# Valley R4 Neg vs Strake JW

# 1NC

### 1

#### Interp: The affirmative must correctly tell the negative which aff they will be reading, including any and all changes, thirty minutes before the posted start time.

#### Violation: screenshots - they added an advantage 10min before

#### Negate:

#### 1] Prep and clash - they force us to spend pre-round prep prepping the wrong advantage which means I’m unprepared to engage - that decks clash and fairness

#### 2] No offense for disclosure bad - they posted cites on the wiki for all their affs but didn't give us the correct advantages till 10 minutes before - the only offense was us not being able to anticipate or prep the right advantage pre round because they forced us to split our time - proves any responses are in bad faith

Graphical user interface

Description automatically generated with low confidence

### 3

#### Carbon border tax coming now and key to solving warming.

Kellard 1/28 Neil Kellard [Dean, Professor in Finance, Essex Business School, University of Essex] “Why the EU’s proposed carbon border levy is an important test for global action on climate change” January 28, 2021 <https://theconversation.com/why-the-eus-proposed-carbon-border-levy-is-an-important-test-for-global-action-on-climate-change-154041> SM

In the more than two decades since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, national policies on climate change have had dangerously and disappointingly little effect on global emissions.

Within the current economic system, perhaps the most ambitious attempt to reduce emissions has been the EU’s emissions trading system (or ETS). In operation since 2005, the ETS covers more than 11,000 heavy-energy-using power stations, factories and airlines, representing around 40% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. The scheme operates via a cap-and-trade principle where an EU-wide cap on emissions means that firms must buy allowances, essentially paying for their polluting activities.

Yet although the ETS has had some success in reducing emissions, finance professor Panayiotis Andreou and I recently showed that the scheme is under-penalising those who pollute the most – primarily because the price of allowances has typically been too low.

The current price of an allowance to emit greenhouse gases is around €33 per tonne, a price already much higher than the average over the life of the ETS. However, to meet EU climate change targets, this price will need to be more like €40 by 2030 and close to €250 in 2050. Given the substantial costs this will impose on EU firms, either to pay for allowances or to invest in low carbon technologies, companies based outside the EU will have a hefty competitive advantage unless they face similar regulatory controls in their own countries.

This is why the European Commission, the EU’s executive branch, plans to present its carbon border levy in June 2021 as part of its Green Deal planning. Frans Timmermans, the first vice-president of the European Commission, recently stressed that:

It’s a matter of survival of our industry. So, if others will not move in the same direction, we will have to protect the European Union against distortion of competition and against the risk of carbon leakage.

Although its details are still undecided, the carbon border levy is expected to charge imports into the EU at an amount related to the emissions trading system price. As commission official Benjamin Angel notes, this could mean setting a carbon amount per product and multiplying it by the ETS price. For example, given production of each tonne of steel typically generates around 1.9 tonnes of CO₂ emissions, if we assume an ETS price of €30 then a firm would pay €57 extra to import it.

Having such a levy in place would send a strong signal to EU firms that potentially expensive investments in environmentally beneficial technologies would not result in undercutting, either by non-EU rivals that enjoy looser regulations, or by firms relocating to outside the EU – the so called “carbon leakage” that Frans Timmermans mentions.

Combining the EU ETS with a border levy is a sensible and workable strategy, providing a long-term context for firms that encourages the reduction of emissions by pricing in the pollution they produce. The benefits of a border levy may also spill over to outside the EU in at least one of two ways. First, and most obviously, non-EU firms that wish to export into Europe will be encouraged to reduce emissions to limit their charge. Secondly, other governments and regulatory authorities will be watching closely to see if the approach is workable and this could see the spread of cap-and-trade agreements more globally.

#### The plan revitalizes WTO credibility and generates momentum

Meyer 6/18 [(David Meyer is the Editor of CEO Daily and a senior writer on Fortune’s European team. Author of the digital rights primer, Control Shift: How Technology Affects You and Your Rights. “The WTO’s survival hinges on the COVID-19 vaccine patent debate, waiver advocates warn,” Fortune, June 18, 2021. <https://fortune.com/2021/06/18/wto-covid-vaccines-patents-waiver-south-africa-trips/>] TDI

According to some of those pushing for the waiver—which was originally proposed last year by India and South Africa—**the WTO's future rests on what happens next.** "The credibility of the WTO will depend on its ability to find a meaningful outcome on this issue that truly ramps-up and diversifies production," says Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, South Africa's ambassador to the WTO. "Final nail in the coffin" The Geneva-based WTO isn't an organization with power, as such—it's a framework within which countries make big decisions about trade, generally by consensus. It's supposed to be the forum where disputes get settled, because all its members have signed up to the same rules. And one of its most important rulebooks is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, which sprang to life alongside the WTO in 1995. The WTO's founding agreement allows for rules to be waived in exceptional circumstances, and indeed this has happened before: its members agreed in 2003 to waive TRIPS obligations that were blocking the importation of cheap, generic drugs into developing countries that lack manufacturing capacity. (That waiver was effectively made permanent in 2017.) Consensus is the key here. Although the failure to reach consensus on a waiver could be overcome with a 75% supermajority vote by the WTO's membership, this would be an unprecedented and seismic event. In the case of the COVID-19 vaccine IP waiver, it would mean standing up to the European Union, and Germany in particular, as well as countries such as Canada and the U.K.—the U.S. recently flipped from opposing the idea of a waiver to supporting it, as did France. **It's a dispute between countries, but the result will be on the WTO as a whole**, say waiver advocates. "If, in the face of one of humanity's greatest challenges in a century, the WTO functionally becomes an obstacle as in contrast to part of the solution, **I think it could be the final nail in the coffin"** **for the organization**, says Lori Wallach, the founder of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, a U.S. campaigning group that focuses on the WTO and trade agreements. "If the TRIPS waiver is successful, and people see the WTO as being part of the solution—saving lives and livelihoods—**it could create goodwill and momentum to address what are still daunting structural problems."** Those problems are legion.

#### Lack of WTO legitimacy is key – the threat of disputes deters action.

Ashurst 7/16 Ashurst [A progressive global law firm] Proposed EU Regulation on CBAM, July 16 2021, <https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/proposed-eu-regulation-of-cbam-published/> SM

Next steps for the Commission's proposal

Following publication of the detailed proposal for the CBAM, it will need to go through the ordinary legislative procedure, which involves being reviewed and modified by the European Parliament and the Council. This process will provide Member States with the opportunity to introduce significant changes.

Future developments

While only a proposal, the draft CBAM regulation also contains a reporting and review mechanism. Here, the draft CBAM regulation obliges the Commission to report before the end of the transitional period on the application of the CBAM, with a view to extending the scope of CBAM to indirect emissions and goods other than those listed in Annex I.

How might the proposal be challenged?

The CBAM is controversial outside the EU. Commentators have already started to map out potential challenges to it. In principle, these challenges follow two distinct routes:

that the CBAM breaches international obligations; and/or

that the CBAM breaches EU domestic law.

The main international route would be a WTO challenge by another WTO member government. As the WTO dispute settlement process is a government-to-government process, business would need to either lobby a government to bring a WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) case, or, in certain jurisdictions, use formal processes (e.g. section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974) to stimulate a government to bring a case that it would not otherwise bring.

The obvious candidates are countries such as Brazil, India, Australia, China and Russia, all of which will be affected by the CBAM.

