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#### Settlerism is an everyday process shaped by affective investments in institutions that claim jurisdiction over native land.

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In Walden (1854), Henry David Thoreau offers a vision of personhood divorced from the state, characterizing his experience of “Nature” during his time at Walden Pond as providing him with a sense of his own autonomous embodiment and a related set of ethical resources that enable him to reject the demands of contemporary political economy.1 The invocation of “Nature” appears to bracket the question of jurisdiction, opening into a different conceptual and phenomenological register that displaces the problem of locating oneself in relation to the boundaries of the state. However, the very feeling that one has moved beyond geopolitics, that one has entered a kind of space that suspends questions of sovereignty or renders them moot, depends on the presence of an encompassing sovereignty that licenses one’s access to that space. If the idea of “Nature” holds at bay the question of jurisdiction so as to envision a kind of place for cultivating a selfhood that can oppose state logics/politics, it also effaces the ways that experience/vision of personhood itself may arise out of the legal subjectivities put in play by the jurisdictional claiming/clearing of that space as against geopolitical claims by other polities, specifically Native peoples. Thoreau offers an example of how settlement – the exertion of control by non-Natives over Native peoples and lands – gives rise to modes of feeling, generating kinds of affect through which the terms of law and policy become imbued with a sensation of everyday certainty. This affective experience productively can be characterized as an instantiation of what more broadly may be characterized as settler common sense. The phrase suggests the ways the legal and political structures that enable non-Native access to Indigenous territories come to be lived as given, as simply the unmarked, generic conditions of possibility for occupancy, association, history, and personhood. Addressing whiteness in Australia, Fiona Nicoll argues that “rather than analysing and evaluating Indigenous sovereignty claims…, we have a political and intellectual responsibility to analyse and evaluate the innumerable ways in which White sovereignty circumscribes and mitigates the exercise of Indigenous sovereignty”, and she suggests that “we move towards a less coercive stance of reconciliation with when we fall from perspective into an embodied recognition that we already exist within Indigenous sovereignty”. 2 Addressing the question of how settlement as a system of coercive incorporation and expropriation comes to be lived as quotidian forms of non-Native being and potential, though, may require tactically shifting the analytical focus such that Indigenous sovereignties are not at the center of critical attention, even as they remain crucial in animating the study of settler colonialism and form its ethical horizon. “An embodied recognition” of the enduring presence of settler sovereignty, as well as of quotidian non-Native implication in the dispossession, effacement, and management of indigeneity, needs to attend to everyday experiences of non-relation, of a perceptual engagement with place, various institutions, and other people that takes shape around the policies and legalities of settlement but that do not specifically refer to them as such or their effects on Indigenous peoples. In order to conceptualize the mundane dynamics of settler colonialism, the quotidian feelings and tendencies through which it is continually reconstituted and experienced as the horizon of everyday potentiality, we may need to shift from an explicit attention to articulations of Native sovereignty and toward an exploration of the processes through which settler geographies are lived as ordinary, non-reflexive conditions of possibility. In Marxism and Literature, Raymond Williams argues for the necessity of approaching “relations of domination and subordination” as “practical consciousness” that saturat[es] … the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense.3 Understanding settlement as, in Williams’s terms, such a “structure of feeling” entails asking how emotions, sensations, psychic life take part in the (ongoing) process of realizing the exertion of non-Native authority over Indigenous peoples, governance, and territoriality in ways that saturate