## Plan

### Covid

#### Waiving IP protections boosts vaccine manufacturing to ensure global herd immunity to COVID -- otherwise, it destabilizes the entire planet which causes extinction through nuclear winter.

#### The aff outweighs on timeframe -- COVID is ravaging the world now while their impacts are speculative.

#### Framing issue -- future actors can respond to their impacts but COVID will undermine all global systems which makes responses harder.

#### Kumar answers meuricio ev –

#### Squo doesn’t’t solve – more recent ev Donations aren’t enough – global manufacturing solves better

DWB 9-22 [Doctors Without Borders - USA, 9-22-2021, "US COVID-19 vaccine donations are not enough to end the pandemic," <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/us-covid-19-vaccine-donations-are-not-enough-end-pandemic> [accessed: 9-25-21] lydia

NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 22, 2021—The Biden Administration’s announcement that it will purchase 500 million additional doses of Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine for COVAX—the global initiative that aims to deliver [COVID-19](https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/covid19) vaccines based on public health needs—is a welcome step that will help vaccinate 250 million people worldwide. The need for doses is immediate, however, and these doses won’t begin shipping until next year. The US [must also transfer its own excess doses](https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/msf-biden-administration-plan-donate-covid-19-vaccines-not-urgent)—many of which will soon go to waste if they aren’t rapidly redistributed. As important as donations are in the short term, they alone are not enough to end this pandemic. The US government must [demand Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna share COVID-19 mRNA vaccine technology](https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/msf-following-full-fda-approval-pfizer-biontech-must-share-covid-19) and know-how so other able manufacturers can make additional mRNA vaccines and meet the global needs. It must also remain committed and urge all countries to [support the "TRIPS waiver" proposal](https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/msf-applauds-us-leadership-waiving-ip-covid-19-vaccines) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) to waive intellectual property monopolies on all COVID-19 products during the pandemic. Dr. Carrie Teicher, director of programs for Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)-USA, said of the announcement: “As only two percent of people in the poorest countries have received even one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine, the US’ decision to purchase and donate 500 million additional doses is welcome news. They must now get these doses—and more of the 593 million excess doses the US will have by the end of the year—out the door and into the arms of people in low and middle-income countries. “At MSF, we see each and every day that people all over the world remain in desperate need of COVID-19 vaccines, including health care workers and people who are the most vulnerable to becoming seriously ill if they contract the virus. “Donations alone aren’t enough to end this pandemic. The vast majority of lofty donation pledges haven’t materialized so far; only 15 percent of the more than 1 billion doses pledged by wealthy governments have arrived in Africa. It’s unfathomable that millions more people are going to die waiting for vaccines just because of where they live. “To stop this reliance on pharmaceutical corporations that receive significant taxpayer funding but still get to decide what volume of vaccines they produce, what prices they set, and who they sell them to first—as well as donors that might not follow through with their commitments—it’s critical for the US to help other countries and regions become as self-sufficient as possible in addressing their own health needs. “The US must help dramatically scale up mRNA vaccine production globally—like through the World Health Organization’s COVID-19 mRNA Vaccine Technology Transfer Hub in South Africa—by demanding that pharmaceutical corporations share the technology and know-how for mRNA vaccines so that many more manufacturers globally can produce these lifesaving vaccines. “The US must also support efforts to eliminate intellectual property barriers on all COVID-19 products, by remaining fully committed to the WTO ‘TRIPS waiver.’ “The only way to end this pandemic anywhere is to end it everywhere.”

#### No price increase – at worst they wait for restock

### Legitimacy

### 1AR---OV---Legitimacy

#### The TRIPS waiver creates momentum for structural reform of the WTO that boosts it’s image and ensures compliance with trade rules – otherwise, trade disputes go nuclear from tensions and undermined interdependence.

#### Framing issue --- perception alone solves --- the plan kickstarts reforms through goodwill.

#### Even if legitimacy takes a hit from a poor COVID response a few years from now, they’ve already done reforms that the plan enabled, which sustains it.

