## OFF

### T Unconditional---1NC

#### 1] Interpretation: The affirmative must defend an unconditional right to strike. This means that the Affirmative must defend that anyone regardless of job or occupation has a fundamental right to strike.

Merriam Webster ND, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconditional> //sid

not conditional or limited : [ABSOLUTE](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/absolute), [UNQUALIFIED](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unqualified)

“Unconditional” necessitates the absence of narrowing restrictions.

US Legal ‘ND (US Legal; dictionary of legal terms of art; US Legal; “Unconditional Law and Legal Definition”; https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/unconditional/; Accessed: 10-30-2021; AU)

Unconditional means **without conditions**; **without restrictions**; or **absolute**. For instance, unconditional promise is a promise that is unqualified in nature. A party who makes an unconditional promise must perform that promise even though the other party has not performed according to the bargain.

#### 2] Violation – They only grant the Right to Strike to [x group]. That by definition is a condition since they condition the right to strike on a particular occupation.

Jensen ’18 (Eric; co-director of the Stanford Rule of Law Program, in collaboration with USAID, The Asia Foundation, and Stanford Law School; April 2018; “Introduction to the Laws of Timor-Leste”; Stanford Law School; <https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Timor-Leste-Constitutional-Rights.pdf>; Accessed: 10-30-2021; AU)

If individuals want to defend their rights at work, the Constitution gives them the right form trade unions and to strike. Individuals are free to join and participate in professional associations that are peaceful. This includes trade unions. Individuals in trade unions have a right to organize their unions independent of the government or their employers. Trade unions should be free and independent, and individuals have the right to set the unions’ internal structure freely. Independent trade unions are important to allow individuals to organize with other workers to collectively defend their interests and their rights. It is important that they are independent so that they reflect the individuals’ interests and not the employer’s or the government’s interests. Individuals have the right to strike. If they feel that their employer is not respecting their rights or interests, employees can refuse to work in protest. The Constitution creates a duty that during a strike, the employer still has to maintain equipment and provide for safety. Individuals’ right to strike is **limited by the law**. The Constitution states that the right to strike is **conditional** on the strike being **compliant** with legal regulations that the government creates. This means that the **government can pass laws** that limit **when and how** individuals can exercise their right to strike. The right to strike is important to give individuals the power to defend their labor rights.

#### 3] Standards –

#### a] Limits – there are endless conditions the aff can place on the right to strike – i.e based on occupation, national holidays, location of strike, etc. That makes the topic untenable since the Aff can just infinitely specify any condition or permutation of conditions which makes predictable preparation and in-depth clash impossible.

#### b] Neg Ground – specifying scenarios lets affs spike out of core, reduction-based disads like Bizcon and Small Businesses. Links are already non-existent on this topic – letting affs impose restrictions on RTS makes it even narrower.

#### 4] TVA – read this aff but defend whole res.

#### [Competing Interps] – Reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### [No RVI’s] – 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

#### DTD – DTA is incoherent since its an indict to the plan as a whole and its key to deterring future abuse. Independently drop the arugment would reject the whole plan text so still vote neg

### Extra T---1NC

#### 1] Interp – “Right to Strike” solely effects the legality of the act of striking – anything else is extra-Topical.

ILO 1 12-10-2001 "CHAPTER V Substantive provisions of labour legislation: The right to strike" <https://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/dialogue/ifpdial/llg/noframes/ch5.htm> (International Labor Organization)//Elmer

The **right to strike** is **recognized** by the ILO’s supervisory bodies **as** an intrinsic corollary of the **right to organize** protected by Convention No. 87, **deriving from** the **right of** **workers'** **organizations to formulate** their programmes of **activities** **to** further and **defend** the **economic and social interests** of their members. However, the right to strike is not absolute. It may be subject to certain legal conditions or restrictions, and may even be prohibited in exceptional circumstances (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), Article 3; General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, para. 151).

#### Strike refers to the act of stopping work.

Meriam Webster No Date "Strike" <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strike>

15: **to stop work in order to force an employer to comply with demands**

#### Recognize is ruling on the legal authority of a particular action

Meriam Webster No Date "Recognize" <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recognize>

3: **to** accept and **approve of** (something) **as having legal** or official **authority**

#### To clarify – the Affirmative can only affect whether of not workers have the right to strike, effecting the conditions or who gets access to it is extra-topical since a strike and right to strike are terms of art – this debate is solely a question of whether or not the recognition of those terms of art are good or not.

#### 2] Violation – they define who an employee is which is outside the scope of a recognition of a right to strike.

**Reilly, 11**, Penn State Law, “Agricultural Laborers: Their Inability to Unionize Under the National Labor Relations Act”, Penn State: Masters of Science, JD Law, URL: <https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/aglaw/Publications_Library/Agricultural_Laborers.pdf>, 2011 + since most recent citation is from then, KR

**The NLRA gives workers “freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing” in order to equalize the bargaining power** between employers and employees in the hopes of limiting the interruptions to the free flow of commerce.10 **The statute covers a large number of workers based on the broad definition of “employee,”11 but excludes from coverage all agricultural laborers**.12 The NLRA does not define who these agricultural laborers are that are excluded from the right to organize, but rather Congress has instructed the National Labor Relations Boards (NLRB)13 in the annual Appropriations Act that in determining who is an agricultural laborer excluded from the NLRA, to rely on the definition of “agriculture” **found in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).14 Agriculture in the FLSA is defined as “farming in all its branches ... and any practices ...** performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations...”15 The definition also lists specific activities to further define what would specifically be considered agricultural work.16 Therefore, workers whose responsibilities are contained in the FLSA’s definition of “agriculture” are excluded from the right to organize and form unions under the NLRA.

The reasoning behind this exclusion is somewhat vague, especially considering that the bill originally proposed in the Senate did not exclude agricultural laborers from the definition of “employee.”17 There is not much mentioned about the agricultural exclusion because of the statute’s primary focus on addressing problems in the industrial sector. There is, however, a debate from in the House addressing the agricultural laborer exemption,18 where an argument was made that **agricultural laborers should be included because they needed the same protections as industrial** workers. Agricultural labor issues were brought to light in 1935 after governmental investigations into child labor issues and the lack of clean water provided for such workers.19

In response, **two possible reasons were briefly mentioned that may explain why agricultural laborers were excluded: first, in regions like the Midwest, farms are mostly family farms and should not be within the scope of the NLRA,** and second there was a concern that Congress did not have jurisdiction over agricultural workers because it was questionable whether such workers were engaged in interstate commerce.20 Many commentators believe that it was the former argument that led to the exclusion of agricultural workers from protection under the NLRA. Another possible reason for this exclusion as presented by some commentators is that the larger farms lobbied to have their workers excluded from the NLRA.21 While not expressly stated, the most likely explanation is that Congress wanted to protect the family farmer from having to pay higher wages that unions would inevitably demand of the employers.22 Realizing that agriculture was important to the entire nation, Congress wanted to shield this industry from unionization, and wanted to protect the family farmer from having to pay what they could not afford. Congress did not think it necessary to equate the family farmer with big business.

