# 1NC Nano Round 4

## 1NC

### T Reduce

#### 1] Interpretation - Reduce means permanent reduction – it’s distinct from “waive” or “suspend.”

**Reynolds 59** (Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13] The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### Waiver is temporary.

Green 5/6 [Andrew Green (Devex Contributing Reporter based in Berlin, his coverage focuses primarily on health and human rights and he has previously worked as Voice of America's South Sudan bureau chief and the Center for Public Integrity's web editor). “US backs waiver for intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines”. Devex. 06 May 2021. Accessed 7/31/2021. <https://www.devex.com/news/us-backs-waiver-for-intellectual-property-rights-for-covid-19-vaccines-99847> //Xu]

In a stunning reversal, U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration came out in favor of waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines Wednesday. The move follows months of U.S. opposition that began under former President Donald Trump to a proposal from South Africa and India to temporarily set aside intellectual property rights around products that would protect, contain, and treat COVID-19. Its supporters have argued that the proposal, first tabled at the World Trade Organization in October and now backed by more than 100 countries, is necessary to expand vaccine production and overcome global shortages.

#### 2] Violation – the plan waives intellectual property protections but defends it as a waiver, Public Citizen 6/22 explicitly says “waiver must be of sufficient duration”

#### 3] Vote neg for limits and neg ground – re-instatement under any infinite number of conditions doubles aff ground – every plan becomes either temporary or permanent – you cherry-pick the best criteria and I must prep every aff while they avoid core topic discussions like reduction-based DAs which decks generics like Pharma Innovation and Bio-Tech.

#### 4] TVA solves – permanently reduce COVID patents.

#### 5] Paradigm Issues –

#### a] Topicality is Drop the Debater – it’s a fundamental baseline for debate-ability.

#### b] Use Competing Interps – 1] Topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical and 2] Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### c] No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

## 1NC

### Climate Patents DA

#### Climate Patents and Innovation high now and solving Warming but COVID waiver sets a dangerous precedent for appropriations - the mere threat is sufficient is enough to kill investment.

Brand 5-26, Melissa. “Trips Ip Waiver Could Establish Dangerous Precedent for Climate Change and Other Biotech Sectors.” IPWatchdog.com | Patents & Patent Law, 26 May 2021, www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/05/26/trips-ip-waiver-establish-dangerous-precedent-climate-change-biotech-sectors/id=133964/. //sid

The biotech industry is making remarkable advancestowards climate change solutions, and it is precisely for this reason that it can expect to be in the crosshairs of potential IP waiver discussions. President Biden is correct to refer to climate change as an existential crisis. Yet it does not take too much effort to connect the dots between President Biden’s focus on climate change and his Administration’s recent commitment to waive global IP rights for Covid vaccines (TRIPS IP Waiver). “This is a global health crisis, and the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic call for extraordinary measures.” If an IP waiver is purportedly necessary to solve the COVID-19 global health crisis (and of course [we dispute this notion](https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/04/19/waiving-ip-rights-during-times-of-covid-a-false-good-idea/id=132399/)), can we really feel confident that this or some future Administration will not apply the same logic to the climate crisis? And, without the confidence in the underlying IP for such solutions, what does this mean for U.S. innovation and economic growth? United States Trade Representative (USTR) [Katherine Tai](https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/05/05/tai-says-united-states-will-back-india-southafrica-proposal-waive-ip-rights-trips/id=133224/) was subject to questioning along this very line during a recent Senate Finance Committee hearing. And while Ambassador Tai did not affirmatively state that an IP waiver would be in the future for climate change technology, she surely did not assuage the concerns of interested parties. The United States has historically supported robust IP protection. This support is one reason the United States is the center of biotechnology innovation and leading the fight against COVID-19. However, a brief review of the domestic legislation arguably most relevant to this discussion shows just how far the international campaign against IP rights has eroded our normative position. The Clean Air Act, for example, contains a provision allowing for the mandatory licensing of patents covering certain devices for reducing air pollution. Importantly, however, the patent owner is accorded due process and the statute lays out a detailed process regulating the manner in which any such license can be issued, including findings of necessity and that no reasonable alternative method to accomplish the legislated goal exists. Also of critical importance is that the statute requires compensation to the patent holder. Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act contemplates mandatory licensing of patents covering inventions of primary importance in producing or utilizing atomic energy. This statute, too, requires due process, findings of importance to the statutory goals and compensation to the rights holder. A TRIPS IP waiver would operate outside of these types of frameworks. There would be no due process, no particularized findings, no compensationand no recourse. Indeed, the fact that the World Trade Organization (WTO) already has a process under the TRIPS agreement to address public health crises, including the compulsory licensing provisions, with necessary guardrails and compensation, makes quite clear that the waiver would operate as a free for all. Forced Tech Transfer Could Be on The Table When being questioned about the scope of a potential TRIPS IP waiver, Ambassador Tai invoked the proverb “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” While this answer suggests primarily that, in times of famine, the Administration would rather give away other people’s fishing rods than share its own plentiful supply of fish (here: actual COVID-19 vaccine stocks), it is apparent that in Ambassador Tai’s view waiving patent rights alone would not help lower- and middle-income countries produce their own vaccines. Rather, they would need to be taught how to make the vaccines and given the biotech industry’s manufacturing know-how, sensitive cell lines, and proprietary cell culture media in order to do so. In other words, Ambassador Tai acknowledged that the scope of the current TRIPS IP waiver discussions includes the concept of forced tech transfer. In the context of climate change, the idea would be that companies who develop successful methods for producing new seed technologies and sustainable biomass**,** reducing greenhouse gases in manufacturing and transportation, capturing and sequestering carbon in soil and products, and more, would be required to turn over their proprietaryknow-how to global competitors. While it is unclear how this concept would work in practice and under the constitutions of certain countries, the suggestion alone could be devastating to voluntary internationalcollaborations. Even if one could assume that the United States could not implement forced tech transfer on its own soil, what about the governments of our international development partners? It is not hard to understand that a U.S.-based company developing climate change technologies would be unenthusiastic about partnering with a company abroad knowing that the foreign country’s government is on track – with the assent of the U.S. government – to change its laws and seize proprietary materials and know-how that had been voluntarily transferred to the local company. Necessary Investment Could Diminish Developing climate change solutions is not an easy endeavor and bad policy positions threaten the likelihood that they will materialize. These products have long lead times from research and development to market introduction, owing not only to a high rate of failure but also rigorous regulatory oversight. Significant investment is required to sustain and drive these challenging and long-enduring endeavors. For example, synthetic biology companies critical to this area of innovation [raised over $1 billion in investment in the second quarter of 2019 alone](https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/Climate%20Report_FINAL.pdf). If investors cannot be confident that IP will be in place to protect important climate change technologies after their long road from bench to market, it is unlikely they will continue to investat the current and required levels**.**

#### Private sector innovation is key to solve climate change – short term politicking and priority shifts means government can’t solve alone.

Henry 17, Simon. “Climate Change Cannot Be Solved by Governments Alone. How Can the Private Sector Help?” World Economic Forum, 21 Nov. 2017, www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/governments-alone-cannot-halt-climate-change-what-can-private-sector-do/.  Programme Director, International Carbon Reduction & Offset Alliance (ICROA) //sid

Climate leadership is also an opportunity for many organizations, and this was the most popular reason for purchasing carbon credits in Ecosystem Marketplace’s [2016 survey of buyers](http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_5677.pdf%5Bforest-trends.org%5D). Companies are looking to differentiate from their competitors, and build their brand, by taking a leadership role on climate. Offsetting plays an integral role in delivering this climate leadership status, alongside direct emissions reductions. The survey indicated that companies that included offsetting in their carbon management strategy typically spend about 10 times more on emissions reductions activities than the typical company that doesn’t offset.

Beyond these direct commercial reasons for companies to take voluntary action, there are many broader, societal motivations at play. Climate change is a global, multidecade challenge that needs solutions and input from all stakeholders. It transcends the short-term nature of politics, which will inevitably experience changes in priorities, personnel and knowledge. Because of this, climate change cannot be solved by governments alone. Instead, it needs significant and long-term investment from the private sector. Companies that take a longer-term outlook recognise this and want to contribute to the solution to help secure the viability of their businesses.

#### Warming causes Extinction

Kareiva 18, Peter, and Valerie Carranza. "Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back." Futures 102 (2018): 39-50. (Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA)//Re-cut by Elmer

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (**climate change**, global **freshwater** cycle, **and** ocean **acidification**) do **pose existential risks**. This is **because of** intrinsic **positive feedback loops**, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all **directly connected to** the provision of **food and water**, and **shortages** of food and water can **create conflict** and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. **Ample clean water** is not a luxury—it **is essential for human survival**. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes **Humans** are remarkably ingenious, and **have adapted** to crises **throughout** their **history**. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). **However**, the many **stories** **of** human ingenuity **successfully** **addressing** **existential risks** such as global famine or extreme air pollution **represent** environmental c**hallenges that are** largely **linear**, have immediate consequences, **and operate without positive feedbacks**. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, **the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops**. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that **very warming can cause more CO2 release** which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that **forest fires will become more frequent** and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This **catastrophic fire** embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that **could catch humanity off-guard and produce a** true **apocalyptic event.** Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that **runaway climate change,** and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks **portends** even greater **existential risks**. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

## 1NC

### China Rise CP

#### CP: The People’s Republic of China should:

#### - substantially increase innovation funding, production and global distribution of COVID-19 Vaccines for all current and future waves of the pandemic

- includes Sinovac, sionpharm, and any future vaccines

#### - cooperate with allies to achieve increased production and global distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccine.

