### 1 – cp

#### 我不同意 The resolution

#### CP – Do the aff in english + chinese

#### 1] linguistics offense NU – I just negated in english + chinese

#### 2] english + chinese better – it’s the middle between English and Taiwanese mandarin

#### 3] best method for american born asians that speak chinese and english bc they arent fluent intheir mother tongue

### 2 – k

#### Debate is a massive network of scholars, activists, policymakers, all of whom can and should orient their energy toward the production of a better world – the presumption that we should not challenge structures on the level of scope and scale with the resources that debate offers us is an explicit concession to fascism. Additionally, fragmented politics generate disempowerment as survival-based praxis becomes self-employing labor that becomes weaponized under neoliberalism against those who cannot survive or be anarchic well enough.

**Hester 17**  
(Helen Hester is Associate Professor of Media and Communication at the University of West London. Her research interests include technofeminism, sexuality studies, and theories of social reproduction. She is a member of the international feminist collective Laboria Cuboniks. “Promethean Labors and Domestic Realism” 25 September 2017 <http://www.e-flux.com/architecture/artificial-labor/140680/promethean-labors-and-domestic-realism/> rvs)

There has been an excess of modesty in the feminist agendas of recent decades. Carol A. Stabile is amongst those who have been critical of an absence of systemic thinking within postmodern feminisms, remarking upon a “growing emphasis on fragmentations and single-issue politics.”1 Stabile dismisses this kind of thinking which, in “so resolutely avoiding ‘totalizing’—the bête noire of contemporary critical theory—[…] ignores or jettisons a structural analysis of capitalism.”2 The difference in scope and scale between that which is being opposed and the strategies being used to oppose it is generative of a sense of disempowerment. On the one hand, Stabile argues, postmodern social theorists “accept the systemic nature of capitalism, as made visible in its consolidation of power and its global expansion […] Capitalism’s power as a system is therefore identified and named as a totality”; on the other hand, these theorists “celebrate local, fragmented, or partial forms of knowledge as the only forms of knowledge available” and criticize big-picture speculative thinking for its potentially oppressive tendencies or applications.3 Nancy Fraser, too, has addressed this apparent “shrinking of emancipatory vision at the fin de siècle,” linking this with “a major shift in the feminist imaginary” during the 1980s and 1990s—that is, with a move away from attempting to remake political economy (redistribution) and towards an effort at transforming culture (recognition).4 The legacies of this kind of political theorizing—legacies some might describe as “folk political”—are still being felt today, and continue to shape the perceived horizons of possibility for progressive projects.5 Yet these projects, which are frequently valuable, necessary, and effective on their own terms, are not sufficient as ends in themselves. To the extent that they are conceptualized in detachment from an ecology of other interventions, operating via a diversity of means and across a variety of scales, they cannot serve as a suitable basis for any politics seeking to contest the imaginaries of the right or to contend with the expansive hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism. It is for this reason that Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’s work positions itself as somewhat skeptical about fragmentations and single-issue politics, pointing out that problems such as “global exploitation, planetary climate change, rising surplus populations, [and] the repeated crises of capitalism are abstract in appearance, complex in structure, and non-localized.”6 As such, a politics based around the ideas that “the local is ethical, simpler is better, the organic is healthy, permanence is oppressive, and progress is over” is not always the best weapon in an attempt to contend with the complex technomaterial conditions of the world as it stands.7 There is a persistent kind of abstraction anxiety hanging over progressive politics; an anxiety that haunts a contemporary leftist feminism still unwilling or unable to critically reappraise the tendencies that Stabile identified in the 90s. Recently, however, a renewed appetite for ambitious and future-oriented emancipatory politics has begun to make itself felt at the fringes of the left—and indeed, to gather momentum and popular support more broadly.8 Perhaps the most remarkable example of this tendency within philosophically-inflected political theory circles has been accelerationism, with its calls to build an “intellectual infrastructure” capable of “creating a new ideology, economic and social models, and a vision of the good to replace and surpass the emaciated ideals that rule our world today.”9 These so-called “Promethean” ideas have generated widespread interest, arguably both reflecting and contributing to the changing tenor of activist discourse. Interestingly, this term has to some extent emerged in opposition to the pejorative “folk political,” acting as a shorthand for a very different set of values and perspectives. In a recent critical piece, Alexander Galloway suggests that “Prometheanism” could be defined as “technology for humans to overcome natural limit.”10 Peter Wolfendale, meanwhile, sees it as a “politics of intervention”—one that starts from the insistence that nothing be exempted in advance from the enactment of re/visionary processes.11

#### Capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction and extinction.

Robinson 18 (William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Accumulation Crisis and Global Police State” Critical Sociology) RE

Each major episode of crisis in the world capitalist system has presented the potential for systemic change. Each has involved the breakdown of state legitimacy, escalating class and social struggles, and military conflicts, leading to a restructuring of the system, including new institutional arrangements, class relations, and accumulation activities that eventually result in a restabilization of the system and renewed capitalist expansion. The current crisis shares aspects of earlier system-wide structural crises, such as of the 1880s, the 1930s or the 1970s. But there are six interrelated dimensions to the current crisis that I believe sets it apart from these earlier ones and suggests that a simple restructuring of the system will not lead to its restabilization – that is, our very survival now requires a revolution against global capitalism (Robinson, 2014). These six dimensions, in broad strokes, present a “big picture” context in which a global police state is emerging. First, the system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. We have already passed tipping points in climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and diversity loss. For the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system in such a way that threatens to bring about a sixth mass extinction (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2011; Moore, 2015). These ecological dimensions of global crisis have been brought to the forefront of the global agenda by the worldwide environmental justice movement. Communities around the world have come under escalating repression as they face off against transnational corporate plunder of their environment. While capitalism cannot be held solely responsible for the ecological crisis, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system given capital’s implacable impulse to accumulate and its accelerated commodification of nature. Second, the level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented. The richest one percent of humanity in 2016 controlled over half of the world’s wealth and 20 percent controlled 95 percent of that wealth, while the remaining 80 percent had to make do with just five percent (Oxfam, 2017). These escalating inequalities fuel capitalism’s chronic problem of overaccumulation: the TCC cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to chronic stagnation in the world economy (see next section). Such extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge of social control to dominant groups. As Trumpism in the United States as well as the rise of far-right and neo-fascist movements in Europe so well illustrate, cooptation also involves the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled towards scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend themselves to projects of 21st century fascism. Third, the sheer magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as well as the magnitude and concentrated control over the means of global communication and the production and circulation of symbols, images, and knowledge. Computerized wars, drone warfare, robot soldiers, bunker-buster bombs, a new generation of nuclear weapons, satellite surveillance, cyberwar, spatial control technology, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare, and more generally, of systems of social control and repression. We have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society, a point brought home by Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication and symbolic production. If global capitalist crisis leads to a new world war the destruction would simply be unprecedented. Fourth, we are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism, in the sense that there are no longer any new territories of significance to integrate into world capitalism and new spaces to commodify are drying up. The capitalist system is by its nature expansionary. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion – from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. At the same time, the privatization of education, health, utilities, basic services, and public lands is turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital’s control into “spaces of capital,” so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? New spaces have to be violently cracked open and the peoples in these spaces must be repressed by the global police state.