The WTO DSU process is currently functioning poorly since the US has refused to appoint new Appellate Body (AB) members, so the AB cannot function. This may have influenced the EU's decision to publish the draft regulation at this time, and until new AB members are appointed the prospect of the CBAM being held, definitively, to be incompatible with WTO obligations appears slim.

#### Otherwise, countries dispute through the WTO

Brooks 7/21 “Trade experts positive on EU’s CBAM, despite risk of rich nation-poor nation rift”, July 21 2021 Cristina Brooks [Senior Journalist, Climate & Sustainability, IHS Markit] <https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/--trade-experts-positive-on-eus-cbam-despite-risk-of-rich-nati.html> SM

In addition to EU due process, the CBAM will face international challenges. World Trade Organization (WTO) rules were not drafted to accommodate climate change policies, so countries slapped with new charges on exports may challenge the CBAM via a WTO dispute settlement case.

Stephen Woolcock, a lecturer in international political economy at the London School of Economics, told Net-Zero Business Daily there are several ways of challenging the CBAM. "If the EU were to introduce the measure, other countries would challenge this, and you then go through a dispute settlement mechanism. The WTO appellate body, if you like 'the international trade court,' would then rule on whether this is complying with the WTO rules," he said.

However, he said it seems likely countries will discuss it in other forums since the US under the Trump administration blocked appointees to the WTO's appellate body. "So, we don't have a functioning appellate body in the WTO at the moment," said Woolcock.

#### WTO-compliant carbon border measures are practically impossible – even the “domestic taxes” route fails. Prefer our ev – it doesn’t matter if WTO compliance is theoretically possible if it’s not pragmatically possible.

Meyer and Tucker 21 “A Pragmatic Approach to Carbon Border Measures” Timothy Meyer [Professor of Law; Director, International Legal Studies Program at Vanderbilt, J.D. and Ph.D. in jurisprudence and social policy from Berkeley], and Todd N. Tucker [Director of Governance Studies at the Roosevelt Institute, PhD and MPhil from the University of Cambridge] World Trade Review (July 2021), 1–12 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-trade-review/article/pragmatic-approach-to-carbon-border-measures/B0D224B3A59E9433D10E74DE6D40A0FD> SM

3. CBMs and the WTO

This variation in domestic authority and the resulting diversity of approaches to decarbonization has two consequences. First, it makes it likely that at least some countries interested in pursuing aggressive domestic decarbonization measures will have difficulty doing so in a way that can easily be married to a CBM that complies with the WTO’s primary rules. Second, it makes it virtually impossible to have a common CBM across countries that complies with those primary rules. The divergence in domestic approaches means that the domestic carbon price – whether explicit or implicit, i.e., calculated from the cost of complying with environmental regulations – will almost surely vary across countries. As a result, barring speedy and successful negotiations, the WTO-consistency of any CBM is likely to hinge on flexibilities, that have not been interpreted in a manner sufficiently deferential to national regulators.

3.1 The GATT’s Primary Rules

The GATT, the WTO’s chief agreement governing trade in goods, contains three main sets of primary obligations: 1) limits on tariffs; 2) a prohibition on import or export restrictions other than tariffs; and 3) a prohibition on discrimination against imports, a category that contains many permutations.40 The most blunt forms of a CBM will violate one of the first two sets of rules. A ban on imports from countries with weak climate laws would run afoul of the prohibition on import restrictions. A simple tariff on carbon-intensive products would violate a country’s tariff bindings.41

What is left are domestic taxes, either assessed on imported products behind the border or ‘charge[s on imports] equivalent to an internal tax’, 42 and regulations. At first glance, this looks quite promising. In recent years, prominent trade lawyers have argued that a non-discriminatory carbon tax, one applicable to both imports and domestic products, would be consistent with WTO rules.43 Just as a domestic sales tax or VAT can be assessed on imports consistent with WTO rules, a country with a domestic carbon tax could apply a charge to imports either ‘equivalent’ to the domestic tax (if the import charge was viewed as a tariff) or not ‘in excess of’ the domestic tax (if viewed as an internal tax). Similarly, product standards, such as energy efficiency standards, could be applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion to both imports and domestic products. Both President Biden’s Build Back Better initiative and the EU’s Green Deal are likely to feature new regulations of this kind.

In theory, then, nondiscriminatory taxes and regulations offer a path to WTO-consistent border measures. In reality, this path is more likely a mirage for many countries. As we have explained above, neither a US-wide nor an EU-wide carbon tax is politically feasible. Moreover, as Hillman notes, for any number of reasons governments might prefer taxes (or regulations) on production or the use of inputs, such as taxes on the generation of energy or the use of fossil fuels, to taxes on products.44 Under WTO rules, only taxes on products (so-called indirect taxes) can be adjusted at the border via nondiscriminatory measures. Deciding whether taxes on production processes or inputs are really taxes on products raises a host of novel questions under WTO law.45

Even if a CBM qualifies for analysis under nondiscrimination rules, its fate is uncertain at best. The WTO’s nondiscrimination rules require that an internal tax on imports be similar to or not in excess of the tax on ‘like’ domestic products, while regulations must offer imports treatment ‘no less favorable’ than that afforded ‘like’ domestic products.46 In various cases over the years, WTO members and panels have urged that either the standard for ‘likeness’ or the standard of treatment take into account regulatory purpose of a measure when that purpose is unrelated to national origin.47 Unfortunately, though, the Appellate Body (AB) declined to adopt such an ‘aim and effect’ test or anything similar. Instead, the current test for ‘like’ products focuses on the commercial relationship between products.48 Otherwise identical products – such as cement, steel, or chemicals – that differ only in the amount of carbon emitted during the production process would probably be found ‘like’ under this test.

The standard of treatment applicable to regulations covering products determined to be ‘like’ has a similar commercial flavor. The AB has said that a measure that disrupts the ‘equality of competitive opportunities’ among like products accords less favorable treatment, even if the distinction among products has nothing to do with national origin and has a legitimate regulatory basis.49 Because the entire purpose of a CBM is to disadvantage otherwise identical products based on how much carbon is emitted during production, some scholars have argued that a CBM will almost certainly run afoul of GATT nondiscrimination rules.50

These core issues present a challenge even to an ideally designed CBM. Government measures are, however, rarely designed on the basis of ideals alone. Instead, they typically include exceptions, variances, or differential treatment designed to ensure sufficient political support for the measure. While a comprehensive examination of all the ways a CBM might violate WTO rules is beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that a whole host of more technical, but not less weighty, issues present ripe targets for potential challengers: whether to adjust the price of imports, or also exports; whether to apply the CBM to all countries, or whether to exempt developing countries; whether to apply the CBM to only direct emissions for a given product, or also the indirect emissions that went into making it; and whether to calculate embedded emissions on a shipment-by-shipment level (or more distantly from the widget itself, such as on the basis of country averages).

The EU’s latest proposal illustrates some of these problems. First, the European CBM would provide importers a credit for any carbon price paid in their home market. It would not, however, give them credit for the cost of complying with decarbonization regulations in their home market.51 Two firms that pay equivalent carbon costs – one via an explicit carbon pricing mechanism and the second an implicit price via regulation – are thus treated differently. This is discriminatory, while failing to reward what the European Commission states as the goal of its CBM: global decarbonization.52 Both the GATT’s primary nondiscrimination rules, as well as the nondiscrimination rule applicable to the GATT’s general exceptions via the chapeau of article XX, would likely require the EU to take account of the implicit price of carbon in all countries if it does so for one. Doing so would create a significant administrative burden, with no guarantee that any ostensibly neutral formula to evaluate the implicit price of carbon across countries will ultimately hold up under review.53 Second, EU producers will benefit from the ability to trade emissions permits in private markets, and pay spot prices daily for doing so, while importers will be forced to buy permits from government at averages of past prices.54 Finally, the details on how verification of emissions will work, and how those procedures compare to the procedures that apply to domestic manufacturers, creates another possible basis for a discrimination complaint.