#### Solves case – China vaccinates the world.

* Quantity

Mallapaty 6-9 Smriti Mallapaty 6-9-2021 "China is vaccinating a staggering 20 million people a day" <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01545-3> (She has a master of science degree in environmental technology from Imperial College London.)//Elmer

For more than a week, an average of about **20 million people** have been vaccinated against COVID-19 **every day in China**. At this rate, the nation would have fully vaccinated the entire UK population in **little more than six days**. China now accounts for more than half of the 35 million or so people around the world receiving a COVID-19 shot each day. Zoltán Kis, a chemical engineer in the Future Vaccine Manufacturing Research Hub at Imperial College London, doesn’t know of “anything **even close to those production scales**” for a vaccine. “The manufacturing efforts required in China to reach this high production throughput are tremendous,” he says. The majority of doses are of one of two vaccines, both of which have been approved for emergency use worldwide by the World Health Organization (WHO). CoronaVac — produced by Beijing-based company Sinovac — showed an efficacy of 51% against symptoms of COVID-19 in clinical trials, and much higher protection against severe disease and death. The second jab was developed in Beijing by state-owned firm Sinopharm and has demonstrated an efficacy of 79% against symptomatic disease and hospitalization. Supplying vaccines to the world China’s current vaccine production rate could potentially **make a significant dent in global demand**, says Kis; that would be “**a huge step in reducing the health-care and economic burden of the COVID-19 pandemic**”. China has already supplied 350 million doses of the two vaccines to more than 75 nations, and WHO approval should now trigger the further distribution of both vaccines to low-income countries. “China’s vaccination campaign got off to a slow start, but has rapidly picked up pace,” says Rongjun Chen, a biomaterials scientist also at the Future Vaccine Manufacturing Research Hub. As recently as mid-April, China was administering only about five million doses a day. According to an official at China’s National Health Commission, the nation aims to produce some three billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines in 2021 — and up to **five billion per year after that**. To achieve such high production rates, many things need to go according to plan across the entire production and distribution chain, from sourcing raw materials to manufacturing active ingredients, filling vials and distributing doses to vaccination centres, says Kis. “It is crucial that everything arrives at the right location at the right time.”

#### China’s using absence of vaccine alternates to assert influence.

Zhao 4-29 Suisheng Zhao 4-29-2021 "Why China’s vaccine diplomacy is winning" <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/04/29/why-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-is-winning/> (Professor and Director of the Center for China–US Cooperation at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver)//Elmer

Chinese COVID-19 vaccines have been shipped to more than **80 countries** for market or emergency use. Among them, 53 countries received vaccines for free (including developing countries in Africa and some strategically important Asian countries such as the Philippines and Pakistan) and 27 middle-income countries paid for doses. Rolling out of vaccines to developing countries, Beijing has framed itself as **a solution to the pandemic** rather than the origin of the coronavirus. China’s advanced vaccine diplomacy stands in contrast **to the ‘me first policies’** of the **United States and the European Union**. With a shortfall in supplies, US and EU leaders have faced high infection rates and death tolls at home and feel the need to inoculate their domestic populations first. This has left the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people without vaccine supply and at risk. China has not faced these problems and can afford to send vaccines abroad. Just by showing up and helping plug gaps in the global supply of vaccines, China has g**ained ground** in vaccine diplomacy. President Xi Jinping pledged that Chinese vaccines would be provided as a global public good. But a large portion of Chinese vaccines are not free — some countries have paid Chinese vaccine makers. Still the absence of the United States and European Union from vaccine diplomacy **is not lost** on countries struggling to put shots in people’s arms. Many countries would prefer US or EU-made Pfizer and Moderna vaccines over China’s vaccines if given the choice, **yet they cannot access them**. These countries are desperate and have jumped at the opportunity to receive Chinese vaccines. Chinese companies are also more willing than their western counterparts **to strike licensing deals** to produce vaccines in foreign countries. For example, Indonesia has become a regional hub for Sinovac’s CoronaVac through its state pharmaceuticals company Bio Farma. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) chose Sinopharm because it was willing to conduct phase three clinical trials in the UAE and build native vaccine production capabilities. Sinopharm also arranged to manufacture its vaccine in the UAE for regional distribution. Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy involves propaganda to boost **perceptions of China as a generous and responsible power**. Chinese media has covered every delivery of vaccine shipment. The scene is set by a standard script. When a cargo plane lands, it is greeted by senior local leaders accompanied by Chinese ambassadors fawning over the vaccine cargo. Vaccine diplomacy has helped **increase China’s influence** and enabled it to capitalise **on new opportunities**. China has rolled vaccines out to participants of its Belt and Road Initiative (**BRI**) **and enhanced preferential access to jabs alongside investments in infrastructure and connectivity projects**. According to an April Think Global Health report, of the 56 countries to which China pledged doses, all but one were participants in its BRI. Naming it the Health Silk Road, vaccine diplomacy has provided a foothold for China’s pharmaceutical industry that has been plagued by scandals and low levels of trust at home and abroad. Making Sinovac and Sinopharm household names in foreign countries, China may change these perceptions. Although Chinese vaccine makers were among the earliest in the world to begin clinical trials and self-reported some key results, many have not published complete data in peer-reviewed journals. This has fuelled scepticism about their safety and effectiveness. Gao Fu, director of China’s Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, noted in April that Chinese vaccines were not as effective as hoped and mixing them was among the strategies being considered to boost their effectiveness. Some countries have been reluctant to greenlight Chinese vaccines. Singapore received its first shipment of Sinovac vaccines in February, but Singaporean regulators have not approved its use, moving ahead with using Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Polish President Andrzej Duda spoke with President Xi about buying Chinese jabs in March. Yet Poland’s health authorities have recommended against using Chinese vaccines because of a lack of data. Concerns have also arisen about whether China’s production capacity is able to keep pace with an ever-expanding list of overseas customers and its domestic vaccination campaign. The Turkish government ordered 20 million doses of China’s Sinovac vaccine. But delayed shipments forced the government to repeatedly revise its vaccination timetable. Egypt purchased a total of 40 million doses of the vaccine from Sinopharm in January but had received only a tiny percentage of its vaccine order from China by the middle of April. This tension will intensify as China’s domestic demand for vaccines increases. China has continued with vaccine diplomacy in the absence of the United States and other Western countries. These countries should compete and cooperate with China to overcome bottlenecks in the global distribution of vaccines and ensure that all nations, particularly developing countries, receive the vaccines they need to finally beat COVID-19.

#### Waivers are a critical issue in the perceptual ineptness of America and the West.

Pratt and Levin 4-29 Simon Frankel Pratt and Jamie Levin 4-29-2021 "Vaccines Will Shape the New Geopolitical Order" <https://archive.is/OgDcA#selection-847.23-857.11> (Simon Frankel Pratt is a lecturer in the School of Sociology, Politics, and International Studies at the University of Bristol. Jamie Levin is an assistant professor of political science at St. Francis Xavier University in Canada.)//Elmer

While home to vaccines produced by the likes of Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca, and Johnson & Johnson—all now household names and whose vaccines are considered more efficacious—governments of these states have demonstrated a **reluctance to supply doses** to much of the rest of the world at the expense of domestic vaccination rates. The United States and the U.K. have exported almost none, and the EU is clamping down. They have similarly been **unwilling to waive patents**, allowing for production of these vaccines where they are most needed. This suggests that the United States and the EU are **slow to fully exploit the geopolitical opportunities** of vaccine diplomacy or at least are not willing to do so with the same alacrity and **enthusiasm as other states**. That may change as time goes on, however, and the result will be worsened inequities within already inequitable trade relationships between these countries and the global south.

#### Chinese leadership solves existential threats.

Yamei 18 Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, <http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491>

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced*.* The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous statein such key areas as global economic governance and climate change*.* Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics*.* The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily*.* All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other *civilizations.* So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced**.** China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.

## 1NC

### Liberalism K

#### Coercive power relations have shifted from the local to the global creating biodiplomacy which facilitates liberal expansion and development.

Constantinou and Opondo 15, Constantinou, Costas M., and Sam Okoth Opondo. "Engaging the ‘ungoverned’: The merging of diplomacy, defence and development." Cooperation and Conflict 51.3 (2016): 307-324. (Professor of International Relations @ University of Cyprus, Sam Okoth Opondo, Professor of Political Science and Africana Studies)//Elmer

Ultimately, this military-diplomatic apparatus presents something more than a state’s or empire’s attempt to ‘enhance its value’ at the periphery of the international system. By **managing** poverty and scarcity and supporting ‘good’ **living conditions around the globe**, the apparatus **maintains** old and extends new ‘**relations of subjection’** and governance while creating new sites of diplomatic engagement that exceed the governmental domain (Mbembe, 2001: 24). Connecting domains of administration and negotiation, but also violence and multiple attempts to curtail it, the apparatus is part of a milieu in which governmental and diplomatic practices are synergized and instituted. Beyond its strategic concern with the optimization of lives and livelihoods, the **entanglement of governmental** **and diplomatic** conduct **registers**, we believe, **an ontological shift from biopolitics to biodiplomacy**. Emerging from the liberal will to self-regulation and governance and specifically addressing the politics of life, biopolitics, Michel Foucault tells us, involves ‘control over relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live’ (Foucault, 2003: 245). Going beyond the juridical conception of sovereignty and law enforcement, **biopolitics concentrates on** the **management of populations through** the **production of knowledge** about life and ways of living, as well as the enhancement of methods of supporting and controlling them. Unlike juridical sovereignty, which was predominantly defined by the right of rulers to ‘take life and let live’, biopolitics follows a governmental logic of ‘**making live and letting die’** (Foucault, 2003: 247). Whereas biopolitics has expanded its reach and deepened its governmental methods to multiple domains around the globe – not only enhancing conditions of living but also determining who is made to live and who is let to die – biodiplomacy underscores the continuous **negotiation of life** that **accompanies** this **global expansion** and that has brought **shifts in** **strategies of control**, discourses of legitimation and forms of co-optation and cohabitation beyond governance. We have examined the theoretical and ethical ramifications of biodiplomacy in more detail in a separate paper (Constantinou and Opondo, 2014). The focus on biodiplomacy provokes us to ask if there is something more going on beyond ‘liberal governance’, the ‘liberal way of war’ or the ‘**merging of security with development’**. Specifically it allows us to inquire how groups, like the Jeldessa villagers or other groups who are acted upon by the powerful, play out their agency and the forms of diplomacy that enable them to do so. Do they create new diplomacies as they enact their lives in the spaces and times where biopolitical regimes operate? Or is the biopolitical formation creating new forms of diplomatic subjects? Posing the question not only of biopolitics but of biodiplomacy makes it possible for us to seriously think how lives and worlds are not just ‘governed’ but ‘negotiated’, how certain lives and worlds become plausible, and others implausible, and this not through centralized command, control and exercise of power. To be sure, biodiplomacy does not ensure symmetrical negotiation, particularly where the USA is involved. Over the last 10 years, the cultivation of outreach and the exploitation of new civilian partnerships have been keenly pursued through the US Transformational Diplomacy initiative, extending operations beyond the traditional centres of power and intergovernmental relationships. For instance, a plethora of projects have been promoted under the auspices of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in a manner that exemplifies both the biopolitical and biodiplomatic dimensions of the military-diplomatic apparatus. Such projects are sometimes frank and cynical about their goal. VETCAP, for example, currently operates in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania and Uganda and aims to ‘deliver veterinary programs in support of strategic military objectives’.3 Although there is no public explanation as to what the specific strategic military objectives are in each country and how they are linked to the vaccination of livestock, the engagements are indicative of the new civilian partnerships that the US Defense and State Departments are developing worldwide as well as of what has been termed as the merging of diplomacy, defence and development (3D) – the ‘three pillars’ of US foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. In short, there is a clear policy reorientation towards supporting ‘foreign’ life that is openly admitted and promoted, but whose global implications and replications are yet to be fully understood.