#### Thus the alternative is to affirm the model of the Communist Party – only democratic centralist dual power organizing can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation.

Escalante 18  
(Alyson Escalante, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> rvs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### No perm – links are disads and their Ty evidence is misrepresented – Asians coming together is different than combine two distinct methods

### 3 – DA

#### Hong Kong is at the verge of a political revolution

Tsui and Chan 3-2 [Anna Tsui and Chris Chan, 3-2-2021, "Hong Kong’s New Union Movement Faces Big Challenges from Covid, National Security Law," Labor Notes, <https://labornotes.org/2021/03/hong-kongs-new-union-movement-faces-big-challenges-covid-national-security-law> [accessed 11-6-21] Lydia

A NEW WAVE OF PROTESTS Hong Kong had enjoyed relative autonomy since its 1997 handover to China, in accordance with the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” established in the city’s mini-constitution. This setup was premised on Beijing’s tolerance of the city’s political arrangement as long as it continued to reap the benefits generated by laissez-faire capitalism there. The principle remained consistent throughout the city’s annual June 4 candlelight vigil commemorating the Tiananmen Square massacre, the mass mobilizations in 2003 against previous national security legislation, and the 2014 Umbrella Movement protesting the lack of democracy in choosing a chief executive. But a legislative proposal to allow extradition to mainland China would have undermined the city’s judicial independence and endangered dissidents—including labor organizers. Beginning in June 2019, millions took to the streets to protest. [An increasingly heavy-handed response](https://labornotes.org/blogs/2019/10/video-white-terror-hong-kong-union-leaders-fired-and-beaten-and-fighting-back) from the police and the courts created a strong “Hongkonger” identity-based resistance, rooted in growing opposition to greater integration with the mainland. That fueled a landslide victory by the pro-democratic camp in district council elections in 2019. It also led to [a wave of new unions](https://www.thenation.com/article/world/hong-kong-unions-strike/) organized under the banner of the resistance movement. Young and militant organizers formed the “HK On Strike” alliance in late 2019. This loose network was made up of 43 new unions representing mostly white-collar and professional sectors, including civil servants, medical workers, finance industry employees, engineers, and speech therapists. Service workers such as hotel staff and railway employees also formed new unions. HK On Strike aimed to unionize 10 percent of workers in each sector and provide a collective voice on political, labor, and economic issues. It also hoped to initiate a “real” general strike in the future. General strikes had been called for multiple times during the anti-extradition bill movement, but hampered by a lack of coordination and declining levels of participation. Organized labor’s growth reflected a paradigm shift: Hong Kong citizens began to accept union organizing as a mode of collective resistance. In the past, unions had been associated with low-income workers seeking emergency help. The new union movement offered activists another method of fighting back; its strategies included confrontation within the legislature, mass street resistance, and a consumer boycott of pro-China businesses. MEDICAL WORKERS’ STRIKE At the start of 2020, as news of the pandemic seeped out from the mainland, a new union of public hospital workers, the Hospital Authority Employees Alliance, surged to the front lines of civic resistance. Its members were at the fore of the battle to stop the pandemic’s spread in Hong Kong; the union demanded that the government deploy much stricter border control policies towards visitors from mainland China, extend mandatory quarantine measures, and ensure the safety of hospital workers on the job. Membership in HAEA skyrocketed after it issued a public call to strike over Covid protections. The union went from 300 members in December 2019—two months after its launch—to 10,000 by the end of January, 20 percent of the city’s public medical sector employees. In February, 7,000 took part in the five-day strike. The strike ended after a democratic vote by the members, with the union’s five demands still not completely fulfilled, and without formal recognition of the union by the Hospital Authority. Yet the government made a number of concessions during the strike, including closure of the Express Rail Link to mainland China and the announcement that all persons entering Hong Kong through the mainland would be required to self-isolate 14 days. The strike gained support from unions in other sectors. Fifty unions raised demands for outbreak prevention. Besides border closure, these unions also requested that employers provide masks for employees and customers, cancel all business trips to mainland China, and establish home working arrangements. Many unions that showed active support also surveyed their members to gauge support for sympathetic industrial actions, signaling possibilities for the strike movement to expand. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW The medical workers strike demonstrated the capacity of labor and civil society to develop new forms of action and solidarity during the pandemic. However, the authoritarian state has also strengthened social controls during the outbreak of Covid, creating new challenges for labor and social movements. The Chinese Communist Party’s plan to legislate its own security law through the Hong Kong government had been shelved indefinitely since a millions-strong demonstration against the idea in 2003. Despite widespread opposition to CCP rule among the public, however, the National Security Law was passed on June 30 by the National People’s Congress in Beijing. The law criminalizes acts of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces, with a maximum sentence of life in prison. Labor and pro-democracy forces strongly opposed the law, because they knew it would be used to criminalize many of their activities—activities long taken for granted in Hong Kong, like appealing for international solidarity, criticizing the government, or organizing demonstrations. The Chief Executive of Hong Kong—chosen in an undemocratic process controlled by the Chinese central government—has the power to appoint judges to hear cases related to national security, and Beijing has the final say over how the law is interpreted. PRIMARIES AND MASS ARRESTS Without full democracy, only half of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council members are elected by universal suffrage. In order to maximize the number of legislators from the pro-democracy camp, a primary election was held in July for supporters to express their preferences among pro-democracy politicians for the Legislative Council elections originally scheduled for September 2020. More than 600,000 voters took part, a surprisingly high turnout given the pandemic and the government’s opposition to the primary. (Citing the pandemic, the government eventually postponed the general election for a year.) Still, it came as a shock to the already gloomy political landscape when, on January 6 of this year, 53 politicians and activists who had run in the primary—from across the entire political spectrum of the opposition—were arrested by the police under the National Security Law. Allegedly, their plan to vote down the annual budget presented by the government—part of their platform, and intended to trigger a clause in Hong Kong’s mini-constitution that would force the Chief Executive to resign—constituted an act of “subversion.”