The broad definition of “agriculture” under the FLSA would seem to exclude from the NLRA any worker who is employed by any agricultural entity. This is not the case, however, because **the Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to determine if an employee is in fact an agricultural laborer excluded from the NLR**A.23 An agricultural employee will be excluded from the right to organize if he or she is engaged in either primary or secondary farming. The Supreme Court has taken the FLSA definition of agriculture and essentially limited its application based on a strict application of the statutory language. Primary farming are those tasks specifically referred to in the statutory definition of “agriculture” such as “cultivation and tillage of the soil [and] dairying.”24 The rest of the definition is considered secondary farming, and therefore a worker is an agricultural laborer if the work performed is of the type that would be performed “by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations.”25

In one of the more recent cases to address the question of who is considered an agricultural employee, the Supreme Court in Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B. upheld the determination made by the NLRB that workers on live-haul chicken crews do not engage in agricultural labor and therefore are not subject to the agricultural exception from the NLRA.26 The responsibility of the live-haul crew is to enter the farms of independent contractors who raise chickens supplied by Holly Farms; the chickens are then caught and caged by nine chicken catchers, moved by a forklift operator onto a truck to be transported by a truck driver to the processing plant.27 These live-haul crews were not engaged in primary farming because primary farming would have been the actual raising of the poultry, which was the responsibility of the independent contractors, not the live- haul crews.28

The court then focused on whether these live-haul crews were engaged in secondary farming. In doing so, the court immediately found that that the work performed by the live-haul crews were not of the kind “performed by a farmer” because Holly Farms gave up its farmer status as soon as the chicks were delivered to independent contractors for raising.29 As a result of this determination, the truck drivers were not considered agricultural laborers and were therefore not part of the agricultural exception to the NLRA and were able to unionize.30

The court then looked to whether the chicken catchers and forklift operators were engaged in work “on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with” raising poultry.31 The Supreme Court found that neither the chicken catchers nor the forklift operators “worked on a farm” because the work these employees performed were part of Holly Farms’ poultry processing operations and was not of the type of work contemplated to be included in the statutory definition of “farming.”32 The Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the NLRB in deciding that the catchers and forklift operators were not performing work “incident to or in conjunction with” the farming operations of the independent contractors.33 In doing so, the Supreme Court decided that it was more important to look at the status of the employer as a farmer rather than where the laborer carried out the responsibilities of the job he or she was hired to perform. Because, as previously determined, Holly Farms was not considered a farmer by the time the live- haul crews went in to catch the chickens, the catchers and the forklift operators were not engaged in secondary farming as defined in the FLSA.34 This meant that all the members of the live-haul crews were not agricultural laborers and therefore all had the right to organize under the NLRA.

The Supreme Court limited the applicability of the definition of “agriculture” in Holly Farms and in doing so opened up the possibility that more workers employed by large, vertically integrated employers would be able to organize.35 By taking the approach to look at the status of the employer rather than where the work is performed, the Supreme Court broadened the already broad definition of “employee” under the NLRA. More employees working for these vertically integrated employers will be able to experience the protection of the NLRA that has been open to industrial workers since the act was first passed in 1935. The impact of the Holly Farms decision is for courts to engage in an in depth analysis before deciding whether a worker is an agricultural laborer not protected by the NLRA. Switching the focus to the status of the employer rather than where the employees are performing their responsibilities will ensure greater protection for workers and a broader reach of the NLRA.

While the definition of “employee” has expanded to include some employees who are employed by agricultural employers, **there is still the exception for agricultural laborers included in the statute and therefore there are still many workers who are unable to form unions.** These may be the **workers that need the most protection because they are the field workers who are subjected to abuse, poverty and hazardous working conditions.36** Many commentators would like to see **the NLRA extended to include agricultural laborers**. The main advantage to **extending the definition of “employee” to include agricultural laborers under the NLRA is that the statute has been in existence for many years, and most of the challenges that would be brought up with respect to agricultural laborers attempting to unionize have most likely already been resolved in other employment sectors allowing the NLRB and courts to rely on precedent. This will make application of the statue to the agricultural laborers consistent with other employment sectors. Reliance on precedent would lead to predictable outcomes when labor disputes arise.** Agricultural laborers still have a ways to go before they will be able to reap the benefits of the NLRA; but, if this were to happen, **agricultural laborers would be able not only to unionize and have their association protected, but also would have the advantage of being able to rely on others with experience and knowledge of the NLRA and its intricacies**.

#### Limits – their model of debate creates an untenable burden for negatives, they could modify and adjust the meaning of any words in the resolution based on past enactments and laws which forces negatives to prep out unknown workers or laborers and their interaction within the resolution.

#### Ground – By adjusing the meaning of terms in the resolution they aren’t bounded by any resolutional basis which lets them spike out of neg disads by saying the plan wouldn’t send a signal. For example, the Business Confidence DA assumes the plan sets a signal for currently existing workers that deters investment but their aff changes what a worker means which makes

### Roberts DA---1NC

#### Courts are Normal Means

Brudney 21 [James; 2/8/21; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol 46, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil>] Justin \*\* Brackets in original

