# 1AC

### Plan

#### Plan: The People’s Republic of China ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. We’ll spec anything they want us to in CX – that checks most theory args

### Advantage 1 - Democracy

#### Democracy is failing right now – a revival is necessary

Hoyama 20 Taisei Hoyama, 11-2-2020, "Authoritarian regimes prevailing over democracies across the world," Nikkei Asia, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Authoritarian-regimes-prevailing-over-democracies-across-the-world> DD AG

The U.S., which won the Cold War with the former Soviet Union about 30 years ago, is putting itself first and has stepped down as the champion of global freedom and democracy.

Other countries that once pursued freedom are turning into authoritarian regimes.

The ancient Roman goddess of peace and order called "Pax" has disappeared. The values humankind has won by making many sacrifices are losing their luster, and democracy is not being properly defended.

In its first report on the rule of law compiled at the end of September, the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union, said there are serious concerns about judicial independence in some members of the bloc.

Hungary came under particular scrutiny. Viktor Orban, the prime minister, has declared that the doctrine that democracy can only be liberal has been toppled.

Since its inauguration in 2010, the Orban administration has repeatedly revised important laws, including the constitution, increased the number of pro-administration judges and contained the judiciary's role of checking power.

The source of the Orban administration's power lies in his ruling party's two-thirds parliamentary majority.

Hungary switched from communism during the Cold War to democracy, and joined the EU in 2004. But wage levels are still one-third of the EU average, and its population has shrunk 7% over the past 30 years.

The dream of becoming affluent after democratization has yet to come true. Low growth and a concentration of wealth are shaking democracy.

The world economy grew by an average of more than 3% in the 1980s, but the rate sank to the lower 2% range between 2010 and 2020. Meanwhile, the income share of the top 1% of earners has risen from 16% in the 1980s to 21%.

Orban has attacked his "enemies" such as refugees, the EU headquarters and liberalism, and has garnered support from people who cannot vent their pent-up frustrations elsewhere.

The paradox of liberal democracy is that citizens are freer but feel powerless, Ivan Krastev, a Bulgaria-born political scientist, wrote about the situation in Central Europe.

In Poland, which pursued democratization during the Cold War, the hard-line right-wing administration also established a law in February to ban judges from objecting to reforms carried out by the government.

According to Swedish research organization V-Dem, the number of democratic countries and regions stood at 87 in 2019, while the number of nondemocratic countries and regions came to 92. It was the first time in 18 years that democratic countries and regions had been outnumbered by nondemocratic ones. Hungary and Albania returned to the ranks of nondemocratic countries in 2018, as did other countries such as the Philippines last year.

The number of people living in democracies now accounts for 46% of the world population, the lowest figure since 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed.

The nightmare of an elected government destroying democracy was also witnessed about 90 years ago.

Germany, which had the most advanced democratic constitution at the time, was devastated by World War I reparations and the Great Depression, leading it to come under the totalitarianism of the Nazis, led by Adolf Hitler.

#### Specifically, Chinese authoritarianism spearheads the authoritarian push that is devastating democracy

Law 2/17 Nathan Law [former student leader, elected representative, and political prisoner in Hong Kong, now resident in London.], “The West Turned a Blind Eye to China’s Threat to Democracy”, Foreign Policy, 2/17/2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/17/china-us-democracy-autocracy-freedom/> DD AG

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, theorists once thought democracy was both optimal and inevitable. After decades of democratic backsliding, this proved far too optimistic. So was the global perception of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) future path. The champions of engagement policies thought that by interacting with China, enhancing economic ties, binding them with international agreements, and then coupling them with a stronger middle class and the pursuit of the rule of law in the country, China would be free and democratic eventually.

It has not happened. On the contrary, China moved the world toward a much more autocratic system. Even so, the world has been reluctant to face reality: Western democracies’ wishful thinking led to the rise of authoritarianism and the decline of democracy. Theorists who once advocated appeasement strategies bear the responsibility of mending it and redirecting the free world to a position far more capable of combating authoritarianism. This starts with a proper strategy toward China and by treating the crisis of democracy as a global problem that demands coordinated global action.

The 2020 Varieties of Democracy report found that 2020 was the first time since 2001 that the world has more autocratic institutions than democratic ones. Increasing autocracy threatens the rights of people in every corner of the world. This is a global emergency that awaits a coordinated response from the free world.

The decline in democracy means the lack of democratically accountable governments, resulting in increased corruption, human rights violations, and conflict. Like poverty, hunger, and climate emergencies, citizens suffer under autocratic systems. Yet the world lacks the willingness to tackle it like other global problems. Although there is humanitarian assistance worldwide to fight hunger and internationally orchestrated actions to decrease carbon emissions, the international community has not found a vision for how democracy can prevail after the delusional dreams of the “end of history” failed. The West walked the wrong path and fed the rise of authoritarianism by engaging them without accountability—it’s time for action to repair these mistakes.

When the military coup took place in Myanmar, global leaders joined hands to condemn it and demand democratic rights for people. At the same time, China defended the coup by claiming it “a major cabinet reshuffle.” The Thai junta also claimed the coup was an internal affair and others should not intervene. Authoritarian countries have abused the concept of sovereignty to evade the most basic monitoring from the rule-based international community and commit appalling human rights violations without being held accountable. Countries that are similar support one another, hence why autocracies grow. With China leading the way and Russia following closely, the world is faced with a camp of tyrants who despises universal value.

