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1] UN 2017: UN Press Release, ‘UN rights expert: Fundamental right to strike must be preserved’, 9 March 2017. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21328&LangID=E]

The right to strike is also an intrinsic corollary of the fundamental right of freedom of association. It is crucial for millions of women and men around the world to assert collectively their rights in the workplace, including the right to just and favourable conditions of work, and to work in dignity and without fear of intimidation and persecution. Moreover, protest action in relation to government social and economic policy, and against negative corporate practices, forms part of the basic civil liberties whose respect is essential for the meaningful exercise of trade union rights. This right enables them to engage with companies and governments on a more equal footing, and Member States have a positive obligation to protect this right, and a negative obligation not to interfere with its exercise. Moreover, protecting the right to strike is not simply about States fulfilling their legal obligations. It is also about them creating democratic and equitable societies that are sustainable in the long run. The concentration of power in one sector – whether in the hands of government or business – inevitably leads to the erosion of democracy, and an increase in inequalities and marginalization with all their attendant consequences. The right to strike is a check on this concentration of power.

2] Vogt et al. 20 [Vogt, Jeffrey, et al. The right to strike in international law. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020.]

Of course, the protection of the right to strike is essential not only for the promotion of workplace democracy, but democracy writ large. Former UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Association and Assembly, Maina Kiai, importantly drew a direct link between the right to strike and enduring democracies.[28] Indeed, on numerous occasions, strikes have played an important role in the xii destabilisation of repressive or authoritarian governments, and ushered in new, democratic possibilities. Trade unions have accomplished this because of their organisation, structure and capacity for mobilisation, based on common workers’ interests and solidarity. The union’s ability to strike also disrupts the capitalist accumulation on which the maintenance of the status quo depends.[29] For example, political scientist Ruth Collier has underscored the important role of trade unions in the third democratisation wave (mid- 1960s to 1980s) in Latin America and Southern Europe. Rather than seeing democratisation as resulting from the strategic choices of elites, as many had posited, she explained that labour’s role was central and not indirect and ancillary to workplace demands: [I]n all third wave cases the working class was an important actor in the political opposition, explicitly demanding a democratic regime. Beyond that, labor often played an autonomous role in affecting the rhythm and pace of the transitions, and in some cases working-class protest for democracy contributed to a climate of ungovernability and delegitimisation that led directly to a general destabilization of authoritarian regimes.[30] In ushering out the old order, the role of strikes was key. She notes: In one pattern of third wave democratization, characterizing Peru, Argentina, and Spain, massive labor protests destabilized authoritarianism and opened the way for the establishment of democracy. In these cases, the working class was the initial and most important anti-authoritarian actor, leading an offensive in the form of strikes and protests against the regime. Regime incumbents were unable to ignore such working-class opposition or formulate a response to these challenges from below.[31] The Arab Spring represents perhaps the most recent democratisation wave, and one in which trade unions were important actors.[32] Indeed, the participation of the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) rank and file in strikes in the years preceding the Arab Spring and in its early days following the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi was critical to the success of the revolution and the ouster of President Ben Ali.[33] Afterwards, the UGTT pushed the transitional xiiigovernment to make fundamental changes which helped prevent a return to the old order.[34] In Egypt, despite few trade unions outside the official, pro-regime Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the number and length of strikes by independent unions had steadily climbed in the period leading up to 2011. In the days before, during and after the ‘Days of Rage’, trade union strikes throughout the country, in the public and private sectors, contributed to the destabilisation of the Mubarak regime and led to his eventual ouster. The revolution was short-lived, however. With a small and fractured independent labour movement unable to push back, the military toppled the failing Morsi government and resumed control in 2013.[35]

#### 3] Vogt et al. 20

Until recently, the exercise of the right to strike had been on the decline in many industrialised countries, in some to the point of near obsolescence. In the United States, for example, there had been a long-term decline in the frequency of major strikes, from a peak of 470 strikes in 1952 involving 2.75 million workers and resulting in nearly 49 million lost work days to seven strikes in 2017, involving 25,000 workers and 440,00 lost work days.[36] A similar pattern is observed in the United Kingdom, where the 1979 ‘Winter of Discontent’ (29.5 million lost work days) and the 1984–85 miners’ strike (27 million lost work days) were significant exceptions to an otherwise long-term decline in strike action since the 1926 General Strike.[37] A similar story is repeated through much of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world, including Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where both the frequency and duration of strikes peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[38] Of course, there are outliers like France, where the frequency of strikes has been and continues to be relatively high. The decline can be explained in some countries by regressive labour reforms (eg, the United Kingdom) which made the resort to the strike far more difficult, while in others (eg, the United States), policy changes, such as the exploitation of the absence of legal restriction on the use of replacement workers was used by the xivUS government in the PATCO (air traffic controllers’) strike in 1981, which gave employers in the private sector a green light to do the same.[39] With the decline in the power of unions to bargain collectively and to strike, constraints on income inequality have obviously loosened. The result has been historically high wealth and income inequality, and diminished democracy in much of the industrialised world. Indeed, while corporate executives saw extraordinary rises in wages, for most workers, the real wage is largely the same as it was 40 years ago in terms of purchasing power.[40] It is well understood that the rise in income inequality is in part the result of a sharp decline in labour’s power.[41] In the United States, research demonstrates that unions at their peak had the ability to constrain income inequality not only for their members, but to the company, the industry and the broader workforce.[42] As Oxfam International reported in 2019, ‘The wealth of the world’s billionaires increased by $900bn in the last year alone, or $2.5bn a day. Meanwhile the wealth of the poorest half of humanity, 3.8 billion people fell by 11%’.[43] According to the Swiss bank, UBS, ‘The past 30 years have seen far greater wealth creation than the Gilded Age’.[44] In 2017 alone, UBS noted that billionaires’ wealth increased by $1.4 trillion, now standing at combined total wealth of $8.9 trillion.[45] Within countries, the distribution of wealth follows a similar pattern. In the United States, for example, three people hold the combined wealth of the bottom half of the population.[46] As to income inequality, pay data collected by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, required under the 2010 ‘Dodd–Frank’ law, show that the average CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio among Fortune 500 companies in 2017 was 339:1, up from a 20:1 ratio in 1965.[47] At the extremes, the pay ratio at fast food giant xvMcDonald’s – a company known for low wages, irregular scheduling practices, and for its aggressive anti-union posture – is a shocking 3,101:1. While the pay ratio is narrower in European countries, the gap is still significant and growing.[48] As to income inequality, pay data collected by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, required under the 2010 ‘Dodd–Frank’ law, show that the average CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio among Fortune 500 companies in 2017 was 339:1, up from a 20:1 ratio in 1965.[47] At the extremes, the pay ratio at fast food giant xvMcDonald’s – a company known for low wages, irregular scheduling practices, and for its aggressive anti-union posture – is a shocking 3,101:1. While the pay ratio is narrower in European countries, the gap is still significant and growing.[48] The concentration of power and wealth is also impacting the quality of democracy. As Colin Crouch has argued, many advanced industrial nations have become ‘post-democratic’, meaning that while the basic features of democracy are in place, such as open elections and universal suffrage, ‘politics and government are increasingly slipping back into the control of privileged elites in the manner of pre-democratic times’.[49] Economic globalisation has strengthened the bargaining power of business and de-industrialisation has weakened that of trade unions. One result has been that political parties which used to respond to the needs of labour have sought support from business and have become increasing more responsive to their views.

### NC --- Collapse Inevitable

**Democracy doesn’t solve war---it increases hostility.**

**Ghatak et al. 17**—Sam Ghatak is a Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tennessee Knoxville; Aaron Gold is a PhD Student in Political Science at UT Knoxville; Brandon C. Prins is a Professor and Director of Graduate Studies of Political Science at UT Knoxville [“External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 34, No. 2, p. 141-159, Emory Libraries]

Conclusion It has become a **stylized fact** that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is **epiphenomenal to territorial issues**, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies **not** as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a **result of settled borders**. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely **ignored rivalry** as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an **external threat**, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to **audience costs**, **resolve** and **electoral pressures**, **fail to resolve problems nonviolently**. This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the **interactive relationship** between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is **less visible**. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more **consistent evidence** that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, **democratic pacifism does not survive**. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of **liberal institutions** or externalized **norms** are **not** always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. **Audience costs**, **resolve**, and **electoral pressures**, produced from external threats, are **powerful forces** that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to **trust one another**, which **inhibits conflict resolution** and facilitates persistent **hostility**. It does appear, then, that there is a **limit** to the Democratic Peace.