#### COVID waivers are a form of American Imperialism.

Patanè 21 Andrea Patanè 5-15-2021 "COVID-19 pandemic: patents and profits" <https://www.marxist.com/covid-19-pandemic-patents-and-profits.htm> (Northern California Functional Medicine | Modern Natural Health.)//Elmer

A “calculated risk” Far from an act of ‘international solidarity', this latest **move from the US** government **is a calculated political risk,** and will be **implemented** **in the interests of US imperialism**. A section of the more serious wing of the **bourgeoisie understands** that a proper **economic recovery** can **happen** **only if** the **pandemic is suppressed** worldwide. As we have explained elsewhere, wealthy countries risk losing billions of dollars if the pandemic is brought under control only within their own borders, because new variants (like those in India and Brazil) can always mutate elsewhere and reinfect their populations, causing further economic disruption. Therefore, even on a capitalist basis, it is expedient in the long-term for the rich countries to facilitate a global vaccination campaign. Even Pope Francis anointed the demand from his seat in Rome! Biden’s announcement is also an **act of vaccine diplomacy.** America’s main rivals, China and Russia, have been shoring up their spheres of influence by distributing their Sinopharm and Sputnik V vaccines to poor countries left out by the vaccine nationalism of the US and Europe. Chinese and Russian vaccines have been exported into countries traditionally under western spheres of influence, including Brazil and Hungary. **Pushing to waive IP protections on** **COVID**-19 vaccines **is** therefore partly an effort to push back against the encroachment of rival imperialist powers, which have so far outcompeted Washington in the global vaccination drive. Biden’s announcement is also an **attempt to restore** the **standing and authority of US imperialism** on the world stage, which has been bruised by the ‘America First’ vaccine nationalist policy started by Donald Trump, and continued by Biden. According to the FT, Katherine Tai (top US trade envoy) and Jake Sullivan (national security adviser) made the case to Biden that pushing for the waiver “was a low-risk way to secure a diplomatic victory”, after coming under fire for not “respond[ing] quickly enough to the unfolding COVID-19 crisis in India”. Here you have it, straight from the horse’s mouth. Under capitalism, **vaccines** – rather than providing a way out of the pandemic – **are tools for ‘low-risk diplomatic victories’**. As if this was some sort of football match between world leaders! In short, Biden is stepping in to prioritise the interests of US imperialism as a whole over the immediate interests of the Big Pharma capitalists. But we should say clearly: this cynical attempt to claim the moral high ground came only after the US used its massive economic clout to secure enough vaccines to inoculate its own population several times over. And in fact, the wartime Defense Production Act is still in effect, which forces US manufacturers to fulfil domestic demands for medical equipment before exports are permitted. This de facto export ban has created bottlenecks in the supply chain that have already undermined the WHO-led COVAX programme to vaccinate poor countries. Rest assured, Biden’s policy remains ‘America First’, just by somewhat more calculated means than his predecessor.

#### Medicine increases liberal governance by attempting to save everything under the transparent gaze of western biomedicine which paradoxically results in the elimination of the very lives they seek to preserve.

Yau 7, Wing-kit. "Representing illness: patients, monsters, andmicrobes." HKU Theses Online (HKUTO) (2007). (Medical Graduate Student at Hong Kong University)//Elmer

