## Aff

### Syllogism:

#### The Sovereign individual is a myth- We are incessantly experiencing and being experienced – I am not the same Ailsa I was 10 years ago, and I will continue to change from the present: Thus, affect as experience is the only constant of fluid bodies – definition is impossible Hardt 1:

Hardt, M. The Power to be Affected. Int J Polit Cult Soc 28, 215–222 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-014-9191-x

Lauren Berlant’s work is filled with explorations of the passions, the many ways in which we are affected by powers greater than ourselves—in institutional contexts and intimate relations, in sexual encounters and aesthetic experiences, and in political affairs and economic struggles. The object of her journeys through the affects is not simply to register or catalogue—let alone lament—the affective damage caused by living in contemporary society or the ways in which our desires are thwarted. Instead, she regards the pains, pleasures, frustrations, and longing as so many tracks we can follow to understand how people manage in this world to create new intimacies, new bonds, and new forms of life. 1 Simply getting by and surviving in a dangerous and threatening world, though, is not enough. Berlant revives classical concepts to name her ultimate goals: we should strive for the good life and seek human flourishing. Orienting the analysis and even the affirmation of the affects toward a project for the good life might well seem an odd combination since the classical tradition teaches us—or, at least, this is what we are usually told—that the passions are the ties that bind us in servitude; only following the dictates of sovereign reason can we truly flourish. In Berlant’s work, instead, the only path toward achieving the good life must be constructed with and through the affects. To understandthe arc of Berlant’sp r o j e c t ,If i n di th e l p f u lt op o s ei ti nr e l a t i o nt ot h a to fB a r u c h Spinoza, to which it has strong correspondences. (Berlant may well be a closet Spinozist—even without knowing it.) For Spinoza being affected by others, by external forces, is not a weakness but a strength, a power. As a first approximation, think of the power to be affected as a gauge of your Int capacity to be really in the world, to register and feel its diverse powers. Once we open up and expand our power to be affected, however, then begins the work of selecting among the affects and discovering the means to repeat or prolong those that are beneficial and prevent the detrimental. That is a path, through the affects, with the affects, toward the first step of this process is to take stock realistically and recognize that we are not sovereign subjects. Berlant is rightly suspicious of the standard ethical injunctions that assume our individual sovereignty, as well as those that aim at constructing or supporting sovereign political powers. Consider the sovereign individual, in corre-spondence with Carl Schmitt’sp o l i t i c a lf o r m u l a ,a st h eo n ew h od e c i d e s( 2007). Berlant questions both elements of this statement: the one and the decision. Sovereign decision, she claims, resides on an illusion of self-control, “a fantasy misrecognized as an objective state” (2011,p .9 7 ) .People are n ot always engaged in projects of self -extension, she says, and in fact, they seldom have significant control over their decision-making. Spinoza expresses the same idea in quantitative terms. The power of all individual or limited subjects to think and act autonomously corresponds proportionally to the relation between their powers and the power of nature as a whole. “**The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external cause**s” (1985 Ethics IV P3). Only God (or nature as a whole) is self-caused because it has no outside. The fact that the power of the world outside of us so far surpasses our own power means that we are affected by others much more than we affect the world or even autonomously affect ourselves, and thus, our capacity for sovereign decision-making is minimal too. The other half of Schmitt’s dictum is equally unfounded :“the one” never decides or acts or is acted on. The subject is never one. Agency **and** causality, Berlant suggests, should be understood not int e r m so fu n i t i e sb u ti n s t e a d“as dispersed environmental mechanisms at the personal as well as the institutional level” (2011, p. 114). Spinoza expresses this too in mathematical and geometrical form. A body or an individual, he explains, is formed when a great number of parts agree with each other and thus communicate in a consistent way (1985 Ethics II P13 definition). Essential to a body is the relation: the body lives as long as that relation is maintained. Instead of thinking in terms of unities, then, **we need to think** the relation **among multiplicities and** recognize the consistency of **dispersed landscapes**. To identify the locus of decision or acting or being acted upon, we need to look to not the one but the consistent relation among the many.

#### Comes before any ethical claim – its binding that no ethical theory can be inconsistent with the instability of the subject

#### Ethics must be a constant interrogation of static norms. This creation of new lines of flight redefines current concepts of normativity to that of deterritorialization. We need to imagine alternative ways to resolve oppression because existing norms propel violence against marginalized bodies.

