### 1AC – Framing

**Presumption and permissibility affirm –**

**A] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.B] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason. C] Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong. D] Presuming obligations is logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation.**

**Conflicting ethical viewpoints does not require the inevitable exclusion of one over another but rather the acceptance that both could be relevant and valuable ethical tool. Thus, the meta ethic should be moral pluralism. Prefer-**

#### 1] Empirics- Best studies prove pluralistic tendencies are inevitable

Polzler and Wright 19[Thomas Pölzler and Jennifer Cole Wright- “Empirical research on folk moral objectivism” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686698/> NCBI. Published July 5th 2019] Dulles AS

Examining these studies' results more closely, however, makes it less clear whether this interpretation is appropriate (Pölzler, 2018b). Take again Goodwin and Darley's study. In this study, almost 30% of subjects' responses to the disagreement measure and almost 50% of their responses to the truth‐aptness measure fell on the option that the researchers took to be indicative of subjectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, pp. 1347, 1351). Moreover, while some moral statements were dominantly classified as objective (e.g., the above statement about robbery), many others were dominantly classified as nonobjective (e.g., the stem cell research statement). This suggests that subjects in Goodwin and Darley's study may have actually favored what Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (2013) called “metaethical pluralism,” i.e., they sometimes sided with objectivism and other times with nonobjectivism. More recent studies have by and large confirmed this hypothesis of folk metaethical pluralism. Wright et al. (2013) and Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (2014), for example, replicated Goodwin and Darley's results, using the exact same measures, but letting subjects classify the presented statements as moral and nonmoral themselves. Objectivity ratings for statements that were dominantly self‐classified as moral varied between as little as 5% and as much as 85%. Research based on different measures yielded high proportions of intrapersonal variation as well (e.g., Beebe, 2014; Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Wright, 2018; Zijlstra, forthcoming.

#### 2] Resolvability- Thousands of years of metaethical debates have concluded in indecisiveness so a 45-minute debate would be unable to correctly resolve nebulous ethical disputes and identify the correct theory. No cross applications from any other flow for the negative since they had a 7 minute nc so its their fault for not cross applying but yes crossaps for the aff since we only had 4 mintues so k2 nuanced clash .Resolvability outweighs on jurisdiction since it’s a meta-constraint on the judge’s final jurisdiction.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting pragmatic deliberation. Prefer-

#### 1] Value Pluralism- Other ethical theories rely on minimalistic criteria as their foundation, our framework resolves this by using these criteria to better inform our judgments LaFollete 2K "Pragmatic Ethics" [Hugh LaFollette](http://www.hughlafollette.com/index.htm) In [Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory](http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/b-guide.htm) 2000. Hugh LaFollette is Marie E. and Leslie Cole Professor in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. He is editor-in-chief of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. <https://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/b-guide.htm> Dulles AS

