# Security K

#### Biden’s Presidency represents a new turning point away from prior ideology of securitization

Bentley 21 [Michelle Bentley, 2-4-2021, "Joe Biden's first foreign policy speech – an expert explains what it means for the world," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-first-foreign-policy-speech-an-expert-explains-what-it-means-for-the-world-154757>] ZS

One of the main takeaways from the speech is that Biden [is] setting out to show the world the gulf of difference between his administration and that of his predecessor. On one level, Biden is openly criticising and reversing pretty much everything Trump did in the foreign policy arena and, at the same time, attacking the ideology that underpinned it. This stance is reflected in the words that Biden used, such as “re-build” (America’s alliances) and “re-engage” (with the world). It’s going to take time to rebuild what has been so badly damaged. But that’s precisely what we’re going to do. At another level, Biden deliberately chose to reassure the international community that the era of American unpredictability was over. He sought to outline a clear vision of what the US will do next and how he hopes this will improve and stabilise international relations. But while Biden clearly wants allies and enemies alike to know where they stand, his speech was silent on Europe, the UK, and Brexit – as well as any threat it may pose to the Good Friday Agreement, which we know is very close to his heart. What this means for the future of the “Special Relationship” is anyone’s guess.

#### The aff’s security rhetoric and discourse reverses this, reifying security logic and manifesting into hegemonic state policies that transform political action. They’ll ask for lines in the aff, so here’s a bunch: “U.S. benevolent hegemony” “critical to preventing global authoritarianism” “a plethora of existential threats” “America is at a tipping point”

Echavarría ’06 (Josefina Echavarría, PhD in Peace, Conflict, and Democracy; Senior Lecturer for the United for Peace and Conflict Studies, “Re-thinking (in)security discourses from a critical perspective,” (2006), https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Rethinking\_insecurity\_Asteriskos\_01.pdf) IP \*\*brackets in original ev // recut SMHS ZS

In this specific point of the discussion, it is of extreme relevance to underscore that discourse does not just impl[ies] the merely linguistic but also the material practices since “discourses and their codes of intelligibility have concrete, and significant, material effects [by allocating] social capacities and resources and mak[ing] practices possible” (Weldes and others, 1999:16-17). In this sense, [d]iscourse is not merely spoken words, but a notion of signification which concerns not merely how it is that certain signifiers come to mean what they mean, but how certain discursive forms articulate objects and subjects in their intelligibility. […] Discourse not merely represents or reports on pregiven practices and relations, but it enters into their articulation and is, in that sense, productive (Butler, 1995b:138). Once there is a consensus about the correspondence between a discourse and reality, when any discourse becomes hegemonic and it is assumed [to be] a transparent and an accurate description of the state of things, it defines the “horizon of the taken-for-granted that marks the boundaries of common sense and accepted knowledge” (Weldes and others, 1999:17). And security has been installed within this realm of common sense as the negation of insecurity, as the pursuit of freedom from threat, as a positive goal in itself, as the primary function of the modern Nation-State and as the legitimizing promise of political order. 2.3. State discourses on security As it was sketched in the first part of this paper, the traditional view on security conceptualizes national security policies and state discourses about security problems as “choices about both the objectives of policy (ends), and the techniques, resources, instruments and actions which will be used to implement it (means)” (Buzan, 1991:330). In contrast to this view, from a critical perspective state discourses on security are understood as sites of social power in which the construction and the functions of security discourses and policies can be questioned. “Because discourses bring with them the power to define and thus to constitute the world, these representations of insecurity are themselves important sources of power” (Weldes and others, 1999:18). So what state security policies and discourses do is not just to identify threats in the outside and vulnerabilities in the inside as part of an imperfect art of security policy-making. The power relations that security policies signify create, recreate and transform the people in whose name they speak. Security policies speak to us and speak Us. They define what a threat is and what is not; who is an insider and who is an outsider. In this process security discourses create identity categories, such as Us and Them, which “are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary” (Butler, 1995a:50). By defining which actions can be carried out in the name of the state and which others defy the very idea of the state, security policies recreate the interests and the attributes of the state itself.