### 1AR---AT: Alt Causes

#### No alt causes:

#### 1---Aff creates goodwill now – that jumpstarts reforms to the WTO which resolves structural issues –

#### 2---COVID is the biggest issue – it’s killing millions now so perception of the WTO as an obstacle to it’s response will have far larger impact than anything in history –

We solve trade agreements

### CP—China

#### 1] Kumar proves we solve better—they don’t do the aff faster because our ev says 6 months is enough

#### 2] too influenced by geopolitics – taiwan proves

#### Chinese leadership bad –

#### Military buildup in the SCS and growing tensions prove aggressive China rise

Cronin and Ha 18 (Patrick, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, Melodie, Graduate student in the Security Studies Program at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, “Toward a New Maritime Strategy in the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, June 22 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/toward-a-new-maritime-strategy-in-the-south-china-sea/>, KC)

China’s attempts at unilaterally changing the status quo in maritime Asia are most visible in the South China Sea, where previously small land features are now burgeoning military outposts. The United States needs to retool its approach to China in the Western Pacific and move toward a new maritime strategy. China’s buildup of armed forces and installations on disputed islands in the South China Sea highlights twin ambitions of solidifying expansive territorial claims and demonstrating Beijing’s growing military reach out to the Second Island Chain and beyond. Landing long-range H-6K bombers on China’s largest outpost in the Paracel archipelago could presage similar moves on the Subi, Mischief, and Fiery Cross Reefs in the Spratly Islands. The fortification of South China Sea installations is both a byproduct of and a means to so-called gray-zone challenges to the existing order. China seeks to change the status quo through incremental actions, mobilizing both military and paramilitary forces, and threats of coercion — but stopping short of steps that might trigger conflict. The United States is pursuing several lines of effort to counter Chinese aggression, including naming and shaming China’s unilateral assertions, bolstering allied and partner capacity, and conducting more frequent but routine freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). In response to China’s destabilizing moves in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, the U.S. disinvited the People’s Liberation Army Navy from the 2018 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise in late July, citing that China’s actions undermine regional security, transparency, and freedom of the seas. Despite this increased effort, there are still key areas lacking in the proposed U.S. maritime strategy. The current U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy espouses the importance of ensuring that the region bridging two major oceans, and where power is likely to predominate for decades to come, remains “free and open.” U.S. strategy that seeks to expand the geographical coverage at a time when the United States needs friends. The Indo-Pacific strategy envisages strengthening cooperation with allies and partners, with members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remaining at the fulcrum. Xi Jinping’s push to militarize the South China Sea serves to expand Beijing’s control over the vital economic zones in the Indo-Pacific. The South China Sea is a critical trade route for China; nearly 30 percent of the world’s maritime trade (and about 40 percent of China’s) transits the region. The semi-enclosed sea presents a potential anti-area/access-denial (A2/AD) challenge for China in both the First and Second Island Chains due to the narrow chokepoints that are could be controlled by U.S. and allied forces. Many of the disputed land features China lays claim to are in this critical region, and China’s aggressive build-up has turned these previously vulnerable areas (think “Malacca Dilemma“) into zones of control to keep out American and allied powers. As the Chinese continue to bolster their First Island Chain claims, they have steadily expanded toward the Second Island Chain, seeking to tip the maritime balance of power in the South China Sea with a combination of boosted anti-ship and anti-air capabilities. In addition to landing H-6K bombers, China’s artificial islands are now capable of deploying HQ-9B surface-to-air missiles and YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as radar and communications jamming equipment. The anti-ship cruise missiles operating from the Spratly airfields could deny large swaths of the South China Sea to U.S. forces, and the H-6K bomber and the DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile could reach Guam, a critical U.S. territory and strategic military base. The United States needs to urgently consider a serious maritime strategy to counter gray-zone aggression and foster inter-agency cooperation with allies in the region.

### DA – infra

#### The US already endorsed support for the TRIPS waiver and Biden has publicly signalled in favor of it---any PC that could be spent already has been.

#### Turn – The plan buys goodwill from trade friendly Dems

Winslett 5-27, Gary Winslett is an associate fellow for finance and trade at the R Street Institute. He is also an assistant professor of political science at Middlebury College. May 27, 2021. National Interest, “The Political Significance of the TRIPS Waiver” <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/political-significance-trips-waiver-186246> brett

Fourth, the U.S. government supporting a limited TRIPS waiver is a massive step toward rebuilding the perceived legitimacy of the WTO. The perception that the WTO was slowing the global response to the coronavirus, however oversimplified and unfair, would have been a potentially devastating blow to an institution that has already been under attack. A TRIPS waiver buys considerable goodwill from developing countries. It also buys goodwill from Democrats. That could help the whole party take a more trade-friendly stance on everything from an Environmental Goods Agreement to an e-commerce trade deal, to say nothing of the broader benefit of convincing Democrats to like trade even more than they already do—79 percent of Democrats view trade as more of an opportunity than a threat versus only 44 percent of Republicans who say the same.