#### But China is cracking down on labor strikes in hongkong – that decks organizing -- the right to strike is key but the aff ignores this

Wang 9-22 [Maya Wang, China Senior Researcher. 9-22-2021, "China Is Dismantling Hong Kong’s Unions," Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/22/china-dismantling-hong-kongs-unions> [accessed 11-4-21] Lydia

International attention to Beijing’s repression in Hong Kong has focused on widely recognized figures like the charismatic young protest leader Joshua Wong or the Apple Daily tycoon Jimmy Lai. But too few outside of Hong Kong realize that China is also dismantling the city’s [unions](https://www.wenweipo.com/a/202107/26/AP60fdf687e4b08d3407cff45f.html) and detaining unionists, a backbone of civil society. Fighting for labor rights has always been a slog in a city known for hyper-capitalism, but doing so now is downright perilous. In late July, the police [arrested](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/22/five-arrested-in-hong-kong-for-sedition-over-childrens-book-about-sheep) five people from the Speech Therapist Union for “sedition” for publishing children’s books depicting cops as wolves and protesters as sheep. Prominent [unionists](https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-community/article/1956365/reach-sky-one-womans-journey-flight-attendant) and labor [activists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leung_Kwok-hung) have been arrested and jailed for endangering national security and other vague charges. For decades, labor unionists like [Lee Cheuk-yan](https://www.hkcnews.com/article/7890/%E9%9B%86%E9%AB%94%E8%AB%87%E5%88%A4%E6%AC%8A-%E5%8B%9E%E5%B7%A5%E6%AC%8A%E7%9B%8A-%E5%B7%A5%E9%BB%A8-7891/%E5%B7%A5%E9%BB%A8%E3%83%BB%E4%BA%BA%E5%80%91-x-%E9%9B%86%E9%AB%94%E8%AB%87%E5%88%A4%E3%83%BB%E5%B7%A5%E6%9C%83%E6%9C%89say%E2%80%94%E2%80%94%E4%B8%89%E4%BB%A3%E4%BA%BA%E5%B0%8D%E8%AB%87-%E5%AE%88%E4%BA%8620%E5%B9%B4%E7%9A%84%E4%BD%BF%E5%91%BD), the former head of HKCTU, organized strikes and camped out at factories to demand that employers negotiate with their workers—acts considered rather “radical” by the public in the 1980s. Knowing that the lack of democracy and the exploitation of workers are intimately linked, the teachers’ union and the HKCTU participated in electoral politics. Lee was an elected legislator for over 20 years, until 2016. Hong Kong’s labor movement gained momentum during the 2019 protests, in which two in seven Hong Kongers participated. Citywide strikes became more broadly accepted. People from various professions—ranging from hairstylists to accountants—[formed](https://news.now.com/home/local/player?newsId=434976) nearly 4,000 new unions. The Chinese government knows the power of grassroots organizing and doubtlessly sees the developments in Hong Kong as threatening. Nowadays, the top ranks of the Chinese Communist Party—far from its humble origins—are packed with billionaires whose family fortunes are entwined with the Party’s fate. They, like the capitalist elites they handpicked to run the city, know that empowered workers are antithetical to their political and business model. In June 2020, Beijing imposed a draconian National Security Law on Hong Kong, arresting activists, banning protests, enveloping the city with pervasive fear. To square the circle of the purported people’s proletariat repressing workers’ advocates, the authorities portray these unions and other civil society groups with the usual authoritarian trope—that they are “foreign agents” out to “destabilize Hong Kong.” Beijing-controlled unions—such as the [Hong Kong Federation of Education Workers](https://www.hk01.com/%E7%A4%BE%E6%9C%83%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E/662190/%E6%95%99%E5%8D%94%E8%A7%A3%E6%95%A3-3%E6%96%B0%E5%B7%A5%E6%9C%83%E4%BB%A5%E6%95%99%E8%81%AF%E6%9C%83%E6%9C%83%E5%9D%80%E7%99%BB%E8%A8%98-%E9%BB%83%E5%9D%87%E7%91%9C-%E8%AA%B0%E6%93%94%E5%A4%A7%E6%97%97%E5%8D%94%E8%AA%BF%E4%B8%AD)—are poised to claim the mantle of workers’ sole representatives in the city, much like their counterparts in China. The demise of Hong Kong’s unions is not just a loss for the territory. These unions have long been part of overlapping communities of labor organizations that promote workers’ rights and democracy in China and Asia. With the Chinese government also cracking down on labor rights groups in mainland China, a valuable window is being lost into the plight of workers amid a global supply chain heavily dependent on China-made products. Labor unions around the world can support their embattled counterparts in Hong Kong, reviving an important legacy of similar efforts from [Poland](https://freedomhouse.org/article/forgotten-legacy-american-labors-pioneering-role-global-support-democracy) to [South Africa](https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/22/china-recall-arms-shipment-headed-zimbabwe). They can press the Chinese government for the release of Hong Kong union leaders, urge their own governments to place escalating sanctions targeting Chinese and Hong Kong officials and entities responsible for the crackdown, and assist counterparts who are still able to promote labor rights in Hong Kong and mainland China.

