#### The aff reifies humanism in its contextualization of space as merely a resource to be exploited for human benefit, justifying the superiority of humans over our natural environment

Ferrando 16 [(Francesca, Ph.D. in philosophy, M.A. in Gender Studies, Professor.@ NYU) “Why Space Migration Must Be Posthuman”, 2016, http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/76546/1/147.pdf.pdf#page=136yperlink] TDI

In 2008, NASA released an official Statement on the Environmental Impact (PEIS), which takes into consideration the environmental impact of space tech- nology on Earth, but it does not acknowledge its impact on other celestial bodies, such as the Moon or other planets of the Solar System. Critical to this type of anthropocentric and Earth-centric approach, William Kramer underlines: “there is no comprehensive process required...for assessing human impacts on those extraterrestrial environments” (2014, 216). Space technology and space-based human activity shall be analyzed from a view which takes into account their effects not only on humans and on Earth, but on outer space as well. In order to address this issue, we first need to engage with the question asked by Reinman (2009): is (outer) space an environment? If so, it shall be regulated under specific environ- mental conditions. In Reinman’s opinion, “space at large should not enjoy a moral status equal to Earth” (ibid., 86), as she grants a primacy to Earth based on bio-centric values: “In many ways Earth, with its unique, abundant life, is special. There is nothing quite like it in the Solar System” (ibid.). Although the point raised by Reinman is of key importance to our discussion, from a posthuman perspective, regarding the Earth as “special” because of its life abundance is problematic, being supported by an Earth-centric, bio-centric and quantitative principle which supremacy is not inherently justified; life itself, in fact, is a slippery concept. The current understanding of life is merely descriptive, not definitive: the border between animate/inanimate is difficult to mark and is often transgressed.24 Viruses, for instance, exhibit some of the characteristics which are common to organic life, while they are missing others, challenging the biological concept of life itself.25 More in general, it can be stated that life is not a clearly defined notion; instead, as Michel Foucault noted: “Life...is a category of classification, relative, like all the other categories, to the criteria one adopts” (1966; Engl. Transl. 1970, 161). Going back to Reinman’s conclusions, she underlines an aspect of strategic relevance for a posthumanist sensitivity: “humans’ actions towards their surroundings will continue to affect people whether we live on Earth or in space” (2009, 86). Let’s reflect further upon this point. The non-human agency of matter (Barad 2007), as high- lighted within the frame of New Materialism, plays a key role in allowing us to recognize agency to planets, stars and asteroids. The relational onto-epistemological approach of New Materialism makes us think on the possible astro-ecological impacts of Moon mining, or of terraforming in Mars,26 on the balance of the solar system and, eventually, on their orbits. Even the environmentally-sound concept of space-based solar power (cf. Ernst 2013) should be considered from perspectives others than Earth. Object-Oriented Ontology, and in particular the ndotion of “Hyperobjects” (Morton 2013), highlights the material viscosity of objects whose performance exceeds both a particular space and a particular time: reading the current opening of the space market from this perspective will unmask the long-term irreversible consequences of our present actions. Space is the next frontier, where new resources, habitats and life forms are currently being sought: in November 2015, the United States Government passed the “Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act “[t]o facilitate a pro-growth environment for the developing commercial space industry by encouraging private sector investment” (U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act 2015). Although approaching outer space as a resource may spark interest and funding, from an heideggerian perspective, it is ontologically limiting and epistemologically partial, based on an Earth-centered policy sustained by an anthropocentric Weltanschauung. Furthermore, the “Space Act” may contravene the international regulations laid down by the “Outer Space Treaty” (1967), a key document ratified by 104 countries, including the US, which still represents the legal framework for space activity. The Office for Outer Space Affairs of the United Nations summarizes the following principles as the main ones sustaining the Treaty: the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all mankind; outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States; outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means; States shall not place nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer space in any other manner; the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; astronauts shall be regarded as the envoys of mankind; States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by gov- ernmental or non-governmental entities; States shall be liable for damage caused by their space objects; and States shall avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies. (Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 1967) As we can see, this document is based on the principle of the common heritage of humankind, according to which “outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty”. Conceived during the Cold War, the Treaty inaugurates a post-nationalistic post-bellic approach to space, setting a new paradigm which has departed from the dualistic imprinting of “us” against “them”. Although still within an anthropocentric schemata focussed on the interests of “mankind”, the step is huge. For instance, celestial bodies shall be used “for peaceful purposes” and shall not be contaminated; astronauts are considered the “envoys” of humankind.27 The human frame has been opened and expanded: posthumanism has entered the gates to the heavens.