To tackle authoritarian expansion, the free world and its supporters have to consolidate their efforts and align their goals. It comes with a shift in perception: China is a threat to democracy, and the decline of democracy affects everyone, the same as with climate emergencies and public health crises. Democratic leaders must form alliances to discuss possible policies that can effectively curb the influence of these authoritarian regimes, including blocking their infiltration and propaganda.

#### Chinese authoritarianism beats down against existing strikes in Hong Kong, which promotes the decline of democracy

Wang 9/22 Maya Wang [Maya Wang is the senior China researcher in the Asia division at Human Rights Watch. Wang has researched and written extensively on the use of torture, arbitrary detention, human rights defenders, civil society, disability rights, and women’s rights in China.], 9-22-2021, "China Is Dismantling Hong Kong’s Unions," Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/22/china-dismantling-hong-kongs-unions> DD AG

Chinese state media outlets are railing against groups they claim are involved in money laundering, inciting riots, and supporting gangsters. They warn against “a chronic poison of society” and “a malignant tumor that must be destroyed.” The situation is so bad, the newspapers say, that it is time for the Hong Kong government to crack down.

One would think they’re talking about some major crime syndicate, perhaps a terrorist group. But no: The pro-Beijing press is talking about Hong Kong labor unions. For 48 years the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union has served 95,000 members; its members’ center is well-known for selling stationery supplies. And as with the teachers’ union, the Hong Kong Journalist Association, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU), and the Association of Hong Kong Nursing Staff have long and illustrious histories of defending civil liberties and workers’ rights.

Often, after Beijing spotlights people in its papers, Hong Kong police swoop into action. Fearing investigation and arrests, many civic groups—the teachers’ union and now the city’s second-largest labor union, the HKCTU—have opted to disband.

International attention to Beijing’s repression in Hong Kong has focused on widely recognized figures like the charismatic young protest leader Joshua Wong or the Apple Daily tycoon Jimmy Lai. But too few outside of Hong Kong realize that China is also dismantling the city’s unions and detaining unionists, a backbone of civil society.

Fighting for labor rights has always been a slog in a city known for hyper-capitalism, but doing so now is downright perilous. In late July, the police arrested five people from the Speech Therapist Union for “sedition” for publishing children’s books depicting cops as wolves and protesters as sheep. Prominent unionists and labor activists have been arrested and jailed for endangering national security and other vague charges.

#### Crackdown against labor unions in China prevent grassroots movements that promote democracy worldwide – strikes can collapse Chinese authoritarianism

Wang 9/22 Maya Wang [Maya Wang is the senior China researcher in the Asia division at Human Rights Watch. Wang has researched and written extensively on the use of torture, arbitrary detention, human rights defenders, civil society, disability rights, and women’s rights in China.], 9-22-2021, "China Is Dismantling Hong Kong’s Unions," Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/22/china-dismantling-hong-kongs-unions> DD AG

The Chinese government knows the power of grassroots organizing and doubtlessly sees the developments in Hong Kong as threatening. Nowadays, the top ranks of the Chinese Communist Party—far from its humble origins—are packed with billionaires whose family fortunes are entwined with the Party’s fate. They, like the capitalist elites they handpicked to run the city, know that empowered workers are antithetical to their political and business model.

In June 2020, Beijing imposed a draconian National Security Law on Hong Kong, arresting activists, banning protests, enveloping the city with pervasive fear. To square the circle of the purported people’s proletariat repressing workers’ advocates, the authorities portray these unions and other civil society groups with the usual authoritarian trope—that they are “foreign agents” out to “destabilize Hong Kong.” Beijing-controlled unions—such as the Hong Kong Federation of Education Workers—are poised to claim the mantle of workers’ sole representatives in the city, much like their counterparts in China.

The demise of Hong Kong’s unions is not just a loss for the territory. These unions have long been part of overlapping communities of labor organizations that promote workers’ rights and democracy in China and Asia. With the Chinese government also cracking down on labor rights groups in mainland China, a valuable window is being lost into the plight of workers amid a global supply chain heavily dependent on China-made products.

Labor unions around the world can support their embattled counterparts in Hong Kong, reviving an important legacy of similar efforts from Poland to South Africa. They can press the Chinese government for the release of Hong Kong union leaders, urge their own governments to place escalating sanctions targeting Chinese and Hong Kong officials and entities responsible for the crackdown, and assist counterparts who are still able to promote labor rights in Hong Kong and mainland China.

#### Democratic backsliding causes extinction.

Kendall-Taylor 16 [Andrea; Deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, Senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” CSIS; 7/15/16; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order>/] // recut DD AG

It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising. The norms, values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are [the ascent of China](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-sees-world-order-15846) and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the [specter of widespread democratic decline](http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/facing-democratic-recession). Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system, but they receive [far less attention](http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2016-5e13/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-april-may-2016-eb2d/58-2-03-boyle-6dbd) in discussions of the shifting world order.