All of these difficulties apply to any single nation’s CBM. A common CBM presents an additional wrinkle. To be consistent with the WTO’s primary rules, countries imposing a common CBM would likely have to impose similar carbon costs on domestic producers. For example, the EU’s proposal requires importers to purchase permits for the amount of carbon emitted during the production of a product, with the price of the permits tied to the price of such a permit under the ETS. Under WTO rules, the United States could not impose a carbon tariff in the same amount as the EU’s price of a permit unless the cost of carbon in the United States were at least as high as the cost of carbon in the EU. Charging a higher tariff than the United States charges on its own domestic products would amount to discrimination. And while this difficulty could in principle be solved by setting the CBM equal to the lowest price charged in any member country, such an approach has several disadvantages. For example, determining those prices in countries, like the United States, that do not have an explicit carbon pricing system is possible but difficult. Worse, a lowest common denominator approach would reduce the environmental effectiveness of the system as a whole. As a result, a common carbon tariff is likely to leave at least some members exposed to claims that the common CBM is more stringent than their domestic decarbonization measures.

#### Warming causes extinction

**Pester 21** (Patrick, staff writer for Live Science. His background is in wildlife conservation and he has worked with endangered species around the world. Patrick holds a master's degree in international journalism from Cardiff University in the U.K. and is currently finishing a second master's degree in biodiversity, evolution and conservation in action at Middlesex University London. Citing **Luke Kemp, a research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridg**e in the United Kingdom AND **Michael Mann, PhD, distinguished professor of atmospheric science at Penn State**. “Could climate change make humans go extinct?” [https://www.livescience.com/climate-change-humans-extinct.html August 30](https://www.livescience.com/climate-change-humans-extinct.html%20August%2030), 2021)DR 21

According to Mann, a global temperature increase of 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit (3 degrees Celsius) or more could lead to a collapse of our societal infrastructure and massive unrest and conflict, which, in turn, could lead to a future that resembles some Hollywood dystopian films.

One way climate change could trigger a societal collapse is by creating food insecurity. Warming the planet has a range of negative impacts on food production, including increasing the water deficit and thereby reducing food harvests, [Live Science previously reported](https://www.livescience.com/58891-why-2-degrees-celsius-increase-matters.html). Food production losses can increase human deaths and drive economic loss and socio-political instability, among other factors, that may trigger a breakdown of our institutions and increase the risk of a societal collapse, according to a study published Feb. 21 in the journal [Climatic Change](https://go.redirectingat.com/?id=92X1590019&xcust=livescience_us_1191050396230939400&xs=1&url=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%2Fs10584-021-02957-w&sref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.livescience.com%2Fclimate-change-humans-extinct.html).

Related: [Has the Earth ever been this hot before?](https://www.livescience.com/65927-has-earth-been-this-hot-before.html)

Past extinctions and collapses

Kemp studies previous civilization collapses and the risk of climate change. Extinctions and catastrophes almost always involve multiple factors, he said, but he thinks if humans were to go extinct, climate change would likely be the main culprit.

"If I'm to say, what do I think is the biggest contributor to the potential for human extinction going towards the future? Then climate change, no doubt," Kemp told Live Science.

All of the major [mass-extinction events](https://www.livescience.com/mass-extinction-events-that-shaped-Earth.html) in Earth's history have involved some kind of climatic change, according to Kemp. These events include cooling during the Ordovician-[Silurian](https://www.livescience.com/43514-silurian-period.html) extinction about 440 million years ago that wiped out 85% of species, and warming during the [Triassic](https://www.livescience.com/43295-triassic-period.html)-[Jurassic](https://www.livescience.com/28739-jurassic-period.html) extinction about 200 million years ago that killed 80% of species, Live Science previously reported. And more recently, climate change affected the fate of early human relatives.

While [Homo sapiens](https://www.livescience.com/homo-sapiens.html) are obviously not extinct, "we do have a track record of other hominid species going extinct, such as [Neanderthals](https://www.livescience.com/28036-neanderthals-facts-about-our-extinct-human-relatives.html)," Kemp said. "And in each of these cases, it appears that again, climatic change plays some kind of role."

Scientists don't know why Neanderthals went extinct about 40,000 years ago, but climatic fluctuations seem to have broken their population up into smaller, fragmented groups, and severe changes in temperature affected the plants and animals they relied on for food, according to the [Natural History Museum](https://www.nhm.ac.uk/discover/who-were-the-neanderthals.html) in London. Food loss, driven by climate change, may have also led to a tiny drop in Neanderthal fertility rates, contributing to their extinction, [Live Science previously reported](https://www.livescience.com/65594-neanderthal-fertility-led-to-extinction.html).

Climate change has also played a role in the collapse of past human civilizations. A [300-year-long drought](https://www.livescience.com/38893-drought-caused-ancient-mediterranean-collapse.html), for example, contributed to the downfall of ancient Greece about 3,200 years ago. But Neanderthals disappearing and civilizations collapsing do not equal human extinction. After all, humans have survived climate fluctuations in the past and currently live all over the world despite the rise and fall of numerous civilizations.

Homo sapiens have proven themselves to be highly adaptable and able to cope with many different climates, be they hot, cold, dry or wet. We can use resources from many different plants and animals and share those resources, along with information, to help us survive in a changing world, according to the [Smithsonian’s National Museum of Natural History](https://humanorigins.si.edu/research/climate-and-human-evolution/climate-effects-human-evolution).

Related: [How would just 2 degrees of warming change the planet?](https://www.livescience.com/58891-why-2-degrees-celsius-increase-matters.html)

Today, we live in a global, interconnected civilization, but there's reason to believe our species could survive its collapse. A study published on July 21 in the journal [Sustainability](https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/15/8161/htm) identified countries most likely to survive a global societal collapse and maintain their complex way of life. Five island countries, including New Zealand and Ireland, were chosen as they could remain habitable through agriculture, thanks to their relatively cool temperatures, low weather variability and other factors that make them more resilient to climate change.

New Zealand would be expected to hold up the best with other favorable conditions, including a low population, large amounts of good quality agricultural land and reliable, domestic energy. So, even if climate change triggers a global civilization collapse, humans will likely be able to keep going, at least in some areas.

Turning on ourselves

The last scenario to consider is climate-driven conflict. Kemp explained that in the future, a scarcity of resources that diminish because of **climate change could** potentially create conditions for wars that threaten humanity. "There's reasons to be concerned that as water resources dry up and scarcity becomes worse, and the general conditions of living today become much, much worse, then suddenly, the threat of potential nuclear war becomes much higher," Kemp said.

Put another way, climate change impacts might not directly cause humans to go extinct, but it could lead to events that seriously endanger hundreds of millions, if not billions, of lives. A 2019 study published in the journal [Science Advances](https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/5/10/eaay5478) found that a nuclear conflict between just India and Pakistan, with a small fraction of the world's nuclear weapons, could kill 50 million to 125 million people in those two countries alone. Nuclear war would also change the climate, such as through temperature drops as burning cities fill the atmosphere with smoke, threatening food production worldwide and potentially causing mass starvation.

