### 1AC – FW – Standard

#### Objective appeals to ethics fail:

#### [A] Intuitionism - Each individual’s experience influences the way they interpret the truth i.e. a person brought up in a racist household is more likely to interpret the claim that all black people are criminals as a true statement, so even if we could have an objective view of truth that would be tainted by the subjective experiences of individuals.

#### [B] Motivation - Even if agents can obtain an objective viewpoint, they wouldn’t be obligated to act upon those truths, so their subjective views must be reconciled to make moral action motivational in the first place, which is necessary because a non-motivational theory would be arbitrary and its normative value does not matter in so far as we aren’t forced to follow it.

#### [C] Self-Defeating - Determining what is the most objective view point requires a subjective choice which means objective viewpoints aren’t even objective – also means that action under one framework isn’t exclusive of action under another. Meaning offense under one index is sufficient to affirm.

- Φ = “act”

Enoch 11 [David Enoch, ethicist and philosopher of law who holds the Rodney Blackman Chair in the Philosophy of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “Giving Practical Reasons,” 2011, *Philosophers Imprint*, Vol. 11, No. 4, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0011.004, RC EA]

I should also note something it does not take for the role played by the given reason in the receiver’s practical reasoning to be appropriate. It is not required that the role be, as it were, ultimate.51 In other words, it is perfectly consistent with robust reason-giving thus understood that there be a further, fuller, perhaps more basic story of why it is that B does and should take A’s relevant intentions as reason-giving. Perhaps, for instance, B is a simple utilitarian, and let’s further assume that simple utilitarianism is indeed the true fundamental story about all reasons for action. If so, B will take A’s request as a reason to Φ if and only if, and because, doing so will maximize utility. But this does not mean that ~~she~~ doesn’t take, in those cases, A’s request to be a (nonultimate) reason. The crucial question is whether the ultimate (or perhaps just more basic) story here is one that goes through the reasongiver’s special intentions identified above (and the receiver’s recognition thereof), as in the case of the utilitarian request-receiver, in which case we may have a case of robust reason-giving; or whether the more basic story here works directly, leaving no role for the specific intentions that make reason-giving robust (as is the case in the dictator’s child example). Cases of this latter type are not, on the account I’m suggesting here, cases of robust reason-giving. And this seems to me the independently plausible result here.

Notice that the intentions mentioned above do not include something like the intention that B actually Φs. This is so because A can give B a reason to Φ knowing well that other reasons may be relevant, including possibly stronger reasons not to Φ.52 Indeed, it seems to me A can make a genuine request that B Φs, all the time acknowledging that if certain other considerations bear on the case, B should not (all things considered) Φ. We do not want to restrict robust reason-giving to just the cases in which the reason-giver intends the given reason to outweigh all others. For similar reasons, A need not intend that the given reason be the only reason for which B Φs.

#### This means the meta-ethic must be perspectivism because every agent has a different subjective viewpoint – The only way to reconcile these disagreements is through an omniperspectivist view of epistemology. The omniperspectivist is the only way to form obligations because anything else allows people to escape ethics through choosing to follow their own ideas.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with international law, which best accounts for all perspectives since it’s consistent across almost the entire world so it’s the most effective way to combine all viewpoints.

#### Prefer independently:

#### [A] Static Actor Specificity – ‘private entities’ are only defined as ‘non-governmental entities’. What constitutes a government is a process of recognition established by I law – Sealand proves only external institutions can discern between a legitimate and illegitimate state – alternative is planting a flag in the ground and claiming that counts as a State. Means only I law grants an understanding of the subject of the resolution – what private entities are.

#### [B] Private Accountability: Only our FW can hold private actors accountable for actions in space that are outside the sovereign domain of their corresponding national governments and restrict their actions within certain defined norms

#### [C] Normativity – If ethics are subjective, the only obligation that can exist is one to your own entity which means that reward/punishment scales like sanctions control the answer to the normativity question.

#### [D] Regress: I-law prevents infinite regress of asking why and how a moral action or evaluation is attributable to the agent, as (1) agents consent to the contracts so the regress terminates in internal motivation or (2) defines the duties and boundaries of state policy which already contextualizes how certain actions are attributable to governments.