In order for the international right to strike to receive protection in a U.S. domestic law setting, this CIL right must be cognizable in federal court. Workers asserting such a right would be seeking direct application of CIL, stemming from legal principles set forth in The Paquete Habana233 and subsequent cases. The Paquete Habana involved U.S. seizure of two Spanish fishing vessels during the Spanish American War. The Court relied on customary international law to hold that the vessels and their cargoes were exempt from capture as prizes of war.234 Justice Gray’s oft-quoted language, recognizing that CIL is part of the law of the United States, is as follows: International law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . . 235 In a number of decisions beginning in the 1960s, the Court has applied CIL rules when determining the legal status of submerged offshore areas, helping guide its application of federal statutes and treaties implicating the law of the seas. 236 The Court has also invoked CIL in determining when an instrumentality of a sovereign state becomes the “alter ego” of that state, a question not controlled by the relevant foreign sovereign immunity statute.237 Relatedly, the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino238 relied on a judge-made principle of U.S. foreign relations law—the Act of State doctrine—to decline to examine the validity of the taking of property by a foreign sovereign government within its own territory.239 Turning to lower federal courts, the courts of appeals have regularly applied the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties “as an articulation of the customary international law of treaty interpretation, even though the United States is not a party to the treaty itself.”240 And at least one district court has recognized FOA and the right to organize as CIL when denying a motion to dismiss.241 Finally, the executive branch also has applied CIL in certain circumstances. Although the U.S. voted against adoption of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, the U.S. government accepts its key provisions regarding the maximum breadth of territorial sea and the extent of exclusive economic zones as CIL.242 In short, U.S. courts and executive branch officials have directly applied CIL and been guided by its teachings in a range of doctrinal settings. 243 As noted earlier, CIL on human rights has been deemed applicable in U.S. courts for suitably defined misconduct occurring in other countries. 244 These doctrinal precedents do not involve direct application of CIL in a domestic law setting akin to the labor and human rights claims being proposed here. That said, lower courts have invoked CIL when applying federal rules of decision in a range of domestic law contexts. Indeed, the use of CIL when applying and construing various federal statutes has increased markedly in recent decades.245 Examples include its use when applying an armed conflict statute to establish limits on detention of a U.S. citizen within the U.S.;246 when construing the same statute to help establish requirements for release and repatriation of a foreign national held on U.S. soil;247 and when limiting the scope of an immigration statute’s authorization of detention.248 In addition, CIL has been applied to help courts apply the choice between indefinite detention and exclusion under a different immigration statute,249 and to assist judicial construction of a statute regulating recovery of sunken warships in U.S. waters. 250 It is not obvious why CIL should be deemed inapplicable when construing federal statutes that implicate appropriately qualified labor/human rights misconduct occurring within our borders.251 Moreover, as previously noted, a number of other countries have accepted the right to strike as a principle of international law when applying their own domestic law despite their conscious decision not to ratify Convention 87.252 Once one accepts that recognized CIL has substantive traction in a domestic law setting, the focus should be on whether this CIL can be situated in relation to certain procedural or jurisdictional limitations that characterize the U.S. judicial context. Accordingly, application of CIL to sustain claims based on FOA and the right to strike requires consideration of how this CIL relates to other aspects of U.S. law. B. CIL as Federal Common Law A threshold question is whether U.S. courts should determine matters of CIL as federal common law or as state law in light of the Erie doctrine.253 The question has been extensively debated by able international law scholars,254 and I will not attempt to add new value in this setting. I am persuaded that CIL should be understood and litigated as federal common law, for reasons presented at length in a range of sources. 255 Indeed, as one international law scholar has recently and thoroughly explained, “[t]he law of nations was the original federal common law.”256 The basic contours of this position were set forth by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino, when it held that the Act of State doctrine is federal law, binding on the states and not within the scope of Erie. 257 In the words of Justice Harlan for an eight-member majority, “an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”258 Subsequently, leading commentators have joined the Court in concluding that Erie was never meant to apply to CIL;259 that federal courts’ incorporation of the CIL of labor and human rights follows post-Erie precedent recognizing and helping to create a federal common law for labor relations and for other uniquely federal interests;260 that CIL may reflect developments in the international arena of labor and human rights in addition to filling gaps with respect to jurisdictional statutes such as the ATS and the Torture Victim Prevention Act (TVPA); 261 and that CIL remains subject to the democratic checks of supervision, endorsement, or revision by the federal political branches.262 Relying on the weight of these arguments in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., Justice Scalia for the Court recognized that a few areas involving “uniquely federal interests” are committed to federal control, including the development of federal common law, and he cited Court precedent on CIL as one such area.263 C. The Presence or Absence of Controlling Law As indicated in The Paquete Habana excerpt above, an important additional consideration is whether there is a treaty or any “controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision” that would preclude federal courts from recognizing a right to strike as CIL. Lower court decisions invoking the “controlling law” principle from Paquete Habana have applied a fairly rigorous standard, relying on a comprehensive scheme of statutes and regulations addressing the precise issue,264 or on a treaty ratified by the U.S. directed to the same problem.265 These lower courts also have invoked Supreme Court statements that focus on the central role of legislative expression when concluding that certain controlling congressional acts were taken with a purpose to preclude the application of CIL to a particular situation.266 Under this standard, controlling U.S. domestic law does not preclude federal courts’ authority to recognize a right to strike as CIL; on the contrary, it arguably supports such authority. As an ILO member, the U.S. is a party to the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.267 Each of these core ILO commitments specifies the fundamental importance of FOA. Congress in two separate trade statutes has incorporated FOA as an “internationally recognized worker right.”268 In addition, the U.S. has ratified the ICCPR, which has incorporated the right to strike as part of FOA, and has signed the ICESCR, which expressly recognizes that right within its text. 269 And both the Administration’s 2015 statement at ILO Governing Body proceedings and its most recent trade agreement, drafted and executed by the Trump Administration, have specified that the right to strike is an integral part of FOA.270

#### SCOTUS’s decision on *Roe v. Wade* hinges on Roberts’ political capital.

Robinson ’21 (Kimberly; reporter for Bloomberg Law; 6-18-2021; “Barrett Channels Roberts’ ‘Go-Slow’ Approach in Landmark Cases”; Bloomberg Law; https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/barrett-channels-roberts-go-slow-approach-in-landmark-cases; Accessed: 10-1-2021; AU)