In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. [A 2015 Freedom House report](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf) stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.”

Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of [key trends](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/democracy-decline) that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global order.

Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad. [Research demonstrates](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/18/1/49.abstract) that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system.

Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing.

Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.

A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the [United Nations](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/christopher-walker-authoritarian-regimes-are-changing-how-the-world-defines-democracy/2014/06/12/d1328e3a-f0ee-11e3-bf76-447a5df6411f_story.html) , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests.

Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become [fragmented and less effective](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2016.1161899?journalCode=tsur20#.V2H3MRbXgdI).

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. [International relations literature](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/1995-05-01/democratization-and-war) tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows.

Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics.

Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. Rising levels of instability, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability. U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations.

While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor. Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single country. From this perspective, the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries.

Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control. Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes. Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support. Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.

#### The plan solves by promoting strikes that bolster democracy in China – existing trade unions can’t get by. A further push is necessary

Wu 20 Sarah Wu [Correspondent at Reuters. Bachelor’s from Harvard], 1-10-2020, "Hong Kong workers flock to labor unions as new protest tactic," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-unions/hong-kong-workers-flock-to-labor-unions-as-new-protest-tactic-idUSKBN1Z9007> DD AG

His aim is to ramp up pressure on Hong Kong’s government, which has so far made no political concessions to protesters’ demands for greater democracy in the Chinese-ruled city, despite millions of people marching in the street.

“The ongoing pro-democracy movement has fundamentally changed people’s lives,” Ngai told Reuters, the day before he set up a booth along the route of a Jan. 1 march, to sign up new members. “It has forced many who were ignorant about society to stand up.”

As violent clashes with police become more common, the pro-democracy movement has reached a point of “anger and hopelessness,” said Ngai, and needs new tactics.

Ngai said he and his team persuaded about 90 engineers, architects and construction workers to join his Hong Kong Construction and Engineering Employees General Union in the past month.

His booth was only one of dozens along the 4 km (2.5 mile) route of the New Year’s Day march, each with a distinct flag and logo, attracting queues of hundreds of people to join new unions for civil servants, hotel staff, theater professionals and others.

Ngai and his fellow organizers are spearheading the biggest push to unionize the laissez-faire, ultra-capitalist finance mecca - where collective bargaining rights are not even recognized - since Britain handed the city back to China in 1997.

They are also at the forefront of the ever-experimenting Hong Kong pro-democracy movement as it looks for more effective forms of protest.

“The movement has been thriving on its ad-hoc character,” said Ma Ngok, a political scientist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “Now more people think the movement may be a long haul, so they need a more organized base to sustain it.”

About 40 pro-democracy unions, including Ngai’s, have formed in recent months or are in the process of registering with the government, with dozens more starting to organize, according to the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (HKCTU).

The confederation, which last month started running crash courses on establishing unions, said about 2,000 people have already joined unions this year and thousands more joined in late 2019. The city has a population of about 7.4 million.

Labor Department records show that 25 new unions registered last year, compared to 13 in 2018. Of those, 18 formed in the second half of the year, as protests escalated.

Like many new protest tactics, the call to unionize first spread via the encrypted messaging app Telegram, where a channel promoting labor organization has grown to more than 74,000 subscribers in less than three months.

‘TIME TO STRIKE’

Traditional unions in Hong Kong are seen by citizens primarily as clubs for hobby classes, banquets and retail discounts. The new unions are motivated more by protecting workers from being punished by employers for expressing their views.

About two months after protests began in June over a now-withdrawn bill that would have allowed extraditions of suspected criminals to China, protesters got a wake-up call on Beijing’s powers of coercion. The mainland’s aviation regulator demanded Hong Kong’s flag carrier Cathay Pacific suspend staff involved in or supporting demonstrations

Many new unionists say the problem is widespread, especially where bosses are keen to avoid conflict with China for fear of damaging business.

A 26-year-old woman who identified herself as Cynthia told Reuters she heard of an auditing firm that hastily organized a lunch for all employees at the same time as a large protest which many of her fellow professionals wanted to attend during their break. She described that as “oppression” and said it was one of the reasons she is helping to establish the Accounting Bro’Sis Labor Union.

Some employees have been reprimanded for expressing political views on their personal Facebook accounts, said Gary Chan, secretary of the Hong Kong Financial Industry Employees General Union, which he said has recruited 160 members since late September.

Programer Alex Tang said his newly formed, 280-member Hong Kong Information Technology Workers’ Union was developing a database of employers who would not threaten or dismiss staff for supporting protests.

Many believe unions will provide safety in numbers.

“If we strike as individuals, we may be suppressed by companies,” said a 23-year-old assistant architect surnamed Lam, who was lining up at Ngai’s booth, wearing a black face mask, on Jan. 1.

The drive to unionize comes as Hong Kong is grappling with a recession as tourist numbers and retail sales decline in the face of violent protests.

While the new unions cannot promise much in terms of immediate economic benefits, they may in time be able to organize more effective strikes and address the city’s deep inequalities, said Eli Friedman, an associate professor at Cornell University who studies labor in China.

“It’s too soon to tell if they will get the union density to exercise that kind of power,” said Friedman.

