## 1AC v4 – UT

### 1AC: Plan

#### Plan – A just government of the People’s Republic of China ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### That solves worker liberation, labor reforms, and re-establishes credible Collective Bargaining in China – establishing legal protection for Labor Unions reduces overall labor-related discontent.

Dongfang 11 Han Dongfang 4-6-2011 "Liberate China's Workers" <https://archive.md/7RvDG#selection-307.0-316.0> (director of China Labour Bulletin, a nongovernmental organization that defends the rights of workers in China.)//Elmer

HONG KONG — **There is no legal right to strike in China**, but there are strikes every day. Factory workers, hotel employees, teachers and taxi drivers regularly withdraw their labor and demand a better deal from their employer. Strikes are often successful, and these days strike leaders hardly ever get put in prison. It may seem ironic that workers in a nominally Communist country don’t have the right to strike, and that workers are apparently willing to defy the Communist Party by going out on strike. But China effectively abandoned Communism and embraced capitalism many years ago. And in a capitalist economy, strikes are a fact of life. Chinese scholars, government **officials** and even some businessmen have long recognized this fact and have **called for the** **restoration of the right to strike**, **which was removed from the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1982**. **Deng Xiaoping feared that the economic reforms he was introducing would lead to labor unrest.** Although Deng and his successors were able to quiet labor unrest and strike action for a while, the trend over the last five years or so has been clear. As the business leader Zeng Qinghong noted recently, the number of strikes is increasing every year. Mr. Zeng, who is head of the Guangzhou Automobile Co., reported that in just two months last summer, there were more than 20 strikes in the automotive industry in the Pearl River Delta alone, and that new strikes were occurring all the time. Mr. Zeng suggested in a submission to this year’s National People’s Congress, China’s annual legislature, that the right to strike should be restored because it was a basic right of workers in a market economy and a natural adjunct to the right to work. I agree with Mr. Zeng on this point and would like to take his argument one step further. The **right to strike** **is** clearly important, but the most vital and fundamental right of workers is **the right to collective bargaining**. After all, **why do workers go out on strike**? Very simply, they go on strike **for higher pay and better working conditions**. **The strike is not an end in itself but is part of a bargaining process.** And **if the collective bargaining process were more effective**, in many cases, **workers would not need to go out on strike at all**. If you talk to factory workers, most will tell you they would rather not go on strike if they can avoid it. Indeed, most only go on strike because they have no alternative. **China’s workers want and need an alternative**. They want **a system** in **which they can raise their demands** for higher pay and discuss those demands **in** peaceful, **equal and constructive negotiations** with management. **If workers can achieve their goals through peaceful collective bargaining, in the long run there will be fewer strikes**, workers will be better paid and labor relations will be vastly improved. We also have to be aware that if the right to strike is reinstated in the Constitution in isolation — without the right to collective bargaining — there would be a danger that the right of workers to go on strike might actually be eroded. Just look at the right to stage a public demonstration. Chinese citizens do have the constitutional right to demonstrate but in reality they have to apply to the police for permission, and of course very few of those applications are granted. Likewise, if workers have to apply to the authorities before they can go on strike, the right to strike will become meaningless. Moreover, the number of strikes would not be reduced because workers would continue to go out on strike regardless and labor relations will deteriorate even further. On the other hand, if the **right to strike** is framed in a way that **can** **liberate workers** and **encourage** **and empower them to engage in collective bargaining**, **safe** **in the knowledge that they have a powerful weapon that can be deployed if necessary, labor relations will be enhanced** and the number of strikes might actually decrease. There is a saying in China that “you should not only focus on your head when you have headache because the real reason for the headache could be your foot.” As Mr. Zeng noted, the rapidly increasing number of strikes in China has become a major headache, not only for business but for the government as well. If the government wants to reduce the number of strikes in China, it needs to take a holistic approach and address the root cause of the problem — the absence of an effective collective bargaining system in which democratically elected workers’ representatives can negotiate better pay and conditions with their employer. If such a system can be implemented in China it would obviously benefit workers but it would also **benefit employers** like Mr. Zeng who are **concerned** **about** **high worker turnover and the loss of production through strike action.** Crucially, it is also in the interest of the Chinese government to introduce collective bargaining. The authorities may be nervous about handing power to the workers but they should bear in mind that by doing so they would aid the development of more harmonious labor relations, which could lead to the Communist Party’s goal of creating a more prosperous, stable and harmonious society.

### 1AC: Soft Power Advantage

#### The Advantage is Chinese Soft Power:

#### Lack of Chinese Right to Strike devastates Collective Bargaining – undermines any legal leverage for Strikes.

Friedman 17 Eli Friedman 4-20-2017 "Collective Bargaining in China is Dead: The Situation is Excellent" <https://www.chinoiresie.info/collective-bargaining-in-china-is-dead-the-situation-is-excellent/> (Assistant Professor of International and Comparative Labour at Cornell University)//Elmer

For many years reform-oriented labour activists and scholars working in China have seen **collective bargaining** as the **cure for** the **country’s severe labour problems**. The logic underlying this was often unstated, but straightforward: collective bargaining was crucial for twentieth century labour movements in capitalist countries in giving workers a voice and creating a more equitable social distribution of wealth. With growing levels of labour unrest in China over the past twenty years, collective bargaining seemed like a logical next step. Hopeful reformers—both within the official unions as well as labour NGO activists and academics—envisioned rationalised, legalised bargaining between labour and capital as a central pillar in the construction of a more just workplace and society. The **challenges to institutionalising** a robust **collective bargaining** system **in** the People’s Republic of **China** (PRC) **have** always **been profound**. **Fundamental** to labour relations theory **is** that collective bargaining rights must be accompanied by the **right to strike** and freedom of association—**capital** **has no reason to take workers seriously without labour possessing some coercive power**. But independent unions have long been an anathema to the Communist Party. From the Lai Ruoyu debacle of the 1950s to the crushing of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation in 1989, the Party has made it clear time and again that independent worker organisations are forbidden. Although workers have never enjoyed the right to strike in practice, the right was formally included in the Chinese constitutions of 1975 and 1978. It **was Deng Xiaoping who removed it from the constitution just as private capital began pouring into China in the early 1980**s. Working Within the System Nonetheless, with no signs of articulated worker movements since 1989, many well-intentioned people thought it was worth trying to advance worker rights within the system. Especially from the mid 2000s on, academics (myself included) launched research projects, NGOs held training sessions, and foreign unions engaged with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). Many assumed that the state would eventually decide that worker insurgency was exacting too high a cost, and that serious labour reforms were therefore necessary. And indeed, beginning in the late 2000s the ACFTU made collective negotiations (xieshang)—rather than the more antagonistic sounding ‘bargaining’ (tanpan)—a high priority, investing time and resources into expanding the coverage of collective contracts. At its best, **collective bargaining in China** **has been woefully inadequate**. The state and the ACFTU have been very cautious about controlling workers’ aspirations, and have insisted on the fundamental harmony of interests between labour and capital. Experiments with bargaining have been almost **exclusively restricted to single enterprises**, thereby preventing workers from constituting cross-workplace ties. The overwhelming majority of collective contracts are **formulaic**: **actual bargaining rarely occurs**, and **enforcement is** largely **non-existent**. The few shining examples where employers have made real compromises during collective bargaining have followed autonomously organised wildcat strikes. The best-known case is the 2010 strike from a Honda transmission plant in Guangdong province, which resulted in major wage gains as well as an (ultimately unsuccessful) effort to reform the enterprise union. It is not coincidental that substantive worker-led bargaining is much more likely in Japanese or American firms, where the state must be cautious not to inflame patriotic sentiments. State-sanctioned economic nationalism is a shaky foundation for a robust collective bargaining system. The Death of Collective Bargaining under Xi Even these timid efforts have been smothered in recent years, as the central government has turned in a markedly anti-worker direction under Xi Jinping. There was a brief moment in 2010 when discussion about the right to strike emerged from hushed whispers into the public discourse. But this opening was ephemeral, and union reformers in Guangdong who had pushed gentle reforms in the mid-late 2000s were replaced with typical Party apparatchiks. The country’s pre-eminent centre for labour studies at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou was shuttered. The academic study of employment has now been left almost entirely to business schools, as the government has stymied further expansion of labour relations programs. Labour NGOs in Guangzhou were subjected to a brutal crackdown in December 2015, with the government specifically targeting those groups that had been helping workers to engage in collective negotiations to resolve strikes. And the ACFTU has seemingly given up on advancing collective negotiations altogether. The Chairman of the ACFTU Li Jianguo does not even mention the term in his speeches anymore. Under the ‘work developments’ section of the ACFTU’s website, a lonely single report on collective contracts for the entirety of 2016 is a stark indication that the union has almost totally forsaken this agenda. Collective bargaining is not dead in the sense that it will disappear from China’s labour-capital relations. It is almost certain that official unions will continue to pursue bargaining in its current vacuous, bureaucratic, and worker-exclusionary form. Collective contracts will continue to be signed, tabulated, and then hidden from view from workers. Somewhat less pessimistically, workers will continue to force management to bargain with the collective via wildcat strikes. This latter form will still be an important means by which workers can attempt to ensure their most basic rights, and these efforts are absolutely worth supporting. But collective bargaining is dead as a political aim. It is not going to be the cornerstone of twentieth century-style class compromise in China, it is not generative of worker power, and it certainly does not herald broader social transformation. To the extent that legal bargaining does develop, it will be as a mechanism for the state to deprive workers of autonomous power. What then might Chinese workers and allied intellectuals and activists aim for? At the risk of stating the obvious, **the working class needs more power**. The question is, how to foster proletarian power in the face of a highly competent authoritarian state that views organised workers as an existential threat? In the absence of independent organisations, the only option is an intensification of already widespread worker insurgency. The more wildcat strikes, mass direct action, and worker riots, the more the state and capital will be forced to take worker grievances seriously. Of course such forms of collective action come at great risk for workers, and many have already paid a high price. In any particular case, the risks may certainly outweigh the benefits. But in the aggregate, expansive unrest is just what the working class needs. With the institutions firmly oriented towards advancing the inter-related goals of state domination and exploitation by capital, disruption on a large scale is the only chance workers have of forcing change. Ungovernability will be the necessary prelude to any institutional reform worthy of the name.