#### Also, Their view of “junk” as a threat to techno-capital expansion is an attempt to bury their co-constitutive ecology. It is only the image of the objects of our accumulation remaining to haunt us.

Ivakhiv 18 [(Adrian, Professor of Environmental Thought and Culture at the University of Vermont) Shadowing the Anthropocene: Eco-Realism for Turbulent Times, 2018] TDI

The signs are there for those who pay attention to them. Reports of melting glaciers and impending crashes. Crashes of the ocean’s fish stocks, mass extinctions on a scale not seen in 65 million years. Stock market crashes, internet seizures and data breaches, doomsday viruses online and off. Plane crashes and mysterious disappearances in Indian or Mediterranean seas. Rising sea levels and strengthening storms, with tag-teamed hurricanes battering and flooding coastal areas. Hundred-year droughts arriving in back to back years. Swirling accumulations of trash in the middles of the world’s oceans. Accumulations of toxic particles, radioactive dust, and microscopic plastic pellets in the bodies and bloodstreams of every living thing on Earth. Accumulations of space junk in the atmosphere. Mountains of waste, electronic and otherwise, building up to WALL·E-like sce- narios, but without Disney/Pixar’s (or the Buy-N-Large corpo- ration’s) interstellar cruise-ship escape. Sooner or later, the trash will hit the fan, the crash will burst the dam, the supercollider will hit with the full force of its im- pact. The mad rush for land, for survival, for salvation, will begin in earnest, even for the most protected of us. These are among the material ecologies that make up the era tendentiously and contentiously called the Anthropocene, the New Era of the Human. There are other kinds of ecologies be- sides these material ones: social ecologies, and perceptual ecologies. I’ll explain why it’s better to think in threes than in twos, and why the social, the material, and the perceptual make a useful frame for thinking of the ecologies that constitute the world. Our social ecologies work the same way as our material ecologies, with blowback to widening inequalities and horrific injustices coming in the form of movements of growing refugee populations—economic refugees, climate refugees, refugees from wars fought over the stakes of all these crashes and the political violence and terror that accompanies them. Between the material and the social are the fleshy, intersensorial dynamics from which the material and the social, or the “objective” and the “subjective,” continually emerge. Drawing from the ecosophies of Félix Guattari and Gregory Bateson, I will call these our mental or perceptual ecologies. Blowback there comes as guilt, bad dreams, ghostly observances fractur- ing our sensory perceptions, inarticulate rage against those who question the tacitly held consensus. This is the hauntedness of the present by the abyss of an ungraspable and inconceivable future. It is these affective undercurrents that are our responses to the eyes of the world haunting us from out of the corners of our vision. (More on those eyes later.) They are what makes us feel that things aren’t right—a hint at the traumatic kernel of real- ity that both psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and, with a different inflection, Buddhist philosophers have placed at the origin of the self, but which in a collective sense is coming back to haunt us globally. We misperceive the nature of the world for the same reasons that we misperceive the nature of our selves. Every social and linguistic order interpellates its members—it shapes and hails them into existence with a call of “Hey you!” Each does it differ- ently. But over the course of the storied history of humans — not the meta-narrative of the Anthropos, just the patchy tale of humanity in its quiverings and coruscations—most such or- ders have incorporated into that interpellation some sense of responsibility to more-than-human entities or processes. In whatever way they were conceived—as spirits or divinities, or as kin, or in terms of synthetic narrative or conceptual meta- phors like life-force, the Way, the path, li and ren, 礼 and 仁, the four directions, Muntu and Ubuntu, Buen Vivir, Nepantla, some gift-giving and life-renewing sacrifice, and so on—these have typically borne a central connection to the kinds of relations we now categorize as ecological. (At least for those social orders that worked.) Modern western capitalism has fragmented these relations, setting us up individually in relation to the products of a seem- ingly limitless marketplace. But it has left us collectively rudder- less. So if scientists, the empirical authorities of our time, tell us we are fouling our habitat, we have yet to figure out how to respond to that, at least at the global scales where most of the problems become manifest. This is why it is the relational, more than the substantive or “objectal,” that humans, especially westerners, need to come to terms with. That is in part the argument of this book. Commodity capitalism has been profoundly successful at encouraging us to think that objects are real, and at projecting value into those objects so that they serve the needs of individuals, even if they never manage to do that (which is, of course, the point). The effects of our actions, on the other hand, are systemic and relational, and we won’t understand them unless we come to a better appreciation of how systems and relational ecologies work and of how we are thoroughly enmeshed within them. At the same time, it is the objects that haunt us: the refuse swirling around in the middle of the Pacific, the mountains of excreted e-waste, the stuff we send down our chutes, out our drains, off to the incinerator, the river, the ocean, the atmosphere—the black holes, out of sight and out of mind, from which we hope they never re-emerge. When they do re-emerge, in our fantasies and nightmares, we reify them as the Thing, a Demon, a Host—as in Bong Joon-Ho’s thriller of that name, about a river monster embodying the legacy of industrial pollution in South Korea’s Han River. The objects become sublime. If our consumptive, commodity-captivated and spectacle- enraptured society has privileged the object over the process, the thing at the center of our attention over the relations that constitute it, this thing-centeredness should not surprise us. In part, it is an effect of the human perceptual apparatus, with its heavy reliance on vision, a sensory modality that shows clear edges to objects and that facilitates distanced observation and predation. Where traditional cultures de-emphasized the visual in favor of the auditory or multisensorial, the narrative, and the relational, societies like ours—fragmented and individualized, intensely visually mediated, and ecologically and historically disembedded societies (in the sense described by Karl Polanyi in his paradigm defining The Great Transformation)1 — push the ontological objectivism, literally the “thing-ism,” about as far as it can go.

