# Fwk:

### Syllogism:

#### The Sovereign individual is a myth- We are incessantly experiencing and being experienced – I am not the same Ailsa I was 10 years ago, and I will continue to change from the present: Thus, affect as experience is the only constant of fluid bodies – definition is impossible Hardt 1:

Hardt, M. The Power to be Affected. Int J Polit Cult Soc 28, 215–222 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-014-9191-x

Lauren Berlant’s work is filled with explorations of the passions, the many ways in which we are affected by powers greater than ourselves—in institutional contexts and intimate relations, in sexual encounters and aesthetic experiences, and in political affairs and economic struggles. The object of her journeys through the affects is not simply to register or catalogue—let alone lament—the affective damage caused by living in contemporary society or the ways in which our desires are thwarted. Instead, she regards the pains, pleasures, frustrations, and longing as so many tracks we can follow to understand how people manage in this world to create new intimacies, new bonds, and new forms of life. 1 Simply getting by and surviving in a dangerous and threatening world, though, is not enough. Berlant revives classical concepts to name her ultimate goals: we should strive for the good life and seek human flourishing. Orienting the analysis and even the affirmation of the affects toward a project for the good life might well seem an odd combination since the classical tradition teaches us—or, at least, this is what we are usually told—that the passions are the ties that bind us in servitude; only following the dictates of sovereign reason can we truly flourish. In Berlant’s work, instead, the only path toward achieving the good life must be constructed with and through the affects. To understandthe arc of Berlant’sp r o j e c t ,If i n di th e l p f u lt op o s ei ti nr e l a t i o nt ot h a to fB a r u c h Spinoza, to which it has strong correspondences. (Berlant may well be a closet Spinozist—even without knowing it.) For Spinoza being affected by others, by external forces, is not a weakness but a strength, a power. As a first approximation, think of the power to be affected as a gauge of your Int capacity to be really in the world, to register and feel its diverse powers. Once we open up and expand our power to be affected, however, then begins the work of selecting among the affects and discovering the means to repeat or prolong those that are beneficial and prevent the detrimental. That is a path, through the affects, with the affects, toward the first step of this process is to take stock realistically and recognize that we are not sovereign subjects. Berlant is rightly suspicious of the standard ethical injunctions that assume our individual sovereignty, as well as those that aim at constructing or supporting sovereign political powers. Consider the sovereign individual, in corre-spondence with Carl Schmitt’sp o l i t i c a lf o r m u l a ,a st h eo n ew h od e c i d e s( 2007). Berlant questions both elements of this statement: the one and the decision. Sovereign decision, she claims, resides on an illusion of self-control, “a fantasy misrecognized as an objective state” (2011,p .9 7 ) .People are n ot always engaged in projects of self -extension, she says, and in fact, they seldom have significant control over their decision-making. Spinoza expresses the same idea in quantitative terms. The power of all individual or limited subjects to think and act autonomously corresponds proportionally to the relation between their powers and the power of nature as a whole. “**The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external cause**s” (1985 Ethics IV P3). Only God (or nature as a whole) is self-caused because it has no outside. The fact that the power of the world outside of us so far surpasses our own power means that we are affected by others much more than we affect the world or even autonomously affect ourselves, and thus, our capacity for sovereign decision-making is minimal too. The other half of Schmitt’s dictum is equally unfounded :“the one” never decides or acts or is acted on. The subject is never one. Agency **and** causality, Berlant suggests, should be understood not int e r m so fu n i t i e sb u ti n s t e a d“as dispersed environmental mechanisms at the personal as well as the institutional level” (2011, p. 114). Spinoza expresses this too in mathematical and geometrical form. A body or an individual, he explains, is formed when a great number of parts agree with each other and thus communicate in a consistent way (1985 Ethics II P13 definition). Essential to a body is the relation: the body lives as long as that relation is maintained. Instead of thinking in terms of unities, then, **we need to think** the relation **among multiplicities and** recognize the consistency of **dispersed landscapes**. To identify the locus of decision or acting or being acted upon, we need to look to not the one but the consistent relation among the many.

#### Ethics must be a constant interrogation of static norms. This creation of new lines of flight redefines current concepts of normativity to that of deterritorialization. We need to imagine alternative ways to resolve oppression because existing norms propel violence against marginalized bodies.