#### [E] Morals innately imply contractarian theories like I law

Gauthier 87[David Gauthier, Distinguished Service Professor emeritus, University of Pittsburg Department of Philosophy, “Morals by Agreement | Overview of a Theory,” 1987, Oxford University Press, pp. 8-9, RC: EA – gendered language edited]

3.1 Morals by agreement begin from an initial presumption against morality, as a constraint on each person's pursuit of ~~his~~ [their] own interest. A person is conceived as an independent centre of activity, endeavouring to direct his capacities and resources to the fulfilment of his interests. ~~He~~ considers what ~~he~~ [they] can do, but initially draws no distinction between what ~~he~~ [they] may and may not do. How then does he come to acknowledge the distinction? How does a person come to recognize a moral dimension to choice, if morality is not initially present?

Morals by agreement offer a contractarian rationale for distinguishing what one may and may not do. Moral principles are introduced as the objects of fully voluntary ex ante agreement among rational persons. Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a premoral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices. But the parties to agreement are real, determinate individuals, distinguished by their capacities, situations, and concerns. In so far as they would agree to constraints on their choices, restraining their pursuit of their own interests, they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do. As rational persons understanding the structure of their interaction, they recognize a place for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

That there is a contractarian rationale for morality must of course be shown. That is the task of our theory. Here our immediate concern is to relate the idea of such a rationale to the introduction of fundamental moral distinctions. This is not a magical process. Morality does not emerge as the rabbit from the empty hat. Rather, as we shall argue, it emerges quite simply from the application of the maximizing conception of rationality to certain structures of interaction. Agreed mutual constraint is the rational response to these structures. Reason overrides the presumption against morality.

#### [F] Hijacks any framework since it your framework is really key to morality it would be included in international law or any other contract since we derive these contracts from deliberation which is able to solve for inherent epistemic weakness.

### 1AC – FW – Extra – TJF’s

#### Prefer our FW for theoretic reasons – we don’t think TJFs are good BUT if they are then it affirms so no TJFs bad

#### [A] Real World Policy Making: private actors must actively abide by international agreements like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Outweighs on time frame and portability since our framework forces debaters to understand international contracts.

#### [B] Anti-Colonial Pedagogy: International institutional focus shifts research away from trying to justify existing commercial space programs in the Global North like the US and Japan towards discussing the impacts of historical inequality and methods to address that.

#### [C] Topic lit: The core of topic debate and vast majority of literature is based around whether or not I law like the OST permits appropriation – every advocate is about international institutions like the UN which means I law is the only predictable interpretation.

### Advocacy

#### Thus, I affirm the resolution – The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust – as a general principle.

#### Is-ought fallacy – “is” is descriptive, not prescriptive. Cohon 18

Rachel Cohon (Her fields of interest are ethics, the philosophy of action, and the history of ethics. She is the author of Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication (Oxford University Press, 2008), a book reinterpreting Hume's meta-ethics and virtue ethics. She has also written a number of articles on Hume's moral and political philosophy and theory of the passions, and on systematic topics related to normative reasons for action. She edited a volume of articles on Hume's ethics, Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy (2001), and wrote the entry on Hume's moral and political philosophy in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. She is also interested in applied ethics and wrote the article on ethical issues pertaining to disability for the Encyclopedia of Bioethics (2003). She teaches graduate courses in moral theory, including such topics as consequentialism vs. deontology vs. virtue ethics, moral realism, the normativity of ethics, and eighteenth century moral philosophy), 8-20-2018, "Hume's Moral Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2018 Edition)," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/hume-moral/>, //hzheng

