# 1NC v Marlborough

### 1

#### Interp – a worker is an individual who works under contract.

Davidov 05 [Guy Davidov (full professor and the Elias Lieberman Chair in Labour Law, published dozens of articles in peer-review journals, including in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Modern Law Review, the University of Toronto Law Journal, Law & Social Inquiry, Industrial Law Journal, and the Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal, founding Chair of the Labour Law Research Network (LLRN), from 2011 through 2015. He has also been the Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations). “Who is a Worker?”. Industrial Law Journal, Volume 34, Issue 1, March 2005, Pages 57–71. Accessed 11/6/21. <https://academic.oup.com/ilj/article-abstract/34/1/57/821218> //Xu]

The term ‘worker’ has been defined to include (a) an individual who has entered into or works under a contract of employment (ie an employee); and (b) an indi- vidual who has entered into or works under any other contract ‘Whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual’. Although hopelessly cumbersome and circular, the definition does make a couple of intentions clear. First, to include all employees and then some others. And second, to maintain a number of requirements associated with the term ‘employee’, in particular the contractual relationship, the personal nature of the engagement, and the lack of an independent business undertaking.

#### Prison labor is coerced.

Benns 15 [Whitney Benns (lecturer on education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education where she teaches the negotiation workshop and fugitive negotiation). “American Slavery, Reinvented”. SEPTEMBER 21, 2015. Accessed 11/6/21. <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-in-america/406177/> //Xu]

Some viewers of the video might be surprised to learn that inmates at Angola, once cleared by the prison doctor, can be forced to work under threat of punishment as severe as solitary confinement. Legally, this labor may be totally uncompensated; more typically inmates are paid meagerly—as little as two cents per hour—for their full-time work in the fields, manufacturing warehouses, or kitchens. How is this legal? Didn’t the Thirteenth Amendment abolish all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude in this country? Not quite. In the shining promise of freedom that was the Thirteenth Amendment, a sharp exception was carved out. Section 1 of the Amendment provides: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Simply put: Incarcerated persons have no constitutional rights in this arena; they can be forced to work as punishment for their crimes. Angola’s farm operations and other similar prison industries have ancestral roots in the black chattel slavery of the South. Specifically, the proliferation of prison labor camps grew during the Reconstruction era following the Civil War, a time when southern states established large prisons throughout the region that they quickly filled, primarily with black men. Many of these prisons had very recently been slave plantations, Angola and Mississippi State Penitentiary (known as Parchman Farm) among them. Other prisons began convict-leasing programs, where, for a leasing fee, the state would lease out the labor of incarcerated workers as hired work crews. Convict leasing was cheaper than slavery, since farm owners and companies did not have to worry at all about the health of their workers. In this new era of prison industry, the criminal “justice” system, the state determined the size of the worker pool. Scores of recently freed slaves and their descendants now labored to generate revenue for the state under a Jim Crow regime. More than a century later, our prison labor system has only grown. We now incarcerate more than 2.2 million people, with the largest prison population in the world, and the second highest incarceration rate per capita. Our prison populations remain racially skewed. With few exceptions, inmates are required to work if cleared by medical professionals at the prison. Punishments for refusing to do so include solitary confinement, loss of earned good time, and revocation of family visitation. For this forced labor, prisoners earn pennies per hour, if anything at all. Angola is not the exception; it is the rule.

#### Semantics o/w –

#### a] Precision – they can arbitrarily jettison words which decks ground and preparation because there is no stasis point

#### b] Jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the authority to vote aff if it wasn’t legitimate

#### Violation – their plan text says incarcerated workers – they don’t exist

#### Vote for predictable limits – their aff explodes the object of the resolution to include individuals from CEOs to volunteers – that allows them to cherry-pick the best aff with no neg ground – also kills predictable advocacies which decks prepared engagement.

**No rvi - a) they’ll bait theory and prep it out with aff infinite prep—justifies infinite abuse and chilling us from checking abuse in fear of things like 2ar ethos which lets them recontextualize and always seem right on the issue b) forces the NC to go 7 minutes of theory because nothing else matters--outweighs because its the longest speech and the 2nr can never recover since the nc is our only route to generate offense. Competing interps - reasonability’s allows 2ar recontextualizations to always sound like the more reasonable debater. T is DTD since its an indict to your whole advocacy.**

### 2

**Interpretation—the aff may not specify a single just government**

**A is an generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01**

**Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001** <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

**\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars**

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

**That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive**

**Violation—they specified China**

**Vote neg:**

**1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff inserting words in the resolution at their whim - decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bound by the resolution.**

**2] Limits—specifying a just government offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of hundreds of governments in the world depending on their definition of “just government”.**

**DTD – same thing as drop the arg**

**Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for**

**No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical.**

### 3

#### CP Text: The US ought to request the International Court of Justice issue an advisory opinion over whether they ought to [establish an unconditional right of incarcerated workers to strike]. [The United States] ought to abide by the outcome of the advisory opinion.

#### Solves – the ICJ will rule in favor of an unconditional right to strike.

Seifert ’18 (Achim; Professor of Law at the University of Jena, and adjunct professor at the University of Luxembourg; December 2018; “The protection of the right to strike in the ILO: some introductory remarks”; CIELO Laboral; http://www.cielolaboral.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/seifert\_noticias\_cielo\_n11\_2018.pdf; Accessed: 11-3-2021; AU)

The **recognition of a right to strike** in the legal order of the **International Labour Organization** (ILO) is probably one of the most controversial questions in international labor law. Since the foundation of the ILO in the aftermath of World War I, the recognition of the right to strike as a **core element** of the principle of freedom of association has been discussed in the International Labour Conference (ILC) as well as in the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. As is well known, the ILO, in its long history spanning almost one century, has not explicitly recognized a right to strike: neither Article 427 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Constitution of the ILO, including the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), nor the Conventions and Recommendations in the field of freedom of association - namely Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) - have explicitly enshrined this right. However, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), established in 1951 by the Governing Body, recognized in 1952 that Convention No. 87 guarantees also the **right to strike** as an **essential element of trade** union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests1. It is worthwhile to note that it was a complaint of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), at that time the Communist Union Federation on international level and front organization of the Soviet Union2, against the United Kingdom for having dissolved a strike in Jamaica by a police operation; since that time the controversy on the right to strike in the legal order of the ILO was also embedded in the wider context of the Cold War. In the complaint procedure initiated by the WFTU, the CFA **recognized** a **right to strike** under Convention No. 87 but considered that the police operation in question was lawful. In the more than six following decades, the CFA has elaborated a **very detailed case law** on the right to strike dealing with many concrete questions of this right and its limits (e.g. in essential services) and manifesting an even more complex structure than the national rules on industrial action in many a Member State. This case law of the CFA has been compiled in the “Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO”3. In 1959, i.e. seven years after case No. 28 of the CFA, the Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) also recognized the right to strike as **a core element of freedom** of association under Article 3 of Convention No. 874. Since then, the CEACR has **reconfirmed** its view on many occasions. Both CFA and CEACR coordinate their interpretation of Article 3 of Convention No. 875. Hence there is one single corpus of rules on the right to strike developed by both supervisory Committees of the Governing Body. Moreover, the ILC also has made clear in various Resolutions adopted since the 1950s that it considers the **right to strike** as an **essential element of freedom of association6**. On the whole, the recognition of the right to strike resulted therefore from the interpretative work of CFA and CEACR as well as of the understanding of the principle of freedom of association the ILC has expressed on various occasions. It should not be underestimated the wider political context of the Cold War had in this constant recognition of a right to strike under ILO Law. Although the very first recognition of the right to strike -as mentioned above- went back to a complaint procedure before the CFA, initiated by the Communist dominated WFTU, it was the Western world that particularly emphasized on the right to strike in order to blame the Communist Regimes of the Warsaw Pact that did not explicitly recognize a right to strike in their national law or, if they legally recognized it, made its exercise factually impossible; to this end, unions, employers’ associations but also Governments of the Western World built up an alliance in the bodies of the ILO7. In accomplishing their functions, CFA and CEACR necessarily have to interpret the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO whose application in the Member States they shall control. In so doing, they need to concretize the principle of freedom of association that is only in general terms guaranteed by the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on freedom of association. But as supervisory bodies, which the Governing Body has established and which are not foreseen in the ILO Constitution, both probably do not have the power to interpret ILO law with binding effect8. This is also the opinion that the CEACR expresses itself in its yearly reports to the ILC when explaining that, “its opinions and recommendations are non-binding”9. As a matter of fact, the Governing Body, when establishing both Committees, could not delegate to them a power that it has never possessed itself: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet10. According to Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, it is within the **competence of the International Court of Justice** to decide upon “any question or dispute relating to the **interpretation of this Constitution** or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.” Furthermore, the ILC has not established yet under Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution an ILO Tribunal, competent for an authentic interpretation of Conventions11. However, it **cannot be denied** that this constant interpretative work of CFA and CEACR possesses an **authoritative character** given the high esteem the twenty members of the CEACR -they are all internationally renowned experts in the field of labor law and social security law- and the nine members of the CFA with their specific expertise have. As the CEACR reiterates in its Reports, “[the opinions and recommendations of the Committee] derive their persuasive value from the legitimacy and rationality of the Committee’s work based on its impartiality, experience and expertise”12. Already this interpretative authority of both Committees justifies that **national legislators or courts take into consideration** the views of these supervisory bodies of the ILO when implementing ILO law. Furthermore, the long-standing and uncontradicted interpretation of the principle of freedom of association by CFA and CEACR as well as its recognition by the Member States may be considered as a **subsequent practice** in the application of the ILO Constitution under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1968): such subsequent practices shall be taken into account when interpreting the Agreement. Their constant supervisory practice probably reflects a volonté ultérieure, since other bodies of the ILO also have **recognized a right to strike** as the two above-mentioned Resolutions of the ILC of 1957 and 1970 as well as the constant practice of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards to examine **cases of violation** of the right to strike as **examples for breaches of the principle of freedom of association** demonstrate. As this constant practice of the organs of the ILO has not been contradicted by Member States, there is a **strong presumption** for recognition of a right to strike as a subsequent practice of the ILO under Article 31(3)(b) of the **Vienna Convention** on the Law of Treaties.

#### US compliance ensures faith in global democratic institutions – solves nuclear war.

Hawksley ’16 [Humphrey; formerly the BBC’s Beijing Bureau Chief and author of The Third World War: A Novel of Global Conflict and Asian Waters: American, China, and the Global Paradox; 11-19-2016; "Trump makes International Law Crucial for Peace"; Humphrey Hawksley; https://www.humphreyhawksley.com/trump-makes-international-law-crucial-for-peace/; Accessed 4-1-2020; AH]

Major powers tend to reject international law when rulings run counter to their interests insisting that the distant courts carry no jurisdiction. China rejected a Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in July and clings to expansive claims in the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal near the Philippines. China’s response mirrored US rejection of a 1986 International Court of Justice ruling against US support for rebels in Nicaragua. “With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties,” writes journalist Humphrey Hawksley for YaleGlobal Online. Disregard for the rule of law weakens the legal system for all. Hawksley offers two recommendations for renewing respect for international law: intuitional overhaul so that the all parties recognize the courts, rejecting decisions only as last resort, and governments accepting the concept, taking a long-term view on balance of power even when rulings go against short-term strategic interests. Reforms may be too late as China organizes its own parallel systems for legal reviews and global governance, Hawksley notes, but international law, if respected, remains a mechanism for ensuring peace. – YaleGlobal LONDON: Flutter over the surprise visit to China by Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte may soon fade. But his abrupt and public dismissal of the United States in favor of China has weakened the argument that international rule of law could underpin a changing world order. The issue in question was the long-running dispute between China and the Philippines over sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal, situated 800 kilometers southeast of China and 160 kilometers west of the Philippines mainland, well inside the United Nations–defined Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite a court ruling and Duterte’s cap in hand during his October mission to Beijing, Philippine fishing vessels still only enter the waters around Scarborough Shoal at China’s mercy. The dispute erupted in April 2012, when China sent ships to expel Filipino fishing crews and took control of the area. The standoff became a symbol of Beijing’s policy to lay claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea where where it continues to build military outposts on remote reefs and artificially created islands in waters claimed by other nations. Lacking military, diplomatic or economic muscle, the Philippines turned to the rule of law and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. A panel of maritime judges ruled China’s claim to Scarborough Shoal invalid in July this year. China refused to recognize the tribunal from the start and declared the decision “null and void,” highlighting the complex balance in the current world order between national power and the rule of law. Beijing’s response mirrored a 1986 US response to Nicaragua’s challenge in the International Court of Justice. The court ruled against the United States for mining Nicaragua’s harbors and supporting right-wing Contra rebels. The United States claimed the court had no jurisdiction. China’s response on the South China Sea ruling mirrors a 1986 US response.With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties. The Western liberal democratic system is being challenged, and confrontations in Asia and Europe, as in Crimea and Ukraine, replicate the lead-up to the global conflicts of last century’s Cold War. As Nicaragua and Central America were a flashpoint in the 1980s, so Scarborough Shoal and South China Sea are one now. Other flashpoints are likely to emerge as China and Russia push to expand influence. Western democracies being challenged by rising powers have a troubled history. The 1930s rise of Germany and Japan; the Cold War’s proxy theaters in Vietnam, Nicaragua and elsewhere; and the current US-Russian deadlock over Syria are evidence that far more thought must be given in the deployment of international law as a mechanism for keeping the peace The view is supported, on the surface at least, by Russia and China who issued a joint statement in June arguing that the concept of “strategic stability” being assured through nuclear weapons was outdated and that all countries should abide by principles stipulated in the “UN Charter and international law.” Emerging power India, with its mixed loyalties, shares that view. “The structures for international peace and security are being tested as never before,” says former Indian ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, author of Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos. “It is everyone’s interest to re-establish the authority of the Security Council and reassert the primacy of law.”

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

* Checked

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

#### No 1AR Theory BUT if they get it, its DTA - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention. Same applies to the 1AR since they can just spam 10 second shells to avoid substantive education, inf abuse impossible since it’s a 7 minute nc and 1ac preempts solve by preparing them better for generics.

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] New 1ar paradigms moot any 1NC theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested

### 4

#### CP Text: In the United States, prisons ought to not crack-down on pre-existing worker strikes.

#### Legally recognizing the right to strike renders it ineffective by de-radicalizing movements, decks solvency and turns case.