History shows that political and economic colonialism that took over geographical area can be justified with a utopian vision, and the modernisation that follows eventually improve the standard of the colonised up to that of the coloniser. **Medical colonisation**, in the same vein, can also be considered as **a humanitarian endeavour**. Western medicine ‘**colonises’** the **field of medicine**, **taking over traditional** and other indigenous medical **practices** **and render them** as ‘**unscientific’** and ‘superstitious’ while celebrating the achievement of scientific method that is the basis for our bio-medical culture as the real life savour. 91 Fortunately or unfortunately, Frank believes this period of medical colonisation has probably ended. He regards this new era medical post-colonisation when political issues and national security are now closely allied and fusing with the medical curriculum, further **alienating** the **patients** and turning the city space into a space of thoroughly-sanitised, isolating environs. It also means that in medical post-colonisation, the meaning of public health is now synonymous with global health. Under this new name, its area of administration reaches beyond the microscopic world of biological border-crossing virus and germs to the border-crossing people and other political agenda as well. Different from other diseases, infectious disease does not confine itself to a particular stigmatisable population. Take SARS for example, it is quite different from other re-emerging diseases that are, to this date, still a regional plague limited to third-world countries (where medical facilities are inadequate and people are living under deprived conditions). The primary risk group during the outbreak in Hong Kong, however, is not the stigmatised ‘other’ – typically the poor or the under-privileged class, but the medical workers in hospitals – who are usually esteemed as professionals and from a prestigious group in our society even today. Christine Loh sums up the impact of SARS and the fusing of medicine with politics in the following way: Events happened quickly. Healthcare professionals had to face enormous personal risks in fighting the disease on the frontline […] Need has been the mother of a number of useful inventions, such as the contact tracing system developed in Hong Kong. SARS also touched almost every other aspect of personal and community life in affected areas [including Toronto, Singapore and Taiwan]. Ministers and officials lost their jobs. Many businesses suffered. Ordinary people were forced to reassess their priorities. Communities had to find useful ways of coping with panic while continuing to fight the disease.92 Paul Virilio has already warned us that the fear of contamination by a viral agent is not, and should not be the sole object of horror in this day and age, but the fear of extinguishments engendered by the hyperfragility of the technological process of our society.93 Although infectious disease is only a viral contamination, and it is by no means comparable to the kind of weapon that is designed to function as another network to cause a wide-spread breakdown of our existing life-dependent networks (such as power supplies), Peter Chan’s Memory has shown how this fear of risk has undergone a series of re-configuration, from being contaminated by the foreign invasion of a virus, to the fear of isolation and incommunicability. Perhaps it is helpful to compare this change of our subject of anxiety in terms of the colonial-era ideologies of medicine and post-colonial ideologies of global health, as there is increasing emphasis on information and commodity exchange networks intertwining with space and territoriality, as Nicholas B King puts it: While colonial anxiety revolved around fears of contamination as certain (white, European, male) bodies moved into vulnerable places and faced novel contaminating environments and (non-white, non-European, female) peoples, postcolonial anxiety revolves around the contamination of space itself by mobile bodies and motile environments. This is not the horror of matter (or bodies) out of place, which presupposed the identification of a place for matter; instead, it is the horror of places no longer mattering, of a ‘third-worlding’ at home.94 The horror in Memory is not the ghostly figure played by Tony Leung. It is true that while he is wandering and happens to see the masked Eugenia Yuan sitting by herself staring out of a café’s window, there is a brief moment of tacit recognition, or as another film critic remarks, it is a moment when Leung and the Yuan (who plays a ghostly figure in another Peter Chan’s film Going Home) meets and it dawns on the audience that Leung, too, is a ghost.95 Nonetheless, the ‘ghosts’ here are just as powerless as the imprisoned people in the building in the sick, infected city. They no more understand the snow in Hong Kong, nor the hearses that are passing by than we do. That is to say, they are not from another world different to ours. The real horror comes from the uniqueness of SARS and the new realisation that it came with – not only does it mean that **biomedicine is no longer the guarantee for health**, but it also paints a grimmer picture of reality that says this new epidemic cannot be reduced to just another ‘difficult time’ for the local people to overcome, and that it, like so many adversities in the past decades, can be overcome. That explains why critics of the 1:99 Short Film Series have been negative, mostly toward the films’ focus on the disease as an ‘adversary’ that Hong Kong people are facing collectively rather than treating SARS as a unique, (un)timely disease.96 In Hong Kong is the Best (Dir. Alan Mak Siu-Fai, Andrew Lau Wai-Keung), for example, SARS is even treated as an equivalent to other pandemics/disasters in the past, as if the disease were just another difficult time that the locals can, and will go through collectively, that what it causes (the other) will not destroy us (the self) because, as the title suggests, Hong Kong is the best. Memory addresses the post-SARS trauma by showing how the disease has caught Hong Kong people getting weary of human-to-human contact – everyone is imprisoned in the round windows in solitude, expressionless and masked. These people have been through mass anxiety and paranoia about the disease, and panic over being infected with the virus, which, like the rest of the influenza viral strain, is still not preventable. In Hystories, Elaine Showalter remarks that mass hysteria usually takes place within a community, especially a tight-knit one like that of Hong Kong, where rumours can develop with the social network to sustain it.97 In the example of SARS, there was once a time when rumour first hit the locals that a mysterious flu has killed people in Guangzhou. And the locals were seen as reacting with irrational fear by stocking up white vinegar98 and the market also reacted by increasing the prices of all kinds of disinfectants, such as Clorox, Dettol and even masks. Interestingly, such mass hysteria did not last long. As masks are being discarded, fear is also being forgotten. Our memories do not seem to hold on for long to our previous experience and soon drifts into oblivion before it disappears completely. As a result, the epidemic itself never plays a major role in shaping the Hong Kong society, and there leaves very little room for artistic production in response to its devastating period of outbreak.99 [cont.] It has become increasingly clear that health and the proper management of illness (especially of infectious diseases) are now individual moral responsibilities in real life. Individuals (lay people) are expected to have improved assess to (medical) knowledge through popular science and mass media that would enable them to better self-surveillance, risk assessment, and ultimately, prevention. In the meantime, we have what Adele E. Clarke et al. calls the ‘biomedicalisation’ process that, ‘through the complex, multisided, multidirectional process of medicalisation and application of technoscience,’ has given us both new individual and collective identities according to our ‘risk status’, DNA profiles, or whether we are ‘Syndrome X sufferers,’ etc.106 Interestingly, if medicalisation is a process in which ‘unwanted’ social phenomenon or behaviours are passed from the jurisdiction of law to that of medicine, (e.g. branding/classifying someone as sick just because (s)he does not fit the social norm, and thereby treating it as an illness and disease), then biomedicalisation can be understood as a process that medicalises health (e.g. classifying somebody as belonging to a ‘high-risk’ group based on lifestyle and genetic make-up or even social class, and treating it as a cause of illness and disease). Disease used to be conceptualised at the level of organs and cells, so that when there is a disease in the heart or the liver, we are simply known as the heart disease patient, or liver disease patient, etc. However, today’s risks and **diseases are** conceptualised at the level of genes and molecules, which are the **codes from which our biological identity is constituted**. As noted by Clarke et al., **health policy is no longer about problem-solving** (i.e., patients visits the physicians with a physical symptoms, with clear test results and unambiguous diagnosis, followed by treatment that cures the disease by removing the symptoms) **but** more about **problem finding** (i.e. patients are tested and classified by risks, for instance, high cholesterol, too skinny, too fat, etc).107 In other words, physical condition becomes a disease to be treated. Thus, it is not difficult to see that selling disease and commodifying health are basically two sides of the same coin. Therefore, the notion of ‘safe space’ in terms of our understanding of Carol’s environmental illness becomes an encapsulation of what biomedicine (and even environmentalists and alternative medicine) are preoccupied with today – that of bodies and space. Peter Donning, the Wrenwood guru, in his welcoming speech to the new ‘long-timers’, made the following statements: ‘what you’re seeing outside is a reflection of what you feel from within,’ and, ‘I’ve stopped reading the papers. I’ve stopped watching the news on TV…I’ve seen their fatalistic, negative attitude and I’ve finally realised once and for all, I don’t need it. So I transform that negative stimulus into something that will not do harm to me.’ The sole reason why Donning calls Wrenwood an ‘environmentally safe place’ is due to his belief that how he feels in his head can directly or indirectly influence his organs (especially his immune system) to behave in a certain way. In other words, within this space, safety is ensured – it is only you and your thinking that is hazardous to your health. Once again, it shows that the spaces and the bodies that inhabit or travel within these spaces have become the primary concern for health maintenance. Film critics like Roddy Reid remarks that Safe is about the experience of our bodies understood as sites of struggle between medical discourses, health-care practices, pathogens, and visual inscriptions108. It is a struggle because we are most disturbed by the opacity of the environment and the ‘unfathomable mystery’ of the body. With the body and the surrounding disappearing into the internal psychological space, one’s past and history have become an alternative form of toxin where repressed dark memories are dug up and turned into an enemy. With new enemy, de-toxification can then begin in yet another form of speech to cleanse the body ‘system’ in the name of ‘self-love.’ However, such promise of speech and self-knowledge is just as groundless as the belief that a fruit diet Carol is on can cleanse the body of the toxins one cannot avoid taking in everyday. The more transparent our body and space is, the easier for surveillance, so that barriers can be set; risks can be assessed. **We are**, in effect, **living as the Boy in the Bubble**, or in Jean Baudrillard’s own words, it is ‘a transparent envelope in which we have taken refuge and where we remain, bereft of everything yet overprotected, **doomed to artificial immunity**, continual transfusions and, at the slightest contact with the world outside, instant death.’109 As a result, the proliferating health product and alternative treatment, in cooperation with the transnational pharmaceutical industry, has now made even high-cholesterol and osteoporosis a disease. Consequently, we are self-conscious of the level of cholesterol in what we eat; the level of pollutants in the air we breathe and the water we drink. But how much transparency is transparent enough? In order to see and know what is doing harm to our bodies, we are **obsessed with information**, and one of the examples would be labels on food packages. Borrowing again from Baudrillard’s idea of ‘absolute communication’ in which the ultra-rapid circulation of signs is operating so fast for the sole reason that it never passes via the mediation of meaning, we may also understand body and health as contaminated by the same sign-circulation process: meat is bad, vegetables are good; city air is polluted, country air is more healthy. The **transparency** of food products **makes us feel safe**, at the same time such transparency corresponds to the pervasiveness of our body which made us believe that we are vulnerable to the invisible killers such as germs, chemical compounds and smoke, and that makes us ‘un-safe’. This conflict illustrates nicely the paradox of the Freudian pleasure principle, which Slavoj Zizek sarcastically remarks: You have a society which is ostensibly oriented toward pure pleasure, but you pay for it through a whole series of "you can't." The hidden prohibitions: eat whatever you want, but beware of fat and cholesterol; smoke, but beware of nicotine; sex, but safe sex. Yet the ultimate consequence of this pleasure principle is that **everything is prohibited** in a way; you can't smoke: there's nicotine; you can't eat: there's fat; you can't have sex: you'll get sick. So this is a kind of everyday confirmation of the Lacanian paradox.111 These are all telling us that nothing is safe. At first glance, it is no wonder why the Wrenwood Centre is a ‘perfect safe space’ – it is toxin-free: no exhaust, no aerosol, no fumes – our desire for transparency has landed us into a vacuum that is also known as a sanatorium. There is finally no prohibition – because it is ubiquitous, it seems like safety is found in this nostalgia afforded by this pre-modern space. However, after all external aggressions are eliminated by a place like Wrenwood; the body has become the Other and become its own internal virulence: Carol’s reaction appears to have been alleviated at Wrenwood but she is becoming more visibly sick as evidenced by her lesions and swollen eyes. In the final scene, Carol succumbs to Wrenwood’s preaching about self-love, and starts to practise saying ‘I love you’ in front of the mirror. However, there is no reconciliation between the utterance and the mirrored image,112 instead, it is more like one more letting down by speech and knowledge, uncovering the same emptiness within the inner psychic realm in which she attempts to create protection. Her facial expression remains bland and vacuous, and all we can see is the Carol that is metamorphosing into ‘the other.’ The sentence ‘I love you’ carries no weight in it because what is there to refer to in a vacuum that is now within and around her? She has not yet become the ‘other’ but we do not have the chance to see this metamorphoses completed as the film ends with a black-out, leaving us in this permanent stage of disease with Carol and with her image in the mirror. Medical sociologist Deborah Lupton argues that due to our dependence on rationality and individualism which is the legacy of Western societies ever since the Enlightenment, together with “**the turn to biomedicine** and science **as** the ultimate **weapons** **against** illness, **disease** and premature death have **generated** **discourses** and practices **which** tend to **deny the fragility** and mortality **of the human body**.”113 But are we really as innately fragile as we think we are? In our attempt to create a safe environment, we are setting up more and more barriers against risks such as toxins and pollutants that are the natural basis of the industrial, modernised society. Yet at the same time, we are **letting our bodies** become **increasingly vulnerable** because bodies are, too, a transparent, porous entity. In such transparent space where everything is made visible, and our visual world has required us to by-pass the mediation of consciousness and meaning, disease soon becomes the only escape(ade) for us to let our natural defence system, i.e. our antibodies, fight against virulence, the same way Carol runs away from her well-protected middle class home in a Californian suburban valley to find salvation in a sanatorium in a New Mexican desert – an excursion on Carol’s part that she is actively doing something about her unknown, undetermined illness . However, there is no escape; just as there is no outside to our environment, nor is there an alternative outside to the existing system into which we can adventure. Outside the Bubble means instant death, thus, there can only be Bubble after Bubble. The same goes for the audience, if watching Safe is a process of immersing ourselves into a world of unknown, unforeseeable environmental risks, a threatened sense of safety and partial knowledge, we are also destined to reach a vacuum with Carol where every last bit of materiality in our environmental space is made to disappear (through speech and discourse on risk and surveillance) into a vacuum where there is no more ‘other’. Disease becomes dis-ease when there are no longer any barriers to put up against anything except the vacuous self that can only be pacified by a self-resistance against an imagined ‘other’114. However, we should also take into consideration the fact that the (female, suffering) body is not just an abstracted object belonging always to someone else, which means also the clinical gaze. The body is also what phenomenologist Vivian Sobchack so forcefully argues, in her collection of essays on the body and illness entitled Carnal Thoughts, that it is also a lived body as ‘objective subject’ and the ‘subjective object,’ with materialised capacities and the agency to make sense of, to feel, both ourselves and the others. She also points out that embodiment is never ‘a priori to historical and cultural existence.’115 Sobchack’s perspective on the lived body shows that suffering is part of our capacities to make sense of, and to feel the body, and therefore, should be taken as a part of life, but it is also something that high technological intervention and our expanding scientific knowledge base would like to deny. What we subsequently have is what Arthur Kleinman calls ‘the facile expectations that psychotherapy and psychopharmacology can relieve residual pain and suffering. In this respect, the culture of biomedicine, which does not value the core illness experience at the same level as the diagnosis and treatment of disease pathology, conspires with the popular culture to treat death as the enemy’ especially for the chronically ill and people suffering from cancer. In Medicine as Culture, Lupton draws from the way medicine is experienced, perceived and socially constructed to provide different theoretical perspectives on the socio-cultural dimension of medicine, illness, and the body. She comments that scientific medicine is merely disillusionment. According to her, ‘the construction of the medical practitioner as omnipotent inevitably leads to disappointment and disillusionment when things go wrong […] there are few explanations that can provide meaning to the [unexpected happenings].’117 Part of the disillusionment also comes from our increasing dependence upon biomedicine (the use of biotechnologies, geneticization, nanoscience, genetic engineering, etc), and we respond by idealizing the physicians as the final saviour.118 While diseases like cancer and chronic illness are today’s worst fear among the ageing population, Jean Baudrillard finds **medicine the real culprit for** the cause of their **incurability**, as he tells us: ‘[**medicine**] **treats cancer or AIDS** **as** if they were **conventional** illnesses, **when** in fact **they are** illnesses **generated by** the **very success of** prophylaxis and **medicine**, illnesses bred of the disappearance of illnesses, of elimination of pathogenic forms.’119 By conventional illness, it means the kind of illness that is believed to be caused by pathogens-bacteria or biochemical imbalance; its symptoms are common enough to be dealt with by conventional treatments – ones that are done by scientific tests for diagnosis and medications and surgery are the key methods of treatment. The problem with treating ‘unconventional’ illnesses the ‘conventional’ way is that when you have somebody like Safe’s Carol in the Safe Room, it is simply denying her physical experience and regarding her as an object – by placing it somewhere safe in the hope that it can become well again through regular monitoring and examination, and elimination of all other invading pathogenic forms. However, environmental illness is not like tuberculosis or liver disease, where the patient can travel to a mountainous area to breathe cleaner air to relieve his/her symptoms, or to have a liver transplant to replace the ailing one. Patients with a disease of an organ can seek help externally, for example, by changing one’s living environment or eating habits, or even taking medicine in order to heal; or in some cases, have the organ replaced or removed surgically, as in the case of cancer. Environmental illness, on the other hand, is not a disease of the organ. It affects the organs but it is not organ-specific. One cannot say that it is the organ that has failed so that there are symptoms, rather, it is something that has gone wrong with the body’s system and it is manifested through the body symptomatically. Environmental illness cannot look to the external for help, for it is not a conventional, scientifically defined disease by traditional Western medicine. This makes way for an easy shift of focus from the body to the soul, especially when the disease is believed to be caused by the mind, or ‘psychological weaknesses’ – the way we tend to explain and understand Carol’s sickness. The idea of the shift from the suffering of the body to the suffering of the mind resonates with the classical study of punishment and the prisoner’s body in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. During the 18th century when La Mettrie first published Man the Machine, the human body was understood as the materialist reduction of the soul and there was an emphasis of the body as ‘docile’, as Foucault himself writes after La Metrrie: ‘The classical age discovered the body as object and target of power. It is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body – to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces.’120 Because of the need to exert control and power over the people that are being governed ‘without the slightest detail escaping [Napoleon’s] attention’, rigorous discipline had to be imposed under his reign, and from here on, Foucault believes that discipline has to proceed from the ‘distribution of individuals in space’, as he explains: ‘Discipline sometimes requires enclosure, the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself. It is the protected place of disciplinary monotony.’ 121 Let us now perceive the environment as such a ‘disciplinary space.’