Hume famously closes the section of the Treatise that argues against moral rationalism by observing that other systems of moral philosophy, proceeding in the ordinary way of reasoning, at some point make an unremarked transition from premises whose parts are linked only by “is” to conclusions whose parts are linked by “ought” (expressing a new relation) — a deduction that seems to Hume “altogether inconceivable” (T3.1.1.27). Attention to this transition would “subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason” (ibid.). Few passages in Hume’s work have generated more interpretive controversy. According to the dominant twentieth-century interpretation, Hume says here that no ought-judgment may be correctly inferred from a set of premises expressed only in terms of ‘is,’ and the vulgar systems of morality commit this logical fallacy. This is usually thought to mean something much more general: that no ethical or indeed evaluative conclusion whatsoever may be validly inferred from any set of purely factual premises. A number of present-day philosophers, including R. M. Hare, endorse this putative thesis of logic, calling it “Hume’s Law.” (As Francis Snare observes, on this reading Hume must simply assume that no purely factual propositions are themselves evaluative, as he does not argue for this.) Some interpreters think Hume commits himself here to a non-propositional or noncognitivist view of moral judgment — the view that moral judgments do not state facts and are not truth-evaluable. (If Hume has already used the famous argument about the motivational influence of morals to establish noncognitivism, then the is/ought paragraph may merely draw out a trivial consequence of it. If moral evaluations are merely expressions of feeling without propositional content, then of course they cannot be inferred from any propositional premises.) Some see the paragraph as denying ethical realism, excluding values from the domain of facts. Other interpreters — the more cognitivist ones — see the paragraph about ‘is’ and ‘ought’ as doing none of the above. Some read it as simply providing further support for Hume’s extensive argument that moral properties are not discernible by demonstrative reason, leaving open whether ethical evaluations may be conclusions of cogent probable arguments. Others interpret it as making a point about the original discovery of virtue and vice, which must involve the use of sentiment. On this view, one cannot make the initial discovery of moral properties by inference from nonmoral premises using reason alone; rather, one requires some input from sentiment. It is not simply by reasoning from the abstract and causal relations one has discovered that one comes to have the ideas of virtue and vice; one must respond to such information with feelings of approval and disapproval. Note that on this reading it is compatible with the is/ought paragraph that once a person has the moral concepts as the result of prior experience of the moral sentiments, he or she may reach some particular moral conclusions by inference from causal, factual premises (stated in terms of ‘is’) about the effects of character traits on the sentiments of observers. They point out that Hume himself makes such inferences frequently in his writings.

#### CP’s and PIC’s don’t negate because they don’t disprove the general thesis of my aff. Resolved is defined as[[1]](#footnote-1) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined.

#### Here’s some definitions for the debate –

#### Affirm means to express agreement[[2]](#footnote-2) and you already know I do.

### Offense

#### Expert consensus, implication, definitions, and historical context all conclude that private appropriation violates international law – specifically, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.

Tronchetti 8 [Fabio Tronchetti, PhD in International Space Law (Leiden University); Co-Director of the Institute of Space Law and Strategy and a Zhuoyue Associate Professor at Beihang University, “The Non–Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of International Law: A New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,” 2008, *Air and Space Law*, Vol. 33, Issue 3, pp. 277-305, https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021, EA – OCR’d]

However, most (other) members of the space law community agree that both national appropriation and private property rights are denied under the Outer Space Treaty. Several lines of reasoning have been advanced to support this view.

Stems and Tennen, for example, affirm that the argument that Article II does not apply to private entities since the latter are not expressly mentioned fails for the reason that they do not have to be explicitly listed in Article II to be fully subject to the non-appropriation principle.9 Private entities are allowed to carry out space activities but, according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, they must be authorized to conduct such activities by the appropriate State of nationality. But, if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in the prohibited activity. Jenks argues that: ‘States bear international responsibility for national activities in space; it follows that what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered company created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer’.10 It has also been suggested that the prohibition of national appropriation implies prohibition of private appropriation because the latter cannot exist independently from the former.11 In order to exist, indeed, private property requires a superior authority to enforce it, either in form of a the State or of some other recognised entity. In outer space, however, this practice of State endorsement is forbidden. Should a State recognise or protect the territorial acquisition of any of its subjects, this would constitute a form of national appropriation in violation of Article II.

Moreover, the interpretation of the term ‘national’ as only referring to States and not to private operators, is not acceptable. As has been suggested by Kerrest, the word ‘national’, as used in the Outer Space Treaty, is defined by Article VI to comprise all activities, whether or not conducted by governmental or non-governmental entities.12 The prohibition of national appropriation of outer space contained in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, therefore, extends to and is fully applicable to appropriation performed by public as well as private entities.