The U.S. Supreme **Court’s** newest justice is showing signs that she’s more **aligned with** John **Roberts** and Brett Kavanaugh **in the center** than she is with her other conservative colleagues, **refusing to support** broad **rulings that** could **shake** the **court’s credibility**. Amy Coney Barrett is “starting to show her stripes” as a moderate who prefers small movements in the law, not huge shifts, South Texas College of Law Houston professor Josh Blackman said. The justices handed down victories to both liberals and conservatives on Thursday saving the Affordable Care Act again but siding with a religious group in the latest battle over LGBT protections. **Roberts**, the chief justice, is viewed as an **institutionalist** **who wants to conserve** the public’s **confidence** in the court. So far, he **favors incremental shifts** in the law. “That’s been one of the Chief’s primary goals all along,” said Case Western Reserve law professor Jonathan Adler. He recently gained an **ally in Kavanaugh** in this pursuit, **and** it appears **Barrett** may join their ranks. The court as a whole has has largely agreed in cases this year. The unanimous decision in the LGBT case was the 25th time the justices were unanimous in 41 rulings so far this term. There are 15 to go in coming days. But the **big test** for Barrett **will be** next term starting in October when the justices will tackle hot-button issues like guns, **abortion**, and possibly affirmative action. “It is a very conservative Court, even if we will only get glimpses of it this year,” said UC Berkeley law school Dean Erwin Chemerinsky. Kicking the Can Both the **A**ffordable **C**are **A**ct **and LGBT** rulings **were** “very, very **narrow**,” Georgia State law professor EricSegall said. In the Obamacare case, California v. Texas, the 7-2 majority handed down a procedural ruling to avoid undoing the landmark 2010 law. The justices said red states led by Texas didn’t have a legal basis—or standing—to challenge it. Only Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch would have voted to gut the act, long a priority of Republicans. The LGBT ruling, while unanimous in its outcome, was splintered in its reasoning. Hiding under the 9-0 breakdown was a dispute about whether to overturn the court’s divisive ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, which sparked the passage of the bipartisan Religious Freedom Protection Act and mini state versions across the country. The court in Smith refused to require an exception from Oregon’s prohibition on peyote, saying religious objectors don’t get a free pass on “generally applicable” laws. On opposite ends in the court’s LGBT ruling were the liberal justices—Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan—along with Roberts, who wanted to uphold the court’s precedent in Smith, and the court’s most conservative members—Clarence Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch—who wanted it overruled once and for all. In **the middle** was Barrett, joined by Kavanaugh, who acknowledged Smith‘s shortcomings but was **concerned with** the **fallout** should the court overrule it. “Yet what should replace Smith?” Barrett asked in a short concurrence. Both cases were a punt, Blackman said, with the issues likely to return to the court at some point in the future. End of the World But the ACA and LGBT cases, along with the extraordinary agreement all term, suggests a **majority** of the justices **don’t think** **it’s** the right **time to make major changes** in the law. “In the throes of everything"—the pandemic, Barrett’s first term, Kavanaugh’s biting confirmation, calls for Breyer to retire, and the caustic 2020 presidential election—"they didn’t want to shock the world this year,” Segall said. “**Preserving** the **court’s** own political **capital** **is** incredibly **important** to the justices because they know their only capital is the confidence of the American people,” he added. **Adler said the court has developed a sort of 3-3-3 split**—that is, three liberals, three conservative justices willing to chuck precedents they don’t agree with, and three conservative justices hesitant to overturn cases they may disagree with. **Roberts, Kavanaugh, and now, apparently, Barrett make up that last group.** Adler said that split will create some interesting pressures for the three justices in the middle next term, when—as Segall said—"the world will end.” **The end of the world was a reference—in part—to the court’s abortion case, which could call into question the landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade and later cases**.

#### **The court’s center is skeptical of overturning precedent in Roe, but the path’s narrow.**

Feldman ‘9/2 (Noah; Bloomberg Opinion columnist and host of the podcast “Deep Background.” He is a professor of law at Harvard University and was a clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter.; “Is the Supreme Court Ready to Overturn Roe? We Don’t Know”; 9/2/21; Bloomberg; https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-09-02/supreme-court-ruling-on-texas-abortion-law-isn-t-death-knell-for-roe; Accessed 9/17/21]

Every nonlawyer on the planet — and no doubt a few lawyers, too — is likely to read this outcome as prefiguring a 5-to-4 vote to overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973 precedent that made abortion a constitutional right. Later this year, **the court will address** a Mississippi anti-**abortion law** that lacks the cleverly diabolical enforcement mechanism of the Texas law but is equally unconstitutional. Indeed, the day after the law went into effect and before the Supreme Court ruled, many non-lawyers who were so unfamiliar with court procedures that they didn’t know it would eventually issue a ruling on the Texas law had already concluded that they knew how the upcoming Mississippi case would come out. That’s a possible interpretation of the latest opinion, to be sure. But the **opinion** for the five conservatives **explicitly denied** it. “We stress,” said the justices, “that we do not purport **to resolve** definitively any jurisdictional or **substantive claim** in the applicants’ lawsuit.” That’s lawyer-speak for **saying** both that the **law could** still **be unconstitutional** and that there might still be some procedural way to block its operation. For good measure, the opinion said the challengers “have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law.” These **formulations indicate** that at least **some** of the five **conservatives** who joined it wanted to take pains **not to** **send** the **message** **that Roe** v. Wade **is sure to be overturned**. What is less clear is whether anyone on the political battlefield wants to hear that message. The pro-choice camp will doubtless spend the months until the court term ends in June whipping up public sentiment, either in the hopes of changing the outcome or turning any decision overturning Roe into the impetus for packing the court or producing a heavy Democratic turnout in the 2022 midterm elections. The pro-life camp has an equal interest in making the overturning of Roe seem inevitable. Consequently, neither side cares much for dispassionate analysis. But the fact remains that the majority in the Texas ruling did not address the underlying issues, so it would be premature to predict the outcome in the Mississippi case based on it. Taken strictly on its own terms, the **opinion** made a point that **is incorrect** in my view, **but** that is **legally plausible**. That is that there’s no clear precedent for courts to block in advance the operation of a law that creates a civil penalty — not a criminal violation — to be applied by the courts after private lawsuits by private parties. Ordinarily, when a criminal law is obviously unconstitutional, the courts issue an order to the state attorney general not to enforce it. Such an order would not have any effect in this case, since the Texas attorney general isn’t empowered to enforce the law.

#### Expanding Rights Protection is perceived as judicial activism – it strays from the Constitution and forces Roberts to expend court capital.

Tribe et al. ‘10 [Laurence; January 2010; Carl M. Loeb University Professor at Harvard Law School, et al.; "TOO HOT FOR COURTS TO HANDLE: FUEL TEMPERATURES, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE," https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe\_WP.pdf/]

We can stipulate that the **Constitution’s** framers were **not driven by** the **relationships** among chemistry, temperature, combustion engines, and global climate when they **assigned** **to** the **judicial process** the task of **interpreting** and applying **rules of law**, and to the political process the mission of making the basic policy choices underlying those rules. Yet the framework established by the Constitution they promulgated, refined over time but admirably constant in this fundamental respect, wisely embodied the recognition that enacting the ground rules for the conduct of commerce in all of its manifestations—including designing incentives for innovation and creative production (through regimes of intellectual property), establishing the metrics and units for commercial transactions (through regimes of weights and measures), and coping with the cross-boundary effects of economic activity (through the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce)—was a task quintessentially political rather than judicial in character. Yet the litigious **character of** American **society**, observed early in the republic’s history by deTocqueville, has ineluctably **drawn** American **courts**, federal as well as state, into problems within these spheres more properly and productively addressed by the legislative and executive branches. This has occurred in part because **political solutions** to complex problems of policy choice inevitably **leave some** citizens and consumers **dissatisfied** and inclined to seek judicial redress for their woes, real or imagined. And it has occurred in part because the toughest **political problems** appear on the horizon long before solutions can be identified, much less agreed upon, **leaving courts** to **fill the vacuum** that social forces abhor no less than nature itself. One can believe strongly in access to courts for the protection of judicially enforceable rights and the preservation of legal boundaries—as the authors of this WORKING PAPER do— while still deploring the perversion of the judicial process to meddle in matters of policy formation far removed from those judicially manageable realms. Indeed, the two concerns are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory, for **courts squander** the **social and cultural capital** they need **in order to do** what may be **politically unpopular in preserving rights and protecting boundaries** when they yield to the temptation to treat lawsuits as ubiquitously useful devices for making the world a better place.