#### Reunification emboldens Beijing – causes invasion of Taiwan

Heydarian 20

Richard, Asia Times, “China, Taiwan on collision course over Hong Kong” July 3, 2020 https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/china-taiwan-on-collision-course-over-hong-kong/

“Any person or force that attempts to undermine China’s national sovereignty, security, development interests, and the prosperity and stability of [Hong Kong] will … suffer the consequences,” she added.

With global nations, including Taiwan ally the US, still rattled by the pandemic, China has faced relatively little substantive resistance in its latest move to crush pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Encouraged by its repressive success in Hong Kong, analysts now wonder whether Beijing may consider a more muscular approach to reincorporating Taiwan. Tian Feilong, a Chinese academic specializing on Taiwan, praised the new Chinese law for “cut[ting] off all the links of confluence between Hong Kong independence and Taiwan independence.” He asserted that Taiwan is the next major priority for Chinese President Xi Jinping. “The weight of the Taiwan problem in his heart, the urgency to solve it and the sense of mission will be even stronger,” the Chinese academic told the New York Times.

#### Cross-strait war goes nuclear

Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. In International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. In International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” *The Diplomat*, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)

Possible Scenario

While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate.

## Case

### 1NC – topic

#### 1] asian garment strikes – 1 not inehrent to strikes, topic is just goverenments – theres so many strikes proves its not

#### 2] cheinese tresturant stirkes arent strikes agaisnt employers that’s a separate instance of racism –

#### Vote neg if I win strikes are good for asians

#### Worker strikes are a means to form Asian American Alliances to resist exploitative corporations that thrive on immigrant labor

Mok 3-27 [Aaron Mok, 3-27-2021, "How the Asian American-led 1982 garment strike shaped three decades of labor activism," Prism, <https://prismreports.org/2021/06/08/how-the-asian-american-led-1982-garment-strike-shaped-three-decades-of-labor-activism/> [accessed 11-3-21] lydia