What's next?

While avoiding complete extinction doesn't sound like much of a climate change silver lining, there is reason for hope. Experts say it isn't too late to avoid the worst-case scenarios

with significant cuts to greenhouse gas emissions.

"It is up to us," Mann said. "If we fail to reduce carbon emissions substantially in the decade ahead, we are likely committed to a worsening of already dangerous extreme weather events, inundation of coastlines around the world due to melting ice and rising sea level, more pressure on limited resources as a growing global population competes for less food, water and space due to climate change impacts. If we act boldly now, we can avoid the worst impacts."

### 3

#### CP: The People’s Republic of China should:

#### - substantially increase innovation funding, production and global distribution of COVID-19 Vaccines for all current and future waves of the pandemic

Includes sinopharma, Sinovac, and all potential future medicines

#### - cooperate with allies to achieve increased production and global distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccine.

#### That solves better – IP rights don’t hinder vaccine cooperation, but manufacturing capacity is the current constraint.

#### Solves case – China already can vaccinate the world.

Mallapaty 6-9 Smriti Mallapaty 6-9-2021 "China is vaccinating a staggering 20 million people a day" <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01545-3> (She has a master of science degree in environmental technology from Imperial College London.)//Elmer

For more than a week, an average of about **20 million people** have been vaccinated against COVID-19 **every day in China**. At this rate, the nation would have fully vaccinated the entire UK population in **little more than six days**. China now accounts for more than half of the 35 million or so people around the world receiving a COVID-19 shot each day. Zoltán Kis, a chemical engineer in the Future Vaccine Manufacturing Research Hub at Imperial College London, doesn’t know of “anything **even close to those production scales**” for a vaccine. “The manufacturing efforts required in China to reach this high production throughput are tremendous,” he says. The majority of doses are of one of two vaccines, both of which have been approved for emergency use worldwide by the World Health Organization (WHO). CoronaVac — produced by Beijing-based company Sinovac — showed an efficacy of 51% against symptoms of COVID-19 in clinical trials, and much higher protection against severe disease and death. The second jab was developed in Beijing by state-owned firm Sinopharm and has demonstrated an efficacy of 79% against symptomatic disease and hospitalization. Supplying vaccines to the world China’s current vaccine production rate could potentially **make a significant dent in global demand**, says Kis; that would be “**a huge step in reducing the health-care and economic burden of the COVID-19 pandemic**”. China has already supplied 350 million doses of the two vaccines to more than 75 nations, and WHO approval should now trigger the further distribution of both vaccines to low-income countries. “China’s vaccination campaign got off to a slow start, but has rapidly picked up pace,” says Rongjun Chen, a biomaterials scientist also at the Future Vaccine Manufacturing Research Hub. As recently as mid-April, China was administering only about five million doses a day. According to an official at China’s National Health Commission, the nation aims to produce some three billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines in 2021 — and up to **five billion per year after that**. To achieve such high production rates, many things need to go according to plan across the entire production and distribution chain, from sourcing raw materials to manufacturing active ingredients, filling vials and distributing doses to vaccination centres, says Kis. “It is crucial that everything arrives at the right location at the right time.”

#### 1AR theory is skewed towards the aff – a) the 2NR must cover substance and over-cover theory, since they get the collapse and persuasive spin advantage of the 3min 2AR, b) their responses to my counter interp will be new, which means 1AR theory necessitates intervention. Implications – a) reject 1AR theory since it can’t be a legitimate check for abuse, b) drop the arg to minimize the chance the round is decided unfairly, c) use reasonability with a bar of defense or the aff always wins since the 2AR can line by line the whole 2NR without winning real abuse

### Case

#### 1] Be extremely skeptical of the brink or uniqueness for this – COVID has happened for nearly two years and we have yet to see a great power conflict.

#### 2] No Correlation and best studies show COVID decreases Conflict.

Salemi 20 Colette Salemi 10-15-2020 "Does COVID-19 raise the risk of violent conflict? Not everywhere" <https://archive.is/h591O#selection-309.0-312.0> (Colette Salemi is a PhD student in applied economics at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on conflict, forced displacement, environmental degradation and their intersections.)//Elmer

How we did our research We **used** the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (**ACLED**), a **database** **that counts** the **number of conflict events daily around the world**. For 2019 and 2020, ACLED includes more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe — and tracks three categories of violent conflict: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence. We examine trends in the number of conflict events over time. To see whether the trend changes in response to covid-19, we look at what happened after the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic (March 11) or the country declared a lockdown. [Don’t miss any of TMC’s smart analysis! Sign up here for our newsletter.] The **relationship between pandemics and conflict is theoretically unclear.** In some countries, job losses from the covid-19 pandemic mean people have fewer income-generating options — that can make participation in violence seem a more viable alternative. But if **market disruptions** and reduced global demand are **driving down** the **value of natural resources** such as oil wells, then **we** may **see less conflict** over control of such resources. We then **conducted** case **studies** based **on** our knowledge of countries with high rates of violent conflict before **covid**-19. These include countries with active civil wars (such as Syria) as well as countries with violent militia groups (such as the Philippines). Conflict during the coronavirus pandemic varies greatly **Worldwide**, **we didn’t observe an increase in violent conflict**. **If anything, conflict has decreased**, as the figure below shows. **Violent conflict** between March and August 2020 **was 23 percent lower** than violent conflict during the same period in 2019. Comparing these time periods, battles are down 20 percent and remote violence and bombings are down 40 percent. But violence against civilians — the deliberate attack of unarmed noncombatants by armed groups — continued at similar rates globally.

Chart, histogram

Description automatically generated

#### 3] Cooperation and Solidarity Check.

Ide 21, Tobias. "COVID-19 and armed conflict." World development 140 (2021): 105355. (School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, 221 Bouverie St, Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia Institute of International Relations, Brunswick University of Technology)//Elmer

**COVID**-19 might also **provide** a **chance to demonstrate solidarity and good intentions**, and hence lessen grievances. The literature on health diplomacy, for example, discusses how **cooperation on** shared h**ealth challenges can increase** the **prospects for peaceful relations**. The empirical success of such efforts is so far been limited (Kelman, 2019). However, research on environmental peacebuilding has revealed that low-level, mutually beneficial cooperation can yield peace dividends in certain contexts (Ide, 2019). Furthermore, **ceasefires** **to deliver health benefits** **have** at least temporally **reduced armed conflict intensity** on several occasions **in the past** (Chattu & Knight, 2019). **In response to the pandemic** (and António Guterres’ call), **armed groups in 14 countries have announced ceasefires** to support responses to COVID-19 (Rustad, 2020).

#### 4] Actors turn inward NOT outward.

Ide 21, Tobias. "COVID-19 and armed conflict." World development 140 (2021): 105355. (School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, 221 Bouverie St, Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia Institute of International Relations, Brunswick University of Technology)//Elmer

However, **COVID**-19 might also **shape** **opportunity costs in a way** **to reduce armed conflict risks**, at least temporarily. If a **state’s capability is strained** and there is an **urgent need to deal with a health emergency**, **military offensives are** certainly **unlikely** (Price-Smith, 2009). Furthermore, existing as well as potential **rebel groups** and militias **face similar challenges** in the face of the pandemic. They need to raise money and food to supply to their fighters during an economic recession, convince their members to take part in operations rather than staying at home (to reduce infection risks and support their family or community), and deal with the logistical constraints of lockdowns and border closures. **Starting** or intensifying **attacks** **during** the **COVID**-19 crisis is **likely to decrease** the local (and international) **legitimacy** of armed groups, especially if health infrastructure is affected. The ceasefire declarations by armed conflict parties in several countries can also be interpreted as a sign that COVID-related capability and legitimacy concerns are warranted.