#### RTS is treated as an issue of corporate free speech - Robert’s legacy is built on its rejection - ensures sustained backlash.

Thomson-DeVeaux 18 (, A., 2018. Chief Justice Roberts Is Reshaping The First Amendment. [online] FiveThirtyEight. Available at: <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/chief-justice-roberts-is-reshaping-the-first-amendment/> [Accessed 5 November 2021] Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux is a senior writer at FiveThirtyEight. Before joining FiveThirtyEight’s staff, she was a regular contributor to the site and a freelance writer and editor with a wide portfolio of work. Her writing has been published in a variety of outlets, including CNN, Cosmopolitan, National Journal, and New York Magazine. She is a graduate of Princeton University and holds a master's degree in religious studies from The University of Chicago. Between degrees, she was on the staff of The American Prospect and worked as a writer and editor for PRRI, a public opinion research organization in Washington, DC.)-rahulpenu

It’s been a big year for free speech at the Supreme Court. Two of the most high-profile cases argued before the court so far have revolved around free speech rights, four other cases on the docket this term involve free speech questions, and yet another case where the issue is paramount greets the court on Tuesday.

The court today is hearing arguments on whether the state of California is trampling on the free speech rights of crisis pregnancy centers — nonprofit organizations that do not perform abortions and encourage women to seek alternatives to the procedure — by requiring them to post notices explaining patients’ ability to access abortion and other medical services. In December, attorneys for a baker at Masterpiece Cakeshop in Colorado argued that a state anti-discrimination law violates his free speech rights as a self-described cake artist by requiring him to make a wedding cake for a gay couple. Last month, the justices heard oral arguments in a case about whether state laws allowing unions to require nonmembers to pay fees violate those employees’ right to free speech.

Whichever way the rulings come down this spring and summer, it’s almost certain that the winning side will include Chief Justice John Roberts, who has spent his 12-plus years at the helm of the high court quietly carving out a space as a prolific and decisive arbiter of free speech law. Supporters and critics both agree that during his tenure, the court has dramatically expanded the reach of the First Amendment by striking down a wide range of statutes for encroaching on free speech rights. And **Roberts** has **authored** more **majority** **opinions** **on** **free** **speech** than any other justice during his tenure, signaling that this is an area where he **wants** **to** **create** a **legacy**.

But just what that legacy will be is **highly** **contested**. Roberts’s admirers argue that his commitment to the First Amendment transcends ideological boundaries. But others contend that his decisions don’t protect speech across the board. Instead, they say that **Roberts** is more than willing to **allow** the government to restrict speech when it’s speech he disagrees with — meaning **free** **speech** is becoming **a** legal **tool** **that** **favors** **corporations** **over** **individuals**.

The chief justice gets to decide who writes the majority opinion in any case where he’s on the winning side, which means that Roberts is able to stake a claim over a particular area of law if he so chooses. And that seems to be what’s happening with free speech: As of the end of the 2016 term, Roberts had written 34 percent of the free speech decisions the court has handed down since he joined its ranks, and 14 percent of his majority opinions were devoted to the topic.1 Even when he’s not writing for the majority, Roberts is rarely on the losing side: Out of the 38 free speech cases we counted,2 he voted with the minority only once.

The First Amendment appears to be a topic of deep personal interest for Roberts, and he’s not commanding the majority opinion in these cases simply to reinforce earlier decisions. Roberts has presided over — and participated in — a deliberate and systematic expansion of free speech rights in the realm of campaign finance and commercial speech. The court’s determination that campaign spending limits on corporations violated free speech in the 2010 case Citizens United v. FEC was just one in a series that struck down a range of campaign finance laws on First Amendment grounds and expanded corporations’ right to speech in other venues, like drug advertising and trademark regulations.

According to legal experts, these rulings represent a clear and unprecedented reversal of previous Supreme Court interpretations of the First Amendment, particularly with regard to corporations. Those interpretations began taking shape early in the last century, as the court only began to strike down federal statutes for abridging free speech after World War I. As it did so, it at first explicitly rejected the idea that commercial speech was constitutionally protected. In the 1970s and ’80s, the justices walked this decision back somewhat as it related to certain types of ads, but they continued to maintain that advertising remained categorically different from other kinds of speech, especially when it was presenting inaccurate information.

At the same time, the justices issued groundbreaking rulings that protected the speech of unpopular individuals and groups against government censorship. It was these cases, which involved government attempts to quash union picketing, student protests of the Vietnam war, flag-burning and Nazi protests, that established free speech as an essential protection for people with minority opinions who were in danger of being silenced by the majority.

This is decidedly not the principle that the Roberts court has embraced with its rulings on campaign finance and commercial speech. Starting in the 1970s, campaign finance laws restricting the flow of money into politicians’ coffers aimed to make space for more voices in the political sphere by preventing the wealthy from buying influence. But in the Citizens United case, the court ruled that the government couldn’t restrict the free speech rights of corporations simply because they were corporations — even if citizens with fewer financial resources were less able to command the attention of their elected officials as a result.

Although the Roberts court seems to be interpreting free speech in a new way with these decisions, some historians say that free speech has always been ideologically flexible. According to Laura Weinrib, a historian and professor of law at the University of Chicago, corporate titans like the Ford Motor Company were part of the early push for broader **free** **speech** **protections** precisely because they recognized the power of the First Amendment for **advancing** **their** **own** **causes**, while organizations like the ACLU strategically accepted a “neutral” vision of free speech that **protected** the strong (**companies** like Ford) as well as the weak (union **workers** **seeking** the **right to strike**) in order to secure early victories for **labor** **rights**. Those twin forces helped **pave** the **way** **for** **today’s** understanding of **free** **speech** **under** the **Roberts** court.

It’s that question of what free speech protections should do — and whether it’s acceptable to muzzle stronger voices if they’re drowning out weak or unpopular opponents — that may help explain the Roberts court’s **rightward** **turn** **on** **corporate** **speech**.

Burt Neuborne, a law professor at New York University and a former legal director of the ACLU, said that the liberal justices are willing to tolerate some restrictions on speech because they see them as necessary to build a fair society. “In this view, you can, for example, limit free speech when it threatens our democracy,” Neuborne said. The **conservative** **justices**, on the other hand, tend to **view** **free** **speech** **itself** **as** the **goal**. “They don’t care what happens afterward or who they’re affecting — they just **want** **to** **get** the **gov**ernment **out** **of** the business of **meddling** with speech,” he said.