Smith 03 [Daniel W. Smith (2003) Deleuze and the liberal tradition: normativity, freedom and judgement, Economy and Society, 32:2, 299-324]

Deleuze would no doubt have followed the same approach in his analysis of normativity had he addressed the issue directly. Foucault himself spoke of the power of what he called the process of normalization, which creates us, as subjects, in terms of existing force relations and existing ‘norms’. For Foucault, normalization is not merely an abstract principle of adjudication but an already actualized (and always actualized) power relation. Foucault’s question then became: is it possible to escape, or at least resist, this power of normalization? In Deleuze’s terminology, the same question would be stated in the following terms: within a given social assemblage or ‘territoriality’, where can one find the ‘line of flight’, or the movement of relative deterritorialization, by means of 51Q 08smith (ds) Page 307 Thursday, April 17, 2003 8:45 PM 308 Economy and Society which one can escape from or transform the existing norm (or territoriality)? From this viewpoint, neither Foucault nor Deleuze avoid the issue of normativity, they simply analyze it in terms of an immanent process. The error of transcendence would be to posit normative criteria as abstract universals, even if these are defined in intersubjective or communicative terms. From the viewpoint of immanence, by contrast, it is the process itself that must account for both the production of the norm as well as its possible destruction or alteration. In a given assemblage, one will indeed find normative criteria that govern, for instance, the application of the power of the State, but one will also find the means for the critique and modification of those norms, their deterritorialization. A truly ‘normative’ principle must not only provide norms for condemning abuses of power, but also a means for condemning norms that have themselves become abuses of power (e.g. the norms that governed the treatment of women, slaves, minorities, etc.). An immanent process, in other words, must, at one and the same time, function as a principle of critique as well as a principle of creation (the ‘genetic’ method). ‘The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are one and the same’ (Deleuze 1994: 139). The one cannot and ‘must’ not exist without the other If deterritorialization functions as a norm for Patton, then, it is a somewhat paradoxical norm. Within any assemblage, what is normative is deterritorialization, that is, the creation of ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze) or ‘resistance’ (Foucault) that allow one to break free from a given norm, or to transform the norm. What ‘must’ always remain normative is the ability to critique and transform existing norms, that is, to create something new (the category of the new should be understood here in the broad sense, including not only social change, but also artistic creation, conceptual innovation and so on.) One cannot have pre-existing norms or criteria for the new; otherwise it would not be new, but already foreseen. This is the basis on which Patton argues that Deleuze’s conception of power is explicitly normative: ‘What a given assemblage is capable of doing or becoming’, he writes, ‘is determined by the lines of flight or deterritorialization which it can sustain’ (Patton 2000: 106). (One might note here that the concept of ‘nomadic war-machines’, which was introduced in A Thousand Plateaus, is Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to address the question of a social formation that would itself be constructed along such movements or lines of flight. Patton suggests that such assemblages should in fact be called ‘metamorphosis’ machines (2000: 110), since they have only an external relation to war and a historically contingent relation to nomads; this is a suggestion that will no doubt be taken up by others. Metamorphosis machines would be the conditions of actualization of absolute deterritorialization and the means by which relative deterritorialization occurs: ‘They bring connections to bear against the great conjunction of the apparatuses of capture or domination.’ . . . A metamorphosis machine would then be one that . . . engenders the production of something altogether different. (Patton 2000: 110) 51Q 08smith (ds) Page 308 Thursday, April 17, 2003 8:45 PM Daniel W. Smith: Deleuze and the liberal tradition 309 Patton is therefore using the concept ‘normativity’ in a quite different manner than Fraser or Habermas. They would say that deterritorialization is not normative, and cannot be, since it eludes any universal criteria and indeed allows for their modification. Patton in effect responds by saying: for that very reason, it is deterritorialization that should be seen as a normative concept, even if that entails a new concept of what normativity is. At one point in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes that ‘one can conserve the word essence, if one wishes, but only on the condition of saying that essence is precisely the accident or the event’ (1994: 191). Patton seems to be saying something similar: one can conserve the word normativity, if one wishes, but only on the condition of saying that the normative is the new or the deterritorialized. Patton’s own trajectory is thus beginning to come into focus: rather than simply dropping or ignoring the concept of normativity, he instead proposes to create a new concept of normativity by critiquing components of the old one, and linking it up with a quite different set of related concepts. In this manner, he is effecting a transformation of the liberal concept, while still attempting to situate his own work fully within the liberal tradition.