Smith 03 [Daniel W. Smith (2003) Deleuze and the liberal tradition: normativity, freedom and judgement, Economy and Society, 32:2, 299-324]

Deleuze would no doubt have followed the same approach in his analysis of normativity had he addressed the issue directly. Foucault himself spoke of the power of what he called the process of normalization, which creates us, as subjects, in terms of existing force relations and existing ‘norms’. For Foucault, normalization is not merely an abstract principle of adjudication but an already actualized (and always actualized) power relation. Foucault’s question then became: is it possible to escape, or at least resist, this power of normalization? In Deleuze’s terminology, the same question would be stated in the following terms: within a given social assemblage or ‘territoriality’, where can one find the ‘line of flight’, or the movement of relative deterritorialization, by means of 51Q 08smith (ds) Page 307 Thursday, April 17, 2003 8:45 PM 308 Economy and Society which one can escape from or transform the existing norm (or territoriality)? From this viewpoint, neither Foucault nor Deleuze avoid the issue of normativity, they simply analyze it in terms of an immanent process. The error of transcendence would be to posit normative criteria as abstract universals, even if these are defined in intersubjective or communicative terms. From the viewpoint of immanence, by contrast, it is the process itself that must account for both the production of the norm as well as its possible destruction or alteration. In a given assemblage, one will indeed find normative criteria that govern, for instance, the application of the power of the State, but one will also find the means for the critique and modification of those norms, their deterritorialization. A truly ‘normative’ principle must not only provide norms for condemning abuses of power, but also a means for condemning norms that have themselves become abuses of power (e.g. the norms that governed the treatment of women, slaves, minorities, etc.). An immanent process, in other words, must, at one and the same time, function as a principle of critique as well as a principle of creation (the ‘genetic’ method). ‘The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are one and the same’ (Deleuze 1994: 139). The one cannot and ‘must’ not exist without the other If deterritorialization functions as a norm for Patton, then, it is a somewhat paradoxical norm. Within any assemblage, what is normative is deterritorialization, that is, the creation of ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze) or ‘resistance’ (Foucault) that allow one to break free from a given norm, or to transform the norm. What ‘must’ always remain normative is the ability to critique and transform existing norms, that is, to create something new (the category of the new should be understood here in the broad sense, including not only social change, but also artistic creation, conceptual innovation and so on.) One cannot have pre-existing norms or criteria for the new; otherwise it would not be new, but already foreseen. This is the basis on which Patton argues that Deleuze’s conception of power is explicitly normative: ‘What a given assemblage is capable of doing or becoming’, he writes, ‘is determined by the lines of flight or deterritorialization which it can sustain’ (Patton 2000: 106). (One might note here that the concept of ‘nomadic war-machines’, which was introduced in A Thousand Plateaus, is Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to address the question of a social formation that would itself be constructed along such movements or lines of flight. Patton suggests that such assemblages should in fact be called ‘metamorphosis’ machines (2000: 110), since they have only an external relation to war and a historically contingent relation to nomads; this is a suggestion that will no doubt be taken up by others. Metamorphosis machines would be the conditions of actualization of absolute deterritorialization and the means by which relative deterritorialization occurs: ‘They bring connections to bear against the great conjunction of the apparatuses of capture or domination.’ . . . A metamorphosis machine would then be one that . . . engenders the production of something altogether different. (Patton 2000: 110) 51Q 08smith (ds) Page 308 Thursday, April 17, 2003 8:45 PM Daniel W. Smith: Deleuze and the liberal tradition 309 Patton is therefore using the concept ‘normativity’ in a quite different manner than Fraser or Habermas. They would say that deterritorialization is not normative, and cannot be, since it eludes any universal criteria and indeed allows for their modification. Patton in effect responds by saying: for that very reason, it is deterritorialization that should be seen as a normative concept, even if that entails a new concept of what normativity is. At one point in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes that ‘one can conserve the word essence, if one wishes, but only on the condition of saying that essence is precisely the accident or the event’ (1994: 191). Patton seems to be saying something similar: one can conserve the word normativity, if one wishes, but only on the condition of saying that the normative is the new or the deterritorialized. Patton’s own trajectory is thus beginning to come into focus: rather than simply dropping or ignoring the concept of normativity, he instead proposes to create a new concept of normativity by critiquing components of the old one, and linking it up with a quite different set of related concepts. In this manner, he is effecting a transformation of the liberal concept, while still attempting to situate his own work fully within the liberal tradition.

