests an answer to “who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role”, and since debaters’ roles dictate a truth-testing model, the judge ought to adjudicate the round under a truth testing model of debate. The judge does not have the jurisdiction to vote on education rather than truth testing (3, para. 7-8) Once a judge commits to a round in accordance with a set of rules…the rules are absolute and non-optional (4, para. 4) Similarly, Nebel uses contractual logic – appealing to the tournament invitation as binding agreement – to justify truth-testing: “The “social contract” argument holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic….given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism (1.1, para. 2) This approach is attractive because it seeks to start from principles we all seem to agree on and some very simple definitions. The primary problem is that the starting point is very thin, but the end point includes very robust conclusions. The terms “affirmative” and “negative” are insufficient to produce universal rules for debate, and certainly do not imply truth-testing (Section I, paragraph 3.) Branse does some legwork in footnoting several definitions of “affirm” and “negate,” but does little in the way of linguistic analysis. We won’t defend a particular definition but point out that there are many definitions that vary and do not all lend themselves to truth-testing. On a ballot the words “speaker points” are as prominently displayed as the words “affirmative” or “negative,” but neither Branse nor Nebel attempt to make any constitutive inference from their existence. Further, to find the constitutive role of a thing, one needs to look at what the thing actually is, rather than a few specific words on a ballot. Looking at debates now, we see that they rarely conform to the truth-testing model. It is simply absurd to observe an activity full of plans, counterplans, kritiks, non-topical performances, theory arguments, etc. and claim that its ‘constitutive nature’ is to exclude these arguments. Not only that, but the truth-testing family has been heavily criticized in both the policy and LD communities (Hynes Jr., 1979; Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982; Mangus, 2008; Nelson, 2008; O’Donnell, 2003; O’Krent, 2014; Palmer, 2008; Rowland, 1981; Simon, 1984; Snider, 1994; Ulrich, 1983). The empirical evidence also points toward argumentative inclusion in three important ways. The first is argument trends. The popularity of kritiks, a prioris, meta-ethics, etc. confirm that at different times the community at large has very different views of what constitutes not only a good argument but also a good mode of affirming or negating. The second is argument cycles. An alternate view would suggest that debate evolves and leaves bad arguments by the wayside. Nevertheless, we see lots of arguments pop in and out of the meta-game, suggesting that we have not made a definitive verdict on the best way to debate. The third is judge deference. While people’s views on proper modes of debate shift, we retain a strong deference to a judge’s decision. Judges have different views of debate; if there were some overarching principle that all judges should follow, we would expect tournament directors to enforce such a rule. In sum, there is no way to view debate as a whole and see truth-testing as the general principle underlying our practices. The existence of a judge and a ballot are also insufficient to produce universal rules for debate. Branse thinks “[t]he ballot requests an answer to ‘who did a comparatively better job fulfilling their role.’” While that may be a valid concern, it is dependent on what the judge views the roles of debaters to be. The absence of any sort of instruction other than determining the ‘better debating’ or the ‘winner’ most naturally lends itself to a presumption of openness. In fact, many practices very explicitly deviate from the constitutive roles Branse lays out. Some counterplans (PICs, PCCs, topical CPs and the like) may do more to prove the resolution than disprove it, yet are generally accepted negative arguments. Another type of objection to Branse’s view is an application of David Enoch’s “agency shmagency” argument. Enoch (2011) summarizes in his paper “Shmagency revisited”: [E]ven if you find yourself engaging in a kind of an activity…inescapably…and even if that activity is constitutively governed by some norm or…aim, this does not suffice for you to have a reason to obey that norm or aim at that aim. Rather, what is also needed is that you have a reason to engage in that activity…Even if you somehow find yourself playing chess, and even if checkmating your opponent is a constitutive aim of playing chess, still you may not have a reason to (try to) checkmate your opponent. You may lack such a reason if you lack a reason to play chess. The analogy is clear enough: Even if you find yourself playing the agency game, and even if agency has a constitutive aim, still you may not have a reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent) (p. 5-6) The application to chess helps us see the application to debate. Truth-testing may be the constitutive aim of doing debate, but it does not follow that our best reasons tell us to test the truth of the resolution. In fact, you may have no reasons to be a truth-testing debater in the first place. If “affirmative” means “the one who proves the resolution true,” we’ve demonstrated times when it’s better to be “shmaffirmative” than “affirmative.” Finally, we think one of the most important (perhaps constitutive) features of debate is its unique capacity to change the rules while playing within the rules. Education-based arguments and non-topical arguments are just arguments – they’re pieces on the chess board to be manipulated by the players. Branse concedes that in APDA debate, the resolution is “contestable through a formal, in-round mechanism (3, para. 9). LD and policy debate also have this mechanism through theory arguments, kritiks, and alternative roles of the ballot. Branse is right that in soccer and chess, there is no way to kick a ball or move a chess piece that would legitimately change the rules of the game. Debate is different. While soccer and chess have incontrovertible empirical conditions for victory (checkmates, more goals at fulltime), debate does not. In fact, discussing the win conditions is