#### Any credible union power is under-cut by detentions of labor activists.

Merkley and McGovern 13 Jeff Merkley and James McGovern 12-20-2013 "Detention of Labor Representative Highlights Challenges for Collective Bargaining in China" <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/detention-of-labor-representative-highlights-challenges-for> (Representative and Co-Chair of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China)//Elmer

**Authorities** in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, **detained** migrant worker and **labor representative** Wu Guijun in May 2013 reportedly **for participating in a peaceful labor protest**. Prior to his detention, Wu was one of seven elected labor representatives involved in collective bargaining with his employer. Labor advocates have condemned Wu’s detention and expressed concern that he has been held for an extended period of time without being formally indicted. Wu’s case **illustrates** the **challenges** **Chinese workers face engaging in collective bargaining** to resolve workplace grievances. On May 23, 2013, public security officials in Bao’an district, Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, detained migrant worker Wu Guijun, after he reportedly participated in a local Bao’an labor protest.[1] Employed at the Diweixin manufacturing factory (“Diweixin”) in Bao’an, Wu was one of seven elected labor representatives negotiating with factory management on a resolution to a near month-long labor dispute. Workers staged a public protest after management failed to agree to collective bargaining demands, including worker compensation for a proposed factory closure. As a result of the protest, authorities **detained** a number of protesters, including Wu. According to his lawyer, Wu now faces possible criminal prosecution **for** “gathering a crowd to **disrupt social order**,” a crime punishable by three to seven years’ imprisonment under Article 290 of the PRC Criminal Law.[2] Background on Wu’s Case In early May 2013, workers at Diweixin, a Hong Kong-owned factory, initiated a strike in response to management plans to close and relocate manufacturing operations from Shenzhen to Huizhou municipality, Guangdong.[3] Seeking severance compensation in connection with the factory’s closure, workers elected Wu, along with six others, to advance their demands in collective negotiations with factory management. According to multiple reports, management repeatedly refused to cooperate with the representatives for more than two weeks of collective negotiations, reportedly offering at one point to provide workers with compensation below the legal minimum required by law.[4] In an attempt to pressure local authorities to intervene in the dispute, 300 workers marched on May 23 to the Shenzhen municipal government.[5] Local public security reportedly intervened in the march, detaining as many as 200 workers, including Wu. Authorities released a majority of those detained the following day and others in the succeeding weeks, but authorities continued to detain Wu, eventually placing him under criminal detention.[6] Labor advocates have expressed concern that authorities have held Wu for an extended period of time without being indicted.[7] In October 2013, procuratorate officials returned Wu’s case to public security officials for additional investigation.[8] According to Wu’s lawyer, the Bao’an district procuratorate twice rejected indicting Wu—apparently on the charge of “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order”—due to insufficient evidence.[9] Reactions to Wu’s Detention Fellow workers, academics, and labor advocates have criticized Wu’s detention. On September 27, 2013, 32 Chinese and international labor organizations cosigned a petition expressing concern that the collective actions taken by Diweixin workers resulted in detentions and the potential criminal prosecution of Wu, despite protections provided under the PRC Constitution guaranteeing freedom of assembly.[10] Signatories stressed that “Wu and other **worker leaders** were **alone in their struggle** without receiving support from the trade union,” and called on authorities to “**defend the worker’s right to strike**” and release Wu. In a September 11, 2013, open letter to the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions, Wu’s coworkers called his **detention** a “**bad precedent**” that would **cause** “**workers striking in the future [to face] the risk of prosecution.”**[11] According to the letter, such a situation would “**intensify social contradictions and influence social harmony**.” Workers urged the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions to fulfill its “core responsibility” to protect workers’ rights and to pressure local authorities to release Wu. Continued Challenges for Collective Bargaining Wu’s case illustrates the continued challenges Chinese workers face pursuing collective bargaining to resolve workplace grievances. The Commission’s 2013 Annual Report noted that demographic and economic shifts have provided workers with greater bargaining power in the workplace, increasing their determination to redress grievances and press for better pay and working conditions.[12] While the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)—China’s sole official trade union under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party—has promoted collective contract and wage bargaining to address workers’ grievances and maintain “harmonious” labor relations, a general lack of autonomy and genuine worker representation in enterprise-level unions continues to limit ACFTU-led collective bargaining.[13] According to Wan Xiangdong, a professor and deputy director of the labor research and service center at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangdong, **government** and local trade union **officials** **continue to approach labor disputes through the perspective of maintaining social stability** and protecting against economic losses, **which places workers at a marked disadvantage**.[14] Wu’s case also highlights the risk workers face by engaging in collective bargaining without trade unions. A December 7, 2012, China Labour Bulletin report, indicated that labor representatives “have suffered reprisals after taking part in collective bargaining with management,” including forced resignations, firings, and detention.[15] The report notes that despite some successful cases of worker-led collective bargaining, a **lack** **of** “any **clear defined legal protection**” for labor representatives **makes them susceptible to retaliation**, necessitating “protection from both the law and a fully functioning trade union.” As a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO), China is obligated to respect, promote, and realize the principles of freedom of association and the “effective recognition” of the right to collective bargaining.[16]

#### The Right to Strike re-balances China’s Economy.

Roberts 10 Dexter Roberts 8-5-2010 "Is the Right to Strike Coming to China" <https://archive.md/hjNI7> (Editor at Bloomberg)//Elmer

The name gives no hint of the revolutionary changes afoot for mainland workers. Yet the **proposed Regulations** on the Democratic Management of Enterprises, now being debated by the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress, **could give Chinese labor the ultimate**—and until now taboo—**bargaining tool**: **an officially sanctioned right to strike**. "This has been a no-go area in China for decades," says Robin Munro, deputy director at the Hong Kong-based China Labour Bulletin. All **Chinese workers** belong to one **union**, but it **wields little power**. "This is the first time ever Chinese authorities have said it is O.K. to strike." The draft law could take effect by this fall in Guangdong, the industrialized coastal province where Honda (HMC) workers in June illegally and successfully struck for higher wages. The proposed law is seen by many activists and researchers as a trial balloon before a possible national rollout. The rules: If one-fifth or more of a company's staff demands collective bargaining, then management must discuss workers' grievances. Before talks begin, the union must elect local worker representatives. Until now, union reps came from management ranks. The next section of the proposed law ventures into even more radical territory. For six decades, picketing and disrupting production have been illegal and subject to harsh punishment. Under the Guangdong proposal, as long as workers first try negotiating and refrain from violence, they're allowed to strike. Though the draft could still get watered down, the fact that officials are even considering legalizing strikes signals a sea change. The party's moves are an attempt to recognize—and regulate—what is already happening. "Every month there are hundreds of strikes," says Chang Kai, a labor relations professor at Renmin University of China who advised the Honda workers. "What the government is concerned about is whether it can control these strikes or not." **Formalizing workers' rights** **could** also advance China's **goal of rebalancing the economy**. "There is a **new emphasis on how to reduce the wage gap** **and get consumers to spend more**," says Chang-Hee Lee, an industrial relations expert at the International Labour Organization's Beijing office. "This is **not** very **easy** to accomplish **unless** **workers have more bargaining power**." The bottom line: A proposed law being debated in Guangdong could greatly strengthen the bargaining power of Chinese workers.