#### The impact is a state of permanent war—their political discourses surrounding space make militarization inevitable. So long as space is viewed as yet another frontier to exploit for human gain, we will be left endlessly fighting over its resources

Dickens and Ormrod 16 [(Peter Dickens, Senior Research Associate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge, member of the Red-Green Study Group in London, James S Ormrod, Principal Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Brighton), “The Future of Outer Space”, *The Palgrave Handbook of Society, Culture and Outer Space*] TDI

An argument can be made that the conquest of outer space has represented the ultimate victory of abstract space (see also Shaw, 2008, p. 115). Any meaningful distinction between terrestrial space and the rest of the cosmos has been eroded. This is not to say that the whole of outer space has been humanized, which of course it has not, but that space has come to be reconceptualized and re-experienced as a space for accumulation like any other. It is a space thoroughly colonized by terrestrial knowledge and practice (whether considered primarily capitalist, male, white or anything else). For Benjamin and a host of others (from Klerkx, 2005, to Parker, 2009), the disinvestment in outer space exploration and development came as a result of the bureaucratization of NASA, and its engulfment within the military-industrial complex. With the development of the International Space Station (ISS) and the Space Shuttle (which according to some accounts were each the rationale for the development of the other), space exploration became routine and unexciting. Nothing fundamentally new appeared to be happening in space. Whether or not this is seen as true depends a great deal on perspective. Even if NASA budgets were being cut, this volume has hopefully made clear that a great deal was still happening in space. New space technologies continued to be developed, and these technologies were being integrated into terrestrial life in innumerable ways. But we believe it is also true (and this has been the emphasis of our work elsewhere, see Dickens and Ormrod, 2007) that these developments represent the continuation of terrestrial power relations and social dynamics. Space development is, to put it one way, business as usual. And crucially, any novelty to these developments was undermined by the representation of outer space in similar terms to the representation of terrestrial space. As evidenced in this book, political scientists, geographers and legal scholars had begun to talk about outer space as a knowable, if not actually known, space. The origins of this representation of space can be traced to Copernicus (MacDonald, 2009) and/or Kepler (Zubrin, 1996). But with the routinization of outer spatial practices (from increasing launch rates to the proliferation of satellite-receiving terminals, to the everyday use of satellite services to underpin military operations, communications, entertainment, navigation and so on), these representations were made manifest in the creation of a new social space. The central problem with the final victory of abstract space was that it obliterated the very ‘absolute spaces’ on which it was founded, and from which it derived its emotional appeal. It is in a way surprising that the development of modern spaceflight was from its inception anchored in a religious or spiritual cosmology. This was true of both Russian and American contexts (see also Geppert, 2007, p. 599). The Russian programme has long roots in the tradition of Russian cosmism (Kohonen, 2009; Siddiqi, 2010). And, as Pop notes, Richard Nixon said to the Apollo 11 astronauts; ‘Because of what you have done, the heavens have become a part of man’s world.’ Pop goes on: ‘Are we today turning mythology into fact?’ – asked Joseph Campbell on the occasion of the Apollo programme. The astronauts walked on the real astronomical moon, as it was; but they walked on the mythical moon of each culture, as thought to be, as imagined. Their trip was physical and metaphysical. They walked through different cosmogonies; through different models of the universe. (Pop, 2012, personal communication, see also ‘High Flight: A Spiritual History of the Space Age’, in preparation) This continued relationship was not coincidental. As a number of contributions here show, the appeal of outer space lay in the promise of conquering the wondrous or Godly and hence the elevation of the status of humanity (or, rather more specifically, white men). This is not necessarily that dissimilar to the process Sims describes in his chapter, whereby myths ‘record time’. Ormrod illustrates this in his chapter through analysis of Tsiolkovsky’s science fiction in which the best human beings are able to fly like angels in space. As Kilgore notes in his chapter, Carl Sagan owed his continued appeal to his simultaneous reproduction of wonder as well as knowledge. The British celebrity cosmologist Brian Cox (see Mellor, this volume, for more on him) has arguably taken this even further, such that his popular shows and writing dedicate more time to what is unknown than to knowledge itself. These lacunae became spaces for wild imaginative projects – projects more captivating than any empirical knowledge. It is no wonder that the continued disenchantment and re-enchantment of the universe have become a major theme in recent work. Based largely on studies of astronauts’ experiences, Kilbryde (2015) argues that space exploration can potentially be a means of overcoming the dualism through which outer space is constructed as an object, and thus of experiencing unity. This is provided that the sense of awe and wonder it engenders is not sought as a ‘possession’ of the individual or as something to be subsequently rationalized. It is the invocation of obstacles that produces space as something potentially unconquerable, and hence worth conquering. And yet the obliteration of the irrational or wondrous sweeps the ground from underneath such a project. To the extent that outer space has become an abstract space, it has been foreclosed as a frontier. It is a frontier, but a frontier without a future. In removing the possibility of an elsewhere, it serves only to secure terrestrial hegemony. In their own ways, both Baudrillard and Virilio present such a view of outer space. For Baudrillard, it was in any case a frontier that served as a model for terrestrial life, which set the permissible limits for struggle and confrontation within it. He concludes, Through the orbital inscription of a spatial object, it is the planet earth that becomes a satellite, it is the terrestrial principle of reality that becomes eccentric, hyperreal, and insignificant. Through the orbital installation of a system of control like peaceful coexistence, all the terrestrial microsystems are satellized and lose their autonomy. (p. 35) Everyone on Earth is neutralized and homogenized. The proliferation of space technology since he was writing, and the blurring of civilian and military technologies, has only broadened the potential of such an understanding. Parks and Schwoch (2012, p. 4), in the context of the ‘satellization’ of global security, refer to the satellites as ‘the ultimate rationalization and instrumentalization of the quest for global security and domination’. For Virilio, there [is] such a homology between the technologies of war, the image of space as a battlefield and the political discourses about space that the future seemed equally foreclosed. He makes the claim that any space is constituted ‘from the outside’ (cited in Bormann, 2009, p. 80). That is to say, it is perceived on the basis of that which precedes it. Bormann is therefore able to argue that ‘nothing about outer space is “out there”, what we get to know about outer space is always socially, spatially and locally embedded’ (p. 80). Bormann, following Virilio, seems to believe that this is especially true of the vacuum of outer space: [O]ther than the view there is no physical or physiological contact. No hearing, no feeling in the sense of touching materials, with the exception of an actual Moon landing. Thus the conquest of space, of outer space – isn’t it more the conquest of the image of space? (Virilio & Ujica, 2003, cited in Bormann, 2009, p. 84) Bormann reaches the pessimistic conclusion that ‘the perpetuation of outer space as a sphere of permanent war and its claims to weaponization will soon make no alternative possible’ (p. 84). This is the product, in the large part, of her assumption that ‘[w]hat we get to know about the space of outer space is dominated by information provided through the possibilities (and limits) of military technology’ (p. 81).