White 18 (, A., 2018. Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike. [online] Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. Available at: <https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1261/> [Accessed 7 November 2021] Ahmed White is the Nicholas Rosenbaum Professor of Law. Before arriving at the University of Colorado, he was a visitor at Northwestern University in 1999. He has also taught at Villanova Law School. Earlier in his career, Professor White's research focused heavily on the fate of rule of law norms and the rule of law concept in capitalist society, and on the role of criminal law and punishment as mechanisms of social control of the working class. More recently, Professor White's scholarship has taken a more definite historical turn. Much of his work concerns the history of law and labor relations from the early Twentieth Century through the New Deal period, as well as the viability of a functional system of labor rights in liberal society. The subjects of many of his articles over the last decade or so, these themes are central to his recent, acclaimed book, The Last Great Strike: Little Steel, the CIO, and the Struggle for Labor Rights in New Deal America (Oakland: University of California, 2016). They also feature in his second book, tentatively titled The Romance and the Suffering: Law, Violence, and the Tragic Fate of Radical Industrial Unionism in Twentieth Century America, which will be published by the University of California Press in 2021.)-rahulpenu

The Wagner Act purported, for the first time in American history, to extend a definite, readily enforceable right to strike to most American workers. Not coincidentally, the years surrounding its enactment featured the most intense wave of labor conflict in the country’s history. When the statute became effective in 1937 (having been widely ignored by employers and blocked by hostile courts), the violence of strikes began to diminish, though not so much their frequency. For much of the period after the Second World War, strikes remained common even as they also became less ambitious in their aims and less militant in their conduct. Beginning about forty years ago, things changed again. Strikes suddenly became rare as well, to the point that workers today basically do not strike at all. From 1947 through 1976, the government documented an average of just over 300 “major work stoppages” (strikes and lockouts involving at least 1000 workers) every year; over the last decade, the annual average was only 14.10 Even the much-ballyhooed mini-strike wave of 2018 appears to be largely an illusion built on a combination of wishful thinking and a convenient misconstruction of a string of well-reported, and sometimes impressive, strikes, as a trend.11 In any event, militancy of the sort that was commonplace when Steinbeck wrote his book, along with the open strife and bloodshed that made the novel a work of undeniable realism, are nearly unheard of today. The waning of bloody battles may be a good thing. But there is not much to celebrate about the overall demise of strikes—not if you are a worker or care about the working class. For strikes are the most important mode of working class protest, the best way, it seems, for workers to directly challenge capitalist hegemony by their own hand, to alter the terms of exploitation if not to build a new world. As they have declined, so has the strength of the labor movement and, with this, the ability of workers to contest the power that employers wield over their work lives and economic fortunes. And so it is that with the demise of strikes, union representation has plummeted, wages have stagnated, economic inequality skyrocketed, and the everyday caprices and tyrannies of capitalist management have been entwined in the web of demeaning indignities, patronizing indulgences, and suffocating bureaucratic rules that define the contemporary workplace. Nevertheless, in most quarters the decline in strikes has been taken in stride, if noticed at all. For most people, **strikes** are hardly more than **historical** **relics** or quaint curiosities that seldom affect their daily lives or command much of their attention. Ironically, this is probably one reason the very modest labor conflict of the last year has been so **overcharacterized**. Once a preoccupation of newspaper editorialists, lawyers, and other commentators, a concern of government, and the subject of numerous hearings and reports, abundant litigation, and seemingly endless attempts at legislation, strikes are now **rarely** **of** **any** **interest** in any of these quarters. Where judges, politicians, and editorialists once worried greatly over how to deal with strikes of the kind that Steinbeck fictionalized, how to protect the economy (not to mention the interests of individual capitalists) from the disruptive effects of labor unrest, and sometimes how to preserve the ability of workers to strike in meaningful ways, their successors stand mute in the context of the near extinction of this form of protest. It has been two decades since Congress, which once grappled with these issues on a regular basis, has seriously confronted the question of strikes.12 Its last engagement with the right to strike attempts, in the early 1990s, to enact modest changes in the law relative to employers’ use of replacement workers during strikes. And even this effort, which collapsed in the mid 1990s, hardly seemed possessed of the kind of urgency that characterized earlier forays on these issues.13 Among the few Americans who well remember what strikes are and why they are important are labor scholars. For them, at least, strikes remain a preoccupation. Prominent students of labor like James Atleson, Julius Getman, Karl Klare, and James Pope—to name the most notable of this group—have expended much effort over the past few decades identifying and critiquing **legal** **doctrines** which have **undermined** the **right** **to** **strike**. Important to them in this regard are doctrines that give employers the prerogative to easily replace striking workers; that allow employers to enjoin and even fire strikers on the ground that they have engaged in coercive “misconduct,” or because they have protested the wrong issue or in the wrong way; that prohibit sympathy strikes and general strikes, and spontaneous “wildcat” strikes; and that funnel labor disputes off of picket lines and into legal proceedings and arbitrations.14 These doctrines have eviscerated a once-vital right to strike, these scholars tell us, subverting a prerogative that earlier in the century was central to improving conditions for workers and lending legitimacy to the very idea that workers have rights to claim in the first place. Indeed, in the 1930s and 1940s, especially, a massive and sustained campaign of strikes proved crucial to the formation of the modern labor movement, the political and legal validation of the Wagner Act, and ultimately the survival of the New Deal itself. This was true even as the Wagner Act itself seemed to play a crucial role in conveying to workers, for the first time, an effective right to strike. But the problem as far as the right to strike goes, we are told, is that the statute was later weakened and corrupted by the connivances of judges and Congress, urged on by a business community relentless in its contempt for organized labor, and abetted at times by inept or corrupt union leaders and a weak and politically diffident National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, the entity with primary authority for enforcing the labor law). And so the Wagner Act is said to have had a great potential, only to have been tragically “deradicalized,” as Klare puts it; and workers are said to have “lost” the right to strike, in Pope’s words, with devastating consequences for workers today and ominous portents for generations ahead.15 Critically, these authors argue, an effective **right** **to** **strike** must be **restored** **at** the **expense** **of** these **unjustified** **impositions**.16 Only then will the labor law regain its relevance and the labor movement its ability to improve the lives of workers. Early on, this attempt to defend an effective right to strike was the object of mean-spirited criticism by more conventional scholars who, in the guise of unmasking its interpretative shortcomings, rejected its radicalism and recoiled at its underlying supposition that law is not only malleable and untethered to its formal, elite iterations, but within the province of workers to reshape around their own interests and visions.17 Despite these efforts, which focused on the work of Klare and Katherine Stone, whose critique of post-war “industrial pluralism” shared a similar reasoning—or maybe, to some extent, anyway, because of them—**support for** this campaign to restore **the right to strike seems like a mandate** among scholars and commentators who purport to take seriously the interests of workers.18 And yet **for all its appeal**, **this project** nevertheless **suffers from** a remarkably negligent oversight, one that has nothing to do with morality of its pretense that the law is malleable and that workers can remake it—a proposition that is broadly true and eminently defensible. Instead, it has to do with its **practical feasibility**. In fact, as this Article argues, a critical reflection on this question suggests that the effort to realize **an effective right to strike is** actually quite **impossible** **and** that **attempts to do so**, however earnest and thoughtful they may be, **represent** as **dubious a battle** as the hopeless walkout dramatized in Steinbeck’s book. This doleful conclusion rests on a frank understanding of the legal and political realities in which strikes necessarily play out. There are many kinds of strikes, but those that are apt to be successful in challenging employers’ power and interests entail a level of militancy that sets them against well-entrenched notion of property and public order. This was true in the 1930s and 1940s when these values **contradicted**, at once, **strike** **militancy** and whatever radical potential the Wagner Act may have had. Ironically, it is perhaps even truer today, now that workers do in fact enjoy the right to strike, albeit only in more conventional ways. Seen in this light, those doctrines that have undermined the right to strike are not aberrations or jurisprudential failings—not mistakes in any sense, in fact, nor a retreat from some earlier, truer iteration of the labor law. Rather, they represent a **settling of the labor law** on bedrock precepts of the American life. However **illegitimate** those **precepts** may be from a vantage that **questions capitalism’s essential legitimacy** and **takes the rights of workers seriously**, they reign supreme, **foreclosing** an **effective right to strike**. All of this, as I argue in this Article, is made plainly evident by a critical review of the history of strikes and striking. To anticipate a bit more of the argument that follows, **the strikes most crucial** to the building of the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s **were not** **built** only **around** **peaceful picketing** **and a withholding of labor**. Rather, they were sit-down strikes and strikes built on mass picketing, as well as, to some extent, secondary boycotts. And **strikes** of this kind were **never considered lawful or politically appropriate**. Ironically, it was these strikes that legitimated the Wagner Act itself and the New Deal. But they could not legitimate themselves. Those who call for resurrecting the right to strike contend that the flourishing of strike militancy reflected, if not the inherent politics of the original Wagner Act before it was “de-radicalized,” then at least its potential. To be sure, it is clear that the Wagner Act was a remarkable document which did more to advance workers’ rights than any statute in American history; and it was at least ambiguous on the question of the legal status of strike militancy. But what seemed like its support for worker militancy was not a product of any particular potential. Rather, it was a reflection of the difficulty that judges, legislators, and other authorities, who dedicated themselves to restraining these strikes even as they flourished, encountered in prosecuting these values amid the unique economic and political conditions of the 1930s and 1940s. These obstructive conditions were quite temporary, though, and the authorities’ efforts culminated soon enough in the near-categorical prohibition of the tactics that had made strikes so effective. It is in this way that the history of strikes shows less in the way of **de-radicalization** than an encounter with the unyielding outer boundaries of what labor protest and labor rights can be in liberal society. As this all played out, it **left** in its wake **a right to strike**, but one **whose power** **consists** almost **entirely of the ability of workers to pressure employers** by withholding labor, while also maybe publicizing the workers’ issues and bolstering their morale. But while publicity and morale are not irrelevant, in the end they are **not effective weapons** in their own right. **Nor are they** generally **advanced when strikes are broken**. Moreover, the withholding of labor, unless it could be managed on a very large scale—something the law also tends to prohibit by its restrictions on secondary boycotts, by barring sympathy strikes and general strikes—is inherently ineffective in all but a small number of cases where workers remain irreplaceable. Of course, **striking in such a conventional way** accords with liberal notions of property and social order; but precisely because of this it **is** simply **not coercive enough to be effective**. And it is bound to remain ineffective, particularly in a context where workers far outnumber decent jobs, where mechanization and automation have steadily eaten away at the centrality of skill, where the perils that employers face in the course of labor disputes are as impersonal as the risks to workers are not, where employers wield overwhelming advantages in wealth and power over workers, where the state’s machinery for enforcing property rights and social order have never been more potent—where, in fact, capital is capital and workers are workers. From this perspective, **the quest for an effective right to strike emerges as a fantasy**—an appealing fantasy for many, but a fantasy no less, steeped in a **misplaced** and exaggerated **faith in the law** and a misreading of the class politics of modern liberalism. The **campaign to resurrect** such **a right appears**, too, not only as a dead-end and **a distraction**, but an undertaking that **risks blinding** those who support viable **unionism** and the interests of the working class **to** the more important and fundamental fact that **liberalism and the legal system** are, in the end, **antithetical to a meaningful system of labor rights**. It is for this reason that **the call for** an effective **right to strike should be set aside** **in favor of more direct endorsement of militancy and** a **turn away from the law** and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold. The argument that follows further elaborates these main contentions about the history of striking and the nature of strikes in liberal society, augmented by a discussion of the legal terrain on which all of this has played out. It unfolds in three main parts. Part I describes how the concept of a right to strike developed in concert with the history of striking itself, how both were influenced by the evolving condition of labor, and how this history created the circumstances under which it became possible to conceive of an effective right to strike without making this possible in fact. Part II consists of a critical review of the fate of coercive and disorderly strikes, especially those featuring sit-down tactics and mass picketing. It considers how the courts, the NLRB, and Congress confronted these strikes, and how they moved with increasing vigor to proscribe them as soon as these strikes emerged as effective forms of labor protest. Part III looks more carefully at the underpinnings of this repudiation of strike militancy, finding in court rulings and other pronouncements against the strikes an opposition to coercion and disorder that, even if sometimes invoked disingenuously, is nonetheless firmly anchored in modern liberalism and its conception of the appropriate boundaries of class protest and labor conflict. On this rests the argument that an effective right to strike is impossible and the pursuit of it, problematic. The final part is a brief conclusion that sums up some of the implications of this argument.

#### We flip U/Q and the Aff Offense – 1AC Harvard Law Review is a negative card – status quo strikes work - the radical nature of Prison Strikes lies in it’s illegality to generate disorder – risk of offense on de-radicalization flips the Case – here’s your Card.

Harvard Law Review, 19 - ("Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes," Harvard Law Review 03/8/2019, accessed 10-28-2021, <https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/03/striking-the-right-balance-toward-a-better-understanding-of-prison-strikes/)//ML>