#### Enhanced Unions and Labor Reforms key to sustained Chinese Economic Growth.

Haack 21 Michael Haack 2-13-2021 "Could Biden Make US-China Trade Better for Workers?" <https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/could-biden-make-us-china-trade-better-for-workers/> (Michael Haack currently a contractor with the China Labor Translation Project, a project of the Chinese Progressive Association. He previously worked with industrial workers in southern China. Michael holds master’s degrees from SOAS, University of London and American University)//Elmer

Meanwhile, **even as China grows, its wealth** **remains** largely **with companies and the government**. **Individual households capture only around 40 percent** of China’s GDP compared to around 70 percent in the United States. **Inequality has soared**. China’s official **Gini coefficient is at 0.47 (independent analyses put the number considerably higher) compared to 0.39 in the U.S**. “**Chinese workers** are **underpaid** and overtaxed, so they **can’t** afford to **spend as much** on goods and services,” said Mathew Klein of Barron’s. “The result is that Chinese businesses systematically generate a **surplus** of goods that gets **dumped** **on the rest of the world**, which in turn **leads to** some combination of **deindustrialization and rising indebtedness**.” Concern for the United States’ industrial capacity has led populists to rally for “decoupling.” For its part, China would also prefer to not rely on the United States for consumers and technology. In a recent speech to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Dialogues, Xi Jinping was clear that “making **domestic consumption** the **main driver of** its **growth**” is the priority for China. While parties on both sides have called for a distancing, the counties’ asset-holding elites have become further entwined. Promising a fairer deal with China, former U.S. President Donald Trump launched a tariff war in 2018, which reached a partial resolution with the Phase One deal on January 15, 2020. The deal dovetailed with China’s domestic efforts to remove barriers on financial services and strengthen intellectual property rights. On April 1, 2020 China removed the caps on foreign ownership of financial services, letting U.S. firms soak up more of the profits from their operations in China. The Wall Street giants were quick to respond. Within days, JP Morgan committed $1 billion to buy the other 49 percent of its joint venture in China. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley soon followed. This just added to the steady increase in U.S. investment into China over the last two decades. Additionally, $2.2 trillion worth of Chinese companies are capitalized on U.S. markets. These financial entanglements indicate that distancing can only lead to a “messy divorce,” according to Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago. “They are tied together in so many ways – trade, investment, tourism, student and academic exchanges – as well as distrustful on so many issues,” Rajan said. “Looks like a bad marriage to me, and they need to figure out how they work out their differences.” Since a total decoupling is not in the cards, could the Biden administration’s approach to the U.S.-China relationship bear fruit for workers when one considers that any worker related demand is likely to have to be balanced against the interests of the financial sector? Policy Opportunities Since the 1990s even when labor provisions were secured in trade agreements, there was little hope of enforcement. Though 14 U.S. free trade agreements have labor provisions, only seven complaints have ever been submitted and only one resolved. This, however, may be changing. “Trump’s ham-fisted, clumsy, cynical, ignorant, desire to approach trade from a different angle did allow for greater attention to issues like labor rights than anyone thought was possible,” said Trevor Sutton from the Center for American Progress. When the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), a.k.a. NAFTA 2.0, was signed at the end of January, 2020 the list of people that celebrated it included Donald Trump’s brash conservative trade representative, Robert Lighthizer; AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka; and a folk singer named Ryan Harvey, who cut his teeth protesting the evils of capitalism before joining Global Trade Watch. In order to be in compliance, the Mexican Congress had to pass a new labor law. Employers in Mexico can be brought to a court chaired by the U.S. trade representative (USTR) and secretary of labor for violating their workers’ right to form a union. If the dispute is unable to be resolved bilaterally, then the United States may directly sanction the Mexican company for violating workers’ right to organize. The new NAFTA also mandates that 40-45 percent of car components be made by a worker earning at least $16 per hour, or be subject to tariffs. The USMCA will rely on activists to bring cases, something that has caused many to question its applicability in authoritarian contexts. The recent experience of Vietnam and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), however, may be more analogous to what could be possible with China. While the TPP was being negotiated, Vietnam’s manufacturing sector was experiencing a long wave of wildcat strikes. Many reformers believed the answer was to give workers a legal avenue to organize and collectively bargain. The TPP negotiations were able to provide cover for the reformers in this system and nudge the skeptics to reform Vietnam’s labor laws. Though the labor agreement fell apart when the United States pulled out of the TPP, Vietnam has recently legalized “worker representative organizations at the enterprise level,” said Joe Buckley of Vietnam Labor Update. It has also signed on to certain International Labor Organization (ILO) collective bargaining conventions that strengthen workers’ right to organize, a first for the one party “socialist” state. A Worker-First Approach to China Like Vietnam, China’s industrial sector faced a wave of strikes in the 2000s and 2010s. In China, just as in Vietnam, reformers in the country’s single party-controlled union federation began to experiment with collective bargaining, especially in the manufacturing hub of Guangdong province. Talk about instituting a “right to strike” emerged amidst a strike wave in 2010. Then came 2013. Xi Jinping took the reins of the Communist Party and set out to remake China and the **crackdowns began**. **Labor NGOs**, labor studies professors, progressive labor lawyers, and even Marxist students have been **shut down**, arrested or otherwise silenced. “Although China enacted a series of **pro-worker laws** in the late 2000s, many of these provisions **are poorly implemented**,” said Eli Friedman, professor at Cornell University (Disclosure: Eli Friedman is one of the author’s supervisors at the China Labor Translation Project). “As has been the case in countless other countries, **China would** likely **experience reduced inequality and greater domestic consumption** **if independent trade unions were allowed to flourish** — thus advancing their own stated policy aims.

#### China’s Economy is on the brink of collapse – only solving poverty can reverse it.

Lopez 10-24 Linette Lopez 10-24-2021 "If China's economy keeps stumbling, it won't just take down Beijing - the whoel world will collapse with it" <https://archive.md/M4qjY#selection-2241.0-2250.1> (Linette is the senior finance correspondent at Business Insider, writing a combination of opinions and analysis. She joined BI in the summer of 2011 after graduating from Columbia University's School of Journalism.)//Elmer

