# Contracts NC

#### First, moral internalism is true:

#### Motivation must be the starting point of ethics since any normative ethical framework assumes that people will actually follow it. Motivation is the only thing that leads to action

#### Externalism collapses to internalism:

#### 1) External reason can’t explain action, it must be consistent with an internal desire

Joyce 01 Joyce, Richard (Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand). The Myth of Morality. 2001. SMHS ZS ***[Bracketed for grammatical clarity]***

Back to the  external reason[s]. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. [r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink - l have a reason not to drink. But how could that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the external reason even explain my [action] from drinking? Clearly, in order to explain it the external reason must have some causally efficacious role [in] the antecedents of the action (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the belief alone can[not] produce action, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that in order to explain an action the belief must couple with desires (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is [bad] tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but in that case the putative external reason collapses into an internal one

#### 2) Externalist theories can’t explain differences in motivation between individuals. Internalism shows how motivation is caused by internal desires that cannot be reduced to an external theory

Markovits 14 [Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. https://philpapers.org/rec/ROCJMM Oxford University Press, 2014.//Scopa] SHS ZS // SMHS ZS recut

Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. We should not assume that some of us have special epistemic access to what matters, especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment. It’s better to start from the assumption, as internalism does, that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit – and correct this assumption only by appealing to standards that are as uncontroversial as possible. According to externalism about reasons, what matters normatively – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – does not depend in any fundamental way on what in fact matters to us – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters, and some of us are “wrongly” motivated. But externalists can offer no explanation for this supposed difference in how well we respond to reasons – no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones – that doesn’t itself appeal to the views about what matters that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) A comparison to the epistemic case helps bring out what is unsatisfactory in the externalist position. We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than to others despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right in their beliefs about a certain topic. Chicken-sexing is a popular example of this among philosophers. We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens. But in the case of chicken-sexing, we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right. Externalism seems to tell[s] us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others, but without providing the independent means of determining which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).

#### 3) Externalism fails because agents only follow external demands that are consistent with their beliefs. For example, citizens only follow the law when it correlates with their desire-people ignore laws by speeding on a highway when they desire to and slow down for a cop when they desire to not get a ticket. Internal desire is what motivates action.

#### Next, only a contractarian system that derives principles of mutual restraint from individuals’ self-interest accounts for internal desire because contractarian principles are in the interest of all parties involved

Gauthier 86 Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

Moral principles are introduced as the objects of full voluntary ex ante agreement among rational persons.  Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.  But the parties to agreement are real, determinate individuals, distinguished by their capacities, situations, and concerns.  In so far as [Since] they would agree to constraints on their choices, restraining their pursuit of their own interests, they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do. As rational persons understanding the structure of their interaction, they recognize [the need] for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

#### We are not consequentialist- consequences are good and bad only within the context of individual desires and contracts of mutual self-restraint. No consequences are intrinsically good or bad

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with contractarian principles of mutual restraint, defined as principles by which individuals constrain their actions with the belief that doing so would serve their self-interest.

#### Prefer the standard:

#### 1) Contractarianism is based on consent through acceptance of a contract, which ultimately determines what qualifies as a net good or harm. Their framework forces conceptions of good and bad upon individuals through external means.

#### 2) Infinite Regress- Asking external authorities begs the question of why their conception of the good is correct and should be preferred. Contractarianism avoids this by allowing individuals to construct conceptions of the good based on a rational restriction of their future actions.

#### 3) Both debaters debate to win the round but we are still restricted by mutually agreed upon constraints like 4 mins of prep, speech times, etc. Their very performance justifies the NC framework and proves the AC collapses to the NC.

#### Now negate:

#### 1) Employees and their employers have formed an explicit contract that unifies the motivations of both the employee and the employer. Strikes are violating this by not upholding their agreement to work, which is intrinsically bad.

#### 2) Strikes themselves inhibit the ability to make contracts- unions force noncompliance with contracts and restrict the creation of new ones.

Levine 01 Peter. "The Libertarian Critique of Labor Unions." Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 21.4 (2001): 17-24. JG

Libertarians strongly defend freedom of choice and association. Thus, when workers choose to act collectively, negotiate together, or voluntarily walk off the job, libertarians have no reasonable complaint--even if other people are harmed--because they support the right to make and exit voluntary partnerships. But unions gain strength by overriding private rights. They routinely block anyone from working under a non-union contract, and they prevent employers from making offers--even advantageous ones--to individual workers unless the union is informed and consents. Unions declare strikes and establish picket lines to prevent customers and workers from entering company property; they may fine employees who cross these lines. They also extract fees from all workers who are covered by their contracts. Although covered workers may avoid paying for certain union functions (such as lobbying) that are not germane to contract issues, they must pay for strikes and other activities that some of them oppose. The great libertarian theorist Friedrich Hayek concluded that unions “are the one institution where government has signally failed in its first task, that of preventing coercion of men by other men--and by coercion I do not mean primarily the coercion of employers but the coercion of workers by their fellow workers.” Hayek may have been thinking mainly of corrupt and unaccountable union leaders. But even a completely democratic union sometimes supplants private rights. As libertarians like Morgan O. Reynolds point out, majorities within a union are able to ignore minorities’ preferences.