This explanation is complicated, though, by the fact the Roberts court — and Roberts himself — has painted a muddier picture of other speech limits. Roberts authored opinions striking down a civil judgment holding the Westboro Baptist Church liable for damages resulting from church members picketing outside a soldier’s funeral, and a law prohibiting the distribution of videos showing animal cruelty. Those rulings are clearly in line with previous ones permitting flag-burning and Nazi protests. But Roberts also issued decisions or signed onto rulings that allowed the government to restrict the speech of students, even when they’re off school property, and limit the expression of public employees in a variety of contexts.

There’s disagreement about whether the Roberts court, by upholding these government restrictions on speech, is undermining its reputation as a court dedicated to a broad view of free speech. “It’s very much to Roberts’s credit that his Supreme Court has a genuinely expansive view of free speech that can’t be explained by political favoritism,” said Michael McConnell, a professor at Stanford Law School. He acknowledged that there are a few exceptions but said they aren’t significant or frequent enough to undermine his broader characterization of Roberts’s record.

But Genevieve Lakier, another University of Chicago law professor, disagreed. “The court does make judgments about when the government needs to restrict speech,” she said. “And in contexts like schools, or when the government says there are national security needs, it’s shockingly willing to allow those restrictions.”

Whether or not it’s fair to say that the Roberts court has been broadly protective of free speech, there’s little question that the court is reshaping it in ways that will resonate for years to come. And the cases this term could play a pivotal role in defining and clarifying that legacy — especially Masterpiece Cakeshop.

Neuborne predicted that the wedding cake case would be challenging for Roberts, but that either way, it would further illuminate his stance on free speech. “This case could have serious ramifications for nondiscrimination law,” Neuborne said. “But there is a free speech claim involved, so we’ll see how much of an absolutist Roberts is willing to be.”

#### Legal Abortion key to Fetal Tissue research that creates treatments and vaccines for disease

LRM 19 Medicine, The Lancet Respiratory. "Fetal tissue research: focus on the science and not the politics." (2019): 639. (ranked as the number one journal in the fields of critical care and respiratory medicine)//Found by JM + BUBU//Re-cut by Elmer

**Stem cell** therapy **research** in lung disease is still at early stages, but the research output is **increasing** and the area is a **promising** one. However, there are **limits** to the use of MSC and other adult multipotent stem cells, because **substantial numbers** are **required for therapeutic effects**. The cells also have a shorter replicative lifespan and can only make a restricted number of specialised cell types that are specific for their organ of origin. **Fetal tissue**, by contrast, provides cell lines that grow rapidly, are able to **easily differentiate** into multiple cell types, and are **less likely to be rejected** by the body. In the future, fetal tissue might be replaced in certain areas of research with the use of induced pluripotent stem cells and organoids, which are human-cell cultures that can be crafted to replicate an organ. However, in areas such as fetal development, a suitable replacement to fetal tissue is unlikely to be found. Although research into fetal tissue alternatives is worthwhile, it will take time and until then, the use of fetal tissue is **essential** so that **research efforts**, which are crucial for the development of new therapeutic treatments in often difficult-to-treat lung diseases, are not severely hampered. And those in the field need to ensure their voices are heard. Indeed, the American Thoracic Society released a statement the day after the Trump administration announcement saying that “Scientific research with fetal tissue is **vital for** the **development of new treatments for** many **deadly** **diseases** and conditions, such as cystic fibrosis and acute lung injury. **There are no alternative research models that can replace all fetal tissue research”.** Fetal tissue has been a **key** **part of** the development of multiple **vaccines**, **treatments** for cystic fibrosis, and ongoing research into cancer immunotherapy. The major objection to fetal tissue research is that the **source of** the **fetal tissue is** **mainly from** **elective abortions**. However, there is no suggestion that the number of abortions will decrease as a result of removing funding for fetal tissue research. **Abortion is still legal** in all 50 states in the USA and fetal tissue would otherwise be discarded. **Fetal tissue research**, in fact, holds the **potential to save lives** through the development of new treatments and vaccines. Politicising scientific research in this way means denying hope to millions of patients with life-limiting diseases.

#### Diseases cause Extinction

Bar-Yam 16 Yaneer Bar-Yam 7-3-2016 “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world” <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition> (Professor and President, New England Complex System Institute; PhD in Physics, MIT)//Elmer

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

### ICJ CP---1NC

#### The United States ought to request the International Court of Justice issue an advisory opinion over whether they ought to recognize an unconditional right to strike for agricultural laborers by amending the National Labor Relations Act to extend the definition of ‘employee’ to include agricultural laborers. The United States ought to abide by the outcome of the advisory opinion.

#### Solves – the ICJ will rule in favor of an unconditional right to strike.

Seifert ’18 (Achim; Professor of Law at the University of Jena, and adjunct professor at the University of Luxembourg; December 2018; “The protection of the right to strike in the ILO: some introductory remarks”; CIELO Laboral; http://www.cielolaboral.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/seifert\_noticias\_cielo\_n11\_2018.pdf; Accessed: 11-3-2021; AU)