debating! Whenever a debater reads a case, they assume or justify certain win conditions and not others. This deals with Branse’s “self-defeatingness” objection because debate about the rules does not create a “free-for-all” — it creates a debate (6, para. 1). The truth-testing judge does not get to pick and choose what makes a good debate; to do so is necessarily interventionist. This demonstrates truth-testing is more arbitrary and subjective [2] than the education position Branse criticizes (4, para. 4; 5, para. 2, 5). To be truly non-interventionist, we should accept them as permissible arguments until proven otherwise in round. Of course, not all rules are up for debate. There is a distinction between rules like speech times (call these procedural rules) and rules like truth-testing (call these substantive rules). The former are not up for the debate in the sense that the tournament director could intervene if a debater refused to stop talking. The latter are debate-able and have been for some time. No tournament director enforces their pet paradigm. Because the tournament director, not the judge, has ultimate authority, we liken her to the referee in soccer. On this view, the judge is not the referee tasked with enforcing “the rules”; she should decide only on the basis of arguments presented in the debate. Tournaments are not subject to any form of higher authority and are not obligated to follow NSDA rules, TOC guidelines, or anything else to determine a winner. Something is only a procedural rule if it is enforced by the tournament, and truth-testing has not and shouldn’t be enforced in this manner. To our knowledge, no bid tournament director has ever imposed a truth-testing burden on all competitors. If anything is a binding contract, it is the judge paradigm. Judge philosophies or paradigms are explicitly agreed to in writing because each judge establishes their own, and there is no coercion at play. Most tournaments mandate or strongly encourage written paradigms, have time to review them, and accept judge services instead of payment for hiring a judge. These norms establish a clearer contractual agreement in favor of judge deferral than universal truth-testing. We have tested the constitutive and contractual arguments by considering how truth-testing is not a procedural rule like speech times. As such, it cannot accrue the benefits of bindingness, authority, and non-arbitrariness. We can also test the argument in the opposite direction. There are some rules that seem even more “constitutive” of debate than the resolution but are not examples of procedural rules. For instance, every judge and debate theorist would likely reject completely new arguments in the 2AR, but there is nothing within Branse’s constitutive rules (speech times, the resolution, the aff and neg) to justify the norm. The no-new-arguments rule does not need to be written in a rulebook to have a lot of force. V. Pragmatic Justifications for Truth-testing With the priority of pragmatics established and constitutive arguments well addressed, we turn to some hybrid arguments that attempt to justify truth-testing by appealing to pragmatics. Nebel argues that the advantages stemming from truth-testing must be weighed against all exceptions to it and that the advantages of debating the ‘true meaning’ of the topic nearly always outweigh: It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash…people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules (1.1, para. 2) However, the advantages of topicality for the semantic/truth-testing view hold on the pragmatic view as well. We agree that the reasons to debate the meaning of the topic are strong. The only difference is that the pragmatic theory can explain the possibility of exceptions to the rule without interpretive contortion. It makes much more sense to understand that strict topicality is just a very good practice than to tout it as an absolute, lexically prior, constitutively- and contractually-binding rule. Ultimately, all benefits to topicality and debating something other than the resolution are weighed on the same scale, so we should adopt the theory that explicitly allows that scale. We are unconvinced that direct appeals to pragmatic considerations would be worse on pragmatic grounds than an external and absolute rule like ‘always be topical.’ If topicality is as important and beneficial as Nebel says it is, then it should be easy to defend within a particular debate, avoiding the worst slippery slope scenarios. Nebel also argues that the pragmatic view “justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate” (1.1, para. 5). Branse makes the same claim about education: “Education as a voting issue legitimizes reading positions and debating topics that have no association with the resolution” (5, para. 3). This alarmism we’ve answered with our discussion of harmful resolutions. There is no empirical indication of a slippery slope to a world where no one discusses the topic. The disadvantages to one debate round departing from topical debate are quite small, and we have no problem biting the bullet here. Sometimes (and it may be very rare), it’s better not to debate the resolution. There may also be reasons to debate something else even when the resolution is very good. Black students should not have to wait for a reparations topic to talk about race in America. As conversations about racial oppression and police brutality grow louder and louder, it becomes increasingly unreasonable to defend a view of debate that ignores their relevance to the everyday lives of our students. It should be clear that the pragmatic view takes no absolute stance on topicality or burdens. A debate practice may be pragmatic in one context but not another. For that reason, we reject the narrowness of truth-testing.

#### 9] Death o/w

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives.

Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

### UV

#### 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) reject the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time, e) comes first – it’s a bigger percentage of the 1AR than 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time and only the 2N has time to win multiple layers, g) voters – fairness because debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education since it gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.