#### Thus the standard is to vote for the debater that best promotes the conditions for fluid subjectivity – Embrace the passions! <3<3<3

#### Hardt 3

Hardt, M. The Power to be Affected. Int J Polit Cult Soc 28, 215–222 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-014-9191-x

This correspondence and the affirmation of our power to be affected are significant because they open an alternative route for ethical and political activity, a path that is more realistically passable. **Instead of enjoining yourself (or others) to take control of your life or to follow the dictates of reason, the mandate here is to increase the extent and number of ways in which you can be affected**. Explore and expand your powers to register and feel your world and those around you. After all, the first path, which is fundamentally ascetic, is blocked to the extent that your power is surpassed by external forces. Try all you want to will yourself to take the path of self-control and mastery, but you are likely to get nowhere. The path of being affected, instead, is open to all of us. We are all able to engage our passions and exercise them and 5 Martin Joughin consistently translates “pouvoir d’être affecté” as “capacity to be affected.” I prefer the more literal “power to be affected” because it highlights the correspondence between this power and the power to act. 6 Deleuze cites both this and the subsequent passage in footnote 14, 383. Note that the “or” that Spinoza uses in these passages, “vel,” is different than the one employed in his famous formula,“deus sive natura,” god or nature, which is commonly recognized to signify an equivalence between the two terms. I think Deleuze is right to interpret an equivalence in these passages too. expand their scope. Spinoza tells us that working this way is (or can be) useful for us and good. This alternative path through the passions might seem to be like a Dantean descentinordertoriseupeventuallytothelight, but really there is nothing dark about the passions. They constitute a power too—**the power to be affected—that is as virtuous as other powers, and it is the power realistically to which we have the most access, one that illuminates a field of bodies and pleasures.**

## Offense:

#### The capitalist framework sustains itself by taking lines of desire and co-opting them for the purpose of capital- It restricts fluidity, replacing affective becoming by experience with capital driven becoming – workers become commodities- a piece of paper and human body are apples to oranges: (Massumi)

A user's guide to capitalism and schizophrenia : deviations from Deleuze and Guattari- Brian Massumi.- Edition A Swerve ed. – Imprint- Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1992.

Money incorporcally transforms the relationship obtaining between bodies into a potential exchange. The body designated as the commodity is given an abstract value. This abstraction has nothing to do with moral-molar ideas. It is numerical, quantitative rather than qualitative. A commodity-body is generalized in a way that not only disregards minor deviations from a norm but is basically disinterested in the body’s intrinsic qualities and their similarity-difference to those of other bodies. The commodity-body is reduced to a pure equivalence. It is generalized in the sense that any number of other bodies carry the same numerical bvalue, and could be substituted for it, exchanged in its stead. The actualization of the capitalist relation transforms a body’s degrees of freedom into a bifurcating network, not of virtual futures for the body to become, but of possible objects a consumer might own- any consumer. The other body is generalized as well. Becoming has been translated, but not into a moralized being – as was the case with fascist paranoid quasicauses- but into a having. The equivalence that is set up is entirely unequal if judged by any other criteria than numerical. It equates elements that are obviously heterogenous- a desired body (which is perhaps even desired for its unique intrinsic qualities) and a piece of paper bearing a recognized denomination. Apples and oranges. The exchange is just as unequal: also active in the consumer-commodity encounter is a third heterogenous term, which may be a single human body or (more often) a collective apparatus, and is rarely physically present at the buying site. It is not assigned a numerical value, it simply collects – surplus value. A porition of the money that changes hands is deflected from the circuit of commodity / consumer encounters into a space formally different from the consumer space but on the same plane as it. The path of deflection runs transversally from the space of purchase into an associated space where a different mode of relation dominates: a bank, for example. Money accumulating in the bank assumes heightened powers- en masse, it can step out of its role as a means of payment to become a means of investment. Capital, with a capital C: money begetting more money, accumulating interest, building factories,.. a series of investment encounters is always implicated in the series of purchase encounters. This is where the second axis on the capitalist grid comes in: worker// capitalist. The heterogenous third term, always involved even in physically absent, is of course the capitalist. Bodies that collect surplus value and control money to use it as a means of payment are workers. Workers are human bodies that have been converted into commodities for purchase by capitalists. Although it is against the principles of “democracy” for human bodies to be bought outright like objects, they are nonetheless given a numerical value, called a wage. What is bought is less than bodies than aspects of their life: a quantity of their time(the workday) the physical and intellectual activity they can perform in that time (labor) and the concentration and attititude of cooperation necessary to perform that activity (docility). Yet another unequal exchange: the capitalist must givenone of those things in the same quantity, or at least in the same way, in order to collect the transversal flow of value the wage relation produces. The capitalist relation is a nexus between two modes of relation in reciprocal presupposition: the commodity relation and the wage relation.