But in order to ensure that the Constitution truly does not stop at the prison walls, courts cannot simply accept prison administrators’ fears regarding strikes at face value and instead should rigorously test their credibility and basis in fact.143 And more importantly, by over-deferring and failing to engage in any analysis of the merits of prison strikes, courts miss an important opportunity. As this Note has argued, prison strikes represent an underappreciated aspect of prison life — the means by which prisoners have, throughout the course of American history, surfaced pressing problems of our carceral state and initiated important transformations in our prison system. Therefore, it is imperative to meaningfully consider why and how such strikes merit legal protection — even if such protection appears to fly in the face of the current state of the law and to defy conventional wisdom. To that end, this Part first explores the First Amendment as one potential avenue for considering the merits of prison strikes, by presenting three critical First Amendment values contained within prison strikes,144 and it then briefly discusses other potential legal avenues for courts and scholars to consider. A. Considering the First Amendment Values of Prison Strikes The right to strike within prisons may be conceptually viewed as a composite of three separate fundamental First Amendment freedoms: the freedom to peacefully associate, the freedom of speech, and the freedom to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.145 Each is considered in turn. 1. Association. — The right to peaceful association is one that captures the right of individuals to commune with others for the expression of ideas and for effective advocacy.146 Strikes, like prison unions, represent an important means of association for prisoners — allowing them to “lay claim to a social identity as ‘workers’ . . . and in doing so generate claims to respect and solidarity.”147 This identity and solidarity can, in turn, enable inmates to engage in productive and peaceful bargains with prison officials for better conditions, higher pay, and other reform desires. Bargaining is, in many respects, already very common in prisons, “for the simple reason that [prison] administrators rarely have sufficient resources to gain complete conformity to all the rules.”148 However, such bargaining typically happens in an informal, ongoing, private process;149 in their recurrent, day-to-day contact with inmates, prison administrators use their arsenal of tools150 to “negotiate” only with select inmate leaders,151 with the central goal of maintaining “short term surface order.”152 This informal bargaining is “dysfunctional” to the long-term stability of prison institutions and “the real needs of those incarcerated within” them153 — creating hierarchical relationships154 that breed mistrust155 and leave many inmates powerless and feeling aggrieved.156 As a result, inmates often feel that they have to resort to violence to protect themselves from exploitation, express their dissatisfaction, and obtain redress.157 Alternatively, peaceful, collective prison strikes avoid these harmful consequences by allowing for “open” and “formal” negotiations between all inmates and prison staff.158 Such transparent and legitimated bargaining benefits both inmates and prisons as a whole. By initiating peaceful protests such as work stoppages, all inmates are able “to solve problems, maximize gains, articulate goals, develop alternative strategies, and deal with [administrators] without resorting to force or violence.”159 And by permitting peaceful strikes, prison administrators “provide inmates with a channel for airing grievances and gaining official response . . . giv[ing] the institution a kind of safety-valve for peaceful, rather than violent, change”160 — avoiding potentially expensive and time-consuming litigation and even helping rehabilitate inmates,161 all while deemphasizing hierarchical structures in prisons that harm institutional order.162 2. Speech. — A prison strike also represents a critical way by which inmates can express themselves.163 First, as alluded to above, a strike allows inmates to claim and communicate an identity — as more than just marginalized, ignored convicts with little to no self-determination, but instead as workers and human beings entitled to basic dignity. Such collective actions represent the “performative declaration and affirmation of rights that one does not (yet) have.”164 And, as Professor Jocelyn Simonson discusses, these strikes are collective contestations to “demand dignity, calling attention to the ways in which [prisoners] are treated as less than human and in the process reclaiming their own agency.”165 Such dignitary considerations, which courts have sought to protect under First Amendment principles, should therefore naturally extend to prisoners attempting to, through strikes, express their basic selfworth.166 Beyond representing a form of inherent, individual expression for inmates, prison strikes also represent a broader form of expression, allowing inmates to be visible to and heard by the public at large. Over the course of American history, inmates — by virtue of being locked up in isolated, impregnable penitentiaries — have largely been a silent and ignored segment of the American population.167 Through peaceful protests like the 2018 national prison strike, however, their suffering, their calls for reform, and their voices are, for the first time, directly expressed on a large scale, ringing out loudly beyond the prison walls and jumpstarting important conversations of criminal justice reform. It is critical to protect such expression; “[i]ndeed, it is from the voices of those who have been most harmed by the punitive nature of our criminal justice system that we can hear the most profound reimaginings of how the system might be truly responsive to local demands for justice and equality.”168 3. Petition for Redress. Inmates’ strikes can be seen not only as expressions of their dignity and general efforts to express their voices beyond prison walls but also as significant methods of assembly to call attention to specific grievances and seek redress from the government.169 While in theory “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,”170 in practice, “prisons often escape the daily microscope focused on other American institutions such as schools, churches, and government.”171 Courts grant prison administrators wide deference not only in running day-to-day life within prisons but also in restricting press access to prisons.172 Therefore, much of the American public — already closed off from and largely indifferent to the lives of prisoners — is kept even more in the dark about prison conditions and the state of our carceral system as a whole. Prison conditions, from what has been documented, are horrendous across states. Many prisons are severely overcrowded and seriously understaffed;173 inmates routinely experience physical abuse and even death at the hands of prison guards,174 receive inadequate protection from guards, are deprived of basic necessities,175 are given substandard medical care,176 and are forced to live in squalor and tolerate extreme circumstances;177 most prisoners have minimal, if any, access, to rehabilitative or mental health services;178 and prisoners have little legal recourse, as internal prison grievance procedures are often stacked against inmates,179 and judicial deference and federal legislation have effectively shut the courthouse doors on prisoners’ civil rights claims.180 And across prisons, criminal sentencing laws not only have contributed to an unprecedented era of mass incarceration, but also have forced African Americans and people of color broadly to bear much of this burden.181 As the Marshall Project states, “[s]ociety won’t fix a prison system it can’t see”;182 **peaceful prison strikes** like the 2018 strike, however, draw back the “iron curtain” of prison walls, **bringing to light many of the pressing** issues described above. Through these strikes, inmates are able not only to express their grievances to their prison administrators, but also to “publicize their on-the-ground realities to the larger world”183 and, in turn, gain attention from and access to the political branches able to implement policy reforms.184 As recent history has shown, inmates have experienced some success by pressing their claims against the government through publicized strikes. For example, as described above, the **California strikes** in 2011 and 2013 **generated public outcry that** eventually **resulted in transfor- mations to the** California prison system’s **solitary confinement policies**.185 In **Alabama**, **inmates’ participation** in the 2016 nationwide prison strike helped **prompt** the **D**epartment **o**f **J**ustice **to open an investigation into the state’s prison conditions**.186 And more broadly speaking, **strikes** like the 2018 strike have **begun** **to “remedy power imbalances**, bring aggregate structural harms into view, and **shift** deeply entrenched legal and constitutional” **barriers to critical prison reforms**.187 B. Considering Additional Legal Avenues for Protecting Prison Strikes The foregoing analysis suggests that the First Amendment is a critical, worthwhile vehicle for considering the merits of a right to strike for prisoners. As Justice Black recognized, the importance of such analysis likely transcends prisoners themselves. He wrote: “I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”188 But this Note acknowledges that judicial recognition of prison strikes’ First Amendment values requires significant doctrinal change. Convincing the Supreme Court to overturn its Jones and Turner precedents, and instead to adopt a test with less deference than is currently afforded to prison administrators, is unlikely. As a result, future research is necessary to identify other potential avenues to consider the legal status and merits of prison strikes. As alluded to above, labor law presents one such promising avenue, as does state constitutional and statutory law. Drawing from the broader jurisprudence around hunger strikes, and this area of the law’s focus on the body, may present yet another avenue to consider.**189**×

### 5

#### Text: The United States ought to establish a universal basic income at $1,000 a month to all legal adults

#### Boosts GDP, labor force participation, prices, and wages.

Michalis Nikiforos, Marshall Steinbaum, and Gennaro Zezza 17, Michalis Nikiforos is a research scholar working in the State of the US and World Economies program, Marshall Steinbaum is Research Director and a Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, Gennaro Zezza is an associate professor of economics at the University of Cassino, Italy, 8-29-2017, "Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of a Universal Basic Income," Roosevelt Institute, http://rooseveltinstitute.org/modeling-macroeconomic-effects-ubi//HM

How would a massive federal spending program like a universal basic income (UBI) affect the macroeconomy? We use the Levy Institute macroeconometric model to estimate the impact of three versions of such an unconditional cash assistance program over an eight-year time horizon. Overall, we find that the economy can not only withstand large increases in federal spending, but could also grow thanks to the stimulative effects of cash transfers on the economy. We examine three versions of unconditional cash transfers: $1,000 a month to all adults, $500 a month to all adults, and a $250 a month child allowance. For each of the three versions, we model the macroeconomic effects of these transfers using two different financing plans - increasing the federal debt, or fully funding the increased spending with increased taxes on households - and compare the effects to the Levy model’s baseline growth rate forecast. Our findings include the following: • For all three designs, enacting a UBI and paying for it by increasing the federal debt would grow the economy. Under the smallest spending scenario, $250 per month for each child, GDP is 0.79% larger than under the baseline forecast after eight years. According to the Levy Model, the largest cash program - $1,000 for all adults annually - expands the economy by 12.56% over the baseline after eight years. After eight years of enactment, the stimulative effects of the program dissipate and GDP growth returns to the baseline forecast, but the level of output remains permanently higher. • When paying for the policy by increasing taxes on households, the Levy model forecasts no effect on the economy. In effect, it gives to households with one hand what it is takes away with the other. • However, when the model is adapted to include distributional effects, the economy grows, even in the taxfinanced scenarios. This occurs because the distributional model incorporates the idea that an extra dollar in the hands of lower income households leads to higher spending. In other words, the households that pay more in taxes than they receive in cash assistance have a low propensity to consume, and those that receive more in assistance than they pay in taxes have a high propensity to consume. Thus, even when the policy is tax- rather than debtfinanced, there is an increase in output, employment, prices, and wages. Levy’s Keynesian model incorporates a series of assumptions based on rigorous empirical studies of the micro and macro effects of unconditional cash transfers, taxation and government net spending and borrowing (see Marinescu (2017), Mason (2017), Coibion et al (2017), and Konczal and Steinbaum (2016)). Fundamentally, the larger the size of the UBI, the larger the increase in aggregate demand and thus the larger the resulting economy is. The individual macroeconomic indicators are (qualitatively) what one would predict given an increase in aggregate demand: in addition to the increase in output, employment, labor force participation, prices, and wages all go up as well. Even in a deficit-financed policy, an increase in the government’s liabilities is mitigated by the increase in aggregate demand. Specifically, the Levy model assumes that the economy is not currently operating near potential output (Mason 2017) and makes two related microeconomic assumptions: (1) unconditional cash transfers do not reduce household labor supply; and (2) increasing government revenue by increasing taxes levied on households does not change household behavior. Other macroeconomic models would make different, likely less optimistic forecasts, because they would disagree with these assumptions. Estimating the macroeconomic effects of UBI is a critical component of any policy evaluation, because what would appear to be a zero-sum transfer in static terms (money is simply transferred from some households to others) turns out to be positive sum in the macro simulation, thanks to the increase in aggregate demand and therefore in the size of the economy.

### 6

#### The Court is stimulating massive backlash over partisanship BUT liberal civil rights rulings pacify opposition.

Dr. Bruce Peabody 20, Professor of American Politics, Fairleigh Dickinson University, PhD in Government from the University of Texas at Austin, “How the Supreme Court can maintain its legitimacy amid intensifying partisanship”, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/how-the-supreme-court-can-maintain-its-legitimacy-amid-intensifying-partisanship-148126

How courts can reinforce their standing While recent polling finds an uptick in the percentage of Americans who approve of “the way the Supreme Court is handling its job,” the general trend line shows a public that has, according to the FiveThirtyEight news site, “slowly become more disillusioned” with the high court over the past three decades. But should anyone care? Isn’t the very purpose of an independent judiciary to make its decisions with little regard for public opinion and what Alexander Hamilton called the “ill humors in the society”? The truth is, the courts need public support. Judges depend upon national and local officials to uphold their opinions, such as clerks issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Law enforcement officials are required by the Supreme Court to provide certain suspects with Miranda warnings. And if the people on the losing end of court decisions believe judges are unfairly appointed and partisan, they may dismiss their judgments as illegitimate. That threatens the sense of unity and stability that Chief Justice John Roberts has said the judiciary must provide in our polarized age. Fortunately, research points to several ways courts can bolster their standing, so that when they inevitably issue controversial decisions they can withstand the ensuing storm. People, for example, are more likely to accept unfavorable judgments if they experience procedural justice – the fairness and transparency through which decisions are made. They may not like a case outcome, but they’ll go along with it if they approve of how the dispute was handled. Courts can protect procedural justice and their legitimacy by making sure each party in a case has a chance to present its story and by emphasizing respect from not only judges but clerks and other court personnel. Of course, these strategies aren’t as relevant for the millions of people who don’t have direct experience with our legal system. But judges can still reach these Americans by conveying the degree to which many decisions seem to uphold principles of law rather than giving vent to ideological beliefs. Closely divided Supreme Court decisions like the 2012 ruling upholding the Affordable Care Act, or the more recent June Medical Services v. Russo case – which struck down a Louisiana law requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals – draw lots of attention. But it turns out that unanimous decisions on the Supreme Court are far more common. Since 2000, approximately 36% of all cases were decided 9-0. During that same span, 19% were decided 5-4. More bluntly, courts can continue to get support from ideological and partisan skeptics if these individuals can recognize victories along with their losses. Recent decisions upholding the civil rights of LGBTQ employees, for example, may blunt liberal frustration over the court’s voting rights cases, such as Shelby County v. Holder, which significantly limited the reach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In our closely divided and polarized era, the Supreme Court can maintain some of its legitimacy by continuing to issue what law professor Tara Leigh Grove calls “a mix of conservative and progressive decisions in high-profile cases.”

#### A Right to Strike is perceived as a key Liberal Ruling.

Lim 19 Woojin Lim 12-11-2019 "The Right to Strike" <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/12/11/lim-right-to-strike/> (Philosophy BA at Harvard)//Elmer

**Strikes** are not only a means of demanding and achieving an **adequate provision of** basic **liberties** but also are themselves intrinsic, self-determined expressions of freedom and human rights. The exercise of the p**ower to strike affirms** a **quintessential** corpus of **values** **akin to liberal democracies**, notably those of dignity, liberty, and autonomy. In acts of collective defiance, strikers assert their freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. Acts of striking, marching, and picketing command the attention of the media and prompt public forums of discussion and dialogue.

#### Republicans love private prison labor – expanding protections sparks Congressional backlash.

Jan ’18 (Tracy; writer for the Washington Post; 3-16-2018; “These **GOP lawmakers** say it’s **okay** for imprisoned immigrants to work for a $1 a day”; The Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/16/republican-congressmen-defend-1-a-day-wage-for-immigrant-detainees-who-work-in-private-prisons/; Accessed: 11-7-2021; AU)

A **group** of 18 **Republican congressmen** is urging the Trump administration to defend private prisons against lawsuits alleging immigrant detainees are forced to work for a wage of $1 a day. The members say that Congress in 1978 had **explicitly** set the **daily reimbursement** rate for voluntary work by detainees in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement facilities, and that the same rate should apply in government-contracted private prisons. “Alien detainees should not be able to use immigration detention as a means of obtaining stable employment that will encourage them to pursue frivolous claims to remain in the country and in detention for as long as possible,” the lawmakers wrote in a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta, and acting ICE director Thomas Homan. In the March 7 letter, first reported by the Daily Beast, the **congressmen argue** that the detainees are **not employees** of private prisons, so they should not be able to file lawsuits seeking to be paid for their work. “It is our expectation that you will soon get involved in this litigation and take the position that these lawsuits lack legal merit and should be dismissed,” they said. A spokeswoman for the Department of Justice said Friday it has not yet confirmed that Sessions received the letter, and declined to respond to a Post request for comment. The letter was filed with a U.S. District Court in California by the GEO Group this week as part of a lawsuit against the company.

#### That prevents Democratic court packing.

D. Benjamin Barros 20, Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Toledo School of Law, “How the Democrats can pack the court and de-escalate at the same time”, The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/520190-how-the-democrats-can-pack-the-court-and-de-escalate-at-the-same-time

We may have reached a degree of disfunction that will force a fundamental change: Increasing the number of justices on the United States Supreme Court, or packing the court.

Democrats will be outraged if Republicans move forward with filling the vacancy caused by the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg so close to the election after refusing to bring President Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland to a vote in 2016. In response to a potential election-year confirmation of President Trump’s anticipated nominee, Democrats are openly discussing packing the court if Joe Biden wins the presidency and Democrats win both houses of Congress in the November election.

Packing the court is remarkably easy to do legislatively. A bill increasing the number of seats on the court simply needs to pass both houses of Congress and be signed by the president. The Constitution does not proscribe the number of justices, and in our history we have had both fewer and more than nine members of the court at any given time.

The big impediment to court packing is political. Historically, packing the court would have been seen as a major violation of political norms that might in turn expose the party making the change to losses in the next election. In light of the Republican flip-flop on seating a justice in an election year, court packing by the Democrats would likely to be seen as par for the course, rather than particularly norm-breaking.

#### Court packing prevents extinction from environmental tipping points like warming---AND independently solves: CJR, democracy collapse and reproductive rights.