**China's economy** — the 2nd-largest in the world — **is teetering on the brink of disaster**. Since this spring, Beijing has **canceled** initial **public offerings**, **fined tech companies** billions for antitrust violations, forcibly **shut down** China's entire for-profit **education industry**, and **sent CEOs running** for the exits to avoid the government's ire. Even more dire, the Chinese megadeveloper Evergrande recently started missing payments on its more than $300 billion in debt, shaking global markets. The convulsions have woken the world up to a startling new possibility — that Beijing may be willing to allow some of its private corporate behemoths to collapse in a bid to reshape the economic model that made China a superpower. The **upheaval**, spanning multiple industries and vast swaths of the country, **is** the result of one giant issue: **China's inability to** **borrow or buy** its **way out of its current economic crisis**. **For decades**, the country **relied on cheap labor** and eye-popping amounts of debt, handed out by government-owned banks, to fuel economic growth — pouring money into massive apartment developments, factories, bridges, and other projects at lightning speed. **Now** the **country** **needs people to actually use**, **and pay for**, **everything that's been built**. But the **bulk of China's population lacks** the **income needed to shift the economy** from one driven by state investments to one sustained by consumer spending. As a result, China finds itself stuck with a system that is overbuilt and overindebted. Take the country's $52 trillion property market, of which the Evergrande mess is the poster child. With money easy to borrow, real-estate speculation became a popular way to store and build wealth for China's young middle class. One academic described this model to me colorfully as an "addiction to real-estate cocaine." It's also been called a "treadmill to hell." As the government now attempts to deflate the real-estate bubble without bursting it, it has been forced to prepare the country for a period of slower growth and belt-tightening. And to make matters worse, China is also facing an energy crisis fueled by skyrocketing coal prices as well as a working-age population that is getting old without enough resources to retire on. In the face of all of these obstacles, Beijing has made a dubious choice. Instead of continuing to open the economy to spur growth, the Chinese Communist Party is closing it. Under President Xi Jinping, Chinese socialism is reverting to a model not seen in decades, with tighter state control over much of the economy. That's why you're seeing Beijing cancel massive IPOs and level entire industries. Economists expect this ideological shift to slow growth even more, which in turn would make China's attempts to transform its economy that much more precarious. "I think Xi is incredibly ideological, and he's focused on his legacy," Charlene Chu, a debt analyst at Autonomous Research, told me. "He really wants to reshape China and put it on the global stage — and that does require a reset from the way we've been doing things previously." The transition from open markets to state control won't be easy to manage, and there's much at stake — for all of us. If Beijing fails at its ambitious plan, it could set off shock waves that would crater the global financial system, slow trade, and devastate businesses worldwide. The resulting chaos, and the crisis of faith in the CCP that would accompany it, could lead to social instability in China, spurring the central government to place an even tighter grip on civil society. In short, Beijing is walking an economic high-wire act, trying to replace its economic model with something unknown. In the process, the weight of its old, debt-ridden system is causing China to wobble. And if the country falls, it could take the rest of the world with it. What China is and how it came to be If you want to pinpoint the moment that set China on the path to where it is today, you have to go back to 1984. That's when Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Communist Party, approved the Decision of Reform of Economic Structure, which rewrote the rulebook for the Chinese economy. Instead of the state directly operating every industrial sector, it would now allow state-owned businesses to flourish without direct government involvement. That ideological flexibility — combined with the country's creation of a modern banking system — paved the way for the emergence of privately-owned companies. Freed from direct government oversight, and flush with free-flowing loans, China's manufacturing sector boomed. People from rural areas flocked to fill the privately-owned, debt-built factories, and a middle class took shape. In 1992, 27% of the country lived in urban areas. By 2020, the number had grown to 61%. All of this growth was supercharged in 2009, during the global financial crisis. Seeking to avoid a downturn, the CCP ordered banks to spray loans all over the economy, especially to the property sector. But as the debt bubble grew, the new buildings remained empty. Despite the booming economy, many Chinese weren't making enough money to afford the homes they were building or the goods they were producing. It was around 2011 when the world started to notice China's jaw-dropping ghost cities and bridges to nowhere. Economists wondered when the debt bubble would pop, and there were several close calls. In 2015 it looked like China's property market would collapse, along with the local governments that had helped finance them. But officials gave the sector a jolt by tearing down slums and relocating residents into new buildings. china apartment construction Chinese developers have used debt to build thousands of office and apartment buildings that are still sitting vacant — and now pose a threat to the economy's stability. Zhang Peng/LightRocket/Getty Images The following year, Beijing started the process of slowly working the debt out of the system. It allowed some companies to default on their loans, ordered local governments to shut down redundant factories, and shuttered coal mines that were no longer needed to supply them with energy. But as extreme as these efforts were, they barely made a dent in China's debt bubble. And that's just one side of the equation. Without a constant churn of new manufacturing and construction jobs, there's little hope left for hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens who left their villages to make money in the city. According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, 600 million people have barely $2,700 to spend a year. With housing prices in major cities soaring, what President Xi refers to as "The Chinese Dream" — the idea that even the poorest in the country would take part in China's rapid growth and modernization — is starting to look out of reach. Chinese socialism is changing (again) In an attempt to revive the Chinese dream, Xi is pushing the idea that China is moving toward "common prosperity." But exactly what that means is hard to say. It could mean higher taxes for the high-income citizens who benefited most from privatization — the generation of supertycoons who were allowed to "get rich first," as Deng Xiaoping urged. Or perhaps it's simply an attempt, using the socialist rhetoric of old, to steel citizens for more volatile times ahead. But either way, it won't help matters if Xi's common-prosperity agenda turns out to hurt the country's new middle class. The only certainty is that China is returning to extreme state intervention, private industry be damned. In the starkest example of state control, China wiped out its entire for-profit education sector in July, sending markets in the US, where some of the companies were listed, into a tailspin. "They took it to nearly zero in a matter of days," Chu said. "It shows a willingness to tolerate a lot more volatility and pain than people expected." Part of the upheaval, it's important to note, is also about power. By moving to rein in China's wealthiest citizens, Xi is effectively hoarding power for himself and the CCP. Jack Ma, the billionaire founder of Alibaba, was once a ubiquitous presence in Chinese society. But since the government started clamping down on his businesses, he's largely disappeared from view. The founder of ByteDance, the company that owns TikTok, also stepped down as CEO, saying he preferred "solitary activities." Even online fan clubs for pop stars are being regulated to encourage devotion to the party. Last month, the former chair of China's top liquor maker was sentenced to life in prison for taking bribes. There is danger to this lack of power sharing and pluralism of opinions. Historically, the CCP has been a tug of war between openers and closers — those who want to welcome outside market forces and those who seek to restrict foreign access. But now the balance of power has shifted. Xi is a defiant closer, and his consolidation of power — including a lifetime appointment to the presidency — has left no pro-opening opposition to push for a course correction should things go awry. Jack Ma Alibaba Founder China Tycoons like Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba, have been avoiding the spotlight as the Communist Party cracks down on private enterprise in a bid to consolidate power. Mark Schiefelbein/AP Photo And things have a good chance of going awry. As Beijing tries to move the economy toward a new, more insular model, it will have to avoid the land mines left by the old one. Consider Evergrande, now teetering on the edge of default. Xi's willingness to tolerate the credit squeeze on big developers shows just how committed he is to remaking the economy. Last summer, to deflate the property sector, Beijing introduced new credit metrics known as the three red lines. Developers were required to hold more cash so they could cover their indebtedness if things went sideways. Evergrande couldn't raise the money — and it's not the only one. Earlier this month Fantasia Holdings, a luxury-property developer, defaulted on a $206 million bond payment. Investors around the world still don't know when — or whether — the Chinese government will stop the bleeding. At the end of September, Chinese authorities met with the state-owned banks to let them know their role in all of this — above all else — would be to protect homeowners and keep the economy going, without resorting to their old debt-driven tricks. "The nuanced message from authorities is: 'Don't pull the funding so these units can't be completed, but don't fund an aggressive expansion of more new developments either,'" Chu told me. Once again, walking a tightrope. The property fiasco also means Beijing needs to run a confidence game on two fronts. Investors need to believe the Chinese government can figure out how to restructure the most indebted property developers without causing a sudden crash for the real-estate sector — a task that will become more difficult as more developers show signs of strain. And consumers need to have the confidence that buying homes with cash in the midst of a credit crunch is a smart move, in the expectation that property values will keep rising. "If confidence in presales tumbles, that could be game over," Chu said. "It would bring everything to a halt immediately." That, in turn, could trigger a plunge in real-estate values and send Chinese banks — and an entire world of investors holding their debt — careening into chaos. The balancing act would be tricky to manage under any circumstances. But it's made far more difficult by China's sudden energy crisis. Electricity prices have more than doubled this year, as pandemic lockdowns lifted and demand for goods soared. China's domestic coal stores were already down, thanks to the government's earlier wave of mine closings, and Beijing made things worse by banning coal imports from Australia, which was pushing to investigate the origins of the coronavirus pandemic. Factories in 20 of China's 31 provinces have suffered a loss of power, and companies including Tesla and Apple have said the crisis will hurt their supply chains. If Xi is initiating a power grab, it will be hard to pull it off without power. Someone find the off ramp All of these not-growing pains would be easier to deal with if the world were in a cooperative mindset with China. But it's not. Under Xi, China has become more bellicose on the world stage. It has encroached on democracy in Hong Kong, set up concentration camps for Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang province, intimidated its neighbors in the South China Sea, and menaced Taiwan as never before. In response, Western policymakers have dug in their heels. In May, the European Union torpedoed a trade deal with Beijing after China sanctioned members of the European Parliament for speaking out against human-rights abuses in Xinjiang. US officials, upset that China isn't purchasing nearly as many American goods as it promised to under a trade deal with the Trump administration, are also taking a hard line. Earlier this month, in a speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai made it clear Washington wanted Beijing to open its markets and respect the international rule of law. "Above all else, we must defend — to the hilt — our economic interests," Tai said. That's not what America sounds like when it's cutting another country some slack. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping. As President Xi Jinping reins in for-profit companies, President Joe Biden has made clear that America will, in the words of his trade representative, "defend to the hilt our economic interests." Paul J. Richards/AFP/Getty Images But all the saber-rattling isn't likely to alter the economic reality. China has no real option at the moment but to slow its growth, and a slow-growth China will inevitably act as a brake on the global economy. As Joyce Chang, the global head of research for JPMorgan, observed in a recent talk, a 1-percentage-point decline in China's growth takes half a point off global growth. Morgan Stanley estimates that from 2022 to 2025, China's growth will be 0.4 percentage points lower each year than previously estimated — and that's the best-case scenario. If investment contracts sharply, **China's growth** could **drop** by 1.2 points lower each year — which in turn **would depress economies worldwide**. China's slowdown will most directly affect its near neighbors in **Asia — South Korea and Taiwan** — as well as energy and commodity suppliers, like Russia and Norway. And the entire world will feel the weight of China's weakness through slower, more expensive exports. What's more, the economic repercussions will almost certainly be accompanied by social upheaval. The Stanford economist Scott Rozelle worries that Beijing will respond to any threat to its authority by ratcheting up nationalistic sentiment. From its inception, the modern Chinese economy has been full of contradictions. It combined socialist management with a dynamic private sector. It created a massive debt bubble that failed to pop. Throughout all this economic modernization and social transformation, speedy growth kept Chinese society stable. But **if** Xi's attempts to sort out **China's** economic discrepancies cause that **growth** to **evaporate**, social stability could well vanish along with it. If that happens, **we risk** more than **the collapse of the global economic order**; we risk the shattering of global peace as well.