#### The impact is an inevitable cycle of violence and war. Security logic results in an insatiable feeling of insecurity that leads us to perpetuate conflict in a never-ending quest for “safety”

Chernus 1—Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder [“Fighting Terror in The National Insecurity State,” <http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm>] SMHS ZS

Just as the outcome of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II, and the outcome of World War II the seeds of the cold war, so the outcome of the cold war sowed the seeds of the war on terrorism. And this newest war is already, quite visibly, sowing the seeds of insecurity to come. It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era of the national insecurity state. Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity. It is not hard to see why. Four decades of cold war enshrined two fundamental principles at the heart of our public life: there is a mortal threat to the very existence of our nation, and our own policies play no role in generating the threat. The belief structure of the national insecurity state flows logically from these premises. If our nation bears no responsibility, then we are powerless to eradicate the threat. If others threaten us through no fault of our own, what can we do? There is no hope for a truly better world, nor for ending the danger by mutual compromise with "the other side." The threat is effectively eternal. The best to hope for is to hold the threat forever at bay. Yet the sense of powerlessness is oddly satisfying, because it preserves the conviction of innocence: if our policies are so ineffectual, the troubles of the world can hardly be our fault. And the vision of an endless status quo is equally satisfying, because it promises to prevent historical change. If peril is permanent, the world is an endless reservoir of potential enemies. Any fundamental change in the status quo portends only catastrophe. The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence. The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out. It is not surprising, then, that the pattern of insecurity crystallized during the cold war survived that war. The "experts" insisted that now we were less secure. September 11 proved them indisputably right. Now they offer an official story that pretends to see an end to insecurity, but actually promises the endless insecurity of another cold war. And the policies based on that story virtually guarantee that the promise will be fulfilled. But that is just what most Americans expect, in any event. Caged inside the logic of the insecurity state, they can see no other possibility. So the official story hardly seems to be one option among many. Its premises and conclusions seem so necessary, so inevitable, that no other story can be imagined. For huge numbers of Americans, the peace movement’s alternative story is not mistaken. It is simply incomprehensible, like a foreign language, for it assumes that we can take steps to address the very sources of insecurity. That denies the most basic foundations of the prevailing public discourse. Quite naturally, then, the majority embraces the only story it can understand. The story is persuasive because the alternative seems to be having no story at all. The official story prevails by default, as the nation faces the prospect of further war around the world. Yet that is only half its power. The other half comes from the paradoxical consolation it provides as we look back to what happened here at home, on September 11, when four hijacked planes crashed headlong into the national insecurity state. The cold war is long over, the Reds are long gone, and now the twin towers are gone, too. But the national insecurity state still stands. Indeed, it stands stronger and taller precisely because the towers are gone. Our sense of insecurity has grown. But it is not fundamentally different in kind. The attacks did not create a pervasive sense of insecurity. Rather, the insecurity that was already pervasive shaped the dominant interpretation of and response to the attacks. The first response was the nearly universal cry: "Pearl Harbor." But "this was not Pearl Harbor," as National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice recognized. There is no rivalry between great nation states. No foreign nation has attacked the U.S. No long-standing diplomatic and economic maneuvering preceded the attacks of September 11, 2001. Why, then, did they so quickly evoke the imagery of December 7, 1941? The common thread was not a hope for redemption, but only a conviction that the nation’s very existence was threatened. In 2001, that judgment is debatable, to say the least. Assuming that the attacks were indeed the work of a Muslim splinter group, such groups have been trying to attack U.S. interests for a quarter-century or more. One massive act of destruction, as horrendous as it was, hardly constitutes evidence of their overwhelming power. Nor is there any real evidence for Bush’s charge that these groups aim to impose their "radical beliefs on people everywhere¼ and end a way of life." Yet evidence is irrelevant in the national insecurity state. The fear comes first, before any evidence that it is warranted. How do we know that our existence is threatened? Because it is so obviously threatened! QED. This circular argument seems to be confirmed by the expressions of fear that have filled the mass media since September 11. They are certainly sincere. Yet it has become almost obligatory to say, "Life will never be the same because now, for the first time, we feel vulnerable." Most who say this can still remember, if they care to, the long cold war years of living on the brink of nuclear annihilation. Many are old enough to recall the Cuban missile crisis. Even more can remember the Reagan administration’s serious plans to fight a nuclear war. Are we really more vulnerable now, or only vulnerable in a different way? Are we really less secure than the days when one push of the button could trigger a thousand September 11’s? True, the September 11 attack was actual rather than merely potential. Yet the scale of the potential attack we feared for so long was so much greater than the actual attack. Why should so many say that the actual attack marked a quantum leap in national anxiety? The notoriously poor historical memory of Americans is only part of the answer. A larger part is the need to contain this new eruption of disorder within a familiar meaning structure. The study of human culture shows, over and over, that anxiety can be held in check, if not banished, by the way people talk about it. People can feel relatively secure amidst the most extraordinary disruption and anxiety, as long as they have familiar words that put the disruption into some larger, dependable, enduring order. The lifeline of security is