quotidian life but are not necessarily present to settlers as a set of political propositions or as a specifically imperial project of dispossession. In the current scholarly efforts to characterize settler colonialism, the contours of settlement often appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality, and in this way, the ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as a set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials slide from view. We need to ask how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian non-Native sensations, inclinations, and trajectories. Moreover, administrative initiatives and legalities become part of everyday normalizations of state aims and mappings but in ways that also allow for an exceeding of state interests that potentially can be turned back against the state, giving rise to oppositional projects still given shape and momentum by the framings that emerge out of the ongoing work of settler occupation – such as in Walden. The essay will close with a brief reading of Thoreau’s text that illustrates how its ethical framing emerges out of, and indexes, everyday forms of settler feeling shaped by state policy but not directly continuous with it. 1. The figure of the vanishing Indian still remains prominent within US popular and scholarly discourses, both explicitly and implicitly. Within this narrative, Native peoples may have had prior claims to the land, but they, perhaps tragically, were removed from the area, or died out, or ceased to be “really” Indian, or simply disappeared at some point between the appearance of the “last” one and the current moment, whenever that may be.4 As against this tendency, scholars who seek to track the workings of settler colonialism face an entrenched inattention to the ways non-Native conceptions and articulations of personhood, place, property, and political belonging coalesce around and through the dispossession of Native peoples and normalization of (the) settler (-state’s) presence on Native lands. Insistence on the systemic quality of such settler seizures, displacements, identifications responds to this relative absence of acknowledgment by emphasizing its centrality and regularity, arguing that the claiming of a naturalized right to Indigenous place lies at the heart of non-Native modes of governance, association, and identity. However, such figurations of the pervasive and enduring quality of settler colonialism may shorthand its workings, producing accounts in which it appears as a fully integrated whole operating in smooth, consistent, and intentional ways across the socio-spatial terrain it encompasses. Doing so, particularly in considering the exchange between the domains of formal policy and of everyday life, may displace how settlement’s histories, brutalities, effacements, and interests become quotidian and common-sensical. Looking at three different models, I want to sketch varied efforts to systemize settler colonialism, highlighting some questions that emerge when they are read in light of issues of process and affect. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay – invasion is a structure not an event.” 5 Offering perhaps the most prominent definition of settler colonialism, Wolfe’s formulation emphasizes the fact that it cannot be localized within a specific period of removal or extermination and that it persists as a determinative feature of national territoriality and identity. He argues that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence”, adding, “Settler colonialism destroys to replace.” 6 Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/period of conquest, however, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society” (390), and “the process of replacement maintains the refractory imprint of the native counter-claim” (389). Yet, when and how do projects of elimination and replacement become geographies of everyday non-Native occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler-Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belonging? In characterizing settlement as a “structure”, “logic”, and a “will”, Wolfe seeks to integrate the multivalent aspects of ongoing processes of non-Native expropriation and superintendence, but doing so potentially sidesteps the question of how official governmental initiatives and framings become normalized as the setting for everyday non-Native being and action in ways that cannot be captured solely by reference to “the murderous activities of the frontier rabble” (392–3).

