# 1NC Grapevine Round 5

## 1

### Theory

#### Interpretation – the Affirmative must present a delineated enforcement mechanism for the Plan. There is no normal means since terms are negotiated contextually among member states.

WTO No Date "Whose WTO is it anyway?" <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm> //Elmer

**When WTO rules impose disciplines** on countries’ policies, **that is the outcome of negotiations among WTO members.** The rules are **enforced** **by** the **members themselves** **under agreed procedures that they negotiated**, **including the possibility of trade sanctions**. But those sanctions are imposed by member countries, and authorized by the membership as a whole. This is quite different from other agencies whose bureaucracies can, for example, influence a country’s policy by threatening to withhold credit.

#### Violation: they don’t

#### Standards

#### 1] Shiftiness- They can redefine the 1AC’s enforcement mechanism in the 1AR which allows them to recontextualize their enforcement mechanism to wriggle out of DA’s since all DA links are predicated on type of enforcement i.e. sanctions bad das, domestic politics das off of backlash, information research sharing da if they put monetary punishments, or trade das.

#### 2] Real World - Policy makers will always specify how the mandates of the plan should be endorsed. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, states can circumvent the Aff’s policy since there is no delineated way to enforce the affirmative which means there’s no way to actualize any of their solvency arguments.

#### ESpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary- it’s an active part of the WTO is central to any advocacy about international IP law since the only uniqueness of a reduction of IP protections is how effective its enforcement is

#### No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

#### DTD – We’ve indicted their whole aff so DTA is incoherent,

#### Competing interps, a) reasonability arbitrary leads to judge intervention, b) collapses since you use a BL on an offense defense paradigm which is CI

## 2

### CP

#### The World Trade Organization ought to increase intellectual property protections for medicines. The United States ought to designate intellectual property protections on medicines as adversely affecting the international transfer of technology.

#### Member states can waive IP rights if they hamper the international flow of medical technology.

WTO ’21 (World Trade Organization; 2021; “Obligations and exceptions”; World Trade Organization; Accessed: 8-30-2021; exact date not provided, but copyright was updated in 2021)

Article 8 Principles […] 2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, **may be needed** to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or **adversely affect** the **international transfer of technology**. SECTION 8: CONTROL OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN CONTRACTUAL LICENCES Article 40 1. Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have **adverse effects on trade** and **may impede** the **transfer and dissemination** of technology. 2. Nothing in this Agreement **shall prevent** Members from specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. As provided above, a Member **may adopt**, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, **appropriate measures** to **prevent or control** such practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member. […]

#### Designating IP protections as antithetical to the global health system revitalizes info-sharing.

Youde ’16 (Jeremy; writer for World Politics Review; 4-29-2016; “Technology **Transfer** Is a **Weak Link** in the Global Health System”; World Politics Review; <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18639/technology-transfer-is-a-weak-link-in-the-global-health-system>; Accessed: 8-30-2021)

In mid-April, a spokesperson for the Ugandan government admitted that the country’s only functioning cancer treatment machine had broken earlier that month. The radiotherapy machine, donated by China to Uganda in 1995 and housed at Mulago Hospital in Kampala, is now considered beyond repair. While the government did acquire a second radiotherapy machine in 2013, it has not been operational because of delays in allocating 30 billion shillings—just shy of $9 million—to construct a new building to house it. The funding delay has lifted, but the machine won’t be up and running for at least six months. The government has announced plans to airlift some cancer patients to Nairobi for treatment, but that plan will only accommodate 400 of the estimated 17,000 to 33,000 cancer patients who need treatment annually in Uganda. This breakdown of technology is a human tragedy for the cancer patients from Uganda as well as elsewhere in East Africa that the radiotherapy machine helped treat. Beyond the personal level, though, the episode illustrates a larger shortcoming in global health. Total annual development assistance for health is approximately $36 billion, but that funding is overwhelmingly concentrated on specific infectious diseases. Noncommunicable diseases like cancer receive relatively little international funding—only 1.3 percent in 2015, and the dollar amount has declined since 2013. Funds to strengthen health systems, geared toward building and supporting a resilient health care system, are similarly low, making up only 7.3 percent of development assistance in 2015. Noncommunicable diseases kill more people every year than infectious diseases and accidents do, but this balance is not reflected in global health spending. ... These shortcomings also speak to larger problems in global health around issues of **technology transfers** and long-term **commitments** to keep that technology working. It’s one thing to provide necessary medical technologies in the first place; it’s another to ensure that those technologies are accessible and operational going forward. Despite the **importance** of technology transfers, questions of **long-term support** for them have received relatively little attention from the global health regime. As noncommunicable diseases like cancer cause an even-higher proportion of deaths each year, it will become all the more **imperative** that the international community address this gap in **sharing** and funding **crucial health care** technology. This does not mean that there are no efforts to facilitate technology transfers around the world. The Fogarty International Center, a part of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, has had an [Office of Technology Transfer](http://www.fic.nih.gov/News/GlobalHealthMatters/march-april-2014/Pages/technology-transfer-nih-ott.aspx) since 1989 to make medical innovations developed in the United States more widely available. The World Health Organization (WHO) also has a [Technology Transfer Initiative](http://www.who.int/phi/programme_technology_transfer/en/) to improve access to health care technologies in developing countries. These efforts are laudable, but their interpretation of technology transfer is almost entirely rooted in access to pharmaceuticals and vaccines. To be sure, that is a very important issue—but it only deals with one narrow element of technology transfer. The problems of global health technology transfers illustrated in Uganda underscore a larger issue: the need for a so-called fourth industrial revolution, what has been described as “blurring the real world with the technological world.” This idea gained prominence earlier this year when it served as the theme for the World Economic Forum in Davos. For global health, this means embracing technology to find low-cost ways to promote health, spread education, and reach communities whose access to the health care infrastructure is weak. It expands on the notion of telemedicine and eHealth to make it more encompassing. According to health care entrepreneur Jonathan Jackson, the fourth industrial revolution could change global health by encouraging a shift in focus “from healthcare to health promotion.” Moving from high-cost treatment to low-cost prevention, he has argued, will have significant and far-reaching positive economic implications for developing countries around the world. Its inspiring sense of technological optimism notwithstanding, this sort of approach cannot be the sole focus of technology transfers in global health. Prevention is indeed important, but the fact of the matter remains that people will get sick—and those sick people will need treatment. Mobile applications and electronic access to health care providers can be useful, but they cannot replace a radiotherapy machine. Understanding the root causes of noncommunicable diseases goes far beyond individual choices and intersects with the larger political, economic and social context, so we cannot assume that cybertechnology alone can stop cancer. It is also important to remember that the results of greater technological innovation and integration won’t be free. Sub-Saharan African states, on average, spend $200 per person per year on health care. Even if technology allows costs to decline, they are still likely to be out of reach for many people in most of these countries—in the same way that the purchase and maintenance of medical technologies are prohibitively expensive in these same states today. Technology in and of itself is not useful unless it can be maintained over the long term. This, then, is a weak link in the larger global health system: How do we ensure access to life-prolonging medical technologies beyond pharmaceuticals and vaccines in a sustainable way? Consider two ideas. First, development assistance for health must orient more of its resources toward treating noncommunicable diseases and strengthening health systems. These are the areas in which these technologies are likely to be used, but are not currently supported by the international system. The changing nature of health and disease will only make them even more important in the years to come. Second, longer-term funding commitments would provide a greater opportunity to incorporate medical technologies into health care systems sustainably. Machines will break down, and technologies will fail. That is inevitable. But the global health regime, from the WHO and its regional organizations like the Regional Office for Africa to major donors like the **U**nited **S**tates government and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, needs to figure out how to ensure that these problems do not put **lives in peril**. Technology alone will not improve global health unless it is properly supported and funded.

#### International collaboration’s key to check future pandemics – otherwise, extinction.

Dulaney ’20 [Michael; digital journalist with the ABC June 2020; "'A question of when, not if': Another pandemic is coming – and sooner than we think", No Publication; https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2020-06-07/a-matter-of-when-not-if-the-next-pandemic-is-around-the-corner/12313372, accessed 4-12-2021]

And as recently as September last year — just a few months before COVID-19 was detected in China — an independent watchdog set up by the WHO warned the world was "grossly" unprepared for the "very real threat" of a pandemic. But even more alarming is what the new coronavirus indicates about the future. Researchers say human impacts on the natural world are causing new infectious diseases to emerge more frequently than ever before, meaning the next pandemic — one perhaps even worse than COVID-19 — is only a matter of time. "We know that it's a probability, not a possibility," Dr Reid says. "The roulette wheel will start to spin again. "If you don't resolve the conditions that generated the problem, then we sit waiting for the next probability equation to come through. "And it will, and sadly it's possible that it's in our lifetime." The growing threat to human health Nearly all emerging pathogens like COVID-19 come from "zoonotic transfer" — essentially, when a virus present in animals jumps to infect humans. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates three out of every four new infectious diseases, and nearly all pandemics, emerge this way. Researchers have counted around 200 infectious diseases that have broken out more than 12,000 times over the past three decades. On average, one new infectious disease jumps to humans every four months. Animal species like civet cats (SARS), camels (MERS), horses (Hendra), pigs (Nipah) and chimpanzees (HIV) have all been implicated in the spread of new viruses at different times.