Jay Willis 20, J.D. from Harvard Law School, B.A. in Social Welfare from the University of California, Berkeley, Senior Contributor, The Appeal at The Justice Collaborative, “Expanding the Supreme Court is Not Radical”, The Appeal, https://theappeal.org/expand-the-supreme-court/

A 6-3 Republican Court whose life-tenured members are openly hostile to preserving reproductive rights, addressing climate change, protecting the environment, safeguarding the civil rights of minority groups, and holding free and fair elections is “radical” because it is wildly out of touch with the hundreds of millions of people whose lives their decisions will control. This Court is not a check or a balance. It is a hostage situation. The Court’s faults, however, extend far beyond the particular group of justices who currently sit on it. This institution charges nine wealthy attorneys, trained at the same tiny circle of law schools, with the herculean task of privately negotiating uneasy resolutions to America’s most contentious disputes. (Barrett, who graduated from Notre Dame Law School in 1997, would be the first justice who did not attend Yale, Stanford, or Harvard law schools to be confirmed since the Ford administration.) Every sudden vacancy kicks off months of frenzied partisan warfare, replete with breathless, competing prognostications about how a nominee, who is careful to say nothing of substance, may or may not rule on some hypothetical high-stakes case. It is a patently ridiculous system of governance, and you would immediately recognize it as such if not for the fact that this is the way we’ve always done it. Granted, the Founders likely never envisioned the justices becoming as powerful as they are today. The Constitution has surprisingly little to say about the Supreme Court beyond its existence and its members’ subjectively-defined terms of office (“during good Behaviour”). The Court’s power of judicial review, which allows it to strike down laws that conflict with the Constitution, appears nowhere in the text; it is the brainchild of Chief Justice and legendary power-grabber John Marshall, who basically created it out of whole cloth in 1803. Since then, the judiciary has continued to siphon power from the politically accountable branches of government, whose members have been increasingly happy to foist seemingly intractable problems on judges who answer to no one. Rather than answer hard questions or take tough votes or commit to convincing people of the merits of their policy preferences, lawmakers can instead pour themselves into the task of empowering like-minded jurists who (they hope) will implement those preferences by judicial fiat, solemnly asserting that the law compels a particular result—one that just so happens to comport with their personal beliefs. This feature of the federal judiciary, as New York Magazine’s Eric Levitz writes, is extremely valuable for Republicans, because it gives a party in decline the chance to nevertheless implement an unpopular policy agenda, all while flying largely under the political radar. (This feature of the federal judiciary also explains why conservatives have invested far more resources over the years to seize control of it.) Judges have slowly transformed into an entrenched cadre of robe-clad superlegislators, where the balance of power can hinge on something as arbitrary as which octogenarian lawyer decides to retire at the right moment or happens to die at the wrong one. Such a small, insular system is extremely vulnerable to exploitation and gamesmanship, especially if the side playing the game more strategically also gets a little lucky along the way. The precise timing of Ginsburg’s death may have been a fluke, but the crisis that ensued is not; it is a foreseeable result of the Court’s fundamental brokenness. Life tenure also meant something very different 230 years ago than it does today, as savvy investments in young, loyal talent can pay off over the course of multiple generations. My daughter will be born this November. When Barrett is 87—the age at which Justice Ginsburg died—my daughter will be thinking about celebrating her 40th birthday. The modern Court is functionally a conservative oligarchy on the verge of swallowing whatever remains of representative democracy, hoping you won’t notice. The Court-packing battle is just one of many debates in which reactionaries weaponize terms like “radical” to obfuscate the urgency of change. Which of these is more dangerous, more destabilizing, more harmful: reducing the legal system’s dependence on a failed mass incarceration system, or continuing to blow hundreds of billions of dollars to put people in cages instead? What strikes you as “illegitimate”: disbanding police departments, or investing even more money in an ineffective public safety regime that cannot stop killing Black and brown people? Relative to the status quo, enacting a Green New Deal might feel “radical.” Relative to the impending heat death of the planet hastened by decades of unchecked human greed, attempting to decarbonize the U.S. economy by 2050 is, I would argue, actually kind of modest. Should Democrats capture the White House and the Senate this fall—and then have the courage to use the power Americans entrust to them—expanding the Court will be a lot of things. It will be significant. It will be groundbreaking. But it will not be “radical,” because confronting an existential crisis that threatens to hollow out democracy is exactly what people should expect their government to do.

### 7

#### SCOTUS’s decision on *Roe v. Wade* hinges on Roberts’ political capital.

Robinson ’21 (Kimberly; reporter for Bloomberg Law; 6-18-2021; “Barrett Channels Roberts’ ‘Go-Slow’ Approach in Landmark Cases”; Bloomberg Law; https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/barrett-channels-roberts-go-slow-approach-in-landmark-cases; Accessed: 10-1-2021; AU)

The U.S. Supreme **Court’s** newest justice is showing signs that she’s more **aligned with** John **Roberts** and Brett Kavanaugh **in the center** than she is with her other conservative colleagues, **refusing to support** broad **rulings that** could **shake** the **court’s credibility**. Amy Coney Barrett is “starting to show her stripes” as a moderate who prefers small movements in the law, not huge shifts, South Texas College of Law Houston professor Josh Blackman said. The justices handed down victories to both liberals and conservatives on Thursday saving the Affordable Care Act again but siding with a religious group in the latest battle over LGBT protections. **Roberts**, the chief justice, is viewed as an **institutionalist** **who wants to conserve** the public’s **confidence** in the court. So far, he **favors incremental shifts** in the law. “That’s been one of the Chief’s primary goals all along,” said Case Western Reserve law professor Jonathan Adler. He recently gained an **ally in Kavanaugh** in this pursuit, **and** it appears **Barrett** may join their ranks. The court as a whole has has largely agreed in cases this year. The unanimous decision in the LGBT case was the 25th time the justices were unanimous in 41 rulings so far this term. There are 15 to go in coming days. But the **big test** for Barrett **will be** next term starting in October when the justices will tackle hot-button issues like guns, **abortion**, and possibly affirmative action. “It is a very conservative Court, even if we will only get glimpses of it this year,” said UC Berkeley law school Dean Erwin Chemerinsky. Kicking the Can Both the **A**ffordable **C**are **A**ct **and LGBT** rulings **were** “very, very **narrow**,” Georgia State law professor EricSegall said. In the Obamacare case, California v. Texas, the 7-2 majority handed down a procedural ruling to avoid undoing the landmark 2010 law. The justices said red states led by Texas didn’t have a legal basis—or standing—to challenge it. Only Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch would have voted to gut the act, long a priority of Republicans. The LGBT ruling, while unanimous in its outcome, was splintered in its reasoning. Hiding under the 9-0 breakdown was a dispute about whether to overturn the court’s divisive ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, which sparked the passage of the bipartisan Religious Freedom Protection Act and mini state versions across the country. The court in Smith refused to require an exception from Oregon’s prohibition on peyote, saying religious objectors don’t get a free pass on “generally applicable” laws. On opposite ends in the court’s LGBT ruling were the liberal justices—Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan—along with Roberts, who wanted to uphold the court’s precedent in Smith, and the court’s most conservative members—Clarence Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch—who wanted it overruled once and for all. In **the middle** was Barrett, joined by Kavanaugh, who acknowledged Smith‘s shortcomings but was **concerned with** the **fallout** should the court overrule it. “Yet what should replace Smith?” Barrett asked in a short concurrence. Both cases were a punt, Blackman said, with the issues likely to return to the court at some point in the future. End of the World But the ACA and LGBT cases, along with the extraordinary agreement all term, suggests a **majority** of the justices **don’t think** **it’s** the right **time to make major changes** in the law. “In the throes of everything"—the pandemic, Barrett’s first term, Kavanaugh’s biting confirmation, calls for Breyer to retire, and the caustic 2020 presidential election—"they didn’t want to shock the world this year,” Segall said. “**Preserving** the **court’s** own political **capital** **is** incredibly **important** to the justices because they know their only capital is the confidence of the American people,” he added. **Adler said the court has developed a sort of 3-3-3 split**—that is, three liberals, three conservative justices willing to chuck precedents they don’t agree with, and three conservative justices hesitant to overturn cases they may disagree with. **Roberts, Kavanaugh, and now, apparently, Barrett make up that last group.** Adler said that split will create some interesting pressures for the three justices in the middle next term, when—as Segall said—"the world will end.” **The end of the world was a reference—in part—to the court’s abortion case, which could call into question the landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade and later cases**.

#### **The court’s center is skeptical of overturning precedent in Roe, but the path’s narrow.**

Feldman ‘9/2 (Noah; Bloomberg Opinion columnist and host of the podcast “Deep Background.” He is a professor of law at Harvard University and was a clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter.; “Is the Supreme Court Ready to Overturn Roe? We Don’t Know”; 9/2/21; Bloomberg; https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-09-02/supreme-court-ruling-on-texas-abortion-law-isn-t-death-knell-for-roe; Accessed 9/17/21]

Every nonlawyer on the planet — and no doubt a few lawyers, too — is likely to read this outcome as prefiguring a 5-to-4 vote to overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973 precedent that made abortion a constitutional right. Later this year, **the court will address** a Mississippi anti-**abortion law** that lacks the cleverly diabolical enforcement mechanism of the Texas law but is equally unconstitutional. Indeed, the day after the law went into effect and before the Supreme Court ruled, many non-lawyers who were so unfamiliar with court procedures that they didn’t know it would eventually issue a ruling on the Texas law had already concluded that they knew how the upcoming Mississippi case would come out. That’s a possible interpretation of the latest opinion, to be sure. But the **opinion** for the five conservatives **explicitly denied** it. “We stress,” said the justices, “that we do not purport **to resolve** definitively any jurisdictional or **substantive claim** in the applicants’ lawsuit.” That’s lawyer-speak for **saying** both that the **law could** still **be unconstitutional** and that there might still be some procedural way to block its operation. For good measure, the opinion said the challengers “have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law.” These **formulations indicate** that at least **some** of the five **conservatives** who joined it wanted to take pains **not to** **send** the **message** **that Roe** v. Wade **is sure to be overturned**. What is less clear is whether anyone on the political battlefield wants to hear that message. The pro-choice camp will doubtless spend the months until the court term ends in June whipping up public sentiment, either in the hopes of changing the outcome or turning any decision overturning Roe into the impetus for packing the court or producing a heavy Democratic turnout in the 2022 midterm elections. The pro-life camp has an equal interest in making the overturning of Roe seem inevitable. Consequently, neither side cares much for dispassionate analysis. But the fact remains that the majority in the Texas ruling did not address the underlying issues, so it would be premature to predict the outcome in the Mississippi case based on it. Taken strictly on its own terms, the **opinion** made a point that **is incorrect** in my view, **but** that is **legally plausible**. That is that there’s no clear precedent for courts to block in advance the operation of a law that creates a civil penalty — not a criminal violation — to be applied by the courts after private lawsuits by private parties. Ordinarily, when a criminal law is obviously unconstitutional, the courts issue an order to the state attorney general not to enforce it. Such an order would not have any effect in this case, since the Texas attorney general isn’t empowered to enforce the law.

#### Expanding Rights Protection is perceived as judicial activism – it strays from the Constitution and forces Roberts to expend court capital.

Tribe et al. ‘10 [Laurence; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor at Harvard Law School, et al.; "TOO HOT FOR COURTS TO HANDLE: FUEL TEMPERATURES, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE," https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe\_WP.pdf/]

We can stipulate that the **Constitution’s** framers were **not driven by** the **relationships** among chemistry, temperature, combustion engines, and global climate when they **assigned** **to** the **judicial process** the task of **interpreting** and applying **rules of law**, and to the political process the mission of making the basic policy choices underlying those rules. Yet the framework established by the Constitution they promulgated, refined over time but admirably constant in this fundamental respect, wisely embodied the recognition that enacting the ground rules for the conduct of commerce in all of its manifestations—including designing incentives for innovation and creative production (through regimes of intellectual property), establishing the metrics and units for commercial transactions (through regimes of weights and measures), and coping with the cross-boundary effects of economic activity (through the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce)—was a task quintessentially political rather than judicial in character. Yet the litigious **character of** American **society**, observed early in the republic’s history by deTocqueville, has ineluctably **drawn** American **courts**, federal as well as state, into problems within these spheres more properly and productively addressed by the legislative and executive branches. This has occurred in part because **political solutions** to complex problems of policy choice inevitably **leave some** citizens and consumers **dissatisfied** and inclined to seek judicial redress for their woes, real or imagined. And it has occurred in part because the toughest **political problems** appear on the horizon long before solutions can be identified, much less agreed upon, **leaving courts** to **fill the vacuum** that social forces abhor no less than nature itself. One can believe strongly in access to courts for the protection of judicially enforceable rights and the preservation of legal boundaries—as the authors of this WORKING PAPER do— while still deploring the perversion of the judicial process to meddle in matters of policy formation far removed from those judicially manageable realms. Indeed, the two concerns are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory, for **courts squander** the **social and cultural capital** they need **in order to do** what may be **politically unpopular in preserving rights and protecting boundaries** when they yield to the temptation to treat lawsuits as ubiquitously useful devices for making the world a better place.

#### RTS is treated as an issue of corporate free speech - Robert’s legacy is built on its rejection - ensures sustained backlash.

Thomson-DeVeaux 18 (, A., 2018. Chief Justice Roberts Is Reshaping The First Amendment. [online] FiveThirtyEight. Available at: <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/chief-justice-roberts-is-reshaping-the-first-amendment/> [Accessed 5 November 2021] Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux is a senior writer at FiveThirtyEight. Before joining FiveThirtyEight’s staff, she was a regular contributor to the site and a freelance writer and editor with a wide portfolio of work. Her writing has been published in a variety of outlets, including CNN, Cosmopolitan, National Journal, and New York Magazine. She is a graduate of Princeton University and holds a master's degree in religious studies from The University of Chicago. Between degrees, she was on the staff of The American Prospect and worked as a writer and editor for PRRI, a public opinion research organization in Washington, DC.)-rahulpenu

It’s been a big year for free speech at the Supreme Court. Two of the most high-profile cases argued before the court so far have revolved around free speech rights, four other cases on the docket this term involve free speech questions, and yet another case where the issue is paramount greets the court on Tuesday.

The court today is hearing arguments on whether the state of California is trampling on the free speech rights of crisis pregnancy centers — nonprofit organizations that do not perform abortions and encourage women to seek alternatives to the procedure — by requiring them to post notices explaining patients’ ability to access abortion and other medical services. In December, attorneys for a baker at Masterpiece Cakeshop in Colorado argued that a state anti-discrimination law violates his free speech rights as a self-described cake artist by requiring him to make a wedding cake for a gay couple. Last month, the justices heard oral arguments in a case about whether state laws allowing unions to require nonmembers to pay fees violate those employees’ right to free speech.

Whichever way the rulings come down this spring and summer, it’s almost certain that the winning side will include Chief Justice John Roberts, who has spent his 12-plus years at the helm of the high court quietly carving out a space as a prolific and decisive arbiter of free speech law. Supporters and critics both agree that during his tenure, the court has dramatically expanded the reach of the First Amendment by striking down a wide range of statutes for encroaching on free speech rights. And **Roberts** has **authored** more **majority** **opinions** **on** **free** **speech** than any other justice during his tenure, signaling that this is an area where he **wants** **to** **create** a **legacy**.

But just what that legacy will be is **highly** **contested**. Roberts’s admirers argue that his commitment to the First Amendment transcends ideological boundaries. But others contend that his decisions don’t protect speech across the board. Instead, they say that **Roberts** is more than willing to **allow** the government to restrict speech when it’s speech he disagrees with — meaning **free** **speech** is becoming **a** legal **tool** **that** **favors** **corporations** **over** **individuals**.

The chief justice gets to decide who writes the majority opinion in any case where he’s on the winning side, which means that Roberts is able to stake a claim over a particular area of law if he so chooses. And that seems to be what’s happening with free speech: As of the end of the 2016 term, Roberts had written 34 percent of the free speech decisions the court has handed down since he joined its ranks, and 14 percent of his majority opinions were devoted to the topic.1 Even when he’s not writing for the majority, Roberts is rarely on the losing side: Out of the 38 free speech cases we counted,2 he voted with the minority only once.