#### Ideal theory is a form of abstraction away from the material violence of settler colonialism – their view from nowhere is not only useless but actively props up settlerism.

Nichols 13 Nichols, R. (2013). Indigeneity and the Settler Contract today. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 39(2), 165–186. doi:10.1177/0191453712470359 SM

Throughout the 20th century, of course, these ‘high theories’ of human development have come under considerable attack. Although anti-imperial leaders and thinkers from those subject to European colonization had always offered trenchant critiques of the European discourse of progress, and counter-narratives were always available from within European thought, it was not until the 20th century that this counter-discourse began to take hold within Europe itself in any significant way. For instance, one of the first demands of the former colonies in the United Nations was to insist on the removal of references from UN documents to members in terms of ‘civilized’ versus ‘uncivilized’. The reason they gave was that this discourse was a prevailing justification for western imperialism in both its colonial and neo-colonial forms and, by the end of the two world wars – themselves major blows to European pretensions to be the standard of civilization – thousands of people in the West were reading these criticisms and taking them more seriously. And so, combined with various other factors (including the rise of Anglo-American analytic philosophy generally), the historical-anthropology language has largely been displaced by other modes of philosophical reflection – namely, more ‘ideal’ theory. As we also all know, in the early 1970s a particular variant of this formal or ideal theory came to predominate in the western academy. The publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) revived and reactivated the intellectual tradition of social contract theory.3 Political 166 Philosophy and Social Criticism 39(2) Downloaded from psc.sagepub.com at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on March 18, 2015 philosophers after Rawls and Nozick have been generally reluctant to engage in the grand, complex historical and anthropological narratives that characterized the work of, for instance, Hegel and Marx. Instead, they argued that guiding principles for the organization of a just society (and a just relationship between societies) can be generated by abstracting away from the specific historical and cultural conditions of the present. By imagining oneself in (to use Rawls’ parlance) an ‘original position’, behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (i.e. without knowledge of one’s race, gender, culture, social location, etc.), it is possible to determine what first principles would be generally acceptable to all (regardless of the above qualifiers). The notion of an original ‘contract’ between such individuals is thus used as a device of representation to generate a normative theory which can then be used to critically examine actually existing practices. This tradition and mode of philosophical reflection have come to replace the 19th-century historical-anthropological discourse as the prevailing manner in which philosophers and political theorists in the western academy (but especially in Anglo-American countries) analyse the possibility of a just relationship to non-western societies. The purpose of this article is to reflect not only upon the limitations, but more importantly upon the political function of this approach, particularly when it is deployed as a resource for reflection on the political struggles and normative claims of the indigenous peoples in the settler-colonial societies of the Anglo-American world (e.g. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States). In so doing, I hope to present a small slice of a much larger project comprising a genealogy of what I will refer to here asthe ‘Settler Contract’.4 In usingthe term ‘Settler Contract’ I am deliberately playing off of previous work by philosophers and political theorists who have been concerned to show the historical function and development of social contract theory in relation to specific axes of oppression and domination. Two of the most important contributions to this literature are Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract and CharlesMills’TheRacialContract.In Pateman’s 1988 work, she rereadthe canon of western social contract theory in an attempt to demonstrate that the presumptively neutral and ideal accounts of the origins of civil society as presented in the works of, for instance, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, were in fact always (implicitly or explicitly) sexual-patriarchal narratives that legitimized the subordination of women. In 1995, Charles Mills deliberately borrowed from Pateman in his project of unmasking the racial (or, more precisely, whitesupremacist) nature of the contract. There, Mills defined the ‘Racial Contract’ as ... that set of formal or informal agreements or meta-agreements ... between the members of one subset of humans, henceforth designated by (shifting) ‘racial’ (phenotypical/genealogical/cultural) criteria C1, C2, C3 ... as ‘white,’ and coextensive (making due allowance for gender differentiation) with the class of full persons, to categorize the remaining subset of humans as ‘nonwhite’ and of a different and inferior moral status, subpersons, so that they have a subordinate civil standing in the white or white-ruled polities the whites either already inhabit or establish or in transactions as aligns with these polities, and the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behaviour of whites in their dealings with one another either do not apply at all in dealings with nonwhites or apply only in a qualified form.5 Although they have not necessarily used the specific term of art ‘Settler Contract’, for some time now various thinkers have attempted to contribute to an expansion on these Nichols 167 Downloaded from psc.sagepub.com at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on March 18, 2015 themes by demonstrating the ways in which social contract theory has served as a primary justificatory device for the establishment of another axis of oppression and domination: an expropriation and usurpation contract whereby the constitution of the ideal civil society is premised upon the extermination of indigenous peoples and/or the displacement of them from their lands. I will use the term ‘Settler Contract’ to refer to the strategic use of the fiction of a society as the product of a ‘contract’ between its founding members when it is employed in these historical moments to displace the question of that society’s actual formation in acts of conquest, genocide and land appropriation.6 The Settler Contract’s reactivation is used not to deny the content of specific indigenous peoples’ claims, but rather to shift the register of argumentation to a highly abstract and counter-factual level, relieving the burden of proof from colonial states. In such a case, the original contract between white colonial settlers thus ‘simultaneously presupposes, extinguishes, and replaces a state of nature. A settled colony simultaneously presupposes and extinguishes a terra nullius.’ 