a language that affirms the enduring truth of the prevailing discourse and worldview. Today, the discourse of the national insecurity state is the nation’s most familiar structure. How natural, then, to reaffirm the fundamental truth of that discourse, especially when its truth seems to be so empirically proven. Certainly, there is a very real danger of more attacks on U.S. soil. But the magnitude of the danger is measured by cultural needs rather than empirical considerations. In the insecurity state, universal cries of alarm, massive preparations for future attack, and protestations that life is fundamentally changed all show how little has really changed. They serve to confirm the basic premise that danger is eternal and unavoidable. The name of the danger changes from time to time; for now, its name is "terrorism." But the underlying reality remains the same. In the face of a massive shock to our cultural assumptions, that promise of continuity is immensely reassuring. This is the paradox that keeps so many millions trapped in the insecurity state. In order to feel culturally and psychologically secure, one must feel physically and politically insecure. Thus the problem¾ the fear of terrorist attack¾ becomes the solution. The film of the towers bursting into flame is shown over and over again. The sheriffs stockpiling gas masks and anthrax vaccine are interviewed over and over again. "Experts" explain "the psychology of the terrorist" over and over again. All of this has a ritualistic quality, for it serves much the same function as every ritual. It acts out the basic worldview of the insecurity state, confirming that it endures in the face of a massive challenge. The dominant response to the tragedy in the U.S. also confirms that our own policies play no role in evoking the danger. This message takes ritual form in prayer meetings, civic gatherings, charity drives, and the Bush administration’s humanitarian gestures for starving Afghans. All enact the essential goodness of Americans. Even the most benign and laudable responses to the tragedy¾ the national pride in heroic rescue efforts, the outpouring of generous contributions, the genuine concern for the welfare of Muslim- and Arab-Americans¾ are seized and twisted in the overpowering cultural grasp of the national insecurity state. As symbols of innocence, all reinforce the basic assumption that the U.S. is powerless to affect the sources of continuing insecurity. Bush has often stated the logical corollary of innocence. if our policies are not relevant to the problem, there is nothing to negotiate. In other words, the U.S. will not contemplate policy changes that might lead to any fundamental change in political or economic power relationships. Therefore the only remaining course is to heighten the nation’s guard and use force to control the behavior of would-be attackers. Much of the response to the tragedy reinforces these interlocked assumptions of powerlessness and innocence. The cries of alarm and defensive preparations create the impression that the nation is circling the wagons and hunkering down for a long siege, because there is nothing else to do. The ubiquitous American flag becomes a symbol, not of abolishing evil, but of banding together to withstand the assault of evil forever. Yet there is almost a palpable eagerness to feel vulnerable. The new sense of national unity comes less from a common commitment to victory than from a common conviction of victimization. Powerful vestiges of the crusading spirit do remain. There is still a longing for unconditional triumph over the foreign foe. The constant allusions to Pearl Harbor, FDR, and World War II express these longings. More importantly, they create the illusion that genuine security is still possible. It is disconcerting to live amidst insecurity and even more disconcerting to acknowledge it openly. So the story of the "good war" is evoked endlessly, because it would be so reassuring to be able to wage another "good war." But the gestures of apocalyptic hope have a peculiarly forced, artificial quality, as if the public is trying to draw the last vestiges of living marrow out of an increasingly dead husk. The symbols, rituals, and mantras of the redeemer nation serve a very different role when public culture no longer really believes in the redemption. The problem is defined in apocalyptic terms. But no apocalyptic solution is available, nor even suggested. Talk of hope for security still elicits powerful images of the peril we hope to be secure from. But talk of peril is simply talk of peril, not a prelude to hope. There are no safe homes we can return to, for we must assume that the enemy, in one form or another, will always be at our gates. Political leaders and pundits offer only an endless horizon of unflagging efforts to maintain relative stability. In an inherently unstable world, made less stable by a superpower pursuing control, this is indeed "a task that does not end." All that once symbolized hope for the Kingdom of God on earth (whether in religious or secular form) now locks us into a future of inconclusive struggle and mounting anxiety. And the more we are convinced that insecurity is perpetual, the more we will resist fundamental change. That, of course, is the ultimate point. The prospect of another long, twilight struggle returns our culture to the certitude of simplistic absolutes. It erases the uncertainties of the ‘90s. It reassures us that nothing has really changed and nothing need ever change. It offers the best reason to go on resisting change. All of the preparations for and acts of war, all the warnings of and protections against future attacks, all the patriotic singing and flag-waving, all the gestures of hope that things will be better in the future, indeed all the dominant cultural responses to the attacks¾ all are now representations of the overriding conviction that security is still an impossible dream, that the future will not be fundamentally different from the present. In a society so fearful of change, where constant change provokes widespread despair, the conviction of unchanging insecurity engenders a strange kind of confidence. Millions now look ahead with more hope precisely because they can now believe that there is nothing really new to hope for. They cling to the insecurity that justifies their resistance to change. They take comfort in knowing that the explosions of September 11, which we are told changed everything, could not shake the foundations of the national insecurity state. The official story of the war on terrorism gives them that perverse comfort. For years to come, we shall live in the shadow of the tragic deaths of September 11, 2001. As long as the official story prevails, death will be piled upon death, and suffering upon suffering. The national insecurity state affords no prospect beyond death and suffering.