The First Amendment appears to be a topic of deep personal interest for Roberts, and he’s not commanding the majority opinion in these cases simply to reinforce earlier decisions. Roberts has presided over — and participated in — a deliberate and systematic expansion of free speech rights in the realm of campaign finance and commercial speech. The court’s determination that campaign spending limits on corporations violated free speech in the 2010 case Citizens United v. FEC was just one in a series that struck down a range of campaign finance laws on First Amendment grounds and expanded corporations’ right to speech in other venues, like drug advertising and trademark regulations.

According to legal experts, these rulings represent a clear and unprecedented reversal of previous Supreme Court interpretations of the First Amendment, particularly with regard to corporations. Those interpretations began taking shape early in the last century, as the court only began to strike down federal statutes for abridging free speech after World War I. As it did so, it at first explicitly rejected the idea that commercial speech was constitutionally protected. In the 1970s and ’80s, the justices walked this decision back somewhat as it related to certain types of ads, but they continued to maintain that advertising remained categorically different from other kinds of speech, especially when it was presenting inaccurate information.

At the same time, the justices issued groundbreaking rulings that protected the speech of unpopular individuals and groups against government censorship. It was these cases, which involved government attempts to quash union picketing, student protests of the Vietnam war, flag-burning and Nazi protests, that established free speech as an essential protection for people with minority opinions who were in danger of being silenced by the majority.

This is decidedly not the principle that the Roberts court has embraced with its rulings on campaign finance and commercial speech. Starting in the 1970s, campaign finance laws restricting the flow of money into politicians’ coffers aimed to make space for more voices in the political sphere by preventing the wealthy from buying influence. But in the Citizens United case, the court ruled that the government couldn’t restrict the free speech rights of corporations simply because they were corporations — even if citizens with fewer financial resources were less able to command the attention of their elected officials as a result.

Although the Roberts court seems to be interpreting free speech in a new way with these decisions, some historians say that free speech has always been ideologically flexible. According to Laura Weinrib, a historian and professor of law at the University of Chicago, corporate titans like the Ford Motor Company were part of the early push for broader **free** **speech** **protections** precisely because they recognized the power of the First Amendment for **advancing** **their** **own** **causes**, while organizations like the ACLU strategically accepted a “neutral” vision of free speech that **protected** the strong (**companies** like Ford) as well as the weak (union **workers** **seeking** the **right to strike**) in order to secure early victories for **labor** **rights**. Those twin forces helped **pave** the **way** **for** **today’s** understanding of **free** **speech** **under** the **Roberts** court.

It’s that question of what free speech protections should do — and whether it’s acceptable to muzzle stronger voices if they’re drowning out weak or unpopular opponents — that may help explain the Roberts court’s **rightward** **turn** **on** **corporate** **speech**.

Burt Neuborne, a law professor at New York University and a former legal director of the ACLU, said that the liberal justices are willing to tolerate some restrictions on speech because they see them as necessary to build a fair society. “In this view, you can, for example, limit free speech when it threatens our democracy,” Neuborne said. The **conservative** **justices**, on the other hand, tend to **view** **free** **speech** **itself** **as** the **goal**. “They don’t care what happens afterward or who they’re affecting — they just **want** **to** **get** the **gov**ernment **out** **of** the business of **meddling** with speech,” he said.

This explanation is complicated, though, by the fact the Roberts court — and Roberts himself — has painted a muddier picture of other speech limits. Roberts authored opinions striking down a civil judgment holding the Westboro Baptist Church liable for damages resulting from church members picketing outside a soldier’s funeral, and a law prohibiting the distribution of videos showing animal cruelty. Those rulings are clearly in line with previous ones permitting flag-burning and Nazi protests. But Roberts also issued decisions or signed onto rulings that allowed the government to restrict the speech of students, even when they’re off school property, and limit the expression of public employees in a variety of contexts.

There’s disagreement about whether the Roberts court, by upholding these government restrictions on speech, is undermining its reputation as a court dedicated to a broad view of free speech. “It’s very much to Roberts’s credit that his Supreme Court has a genuinely expansive view of free speech that can’t be explained by political favoritism,” said Michael McConnell, a professor at Stanford Law School. He acknowledged that there are a few exceptions but said they aren’t significant or frequent enough to undermine his broader characterization of Roberts’s record.

But Genevieve Lakier, another University of Chicago law professor, disagreed. “The court does make judgments about when the government needs to restrict speech,” she said. “And in contexts like schools, or when the government says there are national security needs, it’s shockingly willing to allow those restrictions.”

Whether or not it’s fair to say that the Roberts court has been broadly protective of free speech, there’s little question that the court is reshaping it in ways that will resonate for years to come. And the cases this term could play a pivotal role in defining and clarifying that legacy — especially Masterpiece Cakeshop.

Neuborne predicted that the wedding cake case would be challenging for Roberts, but that either way, it would further illuminate his stance on free speech. “This case could have serious ramifications for nondiscrimination law,” Neuborne said. “But there is a free speech claim involved, so we’ll see how much of an absolutist Roberts is willing to be.”

#### Legal Abortion key to Fetal Tissue research that creates treatments and vaccines for disease

LRM 19 Medicine, The Lancet Respiratory. "Fetal tissue research: focus on the science and not the politics." (2019): 639. (ranked as the number one journal in the fields of critical care and respiratory medicine)//Found by JM + BUBU//Re-cut by Elmer

**Stem cell** therapy **research** in lung disease is still at early stages, but the research output is **increasing** and the area is a **promising** one. However, there are **limits** to the use of MSC and other adult multipotent stem cells, because **substantial numbers** are **required for therapeutic effects**. The cells also have a shorter replicative lifespan and can only make a restricted number of specialised cell types that are specific for their organ of origin. **Fetal tissue**, by contrast, provides cell lines that grow rapidly, are able to **easily differentiate** into multiple cell types, and are **less likely to be rejected** by the body. In the future, fetal tissue might be replaced in certain areas of research with the use of induced pluripotent stem cells and organoids, which are human-cell cultures that can be crafted to replicate an organ. However, in areas such as fetal development, a suitable replacement to fetal tissue is unlikely to be found. Although research into fetal tissue alternatives is worthwhile, it will take time and until then, the use of fetal tissue is **essential** so that **research efforts**, which are crucial for the development of new therapeutic treatments in often difficult-to-treat lung diseases, are not severely hampered. And those in the field need to ensure their voices are heard. Indeed, the American Thoracic Society released a statement the day after the Trump administration announcement saying that “Scientific research with fetal tissue is **vital for** the **development of new treatments for** many **deadly** **diseases** and conditions, such as cystic fibrosis and acute lung injury. **There are no alternative research models that can replace all fetal tissue research”.** Fetal tissue has been a **key** **part of** the development of multiple **vaccines**, **treatments** for cystic fibrosis, and ongoing research into cancer immunotherapy. The major objection to fetal tissue research is that the **source of** the **fetal tissue is** **mainly from** **elective abortions**. However, there is no suggestion that the number of abortions will decrease as a result of removing funding for fetal tissue research. **Abortion is still legal** in all 50 states in the USA and fetal tissue would otherwise be discarded. **Fetal tissue research**, in fact, holds the **potential to save lives** through the development of new treatments and vaccines. Politicising scientific research in this way means denying hope to millions of patients with life-limiting diseases.

#### Diseases cause Extinction

Bar-Yam 16 Yaneer Bar-Yam 7-3-2016 “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world” <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition> (Professor and President, New England Complex System Institute; PhD in Physics, MIT)//Elmer

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

#### Courts are Normal Means

Brudney 21 [James; 2/8/21; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol 46, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil>] Justin \*\* Brackets in original

In order for the international right to strike to receive protection in a U.S. domestic law setting, this CIL right must be cognizable in federal court. Workers asserting such a right would be seeking direct application of CIL, stemming from legal principles set forth in The Paquete Habana233 and subsequent cases. The Paquete Habana involved U.S. seizure of two Spanish fishing vessels during the Spanish American War. The Court relied on customary international law to hold that the vessels and their cargoes were exempt from capture as prizes of war.234 Justice Gray’s oft-quoted language, recognizing that CIL is part of the law of the United States, is as follows: International law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . . 235 In a number of decisions beginning in the 1960s, the Court has applied CIL rules when determining the legal status of submerged offshore areas, helping guide its application of federal statutes and treaties implicating the law of the seas. 236 The Court has also invoked CIL in determining when an instrumentality of a sovereign state becomes the “alter ego” of that state, a question not controlled by the relevant foreign sovereign immunity statute.237 Relatedly, the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino238 relied on a judge-made principle of U.S. foreign relations law—the Act of State doctrine—to decline to examine the validity of the taking of property by a foreign sovereign government within its own territory.239 Turning to lower federal courts, the courts of appeals have regularly applied the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties “as an articulation of the customary international law of treaty interpretation, even though the United States is not a party to the treaty itself.”240 And at least one district court has recognized FOA and the right to organize as CIL when denying a motion to dismiss.241 Finally, the executive branch also has applied CIL in certain circumstances. Although the U.S. voted against adoption of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, the U.S. government accepts its key provisions regarding the maximum breadth of territorial sea and the extent of exclusive economic zones as CIL.242 In short, U.S. courts and executive branch officials have directly applied CIL and been guided by its teachings in a range of doctrinal settings. 243 As noted earlier, CIL on human rights has been deemed applicable in U.S. courts for suitably defined misconduct occurring in other countries. 244 These doctrinal precedents do not involve direct application of CIL in a domestic law setting akin to the labor and human rights claims being proposed here. That said, lower courts have invoked CIL when applying federal rules of decision in a range of domestic law contexts. Indeed, the use of CIL when applying and construing various federal statutes has increased markedly in recent decades.245 Examples include its use when applying an armed conflict statute to establish limits on detention of a U.S. citizen within the U.S.;246 when construing the same statute to help establish requirements for release and repatriation of a foreign national held on U.S. soil;247 and when limiting the scope of an immigration statute’s authorization of detention.248 In addition, CIL has been applied to help courts apply the choice between indefinite detention and exclusion under a different immigration statute,249 and to assist judicial construction of a statute regulating recovery of sunken warships in U.S. waters. 250 It is not obvious why CIL should be deemed inapplicable when construing federal statutes that implicate appropriately qualified labor/human rights misconduct occurring within our borders.251 Moreover, as previously noted, a number of other countries have accepted the right to strike as a principle of international law when applying their own domestic law despite their conscious decision not to ratify Convention 87.252 Once one accepts that recognized CIL has substantive traction in a domestic law setting, the focus should be on whether this CIL can be situated in relation to certain procedural or jurisdictional limitations that characterize the U.S. judicial context. Accordingly, application of CIL to sustain claims based on FOA and the right to strike requires consideration of how this CIL relates to other aspects of U.S. law. B. CIL as Federal Common Law A threshold question is whether U.S. courts should determine matters of CIL as federal common law or as state law in light of the Erie doctrine.253 The question has been extensively debated by able international law scholars,254 and I will not attempt to add new value in this setting. I am persuaded that CIL should be understood and litigated as federal common law, for reasons presented at length in a range of sources. 255 Indeed, as one international law scholar has recently and thoroughly explained, “[t]he law of nations was the original federal common law.”256 The basic contours of this position were set forth by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino, when it held that the Act of State doctrine is federal law, binding on the states and not within the scope of Erie. 257 In the words of Justice Harlan for an eight-member majority, “an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”258 Subsequently, leading commentators have joined the Court in concluding that Erie was never meant to apply to CIL;259 that federal courts’ incorporation of the CIL of labor and human rights follows post-Erie precedent recognizing and helping to create a federal common law for labor relations and for other uniquely federal interests;260 that CIL may reflect developments in the international arena of labor and human rights in addition to filling gaps with respect to jurisdictional statutes such as the ATS and the Torture Victim Prevention Act (TVPA); 261 and that CIL remains subject to the democratic checks of supervision, endorsement, or revision by the federal political branches.262 Relying on the weight of these arguments in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., Justice Scalia for the Court recognized that a few areas involving “uniquely federal interests” are committed to federal control, including the development of federal common law, and he cited Court precedent on CIL as one such area.263 C. The Presence or Absence of Controlling Law As indicated in The Paquete Habana excerpt above, an important additional consideration is whether there is a treaty or any “controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision” that would preclude federal courts from recognizing a right to strike as CIL. Lower court decisions invoking the “controlling law” principle from Paquete Habana have applied a fairly rigorous standard, relying on a comprehensive scheme of statutes and regulations addressing the precise issue,264 or on a treaty ratified by the U.S. directed to the same problem.265 These lower courts also have invoked Supreme Court statements that focus on the central role of legislative expression when concluding that certain controlling congressional acts were taken with a purpose to preclude the application of CIL to a particular situation.266 Under this standard, controlling U.S. domestic law does not preclude federal courts’ authority to recognize a right to strike as CIL; on the contrary, it arguably supports such authority. As an ILO member, the U.S. is a party to the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.267 Each of these core ILO commitments specifies the fundamental importance of FOA. Congress in two separate trade statutes has incorporated FOA as an “internationally recognized worker right.”268 In addition, the U.S. has ratified the ICCPR, which has incorporated the right to strike as part of FOA, and has signed the ICESCR, which expressly recognizes that right within its text. 269 And both the Administration’s 2015 statement at ILO Governing Body proceedings and its most recent trade agreement, drafted and executed by the Trump Administration, have specified that the right to strike is an integral part of FOA.270

Their card concedes it as well

Harvard Law Review, 19 - ("Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes," Harvard Law Review 03/8/2019, accessed 10-28-2021, <https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/03/striking-the-right-balance-toward-a-better-understanding-of-prison-strikes/)//ML>