#### The WTO is a tool of liberal governance – reject it’s authority.

Negri 4, Antonio. "Multitude: war and democracy in the age of Empire." Multitudes 4 (2004): 107-117. (Prof. Romance Studies at Duke, and Antonio)//Elmer

At a second level we find that nation-states provide a more substantial notion of global governance, which introduces stronger elements of au­thority. Bilateral and **multilateral trade agreements** between and among nation-states **are** one **way in which** relations of **authority** and force are **codified** and institutionalized on a higher, more general level. Interna­tional trade agreements have long existed, but now they are tending to create truly global forms of authority. The World Trade Organization (**WTO**) **is** perhaps the most visible example of such a global institution. The WTO is a real **forum for** the **global aristocracy**, in which we see ex­pressed clearly all the antagonisms and contradictions among nation-­states, including their conflicting interests, their unequal powers, and their tendency to **align** along **north-south divisions**. This second level is the realm in which we can recognize most clearly the interregnum halfway on the path from national and international law to global or **imperial** law, where a new **global governance** is **supported by** a vast array of **legal au­thorities**, **normative systems**, **and procedures**. In the contradictory new global economic order that is emerging through international agreements, there are woven together both globalizing tendencies and resurgent na­tionalist elements, both liberal proposals and self-interested perversions of liberal ideals, both regional political solidarities and neocolonial operations of commercial and financial domination. We can recognize the resurgent economic nationalism, for example, in the way the most powerful countries impose protectionist measures as soon as an important sector of their own national economy, such as steel production or agriculture, is affected ad­versely by global markets. The self-interested perversions of liberal ideals can be seen in the way that antitrust laws, adopted by the most dominant countries, aimed at defending competition in the national economy are weakened and subverted in order to allow monopoly practices and destroy competition on the international level. With regard to financial domina­tion, one need only look at the restrictive monetary policies imposed on various regions, such as those dictated by the euro in Eastern Europe and by the Latin American currency boards that link national currencies to the dollar. Despite the coexistence of these contradictory elements, the tendency toward the formation of a global economic order is irreversible. Precisely in this regard, some scholars have recognized that the transformations of sov­ereignty imposed by globalization have given rise not to a simple subtrac­tion of power from the nation-states but rather a global sovereignty that is more "complex. "86

#### Liberal Governance produces Endless War through a biopolitics of security that culminates in extinction.

Evans 16, Brad. "Liberal Violence: From the Benjaminian Divine to the Angels of History." Theory & Event 19.1 (2016). (a senior lecturer in international relations at the School of Sociology, Politics & International Studies)//Elmer