#### LBL 1AC Recna Warrants:

#### 1] Commander Miscalc Warrant is literally “they die” – a] other diseases like Flu also cause death and b] natural causes – chain of command solves.

#### 2] Zero warrant for this Proliferation Warrant – less likely in pandemics since technology and money is re-directed at social and health spending.

#### Decades of protests thump any impact

### Imapct Turn

#### First is offense-

#### 1] Counterbalancing

#### A. Pursuit of hegemony leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### B. A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — that escalates to the use of nuclear force

Klare 18 – Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. (Michael T., “The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia,” April 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/)//sy

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

#### 2] Terrorism

#### A. Hegemony fails and propagates terrorism – it justifies intervention and empirically causes blowback.

Bandow 19 (Doug, senior fellow @ Cato Institute and JD Stanford, 6-2-2019, "Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albright Doctrine," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/understanding-failure-us-foreign-policy-albright-doctrine-60477)> AG

Since 9/11, Washington has been extraordinarily active militarily—invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in yet more countries, and applying sanctions against many. Tragically, **the threat of Islamist violence and terrorism only have metastasized**. Although Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness in directly plotting attacks, it continues to inspire national offshoots. Moreover, while losing its physical “caliphate” the Islamic State added further terrorism to its portfolio.

Three successive administrations have ever more deeply ensnared the United States in the Middle East. War with Iran appears to be frighteningly possible. Ever-wealthier allies are ever-more dependent on America. Russia is actively hostile to the United States and Europe. Washington and Beijing appear to be a collision course on far more than trade. Yet the current administration appears convinced that doing more of the same will achieve different results, the best definition of insanity.

Despite his sometimes abusive and incendiary rhetoric, the president has departed little from his predecessors’ policies. For instance, American forces remain deployed in Afghanistan and Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration has increased its military and materiel deployments to Europe. Also, Washington has intensified economic sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and even penalized additional countries, namely Venezuela.

U.S. foreign policy suffers from systematic flaws in the thinking of the informal policy collective which former Obama aide Ben Rhodes dismissed as “The Blob.” Perhaps no official better articulated The Blob’s defective precepts than Madeleine Albright, United Nations ambassador and Secretary of State.

First is overweening hubris. In 1998 Secretary of State Albright declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: **we are the indispensable nation**. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

Even then her claim was implausible. America blundered into the Korean War and barely achieved a passable outcome. The Johnson administration infused Vietnam with dramatically outsize importance. For decades, Washington foolishly refused to engage the People’s Republic of China. Washington-backed dictators in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and elsewhere fell ingloriously. An economic embargo against Cuba that continues today helped turn Fidel Castro into a global folk hero. Washington veered dangerously close to nuclear war with Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and again two decades later during military exercises in Europe.

U.S. officials rarely were prepared for events that occurred in the next week or month, let alone years later. Americans did no better than the French in Vietnam. Americans managed events in Africa no better than the British, French, and Portuguese colonial overlords. Washington made more than its share of bad, even awful decisions in dealing with other nations around the globe.

Perhaps the worst failing of U.S. foreign policy was ignoring the inevitable impact of **foreign intervention**. Americans would never passively accept another nation bombing, invading, and occupying their nation, or interfering in their political system. Even if outgunned, they would resist. Yet Washington has undertaken all of these practices, with little consideration of the impact on those most affected—hence **the rise of terrorism** against the United States. Terrorism, horrid and awful though it is, became the weapon of choice of weaker peoples against intervention by the world’s industrialized national states.

The U.S. record since September 11 has been uniquely counterproductive. Rather than minimize hostility toward America, Washington adopted a policy—highlighted by launching new wars, killing more civilians, and ravaging additional societies—guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism. **Blowback is everywhere**. Among the worst examples: Iraqi insurgents **mutated into ISIS**, which wreaked military havoc throughout the Middle East and turned to terrorism.

#### C. Terrorism causes global nuclear war—collapses internal AND external stability

Arguello and Buis, 18 – \*Irma, Founder and Chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation (Non-proliferation for Global Security), degree in Phyisics Science from the University of Buenos Aires, Master degree in Business Administration from IDEA/Wharton School, Defense and Security studies (Master level) at the Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Argentina; \*\*Emiliano, lawyer and associate professor of public international law, international humanitarian law, international law of disarmament, and the origins of international law in antiquity (Irma Arguello & Emiliano J. Buis, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812)

But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

#### 3] 1AC Brands says heg solves prolif:

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

#### Prolif solves war – no way they get a new terminal lol

Cohen, PhD, ‘17

(Michael D., PoliSci@BritishColumbia, SeniorLecturerSecurityStudies@Macquarie, “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism,” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 23, Issue 3-4) BW

But there is a systematic effect of experience with nuclear weapons on the conflict propensity of states. The Soviet Union stopped challenging the status quo in Berlin and Cuba after 1963. The number of fatalities from terrorist violence in Kashmir in 2012 was almost that of 1989.83 Mao never again challenged Soviet forces after the 1969 Zhenbao conflict. Recent quantitative studies have also concluded that experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear powers. Most quantitative scholarship concludes that nuclear proliferation does not lead to conventional conflict because quantitative tests showed no relationship between these variables.84 States that develop nuclear weapons are highly conflict prone, so a high propensity for conflict likely causes nuclear-weapon development and further conflict.85 But statistical research has ignored the role of experience with nuclear weapons. Temporally disaggregating the effect of nuclear proliferation on state conflict uncovers a robust correlation between nuclear-weapon proliferation, experience, and international dispute behavior.

University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then decreases over time.

The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states. Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear states.86

University of California-San Diego’s Erik Gartzke conducted a similar statistical test when the dependent variable was dispute initiation rather than reciprocation and found similarly robust results.87 Gartzke found that, while the overall effect of nuclear proliferation on conflict propensity is neutral, there is variation in the effect of proliferation over time. Nuclear proliferation influences the timing, rather than the occurrence, of disputes. While new nuclear states are prone to initiate militarized disputes, over time they moderate their policies and become as likely to initiate disputes as they were before nuclear proliferation.88 These effects wash out in statistical tests that do not control for experience with nuclear weapons. In short, if Iran and North Korea develop nuclear weapons and challenge their regional status quo, the historical record suggests that they will not do so for long. Thus James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations recently claimed that a nuclear Iran would be most dangerous “at first, when it would likely be at its most reckless.” But, “like other nuclear aspirants before them, the guardians of the theocracy might discover that nuclear bombs are simply not good for diplomatic leverage or strategic aggrandizement.” 89

Conclusion: proliferation pessimism, Iran, and North Korea

Three of the four mechanisms long alleged to make nuclear proliferation cause interstate conflict find little to no empirical support when the endogeneity, omitted-variable bias, and conceptual-confusion issues addressed above are recognized and applied to the evidence. Preventive-war motivations, nonsurvivable arsenals, and organizational logics that lead to accidents do not cause armed conflict. The only mechanism that has systematically led to conflict is conventional aggression by weak revisionists after nuclear proliferation, but a few years of experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear states. By failing to specify how frequently we should observe preventive motivations, their effect on nonsurvivable arsenals, or how organizational logics lead to conflict, accidents, and nuclear war, proliferation pessimist claims are unfalsifiable. Pessimist scholars need to specify how much longer we should observe them not leading to conflict before concluding that their threat has been greatly exaggerated.