But in order to ensure that the Constitution truly does not stop at the prison walls, courts cannot simply accept prison administrators’ fears regarding strikes at face value and instead should rigorously test their credibility and basis in fact.143 And more importantly, by over-deferring and failing to engage in any analysis of the merits of prison strikes, courts miss an important opportunity. As this Note has argued, prison strikes represent an underappreciated aspect of prison life — the means by which prisoners have, throughout the course of American history, surfaced pressing problems of our carceral state and initiated important transformations in our prison system. Therefore, it is imperative to meaningfully consider why and how such strikes merit legal protection — even if such protection appears to fly in the face of the current state of the law and to defy conventional wisdom. To that end, this Part first explores the First Amendment as one potential avenue for considering the merits of prison strikes, by presenting three critical First Amendment values contained within prison strikes,144 and it then briefly discusses other potential legal avenues for courts and scholars to consider. A. Considering the First Amendment Values of Prison Strikes The right to strike within prisons may be conceptually viewed as a composite of three separate fundamental First Amendment freedoms: the freedom to peacefully associate, the freedom of speech, and the freedom to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.145 Each is considered in turn. 1. Association. — The right to peaceful association is one that captures the right of individuals to commune with others for the expression of ideas and for effective advocacy.146 Strikes, like prison unions, represent an important means of association for prisoners — allowing them to “lay claim to a social identity as ‘workers’ . . . and in doing so generate claims to respect and solidarity.”147 This identity and solidarity can, in turn, enable inmates to engage in productive and peaceful bargains with prison officials for better conditions, higher pay, and other reform desires. Bargaining is, in many respects, already very common in prisons, “for the simple reason that [prison] administrators rarely have sufficient resources to gain complete conformity to all the rules.”148 However, such bargaining typically happens in an informal, ongoing, private process;149 in their recurrent, day-to-day contact with inmates, prison administrators use their arsenal of tools150 to “negotiate” only with select inmate leaders,151 with the central goal of maintaining “short term surface order.”152 This informal bargaining is “dysfunctional” to the long-term stability of prison institutions and “the real needs of those incarcerated within” them153 — creating hierarchical relationships154 that breed mistrust155 and leave many inmates powerless and feeling aggrieved.156 As a result, inmates often feel that they have to resort to violence to protect themselves from exploitation, express their dissatisfaction, and obtain redress.157 Alternatively, peaceful, collective prison strikes avoid these harmful consequences by allowing for “open” and “formal” negotiations between all inmates and prison staff.158 Such transparent and legitimated bargaining benefits both inmates and prisons as a whole. By initiating peaceful protests such as work stoppages, all inmates are able “to solve problems, maximize gains, articulate goals, develop alternative strategies, and deal with [administrators] without resorting to force or violence.”159 And by permitting peaceful strikes, prison administrators “provide inmates with a channel for airing grievances and gaining official response . . . giv[ing] the institution a kind of safety-valve for peaceful, rather than violent, change”160 — avoiding potentially expensive and time-consuming litigation and even helping rehabilitate inmates,161 all while deemphasizing hierarchical structures in prisons that harm institutional order.162 2. Speech. — A prison strike also represents a critical way by which inmates can express themselves.163 First, as alluded to above, a strike allows inmates to claim and communicate an identity — as more than just marginalized, ignored convicts with little to no self-determination, but instead as workers and human beings entitled to basic dignity. Such collective actions represent the “performative declaration and affirmation of rights that one does not (yet) have.”164 And, as Professor Jocelyn Simonson discusses, these strikes are collective contestations to “demand dignity, calling attention to the ways in which [prisoners] are treated as less than human and in the process reclaiming their own agency.”165 Such dignitary considerations, which courts have sought to protect under First Amendment principles, should therefore naturally extend to prisoners attempting to, through strikes, express their basic selfworth.166 Beyond representing a form of inherent, individual expression for inmates, prison strikes also represent a broader form of expression, allowing inmates to be visible to and heard by the public at large. Over the course of American history, inmates — by virtue of being locked up in isolated, impregnable penitentiaries — have largely been a silent and ignored segment of the American population.167 Through peaceful protests like the 2018 national prison strike, however, their suffering, their calls for reform, and their voices are, for the first time, directly expressed on a large scale, ringing out loudly beyond the prison walls and jumpstarting important conversations of criminal justice reform. It is critical to protect such expression; “[i]ndeed, it is from the voices of those who have been most harmed by the punitive nature of our criminal justice system that we can hear the most profound reimaginings of how the system might be truly responsive to local demands for justice and equality.”168 3. Petition for Redress. Inmates’ strikes can be seen not only as expressions of their dignity and general efforts to express their voices beyond prison walls but also as significant methods of assembly to call attention to specific grievances and seek redress from the government.169 While in theory “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,”170 in practice, “prisons often escape the daily microscope focused on other American institutions such as schools, churches, and government.”171 Courts grant prison administrators wide deference not only in running day-to-day life within prisons but also in restricting press access to prisons.172 Therefore, much of the American public — already closed off from and largely indifferent to the lives of prisoners — is kept even more in the dark about prison conditions and the state of our carceral system as a whole. Prison conditions, from what has been documented, are horrendous across states. Many prisons are severely overcrowded and seriously understaffed;173 inmates routinely experience physical abuse and even death at the hands of prison guards,174 receive inadequate protection from guards, are deprived of basic necessities,175 are given substandard medical care,176 and are forced to live in squalor and tolerate extreme circumstances;177 most prisoners have minimal, if any, access, to rehabilitative or mental health services;178 and prisoners have little legal recourse, as internal prison grievance procedures are often stacked against inmates,179 and judicial deference and federal legislation have effectively shut the courthouse doors on prisoners’ civil rights claims.180 And across prisons, criminal sentencing laws not only have contributed to an unprecedented era of mass incarceration, but also have forced African Americans and people of color broadly to bear much of this burden.181 As the Marshall Project states, “[s]ociety won’t fix a prison system it can’t see”;182 peaceful prison strikes like the 2018 strike, however, draw back the “iron curtain” of prison walls, bringing to light many of the pressing issues described above. Through these strikes, inmates are able not only to express their grievances to their prison administrators, but also to “publicize their on-the-ground realities to the larger world”183 and, in turn, gain attention from and access to the political branches able to implement policy reforms.184 As recent history has shown, inmates have experienced some success by pressing their claims against the government through publicized strikes. For example, as described above, the California strikes in 2011 and 2013 generated public outcry that eventually resulted in transfor- mations to the California prison system’s solitary confinement policies.185 In Alabama, inmates’ participation in the 2016 nationwide prison strike helped prompt the Department of Justice to open an investigation into the state’s prison conditions.186 And more broadly speaking, strikes like the 2018 strike have begun to “remedy power imbalances, bring aggregate structural harms into view, and shift deeply entrenched legal and constitutional” barriers to critical prison reforms.187 B. Considering Additional Legal Avenues for Protecting Prison Strikes The foregoing analysis suggests that the First Amendment is a critical, worthwhile vehicle for considering the merits of a right to strike for prisoners. As Justice Black recognized, the importance of such analysis likely transcends prisoners themselves. He wrote: “I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”188 But this Note acknowledges that judicial recognition of prison strikes’ First Amendment values requires significant doctrinal change. Convincing the Supreme Court to overturn its Jones and Turner precedents, and instead to adopt a test with less deference than is currently afforded to prison administrators, is unlikely. As a result, future research is necessary to identify other potential avenues to consider the legal status and merits of prison strikes. As alluded to above, labor law presents one such promising avenue, as does state constitutional and statutory law. Drawing from the broader j jurisprudence around hunger strikes, and this area of the law’s focus on the body, may present yet another avenue to consider.

## Aff

### Framework

#### Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory

Plummer 15 (Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### 1---Trade-offs are inevitable even under their framework but it’s a question of calculating the harm of those tradeoffs---their framework justifies worse modes of policy obstruction and subjective value adjustments

#### 2---Independently creates terrible policymaking---policymakers make thousands of choices like this every year, and even if an existential risk is .001 percent, they’d trigger a nuclear war given literally three years which proves the “ignore 1 percent” framing is ethically bankrupt

#### Weigh magnitude times probability---“probability first” framing is rooted in psychological biases and leads to mass death

Clarke 08 [Lee, member of a National Academy of Science committee that considered decision-making models, Anschutz Distinguished Scholar at Princeton University, Fellow of AAAS, Professor Sociology (Rutgers), Ph.D. (SUNY), “Possibilistic Thinking: A New Conceptual Tool for Thinking about Extreme Events,” Fall, Social Research 75.3, JSTOR]

In scholarly work, the subfield of disasters is often seen as narrow. One reason for this is that a lot of scholarship on disasters is practically oriented, for obvious reasons, and the social sciences have a deep-seated suspicion of practical work. This is especially true in sociology. Tierney (2007b) has treated this topic at length, so there is no reason to repeat the point here. There is another, somewhat unappreciated reason that work on disaster is seen as narrow, a reason that holds some irony for the main thrust of my argument here: disasters are unusual and the social sciences are generally biased toward phenomena that are frequent. Methods textbooks caution against using case stud- ies as representative of anything, and articles in mainstreams journals that are not based on probability samples must issue similar obligatory caveats. The premise, itself narrow, is that the only way to be certain that we know something about the social world, and the only way to control for subjective influences in data acquisition, is to follow the tenets of probabilistic sampling. This view is a correlate of the central way of defining rational action and rational policy in academic work of all varieties and also in much practical work, which is to say in terms of probabilities. The irony is that probabilistic thinking has its own biases, which, if unacknowledged and uncorrected for, lead to a conceptual neglect of extreme events. This leaves us, as scholars, paying attention to disasters only when they happen and doing that makes the accumulation of good ideas about disaster vulnerable to issue-attention cycles (Birkland, 2007). These conceptual blinders lead to a neglect of disasters as "strategic research sites" (Merton, 1987), which results in learning less about disaster than we could and in missing opportunities to use disaster to learn about society (cf. Sorokin, 1942). We need new conceptual tools because of an upward trend in frequency and severity of disaster since 1970 (Perrow, 2007), and because of a growing intellectual attention to the idea of worst cases (Clarke, 2006b; Clarke, in press). For instance, the chief scientist in charge of studying earthquakes for the US Geological Service, Lucile Jones, has worked on the combination of events that could happen in California that would constitute a "give up scenario": a very long-shaking earthquake in southern California just when the Santa Anna winds are making everything dry and likely to burn. In such conditions, meaningful response to the fires would be impossible and recovery would take an extraordinarily long time. There are other similar pockets of scholarly interest in extreme events, some spurred by September 11 and many catalyzed by Katrina. The consequences of disasters are also becoming more severe, both in terms of lives lost and property damaged. People and their places are becoming more vulnerable. The most important reason that vulnerabilities are increasing is population concentration (Clarke, 2006b). This is a general phenomenon and includes, for example, flying in jumbo jets, working in tall buildings, and attending events in large capacity sports arenas. Considering disasters whose origin is a natural hazard, the specific cause of increased vulnerability is that people are moving to where hazards originate, and most especially to where the water is. In some places, this makes them vulnerable to hurricanes that can create devastating storm surges; in others it makes them vulnerable to earthquakes that can create tsunamis. In any case, the general problem is that people concentrate themselves in dangerous places, so when the hazard comes disasters are intensified. More than one-half of Florida's population lives within 20 miles of the sea. Additionally, Florida's population grows every year, along with increasing development along the coasts. The risk of exposure to a devastating hurricane is obviously high in Florida. No one should be surprised if during the next hurricane season Florida becomes the scene of great tragedy. The demographic pressures and attendant development are wide- spread. People are concentrating along the coasts of the United States, and, like Florida, this puts people at risk of water-related hazards. Or consider the Pacific Rim, the coastline down the west coasts of North and South America, south to Oceania, and then up the eastern coast- line of Asia. There the hazards are particularly threatening. Maps of population concentration around the Pacific Rim should be seen as target maps, because along those shorelines are some of the most active tectonic plates in the world. The 2004 Indonesian earthquake and tsunami, which killed at least 250,000 people, demonstrated the kind of damage that issues from the movement of tectonic plates. (Few in the United States recognize that there is a subduction zone just off the coast of Oregon and Washington that is quite similar to the one in Indonesia.) Additionally, volcanoes reside atop the meeting of tectonic plates; the typhoons that originate in the Pacific Ocean generate furiously fatal winds. Perrow (2007) has generalized the point about concentration, arguing not only that we increase vulnerabilities by increasing the breadth and depth of exposure to hazards but also by concentrating industrial facilities with catastrophic potential. Some of Perrow's most important examples concern chemical production facilities. These are facilities that bring together in a single place multiple stages of production used in the production of toxic substances. Key to Perrow's argument is that there is no technically necessary reason for such concentration, although there may be good economic reasons for it. The general point is that we can expect more disasters, whether their origins are "natural" or "technological." We can also expect more death and destruction from them. I predict we will continue to be poorly prepared to deal with disaster. People around the world were appalled with the incompetence of America's leaders and orga- nizations in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Day after day we watched people suffering unnecessarily. Leaders were slow to grasp the importance of the event. With a few notable exceptions, organi- zations lumbered to a late rescue. Setting aside our moral reaction to the official neglect, perhaps we ought to ask why we should have expected a competent response at all? Are US leaders and organiza- tions particularly attuned to the suffering of people in disasters? Is the political economy of the United States organized so that people, espe- cially poor people, are attended to quickly and effectively in noncri- sis situations? The answers to these questions are obvious. If social systems are not arranged to ensure people's well-being in normal times, there is no good reason to expect them to be so inclined in disastrous times. Still, if we are ever going to be reasonably well prepared to avoid or respond to the next Katrina-like event, we need to identify the barriers to effective thinking about, and effective response to, disas- ters. One of those barriers is that we do not have a set of concepts that would help us think rigorously about out-sized events. The chief toolkit of concepts that we have for thinking about important social events comes from probability theory. There are good reasons for this, as probability theory has obviously served social research well. Still, the toolkit is incomplete when it comes to extreme events, especially when it is used as a base whence to make normative judgments about what people, organizations, and governments should and should not do. As a complement to probabilistic thinking I propose that we need possibilistic thinking. In this paper I explicate the notion of possibilistic thinking. I first discuss the equation of probabilism with rationality in scholarly thought, followed by a section that shows the ubiquity of possibilis- tic thinking in everyday life. Demonstrating the latter will provide an opportunity to explore the limits of the probabilistic approach: that possibilistic thinking is widespread suggests it could be used more rigorously in social research. I will then address the most vexing prob- lem with advancing and employing possibilistic thinking: the prob- lem of infinite imagination. I argue that possibilism can be used with discipline, and that we can be smarter about responding to disasters by doing so.

#### Delgado has no warrant, assumes your revolution is valuable and reform isn’t possible during threats to bodily security which turns their arguments.