#### Chinese Economic Decline leads to all-out War – specifically over Taiwan.

Joske 18 Stephen Joske 10-23-2018 “China’s Coming Financial Crisis And The National Security Connection” <https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/chinas-coming-financial-crisis-and-the-national-security-connection/> (senior adviser to the Australian Treasurer during the 1997–98 Asian crisis)//re-cut by Elmer

The biggest **national security issues**, however, **arise from** the unpredictable **political impact of a recession in China**. We learned this, or should have, during the 1997 to 1998 Asian crisis. China may have had a disguised recession or near recession in 1998, but it was in a much smaller economy. Apart from that one episode there is no collective memory of recession and how to deal with it. As such, **China** is now **psychologically unprepared** to deal with the challenges of a recession. China’s coming recession will be accompanied by a large uncontrolled devaluation of the RMB as foreign exchange reserves evaporate, so it will be impossible to conceal this time. All asset prices, including housing prices, will be hit. **Combine** the **shock** of an unexpected economic setback **with tensions** in a one party state where a single individual has been calling the shots, and **political instability could set in.** While Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has not eliminated corruption, it has created many enemies who are biding their time. Minxin Pei has documented the activities of China’s powerful corruption networks. These networks, not a debilitated civil society, represent the alternative government of China. Competition between them could easily be destabilizing in a winner-take-all political environment. While our understanding of elite politics in China is poor, a recession would likely discredit the existing leadership and **set off intense competition between corrupt factions** for control of China. Bo Xilai, a former Chongqing party chief and Politburo member, was purged in 2012 but his son appears to still be interested in politics. While the outcome is impossible to predict, we can **see** the conditions in place for destabilizing events ranging from **military adventurism** to **civil war**. Alternatively, the regime could reassert its stability through increased repression, which would make China harder to deal with and would spill over into the Chinese diaspora. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has never had a real economic base. It is all about power projection (such as the Gwadar port) and would quickly be dropped by Beijing as a post-crisis China becomes focused on domestic political and economic stability. **Any Chinese military adventurism is likely to be focused on Taiwan.** China’s military is currently poorly equipped for an invasion of Taiwan, which has difficult geography and a substantial military, making an invasion of Taiwan unlikely to succeed. However, it is possible the Chinese **leadership would miscalculate** the risks, leaving it in a limited war with no clear resolution that would quickly **draw in Japan and the U**nited **S**tates. China has spent most of its history disunited, reflecting its geography. It has a number of widely dispersed economic centers. It was in outright civil war as recently as the 1960s. If competition between political factions remains unresolved, a civil war could develop, leaving China as a battleground where Russia, Japan, and the United States seek to influence the outcome. This scenario would stall or even end China’s rise as a global military and political power.

#### Taiwan goes Nuclear.

Talmadge 18 [Caitlin, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-China War Could Spiral Out of Control,” accessible online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>, published Nov/Dec 2018]//re-cut by Elmer

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a **military confrontation**—resulting, for example, **from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan**—**no longer seems** as **implausible** as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. **China**, by contrast, not only has **nuclear weapons**; it has also **intermingled** them **with its conventional** military **forces**, **making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other**. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. **Conventional forces** can threaten nuclear forces in ways that **generate pressures to escalate**—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. **If U.S. operations endangered** or damaged China’s **nuclear forces,** Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, **Beijing might** reluctantly **conclude** that limited **nuclear escalation**—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—**was** a **viable** option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The **most worrisome flash point** for a U.S.-Chinese war **is Taiwan**. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored **U.S. strategy** to ensure a conventional victory **would** likely **endanger** much of China’s **nuclear arsenal** in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in **wartime developments** that could **shift** **China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions.** If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline. If such escalation appears far-fetched, China’s history suggests otherwise. In 1969, similar dynamics brought China to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In early March of that year, Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards amid rising tensions over a disputed border area. Less than two weeks later, the two countries were fighting an undeclared border war with heavy artillery and aircraft. The conflict quickly escalated beyond what Chinese leaders had expected, and before the end of March, Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear threats to pressure China to back down. Chinese leaders initially dismissed these warnings, only to radically upgrade their threat assessment once they learned that the Soviets had privately discussed nuclear attack plans with other countries. Moscow never intended to follow through on its nuclear threat, archives would later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed otherwise. On three separate occasions, they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow sent representatives to talks in Beijing, China suspected that the plane transporting the delegation was in fact carrying nuclear weapons. Increasingly fearful, China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon in the Lop Nur desert and put its rudimentary nuclear forces on alert—a dangerous step in itself, as it increased the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch. Only after numerous preparations for Soviet nuclear attacks that never came did Beijing finally agree to negotiations. China is a different country today than it was in the time of Mao Zedong, but the 1969 conflict offers important lessons. China started a war in which it believed nuclear weapons would be irrelevant, even though the Soviet arsenal was several orders of magnitude larger than China’s, just as the U.S. arsenal dwarfs China’s today. Once the conventional war did not go as planned, the Chinese reversed their assessment of the possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree bordering on paranoia. Most worrying, China signaled that it was actually considering using its nuclear weapons, even though it had to expect devastating retaliation. Ambiguous wartime information and worst-case thinking led it to take nuclear risks it would have considered unthinkable only months earlier. This pattern could unfold again today.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

* Checked

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

#### Chinese leadership solves existential threats and establishes global governance.

Yamei 18 Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, <http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491>

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced*.* The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous statein such key areas as global economic governance and climate change*.* Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics*.* The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily*.* All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other *civilizations.* So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced**.** China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.

#### They presume a closed system and refuse action on the basis that “nothing will change” and ignore the history of Black resistance.

Gordon 15 (GOAT, the leading scholar of Fanon in the US, PhD from Yale, Professor of Philosophy and African American Studies at UConn) (Lewis, Lewis Gordon presents "What Fanon Said", Speech at Red Emma’s hosted by former Towson debater Ben Morgan, 6/10/2015, http://ontologicalummah.tumblr.com/post/122600387439/there-is-this-discussion-going-on-and-a-lot-of)

The first thing to bear in mind you may wonder why in the beginning of the talk I talked about philosophical anthropology. And many people when they are trying to talk about social change, they never think about what a human being is and this is something Fanon pays attention to. Many people want to have closed conceptions of human beings because then human beings can be predicable. And in fact, in Fanon’s writing he gave an example in which he said: one of the problems is that when he would walk in reason seems to walk out. Now, one problem we have to bear in mind when we try to look at the question of human beings in terms of rigid closed systems is that we often are trying to get as a model of how we work as theorists on issues of social change that are actually based on what we can call law like generalizations. Now what is a law like generalization? It is when you make sure that whatever you say has no contradiction down the line. So if you are to say this much, the next stage must be consistent with that, and the next stage until you are maximally consistent. Do you get that? But here is the problem—and I can just put it in a nut shell—nobody, nobody in this room would like to date, be married to, or be a best friend with a maximally consistent person. You know what that is. Its hell. And this tells you something, because if somebody where maximally consistent, you know what you would say that person is not reasonable. And we have a person here who does work on Hegel that can point out this insight, that a human being has the ability to evaluate rationality. Now why is that important? Because you see the mistake many of us make is we want to push the human being into that maximized law like generalization model. So when we think about our philosophical anthropology, some people, the question about intersectionality for instance, what some people don’t understand is that what intersectionality is raising is important insight. Nowhere is there ever a human being who is one identity. People talk about race; do you ever really see a race walking? You see a racialized man or woman, or transman or transwoman, or [inaud], you see what I’m getting at. Do you ever see a class walking? Class is embodied in flesh and blood people. And we can go on and on, a man, a woman, a color, and so forth. So if we enrich our philosophical anthropology, we begin to notice certain other things. And one of the other things we begin to realize is that we commit a serious problem when we do political work. And the problem is this. The question about Wilderson for instance. There is this discussion going on, and a lot of people build it on my early books. I have a category that I call, as a metaphor, an ‘anti-Black world’ – you notice the indefinite article: AN anti-Black world. The reason I say that is because THE world is different from an anti-Black world. The project of racism is to create a world that would be anti-Black, anti-woman. Although that’s a project, it’s not a fait accompli. People don’t seem to understand how recent this phenomenon we’re talking about is… From the perspective of a species that’s 220,000 years old, what the hell is 500 years? And we create a false model of how we study those 500 years when we forget that people have been fighting and resisting. Had they not been fighting and resisting, we wouldn’t be here. The problem in the formulation of pessimism and optimism is they are both based on forecasted knowledge, a prior knowledge. But humans don’t have prior knowledge. And in fact, what in the world are we if we need to have prior knowledge to act? You know what you call such people? Cowards. The fact is, our ancestors, enslaved ancestors who were burning down the plantations and finding clever ways to poison the masters, who were organizing meetings for rebellions – none of them had any clue of what the future would be 100 years later… But you know why they fought? Because they knew it wasn’t for them.