**BUT---pursuit of democracy now uniqely causes nuclear war with China, Russia, and Iran.**

**Miller 17** (Benjamin; 4/27/17; Professor of International Relations at the School of Political Sciences, The University of Haifa; The International Security Studies Forum; “Policy Series: Will Trumpism increase the Danger of War in the International System?: IR Theory and the Illiberal Turn in World Politics”; <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5ag-war>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Some realists might, however, not see these recent developments as necessarily leading to more conflict, although they may not see them as leading to stable peace either.[22] In the eyes of these realists, the seemingly unconditional U.S. security umbrella for America’s allies has **allowed them to ‘free-ride’** on the U.S. commitment and to **avoid allocating** the **necessary resources** for their own national defense.[23] Moreover, some of the allies have been **provocative toward** their **opponents**, while relying on the U.S. security umbrella. This could **cause** **unnecessary conflict**. Especially provocative toward Russia, for example, was the enlargement of NATO to the east and the EU economic agreement with Ukraine in 2014. Such anti-Russian expansionist Western moves, in the realist view, compelled Moscow to **behave** more **assertively** and to **annex Crimea** and to **intervene in** Eastern **Ukraine**.[24] Somewhat similarly, it seems **less costly** for American allies in East Asia to engage in maritime conflicts with China so long they are under the U.S. protective shield. Realists believe that moving away from such ever-growing commitments will **stabilize the international system**, or at the very least **reduce** the likelihood of a **great-power conflict**. The realists are especially concerned about the American policies to shape the domestic character of other states, particularly by advancing democracy-promotion, “nation-building,” and the universal protection of human rights.[25] In this context they highlight what they see as **disastrous** American **military interventions**, notably, in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011 and also the continuously costly intervention in Afghanistan since 2001. In their eyes such military interventions are not necessary for the protection of American national interests. Moreover, such military engagements are **unlikely to succeed** and in many cases are **de-stabilizing** and are causing unnecessary conflicts. Such interventions simply **increase the perceived threat** posed by the U.S. to some other countries. Thus, lessening—if not **completely abandoning**—the U.S. commitment to advance these liberal values is likely, in realist eyes, to **stabilize the international system** and to **serve well** the American national security interests. Even though liberals see trade as a major pacifying mechanism, realists view trade—and economic interdependence more broadly—as potential sources for conflict.[26] They highlight the earlier U.S. trade conflicts with Japan and currently with Mexico and China. Thus, moving away from free trade might diffuse conflicts rather than accelerate them. Moreover, there is a growing populist opposition in the West to globalization. In this sense, it cannot work as a useful recipe for the promotion of peace. Similarly, despite the high levels of economic interdependence between Japan and China, for example, such interdependence does not prevent conflict between them and definitely does not result in stable peace even if it might have helped to prevent a shooting war between them, at least thus far. Realists are also skeptical about the ability of international institutions to advance stable peace.[27] Such institutions are not independent actors, which can influence the behavior of the member-states in important ways. International institutions just reflect the balance of power among states. States follow their national interests, and even more so in this age of rising nationalism. Thus we **cannot** expect much from the ability of international institutions to **pacify intense conflicts**, especially among the great powers. Even the most remarkable of international intuitions—the EU—has recently **failed in advancing cooperation** among its members with regard to the key issues of immigration, terrorism and the Euro financial crisis. Realists might be a bit skeptical about a potential reconciliation between the U.S. and Russia based on factors such as the personal friendship between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin or the supposedly common traditional/illiberal values of key figures in their respective administrations. Yet, the presence of a common enemy might be a good source of friendship. In this sense the Islamic State and perhaps even China create a potential basis for cooperation and avoidance of conflict between Moscow and Washington. But on the whole this will not advance a high-level ‘warm’ peace in Europe or elsewhere; rather it may, at most, lead to some kind of an unstable spheres-of-influence arrangement, which is unlikely to endure for an extended period. In sum, while liberals offer a menu of mechanisms for promoting peace, these mechanisms seem now **under assault** or in some process of weakening **under Trumpism** and the illiberal turn in quite a few other countries. Realists, for their part, do not believe in the far-reaching peace-producing effects of such liberal mechanisms. They tend to see some level of great-power competition as the natural order under international anarchy. Realists at most expect that there will be some stabilizing effects of deterrence, especially **nuclear deterrence**, and of the balance of power among the great powers. These kind of factors might — also under Trumpism—**maintain world stability** and **prevent war** even if some level of great-power conflict is expected to endure at any rate. The **most effective instrument** for cooperation—applicable even under the illiberal turn– is based on common threats faced by the great powers such as large-scale terrorism or risky behavior by a small nuclear power such as North Korea and potentially Iran. Evaluation of the Realist and the Liberal Views At this stage, less than three months into the Trump administration, it is quite difficult to determine which approach is right. Still, on the whole, we might be able to distinguish between short-term versus long-term effects and among different types of peace. In the short-term, **realists** may **have a point**: the avoidance of American interventions for democracy-promotion and humanitarian interventions might **stabilize the international system**. The key American adversaries—Russia, China, and Iran— will be **less troubled** by regime–change strategies or ‘color revolutions’ advanced by the U.S. that are **perceived to be posing major threats** to their regimes. The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU, which realists argue has provoked Russia, **will** also **stop**. Such reassurances are likely to **increase stability** in international politics and to produce at least a ‘cold peace’ in the international system and in key regions.

**Collapse of democracy’s inevitable---transition to Chinese autocracy solves.**

**Schiavenza 17** (Matt; 1/19/17; Senior Content Manager at Asia Society; Asia Society; “Could China's System Replace Democracy?”; <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/could-chinas-system-replace-democracy>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Two decades later, this notion seems increasingly unfeasible. **Democracy is** **struggling**. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies has **fallen since** reaching a peak in **2006**. The world’s non-democracies, meanwhile, have become **more authoritarian**. Russia, once a tentative democracy, is now under the control of Vladimir Putin, a **nationalist leader** whose regime has centralized power, targeted opposition journalists, and seized sovereign territory of other countries. Then there’s China. For years, conventional wisdom stated that as the People’s Republic grew more prosperous, the country would naturally transition to a liberal democracy. But this prediction — dubbed the “China Fantasy” by the author James Mann — has not happened. If anything, China’s economic success has only **further solidified the C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty: The current ruler, Xi Jinping, is widely considered to be the country’s **most powerful** since Deng Xiaoping. Democracy’s ill health has also **infected the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe**. The president of Hungary, a formerly Communist state whose accession to the European Union in 2004 was a triumph for the West, has sought to “**end liberal democracy**” in his country by clamping down on press freedom and judicial independence. These trends are also evident in neighboring Poland. Far-right parties — like the United Kingdom Independence Party, the orchestrator of Brexit — have **gained popularity** across the continent. During his successful campaign for president of the United States, Donald Trump expressed, at best, an indifference toward democratic norms and ideals. Trump called for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, to be imprisoned, raised false accusations of voter fraud, threatened legal action against the media, and refused to commit to honoring the results of the election. Trump has repeatedly professed his **admiration for Putin**, Russia’s dictatorial leader, for being “**a strong leader**”; as president-elect, he **praised the Kazakh dictator** Nursultan Nazarbayev for “achieving a miracle” in his country. Where Did Democracy Go Wrong? According to Brian Klaas, author of the new book The Despot’s Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy, there are **three main reasons**. One is **American hypocrisy**, or, as Klaas puts it, the “Saudi effect.” President George W. Bush made democracy promotion an explicit centerpiece of American foreign policy during his second inaugural speech in 2005, yet the following year when Hamas won democratic elections to govern the Gaza Strip, the U.S. refused to honor the results. And as Washington invested billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to **impose democracy by force** in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government forged a military deal with Uzbekistan’s tyrannical regime and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most repressive countries. A second reason for democracy’s decline is the **resurgence of China and Russia**. As China’s economic rise continued without interruption in the quarter-century after Tiananmen Square, observers began wondering whether the Chinese miracle was **because of**, rather than in spite of, **its autocratic government**. (The slower growth of India, a messy democracy, only seemed to strengthen this argument.) And while Russia’s economic fortunes in the Putin era have lived and died with the price of oil, there’s little question that the country is **wealthier and more stable** than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. The success of both countries, sustainable or not, seemed to indicate that democracy and growth were not necessarily co-dependent. Klaas’ third reason is the **weaknesses embedded in** modern **American democracy** itself. Last year’s presidential election was a multi-billion dollar, 18-month saga that resulted in the election of a candidate who had **never served in government** or the military and one, incidentally, who earned **three million fewer votes** than his main opponent. “Not many people looked at our election and thought that they were missing out,” Klaas told Asia Society. “I even heard a Thai general say that if ‘democracy means Donald Trump, **we don’t want it**.’” What About China's System? There’s **no doubt** that liberal democracy is in crisis. But the next question — whether plausible alternatives exist — is less certain. Consider China. The country’s ability to push through **major infrastructure** projects, such as a nationwide high-speed rail network, without political obstruction has **dazzled Westerners** frustrated at the gridlock endemic to American politics. In a 2010 episode of Meet the Press, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously admitted to fantasizing that the U.S. “could be China for a day” **simply** as a means **to get things done**. Daniel Bell, a professor of political science at Shandong University in eastern China, has written extensively about the **meritocratic advantages** of China’s political system. Chinese leaders must pass a series of examinations and negotiate a complex bureaucracy before achieving national power. Xi Jinping may have benefited from nepotism: His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a key Mao-era official. But the Chinese president also accumulated experience as the governor of two major Chinese provinces and a stint as vice president. This, Bell argues, has given Xi legitimacy in spite of never having to face voters. “I disagree with the view that there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders: **one person, one vote**,” Bell said in an appearance at Asia Society in 2015. State-run media in China spun the chaotic outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings as an example of democracy’s inherent flaws. The election of Donald Trump only served to further **reinforce this notion**. “I remember talking to the Chinese ambassador, and he made a crack about how in the U.S. you can be a nobody one day and the next day rise to power,” said Isaac Stone Fish, a senior fellow at Asia Society, “and you can’t do that in China because you have to go through all these different levels and rise through the system.” Bell acknowledges that the Chinese system has serious drawbacks. The prohibition of free speech, ban on political opposition, and absence of an independent judiciary mean that there are no checks against official abuse of power, something that has emerged as a major crisis in the past decade in the country. The high-profile anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi has reduced visible signs of excess, such as lavish banquets and fast cars. But critics believe that the campaign also serves as cover for Xi’s sidelining of rivals within the Communist Party. Defenders of China’s Communist Party point to the country’s near-**four-decade** run of **economic growth** as proof that the system works. But in structural terms, the modern Party is little different from the one that, under Chairman Mao, presided over widespread political persecution, a deadly famine, and a disastrous period of social upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Even after Deng Xiaoping reversed Mao’s policies and adopted a pragmatic economic approach, the Party has still implemented policies whose consequences threaten stability and prosperity. The One Child Policy, adopted in 1980 without public debate, created a demographic imbalance that, three decades later, has prematurely reduced China’s working-age population. Even the much-vaunted record of economic growth is built on a shaky foundation of debt-fueled investment. "There have been 30 instances in the postwar period when a country's debt increased by 40 percent over a 5-year horizon," Ruchir Sharma, an economics expert at Morgan Stanley, said of China in an appearance at Asia Society in December. “And in 100 percent of these instances, the country got into a deep economic trouble within the next five years." China has taken steps to **systematize its government** by introducing a mandatory retirement age for senior officials and establishing term limits for its leaders. The Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, a seven-man body that stands atop China’s government pyramid, is designed to **divide** the **responsibilities of government** and ensure **no one individual assumes too much power**. The behavior of Xi Jinping over the past three years, though, has raised questions whether these norms are durable. Xi has assumed positions within the Chinese government once shared by fellow leaders and has weakened Li Keqiang, his prime minister, by denying him the office’s traditional stewardship of economic policy. Xi has abetted and re-established a cult of personality, something explicitly discouraged in China after the Maoist era, by encouraging the singing of songs in his name. And, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, there are questions that Xi may not name a successor at this fall’s 19th Party Congress in order to continue as president beyond the customary 10-year term. The Consequences of Democracy's Decline China, for what it’s worth, has never claimed that its system of government was universally applicable. In contrast to the United States or the Soviet Union, Beijing has never tried to install its system in a foreign country by force. Even still, democracy’s decline may prove **advantageous to China** in other ways. For one, it would **weaken the democratic movement** in Hong Kong, which has vied with pro-Beijing elements for political control of the Chinese territory, and deter would-be Chinese dissidents from challenging Communist Party rule on the mainland. In addition, Klaas argues, the American absence of support for democracy **leaves a vacuum** in emerging states that Washington’s geopolitical rivals in Moscow and **Beijing might fill**. “The ‘America First’ mentality, or the mentality that it’s not our business, makes the mistake that thinking that the withdrawal of Western influence means there’s self-determination,” says Klaas. “ [But what it means is] that **China** and Russia **control things**. It’s not something where if the West leaves, then, say, Malawi will be free to choose. It’s a **global foreign policy battle**, and the West’s losses are **China's** and Russia’s **gains**.” Before the U.S. can promote democracy overseas, though the country may need to firm up support for it at home. A Harvard study conducted in November found that just 19 percent of American millennials believe that a military takeover is not legitimate in democracy compared to 45 percent of those older. 26 percent of millennials likewise feel that choosing leaders through free elections is “unimportant,” a sentiment shared by just 14 percent of Baby Boomers. “A lot of people growing up now **don’t understand** what it’s like not to live in a free society in the West,” says Klaas. “That, combined with the "end of history," assumed that democracy is the natural way of things. “In fact, democracy is the **least organic and least natural** way we’ve had."