Pragmatic ethics takes a more aggressive approach, insisting that mankind is responsible for determining the best ethical system possible, which will be refined as new discoveries are made. Put simply; truth does not exist in some abstract realm of thought independent of social relationship or actions; instead, the truth is a function of an active … Pragmatism, according to William James, is derived from the Greek word pragma, which means action and serves as the basis of our English words practical and practice. Pragmatism originated in the United States around 1870, and now presents a growing third alternative to both analytic and Continental philosophical traditions worldwide. 1 - Acceptance . Ethics is a branch of philosophy that is responsible for studying the principles that govern the conduct of an individual. Employs criteria, but is not criterial The previous discussions enable us to say more precisely why pragmatists reject a criterial view of morality. Pragmatism's core contention that practiceis primary in philosophy rulesoutthe hope of logically prior criteria. Any meaningful criteria evolve from our attempt to live morally – in deciding what is the best action in the circumstances. Criteriaare not discovered by pure reason, and they arenotfixed. As ends of action, they are always revisable. Asweobtainnewevidenceabout ourselves and our world, and as our worlds changes, wefindthat whatwasappropriatefor the old environment maynotbeconduciveto survival in thenew one. A style of teaching that might have been ideal for one kind institution (a progressive liberal arts college) at one time (the 60s) may be wholly ineffective in another institution (a regional state university) at another time (the 80s). But that is exactly what we would expect of an evolutionary ethic. Neither could criteria be complete. Themoralworldiscomplexandchangeable**.** No set of criteriacouldgiveusunivocalanswersabouthowwe should behave in all circumstances**.** If we cannot develop an algorithm for winning at chess, where there are only eighteen first moves, there is no way to develop an algorithm for living, which has a finitely large number of "first moves." Moreover, while the chess environment (the rules) stays constant, our natural and moral environments do not. We must adapt or fail. While there is always one end of chess -- the game ends when one player wins – the ends of life change as we grow, and asour environmentschange. Finally, we cannot resolve practical moral questions simply by applying criteria. We do not make personal or profession decisions by applying fixed, complete criteria. Why should we assume we should make moral decisions that way? Appropriates insights from other ethical theories Nonetheless, there is a perfectly good sense in which a pragmatic ethic employs what we might call criteria, but their nature and role dramatically differ from that in a criterial morality (Dewey 1985/1932) . Pragmaticcriteriaare not external rules we apply, but aretoolsweuseinmakinginformedjudgements. They embody learning from previous action, they express our tentative efforts to isolate morally relevant features of those actions. These emergentcriteriacanbecomeintegratedinto our habits**,** thereby informingthe waysthat wereactto, think about, and imagine ourworldsand our relations to others. This explains why pragmatists think other theories can provide guidance on how to live morally. Standard moral theories err not because they offer silly moral advice, but because they misunderstand that advice. Othermoral theoriescan help us isolate(and habitually focus on) morallyrelevantfeaturesof action. And pragmatists take help wherever they can get it. Utilitarianism does not provide an algorithm for deciding how to act, but it shapes habits to help us "naturally" attend to the ways that our actions impact others. Deontology does not provide a list of general rules to follow, but it sensitizes us to ways our actions might promote or undermine respect for others. Contractarianism does not resolve all moral issues, but it sensitizes us to the need for broad consensus. That is why it is mistaken to suppose that the pragmatist makes specific moral judgements oblivious to rules, principles, virtues, and the collective wisdom of human experience. Thepragmatistabsorbstheseinsightsinto her habits, andthereby shapeshowshehabituallyresponds**,** and how she habitually deliberates when deliberation is required. This also explains why criterial moralities tend to be minimalistic. They specify minimal sets of rules to follow in order to be moral. Pragmatism, on the other hand, like virtue theories, is more concerned to emphasize exemplary behavior – to use morally relevant features of action to determine the best way to behave, not the minimally tolerable way

#### 2] Performativity- Responding to our framework concedes the validity of agonism since that in and of itself is a process of contestation that agonism would say is valuable and necessary for spaces like debate to function. No 2NR i/we meets they’re each a NIB for me to winning theory which kills my ability to check abuse.

**3] Hume’s Guillotine – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises since there’s an is/ought gap.** No 2NR “I meet” arguments- they’re each a NIB for me to winning theory which kills my ability to check abuse.

#### 4] TJFS- Frameworks should be fair/educational like any other argument. A] Inclusion – Deliberation definitionally is a procedural for allowing almost any argumentation in the debate space which controls the internal link to inclusion which is an impact multiplier B] Resource Disparities- Discursive frameworks ensure big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity and require a higher level of analytic thinking that small schools have. C] Treat each theoretical argument by the aff as drop the debater – they have the ability to meet them but chose not to and its key to normset.

#### 5] Accept aff interps and definitions A] causes regress since we can infinitely debate what something means but the aff speaks first which means they should define it. Evaluate the debate after the 1ac and before the 1nc – prevents anxiety caused by giving speeches. However, let me recontextualize their arguments since they can collapse for 6 minutes on something I misunderstood in the 1ar to end the round since the 2ar can’t answer.