#### Empirics prove- the war in Iraq was manufactured by the same rhetoric present in the aff

Covington 05 [LaKesha Nicole Covington, "From 9/11 to Iraq: Analysis and critique of the rhetoric of the Bush Administration leading to the war in Iraq, " 2005, <https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/2916>] ZS

However, what I did not expect to find was that this quest for a regime change in Iraq had been in the minds of so called, "neoconservatives" for many years. Before beginning this project, it was almost unthinkable for me that there was a group of people in this country that would take the suffering of the thousands, perhaps millions, to fulfill their idea of what they believe the world should be Reflecting back to the literature review and what was discovered about propaganda during times of war and conflict, I have learned that rhetoric and propaganda played a major role in bringing our country from the events of September 11, 2001 to the start of the war in Iraq on March 19, 2003. The use of rhetoric and propaganda made it possible for the neoconservatives to first convince President Bush that going to war with Iraq was the right decision, then take the fears of the American public and use them to justify a war in Iraq. This is similar to the way that rhetoric and propaganda was used during WWI, WWII, and the Cold War to gain support for war. The neoconservatives in the Bush Administration accomplished their goal of going to war with Iraq buy using rhetoric and propaganda in. different ways. The rhetoric and propaganda of the neoconservatives in the Administration began almost immediately after the events of September 11th. After the terrorist attacks, the neoconservatives began pushing the Iraq agenda by telling President Bush that they believed that the country was involved in the. attacks on the country. The alleged intention of Iraq to purchase uranium from Niger further pushed the agenda of the administration by providing more information supporting the assertion that Iraq had WMDs. Finally, the NIE and the White paper were the final pieces of rhetoric used by the administration to justify their case for war. The White Paper essentially frightened the American public into accepting that a war in Iraq was the best course of action. The media reported all of these "facts." Dyer (1942) asserted that if propaganda is successful, it emphasizes all of the extremes and does not often admit that there is a middle ground. Dyer (1942) further asserts that a propagandist is led to take a portion of the truth and dress it as either black or white, which results in statements that are part truth and part lie. It seems that the neoconservatives and other members of the Bush Administration were using propaganda according to Dyer's definition. The Bush Administration had information that was part truth and part lie (the phony documents from the Nigerien embassy). The administration either believed that this information was complete or they did not care if it was incomplete.

#### The alt is to reject the aff in favor of a deconstruction of their threat construction.

#### This dismantles the threats of the 1ac and the military industrial complex’s hold on imagination.

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In a later book, National Deconstruction, Campbell offers an illuminating account of the Bosnian war using Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida to discuss the nature of responsibility to the Other. Campbell argues that Levinas's work makes it impossible for anyone to say that the Bosnian war was not their concern. This is because Levinas's conception of responsibility toward the Other is not an add-on to already existing identities and subjectivities. Rather, "subjects are constituted by their relationship with the Other."122 By reconfiguring subjectivity in this way, that is, by making it an effect of the relationship with the Other, Levinas also reconfigures ethics. Thus, the war in Bosnia gives us a lack of choice; we cannot opt out of involvement, because ethics "has been transformed from something independent of subjectivity—that is, from a set of rules and regulations adopted by pregiven, autonomous agents—to something insinuated within and integral to that subjectivity."123 Campbell argues that this form of thinking "can help identify and energize the political ethos through which the development of a political life adequate to the complexities of Bosnia might be possible."124 Crucially, Campbell shows how a deconstructive approach can say something detailed about what to do in a case like Bosnia, and he argues powerfully that deconstructive thought allows politics to be politics rather than a "predetermined technology or an undemocratic program hostile to the ethos of the Enlightenment." In contrast to the international community's response, based on realism, which furthered the violence in Bosnia, he believes that "a range of political options informed by deconstructive thought might possibly better address the conflict."126 He gives two reasons for this claim: the first is that whereas others might see contradictions as obstacles to a just politics, deconstructive approaches see these as the contradictions "necessary for a politics, and as such they have to be contested and negotiated rather than transcended and escaped."127 The second, and, he claims, the more important, reason is that all political proposals "have to be preceded by the qualification of a 'perhaps' and followed by an insistent and persistent questioning." In other words, deconstructive thought is never satisfied with claims that a lasting solution to problems can be, or has been, reached.