#### Democracy is resilient, but it solves nothing.

Doorenspleet 19 Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. [Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-243]//BPS

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

### NC--- Fragmentation

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war---leads to fractured states and perpetual intervention.

Michael Neiberg 18. Chair of War Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College. 06-19-18. “Predicting War.” Lawfare. [https://www.lawfareblog.com/predicting-war](about:blank)

Whether influenced by Hollywood or Santa Monica (the California headquarters of RAND), the history of war as Freedman relates it is essentially conceptual. The end of the dominant Cold War paradigm is a case in point. The ahistorical euphoria of the supposed “end of history” misled many western experts into predicting that an age of perpetual peace would at long last come into view because, as one specialist in this period wrote, the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations,” thus undergirding the rise of global governance ideals of liberal internationalism. The way forward in those early years after the fall of the Iron Curtain seemed therefore not technological, but conceptual. The key to peace lay in finding ways to help this one supposedly empirical historical law to take hold. Rather than bring peace, however, the pursuit of the concept of perpetual security through democracy only produced a new idea of war. It convinced western leaders of the need to advance the speed of historical progress through carefully managed military action against a select number of dictators. As prosecuted by George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and their advisers, the new paradigm not only made it possible for great powers to consider meddling in the domestic politics of smaller states, it impelled them to do so. By making more states democratic, through the use of force if necessary, these interventions would make the world safer. The idea was at least as old as Woodrow Wilson, but the eras of the world wars and the Cold War had made it too difficult to put in practice. After 1989, with the seemingly insurmountable dominance of western military organizations, the absence of a Soviet Union to balance western intervention, and the general post-Cold War hubris of western leaders, the environment was right for it to return. The result, of course, has not been an end of history and perpetual peace, but an extension of conflict and a reawakening of older grievances. The central problem, as “The Future of War” depicts it, was an all-too-eager willingness to accept the basic principle of democratic peace theory without thinking through the limits of the theory or fully examining alternatives. One clear alternative theory had already begun to emerge from the minds of theorists like Mary Kaldor and Rupert Smith. Their works essentially argued that war as once understood no longer existed. The future belonged to the side that could best exploit the disintegration of state authority, control the messaging, and work among the people in the new megacities. Anne-Marie Slaughter saw the inevitable splintering of the “sovereign state” into sub-sovereign centers of governance power, thereby squeezing out sovereignty in favor of power exercised by non-sovereign or less-than-sovereign institutions, on the one hand, and the ascendant rule of supra-national institutions, on the other. One might argue, although Freedman does not, that Hezbollah, FARC, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others have been able to survive against much more technologically sophisticated states because they have indeed made the intellectual shift to the kind of conflict that Kaldor and Smith described. The west has struggled against such adversaries not on the technological level but on the conceptual one. The west had two models on which to draw, neither of which helped them conceptualize the central problem. The “aid to civil power” model suggested building up the capabilities of local authorities so that they could care for their own security needs and maybe even become an exporter of regional security. The second model focused on “peacekeeping,” which required armies to act impartially even when, as in Yugoslavia, such a model indirectly empowered malicious actors like Slobodan Milosevic. Both models were frustrating, but they had just enough successes to keep them viable and allow them to survive intellectual challenges like the ones posed by Kaldor and Smith.

#### Democratic peace is false unsustainable - new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutional constrains undermine DPT

Philip Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should.

There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk.

Militaries are less closely tied to voters

Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it.

In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process.

The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further water down the link between society and soldiers. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts.

Adversaries are proliferating and changing

The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues more complex.

Technology is reducing constraint

New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of ~~unmanned—~~autonomous vehicles in combat reduce the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties.

Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president

The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy.

While these advantages are real, they are also fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

#### DPT is a statistical artifact---empirical analysis.

Michael **Mousseau 18**. Professor @ UCF, PhD PoliSci @ Binghamton. Conflict Management and Peace Science, “Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace”, Vol 35(2) 175-192, SagePub.

A weighty controversy has enveloped the study of international conflict: whether the democratic peace, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, may be spurious and accounted for by institutionalized market ‘‘contractualist’’ economy. I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist economy, appear to account for both the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace) in the democratic peace research program (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013; see also Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Five studies have responded with several arguments for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2013; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010). Resolution of this controversy is fundamental to the study and practice of international relations. The observation of democratic peace is ‘‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law’’ in the study of global politics (Levy, 1988: 662), and carries the profound implication that the spread of democracy will end war. New economic norms theory, on the other hand, yields the contrary implication that universal democracy will not end war. Instead, it is market-oriented development that creates a culture of contracting, and this culture legitimates democracy within nations and causes peace among them. The policy implications could hardly be more divergent: to end war (and support democracy), the contractualist democracies should promote the economies of nations at risk (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015; Meierrieks, 2012; Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013; Nieman, 2015). In the literature are five factual claims for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace: (1) an assertion that in three of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), the insignificance of democracy controlling for contractualist economy is due to the treatment of missing data for contractualist economy (Dafoe et al., 2013, henceforth DOR); (2) a claim of error in the measure for conflict (DOR) that appears in one of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013); (3) an alleged misinterpretation of an interaction term that appears in one of the five studies (Mousseau, 2009) that overturned the democratic peace, along with in inference of democratic causality from an interaction of democracy with contractualist economy (Dafoe and Russett, 2013; DOR); (4) a claim of reverse causality, of democracy causing contractualist economy (Ray, 2013); and (5) a report of multiple regressions with most said to show democratic significance after controlling for contractualist economy (DOR). This study investigates all five of these factual claims. I begin by addressing the issue of missing data by constructing two entirely new measures for contractualist economy. I then take up possible measurement error in the dependent variable by reporting tests using both my own (Mousseau, 2013) and DOR’s measures for conflict. Next, I disaggregate the data to investigate a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. I then examine the evidence for reverse causality, and scrutinize the competing test models to pinpoint the exact factors that can account for differences in test outcomes. The results are consistent across all tests: there is no credible evidence supporting democracy as a cause of peace. Using DOR’s base model, the impact of democracy is zero regardless of how contractualist economy or interstate conflict is measured. There is no misinterpreted interaction term in any study that has overturned the democratic peace, and the disaggregation of the data yields no support for a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. Ray’s (2013) evidence for reverse causality from democracy to contractualist economy is shown to be based on an erroneous research design. And of DOR’s 120 separate regressions that consider contractualist economy, 116 contain controversial measurement and specification practices; the remaining four are analyses of all (fatal and non-fatal) disputes, where the correlation of democracy with peace is limited to mixedeconomic dyads, those where one state has a contractualist economy and the other does not, a subset that includes only 27% of dyads from 1951 to 2001, including only 50% of democratic dyads. It is further shown that this marginal peace is a statistical artifact since it does not exist among neighbors where everyone has an equal opportunity to fight. The results of this study should not be surprising, as they merely corroborate the present state of knowledge. This is because, while DOR ardently assert that four alleged errors, when corrected, each independently save the democratic peace proposition—multiple imputation, the exclusion of ongoing dispute years, an interaction term, and their alternative measure for contractualist economy—they never actually report any clear-cut evidence in support of their claims. One issue not addressed is Dafoe and Russett’s (2013) challenge to Mousseau et al. (2013a) on the grounds that our reported insignificance of democracy is not significant. Like the four claims of error made by DOR addressed here, Dafoe and Russett (2013) made this charge without supporting it. Mousseau et al. (2013b) then investigated it and showed that it too has no support. This issue appears resolved, as Russett and colleagues (DOR) did not raise it again. Nor have DOR or anyone else disputed the overturning of the democratic peace as reported in Mousseau (2012a), which has not been contested with any assertion, supported or unsupported. The implications of this study are far from trivial: the observation of democratic peace is a statistical artifact, seemingly explained by economic conditions. If scientific knowledge progresses and the field of interstate conflict processes is to abide by the scientific rules of evidence, then we must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause or correlate of peace, and stop tossing in a variable for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of international conflict; the variable to replace it is contractualist economy. If nations want to advance peace abroad, the promotion of democracy will not achieve it: the policy to replace it is the promotion of economic opportunity The economic norms account for how contractualist economy can cause both democracy and peace has been explicated in numerous prior studies and need not be repeated here (Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013). An abundance of prior studies have also corroborated various novel predictions of the theory in wider domains (Ungerer, 2012), and no one has disputed the multiple reports that contractualist economy is the strongest non-trivial predictor of peace both within (Mousseau, 2012b) and between nations (Mousseau, 2013; see also Nieman, 2015). The only matter in controversy is whether democracy has any observable impact on peace between nations after consideration of contractualist economy. My investigation begins below with the allegation of measurement error.

### NC---Modeling

#### Modeling fails and causes nuclear war – backsliding solves

Muller, director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, 15

(Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

#### Democracy causes a laundry list of existential threats

Alex de Waal 16, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, 12/5/16, “Garrison America and the Threat of Global War,” http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics-global-justice/alex-de-waal-garrison-america-and-threat-global-war

Trump’s promises have been so vague that it will be hard for him to disappoint. Nonetheless, many of his supporters will wake up to the fact that they have been duped, or realize the futility of voting for a wrecker out of a sense of alienated desperation. The progressives’ silver lining to the 2016 election is that, had Clinton won, the Trump constituency would have been back in four years’ time, probably with a more ruthless and ideological candidate. Better for plutocratic populism to fail early. But the damage inflicted in the interim could be terrible—even irredeemable if it were to include swinging a wrecking ball at the Paris Climate Agreement out of simple ignorant malice.

Polanyi recounts how economic and financial crisis led to global calamity. Something similar could happen today. In fact we are already in a steady unpicking of the liberal peace that glowed at the turn of the millennium. Since approximately 2008, the historic decline in the number and lethality of wars appears to have been reversed. Today’s wars are not like World War I, with formal declarations of war, clear war zones, rules of engagement, and definite endings. But they are wars nonetheless.