#### Additionally, humanism is the root cause of climate change and environmental impacts- a humanist attempt to address climate change is doomed to fail

Andrew 17 [Baldwin, Andrew (2017). Climate change, migration, and the crisis of humanism. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 8(3), e460–. doi:10.1002/wcc.460] ZS

Among the foundational tenets of modern thought is the belief that Man possessed the capacity to control Nature. This belief figures centrally within genres of humanist thought in which the human is said to be unique amongst all other living and nonliving entities. Reason, it was said, is what set the human apart from the nonhuman, and reason, properly deployed through science and art, would allow the human total mastery of space (Nature) and time (History). Indeed, one of the core ideas of humanist thought is the notion that humans are the agents of world history. Modern European philosophers like John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and Immanuel Kant all located human subjectivity and reason at the center of their worldviews, even while such views were all radically different. The idea that humans are the agents of history reached its apogee in the experience of European colonialism when European states sought mastery over the colonized world. And in respect of Europe’s colonial history and aftermath it is important to remember that not all humans have been admitted equally into the category of the human.3–5 But with climate change, belief in human mastery of Nature is called into question. For climate change exemplifies the recurring modern trope of Nature’s return. This is the inconvenient idea that nature is not simply available to human manipulation without consequence, but contains the everpresent capacity to overwhelm humans. This is the idea that in spite of our efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions, climate change is an accelerating geophysical phenomenon that exceeds human control, even while humans are its cause. It is what William Cronon (1996) long ago called ‘nature as the demonic other, nature as the avenging angel, nature as the return of the repressed.’ 6 In this sense, we might say that climate change is a particular instance of the crisis of humanism. It embodies the dawning realization that Nature is an uncontainable force, the realization that human distinctiveness from Nature was only ever a provisional belief, and even then a provisional belief confined only to European thought. Climate change forces us to confront our faith in reason. There is, of course, nothing exceptional about climate change in this regard. Whether in the form of an earthquake, tsunami or disease, Nature’s return has always been an ever present feature of modern human society and therefore philosophy.7 Contemporary debates in philosophy, the humanities, and interpretive social sciences have been grappling with these issues for quite some time. Under the broad heading of ‘posthumanism,’ much of this philosophical enquiry has entailed charting the various ways that human distinctiveness from Nature, and indeed human control over Nature, is an artifact of the ideology of humanism.8,9 Bruno Latour10 has been at the forefront of this philosophical exercise, arguing against the ‘modern constitution’ that divides human society from the natural world. So too the geographer Sarah Whatmore,11 for example, has been instrumental in arguing that human societies are always ‘more-than-human’. What these philosophies amount to is the idea that what we understand to be ‘the human’—a self-contained, bounded entity, internal to itself, governed by internal reason, and possessed of the capacity to shape the world to suit his/her needs—is a fiction. According to posthumanist philosophy, the human is best understood as relational, or that being human is in equal measure a function of human agency and the agency of ‘things,’ 12 everything from microbes and Big Data all the way up to the global climate system. It is in this sense that we can say that humanism is in crisis. Its apparent foundations appear to have been washed away.

#### The alt is to recognize a harmonious relationship between humans and nature, rejecting any conceptual distinction between the two

Dussault 16 [Antoine Dussault, (2016). Ecological Nature: A Non-Dualistic Concept for Rethinking Humankind's Place in the World. Ethics and the Environment, 21(1), 1–. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.21.1.01] ZS