#### Prefer util---even if its flawed,

#### 1---alternatives are worse because they justify the same ends but create decision paralysis, and requires saying some lives are more valuable than others, which turns all their impacts

#### 2---Tautological---devolves into consequentialism---either their maxims are created to minimize harm, which means they’re utilitarian consequentialist, or they’re inflexible in cases of moral atrocity worse than utilitarianism because they requires saving some people over others

#### 3---Not our util---utilitarian framework wouldn’t justify atrocities like slavery because the magnitude of the harm to a smaller group still outweighs

#### 4---Their 10 word highlighting the the ev only includes 1 argument about how institutions normalize structural violence with no warrant but insofar we prove that the structures pertaining to the aff are good or that util is a better alternative it has no implication

#### Our disads are true

#### AT Ethics – Doesn’t take out our internal link, its not rationalization of policy but implementation of a new one

#### AT Compound Probability – Shouldn’t’ reject our whole scenario, especially when we have reasons the squo is backsliding, they need to read defense

#### AT Causal Direction, it’s the same as probability argument you should read link defense and not let them get away with low probability every time

#### AT Complexity, this is just impact d read it against the DA lol shouldn’t get to make all these args without analysis

#### Decision gridlock answered by winning a large risk of our scenario

#### Extinction turns structural violence, war leaves some worse off than others based off geographical proximity and hurts them the fastest, all of these arguments should be cross applied to Ansel

### Advantage

#### The right to strike gets utilized against black laborers, forcing them to be strikebreakers marshalling white workers while workers unions remain exclusive to non-blacks

Arnesen 03 (Eric Arnesen is an American historian. He is currently the James R. Hoffa Professor of Modern American Labor History at George Washington University. He was a Fulbright Scholar, and is a member of the Organization of American Historians.), “Specter of the Black Strikebreaker: Race, Employment, and Labor Activism in the Industrial Era”, Labor History, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2003, pg. 320-322, <https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/18650602.pdf> NT

The image of the black male strikebreaker in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was a powerful and broadly provocative one,4 arousing the concern, albeit in opposing ways, of white trade unionists and black elites alike. That image haunted organized white labor. The black strikebreaker appeared, alternately, ignorant and aggressive, manipulated and defiant, docile and violent. In both their reflections and their policies, **white trade unionists exaggerated black strikebreakers’ role and deemed them a greater threat to white labor’s interests than other groups of non-black strikebreakers.** But over the closing decades of the 19th century, many, perhaps most, whites would scarcely have questioned the characterization of African Americans as a “scab race.” After all, too many strikes in too many trades and industries—including mining, meat packing, longshoring, team driving, and even textile and iron and steel manufacturing—had been weakened, at times decisively, by employers’ deployment of black labor. Although in reality blacks constituted only a small if ultimately undeterminable percentage of strikebreakers in the history of American industrial relations—white native-born and immigrant workers constituted a clear majority—white trade unionists and, indeed, much of American society **would express little hesitation in hanging the charge, like a proverbial lynching rope, around the neck of the race**.5 If white workers perceived African Americans as a threat to their economic well being, they made little attempt to understand the motivations and goals of the black workers they confronted on the industrial battlefield. **Instead, they depicted black strikebreakers as depraved and dangerous threats to their livelihoods and collective power**. Viewing black workers as ignorant, depraved, largely unassimilable, and the dupes of capital, they drew the line at admitting blacks into membership in the labor movement with little apology. Black strikebreakers, AFL official John Roach insisted in 1904, were “huge strapping fellows, ignorant and vicious, whose predominating trait was animalism.”6 In response to the arrival of southern black strikebreakers during the 1894 Chicago packinghouse strike white stockyard workers even hung the effigy of a black roustabout from a telegraph pole. “A black false face of hideous expression had been fixed upon the head of straw,” a Chicago white daily paper reported, “and a placard pinned upon the breast of the figure bore the skull and cross-bones with the word ‘nigger scab’ above and below in bold letters.”7 A decade later, another influx of southern black laborers—perhaps as many as 5800—was met by outrage and widespread racial violence on the part of white workers and their sympathizers in the teamsters’ conflict. “It was the niggers that whipped you in line,” the rabidly anti-black southern politician Ben Tillman informed white Chicago stockyard workers after the collapse of their strike. “They were the club with which your brains were beaten out.”8 The number of examples could easily be expanded. Again and again, white workers drew similar connections between black strikebreakers and the failure of their strikes. At their most charitable, white workers tended to dismiss black strikebreakers as misguided, ill-informed pawns of capital. Had they inquired further into their opponents’ motives, many of their fears would have undoubtedly been confirmed. Certainly some **black strikebreakers were recruited under false pretenses or were honestly unaware that they were being used as weapons against white labor**, as whites occasionally claimed. “The reason I left the camp,” explained black strikebreaker Daniel Webster during the 1891 Washington state mining strike, “was that matters had been misrepresented to us. We were told there was no strike, but that we were going to a new mine.”9 But others knew exactly what they were doing: the Negro “fairly aches for the opportunity to scab against whites,” one white union journal insisted.10 Daniel Webster was only one of a small handful of defectors from the ranks of black strikebreakers brought to the mines of Franklin, Washington; the vast majority, numbering as many as 600, clung to their new jobs despite white harassment and racial violence. Given the racially exclusionary barriers erected by many white unions and the racial division of labor that confined blacks to inferior positions, strikebreaking by African Americans could naturally serve as the threat white unionists perceived it to be. It also represented something that most white workers, as well as black leaders, were scarcely prepared to comprehend: black strikebreaking was nothing less than a form of working-class activism designed to advance the interests of black workers and their families. In many instances a collective strategy as much as trade unionism, strikebreaking afforded black workers the means to enter realms of employment previously closed to them and to begin a long, slow climb up the economic ladder. As a strategy, of course, strikebreaking was not without its drawbacks, as many contemporaries, white and black, pointed out. The strikebreaking option was always a calculated risk. **Black workers’ value to white employers rested largely on their ability to check the power of white workers; they remained highly vulnerable in the labor market, often subject to the harsh—or even harsher—conditions that had prompted whites to organize in the first place**. They also exposed themselves to potential or real violence at the hands of strikers and their sympathizers, who bitterly resented their intrusion into local industrial conflicts. Many white workers rejected outright the legitimacy of black workers’ grievances about racial exclusion from unions and employment. Choosing instead to blame the victim, they not only refused to see strikebreaking as a form of working-class activism, but often proved resistant to recognizing or appreciating more familiar forms of activism—namely, labor organizing—in which black workers might engage.

#### Worker strikes empirically fail in prisons and there’s a laundry list of tactics non-employers use within the system to prevent effectiveness without technically violating the right to strike – prisons don’t even have strike task forces because they don’t criminalize the actual striking

Washington 18 (Robin Washington – former interim commentary editor for The Marshall Project interviewing a prison warden, The Marshall Project, “A Former Warden’s View on Prison Strikes”, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/22/a-former-warden-s-view-on-prison-strikes, 22 August 2018, EmmieeM)

This week, a prison strike has been called for inmates at 17 facilities nationwide in response to an April riot at South Carolina’s Lee Correctional Institution, where seven inmates were killed while prison staff failed to immediately respond.

Among 10 demands stated by the [Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee](https://incarceratedworkers.org/campaigns/prison-strike-2018), one of several groups endorsing the strike, are improvements in prison conditions, prevailing wages for incarcerated workers, voting rights for all confined citizens and an end to the racial overcharging, over-sentencing and parole denials to people of color. The strike is planned to continue until Sept. 9, the 47th anniversary of [the Attica prison uprising](https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/292-attica-correctional-facility).

For a view into the nature of prison strikes and how authorities respond to them, The Marshall Project spoke with Cameron Lindsay, a retired warden of three federal facilities: the Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc, California, the U.S. Penitentiary in Canaan, Pennsylvania, and the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, N.Y. Lindsay also ran privatized institutions in Philipsburg and Glen Mills, Pennsylvania, and has taught at several colleges. He now serves as a consultant and an expert witness in corrections cases. He spoke with Interim Commentary Editor Robin Washington. The views expressed are his own, and this interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Q: Have you experienced any strikes, hunger strikes, work strikes or other organized prisoner actions?

A: I’ve seen pretty much all of that over the course of 29 years. The most widespread strike that I ever saw that comes close to what I’m hearing about this week was in federal prisons in October of 1995. It was mostly African American inmates. They were protesting the vast disparity of sentencing laws between powder cocaine and crack cocaine.

It was the first and only time in history that (the federal prison system) announced a nationwide lockdown. The lockdown of a facility is something to be taken very, very seriously. It’s complicated and fraught with all kinds of problems. It’s not a decision to be made lightly.

I can promise you if these inmates do engage in some kind of systematic strikes that wardens will lock down the facilities.

Q: What have you experienced specifically?

In 1995, I worked at the Federal Correctional Institution, McKean, in Bradford, Pennsylvania. It started as a work strike. The first inmate called to duty is at 4 a.m. What we experienced on Oct. 24, 1995, was the inmate crew refused to go to work. There were some that wanted to but they didn’t because they feared retaliation. I have had others on a less severe scale. We had a very brief food strike at the (U.S. Penitentiary) in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. It was small and isolated.

There are food strikes, work strikes, then all-out disturbances and/or riots, depending on the severity. You might have food service inmates who are upset about wages or the way they are being treated by staff. A work strike is the most common way — inappropriate, I might add — that inmates will demonstrate in an attempt to get the attention of the staff. Typically when it happens, the warden will lock down the facility until they have a chance to gauge what really is going on. They’ll gather intelligence, talk to informants, listen to telephone calls, until they can figure out what is going on out there. They may even reach out to certain inmate leaders. Usually, the next thing they do is remove the quote-unquote “agitators” from the general population and put them in isolation. Then they interview every single inmate so that nobody feels singled out.

Q: Does a strike ever work? From the inmate point of view?

In the short term, no. They don’t work because the ringleaders tend to get locked up, and after they are isolated they’re transferred to other facilities.

In the long term, they may be able to effect some change because they do get some media and political attention. In 1987 in Oakdale, Louisiana, and Atlanta, there were simultaneous riots. There was a specific cadre of Cuban inmates from the Mariel boatlift. Our government decided to repatriate them to Cuba. They did not want to go, so they raised hell in their facility. In the long term, their actions did lead to some changes.

Q: The cocaine sentencing disparities protested in the 1995 strike also were eventually changed.

There you go.

Q: Do prisons have a strike task force of some kind, with COs appointed to investigate?

That’s a tough answer. People talk about the “criminal justice system,” but it’s not one system, it’s a whole bunch of systems. There are local corrections, state corrections and federal corrections. There’s very rarely a coordinated effort on a widespread basis for a type of strike.

In the federal Bureau of Prisons, they are really good about gathering and cultivating intelligence. The staffers should be able to predict when one of these happens. Conversely, if you have a correctional facility that is not well operated and they don’t know that something is going to go down, when it does, they’re not going to know how to react.

#### Government recognition doesn’t involve policy action or any change – this is terminal defense to the aff’s solvency since they don’t actually cause strikes or even protect it.

Law Dictionary ‘ND [The Law Dictionary; Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed.; No Date; “What is RECOGNIZE?”; https://thelawdictionary.org/recognize/; Accessed 10-28-2021] AK

To try; to examine in order to determine the truth of a matter. Also to enter into a recognizance.

#### Increased strikes sabotage the economy – they cause major disruptions and lower income for workers.

Grabianowski 6 [Ed; Author and freelance writer. He’s worked as a contributing writer for io9, HowStuffWorks, and Sweethome. His fiction has appeared in Black Static, Fear Project, and other publications and anthologies, including Fear After Fear; “How Strikes Work,” HSW; 3/24/06; https://money.howstuffworks.com/strike.htm]//SJWen

Labor strikes can cause major disruptions to industry, commerce and the lives of many people who aren't even connected to the strike itself. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association strike in 1981 resulted in the firing of thousands of air traffic controllers, and the New York City transit strike in late 2005 affected millions of people. The history of strikes and labor unions is a key chapter in the story of the Industrial Revolution.

While the reasons behind strikes can be complex, they all boil down to two key elements: money and power. In this article, we'll find out how labor strikes have affected the balance of power between corporations and workers, what laws regulate strikes and learn about some important strikes in history.

It's difficult to say when the first real labor strike occurred. The word "strike" was first used in the 1700s, and probably comes from to notion of dealing a blow to the employer [ref]. In 1786, a group of printers in Philadelphia requested a raise and the company rejected it. They stopped working in protest and eventually received their raise. Other professionals followed suit in the next few decades. Everyone in a city who practiced the same profession agreed to set prices and wages at the same rate. Members would shun anyone who diverged from the agreement, refusing to work in the same shop and forcing employers to fire them. By the 1800s, formal trade societies and guilds began to emerge.

To have a strike today, you must have a union (though not necessarily an official union) -- an organization of workers that bargain collectively with an employer. Workers form unions because an individual worker is powerless compared to an employer, who can set low wages and long working hours as long as it adheres to labor laws. When workers combine to form a union, they collectively have enough power to negotiate with the employer. The main weapon the union has against the employer is the threat of a strike action.

At its most basic level, a strike occurs when all the workers in the union stop coming to work. With no workers, the business shuts down. The employer stops making money, though it is still spending money on taxes, rent, electricity and maintenance. The longer the strike lasts, the more money the employer loses. Of course, the workers aren't getting paid either, so they're losing money as well. Some unions build up "war chests" -- funds to pay striking workers. But it isn't usually very much, and it's often not enough for a prolonged strike.

Strikes help explain why unions are more powerful than individuals. Imagine if an employer refuses to give a raise to an individual worker. She then decides to stop coming to work in protest. The employer simply fires her for not coming to work. That one worker has no power to influence the employer. However, it can be very costly for an employer to fire every single worker when a union goes on strike (though it has happened).

#### Illegal strikes solve better and aff strikes become water downed and negotiated out by the state – TURNS CASE

Reddy 21 Reddy, Diana (Doctoral Researcher in the Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program at UC Berkeley) “" There Is No Such Thing as an Illegal Strike": Reconceptualizing the Strike in Law and Political Economy." Yale LJF 130 (2021): 421. <https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy>

In recent years, consistent with this vision, there has been a shift in the kinds of strikes workers and their organizations engage in—increasingly public-facing, engaged with the community, and capacious in their concerns.[178](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref178) They have transcended the ostensible apoliticism of their forebearers in two ways, less voluntaristic and less economistic. They are less voluntaristic in that they seek to engage and mobilize the broader community in support of labor’s goals, and those goals often include community, if not state, action. They are less economistic in that they draw through lines between workplace-based economic issues and other forms of exploitation and subjugation that have been constructed as “political.” These strikes do not necessarily look like what strikes looked like fifty years ago, and they often skirt—or at times, flatly defy—legal rules. Yet, they have often been successful. Since 2012, tens of thousands of workers in the Fight for $15 movement have engaged in discourse-changing, public law-building strikes. They do not shut down production, and their primary targets are not direct employers. For these reasons, they push the boundaries of exiting labor law.[179](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref179) Still, the risks appear to have been worth it. A 2018 report by the National Employment Law Center found that these strikes had helped twenty-two million low-wage workers win $68 billion in raises, a redistribution of wealth fourteen times greater than the value of the last federal minimum wage increase in 2007.[180](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref180) They have demonstrated the power of strikes to do more than challenge employer behavior. As Kate Andrias has argued: [T]he Fight for $15 . . . reject[s] the notion that unions’ primary role is to negotiate traditional private collective bargaining agreements, with the state playing a neutral mediating and enforcing role. Instead, the movements are seeking to bargain in the public arena: they are engaging in social bargaining with the state on behalf of all workers.”[181](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref181) In the so-called “red state” teacher strikes of 2018, more than a hundred thousand educators in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and other states struck to challenge post-Great Recession austerity measures, which they argued hurt teachers and students, alike.[182](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref182) These strikes were illegal; yet, no penalties were imposed.[183](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref183) Rather, the strikes grew workers’ unions, won meaningful concessions from state governments, and built public support. As noted above, public-sector work stoppages are easier to conceive of as political, even under existing jurisprudential categories.[184](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref184) But these strikes were political in the broader sense as well. Educators worked with parents and students to cultivate support, and they explained how their struggles were connected to the needs of those communities.[185](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref185) Their power was not only in depriving schools of their labor power, but in making normative claims about the value of that labor to the community. Most recently, 2020 saw a flurry of work stoppages in support of the Black Lives Matter movement.[186](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref186) These ranged from Minneapolis bus drivers’ refusal to transport protesters to jail, to Service Employees International Union’s Strike for Black Lives, to the NBA players’ wildcat strike.[187](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref187) Some of these protests violated legal restrictions. The NBA players’ strike for instance, was inconsistent with a “no-strike” clause in their collective-bargaining agreement with the NBA.[188](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref188) And it remains an open question in each case whether workers sought goals that were sufficiently job-related as to constitute protected activity.[189](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref189) Whatever the conclusion under current law, however, striking workers demonstrated in fact the relationship between their workplaces and broader political concerns. The NBA players’ strike was resolved in part through an agreement that NBA arenas would be used as polling places and sites of civic engagement.[190](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref190) Workers withheld their labor in order to insist that private capital be used for public, democratic purposes. And in refusing to transport arrested protestors to jail, Minneapolis bus drivers made claims about their vision for public transport. Collectively, all of these strikes have prompted debates within the labor movement about what a strike is, and what its role should be. These strikes are so outside the bounds of institutionalized categories that public data sources do not always reflect them.[191](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref191) And there is, reportedly, a concern by some union leaders that these strikes do not look like the strikes of the mid-twentieth century. There has been a tendency to dismiss them.[192](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref192) In response, Bill Fletcher Jr., the AFL-CIO’s first Black Education Director, has argued, “People, who wouldn’t call them strikes, aren’t looking at history.”[193](https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy#_ftnref193) Fletcher, Jr. analogizes these strikes to the tactics of the civil-rights movement.