What does a world in global, generalized war look like? We have an unwinnable “war on terror” that is metastasizing with every escalation, and which has blurred the boundaries between war and everything else. We have deep states—built on a new oligarchy of generals, spies, and private-sector suppliers—that are strangling liberalism. We have emboldened middle powers (such as Saudi Arabia) and revanchist powers (such as Russia) rearming and taking unilateral military action across borders (Ukraine and Syria). We have massive profiteering from conflicts by the arms industry, as well as through the corruption and organized crime that follow in their wake (Afghanistan). We have impoverishment and starvation through economic warfare, the worst case being Yemen. We have “peacekeeping” forces fighting wars (Somalia). We have regional rivals threatening one another, some with nuclear weapons (India and Pakistan) and others with possibilities of acquiring them (Saudi Arabia and Iran).

Above all, today’s generalized war is a conflict of destabilization, with big powers intervening in the domestic politics of others, buying influence in their security establishments, bribing their way to big commercial contracts and thereby corroding respect for government, and manipulating public opinion through the media. Washington, D.C., and Moscow each does this in its own way. Put the pieces together and a global political market of rival plutocracies comes into view. Add virulent reactionary populism to the mix and it resembles a war on democracy.

What more might we see? Economic liberalism is a creed of optimism and abundance; reactionary protectionism feeds on pessimistic scarcity. If we see punitive trade wars and national leaders taking preemptive action to secure strategic resources within the walls of their garrison states, then old-fashioned territorial disputes along with accelerated state-commercial grabbing of land and minerals are in prospect. We could see mobilization against immigrants and minorities as a way of enflaming and rewarding a constituency that can police borders, enforce the new political rightness, and even become electoral vigilantes.

Liberal multilateralism is a system of seeking common wins through peaceful negotiation; case-by-case power dealing is a zero-sum calculus. We may see regional arms races, nuclear proliferation, and opportunistic power coalitions to exploit the weak. In such a global political marketplace, we would see middle-ranking and junior states rewarded for the toughness of their bargaining, and foreign policy and security strategy delegated to the CEOs of oil companies, defense contractors, bankers, and real estate magnates.

The United Nations system appeals to leaders to live up to the highest standards. The fact that they so often conceal their transgressions is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. A cabal of plutocratic populists would revel in the opposite: applauding one another’s readiness to tear up cosmopolitan liberalism and pursue a latter-day mercantilist naked self-interest. Garrison America could opportunistically collude with similarly constituted political-military business regimes in Russia, China, Turkey, and elsewhere for a new realpolitik global concert, redolent of the early nineteenth-century era of the Congress of Vienna, bringing a façade of stability for as long as they collude—and war when they fall out.

And there is a danger that, in response to a terrorist outrage or an international political crisis, President Trump will do something stupid, just as Europe’s leaders so unthinkingly strolled into World War I. The multilateral security system is in poor health and may not be able to cope.

Underpinning this is a simple truth: the plutocratic populist order is a future that does not work. If illustration were needed of the logic of hiding under the blanket rather than facing difficult realities, look no further than Trump’s readiness to deny climate change.

We have been here before, more or less, and from history we can gather important lessons about what we must do now. The importance of defending civility with democratic deliberation, respecting human rights and values, and maintaining a commitment to public goods and the global commons—including the future of the planet—remain evergreen. We need to find our way to a new 1945—and the global political settlement for a tamed and humane capitalism—without having to suffer the catastrophic traumas of trying everything else first.

#### Irrationality – populism guarantees nuclear escalation

**McCoy 17** (Alfred McCoy – Alfred McCoy is the Harrington professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. <KEN> "The Bloodstained Rise of Global Populism," War is Boring. April 4, 2017. DOA: 4/1/19. https://warisboring.com/the-bloodstained-rise-of-global-populism/)

Scholar Michael Lee suggests that a populist leader succeeds by rhetorically defining his or her national community by both its supposedly “shared characteristics” and its inevitable common “enemy,” whether Mexican “rapists” or Muslim refugees, much as the Nazis created a powerful sense of national selfhood by excluding certain groups by “blood.” In addition, he argues, such movements share the desire for an “apocalyptic confrontation” through a final “mythic battle” as “the vehicle to revolutionary change.” Although scholars such as Lee emphasize the ways in which populist demagogues rely on violent rhetoric for their success, they tend to focus less on another crucial aspect of such populists globally — actual violence. These movements might still be in their relatively benign phase in the United States and Europe, but in less developed democracies around the world populist leaders haven’t hesitated to inscribe their newfound power on the battered bodies of their victims. For more than a decade, for instance, Russian president Vladimir Putin, a reasonable candidate for sparking this wave of populism, has demonstrated his famously bare-chested version of power politics by ensuring that opponents and critics meet grim ends under “mysterious” circumstances. These include the lethal spritz of polonium 210 that killed Russian secret police defector Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006, the shooting of journalist and Putin critic Anna Politkovskaya outside her Moscow apartment that same year, a dose of rare Himalayan plant poison for banker and Putin nemesis Alexander Perepilichny in London in 2012, a fusillade that felled opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in downtown Moscow in 2015 and four fatal bullets this March for refugee whistleblower Denis Voronenkov on a Kiev sidewalk, which Ukraine has denounced as “an act of state terrorism.” As an Islamist populist, Turkish president Recep Erdogan has projected his power through a bloody repression of, and a new war with, the country’s Kurdish minority. He portrays the Kurds as a cancer within the country’s body politic whose identity must be extinguished, much as his forebears rid themselves of the Armenians. In addition, since mid-2016, he’s overseen a wholesale purge of 50,000 officials, journalists, teachers and military officers in the aftermath of a failed coup, and in a brutal round of torture and rape filled Turkish prisons to the brim. In 2014, retired general Prabowo Subianto nearly won Indonesia’s presidency with a populist campaign of “strength and order.” In fact, Prabowo’s military career had long been steeped in such violence. In 1998, when the authoritarian regime of his father-in-law Suharto was at the brink of collapse, Prabowo, then commander of the Kopassus Rangers, staged the kidnapping-disappearance of a dozen student activists, the savage rape of 168 Chinese women — acts meant to incite racial violence — and the burning of 43 shopping malls and 5,109 buildings in Jakarta, the country’s capital, that left more than 1,000 dead. During his first months in power, newly-elected Philippine president Duterte waged his highly publicized war on the drug trade in city slums by loosing the police and vigilantes nationwide in a campaign already marked, in its first six months, by at least 7,000 extrajudicial killings. The bodies of his victims were regularly dumped on Manila’s streets as warnings to others and as down payments on Duterte’s promises of a new, orderly country. And he wasn’t the first populist in Asia to take such a path either. In 2003, Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched his “red shirt” movement as a war on his country’s rampant methamphetamine abuse. In just three months under Thaksin’s rule, the police carried out 2,275 extrajudicial killings of suspected drug dealers and users, often leaving the bodies where they fell as a twisted tribute to his power. Such examples of populist political carnage and the likelihood of more to come — including what Trump’s presidency might have in store — raise certain questions. Just what dynamics lie behind the urge toward violence that seems to propel such movements? Why does the virulent campaign rhetoric of populist political movements so often morph into actual violence once a populist wins power? And why is that violence invariably aimed at enemies believed to threaten the imagined integrity of the national community? In their compulsion to “protect” the nation from what are seen as pernicious alien influences, such populist movements are defined by their need for enemies. That need, in turn, infuses them with an almost uncontrollable compulsion for conflict that transcends actual threats or rational political programs. To give this troubling trend its political due, it’s necessary to understand how, at a particular moment in history, global forces have produced a generation of populist leaders with such potential compulsions. And at the moment, there may be no better example to look to than The Philippines. During its last half-century of bloodstained elections, two populists, Ferdinand Marcos and Duterte, won exceptional power by combining the high politics of diplomacy with the low politics of performative violence, scattering corpses scarred by their signature brutality as if they were so many political pamphlets. A quick look at this history offers us an unsettling glimpse of America’s possible political future. Rodrigo Duterte presents a chart illustrating a drug trade network of high-level drug syndicates in The Philippines during a 2016 press conference. Photo via Wikipedia Populism in The Philippines Although now remembered mainly as a “kleptocrat” who plundered his country and enriched himself with shameless abandon — epitomized by the discovery that his wife possessed 3,000 pairs of shoes — Ferdinand Marcos was, in fact, a brilliant populist, thoroughly skilled in the symbolic uses of violence. As his legal term as president came to an end in 1972, Marcos — who, like many populists, saw himself as chosen by destiny to save his people from perdition — used the military to declare martial law. He then jailed 50,000 opponents, including the senators who had blocked his favored legislation and the gossip columnists who had mocked his wife’s pretensions. The first months of his dictatorship actually lacked any official violence. Then, just before dawn on Jan. 15, 1973, Constabulary officers read a presidential execution order and strapped Lim Seng, an overseas Chinese heroin manufacturer, to a post at a Manila military camp. As a battery of press photographers stood by, an eight-man firing squad raised their rifles. Replayed endlessly on television and in movie theaters, the dramatic footage of bullets ripping open the victim’s chest was clearly meant to be a vivid display of the new dictator’s power, as well as an appeal to his country’s ingrained anti-Chinese racism. Lim Seng would be the only victim legally executed in the 14 years of the Marcos dictatorship. Extra-judicial killings were another matter, however. Marcos made clever use of the massive U.S. military bases near Manila to win continuing support for his authoritarian and increasingly bloody rule from three successive American administrations, even effectively neutralizing Pres. Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy. After a decade of dictatorship, however, the economy began to collapse from a too-heavy dose of “crony capitalism” and the political opposition started to challenge Marcos’s self-image as destiny’s chosen one. To either sate or subdue an increasingly restive population, he soon resorted to escalating raw violence. His security squads conducted what were referred to as “salvagings,” more than 2,500 of them — or 77 percent of the 3,257 extrajudicial killings during his 14-year dictatorship. Bodies scarred by torture were regularly abandoned in public plazas or at busy intersections so passers-by could read the transcript of terror in their stigmata. In the capital, Manila, with only 4,000 police for six million residents, the Marcos regime also deputized hundreds of “secret marshals” responsible for more than 30 shoot-on-sight fatalities during May 1985, the program’s first month, alone. Yet the impact of Marcos’s version of populist violence proved mutable — effective at the start of martial law when people yearned for order and counterproductive at its close when Filipinos again longed for freedom. That shift in sentiment soon led to his downfall in the first of the dramatic “people power” revolutions that would challenge autocratic regimes from Beijing to Berlin. Flickr photo Duterte’s violence Rodrigo Duterte, the son of a provincial governor, initially pursued a career as the mayor of Davao City, a site of endemic violence that left a lasting imprint on his political persona. In 1984, after the communist New People’s Army made Davao its testing ground for urban guerilla warfare, the city’s murders soared, doubling to 800, including the assassination of 150 policemen. To check the communists, who took over part of the city, the military mobilized criminals and ex-communists as death squad vigilantes in a lethal counterterror campaign. When I visited Davao in 1987 to investigate death squad killings, that remote southern city already had an unforgettable air of desolation and hopelessness. It was in this context of rising national and local extrajudicial slaughter that the 33-year old Duterte launched his political career as the elected mayor of Davao City. That was in 1988, the first of seven terms that would keep him in office, on and off, for another 21 years until he won the country’s presidency in 2016. His first campaign was hotly contested and he barely beat his rivals, taking only 26 percent of the vote. Around 1996, he reportedly mobilized his own vigilante group, the Davao Death Squad. It would be responsible for many of the city’s 814 extrajudicial killings over the next decade, as victims were dumped on city streets with faces wrapped bizarrely in packing tape. Duterte himself may have killed one or more of the squad’s victims. Apart from liquidating criminals, the Davao Death Squad also conveniently eliminated the mayor’s political rivals. Campaigning for president in 2016, Duterte would proudly point to the killings in Davao City and promise a drug war that would murder 100,000 Filipinos if necessary. In doing so, he was also drawing on historical resonances from the Marcos era that lent some political depth to his violent rhetoric. By specifically praising Marcos, promising to finally bury his body in the National Heroes Cemetery in Manila, and supporting Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. for vice president, Duterte identified himself with a political lineage of populist strongmen epitomized by the old dictator at a time when desperate Filipinos were looking for new hope of a decent life. On taking office, Duterte promptly started his promised anti-drug campaign and dead bodies became commonplace sights on city streets nationwide, sometimes accompanied by a crude cardboard sign reading “I am a pusher,” or simply with their faces wrapped in the by-now trademark packing tape used by the Davao Death Squad. Although Human Rights Watch would declare his drug war a “calamity,” a resounding 85 percent of Filipinos surveyed were “satisfied,” apparently seeing each body sprawled on a city street as another testament to the president’s promise of order. At the same time, like Marcos, Duterte deployed a new style of diplomacy as part of his populist reach for unrestrained power. Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea between Beijing and Washington, he improved his country’s bargaining position by distancing himself from The Philippines’ classic alliance with the United States. At the 2016 ASEAN conference, reacting to Barack Obama’s criticism of his drug war, he said bluntly of the American president, “Your mother’s a whore.” A month later during a state visit to Beijing, Duterte publicly proclaimed “separation from the United States.’’ By setting aside his country’s recent slam-dunk win over China at the Court of Arbitration in the Hague in a legal dispute over rival claims in the South China Sea, Duterte came home with $24 billion in Chinese trade deals and a sense that he was helping establish a new world order. In January 2017, after his police tortured and killed a South Korean businessman on the pretext of a drug bust, he was forced to call a sudden halt to the nationwide killing spree. Like his role model Marcos, however, Duterte’s populism seems to contain an insatiable appetite for violence and so it was not long before bodies were once again being dumped on the streets of Manila, pushing the death toll past 8,000. Davao City. Photo via Wikipedia Success and the strongman The histories of these Filipino strongmen, past and present, reveal two overlooked aspects of the ill-defined phenomenon of global populism: the role of what might be termed performative violence in projecting domestic strength and a complementary need for diplomatic success to show international influence. How skillfully these critical poles of power are balanced may offer one gauge for speculating about the fate of populist strongmen in disparate parts of the globe. In Russia’s case, Putin’s projection of strength through the murder of selected domestic opponents has been matched by unchecked aggression in Georgia and Ukraine — a successful balancing act that has made his country, with its rickety economy the size of Italy’s, seem like a great power again and is likely to extend his autocratic rule into the foreseeable future. In Turkey, Erdogan’s harsh repression of ethnic and political enemies has essentially sunk his bid for entry into the European Union, plunged him into an unwinnable war with Kurdish rebels, and complicated his alliance with the United States against Islamic fundamentalism — all potential barriers to his successful bid for unchecked power. In Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto failed in his critical first step — building a domestic base large enough to sweep him into the presidency, in part because his call for order resonated so discordantly with a public still capable of remembering his earlier bid for power through eerie violence that roiled Jakarta with hundreds of rapes, fires and deaths. Without the popular support generated by his local spectacle of violence, Duterte’s de facto abrogation of his country’s claims to the South China Sea’s rich fishing grounds and oil reserves in his bid for Chinese support risks a popular backlash, a military coup, or both. For the time being, however, Duterte’s deft juxtaposition of international maneuvering and local bloodletting has made him a successful Philippine strongman with, as yet, few apparent checks on his power. While the essential weakness of the Philippine military limits Duterte’s outlets for his populist violence to the police killings of poor street drug dealers, Trump faces no such restraints. Should Congress and the courts check the virulence of his domestic attacks on Muslims, Mexicans or other imagined enemies and should his presidency run into further setbacks like the recent repeal-Obamacare humiliation, he could readily resort to violent military adventures not only in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and Libya, but even in Iran, not to speak of North Korea, in a bid to recover his populist aura of overweening power. In this way, unlike any other potential populist politician on the planet, he holds the fate of countless millions in his much-discussed hands. If populism’s need for what scholar Michael Lee calls an “apocalyptic confrontation” and a “mythic battle” proves accurate, it might, in the end, lead the Trump administration’s “systemic revolutionaries” far beyond even their most extreme rhetoric into an endlessly escalating cycle of violence against foreign enemies, using whatever weapons are available, whether drones, special operations forces, fighter bombers, naval armadas or even nuclear weapons.