Liberal War as Divine Violence Despite universal claims to peaceful co-habitation, **liberal regimes** have been compelled to **make war on whatever threatens it** 40 . This is why the liberal account of freedom has depended upon a lethal principle, which discursively **wrapped in** the **language of** rights, **security** and justice, inaugurated planetary state of warfare and siege. It has promoted an account of freedom that, in the process of taking hold of the problem of the planetary life of political subjects, linked human potentiality to the possibility of its ruination. If liberal violence has then produced a necessary lethal corollary in its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species in order to alleviate unnecessary suffering; so it has also needed to foster a belief in the necessity of violence in the name of that suffering and vulnerability to which it continually stakes a claim. The Liberal wars of the past two decades in particular have revealed a number of defining principles41 . Aside from relying upon technological supremacy and universal claims to truth, they have been overwhelmingly **driven by** a **bio-political imperative**, which has displaced concerns with Sovereign integrities with forms of violence carried out **in the name of an endangered humanity**. In this regard, they have destroyed the Westphalia pretence, seeing the catastrophes of our global age in fact as a condition of possibility to further the liberal will to rule. Since incorporation in this setting has proceed on the basis that all life should necessarily be included within its strategic orbit, the veritable evisceration of any sense of “the outside” (as conceived in terms of its political imaginary) has led to the **blurring of all** conventional **demarcations** between friends/enemies, citizens/soldiers, times of war/times of peace. What is more, as life itself became increasingly central to questions of security, issues of development as broadly conceived would no longer be regarded as peripheral to the war effort. It would in fact become a central motif as most notably articulated in the strategic mantras “War by Other means” and “War for Hearts and Minds”. Not only would this point to new forms of de-politicisation which, less about Schmittean exceptionalism, were more explicable in terms of the fundamental political and social transformation of societies. It would also lead to the production of violent subjects, as the recourse to violence became sure testament to a conception of humanity realised through the wars fought in its name. **Liberal violence**, in other words, proved to be **unbounded**, **unlimited** and without conventional Sovereign warrant – namely revealing of the fundamental principles of what Benjamin once elected to term “the divine”. Diagnosing the liberal wars of the past two decades as a form of divine violence offers a more disturbing reading of the violence of the liberal encounter. If the violence of political realism, at least in theory, appreciated the value of limits and boundaries, what seems to define the lethality of liberal freedom has been a commitment to war without boundaries, hence limitless. As Dillon and Julian Reid acutely observed: [L]iberal peacemaking is lethal. Its violence a necessary corollary of the aporetic character of its mission to foster the peace and prosperity of the species ... There is, then, a martial face to liberal peace. The liberal way of rule is contoured by the liberal way of war ... Liberalism is therefore **obliged to** **exercise** **a** **strategic calculus of necessary killing**, in the course of which calculus ought to be able to say how much killing is enough... [However] it has no better way of saying how much killing is enough, once it starts killing to make life live, than does the geopolitical strategic calculus of necessary killing’42 . This brings us to Steven Pinker’s Better Angels of Our Nature43 . Reworking the well-rehearsed liberal peace thesis, for Pinker, the reason we have become less warlike today can be account for in terms of our liberal maturity. Leaving aside the evident theological undertones to Pinker’s work, along with the numerous empirical flaws in his thesis, his not so original thesis at least accredits its all too Euro-centric sources of inspiration on matters of civility: ‘The reason so many violent institutions succumbed within so short a span of time was that the arguments that slew them belong to a coherent philosophy that emerged during the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment. The ideas of thinkers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Descartes, Locke, David Hume, Mary Astell, Kant, Beccaria, Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton and John Stuart Mill coalesced into a worldview that we can call Enlightenment humanism’. John Gray has been rightly suspicious of the entire project and claims being made here: The idea that a new world can be constructed through the rational application of force is peculiarly modern, animating ideas of revolutionary war and pedagogic terror that feature in an influential tradition of radical Enlightenment thinking. Downplaying this tradition is extremely important for Pinker. Along with liberal humanists everywhere, he regards the core of the Enlightenment as a commitment to rationality. The fact that prominent Enlightenment figures have favoured violence as an instrument of social transformation is—to put it mildly—inconvenient... No doubt we have become less violent in some ways. But it is easy for liberal humanists to pass over the respects in which civilisation has retreated. Pinker is no exception. Just as he writes off mass killing in developing countries as evidence of backwardness without enquiring whether it might be linked in some way to peace in the developed world, he celebrates “re-civilisation”... without much concern for those who pay the price of the re-civilising process44 . Gray showed his evident concerns here with the promissory nature of liberal violence. Indeed, what he elsewhere terms the violence of the liberal missionary, reposes Nietzsche’s further instance that ‘god is dead and man has killed him’ with a devastating humanistic critique45 . Such violence, in the end, however has proved to be politically, ethically and economically narcissistic. Just as liberal advocates in the zones of crises now increasingly find themselves operating within fortified protectorates as part of a great separation from the world46 , this has been matched, albeit it ways that initially appear disconnected, by new forms of violence which also takes place almost exclusively at a distance. Indeed, as liberal actors increasingly give up on the idea that the world may be transformed for the better, new modalities of violence are emerging which seem to be more logically in fitting with the new politics of catastrophe that increasingly defines our terrifyingly normal times. As the promise of violence and catastrophe now appears inescapable, **insecurity** is becoming **normalised**, dystopian realism becoming the prevailing imaginaries for political rule, and once cited claims to emancipation, unending progress and lasting security for peoples all but abandoned47 . The politics of catastrophe and its relationship to “end of times” narratives adds another layer to our theological enquiry. As Jacob Taubes once noted48 , there is perhaps something theologically different at work here between the pre-modern apocalyptic movements and the catastrophic reasoning now defining the contemporary moment. For all their nihilism and monotheistic servitude, at least the apocalyptic movements of yesteryear could imagine a better world than already existed. There is therefore a vast difference between the subjects which names its disaster ‘apocalypse’ to that which reads disaster in terms of ‘catastrophe.’49 Unlike apocalypse, there is no beyond the catastrophic. Its mediation on the “end of times” is already fated. Catastrophe denies political transformation. It demands instead a forced partaking in a world that is deemed to be insecure unto the end. The upshot being, as all things become the source of endangerment, the human becomes the source of our veritable undoing. Angels of History Every war produces its casualties. Some of these stand out in terms of the sheer body count. The horror of mass warfare reduced to the most banal forms of inhuman quantification. Others, no less important, are its political and philosophical losses. What is increasingly clear is that the past two decades of liberal warfare, punctured but not initially determined by the tragedy of the events of September 11th 2001, ultimately put the very concept of war into question. The reluctance to officially declare war, even when our involvement in the politically motivated violence appears to be all too evident, now demands a move beyond the dominant frames which have shaped discussions for the past two decades. There is an important caveat to address here. What happened during last decade of the Global Wars on Terror cannot simply be inserted into a post 9/11 frames for analysis. Much of what passed for post 9/11 justice or military excessiveness was slowly maturing in the global borderlands for some considerable time. If there is a departure it needs to be accounted for against this broader post-Cold War humanitarian sensibility through which liberalism absorbed local crises into its political fabric to further condition its violent interventions. It has been all too easy for political and social theorists to put the blame for the violence and atrocities of the Global Wars on Terror onto the shoulders of George Bush and Dick Cheney. This has allowed liberals to appropriate Schmitt as one of their own, hence reducing the entire war effort to the reductionist measures of “US hegemony/exceptionalism”. Such retreats back into state centric models have not only proved unhelpful in terms of questioning the normalization of violence, they have failed to grasp the complexity of war – especially how questions of universality, economy, power and the formation of political subjectivities can be rethought through violent encounters. What is more, the limits of these analyses have been further evidenced by the complete lack of engagement with political theology, failing to recognize the violence of universal ambitions, along with the need to put the contemporary legacy of Kant on trial. Let us not forget Tony Blair and Barack Obama have embodied the liberal Kantian idea of political leadership better than any others throughout the history of liberalism. Any change in liberal fortunes must be understood in this context. We have witnessed in recent times profound changes in the violent cartography of what is a post-Iraq liberal influence. Instead of actively and one-sidedly engaging the world, humanely, violently or otherwise, what we are now encountering are new political arrangements shaped by forms of distancing and technological realignment. Just as liberal agents in the dangerous borderland areas increasingly find themselves operating within fortified protectorates as part of a great separation from the world, this is matched, albeit it ways that initially appear disconnected, by new forms of violence that also take place at a distance. The political and philosophical significance of this should not be underestimated. The technological and strategic confluence between the remote management of populations (notably surveillance) and new forms of violence are indicative of the narcissism of a liberal project that reeks of the worst excesses of technological determinism. Instead of looking with confidence towards a post-liberal commitment to transforming the living conditions of the world of peoples, what has taken its place is an intellectually barren landscape offering no alternative other than to live out our catastrophically fated existence. This is instructive regarding how we might envisage “the end of liberal times” as marked out and defined by this incommensurable sense of planetary siege. It also demands new thinking about the relationship between violence, technology and theology in these uncertain times. The **liberal wars** of the past decade have been **premised on** two notable claims to superiority. The first was premised on the logic of technology where it was assumed that high-tech sophistry could replace the need to suffer casualties. The second was premised upon a more **humanitarian ethos**, which **demanded** **local** knowledge and **engagement with dangerous populations**. The narcissistic violence of the Global War on Terror has put this secondary vision into lasting crises as the violence of liberal encounter has fatefully exposed any universal commitment to rights and justice. Not only did we appear to be the principle authors of violence, thereby challenging the notion that underdevelopment was the true cause of planetary endangerment, populations within liberal societies have lost faith in worldly responsibilities. **Metaphysical hubris displaced by a catastrophic reasoning** that quite literally **places us at the point of extinction**. Violence as such has assumed non-locatable forms as liberalism is coming to terms with the limits to its territorial will to rule. Physically separated from a world it no longer understands, it is now left to the digital and technological recoupment of distance to shape worldly relations with little concern for human relations. Drone violence is particularly revealing of this shift in the liberal worldview. While the first recorded drone strike was authorised by President George Bush in Pakistan on 18th June 2004, it has been during the Presidency of Obama that the use of the technology has become the more favoured method for dealing with recalcitrant elements in the global borderlands. Indeed, it seems, whilst the Bush administration favoured extraordinary rendition, detention and torture, the Obama policy for preventing the growth of inmates in camps such as Guantanamo has been their execution. Hence inhumane torture and barbarity replaced by the more dignified and considerate method of targeted assassination! While debates on drone violence tend to centre on questions its legality, especially whether it fits within established rules of war, little attention is given to the wider political moment and how the violence points to the changing nature of liberal power and its veritable retreat from the world of people. Whereas Bush and Blair launched a one-sided territorial assault on Iraq and Afghanistan in order to promote ‘civilisation’, Obama has waged his war in the deregulated atmospheric shadows where technological supremacy allows for the continuation of uninhibited forms of violence, while addressing the fact that the previous interventions failed by any given measure. Hence, this time, out of respect for public sensibilities a ‘precise’ or ‘surgical’ form of violence is delivered remotely to its distant adversaries. We should not forget however that the technologies, infrastructures and aesthetics essential for remote warfare are essentially the same as those that support the economy and consumer society. Targeted drone-strikes and the advertising that maintains the consumer hothouse essentially rely on the same computer-based technologies and algorithmic sense-making tools. Put another way, how Amazon mechanically predicts your next book purchase is not fundamentally different from how adversarial behavioural patterns are isolated in authoring a signature-kill. Drone technologies are not simply a new tool of warfare that allow for legal or strategic reassessment. They are paradigmatic to the contemporary stages of liberal rule. As technological advance compensates for the “soldiers on the ground” militaristic retreat, they further radicalise the very idea of the territorial front line such that any Schmittean notion of inside/outside appears like some arcane remnant of an out-dated past. What takes its place is an atmospheric gaze that further eviscerates the human. From the perspective of violence, displacing the primacy of human agency from the act of killing represents more than the realisation of the military’s dream of zero casualties. It reveals more fully the dominance of dystopian realism as the defining rationality shaping the political landscape in the here and now, and beyond50 . Demanding then of a new conceptual vocabulary that allows us to critique what happens when violence is neither orderly nor progressive, but is simply tasked to mitigate the demise liberal power and ambition in an uncertain world seems more pressing than ever.

#### The Alternative is affirming exilic spaces that breaks out of the Aff’s political imaginary dominated by an apparatus of control.

Vodovnik and Grubacic 15, Ziga, and Andrej Grubacic. "" Yes, we camp!": Democracy in the age of Occupy." Lex Localis 13.3 (2015): 537. (Associate Professor at University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences and Andrej, Ph.D., Associate Professor, California Institute of Integral Studies)//Elmer