Many new union leaders say they recognize that gaining members and changing cultural attitudes to unions will take time. But they are committed to improving workers’ rights, with a long-term goal of organizing mass strikes to increase pressure on the government to allow everyone the right to vote for the city’s leader.

“It’s a numbers game,” said Lee Cheuk-yan, general secretary of HKCTU and a former pro-democracy politician.

“We have to stay organized in the long run and consolidate the consciousness of the people of Hong Kong that has arisen over the past half-year,” Lee said. “All of the unions will decide together when it is time to strike.”

### Advantage 2 – Climate Change

#### China accounts for a majority of greenhouse gases in the air that contribute to climate change – it’s try or die to solve

Pidcock 16 Roz Pidcock [I am a writer, editor and climate change communications specialist. Former oceanographer, Deputy Editor of Carbon Brief and Head of Communications for Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)], 3/17/2016, “China is responsible for 10% of human influence on climate change, study says”, The Carbon Brief, <https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-is-responsible-for-10-of-human-influence-on-climate-change-study-says> DD AG

Boasting one of the world’s largest economies, China has overtaken the EU and the US as the world’s largest emitter, with CO2 emissions from fossil fuels tripling over the past 30 years.

But despite soaring CO2 emissions, China’s relative contribution to climate change has remained steady – around the 10% mark – over the whole industrial period, says a study published in Nature.

It’s a pretty complicated picture. But in recent times, this is because cooling from aerosols has been masking part of the warming signal. The upshot of this is that cutting some types of aerosol in a much-needed bid to improve air quality could drive faster warming in the coming decades, say the authors.

China’s single biggest source of warming is CO2 from fossil fuel burning (red line). With emissions rising steeply over the past few decades, fossil fuels overtook land-use change as the biggest source of CO2 from China in 1992 (brown line).

Warming as a result of changing land use rose throughout the 20th century, before declining in the 1980s as reforestation programmes turned the land from a net emitter to a net absorber.

Despite this, past emissions from land-use change still account for a third of atmospheric CO2 attributable to China, with fossil-fuel burning making up the other two thirds, the paper notes.

The warming caused by emissions of nitrous oxide (yellow) and halogen compounds (pink) increased over the past two or three decades – to a far lesser extent than fossil fuel CO2, while methane-induced warming increased three-fold between 1950-2010 (orange line).

Relative contribution

To put the changes within China into a global context, the inset graph in the figure above shows the warming effect of Chinese greenhouse gases as a percentage of the global total.

Again, the impact of China’s recent fossil fuel expansion is clear, with the country’s contribution to total global fossil fuel CO2 almost tripling in the 30-year period between 1980-2010.

China currently accounts for 12% of the total greenhouse gases in the atmosphere – a figure that has remained fairly steady over the industrial period, at around 8-12% (blue line). This is effectively the balance of impacts from all China’s greenhouse gas emissions over time – i.e. carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and halogen compounds – and from all anthropogenic sources.

The 10% figure is lower than might be expected for the country topping of the list of the biggest emitters. But it reflects the fact that others, such as the US and the EU, have been emitting far longer, the paper notes. The paper does not calculate the contributions from these other entities, so a direct comparison is not possible.

Relative to the rest of the world, China’s share of greenhouse gas warming fell slightly in the 1960s, 70s and 80s before starting to climb again as economic growth and fossil fuel burning accelerated.

But there’s something else going on, too. China is responsible for a disproportionate amount of the aerosols emitted around the world, some of which have a strong cooling effect.

But given the upwards trend in fossil fuel CO2 emissions, the long lifetimes of existing infrastructure and the social and political systems in place, it is “unlikely” that China’s relative contribution to global greenhouse gas warming will come down any time soon, say the authors in the paper.

#### Decreasing CO2 emissions in China is specifically key – it faces the biggest challenges to solving climate change

Brown 10/14 David Brown [Senior Journalist at BBC], 10/14/21, “Why China's climate policy matters to us all”, BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57483492> DD AG

China's carbon emissions are vast and growing, dwarfing those of other countries.

Experts agree that without big reductions in China's emissions, the world cannot win the fight against climate change.

China's President Xi Jinping has said his country will aim for its emissions to reach their highest point before 2030 and for carbon neutrality to be achieved by 2060.

But he has not said how China will achieve this extremely ambitious goal.

Explosive growth

While all countries face problems getting their emissions down, China is facing the biggest challenge.

Per person, China's emissions are about half those of the US, but its huge 1.4 billion population and explosive economic growth have pushed it way ahead of any other country in its overall emissions.

China became the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 2006 and is now responsible for more than a quarter of the world's overall greenhouse gas emissions.

It is expected to come under intense scrutiny at the COP26 global climate summit in November over its commitments to reduce these.

Along with all the other signatories to the Paris Agreement in 2015, China agreed to make changes to try to keep global warming at 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, and "well below" 2C.

China strengthened its commitments in 2020, but Climate Action Tracker, an international group of scientists and policy experts say its current actions to meet that goal are "highly insufficient".