On June 24, 1982, 20,000 garment workers—predominantly Chinese immigrant women—flooded the streets of New York City’s Chinatown to demand fair wages, benefits, and worker conditions from their employers. When the workers reached Columbus Park, city councilmen and organizers delivered passionate speeches on the podium, urging employers to sign the newly revised International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) contract. One by one, Chinese employers rushed to sign, and by early afternoon every manufacturer agreed, marking a major win for Chinatown’s garment workers. Nearly two decades later, the strike is still known as [one of the largest protests](https://www.history.com/news/garment-workers-strike-chinatown) in the history of Chinatown. The success of the strike, however, remains overlooked, or, at best, forgotten by the popular imagination, says May Chen, one of the core ILGWU organizers of the strike. There was little media coverage on Asian Americans at the time, rendering Asian American-led movements and activism “invisible up to the millennium.” With the recent surge of attacks against Asians Americans—the byproduct of [decades’ worth of systemic racism](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/the-long-history-of-racism-against-asian-americans-in-the-u-s) and more recently, the racialization of COVID-19 as the “China Virus,”—a new wave of Asian American activism has emerged. While President Joe Biden signed the [COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/937/text), [more than 85](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/why-over-85-asian-american-lgbtq-groups-opposed-anti-asian-n1267421) Asian American and LGBTQ+ groups criticized the legislation’s focus on law enforcement—which has a dubious record when it comes to the protecting Asian American communities to begin with—for failing to address any of the root causes of anti-Asian violence, including economic inequality. In in an [op-ed](https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/asian-americans-economic-inequality-is-violence-too/) for The Seattle Times, professor Linh Thủy Nguyễn wrote: “We can name physical attacks and deaths as racist violence, why can’t we name the system of racial capitalism that produces the economic precarity of living paycheck to paycheck an issue of violence, as well?” Racial capitalism and economic precarity were at the heart of the 1982 ILGWU strike, which stands as a stark rebuke to the common misperception that Asian Americans are politically unengaged and largely unconcerned with issues like workers’ rights. It’s a story of how Asian American alliances and activism transformed the economic conditions of an industry that exploits marginalized immigrant women with lessons for activists to follow nearly 30 years later. And crucially, it’s an example that illuminates how racial violence manifests in more subtle ways beyond hate crimes and violence. Economic independence through the garment industry In 1963, Chinatown’s garment industry spanned 50 garment factories and employed a total of [2,000](https://ilgwu.ilr.cornell.edu/announcements/5.html) workers. But after the [Immigration and Naturalization Act](https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/immigration/chinese/a-new-community/) eliminated the racial quota system that gave preference to western European immigrants and “skilled” workers in 1965, a new wave of Chinese immigration doubled the Chinese American population within a decade. Twenty years later, garment manufacturers sold between $150 and $200 million in annual merchandise—ranging from zippers and waistbands for sportswear to patterned dresses—with $100 million dollars on the payroll. Chinatown’s garment industry boomed to include 500 garment manufacturers employing up to 25,000 workers, [80% of whom](https://www.history.com/news/garment-workers-strike-chinatown) were Chinese women. The garment industry was an avenue to economic independence for these non-English speaking immigrants and a means to supplement their husbands’ income. However, wages were low, hours were long, injury was common, and crowded, unhygienic, poorly ventilated facilities led to the spread of viral and gastrointestinal disease among garment workers. Jay Mazur, former manager of the Local 23-25 chapter of the ILGWU, called the demands of the workplace “[preposterous, unrealistic, and totally unacceptable](http://ilgwu.ilr.cornell.edu/announcements/5.html#:~:text=During%20the%20resultant%20negotiations%2C%20the,for%20what%20was%20to%20come%2C),” inspiring a new contract that called for higher pay, additional paid time off (holiday, sick leave, jury duty, etc.) and more robust health care and retirement benefits. Industries negotiated a contract with the union but Chinese manufacturers rejected it, fearing that their businesses would go bankrupt. ILGWU organizers like Chen decided to take matters to the streets, which culminated in the 1982 garment strike. “Many employers thought they could prey on the ethnic sympathies of the workers and just say ‘Look, we’re all Chinese. You don’t need the union, you can function without it,’” Chen said. “Thankfully, the workers and the union realized they would have a lot to lose if they gave it up.” Workers secured a more robust union contract and the strike galvanized Chinatown community members to be more politically active—Chen co-founded the [Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance](https://www.apalanet.org/), the first and only union for AAPI workers. The most significant impact of the strike, according to Chen, was how it transformed the cultural perception around Asian American women. Chinese women were once perceived as quiet, docile, and submissive; now they were seen speaking out against injustices in the workforce, actively participating in their union, and becoming leaders at local community organizations. Some women were even empowered to walk away from domestic violence. “Chinatown, especially when I was working in the union in the 80s and 90s, was still really male dominated and chauvinistic,” Chen said. “But the women of this community became much more outspoken … that was pretty amazing to me.” New time and location, same working conditions While the strike improved workplace conditions for Chinatown’s garment workers, the garment industry took a severe hit during the globalization wave in the early ‘90s. U.S.-based Chinese manufacturers moved their production overseas for cheaper labor, and new media companies gentrified remaining factories out of the neighborhood, shuttering up to 50 shops each year between 1998 and 2001. The 9/11 attacks were the final blow—the aftermath blocked off Chinatown and disrupted major commercial activity for weeks. Unable to financially recover, the last standing manufacturers closed shop, leaving 8,000 workers out of jobs over the next two years. Those with speciality skills (i.e., pattern making) found jobs at high-end American fashion stores; the rest transitioned out of the industry and turned to alternative jobs: elderly home care, food service (some women wrapped dumplings at Chinese restaurants), and other low-wage, service-oriented work. Nearly two decades later, California is now the epicenter of U.S. garment industry, employing [over 45,000](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/garment-workers-paid-piece-say-they-ll-keep-fighting-change-n1237810) garment workers, many of whom are undocumented Asian and Latino immigrants. And while the location of the industry has shifted, its working conditions remain unchanged. In 2016, the U.S. the Department of Labor detected violations such as wage theft and unsanitary conditions in [85% of the California factories](https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi-forever-21-factory-workers/) they visited. Furthermore, workers are paid through the piece-rate system, making as little as [$0.03 per garment](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/garment-workers-paid-piece-say-they-ll-keep-fighting-change-n1237810), or up to $300 dollars for a 75-hour week. The economic precarity of the industry was compounded by the recent pandemic—global supply chains were disrupted and consumer demand for clothing lowered so significantly that commercial western brands cancelled [$1.44 billion](http://www.workersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Abandoned-Penn-State-WRC-Report-March-27-2020.pdf) in orders. To make up for lost revenue, [garment manufacturers switched](https://www.instyle.com/fashion/fashion-industry-garment-workers-making-ppe) to producing masks, hospital gowns, and other forms of personal protective equipment (PPE) at high volumes. But even though garment workers in the U.S. were classified as essential workers, they continued to toil in factories where bathroom breaks were limited and social distancing and face coverings [inadequately enforced](https://www.kqed.org/news/11858857/without-vaccines-las-garment-workers-are-hanging-by-a-thread). One of Los Angeles’ largest coronavirus outbreaks took place in an LA Apparel garment factory last summer, where [375 workers](https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/la-apparel-outbreak-coronavirus-covid-19-workplace-work-jobs-los-angeles-county/2401819/) tested positive for COVID-19, resulting in four deaths. While [more than 234,000 Californian residents](https://covid19.ca.gov/vaccination-progress-data/#overview) are getting vaccinated every day, [undocumented workers](https://capitalandmain.com/why-californias-undocumented-immigrants-remain-vaccine-resistant-0426) remain hesitant, fearful of revealing their immigration status while getting vaccinated. Although Chen acknowledges the disparity between what essential workers are called and how they’re actually treated, she appreciates how the labor of garment workers is finally being recognized. “It’s very bittersweet,” Chen says. “I think it’s good that there’s finally a catchphrase that shows even the most minimal appreciation to workers who used to be completely invisible … And for Asians especially—we’ve been invisible for so long.” Labor lessons worth remembering While Chinatown’s garment industry is nearly nonexistent now, the lessons learned from the 1982 strike are still salient. Like the organizers who led the 1982 strike, garment workers in California are continuing to organize for fair wages and safe conditions in the workplace. At the end of last year, [California state Sen. Maria Elena Durazo](https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/garment-workers-sb-62/) introduced the [Garment Workers Protection Act](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB62) (GWPA or SB-62) to replace the piece-rate system with a minimum hourly wage and hold brands accountable for workplace abuse. With support from the Garment Worker Center, the Western Center On Law & Poverty, and Bet Tzedek Justice For All, the GWPA [passed](https://sourcingjournal.com/topics/labor/garment-worker-protection-act-california-sb62-wage-theft-durazo-275209/) the Senate Judiciary Committee in April, inching its way closer towards improving the lives of thousands of workers. What made the 1982 strike so successful, Chen says, boils down to two key factors: collective action under common goals, and the willingness for immigrants, especially women, to be unapologetically vocal about their concerns. “Garment workers recognized that Chinese workers, if they join together, can be an important force,” said Margaret Fung, the co-founder and executive director of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund in the documentary [We Are One](http://ilgwu.ilr.cornell.edu/archives/filmVideo/index.html). “They can exert some control over their lives, their working conditions, and their wages, but only if they work together and have a union.” For Asian Americans in particular, Chen is hopeful that transformative social change, whether that’s an end to unjust labor practices or the numerous cultural mythologies that render Asian American communities susceptible to all forms of violence, is possible. “Like the case of Vincent Chin, there have always been waves of anti-Asian violence,” Chen said. “But what’s good now is that more people are speaking up.”

### 1AC – Kritik

#### 1] Ontology – none of this is specific to Asians, “where are you from” is asked to any other not white passing person, history of exclusion happened to other minorities too

#### Cross proves their wrong – takes out identification args

#### 2] Eng and han 2 is about the model minority – 1AC eng and han 2 Asian Americans are forced to mimic the model minority stereotype in order to be recognized by mainstream society.