## 3

### CP

#### CP: The member nations of the World Trade Organization should implement a one-and-done approach for patent protection.

#### Their solvency advocate concedes it solves

**1AC Feldman, 19 – recut (we read green)** (Robin Feldman, Robin Feldman is professor of law and director of the Institute for Innovation Law at UC Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco and author of “Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes” (Cambridge University Press, March 2019). 2-11-2019, accessed on 8-13-2021, STAT, "Drug patent protection: it's time for a 'one-and-done' approach - STAT", <https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/11/drug-patent-protection-one-done/)WWPP>

-bans method such as evergreening, patent thickets, fake orphan patents, and pay for delay

Why isn’t the system working as it should? Some experts believe the U.S. can rein in drug process with value-based pricing, which aims to tie the prices we pay for drugs to the benefits they provide, either in terms of longer life or better quality of life. Others call for dismantling pharmacy benefit managers. Still others want large groups like Medicare to negotiate with drug companies for better drug prices. While each of these might help, they cannot solve the problem alone. Why? Because they do not reach the heart of the problem. As I explain in my new book, “Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes,” the government itself is giving pharmaceutical companies the power they are wielding through overly generous drug patent protection. Effective solutions must address that problem. Drug companies have brought great innovations to market. Society rewards innovation with patents, or with non-patent exclusivities that can be obtained for activities such as testing drugs in children, undertaking new clinical studies, or developing orphan drugs. The rights provided by patents or non-patent exclusivities provide a defined time period of protection so companies can recoup their investments by charging monopoly prices. When patents end, lower-priced competitors should be able to jump into the market and drive down the price. But that’s not happening. Instead, drug companies build massive patent walls around their products, extending the protection over and over again. Some modern drugs have an avalanche of U.S. patents, with expiration dates staggered across time. For example, the rheumatoid arthritis drug Humira is protected by more than 100 patents. Walls like that are insurmountable. Rather than rewarding innovation, our patent system is now largely repurposing drugs. Between 2005 and 2015, more than three-quarters of the drugs associated with new patents were not new ones coming on the market but existing ones. In other words, we are mostly churning and recycling. Particularly troubling, new patents can be obtained on minor tweaks such as adjustments to dosage or delivery systems — a once-a-day pill instead of a twice-a-day one; a capsule rather than a tablet. Tinkering like this may have some value to some patients, but it nowhere near justifies the rewards we lavish on companies for doing it. From society’s standpoint, incentives should drive scientists back to the lab to look for new things, not to recycle existing drugs for minimal benefit. I believe that one period of protection should be enough. We should make the changes necessary to prevent companies from building patent walls and piling up mountains of rights. This could be accomplished by a “one-and-done” approach for patent protection. Under it, a drug would receive just one period of exclusivity, and no more. The choice of which “one” could be left entirely in the hands of the pharmaceutical company,

## 4

### CP

#### Text – Member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce Intellectual Property Protections on all medicines except for [medicines related to Tuberculosis].

#### Intellectual Property is key to eliminate Tuberculosis – IP ecosystems independently cause Private-Public Partnerships related to Tuberculosis which solves their Turns.

Kilbridge 3-23 Patrick Kilbridge 3-23-2021 "IP to Beat TB: How Efforts to Curb Tuberculosis Are Being Fueled by a Collaborative IP Ecosystem" <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/03/23/ip-beat-tb-efforts-curb-tuberculosis-fueled-collaborative-ip-ecosystem/id=131184/> (vice president of international intellectual property for the Global Intellectual Property Center (GIPC) at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Kilbride oversees the center’s multilateral and international programs promoting the protection and enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights, managing a team of country and regional experts. Previously, Kilbride was Executive Director, Americas Strategic Policy Initiatives, and Executive Vice President, Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (AACCLA), within the Chamber’s International Division. Prior to joining the U.S. Chamber, Kilbride was appointed to serve in the Bush administration as deputy assistant U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) for Intergovernmental Affairs & Public Liaison.)//Elmer

“**Any** true **breakthrough** **in** the **fight against TB** won’t **come from** **a single research team alone**. If there’s anything that the COVID-19 pandemic has taught us, it’s that **innovation is an ecosystem**.” One would think it was ripped from today’s headlines: a deadly respiratory disease sweeps across the world—**killing one person every 22 seconds**. But this disease is not COVID-19. The threat is tuberculosis (or TB), which has flourished for centuries thanks to the ability of the bacteria that cause the disease (Mycobacterium tuberculosis) to quickly spread from person to person through the air that we breathe. Even though treatments exist, TB can easily become a chronic or fatal condition if left unchecked. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2019, 10 million people became ill with TB, and **1.4 million people** **lost their lives to the disease**—a serious, even **silent pandemic** that is **deadlier than HIV.** A Persistent Problem Requires a New Approach Now, thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, public health concerns have become top of mind. At the same time, however, COVID-19 has caused significant disruptions to TB services that threaten the hard-won gains the international community has made in combatting TB in recent years. **Without sustained action** against TB—both during and after the COVID-19 pandemic—the **disease** **will continue to spread**, with **disproportionate** **effects on poorer** **and developing countries**. In 2019, for instance, India, Indonesia, China, the Philippines, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and South Africa put together accounted for two-thirds of that year’s new TB cases. The location of new cases is particularly troubling given co-infections in people living with HIV. In addition to emphasizing the need for universal access to existing tools and services, WHO has adopted a new global TB strategy that calls on stakeholders to accelerate research and innovation to improve disease prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. The **rise of resistance** to current antibiotics **underscores** the **need for novel tools** to win the war against TB. This makes the research of Drs. Clif Barry and Helena Boshoff of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) even more critical. Infectious disease researchers by training, the pair have spent years studying how TB bacteria survive inside, and then kill, human immune cells, thus preventing the body from fighting off the infection. They are also experts in the mechanisms by which TB bacteria develop resistance to the antibiotics used to treat the disease. Even though multidrug-resistant TB (or rifampicin-resistant tuberculosis; MDR/RR-TB) currently affects 550,000 people, antibiotic resistance was identified by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as a looming threat. To address the problems of immune system destruction and antibiotic resistance, the NIH researchers created a strategy for developing a new drug with a mode of action different from that of current medications—a drug that destroys the TB bacteria within the immune cells before they can damage the cells. Such a drug could potentially be a safe and effective treatment for MDR/RR-TB. Public-Private Collaboration Provides a Map But any true breakthrough in the fight against TB won’t come from a single research team alone. If there’s anything that the COVID-19 pandemic has taught us, it’s that innovation is an ecosystem. Addressing **global health challenges**, then, **require an “all-of-society” approach** to leverage global know-how and investment. Helping to connect the dots is the WIPO Re:Search Consortium. The Consortium was founded in 2011 by BIO Ventures for Global Health (BVGH), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and leading **pharmaceutical companies** around a common vision: to proactively **share** **industry i**ntellectual **p**roperty **assets** and expertise **to catalyze** the **discovery and development** of new treatments for TB and other infectious diseases that collectively affect more than one in five people worldwide. BVGH, a non-profit that supports critical research and advises governments on public health initiatives, and WIPO, a specialized agency of the United Nations and the global forum for intellectual property services, policy, information, and cooperation, co-lead the Consortium. To date, **WIPO Re:Search** has **convened** **154 private sector and academic** (including non-profit and government) **members** in 45 countries **to advance research** on neglected infectious diseases. Through collaboration and the **strategic use of i**ntellectual **p**roperty, the Consortium has **spurred breakthroughs for malaria**, Chagas disease, leishmaniasis, human African trypanosomiasis, schistosomiasis, **dengue fever**, and others. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, **collaborations** **between the public and private sectors on** scientific research and **drug development were common**. Public tax dollars, for instance, fund basic, preclinical, and clinical research while the private sector takes care of highly specialized research, testing, and manufacturing of drug candidates. In this case, BVGH connected the NIH researchers with Johnson & Johnson’s Jump-stARter library—the company’s initiative to develop individual compounds for workable and safe medicines. This WIPO Re:Search ‘match’ proved fruitful, as Drs. Barry and Boshoff found several compounds within the library that killed TB bacteria without harming human immune cells. Using those data, along with the results of ongoing studies of structurally similar compounds, Johnson & Johnson will chemically optimize the most active compounds. The partners will then validate the resultant lead candidates in laboratory and preclinical studies. **We Won’t Beat TB Without IP** Intellectual property has been **key to delivering multiple vaccines and treatments** for the current global pandemic—and it will be key **to stopping TB in its tracks**. But in a vast, global innovation ecosystem, it helps to have a map. That’s why initiatives like WIPO Re:Search and the work of organizations like BVGH are indispensable to greater coordination of global R&D. And though we are far away from beating TB for good, we’ll keep an eye out for the headlines.