### DA – Biotech

#### 2 -- Info won’t be shared to China -- secrets are shared with generics producers and nations who lack capacity

#### 3 -- Alt causes -- acquisitions AND heavy investment

1NC Mercy A. Kuo 2017 [(Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting.) “The Great US-China Biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence Race” <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-great-us-china-biotechnology-and-artificial-intelligence-race/>] TDI // Recut NChu

China’s ambition is to lead the global market for precision medicine, **which** necessitates acquiring strategictechnological and human capital in both genomics and AI. And the country excels at this game. A sharp blow in this U.S.-China competition happened in 2013 when BGI purchased Complete Genomics, in California, with the intent to build its own advanced genomic sequencing machines, therefore securing a technological knowhow mainly mastered by U.S. producers. There are significant economic incentives behind China’s heavy investment in the increasing convergence of AI and genomics.

#### 4 -- Heg is dead -- confluence of factors.

Cooley & Nexon 20, ALEXANDER COOLEY is Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. DANIEL H. NEXON is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. “How Hegemony Ends” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends> brett

Multiple signs point to a crisis in global order. The uncoordinated international response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the resulting economic downturns, the resurgence of nationalist politics, and the hardening of state borders all seem to herald the emergence of a less cooperative and more fragile international system. According to many observers, these developments underscore the dangers of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America first” policies and his retreat from global leadership.

Even before the pandemic, Trump routinely criticized the value of alliances and institutions such as NATO, supported the breakup of the European Union, withdrew from a host of international agreements and organizations, and pandered to autocrats such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. He has questioned the merits of placing liberal values such as democracy and human rights at the heart of foreign policy. Trump’s clear preference for zero-sum, transactional politics further supports the notion that the United States is abandoning its commitment to promoting a liberal international order.

#### 5 -- No impact -- Brands has no warrant for extinction -- just talks abt human rights -- prefer empirics on war.

Fettweis ‘17 – Christopher J.-assistant professor of political science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace” Published in Security Studies Vol 26 No 3. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?src=recsys&journalCode=fsst20> mba-alb

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear. Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions**. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the **relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse**. In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace. In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. **It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan,** or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work. Conflict and US Military Spending How does one measure polarity? Power is traditionally considered to be some combination of military and economic strength, but despite scores of efforts, no widely accepted formula exists. Perhaps overall military spending might be thought of as a proxy for hard power capabilities; perhaps too the amount of money the United States devotes to hard power is a reflection of the strength of the unipole. When compared to conflict levels, however, **there is no obvious correlation, and certainly not the kind of negative relationship between US spending and conflict that many hegemonic stability theorists would expect to see**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense by about 25 percent, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990.68 To those believers in the neoconservative version of hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan at the time.69 **The world grew dramatically more peaceful while the United States cut its forces**, however, and stayed just as peaceful while spending rebounded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks**. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the military budget was cut** under President Clinton, in other words, **and kept declining** (though more slowly, since levels were already low) as the Bush administration ramped it back up. Overall US military spending has varied during the period of the New Peace from a low in constant dollars of less than $400 billion to a high of more than $700 billion, but war does not seem to have noticed. The same nonrelationship exists between other potential proxy measurements for hegemony and conflict: **there does not seem to be much connection between warfare and fluctuations in US GDP, alliance commitments, and forward military presence**. There was very little fighting in Europe when there were 300,000 US troops stationed there, for example, and that has not changed as the number of Americans dwindled by 90 percent. Overall, **there does not seem to be much correlation between US actions and systemic stability**. Nothing the United States actually does seems to matter to the New Peace.

#### The worst case scenario happened – no extinction

**Dove, Microbiology PhD, 2012**

(Alan, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?”, 1-24, <http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/>, ldg)

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it. There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies. Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died. That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that. Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack. The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario. Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon. Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.