There are also historical arguments for rejecting the theory that private individuals are not covered by the prohibitions of Article II. The fact that individuals are not mentioned in the text of Article II has a specific reason. When the Outer Space Treaty was being negotiated, States were the only subjects actually carrying out activities in outer space. Indeed, private operators were not involved in any space project or initiative at that time and for years to come. The drafters of the Treaty could not foresee that at some future point in time nongovernmental entities would assume a leading role in performing space activities and that their presence would be crucial for the development of outer space.

Another, perhaps more important, reason for the absence of any reference to individuals or companies in Article II is the attitude of the Soviet Union and its allies at the time: they were, as a matter of principle, opposed to private activities in outer space and would not consider any provision in the Treaty that could be regarded as giving specific rights or any other separate formal recognition to private enterprise: Article VI was created for the specific purpose to meet their concerns in this respect and strike a balance with the US view that private enterprise activities were a (future) reality and should be treated as such in the Treaty.

This consideration also helps us to reject another argument which is used by a number of authors, mainly from the United States, to maintain that private operators are not covered by the terms of Article II.13 These authors compare the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty with those of the 1979 Moon Agreement14. Article XI para. 3 of the Moon Agreement, indeed, further elaborates the text of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty by forbidding the acquisition of property rights by private operators and non-governmental entities over the Moon and other celestial bodies and their resources.15 In the view of these authors, the fact that the drafters of the Moon Agreement introduced a similar provision was a clear attempt to remedy a mistake or ‘loophole’ in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, namely the absence of any reference to private individuals. Considering, therefore, that the United States as well as the other space powers are not parties to the Moon Agreement, these authors claim that the only legally binding provision for these States is Article II. As a consequence, individuals or private companies are fully entitled to appropriate outer space and any parts thereof. This interpretation should be rejected. It has already been demonstrated that the absence of any mention of non-governmental subjects in the wording of Article II resulted from the negotiating position of the Soviet bloc and from the fact that private enterprise was not involved in space activities at the time. The insertion of a specific provision regarding private operators in Article XI, par. 3 of the Moon Agreement, was largely due to the fact that, at the end of the 1970’s, non-governmental entities were emerging as relevant players in space activities. This caused the drafters of the Moon Agreement to pay particular attention to these promising newcomers when formulating the rules concerning the exploitation of the Moon and its resources. Moreover, it may be said, that the presence of a specific clause on private subjects was the result of the introduction of the Common Heritage of Mankind idea in the context of the Agreement. By declaring the Moon and its resources to be the ‘common heritage of mankind’,16 the drafters of the Agreement wanted to rule out any doubt about the fact that both private and public entities were not allowed to appropriate either the Moon or its resources.

Furthermore, there exist other historical elements to support the argument that both the exercise of State sovereignty and the creation of private property rights in outer space are forbidden by Article II. During the negotiations of the Outer Space Treaty, the Delegate of Belgium affirmed that his delegation: ‘had taken note of the interpretation of the non-appropriation advanced by several delegations - apparently without contradiction - as covering both the establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law’.17 The French Delegate stated that: ‘there was reason to be satisfied that three basic principles were affirmed, namely: the prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space’.18 The fact that the signatures and ratifications of the Outer Space Treaty were not accompanied by reservations or interpretations of Article II, further proves that this issue was regarded as settled during the negotiation phase.

Thus, we may conclude that prohibition of appropriation of outer space or parts thereof is a rule applicable to both private and public entities. The theory that private operators are not bound to this rule is a myth not supported by any valid legal argument. Moreover, as it has already been stressed, if any entity was allowed to appropriate parts of outer space, the basic aim of the drafters of the Treaty, namely to prevent a ‘colonial competition’ in outer space and to create the right conditions for an exploration and use of outer space carried out for the benefit of all States, would be betrayed. Therefore, the need to protect the non-appropriative nature of outer space ie eminently relevant.