The concept of ecological nature3 I propose allows for comparisons between the ecological soundness of different cultures which do not fall into the nature/culture trap. Ways of life that are more in harmony with nature are not so because they are less cultural or more primitive, but rather because they are differently cultural. Alienation from the ecological world is not inherent to the notion of culture. Being alienated from nature is a question of the content of a culture, not about its being a culture per se. Culture, the typically human mode of adaptation, which allows us to compensate for the traits and abilities that our biological evolution did not equip us with, can give rise to more or less eco-friendly practices. The recognition that, in the last few centuries, the world’s dominant culture has propagated an ecologically unsound way of life does not obviate the possibility of better cultural alternatives. In Aldo Leopold’s vision, as “the ethical sequence” section of “The Land Ethic” makes clear, the adoption of a harmonious relationship with the land constitutes moral progress (see Leopold 1949, 202–03). It is about going forward, not backward. But it is about going forward in another direction than the one pursued heretofore by modern civilization and it represents a radical shift from the received notion of progress understood as the gradual isolation of humans from nature. Ethics is part of culture, and therefore any ethical project vests some hope in the ability of culture to change us for the better. Leopold’s vision thus embodies the hope that, even in “advanced” societies, culture can be a route to healthy ecological behavior. As Callicott (1991, 351) notes: “Precisely because the works of man are largely cultural they are capable of being rapidly reformed. Other animals cannot change what they do in and to their biotic communities, at least not very rapidly, and perhaps not ever consciously and deliberately. We can, since our economic behaviors are determined more by our cultures than by our genes.” Callicott is quick to emphasize that this does not mean that the solution that will work for us today will be identical or even similar to those that worked for the aboriginal groups mentioned above. As he reminds us: “The human-nature relationship is an ongoing, evolving, one. We can, I am confi dent, work out our own, post-modern, technologically sophisticated, scientifi cally informed, sustainable civilization just as in times past the Minoans in the Mediterranean, the vernacular agriculturists of Western Europe, and the Incas in the Andes worked out theirs.” (Callicott 1991, 357) Of course, the theoretical possibility of our achieving such a symbiotic civilization is, by itself, no guarantee that we will actually succeed in doing so, and the challenge is enormous. But it is only if we stop seeing ourselves and our cultural products as hopelessly alien and injurious to nature that we can start reflecting on the kind of cultural shift that could

#### The alt is a prerequisite – the consequences concerning our space cannot be divorced from the mindset that produces them.

Ferrando 16 [(Francesca, Ph.D. in philosophy, M.A. in Gender Studies, Professor.@ NYU) “Why Space Migration Must Be Posthuman”, 2016, http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/76546/1/147.pdf.pdf#page=136yperlink] TDI

Etymologically, the term “human” comes from the Latin term “humus”3 meaning “soil”, which, in our solar system, is only present on Earth. We can thus see migrating to space as the linguistic and semiotic step towards the literal creation of post-humans, that is, beings “post” (Latin for “behind” and “after”) their earthly provenance. Furthermore, as we will see in the course of this chapter, space migration will expand the notion of the human, aligning it with a posthumanist sensitivity. In the history of planet Earth, most human societies have developed around dualistic ways of thinking, based on symbolic binaries such as: human/robot, human animals/non-human animals, female/male, black/white, good/evil, nature/culture, self/other. Such a dualistic mindset brought along bio-centric, human-centric, sexist, racist, ethnocentric practices and homophobia, along with eco-disasters and war. If humans migrate to space with a dualistic mindset, and if history is any indication, “space colonization” is then likely to precipitate species discrimination and planetary wars. Language is not innocent: in order to set a post-dualistic approach to our futures, we should start with a critical analysis of our own terminology. The postmodern post-colonial legacy of the posthuman does not support the use of the term “space colonization”, since the notion of “colonialism” is embedded in historical contexts and discriminatory policies which have been rigorously analyzed and criticized within the field of Post-Colonial Studies (cf. Said 1978; Spivak 1987). This chapter will adopt, instead, the term “space migration”, offering a revisitation of humanistic, anthropocentric and Earth-centric practices. And still, space cannot be analyzed in separation from Earth: these realms are inextricably related and shall be investigated in conjunction. In order to demonstrate this important point, we will reflect upon the relevance of the study of celestial bodies in the formation of human civilizations; then, we will highlight the impact of current space technology on planet Earth; thirdly, we will delve into the relevance of space migration to a revision of the notion of the human itself. Posthumanism, as a post-humanism (in the sense of the humanistic tradition), a post-anthropocentrism (Braidotti 2013) and, more in general, a post-dualism, represents a well suited philosophy to pursue this onto-epistemological shift. The dynamics of space migration will thus be inquired by reconciling the varied philosophical landscape of the posthuman, bridging dif- ferent schools of thought such as: Philosophical Posthumanism, Transhumanism, New Materialism and Object-Oriented Ontology.