#### Effective global governance prevents unregulated emergent tech – prevents extinction

Bailey 18 Robert Bailey, Vision of Earth contributor and computer science masters, 9-5-2018, "Why do we need global governance?," Vision of Earth, <https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/>

Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen.1 The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3 We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier. There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4 Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways – we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves. Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination. Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

#### Our narrative around China’s Rise ruptures Western understandings of IR.

Cho and Hwang 20, Young Chul, and Yih-Jye Hwang. "Mainstream IR theoretical perspectives and rising China Vis-À-Vis the west: The logic of conquest, conversion and socialisation." Journal of Chinese Political Science 25.2 (2020): 175-198. (The School of International Studies, Chonbuk National University)//Elmer

Embedded Orientalism in Mainstream IR **Mainstream IR scholarship**, under the cloak of objective scientific knowledge production, thus **reflects** the identity and **interests of the West**, specifically the Anglo- American world, **by encouraging** its **scholars to exclude non-Western systems of thought** and using its theoretical perspectives **to** justify and **perpetuate Western hegemony** ([42, 95]: 167–83). Our analysis of the Self/Other relations in each mainstream IR perspective suggests that realist, liberalist, and constructivist perspectives are ‘problem-solving’ approaches, as opposed to critical approaches ([18]: 204–54). To paraphrase Cox’s [18] renowned statement — ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ — mainstream IR theoretical perspectives are always for great, hegemonic powers and for the purpose of securing an international system designed for the security and interests of those great hegemonic powers. In international affairs, the Self is the hegemon (often the West), and the Other is the subordinate (often the Rest). The Self is the proactive subject, and the Other is a mere object to be controlled by the Self for the Other’s own good. The Other’s subjectivity is often missing or ignored. Normatively and meta-theoretically, this way of thinking is tied to logocentrism, ‘which at once differentiates one term from another, prefers one to the other, and arranges them hierarchically, displacing the subordinate term beyond the boundary of what is significant and desirable in context’ ([36]: xvi). From Plato through to the present time, logocentrism has been the dominant mode of producing meaning in Western culture. In the context of Jacques Derrida, Delanty [21] says that logocentrism is ethnocentric because it privileges Western thought over all other forms of thought and makes Western reason the sole criterion for ‘correct and universal’ knowledge. It is easily discernible that logocentrism is theoretically akin to Said’s [93] notion of Orientalism, which notices the Orient as the most recurring image of the Other, the West’s ‘contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience’ that helps to define what the ‘West’ is. In critical IR literature on China, Chengxin Pan’s study on Western representations of China’s rise is particularly illuminating. In Knowledge, Desire, and Power in Global Politics [82], Pan first provocatively asserts that ‘China watching rarely watches itself’. He argues that although it is commonly held as ‘objective truth’, **Western knowledge of China’s rise is** in **fact less about ‘China’; rather**, it is **a reflection of** ‘a certain **Western self-imagination and its quest for** certainty and **identity’** ([82]: viii). Pan then persuasively demonstrates the ways in which two prominent Western ‘paradigms’ – namely: **China** the ‘**threat’** and China the ‘opportunity’ – have steered and **shaped Western understandings** of China, determining ‘certain acceptable ways of making sense of China and facilitate the production of knowledge along those lines’ ([82]: 22). To him, these two paradigms are produced by a longstanding ‘colonial desire’ of the West towards China. Whereas ‘the ‘China threat’ paradigm bears the stamp of fears, the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm can be best seen as manifestations of modern fantasies’ ([82]: 16). In addition, the presumed superiority of the West over its Others suggests that only one single (Western) path leads to the end form of human civilisation or history [31], that is, the one represented by Western civilisation. Western civilisation is thus understood to be not only different from its Eastern counterpart, but far superior to it. Western-centrism in this sense is prescriptively built upon the assumption that the totality of Western culture is universal. External geographical or cultural differences thus come to be represented as Others that could constitute a threat to Western universality. In such a Manichaean world of morality, the Self and the Other are essentially different, and the **temptation** is strong **to translate Self/Other into** a logocentric **good/evil binary** framework **that provides a moral basis for conquest**, conversion, and socialisation. IR examples of this are US President Ronald Regan’s use of ‘evil empire’ to describe the Soviet Union in 1983 and US President George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address describing Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil.’ Thus, the logic of conquest, conversion, and socialisation when dealing with Others is often justified by stealth in mainstream IR perspectives. Realism, liberalism, and constructivism never provide value-free IR knowledge; rather, they are normative theories for the hegemon. Logocentrism and Orientalism have here been shown to constitute the hidden normative underpinning of those mainstream IR theoretical perspectives. As Pan [81] rightly noted, the US perception of the Other (i.e., China) as a threat is closely linked to how US policymakers see themselves ‘as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation.’ By tracing mainstream IR’s understanding, explanation, and interpretation of its practices, we have shown how logocentrism and Orientalism manifest themselves in the discipline. Therefore, in the rest of this article, we turn to a case study — the rise of China — to examine our deliberation of Self-Other relations in world politics and test our initial proposition about the mechanisms through which and the conditions under which Self-Other relations function when theorising about international relations.

#### Reject Sweeping Claims about IR – IR is a good, minimalist theory to explain war and governance – abstract critiques have zero concrete solvency.

Wæver and Buzan20 [Ole and Barry; May 15th; Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen; Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics; KU, “Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit,” Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit; GR]