The undesirability of nuclear use has prevented scholars from coming to terms with what a more careful and systematic reading of the historical record suggests about the relationship between these mechanisms and conflict. Sagan has argued that proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism reduce incentives to combat proliferation.90 But these same dynamics have led scholars to vastly exaggerate the number of threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. If the greatest danger posed by nuclear proliferation is conventional aggression in the short-term, scholars need to rediscover how deterrence can moderate the high conflict propensity of new nuclear states.91 Arguments about the frequency of nuclear escalation, however, say nothing about its cost. Isn’t the possibility of nuclear escalation on the Korean peninsula, for example, evidence against the arguments made throughout this paper? A few cases of accidental, unintentional, or deliberate nuclear escalation could show that the mechanisms offered by pessimist scholars linking nuclear proliferation and conflict survive the criticisms leveled at them here. A lower bar for the proliferation-pessimist theory to pass might be one case of nuclear escalation. But after seventy years, nuclear weapons have not once led to conflict through the mechanisms addressed here.

This is not the place for a lengthier treatment of how the United States and its allies should deal with the challenges posed by a North Korean (or possible Iranian) nuclear bomb. But the historical record suggests that Israeli, South Korean, and others’ preventive motivations to strike will not lead to military action, and that any strike would likely not escalate to conflict unless the United States or its allies decide to topple the regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang. The nonsurvivability of an Iranian or North Korean arsenal will not tempt others to strike. The arguments made here have contrasting findings for preventive-strike considerations. On the one hand, strikes are less costly than many believe because they rarely cause escalation. On the other hand, strikes are less necessary than many believe because the costs of nuclear proliferation are much lower than usually assumed. Nuclear accidents may occur, but these will likely only cause conventional or nuclear escalation if Tehran or Pyongyang have already attempted to revise their status quo. The historical record also suggests that a few years of experience with the bomb will teach Tehran and Pyongyang the limits of nuclear coercion and that any conflict will stop short of nuclear escalation. Future research should further refine proliferation pessimism and integrate it with optimist perspectives through addressing what causes new nuclear states to moderate their aggression and what policies by the United States and its allies might cause this. An optimistic pessimism toward the spread of nuclear weapons can better come to terms with how and when they lead to interstate conflict and form the basis for better policies to reduce the dangers.

#### Defense-

Post dates theirs – assumes us escalates

#### Decline has popularized restraint – a bipartisan coalition formed to avoid the failures of liberal hegemony

Ashford 21 Emma Ashford is a Senior Fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, September/October 2021, "Strategies of Restraint," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/strategies-restraint> mvp

For nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by a bipartisan consensus: that as the world’s “indispensable nation” and with no competitor, the United States had little choice but to pursue a transformational agenda on the world stage. Over the last few years, however, that consensus has collapsed. A growing chorus of voices are advocating a strategy of restraint—a less activist approach that focuses on diplomatic and economic engagement over military intervention. And they have found a receptive audience.

In that, they have undoubtedly been helped by circumstance: the United States’ failed “war on terror,” the rise of China, and growing partisan polarization at home have all made it clear that U.S. foreign policy cannot simply remain on autopilot. Even those who continue to argue for an interventionist approach to the world typically acknowledge that their strategy must be shorn of its worst excesses. Where restraint was once excluded from the halls of power and confined largely to academic journals, now some of its positions have become official policy.

Although President Donald Trump’s record was defined by dysfunction more than any coherent strategy, he did wind down the war in Afghanistan, raise doubts about the value of U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia, and question the wisdom of military intervention and democracy promotion. President Joe Biden, for his part, has begun withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan, has initiated a review of the United States’ global military posture, and has taken steps to stabilize the U.S.-Russian relationship. In 2019, Jake Sullivan, now Biden’s national security adviser, wrote, “The U.S. must get better at seeing both the possibilities and the limits of American power.” That this sentiment is now openly embraced at the highest levels of government is nothing short of a win for those who have long called for a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.

Yet victory also raises a question: Where do restrainers go from here? With Washington having dialed down the war on terrorism, the most politically popular of their demands has been achieved. Now, they are liable to face an uphill battle over the rest of U.S. foreign policy, such as how to treat allies or what to do about China—issues that have little public salience or on which the restrainers are divided. Although often bundled together by Washington’s foreign policy elites and derided as isolationists, the members of the restraint community include a diversity of voices, running the gamut from left-wing antiwar activists to hard-nosed conservative realists. It should not be surprising that they disagree on much.

If the restraint camp focuses on what divides them rather than what unites them, then it will find itself consumed with internecine battles and excluded from decision-making at the very moment its influence could be at its height. But there is a viable consensus, a path forward for restraint that can achieve the most important goals, alienate the fewest members of the coalition, and win new converts. This more pragmatic strategy, which would entail the gradual lessening of U.S. military commitments, would not achieve the most ambitious of the restrainers’ goals. But it has the best chance of moving U.S. foreign policy in a more secure and more popular direction.

A DEBATE REBORN

The idea that the United States is uniquely qualified to reshape the world has manifested itself in different ways in the 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of a bipolar world. Humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion, and counterterrorism—all were attempts to mold the world according to American preferences. Yet the unipolar moment has largely failed to live up to expectations. Today, democracy is in decline, there are more state-level conflicts than at any time since 1990, the war on terrorism has largely failed, and China’s rise has given the lie to the notion that the United States can prevent the emergence of peer competitors. Washington’s foreign policy community now appears to accept the need for a course correction, although it remains divided on the specifics.

Today, opinion is increasingly coalescing around three distinct views. The first of these is a modified form of liberal internationalism, the school of thought that believes that U.S. leadership is a stabilizing force in the world, emphasizes militarized deterrence, and has faith in a liberal, rules-based international order. Proponents of this approach often frame threats from China and Russia as threats to this order rather than as threats to concrete U.S. security interests. Yet the strain of this view dominant today is also, at least in theory, a softer, reformed version of the post–Cold War consensus, one that takes into account critiques of recent U.S. foreign policy and rejects parts of the war on terrorism.

Because they are more aware of the limits of American power than their predecessors, advocates of this view are best described as liberal internationalists, rather than liberal interventionists. The scholars Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Lissner—both of whom now serve on the National Security Council—belong to this camp. As they wrote in these pages in 2019, “Rather than wasting its still considerable power on quixotic bids to restore the liberal order or remake the world in its own image, the United States should focus on what it can realistically achieve.”

Restrainers have not offered a coherent alternative to today’s foreign policy.

Another alternative has percolated out of the synthesis of the Republican foreign policy establishment and the Trump administration: a form of belligerent unilateralism that prioritizes maintaining U.S. military primacy. This “America first” approach to the world is also a clear successor to the old consensus, but one that privileges power over diplomacy and U.S. interests over a liberal order. Like their liberal internationalist counterparts, the America firsters—both Trump administration alumni and more mainstream Republican foreign policy hands—have absorbed the notion that U.S. foreign policy has become unpopular, particularly among the GOP base. They have therefore shifted from democracy promotion and nation building toward a militarized global presence more akin to classic imperial policing.