#### Voting them down solves – view their loss as a way of embracing Asian fail – that’s the best form of resistance

#### Progress is possible and measurable---prioritize preserving life because it’s a prerequisite to evaluating any other value system that individuals can adopt

Pinker 18—Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University [Steven, February 2018, *Enlightment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress*, Chapter 4: Progressophobia, Viking, Accessed early through Gates Notes] AMarb

What is progress? You might think that the question is so subjective and culturally relative as to be forever unanswerable. In fact, it’s one of the easier questions to answer. Most people agree that life is better than death. Health is better than sickness. Sustenance is better than hunger. Abundance is better than poverty. Peace is better than war. Safety is better than danger. Freedom is better than tyranny. Equal rights are better than bigotry and discrimination. Literacy is better than illiteracy. Knowledge is better than ignorance. Intelligence is better than dull- wittedness. Happiness is better than misery. Opportunities to enjoy family, friends, culture, and nature are better than drudgery and monotony. All these things can be measured. If they have increased over time, that is progress. Granted, not everyone would agree on the exact list. The values are avowedly humanistic, and leave out religious, romantic, and aristocratic virtues like salvation, grace, sacredness, heroism, honor, glory, and authenticity. But most would agree that it’s a necessary start. It’s easy to extoll transcendent values in the abstract, but most people prioritize life, health, safety, literacy, sustenance, and stimulation for the obvious reason that these goods are a prerequisite to everything else. If you’re reading this, you are not dead, starving, destitute, moribund, terrified, enslaved, or illiterate, which means that you’re in no position to turn your nose up at these values—or to deny that other people should share your good fortune. As it happens, the world does agree on these values. In the year 2000, all 189 members of the United Nations, together with two dozen international organizations, agreed on eight Millennium Development Goals for the year 2015 that blend right into this list.31 And here is a shocker: The world has made spectacular progress in every single measure of human well-being. Here is a second shocker: Almost no one knows about it.

#### Legislative demands are necessary in mobilizing Asian American movements – otherwise their micropolitical strategy fials

**McCann 12** (Michael McCann, *Inclusion, Exclusion, and the Politics of Rights Mobilization: Reflections on the Asian American Experience*, Seattle Journal for Social Justice Vol 11, <http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol11/iss1/9>) klmd

LEARNING FROM THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE It is tempting to draw from my comments so far a fairly cynical view of law and rights. In short, law and rights simply reflect contests over power, at any moment just registering the ongoing trench war over who gets what and, specifically, who is included and excluded from full protection by the legal agents of dominant groups. I think there is much truth in such a skeptical view, **but I also think it is simplistic**. Framing struggles over power, position, and interest as claims of rights can impart a historically grounded ethical dimension to struggle. This framework can then open the possibility for changing relationships of power, in part by mobilizing the official legal establishment, but even more by potentially mobilizing citizens and organizations in civil society who stand up to challenge either the abuses of rights or the uses of rights to justify abuse, as in these two historical cases. Rights are words, often written on paper, but they become materially powerful when people, ordinary and extraordinary, invest in them meaning and faith through action to challenge the unjust and often arbitrary practices of dominant groups through and beyond states. And that is just the message preached and exemplified by Gordon Hirabayashi: **rights must be mobilized and demanded routinely for them to matter in guiding governmental and social power**. “As fine a document as the Constitution is,” Gordon Hirabayashi famously told a reporter, “it is nothing but a scrap of paper if citizens are not willing to defend it.”23 Such mobilization of rights in the cause of justice is hardly easy or natural, however, and Gordon’s legacy exemplifies what the struggle takes. For one thing, **rights mobilization requires personal virtues of courage and willingness to make personal sacrifice**s. Gordon displayed such selfless bravery in his refusal to accept the order of internment, a defiant challenge to the illegitimate government denial of basic rights to him and other Japanese Americans. In waging his campaigns against criminalizing subjugation, he also had to resist the pressures of others in his community who discouraged “rocking the boat” and making a bad situation worse by challenging government injustice. Gordon made a “lonely stand” in his initial resistance.24 Young Filipino American activists in the 1970s, including Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes, displayed that same type of independent courage and persistence in the face of many obstacles and dangers. Indeed, they not only challenged powerful corporations and the American legal establishment that protected their unjust practices, but the young activists boldly opposed a dictator (who declared martial law) as well as his elite supporters in the American government.25 The young reformers also persisted when other workers, especially senior manongs, 26 were wary about defiant challenges to the status quo. Gordon was willing to go to prison; Gene and Silme lost their lives to assassins. Defiant action to demand rights can be risky business, and often requires such commitment and willingness to make sacrifices for larger causes. **Personal courage and persistence alone are rarely sufficient.** **Struggles for rights also require organizational support, financial resources, and allied experts, usually including cause-oriented lawyers.** Indeed, struggles for rights typically require movements that enlist many forms of organized support. The struggle for the ruling on coram nobis and legislated reparations during the 1980s, in particular, illustrates the important role of committed lawyers, community mobilization, and organizational alliance, both within and beyond the Japanese American communities. The Filipino Americans workers who initially fought for citizenship and workplace organizing rights, and later for workplace justice and democracy in the Philippines, likewise understood the political imperative to build a movement within the union, as well as within the broader Filipino community and beyond, including among diverse progressive organizations. Finally, each of these legacies illustrates that struggles for rights must be willing to go beyond exclusive reliance on litigation to produce change. In each campaign, efforts to mobilize media support**, to influence public opinion, and to lobby members of government, the business community, and the academy were critical to success**. Struggles over rights are most productive when they can convince dominant groups that it is both a matter of public principle and in the political interest of the majority, including the dominant group, to do the right thing.27 As Gordon put it, “I never look at my case as just my own, or just as a Japanese American case. It is an American case, with principles that affect the fundamental human rights of all Americans,” and, I might add, all peoples.28

#### Debate good

#### Debate is uniquely a space for Asian queer minorities – their criticism relies on US communicative spheres being bad, any chance debate is good means you shouldn’t affirm

Joseph et al 20 [Krupa Joseph, DHNS, Bengaluru, 6-4-2020, "Debates go online, draw more girls," Deccan Herald, <https://www.deccanherald.com/metrolife/metrolife-lifestyle/debates-go-online-draw-more-girls-845683.html>] //lydia