#### 6] Deliberation is procedural not substantive, which means that we are first concerned with the decision-making procedure of deliberation and then evaluation of what impacts matter most. Reject 1NC shells – you have 13 minutes in the NC and 2NR to beat back 7 minutes of the 1AR and 2AR To clarify, consequences are a sequencing question. Serra 2

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: As LaFollette presents it, the key to understanding pragmatist ethics is that it is not an ethical theory per se, but rather it is an anthropology, a way of understanding the human being and his moral action. Therefore, pragmatist ethics in reality does not propose a new ethical theory, but rather “reconstructs” through a new prism the basic intuitions of the best ethical theories. The fundamental element on which the attention of pragmatist ethics centers is deliberation. Deliberationisnotdirectlyresponsible for directing action,butonly doessoindirectly**,** bymeans of a critique of past actions, theefforttocorrect or reinforce certain habits and mental experiments that each actor performs in order to determine his own future conduct, and even to determine in a general manner the way in which one wishes to live one’s life (or, what amounts to the same thing, the type of person one wishes to be). Thetaskofapragmatistethics, therefore**,** isnottoprovidefinalsolutions**,** butrather to indicate that it is onlyvia thetestingandcommunicationofexperiencesthatthe superiorityof onemoral ideaover another can be demonstrated. In this sense, one of the principal missions of any given version of pragmatist ethics is to indicate some general manner in which habits can be acquired which, later, will facilitate personal deliberation – both internal and external – in the broad variety of circumstances which make up the moral life.

#### 7] Prag is the only framework to reconcile different realities

MIT ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

**9] All negative arguments presuppose the aff being true since they begin with an descriptive premise about the affirmative, and then justify why X is bad. However, if the aff does not have truth value, that entails the descriptive premise would also not have truth value, which makes the argument a contradiction**

#### 10] a sentence p asserts p is false. if p is true or false, it is what it says so it is true. Denying truth claims collapses to all statements being true.

#### 11] lemons are purple or Santa exists proves the second part true cuz lemons aren’t purple and means any statement is true when swapped with santa exists including the rez

#### 12] The rules of logic claim that the only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

SEP [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] “An Introduction to Philosophy.” Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> TG Massa

Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false.  For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true.

#### If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot.

#### 13] Resolved is defined as[[1]](#footnote-1) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined,

#### 14] affirm means to express agreement[[2]](#footnote-2) and I did.

#### 15] Resolved is past tense which means the rez is already decided to affirm

#### 16] The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – answers collapse because you presume urs is true

#### A] The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[3]](#footnote-3) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[4]](#footnote-4) as to prove true so it's constitutive and jurisdictional

#### B] it’s the most logical since you don’t say vote for the player who shoots the most 3 points, the better player wins since debate is a game with rules given by how there’s a winner and loser.

### 1AC – Offense

#### The negative and I affirm the resolution Resolved: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right to strike.

#### Resolved is defined as[[5]](#footnote-5) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined.

#### 1] Strikes are intrinsically tied to public forums that provide opportunities for deliberation. Simms 18

Melanie Simms, 3-23-2018, "Why workers go on strike," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/why-workers-go-on-strike-93815

Both of these demonstrate how a strike around a fairly technical employment issue can develop a momentum of its own and become a catalyst for a much wider expression of dissatisfaction about the changing bargains being made. As with the concerns raised by junior doctors about [the management of the NHS](https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/01/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-junior-doctors-strike), the higher education pension dispute has rapidly become a space in which to question the [broader direction of the sector](https://theconversation.com/university-lecturer-explains-why-academics-are-striking-over-pension-cuts-93039). In this context, emotions can run high. Many relationships are strengthened, but some inevitably become strained. By definition, strikes are not business as usual. What then becomes important, is how the parties can explicitly negotiate compromises that smooth the way back to work – even if that means negotiating a new normal.

### 1AC – Underview

#### 1] Affs get 1ar theory, its key to checking infinite nc abuse that o/w on magnitude, anything else incentivizes negs to purposely read silly positions that deter from substantive engagement, its drop the debater with no rvis, and competing interps, dtd is key to rectifying abuse because the 1ar is time crunched, reasonability is arbitrary and triggers judge intervention, and rvis make affirming impossible because they can collapse for 6 minutes to an rvi on a 1ar shell, 1ar theory o/w because the 1ar is 4 minues and the 1nc is 7 so theres more abuse if im willing to dedicate that time to theory Vote aff because san mateo’s debate team is on the brink of dying and we only have four competitors so its key to ensuring smallers schools preservation in the activity which ow because it sustains diversity in debate which is prefiat and the only way to keep the activity going, me winning sets a precedent and will incentive people to compete, eval the theory debate after the 1ar because we both had 1 speech to read theory which is reciprocal. No 1NC contestation of paradigm issues because I would need to win 2 things, which is irreciprocal. Evaluate theory after the 1ar is a paradigm issue because it dictates how the judge evaluates theory.