They also reject some of the core liberal components of the old consensus, spurning diplomacy and arms control, fetishizing sovereignty, and preferring American solutions to global problems over multilateral solutions. For them, the liberal order is a mirage. As Nadia Schadlow, a veteran of the Trump White House, wrote in these pages in 2020, “Washington must let go of old illusions, move past the myths of liberal internationalism, and reconsider its views about the nature of the world order.”

Both approaches to the world are still problematic. A rebooted liberal internationalism may succeed at rehabilitating the United States’ image, but it is unlikely to advance democracy or build a unified liberal order through nonmilitary means when military ones have failed. And as the global balance of power shifts, liberal internationalism simultaneously overestimates the contributions that U.S. allies can make to collective defense and underestimates the differences they have with Washington. The “America first” approach, for its part, may yield short-term dividends—Trump, after all, was able to force U.S. allies to abide by sanctions on Iran and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement—but it has diminishing returns. The more the United States uses coercive tools against other countries, the more they will look for ways to blunt those tools. And both approaches lean heavily on a forward U.S. military presence in ways that could all too easily trigger an unplanned conflict, particularly in Asia.

The remaining alternative, restraint, comes from outside the Washington policymaking world and is largely focused on these flaws. It is far more ideologically diverse than the other two, but most restrainers agree on several core principles. They share a conviction that the United States is a remarkably secure nation, that unlike many great powers in history, it faces no real threat of invasion, thanks to geography and nuclear weapons. They argue that U.S. foreign policy has been characterized in recent years by overreach and hubris, with predictably abysmal results. And they think U.S. foreign policy is overmilitarized, with policymakers spending too much on defense and too quickly resorting to force. Most important, advocates of restraint strike directly at the notion of the United States as the indispensable nation, considering it instead as but one among many global powers.

RESTRAINT’S MOMENT

The most common slap at restrainers is that they focus too much on criticism without offering plausible policy alternatives. That is not an entirely accurate evaluation; individual proponents of restraint have offered detailed prescriptions for everything from the war in Afghanistan to U.S.-Russian relations. But it is true that restrainers have often focused on what draws them together—namely, their shared criticisms of the status quo—rather than what would pull them apart: the question of which specific policies to implement instead. As restraint enters the mainstream conversation, the distinctions within this group are coming to the surface.

Restraint contains several different overlapping ideas. The first (and best defined) of these is an academic theory of grand strategy formulated by the political scientist Barry Posen in his 2014 book, Restraint. His version of restraint envisages a much smaller military based primarily within the United States. Other restrainers—such as the international relations theorists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt—advocate a grand strategy of offshore balancing, a distinct but related approach that also calls for downsizing the United States’ global military role. (The distinction between the two is one of degree: Posen backs an entirely offshore military presence, whereas Mearsheimer and Walt admit that the United States may occasionally need to intervene to keep a hostile state from dominating a key region.) As grand strategies, both leave many granular policy details unstated, but they present internally coherent and fully formulated approaches to the world.

There is also a looser definition of “restraint.” Increasingly, the term is Washington shorthand for any proposal for a less militarized and activist foreign policy. That includes those put forth not just by academic realists but also by progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans in Congress, as well as various antiwar groups (such as Code Pink and the Friends Committee on National Legislation) and newer entrants into the antiwar space (such as the veterans’ group Common Defense). Thus, the term “restraint” is now used as often to signify this broader political movement as it is to describe a grand strategy.

Any movement that includes Mearsheimer and Code Pink is by necessity a big tent, and indeed, there are many motivations for restraint. For some, it might be a moral consideration: many libertarians believe that war grows the state, and anti-imperialists want to rein in what they see as an overbearing military-industrial complex. For others, the motivation is financial: although conservative deficit hawks are far less vocal on defense than on other issues, they exist, and many progressives and even some mainstream Democrats view cuts to military spending as an easy way to free up resources for infrastructure or social programs. For others in the restraint community, it is personal: some of the recent activism around ending the war on terrorism has been driven by veterans who are concerned about what the conflict has done to their fellow soldiers and to American society writ large. Then there are the strategists, for whom the pursuit of restraint is largely about avoiding the failures and risks of the current approach. There are even those who might be called “restraint-curious,” people who are open to a more restrained foreign policy on specific issues but reject the broader notion.

The result is a coalition that—much like its opposition—is broad and bipartisan, a partnership of the left and the right in which the two sides don’t agree with each other on much else. Consider the congressional activism around ending U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, a movement that was spearheaded by two liberals, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont and Senator Chris Murphy, a Democrat from Connecticut, and two Republicans, Senators Rand Paul of Kentucky and Mike Lee of Utah. Or consider the strange bedfellows made by the war in Afghanistan. In the House of Representatives, advocates of withdrawal included Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, the standard-bearer of the Democratic Party’s left wing, and Matt Gaetz of Florida, a Republican devotee of Trump. The transpartisan nature of the coalition pushing for restraint is one of its core strengths.

#### Power transitions cause retrenchment and peace, not war.

MacDonald and Parent, PhDs in Political Science, 20

(Paul K., Columbia, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, and Joseph M., Columbia, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, The Authors Respond, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 20(2): 176-179) BW