When Occupy Wall Street initially burst onto the political scene in September 2011, igniting approximately 1400 occupation encampments across the globe – from New York City to Frankfurt, from Ljubljana to the docks of Oakland – it reminded us once again that we should understand social movements as something more than just “orgasms of history” (Fremion 2002). As Raul Zibechi points out, in relation to recent revolutionary movements in Latin America: in the daily life of divided societies, public time dominates the scene; the only audible voices are those of the economic, political and union elites. For this reason the Argentine insurrection was both “unexpected” and “spontaneous” to those elites, who could not hear the underground sounds, despite the fact that for more than a decade the voices had been echoing from below anticipating the approaching event (2010: 213). Social movements are always in the making for a longer time than we can see (or want to see), and we are therefore always surprised by their sudden “eruption.” In this “becoming” even the symbolism is not missing. It was definitely not missing in front of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange (borza), where the vibrations of the 15O protests caused the letter R to fall off the façade of the building, to be replaced only moments later by an improvised letter J. The message of this détournement was clear: borza (stock exchange) was transformed into boj za (struggle for). The Newest Social Movements (NSM), a term coined by Richard J.F. Day (2005) to distinguish the new incarnations of social movements which began to emerge around the turn of the millennium, are assessing political choices – both tactical and strategic – following a new logic. If in the past their actions and choices were organized toward producing effects on the powers that be, today their actions and choices consider the impact on themselves. It is not, therefore, struggle against (boj proti), but increasingly struggle for (boj za). If we are concrete, it is **a struggle for a new “democratized democracy**” which is both plural and inclusive. Although local circumstances, grievances, and idiosyncrasies varied from encampment to encampment, there was nevertheless an overarching context in which the occupations were emerging: the current economic moment, in which **polities and democracy are** being **forced to redefine their** position and **purpose**. The structure of the global economy, based on **Western hegemony** in the interstate system, **appears to be in** a serious **crisis**. However, as many commentators have already pointed out, what Occupy activists shared was more than just the rejection of a particular economic model (cf. Eisenstein in Kennedy, 2012: xiii). Specifically, the **occupations** were not inspired by the narrow economic reductionism and determinism which results in the fetishization of economic exploitation and class antagonisms. Rather, they were **putting** **emphasis on the crisis of** representative **democracy** at global, national, and local levels. Their **tactics highlighted the presence of** **hierarchy and domination** that run throughout all of these levels, and consequently addressed forms of exploitation that may not necessarily have any economic meaning at all. We build on the recent scholarly attention given to the notion of **nonstate spaces,** which we have chosen to call **exilic spaces** (Gray, 2004; Grubacic & O’Hearn, forthcoming) because they **are** populated by communities that voluntarily or involuntarily attempt escape from both state regulation (the focus of much anarchist analysis) and capitalist accumulation (the focus of Marxism). Exilic spaces can be defined as those **areas** of social and economic life **wherein people** and groups **attempt to** **extricate themselves from** **capitalist** economic **processes**, whether by territorial escape or by attempting to build structures that are **independent of** capitalist accumulation and **social control**. This is important because of the centrality of the spatial aspect of occupations – i.e. the idea of occupying public spaces, symbolically proclaiming: “This country is for everyone” (Eisenstein in Kennedy, 2012: xiii). Saskia Sassen (2012) agrees that the question of public space was central for the politics of Occupy, since “**to occupy is to remake**, even if temporarily, territory’s **embedded** and often deeply undemocratic **logics of power**, and to redefine the role of citizens, mostly weakened and fatigued after decades of growing inequality and injustice.” We will return to the exilic politics of Occupy later on, but here we can point out that, in Bookchin’s (2007) terms, the occupations raised much broader and more important questions related to understanding social change as something that should transcends the standard ways we live, work, make love, and collaborate. The exilic character of occupied spaces was not something that was immediately understood. After the occupation of Zuccotti park and the first encampments of the 15O protests, occupy soon became a buzzword, a hashtag. So much so that the American Dialect Society named it “The Word of the Year” for 2012, while in Germany the term Wutbürger (angry citizen) became the word of the year in the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprach. But despite the vast amounts of media coverage and books and articles on the various “Occupy” movements, we argue that the movement’s most important political (exilic) aspirations have still not been properly addressed. To some degree we can understand epistemological myopia, since reflecting something so recent and dynamic as Occupy is always an optical challenge par excellence (cf. Appadurai, 2002; Tormey, 2012). As Saul Newman (2014: 94) points out, political theory has to catch up with this new terrain, since it “generally looks for visible, representative identities situated on an ontological field organized by sovereign power; it is concerned with how we are governed, or with the normative principles or constitutive logics upon which political power is founded.” Indeed, we argue that the new politics of Occupation reveals the need for a wider epistemological and methodological transformation. Too many theoretical concepts and political praxes invented by these new unruly subjects are too elusive for traditional disciplines, theories, and epistemologies. Therefore, their analysis must be founded on a new, more flexible epistemology and methodology. Paraphrasing Eduardo Restrepo and Arturo Escobar (2005), such an epistemological transformation calls for a critical awareness of both the larger epistemic and political field in which disciplines have emerged and continue to function, and of the micro-practices and relations of power within and across different locations and traditions of individual disciplines. In our reading of occupations we will follow James C. Scott’s theory of infrapolitics, but with some important modifications. In Scott’s terminology, infrapolitics is “an unobtrusive realm of political struggle” (Scott, 1990: 183) that includes a “wide variety of low-profile forms of resistance that dare not speak in their own name” (ibid., 38). **Infrapolitics** is essentially a strategic form of resistance that subjects must assume under conditions of great peril (ibid., 199). They provide a “**structural underpinning** for more visible political action, not as a substitute, but as its condition” (ibid., 58). We believe that infrapolitics should be understood as a political process articulated on two distinct levels. In it’s “micropolitical” sense, infrapolitics can assist us in highlighting how many aspects of the politics of Occupy were overlooked, or marginalized at best, since, “like infrared rays,” they were “beyond the visible end of the spectrum” (ibid., 201). Michael Greenberg (2012: 271) argues that “occupation presented **politics** not as a set issues but **as a way of being**. It offered a **release from subjectivity.”** For the political Right and Left, advocating real political action means action via political parties, protests or other conventional forms of collective action. They do not find alternative political praxes such as occupations fascinating and tend to dismiss them as: (1) unorganized, unsystematic, and individual; (2) opportunistic and self-indulgent; and (3) lacking in real potential/consequences. Furthermore, their own solutions always imply accommodation with the existing system of domination (Scott, 1985: 292). Following Scott we will try to recuperate “subaltern” aspects of occupations as providing “much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible political action on which our attention has generally been focused” (Scott, 1990: 184). Our suggestion here is that we must shift our attention from the most visible - and consequently the most mediatized - aspects of Occupy to redefinitions of democracy and political membership that lie in the “immense political terrain … between quiescence and revolt” (ibid., 200). On the “macropolitical” level, infrapolitics is a process of producing forms of place-based politics **within cracks** **of the** global capitalist **system**. Infrapolitics of the capitalist world economy describes the effort of breaking from systemic processes of state and capital. It is a process of (self-)organization of relatively autonomous and only partially-incorporated spaces, and the resulting antagonistic relationship which emerges between exilic spaces and the hierarchical organizations of a capitalist world economy. It is also a predictable response to an enduring logic of exit and capture inscribed in the longue duree of historical capitalism. Instead of ruptures and breaks, we see a long-term, large-scale historical process of state making and state breaking, of state formation and state de-formation, of ongoing and uneven incorporation and exilic re-appropriation and recovery. The rise of the global mass assembly movement and the politics of occupation, should be understood in this larger historical context. The purpose of the article is twofold. First, we examine political practice and imagination of Occupation, focusing on redefinitions of democracy as practiced in encampments and squares, where various collectives and movements developed a genuinely new political alternative, and with it also a new understanding of politics that is worked out on a more manageable scale, that is to say, within local communities. We start from the supposition, that in the Occupy Movement we can find the beginning of a trans-local yet truly global network of direct democracy that, in its struggle against social exclusion and the trivialization of citizenship, recuperates an idea of prefiguration and direct democracy. We will explore further Newman’s (2014) suggestion that we should understand Occupy as a distinct form of politics and a new mode of democratic organization, involving the creation of autonomous spaces, rather than a distinct social movement. Finally, we consider the intersection between political/democratic and physical/spatial aspects of occupations. We examine the reaffirmation of spatiality and, with it, a redefinition of political membership as one of the most important aspects of the politics of Occupation.2 In a way, the movements of Occupation initiated a paradigm shift in political thought and practice, especially if we bear in mind various debates on global/cosmopolitan democracy from the mid-90s onwards. We argue that Occupy imagined new concepts of political participation constituted beyond the nation-state, sometimes in opposition to it, but always transcending the parochial forms of political membership that make global connectedness impossible. 2 Becoming political We can agree with the thesis that two main discourses can be found in contemporary discussions on democracy. The first understands democracy as a word whose roots lie in Ancient Greece and whose etymological origin poses new dilemmas, while the second examines democracy as an egalitarian decisionmaking procedure and everyday practice which in antiquity gradually became labeled “democratic” (Graeber, 2007: 340).3 The results of this dualism are “diachronous” discussions on democracy and, ultimately, a series of debates on the level of democracy of institutions and institutes which by their very essence counterpoise democratic practices. These and similar misconceptions also gave rise to a hegemonic notion of democracy which only recuperated the word while rejecting its contents. What was genuinely new about Occupy, were in fact distinct forms of politics, involving the creation of autonomous spaces. Occupy should be, according to Newman, seen **not** so much as **a movement**, **but** “as a **tactic**, a **practice**, a mode of organisation and **rhizomatic mobilization**, one that spreads spontaneously throughout the nerve centres of capitalist societies, involving the occupation and transformation of physical, symbolic and social spaces.” (Newman, 2014: 94; cf Smucker, 2012). Whether in the US, Slovenia, or elsewhere, what we have seen is a collective re-imagining of democracy. Since one of the key features of Occupy was the link between political struggle and its objectives—“the means are the goals in the making”— it is not surprising that the theory and practice of prefigurative politics developed as a new democratic spirit of encampment. Prefiguration means an attempt to use methods of political organization and action to create the future in the present, or at least, to some extent, foresee and manifest the social changes we are striving for. As explained by Tim Jordan (2002), it means acting in the present the ways we would want to act in the future, or acting as if the world in which we aspire to live has already materialized. It is a brief attempt to delegitimize the existing system and to build up its alternative from the bottom up. In this perspective, the encampments were not important only for their physical disposition, but rather as symbolic spaces for acting out new political structures and norms. For Peter Marcuse (2012: 16), an occupied square offers “a physical presence, a locational identity, a place that can be identified with the movement that visitors can come to, and where adherents can meet. It also has a second function: it is an opportunity to try out different forms of self-governance, the management of a space and, particularly if the physical occupation is overnight and continuous, of living together.”

## Underview

#### Extinction o/ws under any framework, even under moral uncertainty – infinite future generations

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) \*\*we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

**Magnitude first- epistemic perfection is impossible because the nature of risk-calculus is imperfect, but still necessary because we can’t afford to be wrong once**

-precautionary principle= default

**Jablonowski 10**

**(Mark, April, Lecturer in Economics at the University of Hartford, “Implications of Fuzziness for the Practical Management of High-Stakes Risks,” International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, Vol.3, No. 1, JKS)**

**“Danger” is an inherently fuzzy concept. Considerable knowledge imperfections surround** both **the probability of high-stakes exposures, and the assessment of their acceptability.** **This is due to the complex and dynamic nature of risk in the modern world**. ¶ **Fuzzy thresholds for danger are most effectively established based on natural risk standards. This means that risk levels are acceptable only to the degree they blend with natural background levels**. This concept reflects an evolutionary process that has supported life on this planet for thousands of years. By adhering to these levels, **we can help assure ourselves of thousands more.** While the level of such risks is yet to be determined, **observation suggest that the degree of human-made risk we routinely subject ourselves to is several orders of magnitude higher.** ¶ Due to the fuzzy nature of risk, we can not rely on statistical techniques. **The fundamental problem with catastrophe remains, in the long run, there may be no long run**. That is, **we can not rely on results “averaging out” over time.** With such risks, **only precautionary avoidance** (based on the minimax’ing of the largest possible loss) **makes sense. Combined with reasonable natural thresholds, this view allows a very workable approach to achieving safe progress**.

#### Underview Arguments are Incoherent you can use relative probability to assess the different risks of existential scenarios.