#### We must adopt autovalorization as a process of disruption of the wage difference - this is preclusionary to any other capitalistist framework as state frameworks result from needs – any other revolution will be reterritorialized and slip back into the capitalist framework for material reasons (Mussumi)

Thoburn, N. (2003). Deleuze, Marx and Politics (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203361740

For Marx, needs are necessarily variable over time and place. This is his fundamental proposition about the nature of human composition. At a basic level, capitalism is only an expression (albeit at a rather exponential rate) of what Marx saw as the ratchet system of human composition around an expansion of needs in a conception of the human – against any essentialist understanding – as an expansive assemblage operating in productive interrelation with Nature: a conception that Marx (1976: 285) proposes ‘in spite of the Bible’. 25 In this formulation, ‘values’ (ethics, lifestyles, desires, competences, and so on) are as central to the production and control of the human as the apparently more structural forms of ‘work’, for needs are to be met through capitalist practices, ways of being, or ethics, alone. That is, valorization occurs only in so far as needs are formed and met in terms of capitalist identities, commodities, and money (working for a wage, The refusal of work 121 maximizing capacities to increase a wage, the equation of desire with consumption), since needs are only to be met indirectly (through consumption following the sale of one’s labour for money). Because needs, then, are the ‘form of life’ and are intimately enmeshed in capitalist relations and values, they are a crucial site of politics. The politics of autovalorization thus extends beyond a delimited space of work to cover the whole plane of socialization. But rather than thinking of autonomous, independent needs outside of capital, we can think of autovalorization operating in the machinic environments of capitalism – across the multiplicity of sites of the production of ‘machinic surplus value’ – at the meeting points of the expansion of needs and their axiomatization. Autovalorization can, then, be seen as a process of the proliferation of the former and the disruption of the latter. There was much talk in the ’70s of affirming and expanding the particular needs, values, and styles of the various elements and minorities of the class composition. Whilst aspects of these practices and needs were concerned with cleaving off autonomous spaces for self-production relatively independent from direct capitalist relations (such as in self-managed squatted social centres), they were also concerned with strengthening the collection of needs of the class as a whole. Since, in the community of capitalism, money is the means to satisfy needs, the proliferation of needs and values was also part of a politics of the wage. Rather than autovalorization being an arrangement of difference, invention, and autonomy from capital (either in terms of counterculture or biopolitical production), it can instead be seen as one of difference, invention, and the maximization of the wage. At first sight this might seem to be problematic, since, as I argued in Chapter 4, the valuation of activity in terms of the general equivalent of money is the means for the capitalist axiomatization – or moulding and controlling – of life. However, for Negri (1991a) – building on his analysis of Marx’s projected volume of Capital on the wage – money is a political site, which, whilst expressing the essence of capitalist axiomatization, is simultaneously a site of subversion. In seeking to have the proliferation of needs met by a wage, autovalorization can be seen as part of a demand and set of practices – as was central to operaismo and the mass worker – for ‘more pay and less work’ and ‘we want everything’ in a kind of ‘reclamation’ of surplus value against any mechanism which sought to tie the wage to productivity and capitalist ethics. If the mass worker fought on the terrain of the wage (according to Bifo (1980: 150) in 1969 alone, wage rises increased labour costs by more than 20 per cent), and extended this beyond the factory walls to cover the costs of transportation, housing, and so on, as the socialized worker thesis developed to consider the productivity of the social whole, the ‘wage’ would be expanded to encompass a ‘social wage’. Negri reads Marx’s assertion that, with the development of abstract labour and social capital, the workers’ movement comes to demand a proportion of total profit, rather than an individual wage (Negri 1988c: 114–15; Marx 1973a: 597), as an argument for the extension of wage demands not merely within the ‘working day’, but over the entire ‘life 122 The refusal of work span’ (Negri 1988b: 219). The politics of the wage (as I consider below) thus extended to include sectors previously excluded from wage payment, and social services and consumption. This became particularly important since it was on the terrain of the social wage that capital was seeking to recoup the gains of the mass worker through austerity packages and inflation (Negri 1979b).26 If we draw together the aspects of autovalorization developed in ‘Domination and sabotage’ – the compulsion to political innovation and the variation and expansion of needs and political styles – with the emphasis on the expansion of the social wage, autovalorization can be seen as a proletarian minor practice. It is a kind of bordering which connects the ‘little intrigues’ of the various minorities of the class composition to the social whole (for it is through money and the wage that the social axiomatic operates as a metastable whole). It is concerned with developing new needs and styles that emerge through the particular experiences of minorities (what Guattari (1995b: 55) calls new ‘universes of value’). It situates these not as ‘independent’ or ‘real’ needs, but as immanent to the capitalist socius (as they emerge from the machinic processes of the social factory and seek to be supported by a wage). And it seeks to deterritorialize the axioms of identity upon which capitalist valorization is premised (not least by breaking the link between productivity and the wage, and seeking a wage for a wealth of ‘non-work’ practices). Anything which attempts to settle this expansion of needs and styles in equivalence is to be rejected, and hence autovalorization can be conceived as a site of the continual problematization of received subjectivity, of coherent languages, or normative values and ethics, and as producing, not an independent subjectivity, but a form of practice. The expansive and continuous nature of this project is well expressed in ‘Lia’s’ complication of the mass workers’ formula ‘we want everything’: ‘I do not refuse anything, I want everything. But I do not want what exists already’ (in Magale 1980: 140). It is put on firmer conceptual ground by Virno when he describes the development of the Movement of ’77 as a practice of disrupting the identities and equivalence of work and value, not with a new identity, but with a qualitative and varied ‘doing’:

#### Strikes are crucial for for the constant, unbounded testing of the capitalist framework, by which workers can berak apart the capitalist relation of work to labor, and reclaim their methods of existence and identity within the existing framework of capitalism that the vast majority of workers materially exist under (Jamie)

Woodcock, Jamie. “MOMENTS OF RESISTANCE.” Working the Phones: Control and Resistance in Call Centres, Pluto Press, 2017, pp. 97–117, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1h64kww.7>**.**

In order to see resistance in the workplace it is necessary to consider what could constitute resistance, while simultaneously remaining attentive to any new or emergent forms. Before putting on these new analytical glasses it is worth pointing out that there has often been a blinkered approach to signs of resistance that views certain indicators, like official trade union membership statistics, as representative of the whole. This is a view limited by blinkers because it obscures much of the overall picture, and like the role for blinkers in domesticating animals, it also has a pacifying effect. As George Rawick has argued, figures of ‘formal organization’ – like those of membership levels, newspaper subscriptions, participation in electoral politics and so on – are often taken as indicators. However, what is really needed is to uncover the details 99 how many man-hours were lost to production because of strikes, the amount of equipment and material destroyed by industrial sabotage and deliberate negligence, the amount of time lost by absenteeism, the hours gained by workers through the slowdown, the limiting of the speed-up of the productive apparatus through the working class’s own initiative.6 This highlights the plurality of other activities and practices in the workplace that are not captured by union membership. It also draws attention to another important reminder: resistance at work is not only limited to the strike. In many ways the strike – the temporary suspension of the labour process achieved by workers withdrawing their own labour – is the archetypal form of resistance at work. It is a collective, visible and antagonistic rupture of the relationship between labour and capital, bringing contradictions to the fore with a clear dividing line. It conjures up images of physical picket lines (with or without braziers), protests and solidarity. However, between the placid workplace and the all-out strike there are a range of practices – some collective, others individual – that are worthy of sustained attention. The difficulty in spotting other acts of resistance is no accident. At the point of the strike it is obvious to managers what is happening: the labour process is halted. In response pay is withheld and the dispute takes shape: demands, counter-demands and negotiations. However, acts of sabotage or slowdown, for example, are not necessarily things that workers would want to advertise to the boss. While that might be satisfying, it would bring the conflict to a head and in casualised workplaces could lead to an immediate sacking. In this difficult context it is worth considering the struggles of people in even worse conditions. For example, Edward B. Harper’s study of lifelong indentured servants found that most characteristically expressed discontent about their relationship with their master by performing their work carelessly and inefficiently. They could intentionally or unconsciously feign illness, ignorance, or incompetence, driving their masters to distraction. Even though the master could retaliate by refusing to give his servant the extra fringe benefits, he was still obliged to maintain him at a subsistence level if he did not want to lose his investment completely. This method of passive resistance, provided it was not expressed as open defiance, was nearly unbeatable.7 The existence of this low-intensity conflict in a context in which the indentured worker seems to be relatively powerless is important. Even if there were no outward signs of conflict, below the surface there can still be practices of resistance, expressed in a necessarily covert manner. Similarly, James C. Scott’s study of peasant resistance found that ‘open insubordination in almost any context will provoke a more rapid and ferocious response than an insubordination that may be as pervasive but never ventures to contest the formal definitions of hierarchy or power’. Therefore, peasants engaged in ‘everyday’ forms of