7 The Settler Contract then refers to the dual legitimating function of the philosophical and historical-narrative device of the ‘original contract’ as the origins of societal order: first, by presupposing no previous indigenous societies and second, by legitimizing the violence required to turn this fiction into reality. Although the Settler Contract has obvious similarities and points of overlap with the Racial Contract, and is constituted in gendered and sexualized practices, it is analysable as a distinct axis since it pertains more to issues related to land appropriation and the subordination of previously sovereign polities and societies. My specific contribution here is twofold. First, I am interested in expanding the scope of these critical genealogies to include the mode of argumentation or style of reasoning endemic to social contract theory. In order to explain what I mean by this it is helpful to look to a point of difference between Pateman and Mills. Although Charles Mills sees the actual historical instantiation of contract theory as implicated in white supremacy, he nevertheless argues that the form or model of reasoning it represents can be ‘modified and used for emancipatory purposes’.8 Mills argues that the language of an ideal contract that constitutes society ‘serves a useful heuristic purpose – it’s a way of dramatizing the original social contract idea of humans choosing the principles that would regulate a just society’.9 This is why Mills described his work as a contribution to that long struggle to ‘close the gap between the ideal of the social contract and the reality of the Racial Contract’.10 Carole Pateman, on the other hand, has argued that the theoretical device of an appeal to the ‘ideal’ contract is itself inherently problematic. This is because Pateman, unlike Mills, sees contract theory as requiring the ‘fiction’ of property in the person. This theoretical presupposition is, according to Pateman, necessarily enabling of domination and oppression. She writes: Property in the person cannot be contracted out in the absence of the owner. If the worker’s services (property) are to be ‘employed’ in the manner required by the employer, the worker has to go with them. The property is useful to the employer only if the worker acts as the employer demands and, therefore, entry into the contract means that the work becomes a subordinate. The consequence of voluntary entry into a contract is not freedom but superiority and subordination.11 168 Philosophy and Social Criticism 39(2) Downloaded from psc.sagepub.com at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on March 18, 2015 Although Pateman’s more radical and comprehensive critique of social contract theory is instructive here, my contribution is different still. While I agree in general with Pateman’s assessment of the inherently problematic nature of contract theory, my aim is to bring to light another facet of this, one specifically related to colonization. As I will discuss in more length below, I am concerned to show how the appeal to an ‘ideal’ original contract, even as a heuristic device for the generating of ‘first principles’, serves to displace questions of the historical instantiation of actual political societies and domains of sovereignty and, as such, has served and continues to serve the function of justifying ongoing occupation of settler societies in indigenous territory. To do this, I draw upon a Foucaultian distinction between historico-political vs philosophico-juridical discourses of sovereignty and right as a means of complementing and augmenting previous work on the Settler Contract. Furthermore, I argue that the philosophico-juridical discourse of the Settler Contract has its origins – both in historical time and as an event repeated in contemporaneous time – at the moment in which the weight of the past cannot be borne. Contract theory can therefore be studied not merely in terms of the content of its claims (i.e. true or false depictions of indigenous peoples), but in terms of its strategic function in relieving the burden of the historical inheritance of conquest. When read in light of this function, I argue, contract theory emerges as an inherently problematic framework for the adjudication of indigenous claims and, moreover, for the establishment of a non-colonial relationship between indigenous peoples and settler-colonial societies. This also means, however, that unlike Pateman and Mills, I am less interested in the specific content of, for instance, the racist and demeaning depictions of indigenous peoples as pre-political ‘savages’ in the works of contract theorists since it is my claim that even independent of any specifically negative portrayal of indigenous peoples within such work, social contract theory is still a vehicle for the displacement of such peoples, conceptually and in actual historical fact. In fact, I want to argue, it is in those places where contract theory is at its most abstract (purportedly neutral and non-evaluative) that it often functions most effectively as a strategy of settler-colonial domination. The second contribution to this discussion I would like to make is to demonstrate how this form of theory continues to function today with respect to the claims of indigenous peoples. Thus, I am also less concerned here with the historical figures of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant than Pateman or Mills, and more interested in those contemporary thinkers who explicitly work in this tradition – philosophers such as John Rawls, Robert Nozick and, the focus of this article, Jeremy Waldron. A few caveats before I proceed. First, it is not my claim that contemporary thinkers such as Rawls, Nozick, or Waldron necessarily intend to facilitate the logic of the Settler Contract (though I do not rule out this possibility either). I am not primarily interested in what specific authors intend to do with their arguments, but rather with how a specific rhetorical structure or style of argumentation shapes the discursive space such that certain outcomes appear as the logical or necessary conclusion to an argument when, in fact, the debate has been skewed in this direction by the point of departure itself. Second, I acknowledge that my selection of authors is non-comprehensive. I have chosen here to focus on Jeremy Waldron’s recent application of the social contract tradition to the claims of indigenous peoples. This is in part because (as I said at the outset) this particular article is merely one small slice of a much larger genealogy. But it is also in Nichols 169 Downloaded from psc.sagepub.com at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on March 18, 2015 part because Waldron represents a kind of ‘exemplary figure’ here. One of the difficulties in examining contemporary analytic contract philosophy as it relates to indigenous claims is that, overwhelmingly, philosophers working within this tradition do not consider such questions at all. Jeremy Waldron is a major exception to this rule. Since Waldron explicitly locates his work within the tradition descending from Hobbes and Locke, through Kant to Rawls and Nozick, and because Waldron’s influential and prominent role as legal scholar enmeshes his work closely with the juridical apparatus that actually adjudicates indigenous claims in Anglo-settler societies, and finally, because Waldron (a New Zealander of European descent) takes up the question of ‘indigeneity’ so directly and seriously, it seems appropriate to take him as an exemplar of the attempt to reformulate some modified version of analytic contract theory in relation to indigenous peoples.