Racism is a powerful, malignant force in world politics, and our discipline, IR, has deeply problematic entanglements with it. It is a serious matter both to come intellectually to grips with this and to find the most effective strategies to act on it. We worry that more serious problems and possibilities are marginalised by an ultimately very inward-looking and scholastic exercise where a particular definition of racism and a specific theoretical perspective makes it possible to deem the vast majority of scholarship in IR ‘racist’, ‘methodologically white’ and ‘antiblack’- every work that does not explicitly follow one exact version of anti-racist scholarship. Especially, the role played in H&RM’s argumentation by our sins of omission does ultimately seem to rest on the premise that only their distinct form of scholarship can be redeemed, because even post-colonial scholarship and critiques of euro-centrism are not enough; you are a racist if you do not follow exactly this particular route. It is not important whether your scholarship actually supports or hinders anti-racist analysis or political engagement; it is all about who you cite and what declarations you make. Here, a theory is not judged by what can be done with it, but by the question whether self-appointed anti-racists can find supposedly problematic sentences somewhere in its key texts. In this section, we will first point out that the H&RM article is a personal attack on us for racism, despite their reassurances about the opposite. Then, we discuss what an analysis of structural racism (systems of power) could amount to, given that they claim to do one but utterly fail to do so, resorting instead to a pretend examination of the foundations of ST. Next, we discuss what could be methodological guidelines for actually proving whether or not a theory like ST is racist. H&RM’s usage of the term racism for all scholarship that does not foreground race as the primary theme, means that 99% of IR will be ‘racist’. There will be no room for any other scholarship (unless you will live with the moniker of being racist). Not only does this seem very unproductive in terms of disciplinary conversations, not to talk of diversity and pluralism, it also means that it becomes very hard to use the category of ‘racism’ for critical purposes for those cases where it actually is at stake in a sense closer to what the rest of the discipline, and indeed the public discourse, means by it. It has been watered down by the fact that everyone but those in critical whiteness studies have been deemed racist, one by one, where we just happened to get the special honour of being among the first. H&RM might protest that this is not their plan, but we fail to see how this can be avoided when the logic they apply is that the term racist can be based primarily on sins of omission in the sense of a theory being focused around other categories. As documented above, they claim numerous times that ST ‘occludes’ or ‘refuses’ various dynamics relating to race that they find important, but they never offer any basis for concluding that the theory makes it harder to see these things, only that it does not as such zoom in on them. This does not have to do with a choice particularly regarding race but the structure and nature of the theory as a general analytical apparatus that can be applied to all instances where actors try to securitize or desecuritize something, and the user is free then to include race more or less in this analysis, just as the theory is not deciding how important nationalism is or gender51, but it enables the analysis of the way different categories and distinctions become politically mobilised in security struggles. H&RM will probably argue that if you do not mention race in these contexts, you ‘hide’ it. Three answers: 1) no, there is a difference between not mentioning and hiding, it takes a step more of the critic to show that the theory prevents something from being articulated or that it uses abstractions that stand in the way of articulating race; that certainly is the case for some theories, so it is a legitimate avenue of critique, but they haven’t shown this, 2) the theory is intentionally (as we have explained numerous times) minimalist in having a clear conceptual core and then not putting all kinds of factors like the role of media or populism into the theory -- not because we haven’t noticed these factors but because they belong in applications, and the theory exactly allows you to study these phenomena, 3) we are very explicit that one of the advantages of a minimalist theory is the ability to combine it with other theories especially general theories about the nature and structures of society; one should not build out ST to become a general theory of society or international relations, better in any specific usage of the theory combine it with the theories one finds productive for the particular research project. (Wæver 2011, 2015) The latter point has come up in replies to the ‘sociological’ version of ST (Balzacq), which has more of a tendency to add all relevant factors to the theory, while the classical Copenhagen version is tight and invites combination with theories that complement it, which could exactly be theories of race and racism. Our ultimate concern here is: how do we actually get to study racism in world politics in a practically and politically helpful way? When developing our own framework, ST, we took care to make sure it could do critical work in concrete analyses, in our view on racism as well, and H&RM fail to show that this is not the case. In addition, we have then on a more mundane, human level engaged ourselves in various ways to foster non-Western scholarship and theories in IR (Tickner & Wæver 2009; Acharya & Buzan 2010, 2019). One has for instance co-founded a book-series with the aim to identify “alternatives for thinking about the ‘international’ that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West” and “provincializing the West” (quoting from the Routledge homepage of the book series); the other has amongst many other things re-written this history of the IR discipline to show both that it has ignored non-Western contributions and that the Western part of it is indebted to ‘scientific racism’ (Buzan & Lawson 2015; Acharya and Buzan 2019). Closer to ST, the project in Buzan & Wæver 2003 was to a large extent to challenge the euro-centrism enshrined in dominant conceptions of polarity and of the relationship between global and regional, to enable theories to be more attentive to actual security dynamics in ‘most of the world’. Surely, all of these efforts can be critically assessed as to what has been helpful and what hasn’t. But we find it strange that H&RM choose to ignore completely the possibility of assessing the ability of ST to form the basis for helpful analyses of racism. They neither look at those analyses that have actually been done, nor do they show systematically why it would be impossible to do so. On the contrary, they limit themselves to highly abstract and indirect attributions of racism to the theory as such through various unconvincing routes. From this they deduce (without any discussion) that ST can’t inform studies of racism (and when it has actually done it, they presumably are able to magically make those publications go away) (see section 6 below). H&RM offer no explanation as to how their type of analysis helps in combating racism. It is unclear if it is a kind of ground clearing operation to be followed up by new and better theories after getting us out of the way. Or whether they believe that we are so much a part of the oppressive structures that attacking us is in itself liberating. Or -- as we will consider below in more detail -- the whole exercise is more about making universities more inclusive and hospitable to students and scholars of colour. Closely linked to the latter option, their rationale could be that the attack is meant more as a kind of ‘happening’ drawing attention to the question of race. Especially in the latter case, it would be intentional that the article plays ambiguously with making a very personal attack while pretending not to.

#### Root cause explanations of international politics don’t exist – methodological pluralism is necessary to reclaim IR as emancipatory praxis and avoid endless political violence.

Bleiker 14, Roland. "International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique." (2014): 325-327. (Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland)//Elmer

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, **the key challenge in** international relations (**IR**) scholarship **is** what he calls “**unchecked reification**”: the widespread and **dangerous** process of **forgetting** “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because **IR deals with** some of the most **difficult issues**, from genocides to war. **Upholding one subjective position** **without critical scrutiny can** thus **have far-reaching consequences**. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. **Methodological pluralism** lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates **multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena.** He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. **No single method can ever adequately** **represent the event or should gain the upper hand.** But **each should**, in a way, **recognize and capture** details or **perspectives** that the **others cannot** (p. 102). In practical terms, this **means** **combining** a range of **methods** even when—or, rather, precisely **when**—**they are deemed incompatible**. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how **reification may be “checked at the source**” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### Fears of Chinese Rise are rooted in White Western Colonial Narratives.

Singh 18 Ajit Singh 4-9-2018 “China’s rise threatens U.S. imperialism, not American people” <https://mronline.org/2018/04/09/chinas-rise-threatens-u-s-imperialism-not-american-people/> (Lawyer and Writer)SEM//re-cut by Elmer