resistance, because, like most subordinated people, this form of resistance ‘is the only option’.8 The context of everyday resistance in the contemporary workplace is different. Unlike the indentured servants or the peasants described above, the worker, and in this case the call-centre worker, struggles in different conditions. Karl Marx, as discussed in the previous chapter, ironically defined workers as doubly-free under capitalism.9 They do not have to be in a particular workplace, but economic compulsion – rather than physical coercion – forces workers to choose one. The impact of this is discussed by Braverman, who describes how the hostility of workers to the degenerated forms of work which are forced upon them continues as a subterranean stream that makes its way to the surface when employment conditions permit, or when the capitalist drive for a greater intensity of labor oversteps the bounds of physical and mental capacity. It renews itself in new generations, expresses itself in the unbounded cynicism and revulsion which large numbers of workers feel about their work, and comes to the fore repeatedly as a social issue demanding solution.10

#### Right to strike is a method of creative difference in of it self – it frees workers from oppressive environments and even makes the workplace into a realm in which creative difference occurs. (Karp 18)

Matt Karp, 7-12-2018, "A Radical Defense of the Right to Strike,", https://jacobinmag.com/2018/07/right-to-strike-freedom-civil-liberties-oppression

Workers have an interest in resisting the oppression of class society by using their collective power to reduce, or even overcome, that oppression. Their interest is a liberty interest in a double sense. First, resistance to that class-based oppression carries with it, at least implicitly, a demand for freedoms not yet enjoyed. A higher wage expands workers’ freedom of choice. Expanded labor rights increase workers’ collective freedom to influence the terms of employment. Whatever the concrete set of issues, workers’ strike demands are always also a demand for control over portions of one’s life that they do not yet enjoy. Second, strikes don’t just aim at winning more freedom — they are themselves expressions of freedom. When workers walk out, they’re using their own individual and collective agency to win the liberties they deserve. The same capacity for self-determination that workers invoke to demand more freedom is the capacity they exercise when winning their demands. Freedom, not industrial stability or simply higher living standards, is the name of their desire. Put differently, the right to strike has both an intrinsic and instrumental relation to freedom. It has intrinsic value as an (at least implicit) demand for self-emancipation. And it has instrumental value insofar as the strike is an effective means for resisting the oppressiveness of a class society and achieving new freedoms. But if all this is correct, and the right to strike is something that we should defend, then it also has to be meaningful. The right loses its connection to workers’ freedom if they have little chance of exercising it effectively. Otherwise they’re simply engaging in a symbolic act of defiance — laudable, perhaps, but not a tangible means of fighting oppression. The right to strike must therefore cover at least some of the coercive tactics that make strikes potent, like sit-downs and mass pickets. It is therefore often perfectly justified for strikers to exercise their right to strike by using these tactics, even when these tactics are illegal. Still, the question remains: why should the right to strike be given moral priority over other basic liberties? The reason is not just that liberal capitalism produces economic oppression but that the economic oppression that workers face is in part created and sustained by the very economic and civil liberties that liberal capitalism cherishes. Workers find themselves oppressed because of the way property rights, freedom of contract, corporate authority, and tax and labor law operate. Deeming these liberties inviolable doesn’t foster less oppressive, exploitative outcomes, as its defenders insist — quite the opposite. The right to strike has a stronger claim to be protecting a zone of activity that serves the aims of justice itself — coercing people into relations of less oppressive social cooperation. Simply put, to argue for the right to strike is to prioritize democratic freedoms over property rights.