The pandemic has forced India’s biggest debate tournaments to go online, and that has had some positive, unexpected spin-offs. Freed of the hassles of travelling, more girl students are participating in debates than before. Online debating has also helped create and promote safe spaces in the form of the Asia Queer Open and Gender Minorities debate. These tournaments are, as the name suggests, open to queer and gender minorities debators. Bengaluru has a vibrant debating society culture, usually attracting students and young professionals between 18 and 22 years of age. The topics range from economics, politics, state to international relations to feminism and philosophy. “Under normal circumstances, participation from girls was low. One reason was that parents are concerned about safety, given that there are always delays in the tournament,” says Satvik Puti, avid debater. The history of debating as a male-dominated activity will take some time to correct itself. “In the tournament that I organised recently, we made it mandatory for institutional and non-institutional contingents to have at least 50 per cent women’s representation,” he says. The tournament he hosted from Bengaluru saw about 50 per cent women participation. The topics ranged from distance learning, self-suffering as a form of resistance and surrender schemes for militants. The motion for the grand finals was ‘This House regrets the use of martial terminology in dealing with Covid-19’. Online platform A website called Mixidea (mixidea.org) allows anyone to create a tournament with virtual rooms for debaters. “There is a common meeting point like the auditorium. After your 15-minute prep time you can join the room where you debate,” says Daniel Monteiro, IT professional who has been debating for four years. Traditionally, a parliamentary debate comprises teams defending and opposing a proposed motion. A tournament has multiple teams participating in different rooms after a motion is announced 15 minutes prior to the debate. While coordinating with teammates was difficult initially, over some weeks, participants were able to overcome the glitches. Some international tournaments are conducted by integrating video app Zoom and chat app Discord. “A few prefer Zoom because the video allows you to use theatrical aspects. Sometimes the way you speak can better drive your point home,” he says. However, many opt out of the video option. They do not use their cameras at all, preferring to just speak, he says. Excitement lost The biggest disadvantage in online debating is that it cuts out all informal interaction and networking, an integral part of tournaments. “Travelling for these tournaments is about more than the debate itself. It is a great opportunity to meet people and network. Usually, when panellists are adjudicating, members of various teams interact. None of that happens now,” says Daniel. However, the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. Online debating has become accessible and affordable. “Tournaments can be expensive. Registering for one in the same city can cost you about Rs 1,800 and for one outside about Rs 2,500. You also have to factor in travel costs and other expenses,” he says. Online debating completely cuts out these expenses entirely and even makes participating in international tournaments feasible. The Australasian Championships have, for example, shifted their tournament online, and are conducting it at a fraction of their normal cost. Every year the host university is selected for the upcoming year and this year it was to be held at Monash University, Australia, with many from Bengaluru flying at their own cost to take part in it. Online debating also brings down organisational costs, venue costs and even the number of volunteers needed. “Generally only established debate societies would conduct tournaments. For smaller institutions and up-and-coming societies, funding was a problem,” Daniel says. The lockdown has also encouraged collaborations between various debating societies. “You usually practise with members of your own debate society, which after a point can become less challenging. However, online collaborations have allowed us to practice with debaters across the world. We now have three practice sessions a day, which help us in honing our skills,” he adds. The collaborative efforts have improved inter-society relations, which has resulted in the inception of India Debate Open, the first-ever pan India debate tournament. The first edition was held early this month. ‘Charm of annoying participants gone’ Namita Pandey, convenor of India Debate Open-AP 2020, says the biggest difference is the physical absence of people. “Running around to collect score sheets, venting out one’s frustration with the other volunteers, and annoying participants by waking them up at 7 am are just things that cannot be replicated in an online tournament,” she says. Even coordinating decisions between the organising team is rewarding in its own way. While being able to use the Internet for prep time, which isn’t allowed in physical tournaments, may provide an unfair advantage to teams, Namita says, it is a negligible head start as there is only so much one can google and process within 15 minutes.

#### Chinese debaters prove

Economist 19 [Economist, 2019, "Debating contests teach Chinese students an argument has two sides," <https://www.economist.com/china/2019/06/15/debating-contests-teach-chinese-students-an-argument-has-two-sides>] Lydia

Chinese pupils are pushed to study relentlessly, says one. But American-style debate forces students to “brainstorm a lot of ideas in a short time”. Unlike America, where debating clubs are dominated by shouty, self-assured boys, most contestants in the Chinese league are girls. Of its 20 highest-ranked debaters, 16 are female. In a still-chauvinist society, the chance to argue forcefully and be applauded for it has a rare appeal, suggests Liam Mather, the league’s 20-something executive director. The winners in Wuhan are Joyce Yi and Erica Chen, from a state school in the southern boomtown of Shenzhen. Their swaggering first-round performance leaves two ill-prepared boys open-mouthed like fish. Ms Chen initially relished debating in English because “I’m kind of an argumentative person.” Then she realised the subtle effects of having to research both sides of an argument. Chinese education emphasises one correct answer to a question, she says. The debaters are not starry-eyed about America. They talk of gun violence, inequality and crumbling cities. At a practice camp some call the American way of arguing “very chaotic.” But debate can prevent “huge mistakes” because competing perspectives are heard, notes Angela Pan, a teenager from Beijing. The young Chinese assert—perhaps a little optimistically—that American college students are diverse, free and informed about the world. They long to cross the Pacific and meet some.

#### 3] Not specific to debate – even if debate is a communicative activity it’s not the same coercive mimictism eng explains – we aren’t in a classroom where a teacher will fail you because you can’t pronounce a word. Their interp means talking to your friend is anti-Asian because it necessitates communication

#### 4] our alt is better in refusing Asian subject formation – that was explained on top

### 1NC -- Presumption

#### Frame the 1AC through solvency, not impacts – any attempt to filter offense through the RotB or the speech act of the aff is an arbitrary goalpost that only serves to insulate it from criticism and nuanced testing – forcing us to negate the efficacy of personal strategies is at best impossible and at worst violent – the aff can’t change the material structures that produce anti-black violence – no warrant for how the aff spills up to impact structures of politics writ large or out of debate means you vote neg on presumption.

#### Negate on presumption: Inherency---scholars and activists already affirm the 1AC. Their affirmation does not change the impacts they described and has no mechanism to spill up.