#### Prison strikes don’t work – at best they cause incremental, half-hearted reforms; at worst prisoners get punished for them.

Thompson ’16 (Christie; writer for the Marshall Project; 9-21-2016; “Do Prison Strikes Work?”; Marshall Project; https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/21/do-prison-strikes-work; Accessed: 11-8-2021; AU)

On Sept. 9, prisoners across the country stopped showing up for their work assignments to protest what they call slave-like conditions for incarcerated workers. Inmates make pennies an hour keeping the prison running — such as cleaning and cooking — or providing cheap manufacturing for private businesses. Inmates involved in the protest are calling for higher wages, better working conditions and less severe punishment while on the job. The work stoppage was organized by inmates in multiple states and labor activists with the Industrial Workers of the World to coincide with the 45th anniversary of the Attica riot, which was preceded by a strike in the prison’s metal shop. Prisoners and labor organizers on the outside hoped it would be the largest prison strike in history. It’s hard to quantify exactly how many prisoners in how many states have participated, as prison officials and organizers give conflicting accounts of its scope. Activists claim inmates in at least 11 states are taking part. This strike is the latest in a long history of prisoners trying to use what little leverage they have — whether work stoppages or hunger strikes — to demand change from administrators. Some have been more successful **than others**. Here’s a look at five other prison strikes and **what came of them**: Post-WWII Labor Strikes University of Michigan professor Heather Ann Thompson’s history of labor movements in prison details how a series of work stoppages and sit-down protests took off in prisons across the U.S. in 1947. In little over a decade, hundreds of prisoners in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Ohio, and Georgia stopped working to protest long hours, trifling pay, and grueling work environments. Prisoners in Georgia and Louisiana went even further and slit their heel tendons so they could not be forced to work. While the work stoppages **did not lead** to immediate **changes**, they inspired another era of prison protest in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s, which included the Attica work stoppage and eventual riot. Those movements achieved **slight pay raises** and improved safety precautions in some states and led to the creation of prisoner-led unions. 2010 Georgia Labor Strike In 2010, state prisoners across Georgia launched what many then called the largest prison work strike in U.S. history — though official numbers are difficult to confirm. At the protest’s height, organizers said thousands of inmates participated across at least six state prisons. Georgia inmates were paid nothing for their work, as dictated by state law, and were asking for better conditions and more access to programming. Not only were Georgia inmates not showing up to their job assignments — they refused to leave their cells at all until their demands were met. The strike **lasted six days**, and garnered coverage in news outlets like The New York Times. It ended when prisoners decided to leave their cells to go to the law library and try to sue for improvements instead. (It’s **unclear** what became of those efforts). **Prisoners in Georgia are still not paid for their labor**. 2011-2013 Pelican Bay Hunger Strike In 2011, 400 prisoners in California’s supermax prison started refusing their meals. Their numbers grew to 7,000 as they were joined by prisoners all over the state. The inmates had a list of five demands, including limits on solitary confinement and changes to how the prison determines gang membership. Their fast ended after three weeks when prison officials agreed to reconsider some of their solitary confinement policies. Inmates returned to hunger-striking later in 2011 and again in 2013 saying the **changes were too small and too slow**. But the protests did have a significant impact. After the initial strike, the chair of the California Assembly’s Public Safety Committee held a hearing on conditions at Pelican Bay. In 2012, the nonprofit Center for Constitutional Rights filed a class-action lawsuit against the state over its use of prolonged isolation. Todd Ashker, one of the strike’s organizers, was the lead plaintiff. The suit was settled in September 2015, addressing many of the strikers’ concerns about how people end up in solitary and how long they remain there. 2013 Guantanamo Hunger Strike Detainees at the U.S. military prison in Cuba began hunger-striking in March 2013 to fight against their indefinite detention and alleged mistreatment. At the strike’s peak in July that year, 106 men were refusing to eat and 45 were being force-fed through nasal tubes. The strike — for its duration, size, and the graphic nature of force-feeding — **outraged** the public and policymakers and increased pressure on President Obama to fulfill his promise of closing the controversial prison. Since the strike, Obama has lowered the number of men held at Guantanamo from over 2,000 to 61, but has yet to close the prison entirely. 2015-2016 Immigration Detention Center Hunger StrikesSince 2015, hunger strikes have begun at various immigration detention centers — prison-like facilities where immigrants are held while their deportation case is decided — throughout the U.S. Roughly 200 detainees at Eloy Detention Center in Arizona stopped eating in June 2015, in part to pressure an investigation into recent deaths at the facility. That fall, immigrants in detention in California, Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas also stopped eating to object to their indefinite detention and poor conditions. More recently, 22 mothers being held with their children in a family detention center in Pennsylvania went on a hunger strike this August. Their strike accompanied a series of handwritten letters they sent to immigration officials asking to be released from indefinite detention. The strike has continued off-and-on since then, with even their children threatening to refuse to attend classes in solidarity with their mothers. It’s too soon to tell what the impact of their protests might be.

1) Workers don’t have leverage – there’s zero incentive for prisons to raise wages since workers have to be there anyway. Private-sector strikes work because companies are scared of losing labor, so they have to negotiate; but prisons are a monopoly and thus control the labor market. That’s 1NC Thompson.

#### 2) No visibility – lack of public attention means strikes never generate sufficient pressure to spark change.

HLR ’19 (Harvard Law Review; 3-8-2019; “Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes”; Harvard Law Review; https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/03/striking-the-right-balance-toward-a-better-understanding-of-prison-strikes/; Accessed: 11-8-2021; AU)

But more broadly, the prison strikers sought to draw public attention to longstanding grievances over inhumane treatment within prisons across the country and to call for significant criminal justice reforms. The strikers, through the inmate organization Jailhouse Lawyers Speak, issued a list of ten national demands, calling for, among other things, improved prison conditions, better access to rehabilitation programs, voting rights for all current and former prisoners, and the “immediate end to the racial overcharging, over-sentencing, and parole denials of Black and brown humans.”4× Most critically, the strikers passionately called for the “immediate end to prison slavery”5× — the label that activists use to describe the exploitative labor practices within prisons of putting prisoners to work, sometimes compulsorily, for just “cents an hour or even for free.”6× Although **none of the strikers’ ten demands have yet been met**, the 2018 nationwide prison strike was still a remarkable event in its scope and coordination, as well as its ability to generate public support and attention. An estimated 150 different organizations endorsed the strike; citizens held numerous demonstrations outside of prisons in solidarity; and a range of national media publications provided detailed coverage of the protest’s motivations, objectives, tactics, and status as potentially the “largest prison strike in U.S. history.”7× Despite the 2018 prison strike’s apparent gravity, it is difficult to fully contextualize its significance because **surprisingly little attention** has been paid to prison strikes previously. For instance, just two years prior, in 2016, a similar nationwide prison strike was described as “[t]he **largest** prison strike . . . you [probably] **haven’t heard about**.”8× In light of this reality, this Note peers behind prison walls to improve our understanding of prison strikes — the end goal being to open the door to a broader discussion of why and how these strikes should receive legal protection. Part I briefly documents America’s history of prison strikes, showing that the 2018 nationwide strike is the latest in a long, important tradition of prisoners using the only real means available to them — collective actions against prison administrators — to protest labor conditions and other deeply held grievances. Part II then evaluates the legal framework governing prison strikes, demonstrating that such strikes likely do not receive sufficient protections under either the Constitution or federal and state statutes and therefore can be shut down by prison administrators without fear of judicial oversight. Part III, informed by the rich history of prison strikes, argues that their potential and demonstrated value demands, at the very least, consideration of the merits of protecting incarcerated individuals’ right to strike, and it contends that the First Amendment framework offers one potential avenue to allow prisoners to peacefully surface pressing problems in our carceral system and to collectively express their humanity and dignity.

#### Multiple alt causes to recidivism – low wages are a drop in the bucket.

Tegeng et al. ’18 (Goche; professor in the Department of Psychology at Wollo University; 2018; “Exploring Factors Contributing to Recidivism: The Case of Dessie and Woldiya Correctional Centers”; Arts and Social Sciences Journal; https://www.hilarispublisher.com/open-access/exploring-factors-contributing-to-recidivism-the-case-of-dessie-and-woldiya-correctional-centers-2151-6200-1000384.pdf; Accessed: 11-8-2021; AU)

Recidivism is “one of the most fundamental concepts in criminal justice” and relevant in understanding the core functions of the criminal justice system such as incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation [1]. Within criminal justice agencies, the level of recidivism is an important outcome variable that provides the basis for determining the extent to which an agency has been able to effectively intervene in the criminality of the offender populations it serves, identifying the needs for more effective programs, communicating the need for increased resources, and demonstrating accountability to the public and to legislators [2]. There are **many different plausible contributing factors** that might explain why released offenders could not successfully reenter the community. A notable number of studies examined the contributing factors to recidivism among released offenders. The **most plausible reasons** to explain the relatively high recidivism rate among released offenders were centered on the offenders’ **educational illiteracy**, **lack** of vocational **job skills**, lack of interpersonal skills, or **criminal history**. Besides, socio-economic factors such as gender, **age and employment status** influence the possibility of committing crimes after first conviction. In terms of gender, men are more likely to return to prison because of **criminal peer associations**, **carrying weapons**, alcohol abuse, and **aggressive feelings** [3]. According to United States Sentencing commission 24.3 and 13.7 percent of males and females were recidivates respectively in USA. **Age is** also another demographic **determinant factor** for recidivism. A study in USA shows that recidivism rates decline relatively consistently as age increases. So youths are more likely to offend than older people. Among all offenders under age 21, the recidivism rate is 35.5 percent, while offenders over age 50 have a recidivism rate of 9.5 percent (United States Sentencing commission, 2004). Therefore, incarceration, particularly at a young age, can lead to an accumulation of disadvantages over the life course, with future opportunities severely restricted [4]. On the other hand, the **absence of employment** is a consistent factor in recidivism and parole or probation violations, and **having a criminal history** limits employment opportunities and **depresses wages**. In New York State, labor statistics show that **89%** of formerly incarcerated people who violate the terms of their probation or parole are unemployed at the time of violation. Further research suggests that 1 year after release, up to 60% of former inmates are not employed. Nationally, according to a study by Bushway and Reuter [5], one in three incarcerated people reported being unemployed before entering state prison, and fewer than half had a job lined up before release. Moreover, family is **another main factor** in the formation of individual and social personally of the child. From the child’s point of view, parents are the most important and most valuable models of the universe. Prisoners’ recidivism rates are associated with the amount of contact they receive with their families [6]. Less care of family to their children [7] and lack of family involvement is **strongly related** to crime and incarceration rates. In line with this, studies in Australia revealed that, offenders with limited family support or attachment are more likely to reoffend. Alongside, drugs problem is one of the **main headline crime stories** of our times which leads to crime. The urge to commit crimes by drug addicts and alcoholics is **motivated** by the desire to support their habits. Much of these offenders’ behavior can be linked to substance abuse and addictions (UNODC, 2012). Because they tend to serve short-term sentences, their access to treatment and other programmers while in detention is quite limited and they remain at high risk of reoffending. The issue crime in general and recidivism in particular has attracted the interest of some researchers in Ethiopia. These studies were basically focused on criminal behavior; juvenile delinquency and the criminal justice system i.e. have tried to point out from legal perspectives. Yet the amount of researches and the knowledge obtained from those researches do not suffice to explain the extent and depth of the problem related to recidivism rather they try to highlight the issue from criminal behavior. Andargachew [8] in his book “The Crime Problem and Its Correction” found that Ethiopian prisons are suffered from over crowdedness, lack of sanitation, and insufficient amount and quality of food service. He has also focused the history of Ethiopian police force as well as the history of judicial system in Ethiopia. However, Andargachew failed address the issue of recidivism and lack of rehabilitation on repeat offenders. Daniel [9] also studied Crime incidences in Addis Ababa with an emphasis on the nature, spatial pattern, causes, consequences and possible remedies and showed different variables causing criminal behavior. But he too failed to identify the major causes of recidivism. Nayak [10] studies magnitude and impact Juvenile Delinquency in Gondar, explored that Juveniles who were from large sized /or disintegrated family commit delinquent act than smaller sized and healthy family. It has a greater impact on different levels like, individual, family, community and society at large. Yet, he also lacked from discussing recidivism. In addition to this, Meti [11] in his/her study in Addis Ababa tried analyze the influence of socio economic factors on crime with particular emphasis on the triggering factors that prompt criminal behavior is a timely endeavor. But he still refrained from explaining the factors contributing to recidivism. On top of that, methodologically, the aforementioned studies gave a huge emphasis on quantitative method in the understanding of crime and criminal behavior, for the sake of describing socio-economic and demographic characteristics of study participants’ vis-à-vis recidivism. On the contrary, in the present study attempt has made to incorporate qualitative method intensively due to the fact that lived experience of recidivists are more understandable through a detailed and rich data that could be collected by giving more attention to qualitative method.

Claiming that a right to strike is sufficient to overhaul the prison system and solve recidivism is laughable. Even if the aff reduces one trigger for prisoners re-offending, they have no evidence about how that one trigger is sufficient to explain why all cases of recidivism occur. Three alt causes:

#### 1) Housing – local environments influence decision-making post-imprisonment.

Flores ’18 (Nayely; contributor to the Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science; 5-21-2018; “Contributing Factors to Mass Incarceration and Recidivism”; San Jose State University; https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=themis; Accessed: 11-8-2021; AU)

Neighborhood environmental context has been found to **influence** the **behavior** of those that reside in that neighborhood. The social organization of neighborhoods, specifically poor ones, have a **significant impact** on the level of crime and recidivism rate in that particular neighborhood. According to Kubrin and Stewart’s (2006) study, when offenders are released back into their neighborhoods, they seek resources **in their neighborhood** to successfully integrate back into society; however, when that is not present the probability of them returning to the criminal justice system is **significantly higher**. Moreover, when individuals in neighborhoods have high rates of crime, poverty, and high social disorganization, the risk of youth falling into the criminal justice system also increases. Harris’s (2010) study finds that Blacks who find themselves in these neighborhoods are at a higher risk to become incarcerated than whites. In addition, socioeconomic disparities between Blacks and whites make it more difficult for Blacks to access resources once they are in the criminal justice system, making them **susceptible to recidivism**. Typically, offenders return to their neighborhoods with little to no money, the clothes on their back, and no employment. When they are returning to a neighborhood that has those same characteristics (high unemployment, poverty, etc.), there is a **considerable likelihood** of reoffending (Stahler et al., 2013). Overall, many studies show a **significant relationship** between mass incarceration and neighborhood environment.

2) Unemployment – former felons are locked out of the labor market because of a lack of vocational skills. It’s the single biggest factor that drives recidivism – that’s 1NC Tegeng.

3) Education, drug abuse, family support, rehabilitative programs in prison, etc. all matter far more.