#### Revisionist states are only dangerous and conflict-prone when they’ve just had their ambitions denied---the plan creates the only scenario for great power war

Hal Brands 18, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 10/24/18, “Danger: Falling Powers,” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/10/24/danger-falling-powers/>

There is, then, no disputing that rising powers can have profoundly disruptive effects. Yet such powers might not actually be the most aggressive or risk-prone type of revisionist state. After all, if a country’s position is steadily improving over time, why risk messing it all up through reckless policies that precipitate a premature showdown? Why not lay low until the geopolitical balance has become still more favorable? Why not wait until one has surpassed the reigning hegemon altogether and other countries defer to one’s wishes without a shot being fired? So while a rising revisionist power may be tempted to assert itself, it should also have good reason to avoid going for broke.

Now imagine an alternative scenario. A revisionist power—perhaps an authoritarian power—has been gaining influence and ratcheting its ambitions upward. Its leaders have cultivated intense nationalism as a pillar of their domestic legitimacy; they have promised the populace that past insults will be avenged and sacrifices will be rewarded with geopolitical greatness and global prestige. Yet then the country’s potential peaks, either because it has reached its natural limit or because of some unforeseen development, and the balance of power starts to shift in unfavorable ways. It becomes clear to the country’s leadership that it may not be able to accomplish the goals it has set and fulfill the promises it has made, and that the situation will only further worsen with time. A roll of the iron dice now seems more attractive: It may be the only chance the nation has to claim geopolitical spoils before it is too late.

In this scenario, it is not rising power that makes the revisionist state so dangerous, but the temptation to act before decline sets in. In this sense, the dynamic bears a resemblance to the famous Davies J-Curve theory of revolution, wherein a populace is held to be more inclined to revolt not when it is maximally oppressed but rather when raised expectations are shown to be in vain.

Obviously, rational analysis does not always prevail in world politics. Rising states can become intoxicated with their own strength; they may simply get tired of waiting to attain the status they desire; or some domestic pressure may impel leaders to act dangerously. But revisionists whose power has begun to decline, or who have hit a rogue bump in the road, may not feel that they even have the option of waiting.

### NC---Terror

#### **Democracy causes terrorism – laundry list**

Savun, Poli Sci Prof @ Pitt, 9

(Burcu, Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism, Journal of Conflict Resolution Volume XX Number X, pp. online)

Many scholars, particularly within the past decade, have argued that democratic states are more likely to be targets of transnational terrorism. According to this camp, there are various aspects of the democratic regimes that facilitate terrorism. First, democracies, by providing freedom of organization, expression, and movement for their citizens, enable terrorist groups to undertake their illegal activities with relative ease (Engene 2004; Hamilton and Hamilton 1983). The commitment to civil liberties in democratic societies can be used by terrorist groups to organize and carry out their attacks without being noticed (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001). Repressive regimes reduce the ability of terrorist groups to organize and carry out their activities, whereas democracies provide a permissive environment. Second, institutional constraints imposed on democratic governments are usually higher than the ones on other types of regimes. Although these constraints are intended to protect the citizens of democracies from the undue exercise of power by their leaders, they also limit the actions and ability of democratic governments to fight terrorism (Schmid 1992; Li 2005; Wilkinson 1986, 2006). Terrorist groups perceive democracies as soft targets that can be pressured to give into their demands due to the sensitivity of democracies to costs. Pape (2003, 2005) shows that terrorist groups tend to target democracies more frequently because they know that liberal democracies usually accede to their demands. Freedom of press is another factor that is argued to encourage transnational terrorism in democracies. A free press serves the interests of terrorist groups whose main goal is to advertise their cause to a wide audience and gain publicity and recognition (Crenshaw 1981). Unlike in repressive regimes, terrorist incidents are more likely to be reported in detail by the free press in democratic societies. Therefore, press freedom in democracies gives a valuable opportunity to publicity-hungry terrorists to create widespread fear (Li 2005; Nacos 1994).

#### Goes nuclear

Kroenig, Associate Professor and IR @ Georgetown, 14

(R. Davis Gibbons and Matthew Kroenig, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. “The Next Nuclear War,” <http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_The%20Next%20Nuclear%20War.pdf>)

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, scholars, analysts, and politicians have focused on the nexus of nuclear weapons and terrorism. In his closing statement at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama concluded, “We've agreed that nuclear terrorism is one of the most urgent and serious threats to global security.”88 Though there has been some debate on how seriously this threat should be taken,89 evidence indicates that terrorist organizations have both expressed a desire for nuclear weapons and made attempts to buy or seize nuclear material. Declassified documents from the United States suggest Osama bin Laden directed his associates to purchase uranium.90 In addition, Chechnya-based separatist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba in South Asia, and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan have also expressed the desire for nuclear weapons in the past.91 Most analysts consider it unlikely that a state would knowingly provide a terrorist group with a bomb, but it is conceivable that a group could steal one. This fear is especially acute in the case of Pakistan, where an unstable government with a growing nuclear arsenal exists in an area with many terrorist organizations. The government of Pakistan has taken steps in recent years to allay these fears, yet reason for concern remains.92 A second means by which a terrorist group could attain a nuclear capability is by obtaining fissile material and constructing its own crude nuclear bomb. The main challenge for terrorist organizations seeking this capability is finding sufficient fissile material. Approximately 8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is necessary for a bomb. Since 9/11, the United States, Russia, the IAEA, and other partners have taken on a number of efforts to decrease the risks of terrorists accessing nuclear material. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism all seek to increase global cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. Overall, the global stocks of HEU and plutonium are decreasing, but the sheer volume of global fissile material makes this an on-going challenge and the U.S. budget for these activities has recently been cut. Unlike nuclear-armed states, it would be relatively difficult to deter terrorists from taking action.93 In other words, if efforts to keep nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands ever fail, we may witness a nuclear 9/11.