#### 2] No 2NR “I meet” arguments A] Skews theory ground because they’re each a NIB for me to winning theory which kills my ability to check abuse.

#### 3] No new 2n arguments, weighing, and paradigm issues. A] overloads the 2AR with a massive clarification burden B] it becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2nr

#### 4] Check all neg interps and K/DA links in CX – 1) avoids infinite regress due to links and interps 2) otherwise reevlaute under the neg’s K 3) norms – you’d do the same with TFW

#### 5] Reject neg counterinterpretations since aff speaks first which means they constitutively define the terms of the round, any abuse is solved for you next round which makes fairness a question of your ability to engage in the same practice, any other conception is incoherent since the rules are clearly defined before entering.

#### 6] The neg may not read nibs or OCIs (offensive counterinterps) a) you can up-layer for 7 minutes that I have to answer before I even have access to offense

#### 7] No neg analytics - I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win.

#### 8] No neg arguments – skews me to answer those. No cross applications from any other flow for the negative since they had a 7 minute nc so its their fault for not doing it,yes crossaps for the aff since we only had 4 mintues so k2 nuanced clash Answering this triggers a contradiction since it relies on an analytic argument and those affirm since I spoke first and they were your fault for creating.

#### 9] The neg may not read meta-theory – I only have time to check abuse 1 time but you can do it in the NC and 2N, up-layering my attempt means we never get to the best norm. This means reject any reason why an aff spike is bad since they claim aff theory is unfair.

#### 10] The neg may not read overview answers to aff arguments – they can up-layer all aff arguments for 7 minutes and the 1ar has to shift through it all. I have a computer virus that prevents changing font size and everything’s in an overview.

#### 11] Aff theory first – it’s a much larger strategic loss because 1min is ¼ of the 1AR vs 1/7 of the 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time. Reject all neg args against the ROB because they assume the ROB is true.

#### 12] Allow new 2ar responses to nc arguments but not new 2n responses for reciprocity - the NC has 7 minutes of rebuttal time while I only have 4 minutes, the 2ar makes it 7-7.

#### 13] Theory or K indicts on spikes is drop the arg my theory paradigms are simply presented models for debate

#### 14] All neg interps are counter interps since the aff takes an implicit stance on every issue which means you need an rvi to become offensive. You should accept all aff interps and assume I meet neg theory since the aff speaks in the dark and I have to take a stance on something, you can at least react and adapt.

#### 15] If I win one layer, vote aff A]they have 7 minutes to uplayer and nullify my offense B] forces engagement with the aff since they have to defend all arguments which means they read better ones.

#### 16] Reject neg fairness concerns since A] 13-7 time skew and 6-minute collapse gives the negative the strategic advantage and means the AFF must split 1AR time. B] The NC has the ability to uplayer and restart the round and have time to generate offense that matters. Evaluate the debate after the 1AC and before the 1NC because we both have things to do outside of debate so we should get to them, ow on time frame because it makes us happier since we get more things done which is key to making us more calm debaters in the future.

#### 17] Affirming is harder A] Neg is reactive – they tailor the 1NC before the round to exploit the aff’s weakness. Also means no neg weighing and I get new 2ar arguments to everything because the 6 minute 2ar can dump new up layering and spam blips so its key to rectifying skew– it supercharges the abuse since they can collapse in the 2NR and outweigh any turns I make. B] Also means the neg must extend all of their arguments twice verbatim in the 2NR to compensate – means if neg gets weighing, they must weigh prefiat args against side bias since otherwise I’m just making the ground even.

**18] Permissibility and presumption affirm**

**A] Otherwise we’d have to justify neutral actions like drinking water.**

**B] Statements are true until proven false, if I told you my name you’d believe me.**

**C] We wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

**D] Logic - you can’t say P and ~P are both wrong**

**E] We can’t operate in a world where we don’t trust anything**

**F] Presuming obligations is logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation.**

1. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-5)