#### Article VI does too – court decisions prove we’re legally correct.

Su 17 [Jinyuan Su, Professor and Assistant Dean at Xi'an Jiaotong University School of Law, China, “Legality of unilateral exploitation of space resources under international law,” 2017, *International & Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 66, Issue 4, pp. 991-1008, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589317000367, EA]

It is argued that to interpret Article II as permitting private appropriation would defeat the purpose of the treaty.35This argument is tenable, as appropriation by States and appropriation by private entities have the same consequence of hindering free access to outer space. That the term of 'national appropriation' was intended to cover both public and private appropriation is confirmed by the drafting history of the Outer Space Treaty.36In any case, Article VI of the treaty provides that State parties shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space carried out by governmental agencies and non-governmental entities, as well as 'for ensuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty'.37It follows that both governmental and private commercial space mining ventures would be required to comply with principles of international space law.38The appropriation of outer space by private entities should thus be treated as appropriation by their States, which is prohibited.39Based on the above rationale, domestic courts have declared private claims over and sales of celestial bodies, in part or in whole, to be illegal.40These judgments are subsequent State practice in the application of Article II, which helps establish agreement among the parties regarding the above interpretation.41

#### Unjust means unlawful – means winning offense external to framework is sufficient to affirm.

USDCWDA 98 [United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division “Colonia Ins. Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 13 F. Supp. 2d 891 Civil No. 97-2115,” 07/10/98, LexisNexis, EA]

Arkansas law is clear on the issue that in the realm of unjust enrichment, the word "unjust" means "unlawful." "One is not unjustly enriched by receipt of that to which he is legally entitled. \* \* \* No recovery of money received can be based upon unjust enrichment when the recipient can show a legal or equitable ground for keeping it." Halvorson v. Trout, 258 Ark. 397, 403, 527 S.W.2d 573, 577 (1975) (quoting Whitley v. Irwin, 250 Ark. 543, 550-51, 465 S.W.2d 906, 910-11 (1971)). See also, Jackson County Grain Drying Coop v. Newport Wholesale Electric, Inc., 9 Ark. App. 41, 46, 652 S.W.2d 638, 640 (1983) (no one shall be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another; the word "unjustly" means "unlawfully").

### U/V

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false

#### Prefer:

#### [1] Constitutivism: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[3]](#footnote-3) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[4]](#footnote-4) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolutional focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity.

#### [2] Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate.

#### [3] Inclusion: any other role of the ballot would inevitably exclude offense – only truth testing gives you the ability to read whatever you want because it’s offense under it – link turns your role of the ballot because we can still have discussions of your arguments under our framing

#### Permissibility and presumption affirm –

**A] Freezes action- otherwise we would not be able to justify morally neutral actions like drinking water since there isn’t a prohibition and we would needlessly have to prove an obligation.**

**B] Trivialism- statements are true until proven false, if I told you my name you’d believe me.**

#### C] Affirming is harder – that was above

#### D] Negation Theory- Negating requires a complete absence of an existing obligation

Negate [is to]: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate.

#### E] The Law of Excluded Middles: if something is not false, it must be true, which means that if something is not prohibited, it must be obligatory, and permissibility is the same as obligatory.

### 1AC – Advantage

#### Privatization of space is unsustainable and increases debris – triggers the Kessler Syndrome

Thompson 21 [Clive, 11/17/21, Clive Thompson is a contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine, a columnist for Wired and Smithsonian magazines, and a regular contributor to Mother Jones. He’s the author of Coders: The Making of a New Tribe and the Remaking of the World, and Smarter Than You Think: How Technology is Changing our Minds for the Better. He’s @pomeranian99 on Twitter and Instagram, “Get Ready for the “Kessler Syndrome” to Wreck Outer Space,” OneZero, <https://onezero.medium.com/get-ready-for-the-kessler-syndrome-to-wreck-outer-space-7f29cfe62c3e>] Justin