#### Strikes are a silver bullet and force Chinese government to scale back emissions and combat climate change. Independently, these strikes fight back against Chinese capitalism, leading to the switch to socialism faster

China Worker 10/24 China Worker, 10-24-2021, "Climate change: Prepare for mass protests at COP26," <https://chinaworker.info/en/2021/10/14/30694/> DD AG

The initial waves of school strikes pointed toward an approach based on mass mobilisations of young people, linking up with the organised working class, particularly in the Trade Unions. When workers take strike action, they can grind society to a halt. Although smaller-scale actions can be effective, a movement with the backing of the workers’ movement will be essential in winning action on climate change.

This could include coordinated strike action between unions between different countries to bring the globalised capitalist system to its knees, as part of a genuinely international movement against climate change.

A mass climate movement would need to link up with other struggles of workers and young people, such as the struggles against attacks on our right to protest internationally, against sexist and racist oppression, and of workers fighting against mass job losses as a result of the pandemic — all of which have an interest in ending climate change. It would also highlight the systemic nature of climate change, and how it ties into the wider capitalist system responsible for the multi-faceted crisis facing ordinary people right now. This would be an important step not just in fighting for climate change, but for making the popular idea of “climate justice” a reality as well.

Socialism is survival

This would have to be linked to a clear programme for fundamental system change. That means challenging capitalism and fighting for a socialist society where decisions about what is produced and how are decided democratically. Under capitalism, where production is based on the endless drive for greater profits, environmental effects are treated as an “externality”. This focus on short term profit is an inbuilt feature of capitalism. As a result, we see that it is the big corporations themselves that contribute vastly toward the destruction of our planet, with over 70% of CO2 emissions coming from just the top 100 companies worldwide.

**Warming is linear—every decrease in rising temperatures radically mitigates the risk of existential climate change.**

Xu and Ramanathan 17, Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323//recut CHS PK

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

### Framework

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. To clarify, that’s hedonism

#### 1] Actor specificity – comes first since different agents have different ethical obligations.

#### A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission.

#### 2] Extinction comes first!

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 3] Death o/w

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

### Method

#### Methodological pluralism is a necessary aspect of critique.

Bleiker ’14 [Roland, professor of international relations at the university of Queensland. “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014]

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### Capitalism is self-correcting and sustainable – war and environmental destruction are not profitable and innovation solves their impacts

Kaletsky ’11 (Anatole, editor-at-large of *The Times* of London, where he writes weekly columns on economics, politics, and international relationsand on the governing board of the New York-based Institute for New Economic Theory (INET), a nonprofit created after the 2007-2009 crisis to promote and finance academic research in economics, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis, p. 19-21)

Democratic capitalism is a system built for survival. It has adapted successfully to shocks of every kind, to upheavals in technology and economics, to political revolutions and world wars. Capitalism has been able to do this because, unlike communism or socialism or feudalism, it has an inner dynamic akin to a living thing. It can adapt and refine itself in response to the changing environment. And it will evolve into a new species of the same capitalist genus if that is what it takes to survive. In the panic of 2008—09, many politicians, businesses, and pundits forgot about the astonishing adaptability of the capitalist system. Predictions of global collapse were based on static views of the world that extrapolated a few months of admittedly terrifying financial chaos into the indefinite future. The self-correcting mechanisms that market economies and democratic societies have evolved over several centuries were either forgotten or assumed defunct. The language of biology has been applied to politics and economics, but rarely to the way they interact. Democratic capitalism’s equivalent of the biological survival instinct is a built-in capacity for solving social problems and meeting material needs. This capacity stems from the principle of competition, which drives both democratic politics and capitalist markets. Because market forces generally reward the creation of wealth rather than its destruction, they direct the independent efforts and ambitions of millions of individuals toward satisfying material demands, even if these demands sometimes create unwelcome by-products. Because voters generally reward politicians for making their lives better and safer, rather than worse and more dangerous, democratic competition directs political institutions toward solving rather than aggravating society’s problems, even if these solutions sometimes create new problems of their own. Political competition is slower and less decisive than market competition, so its self-stabilizing qualities play out over decades or even generations, not months or years. But regardless of the difference in timescale, capitalism and democracy have one crucial feature in common: Both are mechanisms that encourage individuals to channel their creativity, efforts, and competitive spirit into finding solutions for material and social problems. And in the long run, these mechanisms work very well. If we consider democratic capitalism as a successful problem-solving machine, the implications of this view are very relevant to the 2007-09 economic crisis, but diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom that prevailed in its aftermath. Governments all over the world were ridiculed for trying to resolve a crisis caused by too much borrowing by borrowing even more. Alan Greenspan was accused of trying to delay an inevitable "day of reckoning” by creating ever-bigger financial bubbles. Regulators were attacked for letting half-dead, “zombie” banks stagger on instead of putting them to death. But these charges missed the point of what the democratic capitalist system is designed to achieve. In a capitalist democracy whose raison d’etre is to devise new solutions to long-standing social and material demands, a problem postponed is effectively a problem solved. To be more exact, a problem whose solution can be deferred long enough is a problem that is likely to be solved in ways that are hardly imaginable today. Once the self-healing nature of the capitalist system is recognized, the charge of “passing on our problems to our grand-children”—whether made about budget deficits by conservatives or about global warming by liberals—becomes morally unconvincing. Our grand-children will almost certainly be much richer than we are and will have more powerful technologies at their disposal. It is far from obvious, therefore, why we should make economic sacrifices on their behalf. Sounder morality, as well as economics, than the Victorians ever imagined is in the wistful refrain of the proverbially optimistic Mr. Micawber: "Something will turn up."