#### Settler colonialism is deeply engrained in Western culture and reflects in the universalist logic of non-naturalistic ethics – their philosophy gets appropriated to justify extermination of Indigenous peoples because of its cultural starting point.

John **Hinkinson** – Editor at Arena, an Australian maganzine. “Why Settler Colonialism?” Arena. 20**12**. https://arena.org.au/why-settler-colonialism/ JJN

Settler colonialism as a practice is a subset of colonial history, one where the colonial relationship converts into a very specific cultural practice. It is where the ‘settler culture’ seeks a permanent place in the colonial setting and, as such, enters an unrelenting cultural logic of misrecognition and blindness towards the cultural other, issuing in acts of objective cruelty and cultural destruction. Because this relationship is based in cultures, which are prior to the individual (while simultaneously forming the individual), it is a relationship that is especially difficult to put aside. Empirically speaking, there are many such examples in history, many arising in the period of Western Empire associated with modernity and expansionism in the New World. Settler colonialism as a field illuminates the history of these myriad examples while bridging into accounts of contemporary expressions of the settler phenomenon, from the continued cultural suppression arising out of nineteenth-century Empire (in Africa, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, for example) to twentieth-century expressions in Palestine. If settler colonialism is to develop as a field of critical study it needs to include but go far beyond empirical accounts simply framed by an ethic of cultural justice. To do this it is necessary to develop a theory and account of how settler colonialism as a practice is based culturally. And this will require a broader frame of reference than the specific localities of settler-colonial practice, a broader frame that shows how this phenomenon is an effect of power based in attitudes to other cultures more generally. For it is arguable that the settler-colonial attitude derives from a widespread cultural politics set within a larger frame, one which the world today assumes, rather than reflexively knows or seeks to reform. This is to speak of a continuing imperialist attitude expressed in a view of other cultures that has little respect for those cultures’ core assumptions. There are crude expressions of this lack of cultural empathy, but there are also ‘high’ expressions, such as those embodied in the universalist philosophy of the West. For high universalism, the emancipatory principle is argued to be beyond all specific cultures and, as such, superior to all of them. Recent US adventures in the Middle East come to mind, where the invocation of ‘freedom’ has become a sign of disrespect for the complex cultures of the region. Imposed ‘freedom’ has devastating effects. Common to these expressions is a deep cultural blindness associated with modernity that is unable to view other cultures empathically or engage them in informed, reciprocal cultural interchange. Rather, knowledge of such cultures has predominantly developed instrumentally as a means to domination. These relations of cultural power at a more general level both generate the settler colonial relationship and reflexively feed off its effects. As John Gray remarks in his Black Mass, the Enlightenment is responsible for many racist policies, especially towards colonized peoples. Enlightenment philosophers have a special responsibility, as is seen in the case of Locke: John Locke was a Christian committed to the idea that humans are created equal, but he devoted a good deal of intellectual energy to justifying the seizure of the lands of indigenous people in America.(8) Other philosophers, including Kant, are mired in much the same logic. The goal of equality within a universal civilization was the prospect, but this could only be achieved by the peoples of the colonies ‘giving up their own ways of life and adopting European ways’.(9) If they did not willingly give up their ways of life, extermination, an idea that was widespread, might be entertained. This was not merely a Nazi policy. When H. G. Wells asked himself about the fate of ‘swarms of black and yellow and brown people who do not come into the needs of efficiency’, he replied: ‘Well, the world is not a charitable institution, and I take it they will have to go’.(10) John Gray goes on: Nazi policies of extermination … drew on powerful currents in the Enlightenment and used as models policies in operation in many countries, including the world’s leading liberal democracy. Programmes aiming to sterilize the unfit were under way in the United States. Hitler admired these programmes and also admired America’s genocidal treatment of indigenous peoples: he ‘often praised to his inner circle the efficiency of America’s extermination — by starvation and uneven combat — of the “Red Savages” who could not be tamed by captivity’.(11) If there is any doubt about the crucial role of settler colonialism in the power effects of the West one should turn to the recent book by Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands.(12) Here the author confirms that the various plans constructed by Hitler and the Nazi regime for the mass starvation of the Slavs and the Final Solution of the Jews of Eastern Europe were based on settler-colonial assumptions, in particular as expressed in the example of the United States and the conquest of the Native American peoples. Hitler’s plan (the Generalplan Ost) to colonize the Ukraine breadbasket was one that sought to turn back the clock of industrialization in the Soviet Union, deliberately starve unwanted millions of people, introduce German settlers up to the Urals, enslave Slavs where they were deemed to be essential for economic production and push the Jews of Eastern Europe beyond the Urals into Asia. While the plan was quickly frustrated in its detail by the resistance of the Soviets, Hitler’s plan is nevertheless illustrative of crucial background assumptions and elaborations of notions of ‘development’. For Hitler, Colonization would make of Germany a continental empire fit to rival the United States, another hardy frontier state based upon exterminatory colonialism and slave labor. The East was the Nazi Manifest Destiny. In Hitler’s view, ‘in the East a similar process will repeat itself for a second time as in the conquest of America’. As Hitler imagined the future, Germany would deal with the Slavs much as the North Americans had dealt with the Indians. The Volga River in Russia, he once proclaimed, will be Germany’s Mississippi.(13) As suggestive as this material may be, the point is not that of equating the United States with the Nazis. Rather it is to make the more important ethical point about Western powers and Western culture: they are interwoven with practices that take settler colonialism for granted, practices that arguably define the underside of modernity.

#### The alternative is a call for place-based education – this requires relating theorizing to present realities of injustice and acknowledging the ways settler colonialism creates those injustices to ground our strategies and normative theories. The alternative is unconditional and does not fiat anything – since our links are to the 1AC’s framework, it is an alternative metaethic that should be used to derive ethical frameworks that would conclude material decolonization is obligatory. This doesn’t fiat an action so it doesn’t violate the shell.