#### Drug resistant Tuberculosis coming now – resistance is outpacing new drugs

Scutti 17 Susan Scutti 9-19-2017 “The world is running out of antibiotics, WHO says” <https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/health/antibiotic-resistance-who/index.html> (CNN, Medical Daily, and Newsweek reporter)

**Too few new antibiotics are under development to combat** the threat of multidrug-resistant infections, according to a new World Health Organization report published Tuesday. Adding to the concern: It is likely that the speed of increasing resistance will outpace the slow drug development process. As of May, a total of 51 antibiotics and 11 biologicals -- medical products often made from natural sources -- are being developed, the new report said. "The idea is that biologicals could replace use of antibiotics, which could help in overcoming the resistance problem," Peter Beyer, an author of the report and senior adviser to the WHO's Department of Essential Medicines and Health Products, wrote in an email. Seemingly, this large number of potential new drugs should suffice, yet it is not nearly enough. First, just 33 of the antibiotics in the pipeline target priority pathogens. This year, the WHO published a list of a dozen "priority pathogens": 12 separate families of antibiotic-resistant bacteria that pose the greatest threat to human health. Among the priority pathogens is a drug-resistant tuberculosis, which kills about 250,000 people around the world each year, and a variety of multidrug resistant strains -- Acinetobacter, Pseudomonas and various Enterobacteriaceae -- which are responsible for infections in hospitals and nursing homes and among patients whose care requires ventilators and catheters. Of the 33 potential medicines for treating priority bug infections, only eight are innovative treatments. The other 25 are simple modifications of existing families of antibiotics. At best, then, the 25 will serve as short-term solutions since it is expected bacteria will quickly adapt to and resist these new (though somewhat familiar) drugs, according to the WHO. "It is difficult to speculate why companies develop specific new medicines," Beyer noted. "But in general many new treatments do not necessarily constitute advances over existing treatments." TB infections require a combination of at least three antibiotics, according to the new report, yet only seven of the new TB medicines are even in clinical trials. Soon, there will be a serious lack of treatment options for this infection, the report warns.

#### That causes extinction – transmissibility makes it a unique risk.

Enemark 13, Christian. "Drug-resistant tuberculosis: Security, ethics and global health." Global Society 27.2 (2013): 159-177. (Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton, PhD in International Relations)