#### **Overarching theories about the university and academic violence throw critical tools for material organizing out the window. We should iterate around imperfect structures.**

Angela **Davis and** Gayatri Chakravorty **Spivak** (Angela Yvonne Davis is an American political activist, philosopher, academic, and author. She is a professor emerita at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is an Indian scholar, literary theorist, and feminist critic. She is a University Professor at Columbia University and a founding member of the establishment's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society. “Planetary Utopias”. June 24, 20**18**.)

Nikita Dhawan: Another extremely instructive lesson that we have learnt from you is to adopt a critical posture towards the tools, concepts, vocabularies and organising practices that characterise landscapes of struggle. There is this wonderful, possibly apocryphal, quote that ‘The last capitalist we hang shall be the one who sold us the rope.’ **What do we do with this double bind that the instruments we have to use to change unjust structures are inherited from these very structures**? Angela Davis: This is what we have and **we have no other choice than to use them and to simultaneously question them.** **And so the process of developing critical habits, habits of self-questioning, is a process that never ends.** And we are learning a great deal now especially, given the activism of transgender communities. We are learning a great deal about what it means to challenge categories that we have considered to be so normal that they aren’t even worth questioning. But they actually constitute the arena, the ground of our thinking. Thus when we look at movements around transgender issues, movements against the violence directed against transgender women of colour, we realize that they constitute the sector of the population that is the target of more forms of violence – state, personal, individual, etc. – and more consistent violence than any other group. So we are learning how to challenge the binary structure of gender even though there is often a telling awkwardness, especially in instances where you are asked to introduce yourself with your preferred pronouns. And that awkwardness is good and productive because it makes us question that which we haven’t previously known how to question. So I don’t think anything is immune from that process, **even the ways in which we are formulating this question about how to be critical** regarding that which we consider most normal, that which otherwise **is ideologically constructed.** And I guess **it’s about** education, about **the kind of education** that Gayatri was speaking about, as **opposed to the education that simply wants to produce skilled subjects who are able to participate well in the machinery of global capitalism.** The last thing I would say is that we have to really beware of these terms that are supposed to carry the entire weight of struggles for justice. Sara Ahmed was talking about the term diversity yesterday and I really hate that notion. I cannot stand the notion of diversity, because it means largely the effort to make the machine run more effectively with those who were previously excluded by the machine. Who wants to be assimilated into a racist institution, when the institution continues to maintain its racist structure? This is why **we always have to be hyperconscious of our vocabularies.** This is a practice that I want to carry to my grave. Gayatri Spivak: Yes, **it is legitimation by reversal**. Before they were all bad and now they are all good. This is why I find ‘Global South’ to be a reverse racist term. I mean there are some real self-constructed native informants selling themselves from these places. But **this issue of having only a tainted methodology with which to work, I find that to be completely ok. You work with what you can: an affirmative sabotage.** When Audre Lorde said that you can’t break down the master’s house with the master’s tools, she was extremely angry because of the treatment she had received at NYU. A thing like ‘The subaltern cannot speak’ – these are enraged declarations. Many take it as an excuse for avoiding homework. ‘No, no, we don’t have to read any of the master’s tools. No, the house will not be broken down.’ Lorde was not giving a formula for saving intellectual labour. In that context I would say that the masters had the leisure of the theory class. They had all the leisure on our backs – and some of us also collaborating with our tongues hanging out, so let’s not just do a finger-pointing – to develop these theories. And also, they had such a very long time in early capitalism that they could do this slowly, whereas many colonial places got the mode of exploitation without the mode of production, so they couldn’t do it from inside. **We should take** those **well-developed methods**, make our former masters our servants as it were, put them on tap rather than on top, inhabit them well, **turn them around**. Don’t accuse them, don’t excuse them, **use them for something which they were not made for.**

#### Hyperreality is an absurd theory especially when it’s applied to war – simulation is never absolute and no one thinks it is

Norris, PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Cardiff School of English, Communication & Philosophy, fellowships and visiting appointments at a number of institutions, including the University of California, Berkeley, the City University of New York, Aarhus University, and Dartmouth College, ‘92

(Christopher, *Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War*, pg. 22-25)

Textuality Rules

I hope that many readers with an interest in ‘theory’ will have shared my reaction to Baudrillard’s Guardian piece: that is amounted to a grand exposure of postmodernist thinking from the inside. Up to then it had been possible to regard such ideas as a depressing but fairly harmless symptom of the way that theory was liable to go when exploited by writers with a flair for publicity or the knack of avoding peer-group review. After all, it is no great cause for concern - at least outside the specialized enclaves of cultural criticism - when these notions are applied (as in much of Baudrillard's previous writing) to a range of trivial phenomena like Disneyland, TV commercials, soap-operas, phone-in chatshows and so forth, items whose manifest ‘hyperreality' indeed calls out for such debunking treatment. In fact it is only fair to say that, at his best, Baudrillard is a sharp-eyed diagnostician with a keen sense for the absurdity of these and kindred signs of the times. But his own arguments take on a similar absurdity when he pushes beyond this level of diagnostic commentary **to claim that we have arrived at a stage of terminal indifference** with regard to issues of truth and falsehood; **that ontological distinctions no longer hold up** in an epoch of all-pervasive media 'simulation"; and that we might as well abandon talk of matters such as 'truth' and 'reality' and adapt to living in a postmodern world of proliferating language-games, signs without referents, and illusions that we could never recognise as such In which case clearly an 'event' like the Gulf War must be seen as a kind of mass-induced media fantasy, a product of the various suasive techniques which create the semblance of informed public debate while placing it beyond hope of attainment.