The **recognition of a right to strike** in the legal order of the **International Labour Organization** (ILO) is probably one of the most controversial questions in international labor law. Since the foundation of the ILO in the aftermath of World War I, the recognition of the right to strike as a **core element** of the principle of freedom of association has been discussed in the International Labour Conference (ILC) as well as in the Governing Body and the International Labour Office. As is well known, the ILO, in its long history spanning almost one century, has not explicitly recognized a right to strike: neither Article 427 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Constitution of the ILO, including the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), nor the Conventions and Recommendations in the field of freedom of association - namely Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) - have explicitly enshrined this right. However, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), established in 1951 by the Governing Body, recognized in 1952 that Convention No. 87 guarantees also the **right to strike** as an **essential element of trade** union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests1. It is worthwhile to note that it was a complaint of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), at that time the Communist Union Federation on international level and front organization of the Soviet Union2, against the United Kingdom for having dissolved a strike in Jamaica by a police operation; since that time the controversy on the right to strike in the legal order of the ILO was also embedded in the wider context of the Cold War. In the complaint procedure initiated by the WFTU, the CFA **recognized** a **right to strike** under Convention No. 87 but considered that the police operation in question was lawful. In the more than six following decades, the CFA has elaborated a **very detailed case law** on the right to strike dealing with many concrete questions of this right and its limits (e.g. in essential services) and manifesting an even more complex structure than the national rules on industrial action in many a Member State. This case law of the CFA has been compiled in the “Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO”3. In 1959, i.e. seven years after case No. 28 of the CFA, the Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) also recognized the right to strike as **a core element of freedom** of association under Article 3 of Convention No. 874. Since then, the CEACR has **reconfirmed** its view on many occasions. Both CFA and CEACR coordinate their interpretation of Article 3 of Convention No. 875. Hence there is one single corpus of rules on the right to strike developed by both supervisory Committees of the Governing Body. Moreover, the ILC also has made clear in various Resolutions adopted since the 1950s that it considers the **right to strike** as an **essential element of freedom of association6**. On the whole, the recognition of the right to strike resulted therefore from the interpretative work of CFA and CEACR as well as of the understanding of the principle of freedom of association the ILC has expressed on various occasions. It should not be underestimated the wider political context of the Cold War had in this constant recognition of a right to strike under ILO Law. Although the very first recognition of the right to strike -as mentioned above- went back to a complaint procedure before the CFA, initiated by the Communist dominated WFTU, it was the Western world that particularly emphasized on the right to strike in order to blame the Communist Regimes of the Warsaw Pact that did not explicitly recognize a right to strike in their national law or, if they legally recognized it, made its exercise factually impossible; to this end, unions, employers’ associations but also Governments of the Western World built up an alliance in the bodies of the ILO7. In accomplishing their functions, CFA and CEACR necessarily have to interpret the Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO whose application in the Member States they shall control. In so doing, they need to concretize the principle of freedom of association that is only in general terms guaranteed by the ILO Conventions and Recommendations on freedom of association. But as supervisory bodies, which the Governing Body has established and which are not foreseen in the ILO Constitution, both probably do not have the power to interpret ILO law with binding effect8. This is also the opinion that the CEACR expresses itself in its yearly reports to the ILC when explaining that, “its opinions and recommendations are non-binding”9. As a matter of fact, the Governing Body, when establishing both Committees, could not delegate to them a power that it has never possessed itself: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet10. According to Article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, it is within the **competence of the International Court of Justice** to decide upon “any question or dispute relating to the **interpretation of this Constitution** or of any subsequent Convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.” Furthermore, the ILC has not established yet under Article 37(2) of the ILO Constitution an ILO Tribunal, competent for an authentic interpretation of Conventions11. However, it **cannot be denied** that this constant interpretative work of CFA and CEACR possesses an **authoritative character** given the high esteem the twenty members of the CEACR -they are all internationally renowned experts in the field of labor law and social security law- and the nine members of the CFA with their specific expertise have. As the CEACR reiterates in its Reports, “[the opinions and recommendations of the Committee] derive their persuasive value from the legitimacy and rationality of the Committee’s work based on its impartiality, experience and expertise”12. Already this interpretative authority of both Committees justifies that **national legislators or courts take into consideration** the views of these supervisory bodies of the ILO when implementing ILO law. Furthermore, the long-standing and uncontradicted interpretation of the principle of freedom of association by CFA and CEACR as well as its recognition by the Member States may be considered as a **subsequent practice** in the application of the ILO Constitution under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1968): such subsequent practices shall be taken into account when interpreting the Agreement. Their constant supervisory practice probably reflects a volonté ultérieure, since other bodies of the ILO also have **recognized a right to strike** as the two above-mentioned Resolutions of the ILC of 1957 and 1970 as well as the constant practice of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards to examine **cases of violation** of the right to strike as **examples for breaches of the principle of freedom of association** demonstrate. As this constant practice of the organs of the ILO has not been contradicted by Member States, there is a **strong presumption** for recognition of a right to strike as a subsequent practice of the ILO under Article 31(3)(b) of the **Vienna Convention** on the Law of Treaties.

#### US compliance ensures faith in global democratic institutions – solves nuclear war.

Hawksley ’16 [Humphrey; formerly the BBC’s Beijing Bureau Chief and author of The Third World War: A Novel of Global Conflict and Asian Waters: American, China, and the Global Paradox; 11-19-2016; "Trump makes International Law Crucial for Peace"; Humphrey Hawksley; https://www.humphreyhawksley.com/trump-makes-international-law-crucial-for-peace/; Accessed 4-1-2020; AH]

Major powers tend to reject international law when rulings run counter to their interests insisting that the distant courts carry no jurisdiction. China rejected a Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in July and clings to expansive claims in the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal near the Philippines. China’s response mirrored US rejection of a 1986 International Court of Justice ruling against US support for rebels in Nicaragua. “With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties,” writes journalist Humphrey Hawksley for YaleGlobal Online. Disregard for the rule of law weakens the legal system for all. Hawksley offers two recommendations for renewing respect for international law: intuitional overhaul so that the all parties recognize the courts, rejecting decisions only as last resort, and governments accepting the concept, taking a long-term view on balance of power even when rulings go against short-term strategic interests. Reforms may be too late as China organizes its own parallel systems for legal reviews and global governance, Hawksley notes, but international law, if respected, remains a mechanism for ensuring peace. – YaleGlobal LONDON: Flutter over the surprise visit to China by Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte may soon fade. But his abrupt and public dismissal of the United States in favor of China has weakened the argument that international rule of law could underpin a changing world order. The issue in question was the long-running dispute between China and the Philippines over sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal, situated 800 kilometers southeast of China and 160 kilometers west of the Philippines mainland, well inside the United Nations–defined Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite a court ruling and Duterte’s cap in hand during his October mission to Beijing, Philippine fishing vessels still only enter the waters around Scarborough Shoal at China’s mercy. The dispute erupted in April 2012, when China sent ships to expel Filipino fishing crews and took control of the area. The standoff became a symbol of Beijing’s policy to lay claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea where where it continues to build military outposts on remote reefs and artificially created islands in waters claimed by other nations. Lacking military, diplomatic or economic muscle, the Philippines turned to the rule of law and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. A panel of maritime judges ruled China’s claim to Scarborough Shoal invalid in July this year. China refused to recognize the tribunal from the start and declared the decision “null and void,” highlighting the complex balance in the current world order between national power and the rule of law. Beijing’s response mirrored a 1986 US response to Nicaragua’s challenge in the International Court of Justice. The court ruled against the United States for mining Nicaragua’s harbors and supporting right-wing Contra rebels. The United States claimed the court had no jurisdiction. China’s response on the South China Sea ruling mirrors a 1986 US response.With these stands, both China and the United States weakened a crucial element of international law – consent and recognition by all parties. The Western liberal democratic system is being challenged, and confrontations in Asia and Europe, as in Crimea and Ukraine, replicate the lead-up to the global conflicts of last century’s Cold War. As Nicaragua and Central America were a flashpoint in the 1980s, so Scarborough Shoal and South China Sea are one now. Other flashpoints are likely to emerge as China and Russia push to expand influence. Western democracies being challenged by rising powers have a troubled history. The 1930s rise of Germany and Japan; the Cold War’s proxy theaters in Vietnam, Nicaragua and elsewhere; and the current US-Russian deadlock over Syria are evidence that far more thought must be given in the deployment of international law as a mechanism for keeping the peace The view is supported, on the surface at least, by Russia and China who issued a joint statement in June arguing that the concept of “strategic stability” being assured through nuclear weapons was outdated and that all countries should abide by principles stipulated in the “UN Charter and international law.” Emerging power India, with its mixed loyalties, shares that view. “The structures for international peace and security are being tested as never before,” says former Indian ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, author of Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos. “It is everyone’s interest to re-establish the authority of the Security Council and reassert the primacy of law.”