Introduction The worldwide spread of drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis (TB) bacteria (Mycobacterium tuberculosis) is out of control and incidents of harder-to-cure TB illness are rising. This article explores the present and potential impact of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB)—a deadly, contagious and virtually incurable disease—on human health and state capacity. Detected cases of XDRTB can occasion the implementation of extraordinary control measures, because some governments are sufficiently fearful of the disease as to frame it as an issue of national security. Such framing has the potential to precipitate more financial resources and stronger legal powers to bolster public health, but it might also increase the risk that emergency response measures will be counterproductive and/or unjust. XDR-TB arguably poses an existential threat to local health systems (and the populations they serve) around the world, so difficult and costly is it to contain and cure this disease. It is the premise of this article that dealing with the problem is a security challenge as much as (or more than) a humanitarian one; controlling XDR-TB is not only about compassion, it is also about survival. Accordingly, this warrants the implementation of emergency measures that go beyond human rights rules and economic norms that would otherwise restrain government decision making. Framing XDR-TB as a security issue is empirically plausible, and doing so is a good thing provided that increased response efforts promote rather than hinder the provision of universal access to adequate TB treatment over the long term. The article begins by outlining the ways in which policy makers and scholars have sought to draw a link between security and infectious diseases generally. In order to assess the plausibility of framing XDR-TB specifically in security terms, it is necessary first to understand the disease’s current and likely impact in public health terms. Beyond assessment of the morbidity, mortality and associated economic burden imposed by XDR-TB, the article then explores two disease control measures that are motivated particularly by security concerns (as distinct from mere health- and/or economy-oriented motivations). These measures are border control and patient isolation. Both involve curtailing individuals’ freedom of movement for the purpose of preventing or delaying contagion, so it is important to assess each measure by reference to public health ethics. Informing this ethical assessment is the notion that a person infected with a contagious disease like XDR-TB is both threatened and threatening. On the one hand, that person is a disease vector from whom the broader population should be protected (an immediate greater good). On the other hand, he or she is also a disease victim (and the bearer of human rights to life and liberty) whose health and wellbeing should be protected (an immediate individual good). A policy dilemma arises as regards the relative importance of achieving each immediate good. The diffi- culty is compounded by the notion that two long-term, greater goods are also at stake: public confidence in health systems and in the protection of individual rights. Infectious Diseases, Security and Ethics The idea of linking health and security concerns, as a matter of academic inquiry and public policy, has received support from two directions. For some members of the public health and human development sectors, the language of security is a means of rallying political support and financial resources to address neglected health issues. In the security sector, some analysts and practitioners argue that the impact of particular health challenges is sufficiently serious as to warrant prioritisation comparable to that traditionally accorded to the threat and use of armed force. Infectious disease (disease caused by bacteria, viruses and other microorganisms) is the health issue that has received the most attention in security-oriented policy documents and scholarly debates. AIDS (caused by the virus HIV) was arguably the first disease to receive the imprimatur of serious attention at the highest levels of security decision making. The passage in 2000 of UN Security Council Resolution 1308 was the first time a health issue was officially framed as a threat to international peace and security. The Resolution expressed concern about the potential adverse effects of HIV/AIDS on UN peacekeeping personnel, but it also stressed more generally that this pandemic, “if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security”.1 The belief that HIV/AIDS threatens security has led governments in rich and poor countries alike to take the disease more seriously, and to devote more resources towards controlling it through prevention campaigns and increased provision of life-prolonging medication. George W. Bush’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which in 2003 allocated $US15 billion over five years to international HIV/AIDS programmes—“the largest commitment ever by any nation for an international health initiative dedicated to a single disease”2 —is an example of this. The legislation that authorised this extraordinary allocation of resources included a security rationale, with HIV/ AIDS described as “destabilising communities” and being a disease that “weakens the defenses of countries severely affected”.3 Soon after PEPFAR was authorised, a highly pathogenic avian (and potentially pandemic) influenza virus (H5N1) emerged and began its rapid spread to dozens of countries worldwide. This prompted policy makers and scholars alike to begin contemplating the security implications of an influenza pandemic resembling the great “Spanish Flu” of 1918–1919 which killed an estimated 40 million people. Pandemic influenza is a prime candidate for securitisation because of its capacity to inspire dread on a large scale and in a short space of time. In 2007, for example, the World Health Organization (WHO) described this disease as “the most feared security threat”.4 Naturally occurring disease outbreaks have also come to be considered alongside the enduring problem of biological weapons. US President Barack Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy emphasised the importance of continued efforts “to reduce the risk associated with unintentional or deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease”.5 The political process whereby non-military phenomena (such as naturally occurring disease outbreaks) come to be treated as security issues has been theorised by scholars of the Copenhagen School. The theory of ‘securitisation’ has attracted numerous attempts at contestation, development and refinement, but the theory’s straightforward central proposition continues to have great explanatory power: for threats to count as security issues, they must be distinguished from issues that are merely political. Specifically, they have to be “staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind”.6 Securitisation is not the same as mere prioritisation. Rather, securitisation theory emphasises and insists upon the emergency nature of threats and the extraordinary nature of responses. Both the threat of and the response to XDR-TB are assessed in later sections of this article. For present purposes, the central concern is societal functioning, with the referent object of security being the state’s ability to protect its population through public health and healthcare systems. In assessing whether a particular infectious disease should be framed as a threat to security, the theoretical assumption is that a “security” element is what propels an issue to the top of a government’s political agenda. With this special status comes access to extraordinary legal, financial, military and/or other measures, the implementation of which may have adverse implications both for public health and for individual human rights. Although securitisation theory appears to be mainly descriptive of a political process of constructing “security”, it is important to note its built-in (albeit underdeveloped) normative dimension. In originally expounding their theory, Barry Buzan and his co-authors argued that “[a]voiding excessive and irrational securitization is ... a legitimate social, political and economic objective of considerable importance”.7 Moreover, they warned against idealising national security because “[i]t works to silence opposition and has given power holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes, to claim a right to handle something with less democratic control and constraint”.8 Regarding state responses to infectious diseases, Stefan Elbe points out that people living with HIV, for example, have been “ostracized and even persecuted by some states for their illness”.9 He argues that framing the disease as a national security threat “risks fuelling such exclusionary and dehumanizing responses and could serve as an implicit legitimisation of any harsh or unjust ‘emergency’ policies that states may adopt in relation to persons living with the virus”.10 These observations are a warning that emergency measures to address infectious disease threats must not in themselves curtail human rights to the point that securitisation becomes illegitimate and counterproductive. Although political claims about the security status of particular diseases often refer to the paramount importance of swift and aggressive responses, experience suggests that haste and zeal can sometimes undermine rather than assist disease-control efforts. There is thus a case for tempering security-oriented analysis with a concern for ethical principles. Because disease control measures sometimes involve infringement of widely accepted individual rights and liberties, infectious diseases raise difficult ethical questions about how to strike a balance between the goal of protecting the greater good of public health and the goal of protecting individual human rights. Quarantine, isolation and travel restrictions, for example, violate the right to freedom of movement. Other public health measures—such as contact tracing and the reporting of the health status of individuals to authorities—can interfere with the right to privacy. Although measures such as these might sometimes be necessary to avert public health disasters, the question arises: how great must a public health threat be for such measures to be justified? Most scholars and policy makers would presumably accept that the goal of promoting the greater good of society through public health does not always take priority over the protection of individual rights and liberties, nor vice versa. The task of appropriately balancing and simultaneously pursuing these two sets of interests is then made more difficult—and more important—by the insertion of a security dimension. For example, the fear factor that is necessarily present in anything to do with “security” can have a distorting effect. It has been argued, for example, that infectious diseases’ powerful ability to engender fear often leads to “rapid, emotionally driven decision making about the care of individual patients and about public health policies”, even when these decisions “challenge generally accepted medical ethics principles such as patient autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice”.11 Securitisation of an infectious disease should thus be of such a form as can guard against these dangers. Tuberculosis and Drug Resistance The resurgence of TB in an extremely drug-resistant form since 2006, prompting extraordinary responses by some governments, presents an opportunity to consider anew the relationship between infectious diseases, security and ethics. Tuberculosis is an infectious bacterial disease transmitted via airborne droplets. Although approximately one-third of the world’s population is infected with TB bacteria, not all who are infected develop TB disease. Mycobacterium tuberculosis bacteria can lie dormant in the body for many years. If a person’s immune system is weakened (by HIV co-infection, some other medical condition or simply by old age), he or she can develop what is referred to as “active” TB. Only one in 10 infected individuals is likely to progress to an active TB episode during their lifetime in the absence of immune system suppression. The disease most often affects the lungs, but it can also affect the brain, kidneys or spine. Infectious bacteria can spread through the air when a person with active TB sneezes, coughs, spits or talks, and someone with untreated TB can potentially infect 10 to 15 others annually.12 The disease is today a major cause of illness and premature mortality, especially among people living with HIV, and the human toll it exacts is likely to increase as drug resistance makes TB treatment more difficult and expensive. According to the latest WHO report on global tuberculosis control, in 2011 there were an estimated 8.7 million new cases of TB globally, almost one million deaths among HIV-negative cases of TB, and an additional 430,000 deaths among people who were HIV-positive.13 People living with HIV who are also infected with TB are 21–34 times more likely to develop TB disease compared with those who are HIV-negative, and the highest rates of HIV–TB co-infection occur in Africa where 44% of TB patients with an HIV test result in 2010 were HIV-positive.14 Although the focus of this article is on the security significance of drug-resistant TB rather than the broader HIV–TB co-epidemic, suffice to say that any increase in HIV prevalence would exacerbate the spread of drug-resistant TB. TB bacteria build up resistance to anti-TB drugs because of incomplete or inadequate treatment. In poorer countries especially, it can be difficult to ensure adherence to a course of antibiotics which, to be effective, needs to continue without interruption for six to eight weeks. Unsurprisingly, an individual who begins to feel better before such time has elapsed might decide to stop taking the drugs, especially if they are expensive. To reduce the likelihood of drug-resistant TB bacteria emerging, the longstanding approach to TB treatment is directly observed treatment—short course (DOTS), which focuses on supervised adherence to a fixed combination of drugs. Nevertheless, systemic incountry problems like inconsistent drug prescribing, erratic drug supply and unregulated over-the-counter drug sales increase the risk of inadequate TB treatment. Likewise, in many parts of the world, chronic shortages of trained medical staff and inadequate laboratory capacity make it difficult to track and properly treat incidents of TB illness. If drug treatment is stopped prematurely, the TB bacteria will not be completely eliminated from the body and those that remain may mutate into a form against which the drug is powerless; what did not kill the bacteria serves to makes them stronger. A person infected with TB bacteria that are resistant to first-line drugs—multidrug-resistant (MDR) TB—must then resort to stronger (and more toxic) second-line drugs administered over a longer period of time. Some anti-MDR-TB drugs are administered by injection, so individualised treatment requires a high level of medical expertise. If treatment with these second-line drugs is inadequate or incomplete, the targeted bacteria may mutate further into a form against which almost no drug is effective—extensively drug-resistant (XDR) TB.15 The WHO has reported that the total number of incident TB cases per year worldwide has been falling since 2006.16 However, the proportion of TB cases globally that are caused by drug-resistant TB bacteria is rising. In 2010, there were an estimated 650,000 cases of MDR-TB among the world’s 12 million prevalent cases of TB.17 Among the 27 countries that the WHO designates as high MDRTB burden countries, former Soviet Union countries are conspicuous in terms of the estimated percentages of new TB cases that are multidrug-resistant: Azerbaijan (22%), Belarus (26%), Estonia (18%), Moldova (19%) and Russia (18%).18 The four countries that had the largest number of estimated cases of MDR-TB in absolute terms in 2008 were China (100,000), India (99,000), Russia (38,000) and South Africa (13,000).19 The most worrying statistic is that “patients enrolled on treatment for MDR-TB in 2010 [104,000] only represented 16% of the MDR-TB cases estimated to exist among reported TB cases”.20 The remaining 84% are either not receiving treatment or are receiving inadequate treatment, and the latter poses an XDR-TB risk. As of the end of 2011, 77 countries had reported at least one case of XDR-TB.21 If the number of MDR-TB cases in the world is 650,000, the WHO estimate of global XDR-TB prevalence comes out at 58,500 cases worldwide. Given the low rate (16%) of MDR-TB treatment going to people who need it, it is reasonable to suppose that many if not most XDR-TB cases are also left untreated. The disease called “extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis” was first described in 2006.22 Between January 2005 and March 2006, 221 cases of MDR-TB were identified at the Tugela Ferry district hospital in KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa. Of these, 53 patients were further diagnosed with XDR-TB. Half had never previously received TB treatment. The mortality rate was extremely high—52 of the patients (98%) died within a median of 16 days after initial sputum collection.23 Unsurprisingly, XDR-TB mortality rates resemble mortality rates from ordinary TB during the pre-antibiotic era. Without drug treatment, TB victims are highly likely to die. Studies of the natural history of the disease among sputum smear-positive and HIV-negative cases of pulmonary TB have shown that around 70% of victims died within 10 years. Treatment using combinations of anti-TB drugs developed in the 1940s and 1950s can dramatically reduce mortality rates, and in 2009 the treatment success rate globally among reported smear-positive cases of drug-susceptible, pulmonary TB reached 87%.24 But with increased and more widespread drug resistance has come reduced rates of treatment success for this strengthened form of TB illness. In low HIV-prevalence settings, patients with MDR-TB have been treated with a success rate of 60–80%, and the rate is 44–60% for XDR-TB patients.25 This means the mortality rate among treated MDR-TB and XDR-TB patients is as high as 40% and 56% respectively. Mortality rates are even higher in circumstances where a patient undergoing TB treatment is HIV-positive.26 Naturally, whether or not an MDR-TB or XDR-TB patient is HIV-positive, he or she is more likely still to die in circumstances of no treatment at all. Beyond epidemiological data that evaluate the health burden of TB, it is worth considering also the disease’s economic burden—a burden that will surely increase as TB becomes harder to treat. In addition to the cost of lost productivity, the WHO estimates that TB treatment costs alone will reach US$16.2 billion by 2015.27 Although the six-month course of treatment for drug-susceptible TB is not prohibitively expensive, treating MDR-TB can cost US$144–265 per day, with the requisite two-year treatment costs totalling US$40,000 per patient.28 If every one of the 650,000 people estimated to have MDR-TB were to undergo adequate treatment, the cost would therefore be US$26 billion. According to the WHO, the cost of drugs alone for treating the average MDR-TB patient is 50 to 200 times higher than for treating a drug-susceptible TB patient, and the overall cost of care can be more than 10 times higher.29 In the case of XDR-TB, treatment could be of indefinite duration and indeterminate cost, possibly limited only by the patient’s life expectancy. After establishing that drug-resistant TB is a serious and worsening problem from a health and economic perspective, the question remains: is the threat of XDR-TB severe enough to count as a security threat? For “security” to be invoked, it is not enough simply to point to a “threat”. Lots of things are threatening to a greater or lesser extent, so the Copenhagen School insists that a threat must be an existential one. To count as a security threat (as distinct from a mere economic and/or health threat), the very survival of something or someone must be at stake. The evidence presented so far suggests strongly that this is the case: XDR-TB arguably endangers local and international health systems because treating this disease is increasingly expensive and the burden of treating large numbers of patients could become unbearable. Securitisation as an intersubjective process is achieved, and emergency responses to the identified problem thus endorsed, once the notion of a threat is believed and accepted by others.30 In the case of XDR-TB, the available epidemiological data make a claim to security status plausible, as does a comparison to other infectious diseases that are already sometimes addressed in security terms. For example, compared to HIV which is not readily transmissible, it is much harder to protect oneself against infection by the airborne microorganisms that cause TB. And whereas pandemic influenza also spreads through the air, TB bacteria can be far more deadly than influenza virus if the former are drug resistant. Recent attempts at developing a broadly effective TB vaccine have met with little success,31 so antibiotics remain the primary pharmaceutical response to the disease. But as MDR-TB mutates into XDR-TB, and as drug resistance becomes more widespread, a pharmaceutical solution moves further out of reach. The relative importance of containing what is virtually incurable is increasing, and it is in this context that drastic disease control measures are being proposed and implemented. Adopting emergency measures to counter grave threats is the stuff of “security”, but the protection of public health must always be guided by ethical considerations. Accordingly, the remainder of this article addresses the question: how should XDR-TB be securitised?