#### Don’t reject DAs everything in the world is built on consequence chains, i.e. the affs scenario is built on the claim that covid exists, that an ip waiver would allow development, that would lead to distribution, that would help the global south. Don’t let the word disad mean our argument is any less legitimate.

#### The Ethics argument is also incoherent we didn’t read a DA predicated on the WTO

#### D point is solved by reading thumpers its not a reason to reject the disad and it should just be a 1ar arg to the disad

#### Causal direction is just woefully unwarranted, a) no justification for why determining “direction” is needed, b) winning the DA means our scenario’s are legitimate and high probability

#### Delgado and Kapoor don’t have warrants or implications 1] all our extinction outweighs offense still applies, 2] liberalism turns Delgado bc it makes a claim ab imperialism which links to the aff, not us, 3] Kapoor is just an explanation of why the aff is negative state action which is wrong bc the plan increases persuit and distribution of medicines to territorially gain access to the south which is imperialist, proves their reps are bad

#### Butler – not in the context of existential threats – we agree that we should stop poverty because that is materially bad but extinction forecloses vtl which ow/s

#### Santos ev is sooooo bad

#### 1) proves that neoliberalism is bad – their card says that neoliberal drives are bad and we agree with that so it doesn’t take out the aff

#### 2) doesn’t indicate that existential threats are bad – if everyone dies your card would definitely not agree with that bc all it says is that posturing without doing anything is bad

#### 3) this only applies if you win that we destroy part of the world (which is what your car dsays) so if we win that we don’t discard populations but rather save them then vote neg

## Advantage

#### Top-Level:

#### 1] A vaccine waiver greenlights counterfeit medicine – independently turns Case by increasing vaccine hesitancy.

Conrad 5-18 John Conrad 5-18-2021 "Waiving intellectual property rights is not in the best interests of patients" <https://archive.is/vsNXv#selection-5353.0-5364.0> (president and CEO of the Illinois Biotechnology Innovation Organization in Chicago.)//Elmer

The Biden's administration's support for India and South Africa's proposal before the World Trade Organization to temporarily waive anti-COVID vaccine patents to boost its supply will fuel the **development of counterfeit vaccines and weaken the already strained global supply chain**. The proposal will not increase the effective number of COVID-19 vaccines in India and other countries. The manufacturing standards to produce COVID-19 vaccines are **exceptionally complicated**; it is unlike any other manufacturing process. To ensure patient safety and efficacy, only manufacturers with the **proper facilities and training should produce the vaccine, and they are**. Allowing a temporary waiver that permits compulsory licensing to allow a manufacturer to export counterfeit vaccines will **cause confusion and endanger public health**. For example, between 60,000 and 80,000 children in Niger with fatal falciparum malaria were treated with a counterfeit vaccine containing incorrect active pharmaceutical ingredients, resulting in more than **100 fatal infections.** Beyond the patients impacted, counterfeit drugs erode public confidence in health care systems and the pharmaceutical industry. Vaccine hesitancy is a rampant threat that feeds off of the distribution of misinformation. Allowing the production of vaccines from improper manufacturing facilities further opens the door for antivaccine hacks to stoke the fear fueling **vaccine hesitance**.

#### 2] Lack of key supplies

Tepper 21 James Tepper, 4/10 [James Tepper, (James M. Tepper is an American neuroscientist currently a Board of Governors Professor of Molecular and Behavioral Neuroscience and Distinguished Professor at Rutgers University and an Elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)]. "Global Covid vaccine rollout threatened by shortage of vital components." Guardian, 4-1-2021, Accessed 8-8-2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/10/global-covid-vaccine-rollout-threatened-by-shortage-of-vital-components // duongie

Vaccine-makers around the world face shortages of vital components including large plastic growbags, according to the head of the firm that is manufacturing a quarter of the UK’s jab supply. Stan Erck, the chief executive of Novavax – which makes the second vaccine to be grown and bottled entirely in Britain – told the Observer that the shortage of 2,000-litre bags in which the vaccine cells were grown was a significant hurdle for global supply. His warning came as bag manufacturers revealed that some pharmaceutical firms were waiting up to 12 months for the sterile single-use disposable plastic containers, which are used to make medicines of all kinds, including the Pfizer, Moderna and Novavax Covid-19 vaccines. But Erck and his British partners said they were confident they had enough suppliers to avoid disruption to the supply of Novavax. The vaccine is waiting for approval from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) but the first of 60 million doses ordered by the government are already in production in Teesside. The Fujifilm Diosynth Biotechnologies factory began growing the first cells for the Novavax vaccine in Billingham, County Durham this month and in a few weeks they will fill the bioreactor bag, ready to be transported to GlaxoSmithKline’s plant at Barnard Castle to be put into vials for distribution. “The first hurdle is showing it works and we don’t have that hurdle any more,” Erck said. But he added there were others still to overcome. “There’s the media that the cells have to grow in,” Erck said. “You grow them in these 2,000-litre bags, which are in short supply. Then you pour it out and you have to filter it, and the filters are in short supply. The little things count.” Novavax almost ran out of bags at one of its 20 factories earlier this year, but there had been no delays for the UK operation, according to Martin Meeson, global chief executive of Fujifilm Diosynth. “We started working on our part of the supply chain in summer last year,” he said. “We had to accelerate some of the investment here, but the commitment we made last summer to start manufacturing in February has been fulfilled.” Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Photograph: Christophe Archambault/AP Both Meeson and Erck said the UK’s vaccine taskforce had been helpful in sorting out supply issues so far, but other countries and other medical supplies might be affected. ABEC makes bioreactor bags at two plants in the US and two in Fermoy and Kells in Ireland, and delivered six 4,000-litre bags to the Serum Institute in India last year for its Covid vaccines. Brady Cole, vice-president of equipment solutions at ABEC, said: “We are hearing from our customer base of lead times that are pushing out to nine, 10, even 12 months to get bioreactor bags. We typically run out at 16 weeks to get a custom bioreactor bag out to a customer.” He said ABEC was still managing to fulfil orders at roughly that rate. “The bag manufacturing capacity can’t meet demand right now,” he added. “And on the component side, the tubes and the instruments and so forth that also go into the bag assembly – those lead times are also starting to get stretched as well. But the biggest problem we see is it really is just the ability to get bags in a reasonable amount of time.” ABEC expanded its factories last year and has now started making 6,000-litre bags, which are roughly the size of a minibus. Other firms including MilliporeSigma, part of German company Merck, have also been expanding their manufacturing facilities. American firm Thermo Fisher Scientific expects it will finish doubling its capacity this year. The US government has also blocked exports of bags, filters and other components so it can supply more Pfizer vaccines for Americans. Adar Poonawalla, the chief executive of the Serum Institute of India, said the restrictions were likely to cause serious bottlenecks. Novavax is hoping to avoid delays and “vaccine nationalism” by operating on four continents, with 20 facilities in nine countries. “One year ago, we had exactly zero manufacturing capacity,” Erck said. “We’re self-sufficient. The two main things we need to do are done in the UK. And in the EU we have plants in Spain and the Czech Republic and fill-and-finish in Germany and the Netherlands.” There was no need for vaccines to cross borders to fulfil contracts, he said. The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine was hit by a delay to a delivery of 5 million doses from India and a problem with a batch made in Britain, and the company has been dragged into a lengthy row between the UK and the EU over vaccine exports.

#### 5] Vaccines are too hard to replicate – IP waiver does nothing

Ana Santos Rutschman 21, Assistant Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law., “The COVID-19 Vaccine Patent Waiver: The Wrong Tool for the Right Goal,” Bill of Health, 5-5-2021, https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/05/covid-vaccine-patent-waiver/

Unlike vaccines, the drugs at stake then were much less difficult to replicate, and third parties availing themselves of a compulsory license faced no significant knowledge deficit. Moreover, there was sufficient production capacity and the necessary raw materials for these drugs to be produced and distributed. Compulsory licensing was thus the right tool for this particular public health problem. By contrast, a waiver of COVID-19 vaccine patents is the wrong legal and policy tool because it does not address the lack of knowledge sharing nor the shortage of raw materials and manufacturing capacity. Furthermore, the use of a waiver is politically fraught — as was the use of compulsory licenses in the context of HIV/AIDS. We submit that battles of the political economy are best fought when prevailing on the use of a legal tool that actually solves the underlying practical problems. For the reasons stated above, that is not the case with waivers. It can be appealing to see a patent waiver as an attractive short-term solution. Yet, even the short-term needs are too intense and the challenges too complex for waivers to fully address the infrastructural and knowledge gaps, as well as the additional problem of inequitable distribution of existing vaccines.

#### Tons of alt causes to health inequality – access, structural wealth inequality, private monopolies

#### 6] Squo solves – plan increases price of scarce materials and results in costly, ineffective facilities

Mcmurry-Heath 8/18 (Michelle Mcmurry-Heath, [physician-scientist and president and CEO of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization.], 8-18-2021, “Waiving intellectual property rights would harm global vaccination“, STAT, accessed: 8-19-2021, https://www.statnews.com/2021/08/18/waiving-intellectual-property-rights-compromise-global-vaccination-efforts/) ajs

Covid-19 vaccines are already remarkably cheap, and companies are offering them at low or no cost to low-income countries. Poor access to clinics and transportation are barriers in some countries, but the expense of the shot itself is not. In fact, if the World Trade Organization grants the IP waiver, it could make these vaccines more expensive.

Here’s why. Before Covid-19 emerged, the world produced at most [5.5 billion doses](https://www.barrons.com/articles/a-plan-to-break-the-vaccine-manufacturing-bottleneck-51621952245) of various vaccines every year. Now the world needs an additional [11 billion doses](https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-g7-summit---12-june-2021) — including billions of doses of mRNA vaccines that no one had ever mass-manufactured before — to fully vaccinate every eligible person on the planet against the new disease.

Even as Covid-19 vaccines were still being developed, pharmaceutical companies began retrofitting and upgrading existing facilities to produce Covid-19 vaccines, at a cost of $40 to $100 million each. Vaccine developers also licensed their technologies to well-established manufacturers, like the Serum Institute of India, to further increase production. As a result, almost every facility in the world that can quickly and safely make Covid-19 vaccines is already doing so, or will be in the next few months.