Back in 1978, the astrophysicist Donald Kessler made an alarming prediction: Space junk could wreck our ability to keep satellites aloft. In a fascinating paper, Kessler noted that “low earth orbit” — a region between 99 miles and 1,200 miles up — was getting pretty crowded. In 1978 there were already 3,866 objects being tracked in space. That included satellites used by scientists (say, to monitor weather) or spy agencies. It also included a lot of debris: Every time a rocket launches a satellite into orbit, it tends to leave stray bits of material. The thing is, when objects are zooming through space about 2 km/s, even something as tiny as a chip of paint can smash through glass or steel. Pieces of debris become bullets. What Kessler predicted is that sooner or later, objects in low-earth orbit would start colliding, and produce chain effects, like billiard balls colliding on a crowded pool table. If a piece of debris hit a satellite, it would produce more debris, which would to increase the risk of other collisions … and so on, and so on. At some point, you could reach a tipping point. There’d be so many chunks of debris that collisions would be inevitable, leaving low-earth orbit a junkyard where no satellites could survive. Remember the scene in Wall-E where they blast off Earth, and the planet is utterly ringed with crap? That’s what Kessler worried about. Except in our situation the pieces of junk could be quite small — billions of objects the size of grains of sand, which is actually a lot harder to deal with, because you can’t see it coming. In essence, Kessler predicted we could create an artificial asteroid belt of junk: The result would be an exponential increase in the number of objects with time, creating a belt of debris around the earth. This process of mutual collisions is thought to have been responsible for creating most of the astroids from larger planetlike bodies. Space folks began calling this the “Kessler Syndrome”. It was hard to predict when this might start happening. Kessler worried that conditions could be ripe by as early as 2000. Thankfully, that estimate turned out to be premature. But wow, it looks like it might happen soon. What’s happened recently that makes the “Kessler Syndrome” more likely? A couple of things: Way more satellites are going up The pace at which satellites are going up in the sky is simply exploding. Back when Kessler wrote his paper in 1978, we humans were launching about 53 new satellites a year. Going to space was hard. But now launches are an order of magnitude more common, and they’re increasing in pace rapidly. SpaceX in particular is launching oodles of satellites as it builds its orbital Internet-access service Starlink. In the last two years, it has put 1,740 satellites in low-earth orbit, with plans to eventually shoot 30,000 up there. This is part of a larger trend, which is … The privatization of outer space The private sector is rapidly becoming the dominant actor in space. There’s a huge demand for satellite data — everyone wants better info about weather, crops, traffic patterns, tree coverage, emissions, you name it, on top of the explosive use of satellites for communication and Internet. SpaceX’s remarkable innovations in rocketry (the leading folks, though others are following in their footsteps) have made it cheaper than ever to get a satellite into orbit. It is unlocking a huge pent-up demand for near-earth-orbit tech. More launches mean not only more intentional objects in orbit but unintentional ones — bits of rocket parts and detritus from launches.

#### Privatization exponentially increases the curve but ending dangerous missions prevents it.

Bernat 20 [Pawel, 2020, Military University of Aviation, “ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, Volume 4, PDF] Justin

5. Orbital satellite constellations and the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome Space 2.0 – the new era of space exploration that we witness now in the 21st century means, in words of Buzz Aldrin, “moving human enterprise into space” (Pyle, 2019, p. xiv). The process of commercialization of outer space has already begun and is not limited to private companies providing technologies and services for national or international space agencies, as it was in the past. On the contrary, private companies from the space sector have now matured to carry out their own independent projects. As for 2020, SpaceX is a company that serves as the best example – it launches satellites to the orbit, both for state and private contractors, it successfully realized two crew missions to the International Space Station, and is in the process of constructing Starlink satellite constellation that will provide high-speed internet access across the planet. Each satellite weighs around 260 kg, is equipped with an ion propulsion system, autonomous collision avoidance system, and orbits Earth at approximately 540-560 km altitude (Starlink, 2020). At the beginning of November 2020, more than 860 Starlink satellites were orbiting the Earth (Jewett, 2020). Immediate plans include launching 12,000 satellites, but they assume a potential later extension to 42,000 (Henry, 2019a). Of course, SpaceX has employed, at least declaratively, all necessary measures to keep the space clean – the satellites are equipped with the deorbiting system, and in the event of inoperability of the propulsion system (Starlink, 2020). The orbital collisions are, however, inevitable. As it was shown before, the possibility of collisions grows with the number of orbital objects. Bastida Virgili with the team compared (2016, p. 154-155) orbital debris environment development without and with a large hypothetical constellation consisting of merely 1080 satellites, distributed across 20 orbital planes at 1,100 km altitude (Fig. 5).