## 5

### NC

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – a. the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation b. Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false so negate because the aff is probably false

#### The aff burden is to prove that the resolutional statement is logical, and the reciprocal neg burden is to prove that the resolutional statement is illogical.

#### Prefer:

#### 1. Text – Oxford Dictionary defines ought as “used to indicate something that is probable.”

[https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought //](https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought%20//)Massa

#### Ought is “used to express logical consequence” as defined by Merriam-Webster

(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>) //Massa

#### 2. Debatability – a) my interp means debates focus on empirics about squo trends rather than irresolvable abstract principles that’ve been argued for years b) Moral oughts cannot guide action.

**Gray,** Grey, JW. "The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"" *Ethical Realism*. N.p., 19 July 2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2015. //Massa

**The is/ought gap is a problem in moral philosophy where what is the case and what ought to be the case seem quite different, and it presents itself as the following question** to David Hume: **How do we *know* what morally ought to be the case from what is the case?** Hume posed the question in A Treatise of Human Nature Book III Part I Section I: In **every system of morality**, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs, when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change **is imperceptible**; but is, however, of the last consequence. **For as this ought**, or ought not, **expresses some new relation** or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, **for what seems altogether inconceivable**, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. It is here that Hume points out that **philosophers argue about** various **nonmoral facts, then somehow conclude what ought to be the case** (or what people ought to do) **based on** those facts (about **what is the case**). **For example, we might find out that arsenic is poisonous and conclude that we ought not consume it. But we need to know how nonmoral facts can lead to moral conclusions. These two things seem unrelated. The is/ought gap [isn’t]** doesn’t seem like **a problem for nonmoral oughts**—what we ought to do to accomplish our goals, fulfill our desires, or maintain our commitments. For example, we could say, “If you want to be healthy, you ought not consume arsenic.” However, it might be morally wrong to consume arsenic. If it is, we have some more explaining to do.

#### 4. Neg definition choice – The aff should have defined ought in the 1ac as their value, by not doing so they have forfeited their right to read a new definition – kills 1NC strategy since I premised my engagement on a lack of your definition.

#### [1] Inherency – either a) the aff is non-inherent and you vote neg on presumption or b) it is and it isn’t logically going to happen.

## 6

### Abhinav ED

#### Drop them for not specifying their favorite moment/thing about Abhinav Sinha in the 1AC, 1AR spec doesn’t solve because its disengenous and you made an active decision not to

#### My favorite thing about Abhinav is his incredible posture, he always stands up and sits with his back perfectly straight which is why he’s been able to maintain his height.

#### Standard’s Abhinav Ed, both of us comparing our favorite moment/thing about Abhinav allows us to bond more about someone beside ourselves, that avoids being narcissistic and controls the IL to education because we learn to think about someone beside ourselves.

## Case

### Hedge

#### 1AR Theory bad, have to intervene, 1ac spikes solve, 2ar can blow up 20 second shell, must read 1ar theory as a fleshed out interp cant be paragraph theory

### Econ

#### Growth is unsustainable and innovation can’t solve - shifting away from productivism is key to avoid extinction.

* Growth leads to overwhelming tipping points – collapses freshwater, soil, forests, toxic waste and pollution
* AT Kuznets Curve i.e. more Economic Growth will have a bell curve effect on the environment -

Büchs and Koch 17, Milena, and Max Koch. Postgrowth and wellbeing: Challenges to sustainable welfare. Springer, 2017. (Milena Büchs is Associate Professor in Sustainability, Economics and Low Carbon Transitions at the University of Leeds, UK. Max Koch is Professor of Social Policy at Lund University (School of Social Work))//Re-cut by Elmer