#### However, we can utilize war machines that embraces difference and active desire Robinson 09

Andrew. Andrew Robinson is a political theorist and activist based in the UK. His book Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies (co-authored with Athina Karatzogianni) was published in Sep 2009 by Routledge. “In Theory Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation”. Ceasefire. September 10th

The state is also viewed as a force of ‘antiproduction’. This term is defined against the ‘productive’ or creative power Deleuze and Guattari believe resides in processes of desiring-production (the process through which desires are formed and connected to objects or others) and social production (the process of constructing social ‘assemblages’ or networks). Desiring-production tends to proliferate differences, because desire operates through fluxes and breaks, overflowing particular boundaries. The state as machine of antiproduction operates to restrict, prevent or channel these flows of creative energy so as to preserve fixed social forms and restrict the extent of difference which is able to exist, or the connections it is able to form. Hence, states try to restrict and break down the coming-together of social networks by prohibiting or making difficult the formation of hierarchical assemblages; it operates to block ‘subject-formation’ in terms of social groups, or the emergence of subjectivities which are not already encoded in dominant terms. Take for instance the laws on ‘dispersal’, in which the British state allows police to break up groups (often of young people) congregating in public spaces. Absurdly, the state defines the social act of coming-together as anti-social, because it creates a space in which different kinds of social relations can be formed. The state wishes to have a monopoly on how people interrelate, and so acts to prevent people from associating horizontally. Another example of antiproduction is the way that participation in imposed activities such as the requirement to work and the unpaid reproductive labour involved in families, leaves little time for other kinds of relationships – people don’t have time to form other assemblages either with other people or with other objects of desire. Hakim Bey has argued that this pressure to restrict connections is so strong that simply finding time and space for other forms of belonging – regardless of the goal of these other connections – is already a victory against the system. So what, in Deleuzian theory, is the alternative to the state? Deleuze and Guattari argue for a type of assemblage (social group or cluster of relations) which they refer to as the ‘war-machine’, though with the proviso that certain kinds of ‘war-machines’ can also be captured and used by states. This should not be considered a militarist theory, and the term ‘war-machine’ is in many respects misleading. It is used because Deleuze and Guattari derive their theory from Pierre Clastres’ theory of the role of ritualised (often non-lethal) warfare among indigenous groups. Paul Patton has suggested that the war-machine would be better called a metamorphosis-machine, others have used the term ‘difference engine’, a machine of differentiation, and there is a lot of overlap with the idea of autonomous groups or movements in how the war-machine is theorised. We should also remember that ‘machine’ in Deleuze and Guattari simply refers to a combination of forces or elements; it does not have overtones of instrumentalism or of mindless mechanisms – a social group, an ecosystem, a knight on horseback are all ‘machines’. The term ‘war-machine’ has the unfortunate connotations of brutal military machinery and of uncontrollable militarist apparatuses such as NATO, which operate with a machine-like rigidity and inhumanity (c.f. the phrase ‘military-industrial complex’). For Deleuze and Guattari, these kinds of statist war-machines are also war-machines of a sort, because they descend from a historical process through which states ‘captured’ or incorporated autonomous social movements (particularly those of nomadic indigenous societies) and made them part of the state so as to contain their subversive power. Early states learned to capture war-machines because they were previously vulnerable to being destroyed by the war-machines of nomadic stateless societies, having no similar means of response. Hence, armies are a kind of hybrid social form, containing some of the power of autonomous war-machines but contained in such a way as to harness it to state instrumentalism and inhumanity. Captured in this way, war-machines lose their affirmative force, becoming simply machines of purposeless destruction – having lost the purpose of deterritorialisation (see below), they take on the purpose of pure war as a goal in itself. Deleuze and Guattari argue that state-captured war-machines are regaining their autonomy in a dangerous way, tending to replace limited war in the service of a state’s goals with a drive to total war. This drive is expressed for instance in the ‘war on terror’ as permanent state of emergency. There was a recent controversy about Israeli strategists adopting Deleuzian ideas, which reflects the continuities between state war-machines and autonomous war-machines, but depends on a selective conceptual misreading in which the drive to total war denounced by Deleuze and Guattari is explicitly valorised. The Israeli army is a captured war-machine in the worst possible sense, pursuing the destruction of others’ existential territories in order to accumulate destructive power for a state. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is not the Israeli army but the Palestinian resistance which is a war-machine in the full sense. The autonomous war-machine, as opposed to the state-captured war-machine, is a form of social assemblage directed against the state, and against the coalescence of sovereignty. The way such machines undermine the state is by exercising diffuse power to break down concentrated power, and through the replacement of ‘striated’ (regulated, marked) space with ‘smooth’ space (although the war-machine is the ‘constituent element of smooth space’, I shall save discussion of smooth space for some other time). In Clastres’ account of Amazonian societies, on which Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is based, this is done by means of each band defending its own autonomy, and reacting to any potential accumulation of power by other bands. One could similarly think of how neighbourhood gangs resist subordination by rival gangs, or how autonomous social movements resist concentrations of political power. Autonomous social movements, such as the European squatters’ movement, the Zapatistas, and networks of protest against summits, are the principal example Deleuze and Guattari have in mind of war-machines in the global North, though they also use the concept in relation to Southern guerrilla and popular movements such as the Palestinian intifada and the Vietnamese resistance to American occupation, and also in relation to everyday practices of indigenous groups resisting state control. One could also argue that the ‘war-machine’ is implicit in practices of everyday resistance of the kind studies by James Scott. Marginal groups, termed ‘minorities’ in Deleuzian theory, often coalesce as war-machines because the state-form is inappropriate for them.