### NC---CCP

#### Collapse of democracy’s inevitable – transition to Chinese autocracy solves.

Schiavenza ’17 (Matt; 1/19/17; Senior Content Manager at Asia Society; Asia Society; “Could China's System Replace Democracy?”; <http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/could-chinas-system-replace-democracy>; DOA: 12/6/17)

Two decades later, this notion seems increasingly unfeasible. **Democracy is** **struggling**. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies has **fallen since** reaching a peak in **2006**. The world’s non-democracies, meanwhile, have become **more authoritarian**. Russia, once a tentative democracy, is now under the control of Vladimir Putin, a **nationalist leader** whose regime has centralized power, targeted opposition journalists, and seized sovereign territory of other countries. Then there’s China. For years, conventional wisdom stated that as the People’s Republic grew more prosperous, the country would naturally transition to a liberal democracy. But this prediction — dubbed the “China Fantasy” by the author James Mann — has not happened. If anything, China’s economic success has only **further solidified the C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty: The current ruler, Xi Jinping, is widely considered to be the country’s **most powerful** since Deng Xiaoping. Democracy’s ill health has also **infected the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe**. The president of Hungary, a formerly Communist state whose accession to the European Union in 2004 was a triumph for the West, has sought to “**end liberal democracy**” in his country by clamping down on press freedom and judicial independence. These trends are also evident in neighboring Poland. Far-right parties — like the United Kingdom Independence Party, the orchestrator of Brexit — have **gained popularity** across the continent. During his successful campaign for president of the United States, Donald Trump expressed, at best, an indifference toward democratic norms and ideals. Trump called for his opponent, Hillary Clinton, to be imprisoned, raised false accusations of voter fraud, threatened legal action against the media, and refused to commit to honoring the results of the election. Trump has repeatedly professed his **admiration for Putin**, Russia’s dictatorial leader, for being “**a strong leader**”; as president-elect, he **praised the Kazakh dictator** Nursultan Nazarbayev for “achieving a miracle” in his country. Where Did Democracy Go Wrong? According to Brian Klaas, author of the new book The Despot’s Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy, there are **three main reasons**. One is **American hypocrisy**, or, as Klaas puts it, the “Saudi effect.” President George W. Bush made democracy promotion an explicit centerpiece of American foreign policy during his second inaugural speech in 2005, yet the following year when Hamas won democratic elections to govern the Gaza Strip, the U.S. refused to honor the results. And as Washington invested billions of dollars and thousands of American lives to **impose democracy by force** in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government forged a military deal with Uzbekistan’s tyrannical regime and maintained a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most repressive countries. A second reason for democracy’s decline is the **resurgence of China and Russia**. As China’s economic rise continued without interruption in the quarter-century after Tiananmen Square, observers began wondering whether the Chinese miracle was **because of**, rather than in spite of, **its autocratic government**. (The slower growth of India, a messy democracy, only seemed to strengthen this argument.) And while Russia’s economic fortunes in the Putin era have lived and died with the price of oil, there’s little question that the country is **wealthier and more stable** than it had been under Boris Yeltsin. The success of both countries, sustainable or not, seemed to indicate that democracy and growth were not necessarily co-dependent. Klaas’ third reason is the **weaknesses embedded in** modern **American democracy** itself. Last year’s presidential election was a multi-billion dollar, 18-month saga that resulted in the election of a candidate who had **never served in government** or the military and one, incidentally, who earned **three million fewer votes** than his main opponent. “Not many people looked at our election and thought that they were missing out,” Klaas told Asia Society. “I even heard a Thai general say that if ‘democracy means Donald Trump, **we don’t want it**.’” What About China's System? There’s **no doubt** that liberal democracy is in crisis. But the next question — whether plausible alternatives exist — is less certain. Consider China. The country’s ability to push through major infrastructure projects, such as a nationwide high-speed rail network, without political obstruction has dazzled Westerners frustrated at the gridlock endemic to American politics. In a 2010 episode of Meet the Press, the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman famously admitted to fantasizing that the U.S. “could be China for a day” simply as a means to get things done. Daniel Bell, a professor of political science at Shandong University in eastern China, has written extensively about the meritocratic advantages of China’s political system. Chinese leaders must pass a series of examinations and negotiate a complex bureaucracy before achieving national power. Xi Jinping may have benefited from nepotism: His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a key Mao-era official. But the Chinese president also accumulated experience as the governor of two major Chinese provinces and a stint as vice president. This, Bell argues, has given Xi legitimacy in spite of never having to face voters. “I disagree with the view that there’s only one morally legitimate way of selecting leaders: one person, one vote,” Bell said in an appearance at Asia Society in 2015. State-run media in China spun the chaotic outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings as an example of democracy’s inherent flaws. The election of Donald Trump only served to further reinforce this notion. “I remember talking to the Chinese ambassador, and he made a crack about how in the U.S. you can be a nobody one day and the next day rise to power,” said Isaac Stone Fish, a senior fellow at Asia Society, “and you can’t do that in China because you have to go through all these different levels and rise through the system.” Bell acknowledges that the Chinese system has serious drawbacks. The prohibition of free speech, ban on political opposition, and absence of an independent judiciary mean that there are no checks against official abuse of power, something that has emerged as a major crisis in the past decade in the country. The high-profile anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi has reduced visible signs of excess, such as lavish banquets and fast cars. But critics believe that the campaign also serves as cover for Xi’s sidelining of rivals within the Communist Party. Defenders of China’s Communist Party point to the country’s near-four-decade run of economic growth as proof that the system works. But in structural terms, the modern Party is little different from the one that, under Chairman Mao, presided over widespread political persecution, a deadly famine, and a disastrous period of social upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Even after Deng Xiaoping reversed Mao’s policies and adopted a pragmatic economic approach, the Party has still implemented policies whose consequences threaten stability and prosperity. The One Child Policy, adopted in 1980 without public debate, created a demographic imbalance that, three decades later, has prematurely reduced China’s working-age population. Even the much-vaunted record of economic growth is built on a shaky foundation of debt-fueled investment. "There have been 30 instances in the postwar period when a country's debt increased by 40 percent over a 5-year horizon," Ruchir Sharma, an economics expert at Morgan Stanley, said of China in an appearance at Asia Society in December. “And in 100 percent of these instances, the country got into a deep economic trouble within the next five years." China has taken steps to systematize its government by introducing a mandatory retirement age for senior officials and establishing term limits for its leaders. The Communist Party’s Standing Committee of the Politburo, a seven-man body that stands atop China’s government pyramid, is designed to divide the responsibilities of government and ensure no one individual assumes too much power. The behavior of Xi Jinping over the past three years, though, has raised questions whether these norms are durable. Xi has assumed positions within the Chinese government once shared by fellow leaders and has weakened Li Keqiang, his prime minister, by denying him the office’s traditional stewardship of economic policy. Xi has abetted and re-established a cult of personality, something explicitly discouraged in China after the Maoist era, by encouraging the singing of songs in his name. And, as the Wall Street Journal recently reported, there are questions that Xi may not name a successor at this fall’s 19th Party Congress in order to continue as president beyond the customary 10-year term. The Consequences of Democracy's Decline China, for what it’s worth, has never claimed that its system of government was universally applicable. In contrast to the United States or the Soviet Union, Beijing has never tried to install its system in a foreign country by force. Even still, democracy’s decline may prove advantageous to China in other ways. For one, it would weaken the democratic movement in Hong Kong, which has vied with pro-Beijing elements for political control of the Chinese territory, and deter would-be Chinese dissidents from challenging Communist Party rule on the mainland. In addition, Klaas argues, the American absence of support for democracy leaves a vacuum in emerging states that Washington’s geopolitical rivals in Moscow and Beijing might fill. “The ‘America First’ mentality, or the mentality that it’s not our business, makes the mistake that thinking that the withdrawal of Western influence means there’s self-determination,” says Klaas. “ [But what it means is] that China and Russia control things. It’s not something where if the West leaves, then, say, Malawi will be free to choose. It’s a global foreign policy battle, and the West’s losses are China's and Russia’s gains.” Before the U.S. can promote democracy overseas, though the country may need to firm up support for it at home. A Harvard study conducted in November found that just 19 percent of American millennials believe that a military takeover is not legitimate in democracy compared to 45 percent of those older. 26 percent of millennials likewise feel that choosing leaders through free elections is “unimportant,” a sentiment shared by just 14 percent of Baby Boomers. “A lot of people growing up now don’t understand what it’s like not to live in a free society in the West,” says Klaas. “That, combined with the "end of history," assumed that democracy is the natural way of things. “In fact, democracy is the least organic and least natural way we’ve had."

#### Democracy causes CCP collapse.

Chen & Kinzelbach ’15 (Dingding Chen- assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Katrin Kinzelbach- associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, March 2015, “Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.999322>)

The People's Republic of China is both a decisive blocker as well as an indifferent bystander of democratization. In this article, we looked at whether and how China countervails EU and US democracy promotion at home and in its immediate neighbourhood. In terms of domestic politics, the CCP is clearly determined to withstand, repress, outperform, and outsmart home-grown as well as external pressures for democratization. It is impossible to predict how long this approach will be sustainable. With regard to China's foreign policy, we tested the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival at home will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders as well. The case of Hong Kong confirms that a perceived risk of regime survival leads Beijing to countervail US and EU democracy support outside the Chinese mainland. Although the scope of this article did not allow for additional case studies, we consider it likely that the CCP's focus on regime-survival at home does not only trump the “one country, two systems” doctrine, but ultimately also Beijing's declared non-interference principle in foreign policy. Yet, the fact that Beijing does not seem to use its significant leverage over Myanmar to hinder democracy support is an empirical challenge to the common proposition that authoritarian China is likely to export or protect autocracy, especially in its near-abroad. Given that we view Myanmar as the most likely case with respect to strategic interests, we suggest with considerable certainty that Beijing will only counteract democratization, including US and EU democracy support, where it perceives a challenge to the CCP's survival. Where this is not the case, Beijing is likely to focus on protecting its economic and strategic interests abroad, regardless of regime type. While this finding might be taken to suggest that a focus on China's international influence should not be a priority for democracy supporters, we remain more cautious. China's economic performance has not only granted the CCP legitimacy domestically, it has also made China's development path – economic liberalization without political reform – appear desirable further afield. And the recent economic troubles in Europe and the US, in turn, have challenged the thus far common perception that democracy was required for prosperity. As democracy promoters, both the US and the EU should therefore ensure that the very real governance shortcomings in China, beyond as well as within the economic sphere, are publicly identified for what they are. Without such concerted efforts, it is likely that authoritarian China will continue to be looked at as an alternative development model, thereby challenging democracy's power of attraction.