When beginning its reform, China sought to “keep a low profile” and “bide its time, while building up strength”, as the U.S. led an international offensive, destructively imposing neoliberalism on countries throughout the global South. Today, we are in the midst of a turning point. Announcing to the world that it is entering a “new era” at last year’s National Congress of the Communist Party, China is playing a more assertive and leading role in global affairs. The country’s trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative—called “the largest single infrastructure program in human history”—involves over 70 countries and 1,700 development projects connecting Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Meanwhile, mired in economic stagnation and decline, the U.S. is its losing international authority. In particular, during the “America First”-era, the country’s reputation has plummeted, as the Trump administration unilaterally withdraws from international institutions and agreements, displays open bigotry towards developing countries, and eschews diplomacy for insulting arrogance and genocidal threats. U.S. hostility towards China increases That China and the U.S. are moving in opposite directions is not a new phenomenon, but this trend has been brought into sharp focus under Trump. Growing anxious about its diminishing global dominance, the U.S. demonstrates increasing hostility towards China. In a series of recent policy statements – the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and State of the Union address – the Trump administration has repeatedly identified the “threat” posed by “economic and military ascendance” of China, declaring that “[i]nter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” It is claimed that China, along with Russia, “want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.” In response to this “danger,” the Trump administration is pursuing a substantial buildup in U.S. military forces, viewing “more lethal” and “unmatched power [as] the surest means of our defense.” Trump’s 2019 budget proposes a massive increase in Pentagon spending to $716 billion and he has assembled a war cabinet to make use of it, including extreme hawks and noted anti-China hardliners such as John Bolton, Mike Pompeo and Peter Navarro. These moves come after top U.S. military officer, General Joseph Dunford, called China the country’s “greatest threat” and U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris, new ambassador to Australia, told Congress in February that the U.S. must prepare for war with China. Washington is increasing military pressure on Beijing: ratcheting up tensions on the Korean peninsula; taking steps to construct a “quadrilateral” alliance with right-wing governments in India, Japan and Australia, targeting China; and passing the Taiwan Travel Act which violates the “One China” policy and encourages the U.S. “to send senior officials to Taiwan to meet Taiwanese counterparts and vice versa” On the economic front, the Trump administration seeks to launch a “trade war” with Beijing and form a broad anti-China alliance, proposing $50 billion in tariffs targeting Chinese imports (and threatening $100 billion more), launching an investigation into technology transfers to China, and lodging formal complaints at the World Trade Organization on “the state’s pervasive role in the Chinese economy.” Washington is increasingly regulating and monitoring inbound Chinese investment, outbound U.S. investment in China, and joint ventures. Viewing technological dominance as a pillar of its international authority, Washington considers China’s development and technological advance to be an “existential economic threat.” As this animosity increases, **U.S. rhetoric towards China calls to mind** the virulent anti-communism of the Cold War and **racist “yellow peril” phantoms** of decades past. Newly appointed Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently warned that China was trying “to infiltrate the United States with spies – with people who are going to work on behalf of the Chinese government against America … We see it in our schools. We see it in our hospitals and medicals systems. We see it throughout corporate America. It’s also true in other parts of the world … including Europe and the UK.” Similarly, FBI director Christopher Wray told Congress in February that “the whole of Chinese society” is a threat to the U.S. That such belligerent statements can be made towards 1.4 billion people, one-fifth of humanity, without receiving any challenge from Democrats, Republicans or the corporate-owned media, is an indication of the consensus around the “China threat” theory in the U.S. establishment, and the danger this poses. A new Cold War Washington’s hostility towards Beijing is rooted in the foundation of modern U.S. foreign policy. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and end of the Cold War, ushered in an era during which the U.S. has sought to establish unipolar global dominance. Explicitly outlined in a 1992 Defense Policy Guidance paper authored under neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz, the principal objective of U.S. foreign policy in this period has been “to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival” capable of challenging U.S. aspirations for global hegemony. In the quarter-century since, the U.S. has aggressively pursued this aim, engaging in endless wars, “regime change” efforts, and military build-ups around the world, now operating over 900 military bases globally. Despite these most destructive efforts, the U.S. has been unable to stop China’s momentous rise, which has emerged as the primary obstacle to U.S. aims for unipolar dominance. Although Washington has sought regime change in Beijing ever since the socialist revolution of 1949, the U.S. has generally pursued a strategy of “containment through engagement” following the normalisation of bilateral relations in the 1970s. In part, Washington had hoped that China’s economic reform and the fall of the Soviet Union would lead to political reform in Beijing and the abandonment of Communist Party leadership and socialism with Chinese characteristics, in favour of Western-oriented neoliberalism. History has confirmed that China has no such intention. Recognizing its own declining leverage and that China will not become “more like us”, Washington is attempting to launch a new Cold War against China. The identification of China as the primary target of U.S. foreign policy originated during the Obama era with the “Asia pivot” seeking to encircle China, shifting 60 percent of U.S. naval assets to Asia by 2020. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton argued that the U.S. must reorient the focus of its foreign policy from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific to ensure “continued American leadership well into this century.” The developments under Trump, mark an escalation of this bipartisan strategy. The unipolar-multipolar struggle The importance of U.S.-China relations cannot be overstated, with the two countries at the core of a broader unipolar-multipolar struggle over the shape of the international order. While the U.S. seeks to secure global dominance, China’s rise is central to a multipolarisation trend, in which multiple centres of power are emerging to shape a negotiated, more democratic world. **China’s political orientation has been** fundamentally **shaped by its** history of **subjugation to foreign powers** during its “century of humiliation” **and anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation**. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, **China** has **always identified** itself **as part of the** Third World or **global South and** the **collective struggle** of formerly colonized and oppressed nations **against** the global inequality wrought by **imperialism**. Under the banner of “South-South cooperation”, China continues to champion this collective struggle today, promoting greater say for developing countries in global governance and the construction of a rules-based international order in place of the unilateral actions of major powers, in particular the U.S. More than mere rhetoric, China provides crucial investment, infrastructure construction, technology transfers, debt forgiveness, and diplomatic support to developing countries. Most importantly, **unlike the U.S.** and West **which engage in destructive foreign interventions, China abides by** the principle of **non-interference** in the internal affairs of other countries and does not impose conditions on its relations. China’s respect for the self-determination of other countries has made it an indispensable partner for nations resisting foreign domination and pursuing independent development, **including Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Zimbabwe, Syria, Iran, and North Korea**. It is for this reason that the late Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro declared in 2004 that “China has objectively become the most promising hope and the best example for all Third World countries … an important element of balance, progress and safeguard of world peace and stability.” Venezuelan foreign minister Jorge Arreaza echoed these sentiments last December, saying “Thank God humanity can count on China,” as his country faces sanctions, economic sabotage, and threats of regime change from the U.S. Contributing to the declining global authority of the U.S, **China’s** international **relations have prompted Washington to** cynically **accuse China of** fostering dependency in Africa and **being an “imperial power”** towards Latin America. In fact, **rather than behaving** in a **predatory** manner, **China provides** sorely needed **funding**, on favorable terms, **to African borrowers**, **and** as we have seen above China **supports Latin America’s struggle against imperialism**. **That China is praised by fiercely independent nations of the global South and faces such charges from the U.S.—the most powerful empire in history—reveals the absurdity of such claims**. Anxious about its own decline, the U.S. seeks to both drive a wedge between China and the South, and also restrict the right of developing nations to choose their own partners and path. China has demonstrated that its rise is compatible with the self-determination of other nations—whether capitalist or socialist; what it comes into contradiction with is U.S. imperialism. It is important to recognize that U.S. hostility towards China is not simply a product of narrow competition with the Asian power, it is a resistance to the empowerment of the global South and democratization of international relations. China is the primary target of U.S. imperialism because of its strategic importance at the heart of the world multipolarisation trend, which threatens to bring an end to U.S. international supremacy and 500 years of Western global dominance. An opportunity for ordinary Americans For years, the U.S. political establishment has sought to leverage American workers in its struggle against China. Endless rhetoric about how China is “stealing U.S. jobs” seeks to stir up xenophobia and racism in order divert attention from the fact that it was Washington and U.S. corporations that implemented the neoliberal reforms which hollowed out America’s economy. On a near daily basis, the corporate-owned media further promotes hostility towards China with hawkish, sensationalized and dishonest reporting. In recent months, Americans have been told that China, with its “model of totalitarianism for the 21st century”, “has a plan to rule the world”, that its “‘long arm’ of influence stretches ever further”, its “fingerprints are everywhere” as it “infiltrates” U.S. classrooms, colleges, and more. The message is clear: be afraid. However, for ordinary Americans, multipolarity and the strengthening of international forces, like China, which challenge U.S. imperialism are not a threat. Instead, this offers the potential for progressive advances for the American people in their own struggles. The 20th century provides a historical precedent for this, where the existence of the Soviet Union and a concrete socialist alternative to capitalism along with the wave of Third World national liberation struggles, placed pressure on Western capitalist countries, including the U.S., to respond to their own people’s demands for progressive social and economic policies, such as the welfare state, higher taxes on the wealthy, and anti-racist measures. Similarly, today, as the U.S. and the world face tremendous social, economic and environmental challenges, Chinese socialism is demonstrating a concrete alternative to the dominant capitalist system: pledging to eradicate poverty by 2020; with wage growth soaring and real income for the bottom half of earners growing 401 percent since 1978 (compared to falling by one percent in the U.S. during that time); declaring healthcare to be a universal human right; praised for having the “best response to the world’s environmental crisis” and reducing pollution in cities by an average of 32% in just four years since declaring a “war on pollution”; becoming “a world leader in wind, solar, nuclear and electric vehicles”; building the world’s longest bullet-train network, spending more on infrastructure than the U.S. and Europe combined; and announcing that inequality, not economic underdevelopment, is now the “principal contradiction” to be addressed in Chinese society. China is able to prioritize social and environmental policies—while sustaining rapid, crisis-free economic growth for four decades—because, unlike the U.S., the interests of corporations and wealthy do not rise above political authority. China’s wealthy regularly face severe repercussions for criminal behaviour (instead of bailouts). For example, an annual list of China’s richest citizens is commonly called the “death list” or “kill pigs list” because those named are often later imprisoned or executed—according to one study 17% of the time. While China is not a perfect society and continues to face many challenges, the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics has been able to respond to a number of pressing issues facing the world today, better than the U.S. capitalist system. This is likely why China leads the world in optimism, with 87% feeling the country is headed in the right direction, compared to only 43% feeling the same in the U.S. The new Cold War that Washington seeks to launch against China requires massive increases in military spending, paid for by ordinary Americans with massive cuts to already inadequate social programs, housing support and health care. If the American people can reject the Cold War mentality of their ruling class and arrogant notions of “American exceptionalism”, China’s rise could offer them the opportunity to learn how to build a society that better meets their needs.

### 1AC: Framework

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 3] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

**Moen 16**, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### 4] Extinction outweighs

**MacAskill 14** [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

### 1AC: Underview

#### Interpretation – at all toc bid distributing tournaments, Debaters must disclose previously read positions with popped tags, full citations, and first and last three words of each piece of evidence within 30 minutes of each debate on the NDCA 2020-2021 LD wiki.

#### Violation:

#### Reject semantic I meets- they didn’t disclose anything

#### [1] Research- debaters wont make it an entire topic with the same case unless they update it and frontline nuanced positions—disclosure allows for more specific research and goes into more depth

#### [2] Accessibility – disclosure is key to smaller school debaters alleviating big school prep outs – they’re able to scout but small school debaters don’t have the teams to figure out the affs being read. Disclosure is inevitable – the question is whether it happens on a mutually accessible forum. Not disclosing excludes minorities uniquely which proves accessibility.

#### 3] Evidence – disclosure is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – otherwise you could have unethically misrepresented authors.

#### Ci DTD - the sole purpose of 1ac theory is to deter arguments and anything else lets the 1nc read it regardless

#### No RVIs - otherwise they can spend 7 minutes on the shell and the debate ends right there