#### Thus the ROTB is to vote for the debater that best promotes the conditions for fluid subjectivity

#### Prefer Additionally:

#### The aff is key to adopt and test new resistance strategies within colleges and universities as contemporary pedagogical sites – operating internally is essential to hearing from multiple perspectives and forming new affective relations

Manning and Massumi 18 [Erin and Brian; “A Cryptoeconomy of Affect”; interviewed by Uriah Todoroff for The New Inquiry; Massumi is known for his translations of French post-structuralist classics like Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987); Manning is a prolific author whose last published book was *The Minor Gesture* (2016). They work together at the SenseLab in Montreal, a research laboratory Manning created to experiment with collective pedagogy. The lab provides a base for intellectual and creative activity that is intended to spin off into projects that grow or die according to their own momentum.; https://thenewinquiry.com/a-cryptoeconomy-of-affect/; BP]

There are people all over the world we don’t know who are doing this kind of work, who are creating ways of working together, inventing new forms of collaboration, engaging with complex ecological models of encounter, who are inventing new forms of value. We never believe we are alone doing this work. The question we have isn’t the usual start-up question of how to scale up, it’s how do we create techniques for the registering of that which doesn’t register? The 3E Process Seed Bank is deeply allied to the question of what else learning and living can be, having grown out of its sister project the Three Ecologies Institute. We actually began there, with the Three Ecologies Institute, working from Félix Guattari’s definition of the three ecologies as the conceptual (psychic, mental), the environmental, and the social. It was only two years ago that we realized that thinking value transversally across the three ecologies required us to also take financial value into account. We see the 3E as a kind of intensifier of modes of thinking and living dedicated to inventing ways that we can continue to learn together, regardless of our age, background, or learning style. We don’t see it as an opposite to the university; we see it as a parasite. You could put the emphasis on the site: a para-site, a para-institution that maintains relations with the institution of the university but operates by a different logic. It would be very naive of us to think you could just walk out of capitalism. We’re not that naive. Neoliberalism is our natural environment. We therefore operate with what we call strategic duplicity. This involves recognizing what works in the systems we work against. Which means: We don’t just oppose them head on. We work with them, strategically, while nurturing an alien logic that moves in very different directions. One of the things we know that the university does well is that it attracts really interesting people. The university can facilitate meetings that can change lives. But systemically, it fails. And the systemic failure is getting more and more acute. And so what we imagine is that the Institute, assisted by the 3E Process Seed Bank, will create a new space that might overlap with some of the things the university does well, without being a part of it (or being subsumed by its logic). **MASSUMI.—** Going back to the question of value, we want to create an economy around the platform that does not follow any of the usual economic principles. There will be no individual ownership or shares. There will be no units of account, no currency or tokens used internally. The model of activity will not be transactional. Individual interest will not be used as an incentivizer. What there will be is a complex space of relation for people to create intensities of experience together, in emergent excess over what they could have created working separately, or in traditional teams. It’s meant to be self-organizing, with no separate administrative structure or hierarchy, and even no formal decision-making rules. It’s anarchistic in that sense, but through mobilizing a surplus of organizing potential, rather than lacking organization. You could also call it communistic, in the sense that there is no individual value holding. Everything is common. **MANNING.—** Undercommon. **MASSUMI.—** Yes, undercommonly. The undercommons is Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s word for emergent collectivity, which is one of our inspirations. We want to foster emergence and process, but at the same time find ways of making it sustainable. That means that the strategic duplicity has to extend to the economy as we currently know it. We have to be parasitical to the capitalist economy, while operating according to a logic that is totally alien to it. What we’re thinking of is making the collaborative process moving through the platform function according to the radically anti-capitalist principles we were just talking about, centering on the collective production of surplus values of life, and separating that from the dominant economy by a membrane. A membrane creates a separation, but at the same time allows for movements across. It has a certain porosity. The idea is that we would find ways, associated with the affect-o-meter we were describing earlier, to register qualitative shifts in the creative process as it moves over its formative thresholds, and moves back and forth between online operations and offline events. What would be registered is the affective intensity of the production of surplus value of life, its ebbs and flows. The membrane would consist in a translation of those qualitative flows into a numerical expression, which would feed into a cryptocurrency. Basically, we’d be mining crypto with collaborative creative energies—monetizing emergent collectivity. The currency would be “backed” by the confidence we could build in our ability to keep the creative process going and spin it off into other projects, as evidenced by the activities of the Three Ecologies Institute as an experiment in alter-education.