#### Goes nuclear.

Yee & Storey ’13 (Yee and Storey 13 Herbert - Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Ian - Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality 2013 p. 15)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in **territorial fragmentation**, **civil war** and waves of **refugees** pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a **profoundly negative impact on regional stability**. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in **millions of Chinese refugees** seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a **severe strain** on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in **a**nother **nightmare scenario**—**nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local** provincial **leaders** or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also **pose a threat to** its neighbours and **the world**.

### NC---Russia War

#### Democracy causes Russia war---tons of empirics prove.

Babayan 15 (Nelli Babayan is a senior researcher at the Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universita¨t Berlin. “The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad” Democratization, 2015 Vol. 22, No. 3, 438 – 45)

How did Russia counteract EaP in Armenia? Since its independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia has welcomed democracy promotion efforts and committed to the regional policies of the EU and the US, including democracy promotion. The expulsion of Russian military bases from Georgia after the 2008 conflict and their move to Armenia made the latter last remaining stronghold of Russian military power in the region. The entire spectrum of Russia's instruments in counteracting democracy promotion or for that matter any EU/US policy deemed as challenging were particularly evident in the case of Armenia's 2013 “U-turn”59 from the EU AA to Russia's Customs Union. The case of Armenia demonstrates that Russia is most prone to counteract the EU and the US when faced with imminent effectiveness of democracy promotion supported by local actors or when faced with challenges to its geostrategic interests. As Delcour and Wolczuk show in this special issue, this logic also applies to Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine. By the employment of economic and military instruments and through the promotion of alternative regional institutions, Russia counteracted EU policy, which has also been supported by the US. Thus, Russian efforts for counteracting the initiatives within the EaP peaked with success in September 2013: Armenia turned to the Eurasian Customs Union and in November 2013 Ukraine withdrew from initialling the AA despite a wave of domestic protests in both countries.60 Energy, more specifically gas, and the protracted conflicts are the main pressure points used by Russia in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Devoid of natural energy resources and with a protracted conflict at hand, Armenia makes a compliant target for Russia's energy and military pressures. In the mid-2000s Russia successfully blocked the diversification of Armenia's gas sources by imposing restrictions on the pipeline from Iran.61 Regular Armenian concessions in terms of infrastructure and cooperation with other neighbours secured comparatively lower gas prices. However, after Armenia concluded the sixth round of DCFTA negotiations leading to the initialling of the AA, in July 2013 Russia threatened to increase gas prices by 60%, while suggesting that the costs may be subsidized and not increase in the next five years should Armenia join the Customs Union.62 Consequently, Armenia entered negotiations for an 18% rise. It allowed Russian gas-monopoly Gazprom to acquire the remaining 20% of shares of the gas procuring company ArmRusGazprom, which had previously belonged to the Armenian government. Russian media, which is also widely viewed in Armenia, publicized a number of preferential agreements and possible subsidies promised by Putin to Armenia's President Serzh Sargsyan in return for joining the Customs Union. In addition, Russia promised larger investments into prolonging the exploitation of the Armenian nuclear power plant and other factories, regarded as obsolete or environmentally hazardous by the EU and the US.63 Besides economic threats, Russia has also been taking advantage of the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh region. While Azerbaijan's energy industry has allowed it to exponentially multiply its military budget, Armenia has been largely reliant on Russia for its security against possible military actions by Azerbaijan. While Armenia showed growing interest in its partnership with the EU and did not attend a June 2013 meeting of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia subsequently increased its arms export to Azerbaijan by US$1 billion.64 This move served as a clear warning to Armenia that Russia may no longer support it in the framework of the conflict. Regularly playing two sides of the conflict against each other using the promise or threat of arms sales, Russia has managed to keep the South Caucasus divided and hindered regional projects of the EU and the US. Armenia backpedalled on AA after two years of preparations and previously expressed confidence by the Armenian authorities that “the AAs with some partner countries, including Armenia, will be initialled” in November 2013.65 The EU delegation in Armenia confirmed that the latter was on track for signing the AA. Former Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian also repeatedly argued against Armenian entry into the Customs Union, due to the lack of common borders with Russia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.66 Thus, the decision to reject initialling the AA bewildered both the EU and the Armenian public, which took to the streets in protest (even if with limited coverage by Western media). Given the pressures coming from the Kremlin, Armenian officials attempted to frame the decision in pragmatic terms, calling Russia the “military security choice” and the DCFTA the “economic choice”, since “in terms of security, Armenia is tied to Russia”.67 However, while the Armenian government and the Kremlin have attempted to present the Customs Union as a better economic and trade choice for Armenia,68 the benefits of joining it are hardly identifiable. Due to its closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and lack of a border with Russia, Armenia conducts most of its trade through Georgia. Since Georgia signed the DCFTA in summer 2014, these two neighbouring countries will now have to abide by different tariffs and agreements, further straining Armenia's already weak economy. The stagnation of democracy in post-Soviet countries has been the result of a set of factors, such as low resonance of democracy, high adaptation costs to democracy, protracted conflicts, weak institutions, or illiberal elites. Yet, through economic sanctions, military threats, and even through such formal institutions as the Eurasian Union, Russia has contributed to the stagnation of democratization in its near abroad. It counteracted democracy promotion or, for that matter, any other Western policies, which it considered a threat to its geostrategic interests and ambitions for restoring its great power status. At the same time, even if the level of democracy in its near abroad has gradually deteriorated, there is no evidence of Russia promoting autocracy or any other regime alternative to democracy. Russia's actions are hardly surprising. For centuries under the direct influence of Russia, the regions of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia did not only constitute parts of the Russia-led Soviet Union but also of the earlier Russian Empire. The exposure to Western principles (along with material incentives) and democratization under the guidance of the EU or the US may potentially steer the allegiance of its near abroad away from Russia. Moreover, just as the EU and the US have continuously preferred stability over democracy,69 Russia has also strived to maintain the status quo and safeguard its interests in its own neighbourhood. At the same time, the EU and the US currently do not match either the level of political prowess – borderline blackmail – or the type of economic or security pressures employed by Russia in its near abroad.

### NC---Africa

#### Democratization causes in Africa war – autocratic peace theory is true

Gartzke, Poli Sci Prof @ UCSD, 13

(Erik, “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Quarterly Volume 57, Issue 1, pages 171–185)

The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether democratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having little democracy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several studies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recognize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reciprocal meddling in the country's own domestic affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990).5 However, these arguments fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggressively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace emerged in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic–autocratic dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evaluate several data sets, finding that autocracies are less war prone than democracy–autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find that socialist countries with advanced industrialized economies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002) goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifiable democratic peace. Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that similarity of both political and economic institutions encourages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date, Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in contrast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even among nondemocracies. The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for democratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or consequences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998 , 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical elegance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical arguments that spring from regime similarity in general. Another source of novel empirical variation for second-generation democratic peace research involves temporal dynamics in the relationship between regime type and conflict behavior. Cederman (2001a) raised this possibility in arguing that an appropriate interpretation of Kant requires viewing the democratic peace as a macro-historical learning process in which the effects of the democratic peace strengthened over time. Indeed, criticisms of the democratic peace often focus on “near misses,” most of which occur in the nineteenth century (Layne 1994; Elman 1997). At the same time, however, there is evidence that the democratic peace may have weakened after the Cold War (Sobek, Clark and Kimball 2006; Gowa 2010). Of course, such dynamic effects may be spurious, arising from failures to control for variables that trend with democracy over time (Gartzke and Weisiger 2013b) or even more prosaically from deficiencies in standard measures of democracy that may overstate the prevalence of democracies in earlier time periods.6 To the extent that they exist, however, temporal dynamics in the relationship between shared regime type and conflict behavior provide another novel empirical relationship//

that can be used in refining theories of liberal peace. A third empirical characteristic of democracy that deserves mention is its distinctly non-random distribution. Today, Europe is almost entirely democratic; Africa and the Middle East are predominantly autocratic.7 Indeed, it is impossible to fully explain transitions to and from democracy without reference to the regional mix of regime types (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). This clustering in turn influences the democratic peace: A country may be more likely to democratize (Gleditsch 2003), and a new democracy may be more likely to survive, if the country finds itself in a democratic neighborhood (Cederman and Gleditsch 2004). Clustering by regime type is certainly appealing given the key prediction of the democratic peace; democracies should prefer democratic neighbors, as this makes conflict unlikely. However, regime type clustering does not emerge in an organic fashion from conventional democratic peace theories, since none of the most common arguments (norms, constraints, information, identity) explicitly considers geography. Further, the rationale used to reconcile geographic clustering by regime type with democratic peace theory implies precisely that it is difference in regime type that is particularly pernicious to peace. The desire of democracies to encourage or compel regime change in autocratic neighbors must mean that the security dilemma is especially intense between unlike regimes. Autocracies, in turn, must prefer autocrats as neighbors, if for no other reason than that insecure democrats incline toward undermining autocracies.