### Solvency

#### Using the ballot for solvency is bad:

#### 1 -- It zeroes the potential for transformative change -- stats prove.

Ritter 13. (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterize5d as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

#### 2 -- It fosters worse hostility and exclusion.

Ritter 13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The fiction of social change through debate abuses the win--loss structure of debate and permits debaters to otherize, demonize, dehumanize, and exclude opponents. The win--loss structure of debate rounds requires a judge to vote for one side or the other, as judges generally cannot give a double win. This precludes the possibility of compromise on any major position in the debate when the resolution of the position would determine the ultimate issue of “which team did the better debating.” Thus, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to construct narratives of good versus evil in which the other team is representative of some evil that threatens to bring about our destruction if it is endorsed (e.g. capitalism). The team relying on the fiction of social change through debate then paints themselves as agents of the good, and gives the judge a George W. Bush-like “option”: “You’re either with us or you’re against us.” The fiction of social change through debate—like Bush’s rhetorical fear tactics and creation of a false, polarizing, and exclusionary dichotomy to justify all parts of the War on Terror—enables the otherization, demonization, dehumanization, and exclusion of the opposing team. When the unfairness of this tactic is brought to light—particularly in egregious situations when a team is arguing that the other team should lose because of their skin color—all can see that the debate centers on personal attacks against opposing debaters. This causes tensions between debaters that frequently result in debaters losing interest or quitting. By alienating and excluding members of the competitive interscholastic debate community for the purpose of winning a debate, it also makes the reaching of any compromise outside of the debate—the only place where compromise is possible—much less likely. By bringing the social issue into a debate round, debaters impede out-of round progress on the resolution of social issues within and outside the debate community by prompting backlash.

#### 3 -- Debate bad is feel good resistance that fails to spill up to challenge material structures of power.

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McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out the ‘justification for treating everyday practices as significant’ suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are not ‘duped’ by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness, subjects ‘are ironic, critical, realistic, even sophisticated’ (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday resistance in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to reaffirm the subject’s dignity. But this too causes a problem for the authors because they:

query why subversive ‘assertions of self’ should bring dignity and psychological empowerment when they produce no greater material benefits or changes in relational power … By standards of ‘realism’, … subjects given to avoidance and ‘lumping it’ may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227)

Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, everyday resistance fails to tell us any more about so-called false consciousness than was already known among earlier Left theorists; and second, that a focus on discursive resistance ignores the role of material conditions in helping to shape identity.

Indeed, absent a broader political struggle or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the authors that ‘powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and entrapment’ (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that ‘discursive practices that neither alter material conditions nor directly challenge broad structures are nevertheless’ considered by the authors he examined ‘the stuff out of which power is made and remade’. If this sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. Arguing against celebrating forms of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in part, recognizing the continued ‘real’ existence of identifiable, powerful groups (classes). In downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the label as those acts which bring about lasting social change), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing domination at the level of ‘constructs’ such as class.

Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears consideration:

[T]hese authors generally do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become more adept at domination or to dominate differently, or it might mean precluding alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power. … [I]t is necessary to do more than show that such discursive acts speak to, or engage with, power. It must also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes.

In other words, some of the acts of everyday resistance may in the real world, through their absorption into mechanisms of power, reinforce the localized domination that they supposedly oppose. The implications of this argument can be further clarified when we study the way ‘resistance’ is dealt with in a risk society.

Risk theorists already understand that every administrative system has holes which can be exploited by those who learn about them. That is what makes governmentality work: the supposed governor is in turn governed – in part through the noncompliance of subjects (Foucault, 1991a; Rose and Miller, 1992). For example, where employees demonstrate unwillingness to embrace technological changes in the workplace, management consultants can create:

a point of entry, but also a ‘problem’ that their ‘packages’ are designed to resolve. … In short, consultants readily constitute certain forms of conduct as ‘resistance to technology’ as this gives them some purchase on its reform by identifying a space in which expertise can be brought to bear in the exercise of power. Resistance consequently plays the role of continuously provoking extensions, revisions and refinements of those same practices which it confronts. (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994: 80)

This appears to be a very different kind of resistance from that contemplated by Rubin, but perhaps not so different from that of the authors whom he and McCann and March critique: those whose analysis ends at the discursive production of noncompliance. Instead, the above account is of a resistance that almost invariably helps power to work better. A conclusion in the present day that ominously foreshadows the futuristic, dystopic risk assemblage described by Bogard (1996).

Another example of the ‘resolution’ of resistance proposed above is the institution of a tool library described by Shearing (2001: 204–5). In this parable, a business deals with the issue of tool theft on the part of workers by installing a ‘lending library’ of tools instead of engaging in vigorous prosecution and jeopardizing worker morale. While the parable is meant to indicate a difference between actuarial and more traditional (moral) forms of justice, it also demonstrates how an act that may be considered ‘resistant’ is incorporated without conflict into the workplace loss-prevention scheme – an eminently preferable, ‘forward-looking’ solution within the logic of risk management. The same is possible in the case of more discursive forms of resistance. If I do not see myself as a Guinness man, for example, market researchers will do their best to adapt Guinness to the way I do see myself (Miller and Rose, 1997). The end result, of course, is that I purchase the beer. As manifested in a form of justice (Shearing and Johnston, 2005), it always consolidates, tempers emotions, cools the analysis, reconciles factions, and always relentlessly moves forward, assimilating as it grows. In this sense, therefore, Bogard’s ‘social science fiction’ actually pre-supposes and logically extends Shearing’s (2001) rather cheery and benevolent rendering of risk thinking. In this context of governmentality theory – as self-described and lauded for its political non-prescription by its own pundits – the acts or attitudes described as resistant are, in the end, absorbed by those who govern. Resistance as an oppositional force – that pushes against or has the potential to take power – is theoretically and politically neutralized. In the neutralization process, power is reproduced.

So, along with McCann and March’s observations that everyday resistance adds little to our understanding of false consciousness and that it denies the role of material factors in shaping identity, we can add Rubin’s two main criticisms of everyday resistance: it relies on an inaccurate understanding of power, and acts of resistance which supposedly emancipate actually may reinforce domination. All four of these criticisms demand the same thing: to know what is really going on, to get an adequate grasp of the social.