As the previous chapters have shown, economic growth is regarded as a prime policy aim by policy makers and economists because it is thought to be essential for reducing poverty and generating rising living standards and stable levels of employment (Ben-Ami 2010: 19–20). More generally, support for economic growth is usually intertwined with advocating social progress based on scientific rationality and reason and hence with an optimistic view of humans’ ingenuity to solve problems (ibid.: 17, 20, Chap. 5). Growth criticism thus tends to be portrayed as anti-progress and inherently conservative (ibid.: Chap. 8). While it is important to acknowledge and discuss this view, it needs to be emphasised that growth criticism is formulated with long-term human welfare in mind which advocates alternative types of social progress (Barry 1998). This chapter first outlines ecological and social strands of growth critiques and then introduces relevant concepts of and positions within the postgrowth debate. Ecological Critiques of G rowth Generally speaking, two types of growth criticism can b e distinguished: the first focuses on limitations of GDP as a measure of economic performance; the second goes beyond this by highlighting the inappropriateness of growth as the ultimate goal of economic activity and its negative implications for environment and society. Since GDP measures the monetary value of all final goods and services in an economy, it excludes the environmental costs generated by production. For instance, as long as there is no cost associated with emitting greenhouse gases , the cost for the environmental and social damage following from this is not reflected in GDP figures. Worse even, GDP increases as a consequence of some types of environmental damage: if **deforestation** and timber trade increase or if **natural disasters or industrial accidents** require expenditures for clean-up and reconstruction, GDP figures will rise (Douthwaite 1999: 18; Leipert 1986). Several critics of GDP as a measure of progress have proposed alternative indicators of welfare such as the Genuine Progress Indicator, Green GDPs or other approaches which factor in environmental costs (see Chap. 5 for more details), but they do not necessarily object to economic growth being the primary goal of economic activity (van den Bergh 2011). In contrast, the idea of ecological limits to growth goes beyond the critique of GDP as a measure of economic performance. Instead, it maintains that economic growth should not, and probably cannot, be the main goal of economic activity because it requires increasing resource inputs, some of which are non-renewable, and generates wastes, including greenhouse gases, that disturb various ecosystems, severely **threatening human and planetary functioning** in the short and long term. 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 41 Resources are regarded as non-renewable if they cannot be naturally replaced at the rate of consumption (Daly and Farley 2011: 75–76). Examples include fossil fuels, earth minerals and metals, and some nuclear materials like uranium (Daly and Farley 2011: 77; Meadows et al. 2004: 87–107). Based on work by Georgescu-Roegen (1971), many ecological economists also assume that non-renewable resources cannot be fully recycled because they become degraded in the process of economic activity. Historically speaking, economic growth is a fairly recent phenomenon (Fig. 2.1). Since its onset in the late seventeenth century in Europe and mid-eighteenth century in the US (Gordon 2012), it has gone hand in hand with an exponentially increasing use of non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels (Fig. 4.1). While we are not yet close to running out of non-renewable resources, over time they will become more difficult and hence more expensive to recover. This idea is captured by the concept of “**energy returned on energy invested**” (EROEI). In relation to oil for instance, it has been shown that the easily recoverable fields have been targeted first and that therefore greater energy (and hence financial) inputs will be required to produce more oil. Over time, the ratio of energy returned on energy invested will decrease, reducing the financial incentive to invest further in the recovery of these non-renewable resources (Dale et al. 2011; Brandt et al. 2015: 2). Relevant to this is also the debate about peak oil—a concept coined by Shell Oil geologist Marion King Hubbert in the 1950s—the point at which the rate of global conventional oil production reaches its maximum which is expected to take place roughly once half of global oil reserves have been produced. There is still controversy about whether global peak oil will occur, and if so when, as it is difficult to predict, or get reliable data on, the rate at which alternative types of energy will replace oil (if this was to happen fast enough, peak oil might not be reached, if it has not yet occurred), the size of remaining oil reserves and the future efficiency of oil extraction technologies (Chapman 2014). However, it is plausible to assume that oil prices will rise in the long term if conventional oil availability diminishes, while global demand for oil increases with continuing economic and population growth. Since economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century required increasing inputs of conventional oil, higher oil prices would have a negative impact on growth unless alternative technologies are developed that can generate equivalent liquid fuels at lower prices (Murphy and Hall 2011). Some scholars have criticised the focus on physical/energy resource limitations as initially highlighted in the “limits to growth” debate (Meadows et al. 1972) and state that instead catastrophic climate change is likely to be a more serious and immanent threat to humanity (Schwartzman 2012). The main arguments here are first that much uncertainty remains about the potential and timing of peak oil, future availability of other fossil fuels and development of alternative low energy resources, while the impacts of climate change are already immanent and may accelerate within the very near future. Second, even if peaks in fossil fuel production occurred in the near future, remaining resources could still be exploited to their maximum. However, this would be devastating from a climate change perspective as, according to the latest IPCC scenarios, greenhouse gas emissions need to turn net-zero by the second half of this century for there to be a good chance to limit global warming to 2° Celsius (and ideally, below that) (Anderson and Peters 2016). It is telling that some of the more recent debates about ecological limits to growth put much more emphasis on environmental impacts of growth, rather than on peak oil or other resource limitations (Dietz and O’Neill 2013). Differently put, limits of sinks, especially to absorb greenhouse gases, and to the regeneration of vital ecosystems are now attracting greater concern, compared to limits of resources. Growing economic production generates increasing pressures on the environment due to pollution of air, water and soil, the destruction of natural habitats and landscapes, for instance, through deforestation and the extraction of natural resources. Therefore, **growth often also threatens the regeneration of renewable resources such as healthy soil, freshwater and forests, as well as the functioning of vital ecosystems and ecosystems services such as the purification of air and water, water absorption and storage and the related mitigation of droughts and floods, decomposition and detoxification and absorption of wastes, pollination and pest control** (Meadows et al. 2004: 83–84). Recent research on planetary boundaries has started to identify thresholds of environmental pollution or disturbance of a range of ecosystems services beyond which the functioning of human **life on earth will be put at risk**. Rockström and colleagues have identified nine such “planetary boundaries”—“climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading” (Rockström et al. 2009: 472). They also present evidence according to which three of these boundaries—climate change, rate of biodiversity loss and the nitrogen cycle—have already reached their limits (Rockström et al. 2009). Of those three thresholds, climate change has received most attention. The 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) concluded that global temperatures have risen by an average of 0.85° since the 1880s (while local temperature increases can be much higher than that) and that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has reached unprecedented levels over the last 800,000 years—that of CO2 has now reached 405.6 parts per million (NASA, January 2017, Fig. 4.2), far surpassing the level of 350 ppm which is considered safe by many scientists (Rockström et al. 2009). The IPCC report also maintained that humans very likely contributed to at least 50% of global warming that occurred since the 1950s (IPCC 2014: 5). A range of climate change impacts can already be observed, including a 26% increase of ocean acidification since industrialisation; shrinking of glaciers, Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, as well as arctic sea ice; and the rise of sea levels of 19 cm since 1901. This is projected to increase by an additional 82 cm by the end of this century at current levels of greenhouse gas emissions (ibid.: 13). Climate change impacts are already felt with increased occurrences of heat waves, heavy rain fall, increased risk of flooding and impacts on food and water security in a number of regions around the world. It is projected that with a rise of 2° of global temperatures, 280 million people worldwide (with greatest numbers in China, India and Bangladesh) would be affected by sea level rise, escalating to a projected 627 million people under a 4° scenario (Strauss et al. 2015: 10). At the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris in 2015, representatives agreed that action should be taken to limit rise of global temperatures to 2° and Fig. 4.2 Concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. Source NASA, available from https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/. The CO2 levels have been reconstructed from measures of trapped air in polar cap ice cores 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 45 to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5°. This has been adopted by 196 countries, but immense efforts and very radical reductions of greenhouse gas emissions will be required to comply with the agreement. Even if net greenhouse gas emissions were reduced to zero, surface temperatures would remain constant at their increased levels for hundreds of years to come and climate change impacts such as ocean acidification and rising sea levels would continue for hundreds or even thousands of years once global temperatures are stabilised; moreover, a range of climate change impacts are deemed irreversible (IPCC 2014: 16). One controversial question in the debate about economic growth and environmental impacts has been whether growth can be decoupled from the damage it causes. Important to this debate is the theory of the Environmental Kuznets Curve which applies Simon Kuznets’ hypothesised inverted u-shaped relationship between economic development and income inequality to the relationship between economic development and environmental degradation. According to this theory, environmental degradation is low in the early phases of economic development, then rises with increasing development up to a certain point, beyond which it falls again with advancing development because more resources can be invested to render production and consumption more efficient and less polluting. Therefore, this theory suggests that it is possible to decouple economic growth (measured in GDP) from its environmental implications. The counter-argument to this theory is that it does not take into account the difference between **relative and absolute decoupling**. Relative decoupling refers to the environmental impacts generated over time **per unit of economic output**, for instance CO2 emissions per million of US$. In contrast, **absolute decoupling would examine aggregate environmental impact, compared to total economic output over time**. Here it has been argued that while relative decoupling may be possible as the environmental impact per unit of economic output decreases over time due to efficiency gains, absolute decoupling is much **harder to achieve while growth continues**. Indeed, there is no evidence for absolute decoupling as total environmental impacts, for instance total global CO2 emissions, are still rising with rising global GDP (Jackson 2011: 67–86). This is partly due to rebound effects which we discussed in Chap. 2: rising consumption because the increase in efficiency has made it cheaper to produce/consume (Jackson 2011: 67–86; see also Czech 2013: Chap. 8 criticising “green growth”). Furthermore, if decoupling is examined at the country level, one would need to take consumptionbased resource use/emissions into account rather than productionbased impacts. Substantial environmental impacts related to everything that is consumed in rich countries occur in developing countries from which goods are imported. A focus on production-based environmental impacts would hence be misleading as it ignores the [and] environmental impacts that relate to a country’s living standards and that occur outside of that country. Social Critiques of Growth Economic growth has not only been criticised from an ecological perspective, but also from an individual and social wellbeing point of view. Here, we can again distinguish a critique of GDP as a measure of wellbeing and a wider critique which highlights potential negative consequences of economic growth for human wellbeing. Several scholars have argued that GDP is an inadequate measure of prosperity or wellbeing because it only includes market transactions and ignores activities of the informal economy in households and the volunteering sector which make an important contribution to individual and social wellbeing (Stiglitz et al. 2011; van den Bergh 2009; Jackson 2011). It also excludes the contribution of certain government services that are provided for free (Douthwaite 1999: 14; Stiglitz et al. 2011: 23), and the roles of capital stocks and of leisure in generating welfare (Costanza et al. 2015: 137). Furthermore, all market transactions make a positive contribution to GDP, regardless of whether expenditures increase or decrease welfare. Similar to the way in which environmental costs of growth are either excluded from GDP or even increase it, expenditures that arise from road accidents, divorces, crime, etc., contribute positively to GDP (ibid.: 133). The focus on market transactions also means that an increasing marketisation (or “commodification”) of an economy will be reflected in a rise of GDP, which may or may not be related to actual “welfare” outcomes (Stiglitz et al. 2011: 49). It also implies that GDP is an insufficient cross-national comparator for the quality of life, as it does not take into account the different sizes of the informal economy across countries (ibid.: 15). Furthermore, GDP does not indicate how income and consumption are distributed in society (Stiglitz et al. 2011: 44). This implies that a rise of GDP can be consistent with a rise of inequality of income and wealth. 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 47 However, if greater inequality has negative impacts on social wellbeing (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), this would be masked by rising GDP figures (Douthwaite 1999: 17). An even more fundamental criticism of GDP as a measure of wellbeing is that it focuses on the accumulation of money or wealth and thus on the material aspects of wellbeing. Such a narrow conception of the goals of economic activity and wellbeing has been criticised early on in the history of economic thought, e.g. by Aristotle’s distinction between oikonomia and chrematistics. The latter refers to the accumulation of wealth and was regarded by him as an “unnatural” activity which did not contribute to the generation of use value and wellbeing (Cruz et al. 2009: 2021). The argument that wider conceptions of wellbeing and prosperity are required has also become relevant for contemporary critiques of economic growth (Jackson 2011; Paech 2013; Schneider et al. 2010) as we will discuss this in more detail in Chap. 5. Arguments About the Psychological and S ocial Costs of G rowth The broader social critique of economic growth highlights potential “social limits” to or even negative consequences of economic growth for individual and collective wellbeing. The term “social limits to growth” was coined by Fred Hirsch (1976). He argued that the benefits of growth are initially exclusive to small elites and that these benefits disappear as soon as they spread more widely through mass consumption. For instance, only few people can own a Rembrandt painting; holiday destinations are more enjoyable when they are not overrun by hordes of other tourists; there are only few leadership positions, etc. From this perspective, there are “social limits” to the extent to which the benefits of growth can be socially expanded and equally shared. Other scholars have expressed concern about individual and collective social costs of economic growth. First, there is the argument that the need to keep up with ever-rising living standards and new consumer habits, “keeping up with the Joneses”—a lot of which is seen to be driven by advertisement and social pressure rather than real needs, for instance fashionable clothing or gadgets—can generate stress and increase the occurrence of mental disorders (James 2007; Offer 2006; Kasser 2002). 48 M. BÜCHS AND M. KOCH Second, it has been argued that economic growth can imply wider social costs. For instance, with its emphasis on individual gain, market relations and competition, and the need that it generates for spatial mobility (e.g. for successful participation in education and labour markets), it is feared to undermine moral and social capital and put a strain on family and community relations, potentially even leading to increasing divorce and crime rates (Douthwaite 1999; Daly and Cobb 1989: 50–51; Hirsch 1976). Social costs of technological development and industrialisation also include industrial workplace and traffic accidents and time lost in traffic jams and for commuting (Czech 2013: Chap. 2; Stiglitz et al. 2011: 24). Technological innovation which arises from growth can also act as a factor for job losses and increasing job insecurity (Douthwaite 1999), especially if growth rates are not sufficiently high to compensate gains in productivity. It is often assumed that growth will benefit the many because of assumed “trickle-down” effects which promise to improve the lot of the poor simply because the “cake” of available wealth is growing. While progress has been made in reducing extreme global poverty and inequality (Sala-i-Martin 2006; Rougoor and van Marrewijk 2015), the number of people living in poverty across the globe remains high.1 At the same time, income inequality in a range of countries has been rising and the situation of many of the people living in extreme poverty is not improving which means the fruits of economic growth remain to be unequally distributed (Collier 2007; Piketty and Saez 2014). The post-development debate goes even further than that in arguing that not only may growth not have reached the global poor to the extent that had been predicted by neoclassical economists, but that it can also have negative impacts on indigenous communities in developing countries, especially those who rely on local natural resources for their livelihoods which often suffer exploitation, pollution or even destruction through the inclusion of local economies into global value chains (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). While the distinction between critiques of growth that focus on its problematic ecological and social consequences is useful for analytic purposes, the two dimensions are of course closely linked. Ecological consequences of growth have the potential to severely impact or even undermine human wellbeing. Local livelihoods are already affected by current climate change impacts such as ocean acidification and its impact on marine organisms, draughts, floods and severe weather events, the 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 49 frequency of which has been rising. Accordingly, it is estimated that crop and fish yields are already diminishing in several regions (Stern 2015; IPCC 2014) and that millions of people are already being displaced and forced to migrate due to climate change and other environmental impacts (Black et al. 2011). While the overall long-term impacts of climate change and the surpassing of other planetary boundaries are difficult to predict, they clearly have the potential to substantially undermine human wellbeing. Since greenhouse gas emissions are driven by economic growth, the development of alternative economic models that do not depend on growth is urgent since co**ntinued growth “threatens to alter the ability of the Earth to support life**” (Daly and Farley 2011: 12).