In one sense Baudrillard is undoubtedly right: that is to say, in his argument that public opinion (or what counts as such) can be swung so far that it completely loses touch with any knowledge of real-world issues and events. To the extent that we are reliant on the 'textual' evidence - on the TV coverage and newspaper reporting - it is hard to escape his cynical conclusion that nobody can possibly claim any knowledge beyond what is offered by the official machinery of state-sponsored censorship and disinformation. **On the one hand we are bombarded with a ceaseless stream of images**, statistics, 'front-line' dispatches. Pentagon briefings and so forth, all of which serve to create the illusion that this is the first war in history to be covered in such detail and communicated 'live' to a world-wide community of highly Informed viewers, listeners and readers. On the other it becomes increasingly apparent - **at least to anyone who** sifts and compares the 'evidence**'** - that this whole relentless barrage of media coverage is designed to overload our receptive and cognitive faculties to the point where the line between fact and fiction (or, in Baudrillard's terms, the 'real' and the 'hyperreal') seems well-nigh impossible to draw. **But from this, Baudrillard** draws the absurd - **yet on his own terms seductively plausible** - conclusion that we just cannot know whether war has indeed 'broken out', as opposed to the simulated images of war that both preceded the 'event' and continued thereafter as our only source of news and information. Such is the 'reality gulf that has opened up between war and its postmodern fantasy-substitute. It no longer makes sense to think in terms which imply that there must be some truth behind appearances, some means of ultimately telling the difference between what we are presently given to believe through the news reports, government statements, official casualty figures etc, and what will at last turn out to have been the case when all the relevant facts come in. On the contrary, Baudrillard argues: if there is one lesson to be learned from this war (or this hyperreal 'simulacrum' of war) it is the irrelevance of half-way pragmatist doctrines like 'truth at the end of enquiry', and the need to make terms with a new situation where nothing - no appeal to historical realities or the putative facts of the case - could warrant the use of terms like 'propaganda', 'indoctrination', 'media bias' and so forth, words that still trade on the same old range of hopelessly outmoded epistemic or ontological distinctions.

It is not surprising that Baudrillard's ideas have been taken up with such relish by US readers, even when he offers them what might be thought some rather unpalatable home truths, as for instance that America is a realm of unlimited substitute-gratification, of depthless surfaces and 'hyperreal', self-parodic life styles which exceed all the bounds of rational comprehension." For these remarks are often taken - and apparently intended - as the highest compliment that could possibly be paid by a postmodern intellectual guru who finds all his arguments so strikingly borne out by the evidence to hand. And if further confirmation were needed then US responses to the Gulf conflict would provide quite a mass of socio-documentary (or psycho-pathological) support. Judith Williamson captured the mood well enough in a Guardian piece written from San Diego during the third week of hostilities.

It is the unreality of anywhere outside the US, in the eyes of its citizens, which must frighten any foreigner. Like an infant who has yet to learn there are other centres of self, this culture sees others merely as fodder for its dreams and nightmares ... The hyped-up concern over US children's fears ('Will Saddam kill me Mommy?') is obscene when you consider that American bombs are right now killing Iraqi children. It isn't that Americans don't care (God knows they care) but that for most of them, other lands and people cannot be imagined as real. Mattel brought out a doe-eyed doll called Iraqi Baby, it could be guaranteed to evoke pity. Meanwhile on the national news, shots of birds caught in 'Saddam's oil slick' have been presented more poignantly than the human victims of our bombing."

Probably Williamson faxed her article before it was revealed – or somebody caught on – that those birds couldn’t have been victims of ‘Saddam’s oil-slick’, since the slick was drifting several miles out to sea while the birds filmed were making painful efforts to drag themselves onto dry land. Of course we cannot know. Baudrillard would be quick to point out, that some alternative explanation was the truthful account, or that - as seemed very likely - the; spillage in question had been caused by US bombing of inshore installations. But this episode was just one instance of the numerous contradictions, cross-purpose statements, non-sequiturs, and manifest untruths that came to light during the first few weeks of the so-called 'Allied' propaganda campaign. Even so, as Williamson suggests in her article, such revelations could have had little impact on the state of US 'public opinion", given over as it was to a kind of collective hysteria, a media-induced climate of paranoid delusion, and an utter refusal to contemplate the effects - the real-world human effects - of what was being done to civilian populations in the name of freedom, democracy and a 'new world order'. In which case one might be tempted to conclude that this is indeed a decisive confirmation of Baudrillard's postmodernist claims, an instance of the henceforth unbridgeable 'reality gulf. What price truth in an age when mass-media simulation determines the agenda, the admissible viewpoints, or the very 'horizon of intelligibility' in matters of factual, moral and political concern?