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As place-based educators have worked to disrupt the norms of schooling, they have started to examine the normative conception of place within the Western knowledge system. This, in turn, has led prominent scholars of place to sug- gest that the dominant understanding of place exists in an abstract capacity that subordinates place to simplistic conceptualizations of land as divorced from the personal and ontological. David Orr (2005) is emblematic of this perspective when he suggests, “Place has no particular standing in contemporary education” (87); all places have been relegated to “‘real estate’ or mere natural resources, their larger economic, ecological, social, political, and spiritual possibilities lost to the purely and narrowly utilitarian” (89). Western epistemology, and subsequently Western schooling, has come to be seen as placeless (Greenwood 2009, 2013a; Marker 2006; Orr 2005; Sobel 2004). Marking the Western concept of place as “narrowly utilitarian” is rooted in an accurate understanding of the distorted realities imposed by capitalism, but I argue that Western epistemology is not placeless and that, in addition to the distorted values of capitalism, place operates in a more significant capacity by shaping and influencing the self. Place, as it is articulated through a Western knowledge system, intersects with a social epistemology that normalizes domination through systems of white supremacy, settler colonialism, heteropatriarchy, and anthropocentrism, among other modes of domination. As a result, these epistemic norms curate conceptions of place, and come to bear on the way one knows oneself, others, and one’s relation to the natural world. Emerging from this normalized epistemological context, this article focuses on how Western social epistemologies constitute places in relation to the raced, classed, and gendered ontological possibilities embedded in the dominant knowl- edge system. Of particular interest is the method by which this oppressive epis- temology formulates an ideal social actor, an ideal social being that mirrors and reinforces the cognitive, moral, material, and spiritual norms of the operative modes of domination. In this article, I pay specific attention to how this formula- tion of the ideal social actor is established upon a particular conception of place that is integral in perpetuating domination. This article is rooted in the idea that to envision a better and more just fu- ture, the nuances and reality of systemically imposed oppression and violence must be understood. Jose ́ Medina (2013) offers an example of a similar guid- ing principle in The Epistemology of Resistance, in which he uses an approach to epistemology that emerges from an understanding that the prevailing social episte- mology operates from a normalized injustice. Medina explains, “If our normative theories should start where we are, in medias res, we should start our theorizing by reflecting on the details of the actual injustices that surround us, rather than by speculating what a perfect justice might be. We need a theory of injustice more than a theory of justice” (12, emphasis in original). In response, Medina argues that epistemologies of resistance must be cultivated through critical understand- ings of how injustice is epistemically proliferated across social systems and must begin with a structural account of domination. This article harbors a parallel spirit, and seeks to elucidate the epistemic mechanics of white supremacy and settler colonialism, to consider the possibilities of building resistance, and to encourage critical epistemic interrogation and introspection in place-based education. Place is an appropriate point of departure for this critical epistemic interroga- tion because inherent to place-based models of learning is epistemic challenge—a shifting of perspective that dares to see and understand the world around us in new ways (Gruenewald 2003). Critical epistemic shifts can move conceptions of place beyond simplistic visions of geography and flattened understandings of the land or the environment to a point where the soil, streams, and multitudes of beings engaged in complex relationships can be seen on their own terms outside of economic utility. Following the path set by many place-based scholars, I also see critical potential in place (Basso 1996; Cajete 1994, 1999; Greenwood 2013a, 2013b; Kawagley and Barnhardt 1999; Pen ̃a 1998). We all exist in place and we are all engaged in a subtle process of place-making: constituting and defining the places we exist in (Basso 1996), and thus the potential of place-based learning to encourage a shift in awareness towards our most intimate environments. As this article suggests, such an epistemic shift can be pushed further to incorporate a critical awareness of how place intersects with race, gender, and colonialism. How- ever, epistemic interrogation cannot only be comprised of an individual critically engaging structural aspects of epistemology. Interrogation must also forefront a process of “self-estrangement” (Medina 2013, 19), in which epistemic positional- ity is located, and an individual seeks awareness of their relationship to epistemic structures and matrices of power. Accordingly, place-based inquiry needs to more thoroughly engage the complex epistemic relationship between modes of domi- nation, conceptions of the natural world, and the politics of self. The structural epistemologies that influence conceptions of the self are not only enmeshed with white supremacy and settler colonialism. As has been pointed out by many scholars, educators and activists, to truly understand domination it must be seen in its entirety, meaning that white supremacy and settler colonialism have to be understood alongside the likes of heteropatriarchy (Smith 2006) and anthropocentrism (Martusewicz, Edmundson, and Lupinacci 2011; Plumwood 2002). Although these modes of domination employ intersecting and mutually invested logics (e.g., a dependence on false dichotomies like man/woman, nature/culture, reason/passion, mind/body; Plumwood 2002), they do not always operate in the same manner, and thus need to be considered on their own terms and according to their epistemic uniqueness (Medina 2013). With that being said, this article’s primary focus is on the structural epistemic interactions between white supremacy, settler colonialism, and place, hence the spotlight on white settler epistemology. I do my best to honestly engage with the complexities inherent to conversations of structure, positionality, and identity, and to acknowledge the concomitant nature between white supremacy and other modes of domination and elucidate these intersections where possible. To build upon the critical possibilities of epistemic interrogation within place- based education, this article examines white settler epistemology in relation to the politics of place and politics of self. To properly situate the role of place within the white settler epistemology, I argue that settler traditions of place are constituted by normative habits and practices that have been passed down for generations, encouraging particular relations to place, and ultimately impacting the contemporary potential of place-based education. Addressing the function of place within both white supremacy and settler colonialism provides a look at some of the nuances of settler traditions of place. The work of John Locke, as an epistemic representative of the West, is analyzed to push the politics of place to incorporate the politics of self. Locke’s theory of land, nature, people, and labor brings to light the racist, sexist, and anthropocentric characteristics and values of the ideal social actor embedded in Western epistemology. There is a radical potential in place-based education to promote productive epistemic friction and interrogation of the epistemic genealogy of the West. However, a critical comprehension of how we are differentially incorporated into epistemic structures is required to fully realize its potential.