#### Group constraints deter autocratic aggression.

Rosato 11 PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. The Handbookon the Political Economy of War By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. Mathers

There is also little evidence for Ihe other implication of the group constraint claim, namely that group constraints must be weaker in autocracies than in democracies. If the mechanism is to explain why democracies remain at peace but autocracies do not, then there must be good evidence that democratic leaders face greater group constraints. The evidence suggests, however, that autocratic leaders often respond to groups - themselves or their supporters that have powerful incentives to avoid war. One reason for autocrats to shy away from conflict is that wars are expensive and the best way to pay for them is to move to a system of consensual taxation, which in turn requires the expansion of the franchise. In other words, autocratic leaders have a powerful incentive to avoid wars lest they trigger political changes that may destroy their hold on power. Another reason to avoid war is that it allows civilian autocrats to maintain weak military establishments, thereby reducing the chances that they will be overthrown. Different considerations inhibit the war proneness of military dictators. First, because they must often devote considerable effort to domestic repression, they have fewer resources available for prosecuting foreign wars. Second, because they are used for repression their militaries often have little societal support, which makes them ill equipped to fight external wars. Third, military dictators are closely identified with the military and will therefore be cautious about waging war for fear that they will be blamed for any subsequent defeat. Finally, time spent fighting abroad is time away from other tasks on which a dictator's domestic tenure also depends. Thus there may be fewer groups with access to the foreign policy process in autocracies - in extreme cases only the autocrat himself has a say - but these often have a vested interest in avoiding war. This being the case, it is not clear that group constraints are weaker in autocracies than they are in democracies

#### Autocracies are *highly risk averse*.

Rosato 11 PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. The Handbookon the Political Economy of War By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. Mathers

In assessing whether leaders are accountable, proponents of the democratic peace focus exclusively on their chances of losing office as a result of waging a losing or costly war (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, p. 794). Logically, however, accountability depends on a leader's likelihood of removal and the costs that he or she will incur when removed. It is not clear, for example, that leaders who are likely to be voted out of office for prosecuting a losing or costly war, but are unlikely to be exiled, imprisoned or killed in the process will feel more accountable than leaders who are unlikely to lose office, but can expect severe punishment in the unlikely event that they are in fact removed. Put somewhat differently, it is not clear that their expected costs, which are a function of the likelihood that they will be removed and the costs they will incur if they are removed, are substantially different.20 If we focus on expected costs, democrats do not appear to be more accountable than autocrats. An analysis of the fate of all leaders in all the wars in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, reveals that democratic leaders who lose a war or embroil their state in a costly war are marginally more likely to be removed from office than their autocratic counterparts (37 percent to 35 percent), but considerably less likely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed (5 percent to 28 percent).21 Thus there is little evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs for waging losing or costly wars and are therefore more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans reach a similar conclusion in their examination of how defeat in war affects the tenure of democratic and nondemocratic leaders between 1919 and 1999. Defeat in war does not significantly affect the tenure of democrats, but does significantly reduce the tenure of autocrats (Chiozza and Goemans 2004, p. 613). Similarly, in her analysis of domestic audience costs, Jessica Weeks (2008, p. 59) finds that leaders in most nondemocracies are just as accountable as their democratic counterparts.

### Transition

#### We turn this argument---a transition to democracy is worse than one to autocracy---uniquely escalates.

**Mansfield & Snyder 2**[Edward Mansfield- Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics @ Upenn, Jack Snyder- Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations @ Columbia University, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” International Organization Journal, vol 56, issue 2]

In previous research, we reported that states undergoing democratic transitions were **substantially more likely** to participate in external wars than were states whose regimes remained unchanged or changed in an autocratic direction. [6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_organization/v056/56.2mansfield.html#FOOT6%23FOOT6) We argued that elites in newly democratizing states often use nationalist appeals to attract mass support without submitting to full democratic accountability and that the institutional weakness of transitional states creates the opportunity for such war-causing strategies to succeed. However, these earlier studies did not fully address the circumstances under which transitions are most likely to precipitate war, and they did not take into account various important causes of war. Equally, some critics worried that the time periods over which we measured the effects of democratization were sometimes so long that events occurring at the beginning of a period would be unlikely to influence foreign policy at its end. [7](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_organization/v056/56.2mansfield.html#FOOT7%23FOOT7) Employing a more refined research design than in our prior work, we aim here to identify more precisely the conditions under which democratization stimulates hostilities. We find that the heightened danger of war**grows**primarily out of the**transition from an autocratic regime to** one that is partly **democratic**. The specter of war during this phase of democratization looms especially large when governmental institutions, including those regulating political participation, are especially weak. Under these conditions, elites commonly employ nationalist rhetoric to mobilize mass support but then become drawn into the belligerent foreign policies unleashed by this process. We find, in contrast, that transitions that quickly culminate in a fully coherent democracy are much less perilous. 8 Further, our results refute the view that transitional democracies are simply inviting targets of attack because of their temporary weakness. In fact, they tend to be the initiators of war. We also refute the view that any regime change is likely to precipitate the outbreak of war. We find that **transitions toward democracy are significantly more likely to generate hostilities than transitions toward autocracy**. [End Page 298] The early stages of democratization unleash intense competition among myriad social groups and interests. Many transitional democracies lack state institutions that are sufficiently strong and coherent to effectively regulate this mass political competition. To use Samuel Huntington's terminology, such countries frequently suffer from a gap between high levels of political participation and weak political institutions. 9 The weaker these institutions, the greater the likelihood that war-provoking nationalism will emerge in democratizing countries. 10 Belligerent nationalism is likely to arise in this setting for two related reasons. The first and more general reason is that political leaders try to use nationalism as an **ideological motivator** of national collective action in the **absence of effective political institutions**. Leaders of various stripes find that appeals to national sentiment are essential for mobilizing popular support when more routine instruments of legitimacy and governance—parties, legislatures, courts, and independent news media—are in their infancy. Both old and new elites share this incentive to play the nationalist card. Often such appeals depend for their success on exaggerating foreign threats. Allegations that internal foes have treasonous ties to these external enemies of the nation help the regime hold on to power despite the weakness of governmental institutions. At the outset of the French Revolution, for example, mass nationalism was weak, but soon the leaders of various republican factions found that the rhetoric of war and treason was indispensable to their political survival in the revolutionary institutional wasteland. 11 Newspapers tied to political factions inflamed public opinion with the paired themes of war and treason. A second reason democratization often fosters belligerent nationalism is that **the breakup of authoritarian regimes threatens powerful interests**, including military bureaucracies and economic actors that derive a parochial benefit from war and empire. To salvage their position, threatened interests frequently try to recruit mass support, typically by resorting to nationalist appeals that allow them to claim to rule in the name of the people, but without instituting full democratic accountability to the average voter. Exploiting what remains of their governmental, economic, and media power, these elites may succeed in establishing terms of inclusion in politics that force opposition groups to accept nationalism as the common currency of public discourse. For example, Bismarck and his successors in Prussia and Germany used nationalist, military, and colonial issues to rally middle class and rural voters against the working classes while perpetuating a system of rule that kept the power to name [End Page 299] government ministers in while federalism may generate certain benefits for mature democracies, the decentralization and fragmentation of power in newly democratizing regimes is likely to exacerbate the problems attendant to democratic transitions. As the bloody breakups of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union show, divisive nationalism is especially likely when the state's power is dispersed among ethnically defined federal regionsthe hands of the hereditary Kaiser rather than the elected legislature. 12 Moreover,. Hence, none of the mechanisms that produce the democratic peace among mature democracies operate in the same fashion in newly democratizing states. Indeed, in their imperfect condition, these mechanisms have the opposite effect. In short, newly democratizing countries often experience a **weakening of central state institutions** because their old institutions have eroded and their new ones are only partially developed. Autocratic power is in decline vis-à-vis both elite interest groups and mass groups, and democratic institutions lack the strength to integrate these contending interests and views. Not all newly democratizing states suffer from institutional weakness, but for those that do the resulting political dynamic creates conditions that encourage hostilities. In the face of this institutional deficit, political leaders rely on expedient strategies to cope with the political impasse of democratization. Such tactics, which often include the appeasement of nationalist veto groups or competition among factions in nationalist bidding wars (or both), **can breed reckless foreign policies and the resort to war**.

### Disease

#### Democracy causes disease spread – authoritarianism solves

**Schwartz**, Poli Sci Prof @ State University of New York, **12**

(Jonathon, Compensating for the ‘Authoritarian Advantage’ in Crisis Response: A Comparative Case Study of SARS Pandemic Responses in China and Taiwan, J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2012) 17:313–331)

In the aftermath of the SARS epidemic much was made of China’s effective efforts at disease control and prevention. China’s perceived success in controlling SARS stands in stark contrast with Taiwan’s troubled response to its own SARS outbreak. Why does Taiwan, a geographically small, densely populated country with a democratic government, wealthy and modern knowledge-based economy, fail to effectively respond to SARS whereas big, heavily populated, relatively under-developed and authoritarian China succeeds? Does regime type explain China’s relative success, and to the extent that regime type matters, what can be done to compensate for China’s ‘authoritarian advantage’ in crisis response? To address these questions I conduct a comparative analysis of pandemic response by Taiwan and China. Due to space limitations, I focus primarily on Taiwan, drawing on previous studies of China to highlight the differences between Chinese and Taiwanese responses. In the final section I draw on this comparison to identify means to compensate for China’s ‘authoritarian advantage’. Crisis and Response The crisis literature distinguishes between routine crises and novel crises. In routine crises (frequently recurring crises such as fires and floods), political leaders may defer to operational commanders – people such as fire fighters or police officers - who have dealt with similar crises in the past. These operational commanders have trained for, and perhaps experienced similar crises and are able to respond effectively with only moderate adaptation of existing crisis response procedures [1]. However, this approach cannot be followed in the case of novel crises. Novel crises are crises where there is little past experience to draw on. Such crises include massive events such as hurricane Katrina, the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami or the 9/11 attacks on the United States that explode on the scene, or more insidious crises such as **the spread of a previously unknown infectious disease** that only slowly makes itself evident. Of the two types of novel crises the insidious type is often far more dangerous. The danger lies in the likelihood that the **leadership will fail** to recognize the **insidious crisis** as a crisis because it develops only slowly and seems amenable to existing response strategies. As a result, the leadership may become aware of the crisis only after it has become widespread or more threatening [2]. SARS is an example of insidious crises. It at first went unrecognized and only slowly did the leadership come to realize the immensity of the threat it represented. Both forms of novel crises require flexible leadership and response capabilities. The leadership must quickly identify the challenge, engage relevant bureaucracies, implement a response, communicate the nature of the crisis and response effectively and clearly to the public, and control the message as it is being broadcast by the media to the public. These already extremely challenging tasks must be accomplished in a compressed timeframe under highly stressful conditions. Not surprisingly, **governments often fail**. Some authors argue that an already challenging situation for leaders is made even more so if they are functioning **in a democratic** system. In democracies, major emergencies require involvement **by multiple jurisdictions** and **many levels of representative** **government**. **Coordinating** among these often overlapping and contentious jurisdictions can be difficult. Politicians must identify and justify priorities and actions to local leaders, the public and the mass media.1 These same authors suggest that **the challenges are less significant in authoritarian regimes**. Authoritarian leaders enjoy an ‘**authoritarian advantage’**, being less likely to need to negotiate with bureaucracies over jurisdictional powers or struggle to disentangle overlapping institutions. Furthermore, the media and by extension the message to the public are more easily controlled.

#### Burnout is wrong – disease risks extinction

**Kerscher 14**—Professor, unclear where because every website about him is in German

(Karl-Heinz, “Space Education”, Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten)

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations//

 of hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.