#### Crisis now solves the transition to a sustainable society

Loorbach et Al 16, Derk, et al. "The economic crisis as a game changer? Exploring the role of social construction in sustainability transitions." Ecology and Society 21.4 (2016). (director of DRIFT and Professor of Socio-economic Transitions at the Faculty of Social Science, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam.)//Re-cut by Elmer

Meanwhile, many political and public debates seem to be primarily concerned with standard, relatively short-term, economic issues, such as monetary losses, stop-and-start economic growth, increasing unemployment, falling real estate prices, failing banks, virtually bankrupt nations, and how to get back on course to economic growth. The standard responses when national governments are struggling to get their economies healthy again are mostly about inducing more money, austerity measures, and introducing financial regulations, all often part of a broader financial–economic logic (Stiglitz 2010). The dominant focus on fighting economic deficits and problems at the expense of investing in social and ecological deficits—thereby failing to address persistent problems in these areas—can be argued to be a short-term strategy to prop up an inherently unmanageable system. Examples are the support of system banks with public money and the green growth strategy (OECD 2009, 2013a). Transition theory (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012) suggests that such short-term fixes are typical regime-based strategies to sustain existing structures, cultures, and practices, and to fend off the threats of **more radical systemic change**. The transition perspective suggests that most regular policy and governance strategies essentially reproduce existing systems and, by definition, do not address the root causes of problems that are embedded in the same structures and cultures that determine how solutions are framed and implemented. Such path-dependent development optimizing existing institutional structures will inevitably lead to recurring crises and ultimately a more disruptive, shock-wise structural change of an incumbent regime. Transition studies thus argue that solutions that address symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes tend to reinforce a **lock-in and result in further emergent problems** (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010, Schuitmaker 2012). We argue that the underlying causes and mechanisms of the economic crises have not been thoroughly analyzed, let alone addressed through effective policies. In a globalized economy, fundamental changes will not likely come from actions by (national) governments or incumbent businesses, as these are inherently intertwined with and dependent upon the currently still dominant financial– economic systems and their governance. The need for alternative economic approaches, discourses, and systems is increasingly emphasized (Schor 2010, Simms 2013, Jackson 2013, van den Bergh 2013, Schor and Thompson, 2014). Even though the benefits of liberalization are still significant, it seems that the transfer of control from government to markets has substantially diminished possibilities for top-down policy making, **adding to brittleness, complexity, and lock-in** (Loorbach and LijnisHuffenreuter 2013). In this paper, we take a transition perspective on transformative social innovation to conceptualize and map the systemic dynamics that have caused the economic crisis, as well as how it influences the dynamics of **social transformation**. We explore how the economic crisis might be considered as a phase in a broader economic transition and which types of changes coincide to develop into this direction. We thus view the economic crisis not as a phenomenon in isolation within a relatively short time frame, but as an intrinsic part, or perhaps a symptom, of deeper underlying structural societal changes over the longer term. The question we seek to address is how the economic crisis interacts with broader societal changes as well as which dynamics might accelerate or hamper more structural (sustainability) transitions. To this end, we ask when and how a macrolevel or landscape development like the economic crisis **fundamentally changes the dominant logic, rules, and conditions** of incumbent regimes. In other words, when does a macrodevelopment become a game changer (cf. Avelino et al. 2014)? The paper builds upon theoretical work from the European FP7 project TRANSIT, which draws on transition theory to develop an empirically grounded theory on transformative social innovation. In this paper, we introduce the analytical perspective that we developed on transformative social innovation and two empirical examples. Although our analytical perspective suggests that alternatives and breakthroughs can come from any sector or actor, in this paper, we focus on the agency of social innovation and civil-society-led initiatives in providing and producing alternatives. The paper was developed through a number of iterations, workshops, and theoretical synthesizing. To develop our arguments, we build upon insights from sustainability transitions literature (Grin et al. 2010, Markard et al. 2012), social innovation research (Mulgan 2006, Murray et al. 2010, Franz et al. 2012, Westley 2013, Moulaert et al. 2013) and other fields aiming to understand the economic crisis. In addition, we include two empirical cases, transnational networks of social innovation, time banks, and the transition movement. For both cases, we draw upon a general literature review. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, “Economic change or transition?,” we introduce the economic crisis as a multifarious phenomenon, how we understand it from a transition perspective, and how it is understood from an economist’s point of view. We illustrate that it is an ambiguous phenomenon that is simultaneously seen as part of regular changes in that it is part of disruptive or transformative change. In the section “Making sense of the economic crisis?,” we present a number of alternative perspectives on the economic crisis that put forward particular fundamental and systemic causes of the economic crisis and how these are translated in so called “narratives of change.” In “Transformative social innovations,” we highlight two specific social innovation initiatives, time banks and transition towns, which have an evident transformative claim and potential, and reflect upon how such transformative social innovations relate (themselves) to the economic crisis. In “Reconceptualizing societal transformations and the role of the economic crisis,” we synthesize our findings and argue that the concepts of game changers and narratives could help to unpack the landscape and better understand how macro- and microlevels interact to trigger transformative changes at the mesolevel. In conclusion, we address the need for a better understanding of the transformative impacts of the different shades of change (in coevolution) vis-é-vis the restorative dynamics associated with incumbent regimes.

#### No Economic Transition Wars – prefer post-COVID evidence

Walt 20 Stephen M Walt 5-13-2020 "Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?" <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/> (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.)//Elmer

For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely? One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it **would hammer the last nail** in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after **pose an imminent threat** to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is **hard to imagine** any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment **when debt** levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct **ways to stimulate the economy**—**infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments**”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, **there would be a lot more** of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second**, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick** and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, **the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain**. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term. To be sure, I can’t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days. So there is no guarantee that we won’t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting. But given that it’s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history, I’m going to hope I’m right about this one.

#### Growth-oriented AI causes Extinction but de-growth orientation solves

Pueyo 18, Salvador. "Growth, degrowth, and the challenge of artificial superintelligence." Journal of Cleaner Production 197 (2018): 1731-1736. (Department of Evolutionary Biology, Ecology, and Environmental Sciences, Universitat de Barcelona)//Re-cut by Elmer