**But this conclusion only follows if one accepts the postmodern-textualist premise**: that reality just is whatever we make of it according to this or that predominant language-game, discourse, or mode of signifying practice. **Once reject that premise** – as most people would **unless drilled into accepting it by prolonged exposure to the tads and fashions of cultural theory** - **and the whole line of argument** simply collapses.19 The export of ideas from the realm of avant garde literary theory to adjacent disciplines such as historiography, as commented on by Bennett in the passage cited earlier, **has had the effect of promoting an** extreme **anti-cognitivist and relativist doctrine**. In this sense one could justifiably argue that Baudrillard was waiting at the end of the road that structuralism and post-structuralism had been travelling for the past three decades and more. The movement started out, in Perry Anderson's phrase, as an 'abusive extrapolation' from the specialized methodology of Saussure; it took certain strictly heuristic precepts from the realm of structuralist language-study and made them the basis for a full-scale assault on the concepts of truth, reality, and representation.20 It has finished by promoting a postmodern-pragmatist worldview, which blithely deconstructs the 'notional' difference between 'war' as a simulated pseudo-event - a fictive 'referent' conjured up by the opinion-polls, TV images, rhetorical sabre-rattling - **and war as a real-world state of affairs in which countless thousands of Iraqi civilian men, women and children were daily being killed in an aerial bombardment of unprecedented scale and ferocity.** Small wonder, as I say, that Baudrillard's ideas have achieved such a cult following at a time and in a context - that of the current US drive for renewed world hegemony - when few intellectuals seem able or willing to resist these pressures of ideological recruitment.

#### Free market capitalism has drastically improved the world.

Empirical education in child mortality and increase in life expectancy, development of tech innovation in the private market k2 medical advances, food production increased with agriculture tech green revolution, also decreased armed conflicts

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In How Much Have Global Problems Cost the World? Lomborg and a group of economists conclude that, with a few exceptions, the world is richer, freer, healthier, and smarter than it’s ever been. These gains have coincided with the near-universal rejection of statism and the flourishing of capitalist principles. At a time when political figures such as New York City mayor Bill de Blasio and religious leaders such as Pope Francis frequently remind us about the evils of unfettered capitalism, this is a worthwhile message. The doubling of human life expectancy is one of the most remarkable achievements of the past century. Consider, Lomborg writes, that “the twentieth century saw life expectancy rise by about 3 months for every calendar year.” The average child in 1900 could expect to live to just 32 years old; now that same child should make it to 70. This increase came during a century when worldwide economic output, driven by the spread of capitalism and freedom, grew by more than 4,000 percent. These gains occurred in developed and developing countries alike; among men and women; and even in a sense among children, as child mortality plummeted. Why are we living so much longer? Massive improvements in public health

certainly played an important role. The World Health Organization’s global vaccination efforts essentially eradicated smallpox. But this would have been impossible without the innovative methods of vaccine preservation developed in the private sector by British scientist Leslie Collier. Oral rehydration therapies and antibiotics have also been instrumental in reducing child mortality. Simply put, technological progress is the key to these gains—and market economies have liberated, and rewarded, technological innovation. People are not just living longer, but better—sometimes with government’s help, and sometimes despite it. Even people in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America are better educated and better fed than ever before. Hundreds of thousands of children who would have died during previous eras due to malnutrition are alive today. Here, we can thank massive advancements in agricultural production unleashed by the free market. In the 1960s, privately funded agricultural researchers bred new, high-yield strains of corn, wheat, and various other crops thanks to advances in molecular genetics. Globalization helped spread these technologies to developing countries, which used them not only to feed their people, but also to become export powerhouses. This so-called “green revolution” reinforced both the educational progress (properly nourished children tend to learn more) and the life-expectancy gains (better nutrition leads to better health) of the twentieth century. These children live in a world with fewer armed conflicts, netting what the authors call a “peace dividend.” Globalization and trade liberalization have surely contributed to this more peaceful world (on aggregate). An interdependent global economy makes war costly. Of course, problems remain. As Lomborg points out, most foreign aid likely does little to boost economic welfare, yet hundreds of billions of dollars in “development assistance” continue to flow every year from developed countries to the developing world. Moreover, climate change is widely projected to intensify in the second half of the twenty-first century, and will carry with it a significant economic cost. But those familiar with the prior work of the “skeptical environmentalist” understand that ameliorating these effects over time could prove wasteful. Lomborg notes that the latest research on climate change estimates a net cost of 0.2 to 2 percent of GDP from 2055 to 2080. The same report points out that in 2030, mitigation costs may be as high as 4 percent of GDP. Perhaps directing mitigation funding to other priorities—curing AIDS for instance—would be a better use of the resources. Lomborg’s main message? Ignore those pining for the “good old days.” Thanks to the immense gains of the past century, there has never been a better time to be alive.

### UV

#### 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) reject the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time, e) comes first – it’s a bigger percentage of the 1AR than 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time and only the 2N has time to win multiple layers, g) voters – fairness because debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education since it gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.