#### Restrictions of fluidity culminates in creating forms of fascism that reproduce and underpin all life – it shifts to dominate lives in a multiplicity of ways

Evans [Brad; Deleuze and Fascism; Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Global Insecurities Center @ U Bristol; 2013; LCA-BP]**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

This is perhaps what Deleuze had in mind when he previously argued that a 'global agreement on security' was 'just as terrifying as war', for when our very life processes become the source of our bio-political concerns, what Kenneth Galbreith once termed the 'contented society' is displaced by an 'Anxious Mass' who fear the infinitely dangerous: 'All our petty fears will be organized in concert, all our petty anxieties will be harnessed to make micro-fascists of us; we will be called upon to stifle every little thing, every suspicious face, every dissonant voice.' Whilst it is common to suggest that this dismantling of traditional sovereign allegiance has resulted in a crisis of subjectivity - to say that the subject is in crisis misses the point. Liberal subjectivity is made real on account of its ability to live through the ongoing emergency of its own emergence. Eschewing fixed modes of being, it is forever in the making. The liberal subject is therefore *the* subject of crises (Evans 2012). It lives and breathes through the continual disruption to its own static modes of recovery. None of this is incidental. It is central to paranoiac underpinnings of contemporary forms of fascism. While security has become the main criteria of political legitimacy (Agamben 2001), still we hold onto the belief that subjects of crises are *desirable.* Freed from the boundary-drawing constraints of the past, it is the risk embracing subject who is enriched beyond their forbear's wildest dreams. This reveals the fateful paradox of our times. Encoded with an altogether more powerful bodily trope, contemporary liberal subjectivity is assumed to be exponentially more powerful and dangerous because of it. It, too, registers the same dynamic, decentralized and recombinant presumptions which give risk societies their very meaning. If its allegiance, then, can no longer be taken for granted, neither can its actions be anticipated with absolute precision. It, too, operates beyond the epistemic pale. While planetary life is therefore seen to be the proper embodiment of liberated political existence, life's emergent globality renders it globally dangerous unto itself because of this potentiality. We must in short learn to embrace and yet fear what we have become.

### Plan Text

#### Thus, Affirm: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike

### UV:

#### 1] Aff gets 1AR theory, Drop the Debater, and no RVIs – 1AR theory is the only recourse to check back infinite NC abuse, since it’s impossible to preempt NC abuse within the AC. Aff gets drop the debater, since 1AR is too short to win both theory and substance, and 2N doesn’t get RVIs, since RVIs uniquely deter the 1AR from checking NC abuse since the 1A knows the 2N can spend 6 minutes on the RVI and win. 1AR theory is the highest layer – Else, the NC has 7 minutes to be abusive and 6 minutes to leverage the abuse against 1A theory in the 2N, making checking abuse lexically impossible.

#### 2] Use reasonability on neg theory – **[a] Competing interps moots 6 mins of AC offense creating a 7-13 time skew which outweighs minimal aff abuse. [b] Offense-defense disincentivizes substantive education by shifting the round from the AC to a norm so their model prioritizes diminishing marginal skews over substance. That outweighs – the end goal of theory is better substantive debates.**

1. [Brad; Deleuze and Fascism; Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Global Inse- curities Center, the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, the University of Bristol, UK. He has published extensively on the Liberal bio-politics of security, contemporary war and political violence, the politics ofcatastrophe, along with mediation's on post-liberal political thought. Brad is the author of numerous books and edited volumes, most recently including: *Liberal Terror* (PolitYPress: 2013) and *Resilient Life: The Art ofLiving Dan- gerously* (forthcoming with Julian Reid, Polity Press: 2014). He is the Founder and Director of the Histories of Violence project (www.historiesofviolence.com) and a member of the Society for the Study of Bio-political Futures.; 2013] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)