#### The discourse of the 1AC is what perpetuates settler traditions that are rooted in the logic of domination – centering Indigenous scholarship and questions of epistemology is your role as a judge

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Situating Settler Traditions Settler traditions of place are an epistemic genealogy—the ethics, logics, and ideologies foundational to a knowledge system that have been passed down across generations, a knowledge framework that establishes what is known (the socially constructed commonsense of a culture), how things come to be known (the process of attaining new knowledge), how the world is to be interpreted according to what is known (the social construction of reality), and how the self is known in relation to perceived reality (the politics of self). Tradition is used as a conceptual tool allowing for domination to be empha- sized as an on-going historical process, while also allowing for epistemology as tradition to simultaneously be evolutionary and a cherished cultural artifact. As a cultural product, settler traditions of place are transmitted across generations through discipline, teaching, modeling and other forms of direct and subtle so- cial communication resulting in normalized habits, beliefs, values, and practices. In speaking about “western cultural traditions,” Val Plumood (2002) argues that there are “epistemic and moral limitations” embedded in these traditions—these normalized habits—that perpetuate hierarchized notions of the world that privi- lege white-hetero-landowning males (99). As Martusewicz et al. (2011) explain, these subtle discourses manifest as taken-for-granted cultural assumptions that are rooted in racism, sexism, classism that intertwine with and reflect the cultivation of violent relationships with the more-than-human world and natural systems that we depend on for life (119). The tradition in question here is the social air that penetrates the Western world, interacting with human beings whether they want it to or not. Using tradition as a metaphor for epistemology allows me to emphasize the way epistemology can im- pact every aspect of life while remaining removed from a deterministic position. Embedded in discourse, tradition appears as ever-present; despite this, individual social actors have the agency to break tradition. Consequently, in the same way that an individual breaks from familial, cultural, or religious tradition and faces the ramifications for transgressing, epistemic transgression can also incur social fallout and cause friction. When an individual epistemically transgresses, they employ an epistemic praxis (the operationalization of an alternative or critical epistemology) that goes against the grain and is counter to the tradition that defines the social environment. For conversations concerning the cultivation of criticality (like the one herein) this break in tradition is absolutely desirable and can inspire what Jose ́ Medina (2013) calls epistemic friction. Epistemic friction is contained in those uncomfortable moments in which our taken-for-granted assumptions about the world begin to crack. These moments can be transformative and cat- alyze critical consciousness to imagine and hopefully actualize an alternative epistemology.

## Case

### Aff Framework

#### Top level framing issues –

#### 1] Every morally repugnant blip in the 1AC is an independent link that they shouldn’t be allowed to kick out of – a refusal to hold the aff accountable for the racist choices they made in the 1AC encourages students to knowingly blip out racist one liners for strategic gain and is a form of settler fluidity

#### 2] You should auto reject any aff FW arg that tries to claim the impacts of the K don’t matter – denying that things like genocide or racism matter makes the debate space unsafe and encourages the development of racist subjectivities – that outweighs – a] accessibility – maintaining a safe environment is a pre requisite to every other impact b] it disproves the conclusion of their theory even if you can’t pinpoint exactly where it fell apart

#### 3] I’m making this clear at the top – I am NOT going to read util and they can NOT extend their util offense – there are two ROBs in the round – kant and the K ROB – and if we win kant is wrong that means you should evaluate the K’s framing which is explicitly not utilitarian and is about the aff’s research project not the consequences of the plan – no 1ar extinction outweighs bullshit

#### AT: Apriori ethics

#### 1] Beginning a priori assumes the position of a disembodied calculator that isn’t accessible to natives who are tied to their identity

#### 2] A priori knowledge can’t exist – if two people disagree about a priori claims you have to devolve to empirical claims to resolve them