### Kant---1NC

#### The meta-ethic is procedural moral realism.

#### This entails that moral facts stem from procedures while substantive realism holds that moral truths exist independently of that in the empirical world. Prefer procedural realism –

#### [1] Collapses – the only way to verify whether something is a moral fact is by using procedures to warrant it.

#### [2] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [3] Is/Ought Gap – we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. It’s impossible to derive an ought statement from descriptive facts about the world, necessitating a priori premises.

#### Practical Reason is that procedure. To ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary. That hijacks their framework since you need reason to evaluate any relevant consequences.

#### Moral law must be universal—our judgements can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me – any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### [2] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### I defend the squo so Negate:

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

#### 3] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits.

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build solidarity among their supporters, they are susceptible to collective action problems. This is because **the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits**. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be enjoyed by both strikers and non-strikers. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of free-riding problems, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.

### LogCon---1NC

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – a. the resolution indicates the affirmative is proactive, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation b. Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### The neg burden is to prove that the aff won’t logically happen in the status quo, and the aff burden is to prove that it will.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Text –

#### A] Ought is “used to express logical consequence” as defined by Merriam-Webster

(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>) //Massa

#### B] Oxford Dictionary defines ought as “used to indicate something that is probable.”

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought> //Massa

#### 2] Debatability – a) it focuses debates on empirics about squo trends rather than irresolvable abstract principles that’ve been argued for years B] moral framework debate is impossible- we can only tell what is from experiences not what ought to be

#### 3] Neg definition choice – the aff should have defined ought in the 1ac because it was in the rez so it’s predictable contestation, by not doing so they have forfeited their right to read a new definition – kills 1NC strategy since I premised my engagement on a lack of your definition.

**Negate:**

#### 1] Inherency – either a) the aff is non-inherent and you vote neg on presumption or b) it is and it isn’t going to happen.

#### 2] A guarantee for all workers won’t happen. Even if the private sector gets the right to strike, public workers will be excluded

Nolan 4/13 Hamilton Nolan, 4-13-2020, "Public Sector's Right to Strike Is Left Behind in Biden-Bernie Task Force," Truthout, <https://truthout.org/articles/public-sectors-right-to-strike-is-left-behind-in-biden-bernie-task-force/>, SJLW

The task force, made up of 49 surrogates from both Sanders and Biden, produced a report of more than 100 pages, intended to influence both the Democratic Party’s platform and Biden’s own policy priorities. The eight members of the economy section of the task force included two labor leaders: Lee Saunders, head of the 1.6 million-member public sector union AFSCME, a Biden delegate; and Sara Nelson, head of the Association of Flight Attendants, a Sanders delegate. Their experiences crafting the labor policy recommendations are a microcosm of the larger divide between the more establishment and radical wings of American unions. The task force’s labor and worker rights platform includes several items that are standard on most unions’ political wish list: a repeal of “right to work” laws that make it more difficult to organize; “card check” recognition that makes it easier to put new unions in place; a ban on anti-union “captive audience meetings” and harsher penalties for employers that violate labor laws; and passage of the PRO Act, a strong pro-labor bill that passed the House earlier this year. Perhaps the most notable part of the platform, however, is an omission. It asks to “ensure that all private-sector workers’ right to strike… is vigorously protected.” But for public sector workers, it asks only to “Provide a federal guarantee for public sector employees to bargain for better pay and benefits and the working conditions they deserve.” In other words, despite the fact that the public sector is much more heavily unionized than the private sector, and has been under legal attack from the right for decades, there is no demand that public sector workers be granted the right to strike—the single most potent weapon in any union’s toolbox.

#### 3] Zeno’s Paradox – to go anywhere, you must go halfway first, and then you must go half of the remaining distance, and half of the remaining distance, and so forth to infinity – thus, motion is impossible because it necessitates traversing an infinite number of spaces in a finite amount of time. If movement is impossible, so recognizing a strike isn’t a logical consequence of the rez.

## Underview

### AT: 1AR Theory

1ar theory bad, doesn’t ow, paradigm issues contextuak, doesn’t ow nc theory time a] time skew non uq, b] getting more efficient solves, c] inf things you can read theory on, d] nc theory prior so any abuse was caused by a bad aff

## Framework

### Top Level Calc Indicts---1NC

#### 1] Induction Fails- We can’t use the past to justify actions since it assumes those exact past events will happen the same way

#### 2] Culpability- There’s no cutoff for when a consequence ends which leads to endless causal chains i.e. me dropping a pen could cause several consequences down the line, I’m not culpable for

#### 3] Action Guidance- we only know a consequence will occur after it happens which means util can’t guide prior action

#### 5] An infinite universe takes out util.

Bostrom 09, Staff at philosophy oxford school

Nick [Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School]. "Infinite Ethics." Nick Bostrom's Home Page. 2009. Web. <http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.html> “Recent cosmological evidence…this one is.”

“Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, If the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it **contains an infinite number of galaxies**, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets **then there is,** with probability one, **an infinite number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy.** Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations葉here are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc.Suppose the world [does] contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. **Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that** a canonically **infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive** value **and** an infinite quantity of **negative value.** This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good **or bad. Yet** in cardinal arithmetic, **adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours** therefore **has** the same **net effect on the total amount of good and bad** in a canonically infinite world:none whatsoever. **Aggregative consequentialist theories are threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they** seem to **imply that** if the world is canonically infinite then **it is always ethically indifferent what we do**. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent **whether we cause another holocaust** or prevent one from occurring. If any non‐contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.

#### 6] This triggers presumption- They don’t have a theory of pleasure and pain so we don’t know which consequences matter or why death is bad so vote negative on presumption

### AT: Actor Spec---1NC

#### 1] Commits the is-ought fallacy. Just because governments use util doesn’t mean that’s how it ought to be

#### 2] Empirically Disproven- governments have acted non-utilitarian in the past like the Iraq war or libertarian taxes

### AT: Lexical PreReq

#### 1] Fallacy of Origin- Just because something comes first doesn’t mean it’s more valuable for example a doctor ties his shoes before an operation but that doesn’t mean it better

### Necessary Enabler---1NC

1] proves inf regress, no cut off point

3] we don’t think consequences good so we don’t need to explain necessary enablers

## Food Wars

### BioD---1NC

#### Ag is reslient

Steven **Pinker 11**, Prof @ Harvard, Steven Pinker: Resource Scarcity Doesn’t Cause Wars, <http://www.globalwarming.org/2011/11/28/steven-pinker-resource-scarcity-doesnt-cause-wars/>

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or toe, he concluded, “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”