The challenges of sustainability and of superintelligence are not independent. The changing 84 fluxes of energy, matter, and information can be interpreted as different faces of a general acceleration2 85 . More directly, it is argued below that superintelligence would deeply affect 86 production technologies and also economic decisions, and could in turn be affected by the 87 socioeconomic and ecological **context in which it develops**. Along the lines of Pueyo (2014, p. 88 3454), this paper presents an approach that integrates these topics. It employs insights from a 89 variety of sources, such as ecological theory and several schools of economic theory. 90 The next section presents a thought experiment, in which superintelligence emerges after the 91 technical aspects of goal alignment have been resolved, and this occurs specifically in a neoliberal 92 scenario. Neoliberalism **is a major force shaping current policies** on a global level, which urges 93 governments to assume as their main role the creation and support of capitalist markets, and to 94 avoid interfering in their functioning (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal policies stand in sharp contrast 95 to degrowth views: the first are largely rationalized as a way to enhance efficiency and production 96 (Plehwe, 2009), and represent the maximum expression of capitalist values. 97 The thought experiment illustrates how superintelligence perfectly aligned with capitalist 98 markets could have very **undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere**. It also 99 suggests that there is little reason to expect that the wealthiest and most powerful people would be 100 exempt from these consequences, which, as argued below, gives reason for hope. Section 3 raises 101 the possibility of a broad social consensus to respond to this challenge along the lines of degrowth, 102 thus tackling major technological, environmental, and social problems simultaneously. The 103 uncertainty involved in these scenarios is vast, but, if a non-negligible probability is assigned to 104 these two futures, little room is left for either complacency or resignation. 105 106 2. Thought experiment: Superintelligence in a neoliberal scenario 107 108 Neoliberalism is creating a very special breeding ground for superintelligence, because it strives 109 **to reduce the role of human agency in collective affairs**. The neoliberal pioneer Friedrich Hayek 110 argued that the spontaneous order of markets was preferable over conscious plans, because markets, 111 he thought, have more capacity than humans to process information (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal 112 policies are actively transferring decisions to markets (Mirowski, 2009), while firms' automated 113 decision systems become an integral part of the market's information processing machinery 114 (Davenport and Harris, 2005). Neoliberal globalization is locking governments in the role of mere 115 players competing in the global market (Swank, 2016). Furthermore, automated governance is a 116 foundational tenet of neoliberal ideology (Plehwe, 2009, p. 23). 117 In the neoliberal scenario, most technological development can be expected to take **place either in the context of firms** or in support of firms3 118 . A number of institutionalist (Galbraith, 1985), post119 Keynesian (Lavoie, 2014; and references therein) and evolutionary (Metcalfe, 2008) economists 120 concur that, in capitalist markets, firms tend to maximize their growth rates (this principle is related 121 but not identical to the neoclassical assumption that firms maximize profits; Lavoie, 2014). Growth 122 maximization might be interpreted as expressing the goals of people in key positions, but, from an 123 evolutionary perspective, it is thought to result from a mechanism akin to natural selection 124 (Metcalfe, 2008). The first interpretation is insufficient if we accept that: (1) in big corporations, the 125 managerial bureaucracy is a coherent social-psychological system with motives and preferences of 126 its own (Gordon, 1968, p. 639; for an insider view, see Nace, 2005, pp. 1-10), (2) this system is 127 becoming techno-social-psychological with the progressive incorporation of decision-making 128 algorithms and the increasing opacity of such algorithms (Danaher, 2016), and (3) human mentality 129 and goals are partly shaped by firms themselves (Galbraith, 1985). 130 The type of AI best suited to participate in firms' decisions in this context is described in a 131 recent review in Science: AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the 132 mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating 133 this new species of machine, machina economicus (Parkes and Wellman, 2015, p. 267; a more 134 orthodox denomination would be Machina oeconomica). 135 Firm growth is thought to rely critically on retained earnings (Galbraith, 1985; Lavoie, 2014, p. 136 134-141). Therefore, economic selection can be generally expected to favor firms in which these are greater. The aggregate retained earnings4 137 RE of all firms in an economy can be expressed as: 138 RE=FE(R,L,K)-w⋅L-(i+δ)⋅K-g. (1) 139 Bold symbols represent vectors (to indicate multidimensionality). F is an aggregate production 140 function, relying on inputs of various types of natural resources R, labor L and capital K (including intelligent machines), and being affected by environmental factors5 141 E; w are wages, i are returns to 142 capital (dividends, interests) paid to households, δ is depreciation and g are the net taxes paid to 143 governments. 144 Increases in retained earnings face constraints, such as trade-offs among different parameters of 145 Eq. 1. The present thought experiment explores the consequences of economic selection in a 146 scenario in which two sets of constraints are nearly absent: sociopolitical constraints on market 147 dynamics are averted by a neoliberal institutional setting, while technical constraints are overcome 148 by **asymptotically advanced technology** (with extreme AI allowing for extreme technological 149 development also in other fields). The environmental and the social implications are discussed in 150 turn. Note that this scenario is not defined by some **contingent choice of AIs' goals by their 151 programmers**: The goals of maximizing each firm's growth and retained earnings are assumed to 152 emerge from the collective dynamics of large sets of entities subject to **capitalistic rules of 153 interaction and, therefore, to economic selection**.

#### Diversionary conflict theory is wrong

Erin Baggott 14. Harvard University Department of Government. “Diversionary Cheap Talk: Domestic Discontent and US Foreign Policy, 1945-2006”, International Studies Association Conference, Toronto, March 28, 2014

Testing the diversionary aggression hypothesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry in political science. A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary war is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the empirical evidence is “decidedly mixed.”12 Several studies have found empirical support for diversionary aggression in US foreign policy.13 A commonly cited example is President Reagan’s 1983 invasion of Grenada following the incident in Lebanon in which 200 Marines were killed. Other incidents that have raised scholarly interest are President Clinton’s strikes in Serbia, Sudan, and Afghanistan in 1998 and 1999 concurrent with his impeachment scandal.14 Other studies have found support for diversionary aggression in non-US and cross-national contexts.15 However, skeptics have amassed opposing evidence.16 Some go so far as to call diversion- ary aggression a “myth.”17 Others have piloted a middle course by putting conditions on the situations in which diversionary aggression holds. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries.18 It is less likely when states foresee aggression from troubled adver- saries and avoid provoking them.19 For example, other states appear to act more peacefully towards the United States when US domestic conditions favor diversionary aggression.20 There is some evidence that mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are more likely than other regime types to divert.21 There is also evidence that US presidents are more likely to use force in response to low approval ratings when faced with low congressional support.22 Finally, findings suggest that diversion can take heterogeneous forms. In the British case, there were rallies in the Falklands War and the Gulf War, but not in other cases in which rallies would be expected, such as the Korean, Suez, or Kosovo wars.23 Overall, empirical findings on diversionary aggression are cross-cutting. Moreover, all of these studies suffer from problems of data and methodology. Many of the papers use Militarized Interstate Dispute data to test the diversionary aggression hypothesis.24 MID data is appealing because of its impressive time range, from 1816 to 2004. However, as Fordham and Sarver comment, “the MID data are not appropriate for analyses of U.S. decisions to use force, including tests of the diversionary hypothesis. The MID data set excludes several categories of incidents relevant to major theoretical arguments about the use of force and includes many irrelevant incidents.”25 For example, they note, the MID dataset does not include the 1982 deployment of US Marines to Lebanon because the action was not technically part of an interstate dispute. In addition, many studies using MID data include Germany and Japan in their analyses, which have restrictions on the use of force, and Iceland, which has no military. Perceiving this problem, scholars have used the International Military Intervention dataset coded by Pearson and Baumann (1993).26 This dataset is limited insofar as it captures only the most severe episodes of international conflict, interstate territorial incursions. Other papers use quarterly force levels as a metric of US aggression abroad.27 This is arguably a poor measure, as periods characterized by arms buildups (e.g. the Cold War) sometimes experience little actual conflict. Still other datasets such as Blechman and Kaplan (1978) on US political uses of force are similarly coarse.28 This dataset records 383 presidential uses of force between 1945 and 2000, compared with 7,140 acts of verbal conflict and 6,228 acts of material conflict over the same period in my dataset. A fundamental problem with all these datasets is the range of incidents that are theoret- ically relevant. The granularity of the data is significant because if diversionary aggression were to materialize, it might well manifest as saber rattling behavior below the outright in- vasion level—that is, as cheap talk designed to garner public support but not costly conflict. MID event types are limited to very aggressive military actions, starting with threats to use force and rising in aggressiveness through 21 categories, including threats to blockade, oc- cupy territory, or declare war; shows of force; military alerts; troop mobilizations; territorial occupations; attacks; and war initiations. The bias towards explicit military action is even more pronounced with the International Military Intervention and political uses of force datasets. Diversionary aggression could manifest in two forms entirely absent from these datasets: less severe material provocations and the full range of verbal provocations. Less severe material provocations might take the form of obstructing another state’s initiatives, reducing economic, military, or humanitarian assistance, expelling representatives of another state, or coercion. Verbal provocations might take the form of criticism, blame, disapproval, or condemnation of other nations. Verbal provocation, including cheap talk, is a prevalent and theoretically important form of international diplomacy. For example, criticism of the United States by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Ch ́avez increased domestic support for these leaders and was often not backed by commensurate material measures.29 This paper advances the theoretical proposition that acts of verbal conflict may be ap- pealing to leaders as measures that can garner rally around the flag effects without forcing them to pay the costs of war. Diversionary cheap talk consists of actions designed to make a leader look tough on foreigners without resorting to military force, such as: disapprovals, demands, rejections, the reduction of relations, and protests. All of these theoretically rele- vant event types appear in my data, but not in MID or the other abovementioned datasets. Overall, the data currently used to investigate diversionary aggression are crude in terms of categories, sparse in terms of observations, insufficient in historical range, and entirely neglect low-level and non-military diplomatic initiatives.

### Food Wars

#### No food wars.

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It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests. Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

#### Ag is reslient

Steven **Pinker 11**, Prof @ Harvard, Steven Pinker: Resource Scarcity Doesn’t Cause Wars, <http://www.globalwarming.org/2011/11/28/steven-pinker-resource-scarcity-doesnt-cause-wars/>

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or toe, he concluded, “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”

### Disease

#### No IL– they have 0 evidence that waiving IP rights are able to scale up innovation to the point it solves their impacts. Their evidence just says innovation k2 solving disease and IP rights hamper innovation, don’t give them an IL not in their evidence.

#### Can’t solve their disease offense, their ev highlights alt cuases like people that are unaware and don’t get vaccinated proves innovation alone isn’t enough.