### Contention 1:

#### Capitalism arose in Western Europe centered around appropriation of land for private use – This force supported by the state ruptures all existing relations, political or otherwise, and commodifies them into a single logic centered around accumulation of capital – this obliterates potential for affective: (Saldanha 1)

Saldanha, Arun. *Space after Deleuze*. Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.

As US hegemony started to appear doomed already in the mid-1970s, capital’s axiomatic creativity allowed it to start rearranging the North/South polarity globally (see ATP 566n23). Evidently capital has no special fondness for white people. As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, Deleuze has great interest in a question fundamental to both post-Braudelian comparative history and, at the beginning of capitalism’s adventure, Hegel: why did Europe become dominant? “The only universal history is the history of contingency. Let us return to this eminently contingent question that modern historians know how to ask: why Europe, why not China?” ( AO 224). While shipping in other civilizations supported commerce and despotic territoriality, Western Europeans developed the mad desire to cross the oceans and subdue populations. Capitalism proper requires a singular kind of adventurous zeal to extend the new conjunction of capital and labor fl ows. Closely following Marx, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the fl ows of commodities, technology, industry, money, and armies through China, India, or the Roman Empire were not allowed to “stream together” ( ATP 452). Capitalism only appears where and when labor is deterritorialized from serfdom and village, and capital from land and market square. The two fl ows are “conjugated” through the comparability granted by a uniform system of prices (including wages) and exchange rates. Conjugation is what capitalist fl ow is all about, from the machinic entangling of money, raw materials, tools, invention, and labor- power in eighteenth- century Lancashire to the computerized stock markets today. The new highly lucrative form of exploitation of industrial labor rapidly diffused by conjugating (deterritorializing) one market after another, so that Marx and Engels would in fi ve decades talk of one economic world- system. Globalization was of course an old dream of some emperors and holy men across the world, but it was only industrial wage- labor, fi nanced through previously accumulated mercantile wealth, that could kickstart this runaway process. Unlike the territorial morphology of antiquities and feudalisms, capital strives to absorb and overcode all political entities of the world. Now “we can depict an enormous, so-called stateless, monetary mass that circulates through foreign exchange and across borders, eluding control by the States, forming a multinational ecumenical organization, constituting a de facto supranational power untouched by governmental decisions” ( ATP 453). However, states have always been crucial for providing infrastructure and laying down axioms conducive to capital fl ow, especially through war and technology. For Marx (1992: part 8), of course, the “primitive accumulation” by states on the basis of dispossessing colonized populations was in hindsight another necessary territorializing project for capitalism to take off. Deleuze and Guattari push this further: “there is a violence that necessarily operates through the State, precedes the capitalist mode of production, constitutes the ‘primitive accumulation’, and makes possible the capitalist mode of production itself” ( ATP 447). A long passage in A Thousand Plateaus locates the origins of geographical FLOWS79 inequality in the extortion practices of ancient empires (437–47). The mere fact that agriculture produces a fl ow of surplus that has to be siphoned and distributed creates wealth for those who capture it. A state is in fact nothing but an “apparatus of capture.” The despot invents a new kind of arithmetic, money, in order to seize rent and tribute and, from around the sixteenth century, profi ts from trade and manufacturing. For thousands of years, therefore, the state machine has involved a “general space of comparison and a mobile center of appropriation” (444). Deleuze and Guattari make the startling claim that any sedentary society is already urban, stockpiling by exploiting many peripherals at once (440). In retrospect, but only in retrospect, the state, the city, and capitalism were and are tangible in nomadic and agricultural societies as transcendental limits in both the mathematical and geographic sense. These limits were actively staved off as undesirable by the nomads and savages. It is as if they presaged the global catastrophes of our twenty- fi rst century.