#### 3] All of the ideal theory bad args answer this

#### AT: Evil Demon/Descartes

#### The Descartes Paradox is wrong – 1] there’s no way to know if we’re setting our own ends either cuz we could’ve be dreaming about that too 2] Their framework collapses to the empirical world – there’s no way to know whether those resembling agents are agents or moving fleshy objects and therefore whether or not we should respect their agency

#### AT: Inescapability/regress

#### 1] Presupposes we need to keep asking why is this good or bad – even if that process leads us to unconditional human worth, our argument is the decision to avoid regress solves the problem of regress because we can choose to recognize genocide is bad full stop – it’s a trap of western philosophy to claim we need to channel organizing and energy into explaining WHY bad things are bad instead of STOPPING those bad things

#### 2] I can choose to be a smagent – guess its not binding!

#### 3] Tailoring objection – you can tailor your rule to be specific to your circumstances which makes any action or maxim universalizable

#### AT: Is ought gap

#### 1] we can derive ethics from lived experience ie from taking the positionality of those who have violence committed against them – that’s our seawright ev

#### 2] Introspection on the is bridges the gap to the ought – i.e. strong intuitive conceptions that genocide is bad suggests human capacity to identify morality leads to our fw

#### AT: Action Theory

#### Unity of Action is wrong – 1] we can stop dividing at a reasonable point which solves infinite regress 2] turn – intent focus can’t explain substitutability – for example, if I make a promise to mow the grass, intent based theories can’t explain why I have an ethical obligation to stand up or to turn on the mower

#### AT: Universalizability

#### 1] Universal ethics is impossible and violent -- ethics is informed by social location and subject position– a rich white person might have an obligation not to steal but that doesn’t mean someone stealing to feed their family is bad

#### 2] Indigenous people are excluded from their conception of reason – indigenous agency destabilizes settler sovereignty which necessitates the relegation of the native to the nonhuman – the inevitable 1AR pivot to “we recognize ALL agency” is a settler ruse of inclusion that creates cruel optimism in the possibility of Western theory to provide liberation

#### AT: TJFs

#### 1] Reject TJFs – debating under an incorrect FW just because it’s more fair defeats the point of debate cuz the skills of ethical comparison we learn are useless and not applicable in real life – specifically true in the context of a racist FW cuz debating under it creates unethical subjects – that outewighs any marginal fairness skews

#### 2] Turn – rejecting settler colonialism and racism is a pre requisite to accessibility and outweighs any fairness or education concerns – you also don’t need prep to answer Ks and all your offense is solved by just not being racist so you don’t link in the first place

#### 3] Settler violence occurs on a daily basis and is sutured into the land we exist on which makes it predictable

#### 4] Impact weighing is in fact good – it is how we derive deliberative portable skills from debate – impact turns their standard

#### Calc Indicts: We don’t need to answer this because our framework isn’t utilitiarian

#### Infinite consequences – reasonable predictions solve, lack of probability of diverging possibilities reduces important to statistical noise

#### Induction – occams razer solves

#### Action theory – aggregation solves – induction allows condemnation and we can condemn end states

#### Reject act omission distinction – greenlights settler practices – I’m guessing the US government “forgot” to invest in high quality health infrastructure and salination plants in reservations?

#### AT: Farr

#### 1] Farr is wrong – natives have empirically been excluded from those notions of reason – their assumption relies on an ideal world where settlers respect native’s dignity which proves their disconnect from reality

#### 2] They have it backwards – egalitarian inclusionism isn’t social justice, it’s the end goal of the settler project – settlers WANT to bring natives into the fold of universal reason – after all, it means less people who are culturally “native”

#### AT: Korsgaard 92

#### 1] Excludes indigenous peoples whos notions of personal identity are derived in part from the empirical world external to themselves – relationships to land

#### 2] Even if the beliefs and reasons that construct identity are compatible with indigenous cosmologies, the normative rules their framework imposes on all people which we’ve derived links to aren’t

#### 3] The WAY you deliberate isn’t intrinsic to the self- its informed by your experiences and surroundings

### Contention

#### [1] Turn – aliens are also private entities – double bind either [A] they have the ability to reason, so they are able to be considered reasoners in a private entity or [B] they aren’t reasoners, and thus have no control of property rights like how an ant doesn’t own the ground it walks on so appropriation can’t be unjust. Either way that negates – proves that either we need to give aliens the rights they owe or we don’t owe them anything and the aff is arbitrary and restrictive.

#### [2] You aren’t fiating that appropriation is unjust – the resolution is just declaring whether it’s good or bad. Existing laws don’t necessarily prove something just or unjust, just like how being able to get the death penalty for laughing in authoritarian regimes doesn’t mean that laughing is unjust. Regardless of current laws if I win my offense it proves that it’s just and that these laws should be changed.