How do great powers respond to decline? Do they tend to embrace policies that raise the risk of war with rising challengers? These were the core questions that we set out to answer in our book Twilight of the Titans. We focused on these questions because there is a growing consensus among many policymakers and pundits that shifts in relative power are particularly perilous. In an influential 2015 Atlantic Monthly article, for example, the political scientist Graham Allison argued that “war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not” (Allison 2015; 2017). In 2017, Allison reportedly briefed these findings, which are derived from his accounting of sixteen historical power transitions, to Trump’s National Security Council (Crowley 2017). For better or worse, academic arguments about rising and falling powers are helping to shape contemporary Sino-American relations. Probably for worse, because the marquee finding in our book is that power transition theory is wrong. Ordinal transitions between rising and declining powers tend to be less—rather than more—conflict prone. The main reason why this is the case is because great powers tend to respond to decline not by lashing out against their rising rivals, but by adopting policies of strategic retrenchment. These policies do not always work, and different structural conditions can make it easier or harder for declining powers to use retrenchment to effectively manage decline. Yet to the extent that hawks in the United States are drawing on power transition theory to advocate for “confronting” a rising China or for a strategy of “great power competition,” these policy recommendations are based on flimsy intellectual foundations. We appreciate the care with which all three of the reviewers have engaged with the arguments and evidence we present in our book. All three seem to accept the basic conclusion: that the impending Sino-American power transition may be turbulent, but that conflict is less likely than not. Yet there are some important areas of dispute. One concerns what the chief source of grand strategy is and how that will affects great power relations. Along with Robert Ross, we tend to rely on structural material factors, while David Kang and Ketian Zhang rely more on domestic and/or non-material factors. The other concerns how conflictual the rise of China will be. Ironically, although we tend to share Ross’s analytical focus on systemic factors, we reach a much more optimistic conclusion about the extent to which conditions in the Asia-Pacific are “ripe for rivalry” (Friedberg 1993). Let us start with the question of what shapes grand strategy. Our book follows realist theory and argues that actors in international politics, typically states, are primarily interested in their security and survival. This is precisely why states tend to be alarmed by relative decline, because it exposes them to potential harm. Yet beyond this simple and spare assumption, we accept that states can define their security needs in a wide variety of ways, and that culture, history, and domestic politics can matter a great deal in how they do so. Here we are in complete agreement with Kang that one should not “unproblematically assume that all states are the same in the contemporary world.” He is absolutely right to be frustrated that international relations scholars know much more about European than Asian history, a regrettable legacy of imperialism and the Cold War, which is getting better too slowly. We accept that China’s conception of its security needs and its role in the Asia-Pacific region will inevitably be shaped by cultural and historical legacies, the same way that Britain’s tradition of “splendid isolation” or French conceptions of “grandeur” influenced their grand strategic responses in the cases we explore in our book. Indeed, although our research finds that shifts in relative power are among the most important factors shaping great power grand strategies, we note that the correlation is imperfect. States routinely retrench less than we expect given the depth of their declines, to highlight one notable exception (pp. 53–55). The question for contemporary US–Chinese relations is the extent to which historical or cultural differences override structural conditions or make it simply impossible to compare cases of rising and declining powers. Here we disagree with Kang that China’s experience is not just distinctive, but fundamentally sui generis. It may be true that “the historical East Asian system was hegemonic,” and that as a result, Chinese foreign policy was traditionally oriented more towards monitoring hierarchic relationships rather than managing shifts in the balance of power. Yet British grand strategy was likewise obsessed with questions of imperial management, while the expansion and contraction of contested frontiers were central preoccupations of Russian grand strategy. Similarly, it may well be the case that East Asian history highlights “the dangers of internal challenges rather than external threats.” Yet French policymakers grappled with a rising Germany amidst a contested transition from royalism to republicanism, while domestic unrest and parliamentary protest provided a fatal backdrop for late-tsarist responses to decline. Great powers are inevitably preoccupied with a range of competing concerns—external threats, imperial entanglements, domestic difficulties—all of which are impacted by decline in different ways to varying degrees. Zhang’s core contention is that the making of grand strategy is more complex than we allow for in the book. She notes that there are multiple ways to measure “rising” and “declining,” that grand strategies are sometimes too complex to capture with a single word such as “retrenchment,” and that diplomatic or economic interests can often trump security concerns. We acknowledge all of these points and do our best to defend our choices in the text. We choose one way to measure decline (relative great power share of GDP) and focus on a particular moment of decline (five year windows around an ordinal transition) not because these are the only measures or moments that matter, but because they match those of power transition theorists and are easiest to implement (pp. 5–6, 45–48). We classify and compare grand strategies based on their relative ambition—do they trend towards expansion or retrenchment—not because this is the only or necessarily the best way to think about grand strategy, but because questions of the bearing burdens and managing costs tend to be particularly salient during moments of decline (pp. 6–9, 48–50). Zhang is certainly correct that there are broader shifts in the character of international politics that may mute our findings. Perhaps globalization has fundamentally transformed the boundaries in which great power competition can take place, thereby rendering the concerns of power transition theorists obsolete (nuclear weapons, international institutions, and the spread of democracy are often cited as having a similar pacifying effect). We try to account for this in our discussion of the “conquest calculus”: when it is harder for states to profit from using force, they will be less likely to choose preventive war in response to decline (pp. 70–71). Yet many of our cases of decline come from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, when these pacifying forces were relatively weak, and yet great powers still tended to favor retrenchment over war (pp. 40–41, 191–192). Even in familiar and favorable cases, the evidence in favor of power transition theory is thin. Now that trade networks, international institutions, democracy, and nuclear weapons have remade the global landscape, the implications of our argument tend to be more optimistic. Decline is not destiny, and great powers have considerable latitude to manage power transitions using retrenchment, even in seemingly unfavorable circumstances. We were surprised, therefore, that Ross finds our account “especially pessimistic” about the future of Sino-American relations. Ross is right that some of the conditions we emphasize may make the United States reluctant to retrench, notably the United States’ unwillingness to surrender preeminence and the apparent absence of regional allies who are willing or able to balance against a rising China. Nevertheless, there are other conditions that appear to favor accommodation and retrenchment: vast distances separate the two biggest powers; the conquest calculus appears to favor the defense; American security commitments are relatively independent, easing worries about falling dominos; and the United States is falling gradually, which leaves time for experimentation an

d for reforms to bear fruit (pp. 197–198). We concur with Ross’s observation about the importance of geography, which can mute incentives to use force and provide opportunities for retrenchment (pp. 39–41). Still, we think these opportunities are not unique to maritime environments. In the 1880s, the vast and dispersed character of Russia’s imperial commitments provided it with opportunities to pull back from exposed frontiers while reinforcing key strongpoints. Declining powers often see retrenchment not as a strategy that sacrifices security, but as a means to bolster deterrence and protect vital interests. If so, then the United States was wise to reorient its defense priorities and devote an increasing share of its resources to the Pacific. As for applications, we would like to consider two: balancing and signaling. Kang builds the case that Asian states are not balancing against China because China is not a threat, is working to reassure its neighbors, and by implication does not much threaten the United States. In contrast, we believe that Kang is excessively optimistic about the intensity of the security dilemma in Asia. At root, balance of power theory proposes that, in a self-help world, great powers generally balance against each other mostly by strengthening their own capabilities; for weaker actors, however, their behaviors are more variable. This is exactly what Kang’s Figure 1 shows and exactly what American policymakers fear: China balancing against the United States and most Asian states failing to balance against China. This has led to a rebalancing of US forces to the Asia-Pacific and increasingly fraught relations between the two superpowers. Moreover, and rather than being a sui generis feature of East Asia, this trend is also consistent with historical practice. Our data suggest that rising powers tend to increase defense spending at a faster rate than other great powers, but that they also tend to negotiate more alliance agreements and to get involved in fewer militarized disputes (pp. 64–66). Rising powers often invest in and modernize their militaries, yet also go out of their way to reassure their neighbors. This is a classic balance of power dynamic: great power poles repel each other as weaker states caught in between are generally swept into one orbit or another. Oddly enough, this allows us to close on an ungloomy note. Zhang has pervasive worries about signaling. What if kindness is mistaken for weakness and US defensive measures signal a lack of resolve? We hope our work can dampen some of these anxieties. Over more than a century, the complexities of power and statecraft have changed. In markedly worse circumstances than those in the contemporary Asia-Pacific, great powers have risen and fallen, made contradictory statements, and pursued contradictory policies, yet across many measures, and controlling for many confounding factors, moments of power transition have tended to be peaceful. For all their manifest imperfections, great powers generally sense power trends accurately, and exchange signals as intended, which has powerfully contributed to peace. While this is no reason for complacency—deterrence can break down, reassurance can fail, historical legacies can cast long shadows—it is no reason for undue alarm either. Contra Allison, the United States and China are not trapped in the same old story of war and change; they remain coauthors of their future.

#### Scenario Defense

#### Empirics go neg – most qualified studies disprove hegemonic stability theories.

Fettweis 17 –Christopher J. Fettweis is an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies” 26:3, 423-451; EG)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, **but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.** Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not**. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. **US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse.** In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. **In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.** In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended Table 1. Post-Cold War US intervention and violence by region. High Violence Low Violence High US Intervention Middle East Europe South and Central Asia Pacific Rim North America Low US Intervention Africa South America Former Soviet Union in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### Leadership

#### Chinese leadership solves existential threats.

Yamei 18 Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, <http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491>

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced*.* The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous statein such key areas as global economic governance and climate change*.* Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics*.* The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily*.* All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other *civilizations.* So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations.

Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced**.** China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.