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

It has to be noted that although SpaceX’s Starlink is the only constellation that is being built in orbit, it is not the only one planned. There are at least a few initiatives aiming at the same goal – to construct internet infrastructure at the Earth’s orbit. The planned Kuiper Systems LLC, which is a subsidiary of Amazon and intends to place 3,236 broadband satellites in the LEO, is one of Starlink’s biggest competitors (Henry, 2019b). Now, there is even a rivalry between the two companies because Kuiper’s lowest orbital shell is planned to be 590 km, with a tolerance of 9 km either above or below (Cao, 2020), which is the altitude of Starlink satellites. Moreover, the race for space in orbit is now at the beginning. The outer space is vast. It increasingly becomes more cluttered with both operational satellites and space debris. The threat of collisions increases and no institution or body has enough power to license, coordinate and regulate what is sent to the orbit. The UNOOSA has not such power. National states decide what the companies from the space industry can launch to space. In the United States, which is most advanced in the area of private constellations, it is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that issues the appropriate approvals. The race to put broadband internet satellites bears similarities to the gold rush – there are no rules, at the global level, apart from first-come, first-served.

#### Debris causes nuclear war---Noko, Iran, and China.

Beauchamp 14 – Zack, 4/21/14, Zack Beauchamp is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on foreign policy and international relations. His work focuses on the rise of the populist right across the West, the role of identity in American politics, and how fringe ideologies shape the mainstream. Before coming to Vox, he edited TP Ideas, a section of Think Progress devoted to the ideas shaping our political world. He has an MSc from the London School of Economics in International Relations and grew up in Washington, DC, where he currently lives with his wife, daughter, and two (rescue) dogs [“How space trash could start a nuclear war,” Vox, <https://www.vox.com/2014/4/21/5625246/space-war-china-north-korea-iran>] Justin \*Brackets added for ableist language

If debris from a Chinese test destroys a US military satellite, the US could mistake it as a preemptive strike against its space capabilities — some of which are designed to detect nuclear missile launches. If the US thinks China is trying to take out its ability to detect a nuclear launch, things could get very bad, very quickly. Accidents aren't the only concern. Zenko also worries about intentional space attacks, either during peacetime or a crisis. Here, Iran and North Korea are probably bigger threats, though their ASAT capabilities are far from proven. North Korea has a pattern of ~~crazy~~ [irrational] military moves designed to extort concessions from South Korea and the West; it could extend that behavior to space. Iran, according to Zenko, "already views space as a legitimate arena in which to contest US military power." He worries that Iran might fire missiles into space "during a major crisis, especially if it believes war is imminent — an assessment that could have self-fulfilling consequences."


#### Any nuclear war causes extinction – ice age and famine.


Steven Starr 15 [Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the [Physicians for Social Responsibility](http://www.psr.org/). He has worked with the Swiss, Chilean, and Swedish governments in support of their efforts at the United Nations to eliminate thousands of high-alert, launch-ready U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html>] TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create [a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSAD.pdf). Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

### 1AC – Shell

#### Interpretation: At minimum, debaters must have their contact information disclosed on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD Wiki for pre-round disclosure.





#### Standards; 1] Pre-round prep, under your model no one would ever be able to contact debate before round for disclosure of the aff or to check interps, debate would become vacuous and underresourced schools would be the worst off since they don’t know norms like facebook to ask or look you up, even if in this round I was able to find you not every debater would check facebook and having a delineated mode of contact is better. That turns every impact making clash and education impossible as no one could know what you’re going to be reading or check any interps to facilitate better rounds, makes debate’s qualitatively worse. Contact info is BARE minimum and clearly you know wiki norms

#### Compting interps on shells about disclosure, it’s a question of the disclosure practice you chose to engage in and reasonability is insufficient when it comes to out of round norm setting, this is egregious and it’s a common practice so voting on reasonability is incoherent especially when they aren’t reasonable.

#### No RVI on 1AC theory or disclosure violations, you shouldn’t win for proving you disclosd, it also incentivizes you to sit on th shell for 7 minutes which moots topic ed and creates a 13-7 skew for the 1ar.

#### Disclosure of where to contact you is a basic norm and expectation and if you can’t meet it then you deserve to lose which also justifies DTD as DTA would a) be incoherent, as its an out of round violation b) is uniquely key to forcing you to change disclosure practices

#### Asking before round wouldn’t solve because NO one would know where to ask you, reject arguments specific to this round as they’re broadly incoherent since you can’t justify racism by saying “it didn’t affect you”

1. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-4)