#### Capitalism thrives off the industrial appropriation of “new lands” or areas of space – imposing it’s own Eurocentric narrative of capital onto the areas and blocking off new relationships that people could create with the land (Saldanha 2)

Saldanha, Arun. *Space after Deleuze*. Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.

Deleuze formulates the island concept by drawing from Daniel Defoe’s classic Robinson Crusoe of 1719, which launched a central philosophical fi gure – “conceptual persona” in the terms of What is Philosophy? – of European colonial modernity. Crusoe embodies the early- capitalist belief in the power of civilization to recommence itself from scratch anywhere by virtue of its orderliness and, in this case, the sheer determination of one virtuous man and his slave, Friday. The celebration of industriousness is also a racialization or facialization (see next chapter) of the bodily affections of the protagonists. Crusoe and Friday form a microcosmic analogy of the real assemblage of plantation labor, which was in the eighteenth century accumulating towards British industrialization. Now, for Marxists (like Amin 1976 or Smith 2008), as much as for Deleuze and Guattari, to think human multiplicity (social formation) is to think inequality and mobility as themselves generative. We now add that the degree zero of European colonial society is found in the shipwreck narrative, and updated in disaster and adventure movies wherein the apocalypse challenges a white man to rebuild the civilization that spawned him. The white man believes it is his responsibility to conquer the furthest bits of earth and transcend all obstacles to his industriousness. The tragedy of ever-encroaching colonization includes the complicity of “savage” populations whom we now wish could have resisted the white man’s greedy appropriation, deadly guns and diseases, and quasi- divine self- confi dence. Robinson’s vision of the world resides exclusively in property; never have we seen an owner more ready to preach. The mythical recreation of the world from the deserted island gives way to the reconstitution of bourgeois life from the reserve of capital. [. . .] Robinson’s companion is not Eve, but Friday, docile towards work, happy to be a slave, and too easily disgusted by cannibalism. Any healthy reader would dream of seeing him eat Robinson. DI 12 The myth of subduing a wild island and savages represents a central racist myth driving the expansionism of capitalism. Deleuze takes issue not just with the racism but the metaphysical duality supporting it. According to the myth, Crusoe creates his little civilization by imposing a spatiotemporal regime upon himself, Friday, and “nature.” This legal regime is presented as something external to the bodies and ecosystems it organizes. It is what the dominant European political tradition calls a social contract, the rules whereby society maintains itself. Rational agents are to engage each other according to this contract if they are to live together peacefully. Society emerges only when competing individuals transfer some of their natural freedom to the collective level. In his lectures on Rousseau of 1959–60, Deleuze argues against this classical liberal conception (R 19ff). The Hobbesian presupposition is that a “war of all against all” is inevitable without a strong law. This is a convenient justifi cation of European conquest and government. Crusoe’s situation is not at all the state of “nature” as Crusoe already enjoys a theological privilege prior to his shipwreck. Why is he in the Pacifi c in the fi rst place? Humans never “revert” to “nature” when stranded on an island, as happens in William Golding’s The Lord of the Flies (1954). While Hobbes places in nature a determinism of competition that says much about early colonialist England (and nothing, incidentally, about the life of animals and plants), Deleuze reads in Rousseau’s version of the social contract a very different idea of nature, a “genetic virtuality” in which it makes no sense to talk about either atomistic individuals or human instincts (R 10). There is in Rousseau even a proto-Marxist understanding of the irreducibility of the social (R 11). Such a perspective allows one to see that violence or oppression does not constitute a primordial fact, but supposes a civil state, social situations, and economic determinations. If Robinson enslaves Friday, it is not due to Robinson’s natural disposition, and it is not by the power of his fi st; he does it with a small capital and the means of production which he saved from the debts, and he does it to subjugate Friday to social tasks, the ideas of which Robinson has not lost in his shipwreck. DI 53 It is only because of the recent inventions of capitalism and racism that Robinson Crusoe can institute the law on “his” island, not because there is some “natural” antagonism between different bodies, much less an innate superiority. If it is not beholden to some grim nature, a population might as well build an entirely new egalitarian society if they really want to, as they do in Aldous Huxley’s Island ( 1962 ). Following Rousseau’s notorious concept of the general will, Deleuze notes that a people creates itself to the extent that it exerts a rational, virtuous, fully egalitarian volition relatively autonomous from its physical- geographical limitations (R 24).